Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
RANGER CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 15-005535BID (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 30, 2015 Number: 15-005535BID Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2015

The Issue The ultimate issue presented in this part of the bifurcated proceeding is whether the Petition should be dismissed as an untimely protest to the RFP specifications. Subsidiary issues presented are whether any such timeliness defect could be cured by allowing Petitioner to amend its Petition, and whether the points of entry provided to Petitioner with the RFP, as amended, were ineffective to operate as clear points of entry because Respondent did not also post the RFP and addenda amending the RFP on the MyFloridaMarketPlace vendor bid system.

Findings Of Fact By this action, Petitioner seeks to reverse Respondent’s intended decision to award a contract to Intervenor for a design- build project to widen Kanner Highway from four lanes to six lanes over a 4.3 mile stretch in Martin County (the Kanner Highway Project). Instead of awarding a contract to Intervenor, Petitioner contends that Respondent should reject all proposals and conduct a new procurement. Petitioner’s complaint is directed to Respondent’s issuance of one or more addenda as RFP amendments after the three shortlisted vendors submitted technical proposals, but before they submitted price proposals. Adjusted Score Design-Build Process for Kanner Highway Project DOT is the state agency authorized to contract for the construction and maintenance of roads designated as part of the State Highway System, the State Park Road System, and other roads placed under DOT’s supervision by law. § 337.11(1), Fla. Stat. When DOT determines, as it did for the Kanner Highway Project, “that it is in the best interests of the public [to] combine the design and construction phases” of certain projects into a single contract, DOT is authorized to use the design-build contract procurement procedures generally outlined in section 337.11(7) for competitive selection of a design-build firm. Section 337.11(7)(b) authorizes DOT to “adopt by rule procedures” that detail the processes and procedures by which design-build projects are publicly announced, qualified design- build firms are selected to submit bid proposals, and the firm to receive the contract award is selected. DOT’s rules carrying out the authority conveyed in section 337.11(7)(b) are codified in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-91.2/ The solicitation for the Kanner Highway Project began with the posting of a Notice to Contractors/Consultants on DOT’s website, which set forth a general description of the project, identified required submittals, and provided a draft RFP, as specified in rule 14-91.005 (“Public Announcement Procedures”). The notice with draft RFP was first posted on September 22, 2014, on the “planned advertisement” webpage, to give a heads-up to the vendor community that a public announcement was forthcoming for this project. The official announcement was posted on October 6, 2014, on DOT’s design-build “current advertisement” webpage. As required by rule 14-91.005, the posted notice advised that for the Kanner Highway Project, DOT would use the adjusted score design-build (ASDB) process. The notice also described the ASDB process, which is a two-phase process. In the first phase, interested design-build firms were required to file an expanded letter of interest (ELOI) by October 27, 2014, demonstrating their qualifications to perform the work contemplated by the project, as generally described in the notice and preliminarily detailed in the draft RFP. The notice specified the required ELOI contents and supporting documents, the minimum qualification requirements by work class, and the criteria for evaluating and scoring the ELOIs. The notice provided that ELOIs and supporting documents “shall be submitted electronically” in .pdf format attached to a single electronic mail (email) transmission. In turn, each ELOI was to designate and give contact information, including email address, for the design-build firm’s contact person. As authorized by section 337.11(7)(b)9., and rule 14- 91.007(8), the posted notice also provided the criteria by which DOT would pay stipend compensation to certain design-build firms who are not ultimately awarded the contract. Both public announcements (posted on September 22, 2014, and on October 6, 2014), contained the following: Pursuant to Sections 120.57(3) and 337.11, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 28-110, Florida Administrative Code, any person adversely affected by the agency decision or intended decision shall file with the agency both a notice of protest in writing and bond within 72 hours after the posting of the notice of decision or intended decision, or posting of the solicitation with respect to a protest of the terms, conditions, and specifications contained in a solicitation and will file a formal written protest within ten days after the filing of the notice of protest. The required notice of protest and bond, and formal written protest must each be timely filed with the Florida Department of Transportation, Clerk of Agency Proceedings, 605 Suwannee St, Mail Station 58, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458. Failure to file a notice of protest or formal written protest within the time prescribed in section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120 Florida Statutes. There were no notices of protest filed within 72 hours of the posted solicitation, nor formal written protests within 10 days after a notice of protest, to contest the terms, conditions, or specifications in the Kanner Highway Project solicitation. Four design-build firms submitted ELOIs for the Kanner Highway Project, were determined to be responsive, and were scored. The ELOI scores were posted on DOT’s website on the procurement office’s page for design-build selection results. At the top of this webpage, an all-bold point of entry is provided in the same language contained in the public announcement notice. There were no notices of protest filed within 72 hours after the ELOI scoring results were posted, nor any formal written protests within 10 days after a notice of protest. Consistent with rule 14-91.007(2)(a) and the process described in the public announcements, design-build firms whose ELOIs were responsive and scored were required to provide DOT with written affirmation by December 10, 2014, of the firms’ intent to proceed to phase two. Three of the four firms--the three with the best ELOI scores--provided written affirmation: Petitioner, Intervenor, and Prince Contracting, LLC. In accordance with rule 14-91.007(2)(a), those three firms were shortlisted and, thereby, eligible to proceed to phase two, receive the final RFP and addenda, and submit technical and price proposals. For design-build projects using the two-phase ASDB process, the RFP developed by DOT serves the purpose of “furnish[ing] sufficient information for Design-Build Firms to prepare technical and price proposals,” and the RFP is provided only to shortlisted firms, because only the shortlisted firms are eligible to submit technical and price proposals. Fla. Admin. Code R. 14-91.007(2)(a) and (3). Thus, while a “draft” RFP for the Kanner Highway Project was attached to the public announcement posted on DOT’s website, the “final” RFP was not posted on DOT’s website. Instead, DOT followed the procedure in rule 14-91.007(3), by providing the final RFP directly to the three shortlisted firms.3/ As is apparently common practice with design-build procurements, the so-called “final” Kanner Highway Project RFP was not actually final; it was amended by several addenda.4/ RFP addenda are posted on DOT’s website. The Contracts Administration page for design-build projects identifies the addenda by number, and the addenda themselves are linked and can be accessed by clicking on each number. The addenda are also transmitted by email to an email list of contact persons for the shortlisted firms. In addition, each time an addendum is issued that amends the “final” RFP, the entire RFP, as amended, is reissued and transmitted with the same email message. A redlined version of the reissued RFP is also transmitted with the same email message, to highlight the addendum changes and put them in context with the whole RFP. Emails transmitting the Kanner Highway Project addenda, the reissued RFPs as amended by the addenda, and the redlined versions of the reissued RFPs, as amended by the addenda, were sent to the three shortlisted firms with a “high importance” flag and a request to confirm the receipt of the email. Petitioner’s designated representative--its president, Bob Schafer--confirmed in his deposition testimony that this was the procedure followed for the Kanner Highway Project. Mr. Schafer confirmed that Petitioner received the emails transmitting each of the six addenda, and Petitioner confirmed receipt within minutes of the transmittals. The Kanner Highway Project RFP, in its “final” form and in each reissued form as amended by addenda, is a 62-page document, not counting attachments. The first two pages of the RFP is a Table of Contents. Page one of the RFP lists a section called “Protest Rights,” which appears at page nine. Beginning on page nine of each version of the RFP, as reissued and amended by the addenda, a separate section identified as “Protest Rights” provides as follows: Any person who is adversely affected by the specifications contained in this Request for Proposal must file a notice of intent to protest in writing within seventy-two hours of the posting of this Request for Proposals. Pursuant to Sections 120.57(3) and 337.11, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 28-110, Florida Administrative Code, any person adversely affected by the agency decision or intended decision shall file with the agency both a notice of protest in writing and bond within 72 hours after the posting of the notice of decision or intended decision, or posting of the solicitation with respect to a protest of the terms, conditions, and specifications contained in a solicitation and will file a formal written protest within ten days after the filing of the notice of protest. . . . [Agency Clerk address provided for filing] Failure to file a notice of protest or formal written protest with the time prescribed in section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120 Florida Statutes. No notices of protest were filed within 72 hours of the electronic transmittal of each reissued RFP, as amended by addenda, nor were formal written protests filed within 10 days after a notice of protest, to protest the terms, conditions, and specifications in any of the reissued RFPs, as amended by addenda. After Addenda 1 and 2 were issued, the three shortlisted firms submitted technical proposals by the deadline on March 16, 2015. Addendum 3, the reissued RFP, and the redlined reissued RFP were transmitted by a single email sent to the shortlisted firms on April 27, 2015, at 5:03 p.m. Petitioner confirmed receipt of the email transmittal 20 minutes later, at 5:23 p.m. Petitioner knew of its objections to Addendum 3 as soon as it was read, which was within hours of its electronic transmittal on April 27, 2015. Petitioner took steps to notify DOT of its objections regarding Addendum 3, but those steps did not include filing a notice of protest to the amended RFP specifications within 72 hours after its transmittal or receipt. Instead, Mr. Schafer, Jason Daley (Ranger’s designated contact person for the project), David Wantman of the Wantman Group (engineering firm that is a member of Petitioner’s design- build team), and Randy Cropp with Cone & Graham (bridge contractor team member) had a telephone conference with John Olsen (described by Mr. Schafer as DOT’s design-build coordinator), and “two or three people from the Department, I’m not sure other than John.” (Schafer deposition at 17). Mr. Schafer said he believed the conference call was the day after Addendum 3 was received, which was April 28, 2015. On April 29, 2015, at 10:23:55 a.m., Mr. Schafer sent an email to Gerry O’Reilly, P.E., the DOT District Four Secretary, with copies to Jim Boxold (DOT Secretary, the agency head), and Bob Burleson with the Florida Transportation Builders’ Association. The email text was as follows: Guys, I’m extremely disappointed. What is going on in D-4 with releasing Team’s cost saving ideas. For the second time in two projects, either an ATC [Alternative Technical Concept] or concept in our Technical Proposal, one of our cost saving ideas has been released to the other bidders by the Department. For this $20+M project, a drainage concept that would’ve saved about $1.2M has been released by Addendum to all the bidders, after the Technical Proposals were submitted and 2 weeks prior to the submission of the numbers. Why has that happened??? I have partners on this project in Cone & Graham and Wantman Group that, along with Ranger, have spent a lot of money and man- hours trying to “design a better mouse trap” to give us a competitive advantage. If we’re not successful on this one, we may not have a choice but to protest. This has got to Stop. Two subsequent emails, from representatives of the Wantman Group and Cone & Graham, echoed Mr. Schafer’s complaints. All three emails were sent on April 29, 2015, with the last transmittal being made at 6:20 p.m., approximately 49 hours after Petitioner received the email transmittal with Addendum 3. Addendum 4, the reissued RFP, and the redlined reissued RFP were transmitted by a single email sent to the three shortlisted firms, including Petitioner, on May 4, 2015, at 4:11 p.m. Petitioner confirmed receipt of the email transmittal three minutes later, at 4:14 p.m. Addendum 5, the reissued RFP, and the redlined reissued RFP were transmitted by a single email message transmitted to the three shortlisted firms, including Petitioner, on May 5, 2015, at 12:10 p.m. Petitioner confirmed receipt of the email transmittal two minutes later, at 12:12 p.m. The three shortlisted firms, including Petitioner, submitted sealed lump-sum price proposals and proposed contract time (number of calendar days to complete the project) for the Kanner Highway Project by the May 6, 2015, deadline. Petitioner’s price proposal acknowledged that as of May 6, 2015, Petitioner had received Addenda 1 through 5 during the bidding period, and specified the dates of receipt of each addendum.5/ Thereafter, Respondent calculated the “adjusted scores,” using the following components: the technical score (combination of the ELOI score and the technical proposal score), the proposed contract time, the time value costs provided in the RFP ($7,093 per day), and the bid price proposal. The formula, set forth in the RFP, is the bid price proposal plus the product of the proposed contract time in number of days times the time value cost per day, divided by the technical score (ELOI, or phase one, score, plus technical proposal, or phase two, score). As provided in the RFP, the design-build firm to be selected is the one whose adjusted score is the lowest. The adjusted score calculation components and results, announced at a public meeting and posted on the DOT website, were as follows: If We Are Not Successful, We Might Have To Protest: The Petition As forewarned, within 72 hours after DOT announced and posted the results on its website, showing that Intervenor had the lowest adjusted score and was the intended awardee, and that Petitioner’s proposal was in third place, Petitioner filed its notice of protest and protest bond. Within 10 days thereafter (as extended to the following Monday, day 12, by virtue of the uniform rules of procedure), Petitioner filed its Petition. The Petition sets forth the objections to Addendum 3 voiced in the April 29, 2015, emails, alleging in pertinent part: Technical proposals had already been submitted by the time Addendum 3 was released. Thus, the Department changed the proposal requirements after submission of vendors’ proposals. (Petition, ¶ 11). In Addendum 3, which was issued one day after the Q&A – after Ranger submitted its drainage concept as part of its technical proposal – the Department adopted Ranger’s drainage concept, significantly revising the plan for SMF 4, utilizing a smart box drainage control structure, and Basin 4’s piping system, including relocating SMF 4 structures and retaining existing pipes. That is, the Department gave the other vendors Ranger’s design for use by the other vendors after the technical proposals had been submitted and opened. (Petition, ¶ 15). Although none of the other vendors had included this design in their original technical proposals, they each improperly benefitted from Ranger’s efforts to develop a unique, substantially improved, more cost efficient plan: in violation of Florida law, the Department disclosed Ranger’s proposal concept to these firms, and, by mandating through Addendum 3 that all vendors use Ranger’s design concept, effectively allowed the other vendors to revise their own proposals after the technical proposal submission deadline and base their pricing on Ranger’s concept. (Petition, ¶ 16). The end result of the Department’s improper reveal of Ranger’s design concept was the posting of an intended award of the contract to another vendor instead of Ranger . . . making no attempt whatsoever to compensate Ranger for handing others the benefits that Ranger had earned. (Petition, ¶ 17). The complaint that Addendum 3 changed the RFP after submission of the technical proposals is a complaint directed to the RFP specifications as reissued on April 27, 2015. As to Petitioner’s complaint about not being compensated, it is not clear whether the Petition’s references are to stipend compensation or to some other asserted basis for compensation. The references to Petitioner not being compensated are not tied to the relief sought, which is a rejection of all bids (and not payment of compensation). To the extent Petitioner is attempting to assert a right to stipend compensation, such a request would be premature and would not be grounds for rejection of all bids. The RFP provides that non-selected shortlisted firms are eligible for stipend compensation if they have executed the Design-Build Stipend Agreement, and if they submit an invoice “after the selection/award process is complete.” (RFP at 62). By virtue of this proceeding, the selection/award process is not complete. Any other claim of a right to compensation would not be cognizable in a bid protest proceeding, as apparently Petitioner recognizes by not actually seeking compensation as relief. The Proposed Amended Petition In reaction to Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition as an untimely specifications challenge, on October 13, 2015, Petitioner offered the proposed Amended Petition. The proposed Amended Petition seeks to add to the claim that Addendum 3 modified the RFP’s specifications after the technical proposals were submitted, by extending that same claim to Addenda 4 and 5; that is, that Addenda 3, 4, and 5 modified the RFP’s specifications after the technical proposals were submitted. (Amended Petition, ¶ 11). With regard to the suggestion that Petitioner’s protest was an untimely challenge to the RFP’s specifications, the proposed Amended Petition adds the following: The Department did not electronically post any of the procurement documents – the RFP, the addenda, or the notice of intended award decision – as required by section 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60A-1.021. Amended Petition, ¶ 12. The Amended Petition also seeks to evoke the impression of a scoring challenge by alleging that “on information and belief” the technical proposals were not scored on the basis of the RFP amendments that were issued after the technical proposals were submitted. (Amended Petition, ¶ 18). In explaining the grounds for Petitioner’s protest, Petitioner’s president described this challenge to the “scoring” as follows: Petitioner is “protesting that the – how could the technical scores reflect all of the addendums that were submitted after the technical proposal[s].” (Schafer deposition at 10). In other words, this is not a scoring challenge, but a process challenge: Petitioner’s objection is to the issuance of one addendum (per the Petition) or three addenda (per the Amended Petition) that amended the RFP after technical proposals were submitted, but before price proposals were submitted. The proposed Amended Petition does not cure the Petition’s timeliness problem. Petitioner’s notice of protest with protest bond was not filed within 72 hours of the electronic transmittal or receipt of Addendum 3, Addendum 4, or Addendum 5. Petitioner received the reissued RFPs, incorporating these addenda, on April 27, May 4, and May 5, respectively. The notice of protest was not filed until May 20, a full 15 days after Addendum 5 was received. Proposed Second Amended Petition Putting aside the argumentative portions of the proposed Second Amended Petition,6/ the proposed new allegations include pleading in the alternative that either the technical proposals were evaluated and scored without consideration of the RFP addenda that were issued after the technical proposals were submitted; or, in the alternative, that the RFP addenda were considered in evaluating the technical proposals, but the awarded scores must be improper because the technical proposals did not address the RFP addenda. (Second Amended Petition, ¶¶ 20-22). By pleading in the alternative this way, the proposed Second Amended Petition confirms that the Petition and both proposed amended petitions only challenge the RFP specifications as amended by Addendum 3, or by Addenda 3, 4, and 5. Petitioner complains that the process was rendered flawed by virtue of the issuance of RFP addenda after the technical proposals were submitted, and that--one way or another--this must have undermined the evaluation and scoring of the technical proposals. The proposed Second Amended Petition seeks to add an allegation directed to Intervenor’s technical proposal, alleging that it “did not address the changes to SMF 4 that were required by Addendum 3.” (Second Amended Petition, ¶ 22). A corollary disputed issue of fact alleged is “[w]hether Community’s proposal complied with the requirements of the addenda[.]” (Second Amended Petition, ¶ 31.e.). While these allegations single out Intervenor, in substance they are no different than the other process challenges. While perhaps they are directed to the intended awardee in an effort to appear as if Petitioner is raising grounds to challenge the award decision, that effort would give rise to another problem. Petitioner, as the third- ranked firm, would lack standing to protest a contract award on grounds that the highest ranked firm should not have been highest ranked or should have been found non-responsive (not alleged by Petitioner in any petition). How Clear Were the Points of Entry? Neither the proposed Amended Petition nor the proposed Second Amended Petition would cure the Petition’s timeliness problem. However, they raise as a defense to Respondent’s timeliness challenge (which itself is in the nature of a defense, that of waiver of a clear point of entry) that the points of entry relied on were ineffective to operate as clear points of entry. It is not necessary to amend the Petition to consider this argument, as it is responsive to the issues raised by the Motion to Relinquish. Petitioner, and members of its design-build team, are hardly newcomers to DOT design-build procurements.7/ Petitioner’s president acknowledged that the Kanner Highway Project is not Petitioner’s first involvement in a DOT design-build procurement. Petitioner has successfully responded to a number of design-build proposals, including several in District Four, the results of which were that Petitioner was awarded the contracts. Petitioner is familiar with the DOT website and uses that website as a tool to stay abreast of design-build project advertisements and procurement information. Petitioner’s president could not identify any other tool, on the internet or otherwise, used by Petitioner for those purposes. In particular, although Petitioner is aware of the MyFloridaMarketPlace vendor bid system on myflorida.com, Petitioner could not say whether, for any of the design-build projects in which Ranger succeeded as the contract awardee, DOT posted RFPs, addenda, or notices of intended award on that myflorida.com system. DOT’s representative confirmed that DOT does not use the MyFloridaMarketPlace vendor bid system on myflorida.com for design-build procurements that are conducted pursuant to section 337.11(7) and DOT’s implementing rules, or for other road/bridge construction procurements under section 337.11. DOT uses the MyFloridaMarketPlace vendor bid system for procurements of commodities and contractual services. Petitioner’s president acknowledged that he was aware of the protest rights provision set forth in each version of the RFP for the Kanner Highway Project, as reissued to incorporate each of the addendum amendments. Petitioner also acknowledged that none of the email communications with DOT officials regarding the objections of Petitioner and its team members to Addendum 3 were filed as a notice of protest or formal written protest of the terms, conditions, or specifications of the RFP as amended by Addendum 3.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Formal Written Protest be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2015.

Florida Laws (12) 11.12120.53120.569120.57120.68287.012287.042287.055287.057288.703337.11337.251
# 1
CRAIG A. SMITH AND ASSOCIATES vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 86-000892BID (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000892BID Latest Update: May 14, 1986

Findings Of Fact Background On January 18, 1985, respondents Department of Transportation (DOT), gave notice through the Florida Administrative Weekly to qualified and interested engineering firms that it desired "letters of interest" from firms interested in providing construction, engineering and inspection (CEI) services on State Job Nos. 87170-3525 through 871703530. 1/ Those jobs related to the construction of two major double leaf bascule bridges across the Intracoastal Waterway "flyover" bridge connecting State Road 826 (N.E. 163rd Street), A1A and continuous roadway sections in northern Dade County, Florida. The project is more commonly known as the Sunny Isles Causeway project. After receiving and evaluating ten letters of interest, a DOT selection committee compiled a "short-list" of the four engineering firms considered most qualified and capable of performing the job. The short-list included petitioner, Craig A. Smith and Associates (petitioner or CAS), Beiswenger Hoch and Associates (BHA), Post, Buckley, Schuh and Jernigan (PBSJ), and Reynolds Smith and Hill (RSH). The four consulting firms were invited to a scope of services meeting on October 14, 1985. At that meeting DOT discussed in detail the services required on the project, answered all inquiries by the firms' representatives, and provided each firm with the scope of services package, which contains the technical specifications and plans. The firms were also given DOT's recommended staffing chart which identified the individuals required on the job and the anticipated man-months required from those personnel. According to DOT's recommended staffing plane the project would require approximately 105,070 man hours. It was emphasized that this staff chart would be used as a "critical" measuring tool to evaluate the proposed staffing plans submitted by the firms, but that the firms would have an opportunity to change the number of man hours if such were necessary. The four firms were told to review the specifications and plans and to submit separate technical and price proposals with DOT no later than November 12, 1985. As a part of the technical proposals the firms were required to estimate the man hours to be provided on the project, keeping in mind the 105,070 figure utilized by DOT in its plans and specifications. The man-hour estimates submitted by the four firms were as follows: BHA 66,011 CAS 74,800 RSH 83,214 PBSJ 97,328 After receiving the technical and price proposals an evaluation of the technical proposals was begun by personnel at both the Miami district office and the Tallahassee central office. The two reviews were conducted independently and without the benefit of the price proposal. The district review committee was made up of three district employees while the central office review was made by a construction engineer. Each firm was numerically ranked based upon the firm's (a) technical plan, (b) management plan, (c) project schedule, and (d) "other" factors. In determining the scores, the Miami and Tallahassee offices used an internal written DOT "procedure" which provides guidelines for evaluating a CEI technical proposal. After the grades were assigned, they were totaled and the firms were ranked according to their scores. The two grades were then averaged on a weighted average basis by DOT's Bureau of Contractual Services. The districts central office and weighted average scores were as follows: Firm District Central Office Average RSH 71 74 74 PBSJ 72 54 63 BHA 62 59 62 CAS 61 57 59 The firms were also ranked in accordance with their price proposals. The following price bids were made by the four firms: CAS $2,129,105 BHA 2,136,417 PBSJ 2,862,929 RSH 2,978,462 It is noted that DOT initially estimated its cost for the CEI services to be $3,033,873. All firms were below this estimate. The grades and comments were forwarded to the office of the state construction engineer. Under his supervision, the two sets of comments and scores were "merged" together into a single recommendation as to which firm was the most qualified to perform the work. This recommendation, which was in the form of a memorandum was then forwarded to the chief of the Bureau of Contractual Services on January 9, 1986. In his memorandum the state construction engineer pointed out that although RSH and PBSJ were both technically qualified, he favored RSH for the project. The memorandum also recommended that neither CAS or BHA "be considered" for the work. The adverse recommendation for CAS was based upon its "inadequate staffing" estimates (some 30,000 man hours less than the DOT estimate), and its proposed resident engineer not being registered as a professional engineer in Florida. A selection committee made up of DOT's secretary, assistant secretary and deputy assistant secretary met on February 10, 1986, to make a final selection. The state director of construction (Murray Yates) was also present for the purpose of giving his recommendation to the committee. In preparing his recommendations Yates reviewed public hearing documents and studies relating to the project, and analyzed the DOT evaluation data and the CEI proposals. He also had discussions with both the district and central office personnel who originally evaluated the proposals. Finally, he relied upon his own experience as the DOT design engineer for the project. Prior to their meeting the members were furnished copies of the staff comments and the technical and price proposals of the four firms. At the first meeting, it was agreed to postpone the decision until February 17, 1986, so that the staff could reevaluate the number of man hours needed on the project. As a result of the further staff study, DOT revised its estimated man hours required on the job from 105,000 to approximately 95,000. At the second meeting PBSJ was tentatively selected as the successful firm subject to the Federal Highway Administration's (FHA) approval. The latter approval was necessary since the project is federally funded and PBSJ did not have the lowest price proposal. According to committee notes, PBSJ was selected because of its "sound technical plan for the project," its familiarity "with basculate construction, having provided similar services on the Miami River crossing," "inadequate" staffing requirements having been proposed by CAS and BHA and their lack of experience on bascule construction, and because the top technical firm, RSH, did not propose a fee acceptable to the selection committee." On February 18, 1986, DOT advised petitioner by letter that it "was not selected to provide engineering services on the above referenced project." No reason was given for rejecting petitioner's proposal. However, DOT orally advised CAS that its rejection was based upon inadequate man hours and the lack of qualifications of CAS personnel. Further, in a letter to the FHA dated February 19, 1986, DOT noted that CAS had been rejected because (a) CAS "did not propose adequate manpower to satisfactorily perform the services," (b) its "staffing plan did not provide the expertise desired" for the project, and (c) CAS has no "demonstrated proven ability in the performance of CEI services for the construction of bascule bridges in Florida." The federal agency gave its approval of PBSJ's selection on a later undisclosed date. There was no published notice of the meetings on February 10 and 17, 1986, nor was specific notice given to the four firms. However, there was no intent to bar any persons from attending the meetings, and had any appeared, they would have been permitted to observe the meetings. There is no indication of record that CAS made any inquiry to DOT as to when such meetings would take place, or that it be given notice of any meetings. No formal minutes of the meetings were kept. In accordance with DOT procedures, CAS was allowed to attend a "settlement meeting" with DOT personnel after the bid protest was filed. Such a meeting gave CAS the opportunity to discuss its proposal and presumably to seek DOT to change its mind. However, DOT did not change its position, and this proceeding followed. The Project Requirements DOT required an outside consultant on this project for additional expertise and manpower. The CEI contract calls for the consultant to administer construction activity by inspecting the work of the contractor. By having the work inspected DOT insures that it will receive the type and quality of work necessary to satisfactorily complete the job. The Sunny Isles Causeway project is considered to be a major project by DOT and was characterized by its state director of construction as being an "extremely complex project." Among other things, it involves the construction of two bascule bridges. A bascule bridge is one that can be raised or lowered to allow boat traffic to pass underneath. The total project cost is approximately $24.4 millions and will require 1,365 calendar days (or almost four years) for completion. The six jobs and their respective contract numbers are the west bound roadway and approach (87170-3525), Casino Canal work (87170- 3526), fly over bridge and roadway (87170-3527), east bound roadway and approach (87170-3528), west bound bascule bridge (87170-3529), and east bound bascule bridge (87170-3530). Despite some assertions to the contrary, it is found that the construction of a bascule bridge is indeed complex in nature. In addition, the Sunny Isles project is unique in the sense that the contract calls for the existing bridge to be demolished and removed, and the new bridge to be placed in the same location. The existing foundation will be widened and incorporated into the foundation of the replacement bridge. Further some of the major utilities crossing the intracoastal waterway, such as the 48 inch force main, will remain in place during construction and cannot be disturbed or damaged. Finally the project is located in an affluent area of Dade County, and the contractor must be careful not to infringe upon adjacent private properties. Because of these features, the successful firm would be expected to have an experienced resident engineer, and other key personnel, who was familiar not only with bascule bridge construction, but also with DOT procedures regarding contractual claims, utility problems maintenance of traffic, and interfacing with the community on any other problems that might arise. DOT's Selection Process DOT is required by state law to "adopt administrative procedures for the evaluation of professional services, including, but not limited to capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, experience, whether the firm is a certified minority business . . . and such other factors as may be determined by the agency to be applicable to its particular requirements." In accordance with the foregoing legislative mandated DOT has informally adopted a document known as "Guidelines and Philosophy on Consultant Selections." These guidelines are set forth in an agency memorandum dated January 29, 1985, prepared by its then chief of Bureau of Contractual Services, John S. Berry, III. This memorandum has been disseminated to all district consultant coordinators. In general terms, the memorandum provides district personnel with guidelines to be used in grading the short-list firms in the various technical non-technical and management categories. More specifically, the graders are given factors to be considered and scores to be given when assessing a firm's technical ability and capability to meet time and budget requirements. Specific guidelines are also given for non-technical and non- management factors such as workload and past performance. Further guidelines are given to assess the firms' managerial skills. On October 20, 1983, DOT adopted Procedure No. 146-002 which governs the selection process for engineering consulting firms. However, the procedure has not been formally adopted as a rule. It covers everything from the initial DOT decision to use an outside consultant through the execution of the final contract. Among other things, the procedure sets forth in detail guidelines for (a) initial selection evaluation, including the duties of the requesting unit, contractual services officer and selection committee, (b) scope of services meeting, (c) technical review committee evaluations and (d) final selection evaluation. Once the proposals have reached the final selection stage, DOT procedure No. 146-002 requires that the contractual services office provide the final selection committee with a summary of all evaluations and grade point averages and the volume of work previously awarded to each firm. The committee must then review these summaries; the volume of work previously awarded the firms, the price proposals, and assign a rating factor to each firm. Although the contents of the memorandum and procedure have not been "formally" adopted as rules, there was testimony from DOT personnel explaining the purpose, meaning and contents of both. In the case at bar the agency adhered to its January 29, 1985 memorandum and procedure No. 146-002 in evaluating the various technical proposals. More specifically, the evaluation process considered each firm's capabilities personnel past record experience and other relevant factors. Prior to the selection of the successful firm DOT met with each firm including petitioner, at the scope of services meeting on October 14, 1985. At that meeting each firm was given the opportunity to ask questions, seek clarification on any ambiguous matter, and learn the specific needs of DOT. In addition it was emphasized to each firm that DOT placed special significance on the staffing plan that would be submitted by each firm. Finally, each step in the review and selection process was documented in writing by DOT, and such documents have been made available to petitioner and all other interested parties. These documents have been amplified on by DOT personnel through discovery and oral testimony at final hearing. DOT Concerns With CAS's Proposals DOT expressed several concerns with CAS's technical proposal, two of which were valid. First DOT was concerned that CAS did not propose adequate staffing and manpower for the jobs. This concern was based on staffing problems CAS is now experiencing on another pending CEI project, and the inadequate number of hours (74,800) proposed in CAS's technical plan for the Sunny Isles project. A failure to provide adequate staffing can create serious potential problems. These include inaccurate recordkeeping, loss of federal funding, contractual claims, insufficient personnel to perform all necessary tasks, a failure to adhere to public concerns, and the possibility of having to obtain another consulting firm to finish the job. In preparing the job specifications, DOT estimated that 105,070 man hours would be required from the CEI firm during the life of the project. After further evaluations this was reduced to approximately 95,000 man hours to eliminate around 10 percent of "fat" in the estimate. CAS estimated that only 74,800 man hours would be required, which was some 21 percent below DOT's revised estimate. Although the DOT resident engineer who initially prepared the 105,070 man hours estimate did not have the plans and specifications for the project when his original estimate was made, he relied upon his extensive experience and familiarity with CEI contracts in preparing his estimate. The engineer had estimated man hours on twelve other CEI contracts, utilized information from the project manager, reviewed available design data, and made a visit to the job site. These calculations were not subsequently reviewed in detail by any other DOT employee. However, the same procedure was followed by the engineer who prepared the estimate for PBSJ and he reached a comparable figure. The methodology and results thereof were not shown to be unreasonable or unreliable, and it is found that the estimates by DOT and PBSJ were both reasonable and appropriate. Three experienced CAS personnel were involved in preparing that firm's estimate, and they had the benefit of the plans and specifications in doing so. In contrast to the 173 hour manmonths used by DOT and PBSJ in their calculations, CAS "absorbed" 13 hours into its overhead and accordingly used a 160 hour man month in its calculation. It also included the project directors' man hours in its overhead cost. This results in CAS having a lower man-hour estimate for its staffing plan. Even so, CAS made no effort to determine the DOT methodology at the scope of services meeting, or to advise DOT that it was calculating man hours in a different manner. Given the low number of man hours, and CAS's problems on another pending job, DOT's concern was well- founded. DOT also expressed concern over the expertise of CAS's staff to be assigned to the job. Although the resident engineer had many years of experience as an engineer, he had just moved to Florida and had no prior construction experience in the State. There was no evidence that he was familiar with DOT procedures, which is of particular importance where a complex and sensitive project is involved. Moreover, the firm itself has never constructed a bascule bridge. Given these considerations, DOT properly found the expertise and qualifications to be less than that of the successful firm. Finally, at the initial stage of the review process, DOT personnel were concerned that CAS's proposed resident engineer was not a registered professional engineer in the State of Florida. However, this concern was unfounded since the engineer in question was granted his registration on February 4, 1986, which was prior to the final selection. The Successful Firm PBSJ is currently working on three CEI contracts for DOT. It has just successfully completed a CEI contract on a major bascule bridge project in downtown Miami which is comparable to the Sunny Isles project. The firm's proposed resident engineer has been involved on five bascule bridge projects in prior years. The firm's man-hour estimate of 97,328 was in line with DOT's revised estimate, and was prepared by the proposed resident engineer in a manner consistent with that used by DOT's estimator. Given the type and amount of experience on the part of PBSJ, and its adequate staffing plan DOT properly selected PBSJ as the consulting engineer on the project.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered awarding the contract on State Job Nos. 87170-3525--87170-3530 to Port, Buckley, Schuh and Jernigan, Inc., and that Craig A. Smith's bid protest be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of May 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1986.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68287.042287.055337.105
# 2
OLD TAMPA BAY ENTERPRISES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 98-005225BID (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 01, 1998 Number: 98-005225BID Latest Update: Apr. 13, 2000

The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent, the Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT"), acted contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, rules or policies, or the proposal specifications, in rejecting the proposal of Petitioner, Old Tampa Bay Enterprises, Inc. ("Old Tampa Bay"), to RFP-DOT-97/98-1003, Bridge Tending/Maintenance and Repair Services for Five Movable Bridges, Sarasota and Manatee Counties (the "RFP" or "RFP 1003"), and awarding the contract to Intervenor, General Electric Industrial Systems ("GE"). GE also raises the issue whether Old Tampa Bay lacks standing because it submitted a materially false or fraudulent proposal.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 10, 1998, FDOT issued RFP 1003, requesting proposals for a bridge-tending, maintenance and repair service contract for five movable bridges within Manatee and Sarasota Counties. The contract would run for a period of one year, with an option for two annual renewals. FDOT contemporaneously issued RFP 1004, for the performance of identical bridge tending, preventive maintenance and repair services on four other movable bridges in Sarasota County. The RFP required, among other things, that proposers must employ an experienced bridge tender supervisor and an experienced registered electrical engineer. The RFP required that the contractor must be licensed to perform electrical and mechanical work in the State of Florida, and that a copy of the license be submitted as part of the proposal package. RFP 1003, Section 1.7.5. (In this and some other sections of the RFP, FDOT employed the undefined term "Consultant" rather than the term "Contractor" or "Proposer" used through the bulk of the RFPs. Absent a clarifying explanation, it is assumed that all three terms are used interchangeably.) The RFP required the proposers to provide the names of "key personnel," a resume for each of these individuals, and a description of the functions and responsibilities of each key person relative to the task to be performed. The approximate percent of time to be devoted exclusively to this project was also to be provided. FDOT’s prior written approval was required for the removal and substitution of any of the key personnel proposed. "Key personnel" included project engineers, bridge superintendents, mechanics, and electricians. Under the heading "preventive maintenance," the RFP required the proposers to provide "sufficient and competent personnel to perform the inspection, troubleshooting and work for all bid item requirements." The electrician must be "a licensed electrician with experience in industrial maintenance and troubleshooting." RFP 1003, Exhibit A-3, Section 3.0. The RFPs incorporated by reference the "Bridge Operations and Maintenance Manual" (the "Bridge Manual"), an FDOT document establishing procedures for bridge operations and maintenance requirements statewide. The Bridge Manual set forth the following qualifications for electricians: All electricians working on movable bridges or electrical equipment on any bridge must hold at least a journeyman electrician’s license in at least one Florida county and have skills in industrial electrical work. Ability to read and understand blueprints and written instructions. Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing. Ability to plan, organize and coordinate work assignments. Ability to install, alter, repair and maintain electrical systems, equipment and fixtures. Bridge Manual, pages 2-3. Another section of the Bridge Manual elaborated on the minimum qualifications for electricians as follows: All electricians working on movable bridges or electrical equipment on any bridge must hold at least a journeyman electrician’s license in at least one Florida county and have at least two years experience in industrial electrical work. Vocational/training in industrial electricity can substitute at the rate of 720 classroom hours for each year of the required experience. After employment, they should attend the Bridge Inspection school and Movable Bridge Inspection school. They should also receive continuing training on motor controls, National Electric Code and applicable safety training. They should be able to read blueprints, and written instructions, communicate effectively, be able to plan, organize, and coordinate work assignments, and have the ability to install, alter, repair and maintain electrical systems, equipment and fixtures. Bridge Manual, pages 2-17 through 2-18. The RFP awarded a maximum of 100 points to responsive proposals. A maximum of 60 points could be awarded for the technical proposals, which were scored by a three-member technical committee that included Hendrik Ooms, FDOT’s assistant maintenance engineer for District One. Each member of the committee scored the proposals independently. Their scores were then averaged to arrive at the final technical score. The RFP listed Richard Marino, the head of contracts for District One, as the project manager who should receive all technical questions from prospective proposers. Regardless of the formal designation, Mr. Ooms was in fact the project manager and the person capable of answering technical questions. The technical proposal scoring subsumed a maximum of 35 points for the "management plan," including 20 points for identified "key personnel." A maximum of 35 points could be awarded for the price proposal. The low price proposal received the maximum 35 points, with the remaining proposals scored according to the formula: (Low price/proposer’s price) x Price points = Proposer’s total points. The technical committee was not aware of the contents of the price proposals prior to scoring the technical proposals. Finally, proposers could obtain 5 preference points for Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) participation of at least 10 percent of the total dollar amount of the contract, or 2 preference points for DBE participation of between 5 and 10% of the total dollar amount. On or about May 11, 1998, three companies submitted proposals for RFP 1003 and 1004: GE; Old Tampa Bay; and C & S Building Maintenance Corporation. GE is the incumbent vendor for these contracts. Until this bid, Old Tampa Bay was a subcontractor to GE on these contracts. On May 22, 1998, FDOT posted the proposal tabulations indicating the intended awardees of the two contracts. Old Tampa Bay was the apparent awardee of the contract for RFP 1003, the contract at issue in this case, with a total score of 79.67 points. GE was the second high scorer, with 79.45 points. GE was the apparent awardee of the contract for RFP 1004. As to RFP 1003, the averaged technical score for Old Tampa Bay was 39.67 points. The averaged technical score for GE was 49 points. All three members of the technical committee awarded GE more points than Old Tampa Bay, though Mr. Ooms saw a greater difference between the two bids than did the other committee members, Richard Marino and Kenneth Clark. Mr. Marino awarded 56 points to GE and 52 points to Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Clark awarded 53 points to GE and 47 points to Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Ooms awarded 38 points to GE and 20 points to Old Tampa Bay. Despite the difference in the technical proposals, Old Tampa Bay was named the intended awardee for RFP 1003 on the strength of 35 points for its significantly lower price proposal ($539,915 per year, versus $621,340 per year for GE) and obtaining the full 5 points for DBE participation. GE was awarded 30.45 price points according to the RFP formula and obtained no DBE points. No formal protest having been received, FDOT moved forward to the next step in the award process. The agency sent substantially identical letters to Old Tampa Bay as the intended awardee of the contract for RFP 1003 and to GE as the intended awardee of the contract for RFP 1004. The letters, dated June 15, 1998, and signed by Felipe Alvarez, FDOT’s purchasing agent, informed the vendors that they had each proposed the same people as "key personnel" who would devote 100 percent of their time to the project. This situation "concerned" FDOT, as these persons obviously could not devote 100 percent of their time to RFP 1003 as employees of Old Tampa Bay and 100 percent of their time to RFP 1004 as employees of GE. The letters requested each of the vendors to clarify the employment of the following persons: Mr. W. Bruce Chapman, whom GE had identified as its bridge superintendent and Old Tampa Bay had identified as its project manager; Mr. Gary Berkley, whom GE had identified as its mechanic and Old Tampa Bay had identified as its primary mechanic; Kelly Green, whom both GE and Old Tampa Bay had identified as primary electrician; and John Vance, whom both GE and Old Tampa Bay had identified as supporting electrician. The letters concluded with the following statement: The Proposal Package stated that if awarded the Agreement, the Consultant is to provide the services of the key personnel proposed. Removal and substitution of any of the key personnel proposed will require the Department’s prior written approval. Please advise the Department if your firm plans to provide the same key personnel or will be providing an equivalent substitution; equivalent meaning as of [sic] the same caliber, experience, and expertise or better than the individual originally proposed. (Emphasis added.) As noted in FDOT’s letter, the Old Tampa Bay proposal listed Kelly Green and John Vance as electricians. Old Tampa Bay’s proposal emphasized that Vance and Green were the current electricians performing electrical maintenance and repairs on the bridges, with nine years combined experience on the District One contract. Old Tampa Bay's proposal emphasized the ease of transition to the new contract that FDOT would enjoy should it select Old Tampa Bay: There will be no transition pain from the existing prime contractor [GE] to [Old Tampa Bay] as ALL personnel currently serving are already on the [Old Tampa Bay] payroll and have been for several years. FDOT will have no new relationships to establish or unknowns with which to be concerned. (Emphasis in original.) Old Tampa Bay’s proposal emphasized in several places that Old Tampa Bay would provide the same electricians who were already working on the bridges. In describing its technical approach to the electrical systems, Old Tampa Bay emphasized that its electricians would require no orientation before commencing work: The electrical system is a critical link in the operation of the bridge. Its maintenance is crucial to reliable operation. [Old Tampa Bay's] comprehensive maintenance program is designed to meet and exceed contract requirements. The [Old Tampa Bay] electrician (Resume attached) is knowledgeable and experienced in the performance of this program. He has performed this service under other FDOT contracts. Old Tampa Bay's proposal emphasized the experience of its electricians with respect to the electro-mechanical control systems, stating that "All [Old Tampa Bay] service personnel including electricians have been trained to work on, maintain, and troubleshoot as required each intricate system." Old Tampa Bay emphasized the experience of Vance and Green, and stated that they had "never failed to correct any problems on this system on any of the bridges in this contract." Old Tampa Bay made similar representations in regard to equipment malfunctions and computerized control systems, emphasizing the quick, successful responses by and experience of its electricians. The evidence indicated that Old Tampa Bay knew, or should have known, at the time it submitted its proposal, that John Vance had no intention of working for Old Tampa Bay on these contracts. Old Tampa Bay included Mr. Vance’s name and license in its proposal without his consent. Mr. Vance never stated orally or in writing that he agreed to be included in Old Tampa Bay's proposal. Old Tampa Bay never asked Mr. Vance’s permission to include his name as a proposed supporting electrician. Old Tampa Bay never asked Mr. Vance’s permission to include a copy of his electrical contractor’s license in Old Tampa Bay's proposal. About two weeks prior to the proposal submission date, Old Tampa Bay's president, Donald Abernathy, asked Mr. Vance for a copy of his license, but did not tell him that Old Tampa Bay intended to include the license in its proposal. Rather, Mr. Abernathy told Mr. Vance that Old Tampa Bay needed the license for purposes related to insurance. Mr. Vance refused to provide Old Tampa Bay with a copy of his license. Old Tampa Bay obtained a copy of Mr. Vance’s license by making a public records request to Manatee County, and submitted that copy with its proposal. Mr. Bruce Chapman has served for nearly four years as a bridge tender supervisor, employed by Old Tampa Bay under a GE contract with the FDOT. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Chapman was still an Old Tampa Bay employee. Mr. Chapman assisted Mr. Abernathy in trying to obtain permission of various people to use their names in Old Tampa Bay's proposal. Mr. Chapman testified that he knew from conversations with Mr. Vance that Mr. Vance did not want to work for Old Tampa Bay on the new contract. Old Tampa Bay also knew at the time of proposal submission that it had obtained no assurances from Kelly Green that he would work for Old Tampa Bay on the contract for RFP 1003. As detailed below, Mr. Green ultimately signed a letter-of-intent to work for GE on the contract for RFP 1004. Mr. Abernathy contended that Old Tampa Bay was entitled to include Vance and Green in its proposal without permission because they were Old Tampa Bay employees. However, Mr. Abernathy also conceded that Vance and Green were at-will employees, and his prior attempt to secure their permission to use their names in the Old Tampa Bay proposal was a tacit admission that Old Tampa Bay had no control over them. Further, in the fall of 1997, Mr. Abernathy attempted to obtain the signatures of Mr. Vance and several other bridge employees to a non-compete agreement for the purpose of binding them to Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Vance refused to sign the agreement. Old Tampa Bay provided payroll services to Vance and Green during their work on the bridges under GE’s existing contract with the FDOT, but Old Tampa Bay never supervised the work of the bridge electricians, never provided Vance or Green with the tools, equipment or supplies they used in their work as bridge electricians, and never had any control over the day-to- day activities of any electricians on any FDOT contract. The electricians worked on a daily basis with GE’s project engineer, Douglas Blake. Mr. Blake had trained Mr. Vance on bridge electrical equipment when the latter commenced work on the bridges. The electricians looked to Mr. Blake for technical and substantive assistance in working on the bridges. Mr. Vance testified that he considered himself an employee of GE. Mr. Green did not testify at the hearing. On June 26, 1998, both Old Tampa Bay and GE submitted responses to the FDOT letter of June 15, 1998. In a letter signed by William Trainor, contract leader, GE set forth its staffing plan for RFP 1004. GE identified the following as "key personnel" proposed for the positions discussed in the FDOT letters: John Vance as bridge superintendent (replacing W. Bruce Chapman); Bruce Morris as mechanic (replacing Gary Berkley); Kelly Green as primary electrician; and John Vance as Supporting electrician. GE attached résumés for each of these personnel. GE indicated that it would utilize PRM, Inc. as a subcontractor to secure the required contract personnel for the contract under RFP 1004, and GE attached letters-of-intent for employment for each of the named key personnel. Each of these letters was signed either by the named employee or by the president of PRM, Inc. FDOT accepted GE’s response in full. The award of the contract for RFP 1004 to GE was not protested. In a letter dated June 26, 1998, signed by Donald R. Abernathy, president, Old Tampa Bay proposed the following key personnel: W. Bruce Chapman as project manager; Gary Berkley as mechanic; Charles Adam Kenney as bridge superintendent (not mentioned in the FDOT letter); and Kelly Green as primary electrician. Old Tampa Bay attached résumés for each of these personnel. The letter made no mention of a supporting electrician. Old Tampa Bay also attached agreements of the employees to serve in their respective positions. However, the signature line on Kelly Green’s statement of acceptance was left blank. Mr. Abernathy testified that he asked Mr. Green to sign the document indicating his acceptance of employment with Old Tampa Bay, but Mr. Green refused. Mr. Abernathy did not reveal this information to FDOT, continuing to maintain that he was within his rights as Mr. Green's employer to include his name in the proposal. FDOT knew from its review of the GE submission that Mr. Green had in fact signed a letter of intent for employment with PRM, Inc. to work on the GE contract. Mr. Alvarez, the FDOT purchasing agent, acted chiefly as a coordinator and as the person ensuring that the procedural requirements of competitive bidding laws were met by FDOT. He admittedly lacked the expertise to make decisions as to the technical aspects of the project. Thus, Mr. Alvarez forwarded the vendors’ responses to Mr. Ooms, the project manager, for his evaluation. Mr. Ooms is a professional engineer, and for the past five years has supervised the operations of all nine bridges covered by RFPs 1003 and 1004. In a memorandum to Mr. Alvarez, dated July 2, 1998, Mr.. Ooms reported his findings and conclusions regarding the vendors’ submissions. As noted above, he found the GE submission acceptable in its identification of PRM, Inc. as a subcontractor and its naming of Vance, Morris, and Green as intended key personnel. Mr. Ooms found acceptable the submission of Old Tampa Bay insofar as it named Chapman, Kenney, and Berkley as key personnel. However, Mr. Ooms noted that the Old Tampa Bay submission provided no documentation of Kelly Green’s commitment to work for Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Ooms also noted that the Old Tampa Bay submission made no mention of John Vance, who had been listed as support electrician in Old Tampa Bay’s original proposal, and listed no substitute who would take over those duties. Mr. Vance had also accepted an offer from PRM, Inc. to work on the GE contract. Thus, Mr. Ooms concluded that the proposed key personnel roster submitted by Old Tampa Bay was not acceptable. By letter to Donald R. Abernathy dated July 8, 1998, Mr. Alvarez conveyed to Old Tampa Bay the "discrepancies" found by FDOT in the Old Tampa Bay submission of June 26, 1998. While stating that FDOT accepted the proposal of Chapman, Kenney, and Berkley for their respective positions, Mr. Alvarez pointed out the problems noted by Mr. Ooms as to Green and Vance. The letter concluded that "the Department still requires that your firm provide, in writing, clarification as to the positions of Primary and Supporting Electricians," and required the response by July 13, 1998. Old Tampa Bay responded by letter to Mr. Alvarez from Mr. Abernathy dated July 10, 1998. The letter provided no explanation as to Mr. Green’s unsigned agreement or Old Tampa Bay's failure to mention Mr. Vance or otherwise address the position of supporting electrician. The letter stated no objection to any of the conclusions contained in FDOT’s letter of July 8, 1998. The letter took no issue with the standard described for "equivalent" electricians. Old Tampa Bay's letter stated that it had selected Mr. Gary McCormick as its primary electrician. The letter noted that Mr. McCormick was finishing a project but would be available for this contract no later than July 27, 1998. The letter stated that while Mr. McCormick was a "skilled and valuable electrical and hydraulic specialist," he had never been required to have an electrician’s license by any prior employer. The letter requested that FDOT waive the license requirement for 90 days, during which time Mr. McCormick would obtain the required license. The letter attached Mr. McCormick’s résumé, which indicated that he had been involved with the Stickney Point bridge from September 1997 until July 1998. The résumé provided no dates for any of his other employment since 1973. The résumé indicated that most of Mr. McCormick’s electrical experience involved repair and installation of elevators. Old Tampa Bay's submission made no attempt to relate Mr. McCormick’s elevator experience to the electrical specifications of the RFP. The letter further stated that Old Tampa Bay was "actively seeking" a supporting electrician, and that Mr. Abernathy would fill the position until the search was completed over the "next few weeks." The letter gave no further indication of the status of Old Tampa Bay's attempt to locate a support electrician. The letter attached the résumé of Mr. Abernathy. Mr. Alvarez forwarded Old Tampa Bay’s July 10, 1998, letter to Mr. Ooms for his review. By memorandum dated July 15, 1998, Mr. Ooms responded to Mr. Alvarez, concluding that the proposed key personnel roster of Mr. McCormick and Mr. Abernathy as primary and supporting electricians was not acceptable. Mr. Ooms’ memorandum first addressed Old Tampa Bay's original statements in its proposal as to Vance and Green, noting that Old Tampa Bay represented both electricians as follows, in his words (punctuation and capitalization not corrected): [Mr. Green] "has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 4 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties. His duties range from preventive maintenance to emergency repair" . . . "an intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Green has a Journeyman’s electricians license. * * * [Mr. Vance] has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 5 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties. The maintenance he performs covers the entire bridge--the gates, lock motors, drive motors, variable frequency drives, programmable controllers, contactors, limit switches, control panels and resistors." "intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Vance has a [sic] Electrical Contractor’s license. Mr. Ooms contrasted Mr. Green’s qualifications with those of Mr. McCormick, whose résumé showed that he had less than one year’s experience with bridges, did not hold a journeyman electrician’s license, and thus was not "an equivalent substitution for Mr. Kelly Green." Mr. McCormick’s résumé listed his current employer as "Acutec Inc.," his position as "project electrical foreman," and stated that he was "currently finishing Stickney Point drawbridge rehabilitation project. In charge of electrical, PLC, and hydraulic systems installation, trouble-shooting, and start-up. Working closely with Gregg Martin of FDOT, Sarasota." Mr. Ooms testified that Mr. McCormick did not have the qualifications claimed in his résumé. He testified that Mr. McCormick was not in charge of electrical, PLC and hydraulic systems installation on the Stickney Point bridge. He testified that Mr. McCormick was strictly a "wire puller," with "no experience whatsoever to do this type of work." Mr. Ooms took issue with Mr. McCormick’s claim that he was "in charge" of the installation of the PLC, or programmable logic controls. Mr. Ooms testified that Mr. McCormick’s employer, Acutec, was involved with writing the PLC program, setting up the parameters, checking out the hydraulics, and performing the interfacing, but that Mr. McCormick was simply running wires from point-to-point pursuant to instructions from others. Mr. Ooms testified that he knew these facts from watching at first-hand the work being performed on the Stickney Point bridge. Mr. Ooms did not call Acutec to verify the statements in Mr. McCormick’s resume. Mr. Ooms stated that there was no need to call Acutec, as he was out on the bridge and could see for himself what Mr. McCormick was doing. PLCs, or programmable logic controls, are the means by which newer bridges are controlled by computer. The PLC sequences the computer program to constantly monitor the condition and operation of the bridge. The PLC technology is not unique to bridges. It is common in many manufacturing operations, and is in place on two of the five bridges covered by RFP 1003. The remaining three bridges have a manual relay control system. Old Tampa Bay did not dispute that PLC experience is necessary to perform the work as an electrician on this contract. Mr. Ooms noted that Mr. McCormick’s résumé claimed PLC experience, but that when the time came for the contractor to deliver the laptop computer with the PLC programs to run the renovated Stickney Point bridge, Mr. McCormick could not even run the program on the computer. Mr. Ooms testified that if one cannot run the computer program, one cannot do anything on a computer controlled bridge. Mr. Ooms’ testimony as to the qualifications of Mr. McCormick is credited. While Mr. Ooms might have confirmed his conclusions with Mr. McCormick’s employer, he cannot be found to have acted arbitrarily in relying on his own extensive observations of Mr. McCormick’s job performance. Old Tampa Bay offered no evidence to dispute the factual underpinnings of Mr. Ooms’ decision that Mr. McCormick was not an equivalent substitute for Kelly Green. Mr. Ooms’ July 15, 1998, memorandum also rejected Mr. Abernathy as the temporary supporting electrician. As quoted above, the memorandum noted Old Tampa Bay's representation that John Vance, the supporting electrician it originally proposed, has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past five years in Sarasota and Manatee counties, has intimate knowledge of these bridges, and has an electrical contractor’s license. Mr. Ooms noted that Mr. Abernathy does not have an electrical contractor’s license. Mr. Ooms also took issue with Mr. Abernathy’s résumé statement that he has acted as a bridge inspector for the past eight years for Kisinger Campo and Associates, a company that FDOT hires to perform bridge inspections. Mr. Ooms wrote that in the five years that FDOT has let out the operations and maintenance contracts, he has never "seen or known of Mr. Abernathy visiting a Sarasota or Manatee county bridge or troubleshooting a bridge problem." He testified that Kisinger Campo could not have used Mr. Abernathy as a bridge inspector because he lacked the required engineer’s license or certification as a bridge inspector. Mr. Ooms admitted that Kisinger Campo does not always tell him who is performing the inspections. Mr. Ooms made no inquiries of Kisinger Campo to verify Mr. Abernathy’s résumé. Mr. Abernathy testified that he was in fact an electrical inspector for Kisinger Campo for eight years and that in 1997 he personally performed inspections on every bridge covered by RFP 1003, including the electrical, lighting, and PLC systems. Mr. Abernathy conceded that he does not have an electrical contractor’s license. Mr. Abernathy’s testimony is credited as to his experience as a bridge inspector. In the case of Mr. McCormick, Mr. Ooms reasonably relied on his own extensive observations. As to Mr. Abernathy, Mr. Ooms attempted to rely on what he did not observe. Mr. Ooms chose to assume, without knowledge or verification, that Mr. Abernathy’s résumé was false. This assumption was arbitrary, and cannot be credited. Mr. Ooms’ decision to reject Mr. Abernathy was nonetheless reasonable. Mr. Abernathy did not possess the requisite license, and admitted that his most recent experience in actually performing bridge electrical maintenance and repair was more than twenty years ago. By letter to Mr. Abernathy dated July 17, 1998, Mr. Alvarez conveyed FDOT’s rejection of Old Tampa Bay’s proposal pertaining to the electrician positions. The reason for rejection was stated as follows: As stated within the Request for Proposal Package, if you are proposing to substitute key personnel you must provide an equivalent substitution; equivalent meaning as of [sic] the same caliber, experience, expertise or better than the individual originally proposed. . . . Please understand, the Department is looking forward in [sic] entering into an Agreement with your firm, [sic] however, it cannot accept anything less than what was originally proposed. Mr. Alvarez’ letter enclosed Mr. Ooms’ memorandum of July 15, 1998, and offered Old Tampa Bay another opportunity to submit substitute electricians no later than July 27, 1998. By letter from Mr. Abernathy to Mr. Alvarez, dated July 27, 1998, Old Tampa Bay submitted a new list of proposed substitutes. The text of the letter stated, in full: We have selected Mr. Steven Manning, Master Electrician License Number 3994, Hillsborough County to be our primary electrician. Attached is his resume. We have selected Mr. Adrian Cook as the supporting electrician, Journeyman License Number JE776, Hillsborough County. We have selected Mr. Wayne Cano as an electrician’s helper. Hillsborough County licenses have full reciprocity with Manatee and Sarasota Counties. Résumés of all three proposed employees were attached, along with copies of the relevant licenses and certificates of completion of various professional training courses. Mr. Manning’s résumé contained sketchy descriptions of the kinds of electrical work he had performed, and gave no indication that he had any experience working with computers or PLCs. Mr. Manning’s résumé revealed no experience with moveable bridge maintenance or repair. Mr. Manning had no experience as an electrician on the FDOT bridges. Mr. Manning’s résumé indicated that his experience included industrial electrical experience intermittently during eight years of electrical work. The résumé indicated "industrial and commercial electrical work," "working in fuel terminals, working with motor controls," "remodeling tenant spaces," "working with new commercial," "working with commercial remodeling, and service work," "traveling around Florida and Georgia remodeling Pizza Huts," "residential and commercial sales, estimating jobs, job foreman, billing and scheduling, handling of permits," and "working with industrial and commercial, service work, remodeling and new construction." Old Tampa Bay's submission offered no specific information or explanation of how Mr. Manning’s varied experience related to the specifications for electrical maintenance and repair in the RFP. Old Tampa Bay had obtained Mr. Manning’s name by calling an electrical company, Southern Power and Controls, and asking for recommendations of personnel with qualifications and experience equivalent to Mr. Green’s. Southern Power and Controls is an industrial electrical firm specializing in industrial controls, motor controls, switch gears, limit switches, and PLCs. Old Tampa Bay would have paid a finder's fee to Southern Power & Controls for any employees who went to work for Old Tampa Bay on this contract. Old Tampa Bay provided Southern Power and Controls with the documentation it had submitted to FDOT regarding the qualifications and experience of Vance and Green. Robert Harwell, a registered electrical engineer and principal of Old Tampa Bay, had discussions with Southern Power and Controls as to the qualifications of the candidates it sought. No person from Southern Power and Controls appeared at the hearing to explain the process by which they selected Mr. Manning. No person from Old Tampa Bay ever interviewed Mr. Manning. Mr. Manning did not testify at the hearing. Old Tampa Bay proposed Adrian Cook as a supporting electrician. Mr. Cook’s résumé indicated that he was a licensed journeyman electrician, with four years’ experience as an electrician and two years as an apprentice. Mr. Cook’s résumé indicated two years of unspecified commercial and industrial work, but no moveable bridge experience. Old Tampa Bay obtained Mr. Cook’s name from Southern Power & Controls, asking for personnel with qualifications and experience equivalent to Mr. Green’s. No person from Southern Power & Controls appeared at the hearing to explain the rationale for choosing Mr. Cook. No person from Old Tampa Bay ever interviewed Mr. Cook. Mr. Cook did not testify at the hearing. Old Tampa Bay submitted Mr. Wayne Cano as an "electrician’s helper." Old Tampa Bay did not specify what function Mr. Cano would serve or what actions he would perform as an "electrician’s helper." Neither the RFP nor Old Tampa Bay's proposal contains any mention of an "electrician’s helper." Mr. Cano’s résumé did not indicate an electrician’s license. Old Tampa Bay did not state that it had any intention to require Mr. Cano to obtain an electrician’s license. Mr. Cano’s résumé did not indicate any moveable bridge experience or experience on other FDOT projects. Again, Mr. Alvarez forwarded the Old Tampa Bay letter and attachments to Mr. Ooms for his review. Mr. Ooms provided his response by memorandum dated August 6, 1998. Again, Mr. Ooms outlined the qualifications and experience of the electricians originally proposed, Kelly Green and John Vance, as set forth in Old Tampa Bay's own proposal. Mr. Ooms wrote as follows (punctuation and capitalization not corrected): Mr. Green’s experience were [sic] listed as follows. "has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 4 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties. His duties range from preventive maintenance to emergency repair . . . an intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Green has a Journeyman’s electrician license. Mr. Vance’s experience were [sic] listed as follows. "has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 5 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties." "The maintenance he performs covers the entire bridge-- the gates, lock motors, drive motors, variable frequency drives, programmable controllers, contactors, limit switches, control panels and resistors." "intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Vance has a [sic] Electrical Contractor’s license. Mr. Green and Mr. Vance each have over four years of "on the Bridge" experience trouble shooting non functioning systems. They have worked on nine different bridges that were 30-40 years old with antique controll [sic] systems and on bridges recently rehabilitated with modern computer controlled systems. They have years of experience in reading and analyzing bridge ladder logic programs and trouble shooting problems and solutions. All these bridges were operational and any loss of service was quickly reported. An outage can easily block traffic for several miles in minutes generating calls from the sherrifs [sic] department. In addition, any breakdown in service has severe political consequences due to the Ringling bridge and Anna Maria Bridge replacement program. A problem on Ringling Bridge can cause a [sic] hour detour and missed flights. On page C-1 of the contract it states "The Contractor’s personnel that will perform the work required by this Section shall be trained and well experienced in start-up and maintenance of equipment . . . and will have headquarters within Sarasota/Manatee County" . . . On page A-3.2 is [sic] states "the Contractor shall initiate corrective action within fifteen (15) minutes following the malfunction." further down on Page C-1 of the contract "the Contractor agrees to provide men and equipment to a bridge sites [sic] within 30 minutes of notification of any emergency equipment failure". Mr. Ooms contrasted the experience and qualifications of the proposed substitutes as follows (punctuation and capitalization not corrected): Mr. Steven Manning experience [sic] in industrial electrical work does not start until 1997. It does not show any bridge related work. His training certificate in Electrical ladder Drawings" is for a one day 7 contact hours session. The "well experienced" requirement is not clearly indicated by his resume. Mr. Adrian Cook also does not show any bridge related work and the "well experienced". Mr. Wayne Cano has 11 years of industrial experience but no bridge experience or electricians license. In conclusion Old Tampa Bay enterprises needs to provide us with equivalent substitutions. Specifically licensed electricians with a minimum of four years experience in diverse bridge electrical configuration; with old relay logic operation, well experienced in PLC controllers from various manufactures [sic]; the ability to read and interpret ladder logic drawing; the ability to program plc’s. The Department’s inclusion of response time in the contract clearly indicates our desire for prompt and efficient emergency repair work. In other words the Department would like the equivalent of Mr. Green and Mr. Vance in the original proposal who’s [sic] experience will "keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." By letter to Mr. Abernathy dated August 13, 1998, Mr. Alvarez forwarded FDOT’s rejection of Old Tampa Bay’s proposed substitutes. The letter essentially reiterated the contents of the memorandum quoted above, and informed Old Tampa Bay that it would have one last opportunity to provide FDOT with equivalent or better substitutions for the electrical key personnel. Old Tampa Bay’s response would be due no later than August 24, 1998. Mr. Alvarez testified that as to this and his prior letters to Mr. Abernathy, he essentially acted as a conduit for the actual decision-maker, Mr. Ooms. Mr. Alvarez wrote the letters because he was the designated contact person in the FDOT contracts office, not because of any personal expertise or authority he possessed to deal with the issue of the qualifications of the proposed key personnel. By letter from Mr. Abernathy to Mr. Alvarez, dated August 21, 1998, Old Tampa Bay informed FDOT that "we are unable to locate electricians which meet or exceed the qualifications of those we proposed, i.e., Mr. Green and Mr. Vance. Please proceed as necessary." Old Tampa Bay’s letter did not take issue with any of the conclusions set forth in Mr. Alvarez’ letter of August 13, 1998. On August 24, 1998, FDOT posted a revised proposal tabulation finding Old Tampa Bay nonresponsive and listing GE as the intended awardee of the contract for RFP 1003. At the hearing, Mr. Ooms testified that he did not know Mr. Manning, Mr. Cook, or Mr. Cano, had no personal knowledge of their background or experience, and relied on their résumés in making his decision. Mr. Ooms felt that Mr. Manning, while a master electrician, lacked sufficient experience on PLCs and had no experience working on bridges. Mr. Ooms noted that the only indication of electrical ladder drawing or computer experience on Mr. Manning’s résumé was a seven-hour continuing education course in electrical ladder drawing. Mr. Ooms’ undisputed testimony was that a single seven-hour course was insufficient to provide the expertise needed to perform the duties required of an electrician on these bridges. Mr. Ooms admitted that John Vance and Kelly Green lacked PLC experience when they started working on the bridges, and were trained by FDOT. However, Mr. Ooms rejected Old Tampa Bay’s suggestion that Mr. Manning could be similarly trained on the job. Vance and Green were trained in connection with the installation of PLC equipment on the Cortez Bridge in 1996. Mr. Ooms testified that this training was simply a part of the rehabilitation of the bridge, and that PLC experience was not a prerequisite at the time Vance and Green were hired. Mr. Ooms further distinguished this situation by noting that the issue here is not simply qualifications, but equivalency. Mr. Ooms stated that because Old Tampa Bay’s winning proposal was based on the presence of Vance and Green, any substitutes for Vance and Green must not only meet the RFP specifications but must be equivalent to the experience of Vance and Green, which included PLC experience. Mr. Ooms testified that he rejected Adrian Cook for the same lack of PLC experience. Mr. Cook held the required journeyman electrician’s license, but his résumé gave no indication of PLC or troubleshooting experience. Mr. Ooms testified that he called Mr. Cook’s current employer, who vouched for him as a "good man," but provided no details as to his PLC experience. Mr. Ooms also admitted that he did not ask the employer about Mr. Cook’s PLC experience. As to Mr. Cano, Mr. Ooms testified that he appeared well qualified but lacked the required journeyman electrician’s license, and lacked bridge experience. Mr. Ooms was impressed by Mr. Cano’s PLC and ladder logic experience, and might have approved him but for the lack of the required license. Mr. Ooms acknowledged that Kelly Green did not have his journeyman electrician’s license when he started work on the bridges. Mr. Ooms testified that he was unaware of that fact at the time Mr. Green was hired. Douglas Blake, project engineer for GE, affirmed that in the five years GE has been performing bridge operations and maintenance, FDOT has never asked any electrician to produce a license. Mr. Blake testified that performance of an electrician’s job on these bridges does not require permitting, and that there is no license exposure to an electrician working these jobs. Mr. Blake’s opinion was that the license requirement is merely a contract tool FDOT can use to eliminate substandard bids. No witness for FDOT assented to Mr. Blake’s characterization of the license requirement. FDOT’s consistent position was that a prospective electrician must have at least a journeyman electrician’s license, as set forth in the RFP and the Bridge Manual. Mr. Blake testified that Manning, Cook, and Cano all appeared to be worthy candidates to be bridge electricians, insofar as their electrical technical qualifications appeared to compare favorably to those of Vance and Green. No evidence was presented that Mr. Ooms had any knowledge of Mr. Blake’s opinion at the time he made his decision, or that such knowledge would have altered that decision. Lane Tyus, a GE electrical engineer with experience on these bridges, likewise testified that the résumés of Manning, Cook, and Cano would pass his initial screening and that he would make a final decision in a face-to-face interview. No evidence was presented that Mr. Ooms had any knowledge of Mr. Tyus’ opinion at the time he made his decision, or that such knowledge would have altered that decision. At the hearing, Old Tampa Bay produced a list purporting to show 25 electricians whose hiring for bridge work was approved by FDOT for various districts during the period 1991 through 1998, despite the fact that none of the 25 had prior bridge experience. This list included Mr. Vance and Mr. Green in District One, where Mr. Ooms works. Mr. Ooms disclaimed knowledge as to the approval practices of other districts, which in any event have no relevance to this proceeding. Mr. Ooms again averred that this situation is different than that prevailing when Vance and Green were hired, because the substitutes here proffered by Old Tampa Bay must not only meet the RFP requirements but must be the equivalent of Vance and Green in experience and expertise. Mr. Abernathy testified that he believed the team of Manning, Cook and Cano was the equivalent of Vance and Green. He testified that any modern industrial electrician must have experience with PLCs, and will not necessarily spell-out that experience on his résumé. He testified that it was his "absolute firm belief" that no matter whose names he submitted to FDOT as substitute electricians, they would be rejected. Mr. Ooms testified that he neither favored GE nor disfavored Old Tampa Bay. He admitted having greater familiarity with GE’s personnel because they have been working on the bridges for the last five years. He testified that he considers it his professional obligation to work with whoever holds the contract. Aside from the obvious licensure deficiency for Mr. Cano, these proposed substitutes may well have been equivalent to Vance and Green. However, their equivalence could not be ascertained from Old Tampa Bay's submissions. Their résumés did not clearly establish their qualifications in areas that Old Tampa Bay knew or should have known were critical to FDOT. The agency made its expectations very clear to Old Tampa Bay as to what was expected of equivalent substitutes. Old Tampa Bay did nothing to expand upon the sketchy résumés of these persons, or to explicate the relationship between their experience and the work to be performed on the bridges. Mr. Ooms cannot be faulted for failing to consider information that the proposer did not provide. It is found that Mr. Ooms was not biased in rejecting Manning, Cook, and Cano. Old Tampa Bay argues that the disparity in the scoring of the technical proposals between Mr. Ooms and the other two evaluators demonstrates his bias in favor of GE. However, as noted above, all three evaluators gave GE the highest marks for RFP 1003. In fact, the scores for GE’s proposal given by the other two evaluators were significantly higher than the score Mr. Ooms gave to GE’s proposal. The fact that Mr. Ooms found an 18-point disparity between the proposal of GE and the proposals of the other two bidders does not of itself indicate bias in favor of GE on his part, any more than the fact that his score for GE was 15 to 18 points lower than the GE scores by the other evaluators indicates a bias against GE. FDOT demonstrated no bias against Old Tampa Bay in this process, providing Old Tampa Bay repeated opportunities to provide satisfactory substitutes for Green and Vance. Old Tampa Bay attempted to show disparate treatment by introducing evidence showing that FDOT allowed GE to substitute Kelly Green for an electrician named Charles Cave in 1995, after award of the previous contract, despite the fact that Green at the time had no experience working on the bridges and did not obtain a journeyman electrician’s license until approximately two months after he commenced work. Assuming arguendo that FDOT’s actions in awarding this contract may be attacked by showing different agency behavior in prior contracts, the evidence adduced by Old Tampa Bay is insufficient because it gives no indication of the qualifications of Charles Cave, the electrician replaced by Mr. Green. There is no way to determine whether Mr. Green was or was not an equivalent substitute for Mr. Cave, and thus no way to establish disparate treatment by FDOT from one contract to the next. Old Tampa Bay further asserts that FDOT’s treatment of Mr. Green when he commenced work indicates that FDOT had the discretion to allow Mr. McCormick to obtain his journeyman electrician’s license after commencing work. Assuming arguendo that Old Tampa Bay’s assertion is correct, the facts establish that the lack of a license was a secondary concern in the rejection of Mr. McCormick. Mr. Ooms testified that his rejection of Mr. McCormick was primarily based on lack of bridge and PLC experience, and the overstatement of qualifications on Mr. McCormick’s résumé. Even if Mr. McCormick possessed the required license, Mr. Ooms would have properly rejected him. Old Tampa Bay challenged FDOT’s allowing GE to make changes in its management personnel after being awarded the contract for RFP 1003. The three upper-level managers in question were located in Atlanta, had nothing directly to do with the operation of the bridges, and were not "key personnel" as described in the RFP and Bridge Manual. GE informed FDOT of the change in a courtesy letter, dated October 20, 1998, more than five months after submission of the original proposals. The RFP did not require these remote persons to be identified by name at all, let alone require GE to freeze them in place as a condition of its contract. As noted above, the facts established that Old Tampa Bay included the name of John Vance in its proposal though it knew or should have known that Mr. Vance had no intention of working for Old Tampa Bay on this project. Old Tampa Bay attempted to demonstrate that GE did substantially the same thing when it included the name of Mr. Lane Tyus in its proposal as its registered electrical engineer. Mr. Tyus indeed testified that he did not know that GE had included his name in the proposal at the time it was submitted, and was not made aware of his inclusion until some time after Old Tampa Bay filed its protest. However, Mr. Tyus also testified that he knew his résumé was kept on file by GE precisely for inclusion in proposals. Further, he testified that he has been involved with the contract for these bridges since 1992, that he was not surprised at his inclusion, and that he was prepared to undertake the tasks described in the GE proposal. Thus, there is no comparison between Mr. Tyus’ situation with GE and that of Mr. Vance with Old Tampa Bay. Finally, Old Tampa Bay attempted to demonstrate bias in the fact that FDOT allowed GE to submit John Vance's name as bridge superintendent for RFP 1004, despite his lack of experience in that position. However, Mr. Ooms testified that Mr. Vance was in fact more than qualified for the position, in that the training requirements set forth in the Bridge Manual for electricians such as Mr. Vance include all the requirements for bridge superintendents as well as electrical courses.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the protest filed by Old Tampa Bay Enterprises, Inc. and awarding the contract for RFP-DOT-97/98- 1003, Bridge Tending/Maintenance and Repair Services for Five Movable Bridges, Sarasota and Manatee Counties, to General Electric Industrial Systems. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan Sjostrom, Esquire Steel, Hector & Davis LLP 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Office oif the General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert A. Rush, Esquire Robert A. Rush, P.A. 726 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (2) 120.57287.057
# 3
MORSE DIESEL CIVIL, LLC vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 00-001202 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 20, 2000 Number: 00-001202 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 2000

The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), properly denied Petitioner's Application for Qualification to perform work on DOT contracts which exceed $250,000.00 pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Morse Diesel Civil, LLC ("Morse Diesel"), is a new company created to perform heavy civil construction, in particular large road and bridge projects. Morse Diesel is owned 80 percent by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., and 20 percent by KPG, Inc. Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., is owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. KPG, Inc., is owned by Richard Kelly ("Kelly") and Jack Palmer ("Palmer"). Together, Kelly and Palmer have over 50 years' experience in heavy civil construction. On October 8, 1998, Morse Diesel filed an application for qualification with the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") to perform all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. Since the company was new and had not yet performed any work, the letters of recommendation provided in the application related to Morse Diesel International, Inc. ("MDI"). MDI is a large commercial construction management company owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. Through DOT requests for additional information, Morse Diesel learned that DOT was interested in the experience of its principals and recommendations regarding their work. The work experience of Kelly, Palmer, John Zito, and Grant Ralston was provided to DOT in response to those requests. Under Rule 14-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, DOT thoroughly evaluated Morse Diesel and awarded it an Ability Score of 75 out of 100. DOT found that Morse Diesel had the necessary organization and management, adequate equipment, and a satisfactory work performance record which included an evaluation of the quality of completed work, any history of payment of liquidated damages, untimely completion of projects for which liquidated damages were not paid, cooperative attitude, contract litigations, claims, and defaults. Their score of 75 also included an evaluation of their integrity and responsibility. To date, Morse Diesel's ability score remains unchanged and in effect. On January 11, 1999, Morse Diesel was granted a Certificate of Qualification to perform all classes of work requested except major bridges and provided a maximum capacity rating of $200,000,000; that is, the total aggregate dollar amount of uncompleted work a contractor may have in progress at any time. Thereafter, Morse Diesel applied for a revised Certificate of Qualification to include major bridge classifications. DOT requested and was supplied additional information regarding the work experience of Kelly, Palmer, Zito and Ralston. DOT served a Notice of Intent to Deny the application for additional classes of work and Morse Diesel filed a request for a Section 120.57, administrative hearing. That case was dismissed as moot when Morse Diesel did not renew its Certificate of Qualification. On February 2, 2000, Morse Diesel applied for a Certificate of Qualification for all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. DOT denied its application on March 3, 2000. The decision to deny an application for Qualification is a very serious matter and each application is thoroughly evaluated by DOT. Less than one percent of all applications are denied. The decision to deny the February 2, 2000, application of Morse Diesel was made by the DOT pre-qualification engineer, Lewis Harper. The Notice of Intent to Deny the Application ("Notice of Intent") was written by Mr. Harper and Brian McGrail of the legal staff and identified the factual bases for the denial of the application and all the statutory and rule criteria utilized in the review of the application. Summary of Allegations The grounds for denial identified by DOT in the written Notice of Intent are: (a) a record of contract litigation, claims, uncooperative attitude, untimely completion of projects without payment of liquidated damages, and defaults by the management of Morse Diesel (Kelly and Palmer) when they worked for S. J. Groves and Sons, Inc., and Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc., on major bridge projects in Alabama, West Virginia, and Florida; (b) S. J. Groves was defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge Project by the State of Alabama; (c) Kelly and Palmer had substantial supervisory and management responsibilities for the Cochrane Bridge project and contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department; (d) The answer to Question 19-2 of the application regarding Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the Cochrane Bridge project does not accurately reflect their role and is considered false, deceptive or fraudulent; (e) Kelly and Palmer had responsibility for prosecuting work and making decisions for filing claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge project in the State of West Virginia and there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims; (f) Kelly and Palmer were litigious and claims-oriented when they were associated with Balfour Beatty in Florida; (g) MDI is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Norm Fornella is an officer is both companies and MDI was not listed in the application as an affiliate; (h) Morse Diesel did not advise DOT of the default of MDI; and (i) KPG is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Kelly is an officer in both companies and KPG was not listed in the application as an affiliate. The application was not denied due to a lack of adequate experience or equipment. Although Morse Diesel listed the same affiliates in its 1998 application as it did in its 2000 application, the 1998 application was partially granted and the failure to list affiliates was not a ground for denial of the request for additional classes. Allegations (a)-(d): Record of Contract Litigation, Claims, Uncooperative Attitude, Untimely Completion of Projects and Defaults by Management of Morse Diesel The right to submit a claim is a valuable right of the contractor. If a contractor contends he/she is due additional time and money, it is common for him/her to pursue his/her claims rights. If the liability for unforeseen circumstances falls on the owner, the contractor typically pursues claims based upon the increased cost associated with the extra time and expense occasioned by the unforeseen circumstances. Kelly and Palmer have been involved in very difficult, highly technical jobs throughout their careers. It is common for these projects to involve a number of problems and related change items. Industry-wide, complex projects often involve change item costs ranging between 12 percent and 20 percent of the contract price. The Cochrane Bridge Project; Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement; and Application Question 19-2 Construction on the Cochrane Bridge was begun in 1985. Kelly was an executive vice president of S. J. Groves at the time and was also responsible for 30 or 40 other projects. At the same time, Palmer was a vice president of operations for S. J. Groves responsible for 10 to 12 projects. The project manager for the Cochrane Bridge project reported to Palmer and Palmer visited the project every two weeks, mainly to solve problems. The Cochrane Bridge was one of the first cable-stayed bridges built in the United States. It was designed by an Italian design firm and could not be built in accordance with the method of construction proposed by the designer. Moreover, each time there was a design problem, the Italian design firm had to be consulted, which took a great deal of time and caused delays. The Cochrane Bridge was designed to withstand a certain maximum load after construction was completed. The bridge, however, was undergoing greater stress while it was under construction. Consequently, disagreement ensued over the sequence of erection, whose responsibility it was to develop the erection sequencing, whether additional strengthening was needed during construction and, if so, who would pay for it. While these issues were addressed, S. J. Groves stopped work on the project. The State of Alabama requested Groves to work on other areas of the project during the down-time, but Mr. Groves refused for economic reasons. Alabama threatened to default Groves if they did not return to work. Kelly and Palmer attended several high-level company meetings where the issue of whether to continue the project was discussed by Franklin Groves, the owner of S. J. Groves, as well as the company's president and general counsel. Although Kelly and Palmer recommended that S. J. Groves remain on the project, their recommendation was overruled and a default was entered by the State of Alabama. Kelly and Palmer left S. J. Groves within 6 months of the default and formed their own company, RNE, in 1989. There is no reliable evidence that they "contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department" as charged in the Notice of Intent to Deny. S. J. Groves pursued litigation against the Alabama road department regarding the default and a settlement was reached. The contractor chosen to take over the job after the Groves default, filed claims of approximately $10,000,000 to $12,000,000, and also wound-up in litigation with the State of Alabama. There were thirty to forty vice presidents of S. J. Groves. Neither Kelly nor Palmer understood that they served as a corporate officer of S. J. Groves until after Morse Diesel had filed the 1998 application and were shown corporate forms filed with the Secretary of State. In response to Question 19-2 in the application, Morse Diesel stated: "Richard Kelly and Jack Palmer were denominated vice presidents of S. J. Groves, which defaulted on a job in Alabama in 1989. S. J. Groves had a number of people denominated as Vice Presidents and neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. Palmer was at the level of management responsible for the decision to abandon the Cochrane Bridge Project. Both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Palmer recommended against abandoning the project and were overruled. They then left the company." There is no evidence which contradicts this finding. Allegation (e): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in the Wierton- Stubenville Project DOT presented no evidence to support its charge in the Notice of Intent that Kelly and Palmer were responsible for making the decision to file claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge in the State of West Virginia and that there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims. The only direct evidence is that Kelly was not involved in the preparation of claims or claims settlement on the Wierton- Stubenville project. The record is silent as to Palmer's involvement, if any. Allegation (f): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in Litigation and Claims at Balfour Beatty Kelly and Palmer were involved in Balfour Beatty's initial foray into the heavy civil construction business in Florida. In the early 1990's, Kelly met with DOT on Balfour Beatty's application for qualification to bid. At that time, DOT was on notice and inquired about Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the S. J. Grove's default in Alabama. The Cochrane Bridge project was discussed in detail during a meeting held at DOT headquarters in Tallahassee. After being qualified, Balfour Beatty bid $82,000,000 on a large I-95 project in Broward County and was the successful low bidder by $1,000,000. In the beginning of the project Kelly and Palmer acquired staff and equipment, wrote purchase orders for materials, and supervised the project. On December 31, 1991, Dan White was hired as the project manager and Palmer visited the site every couple of weeks until problems on the project escalated. As the project manager, Dan White was in charge of the job and was responsible for the filing of claims. There were right-of-way problems and contaminated soil which delayed the project from the beginning. An initial design problem resulted from the project having been designed by two different design firms operating from different types of surveys. Consequently, the road was not aligned at the same elevation to match existing structures. These elevation problems shut down the project for months. None of the design, right-of-way, or soil contamination problems was the fault of Balfour Beatty. Nonetheless, DOT rejected all change items and required Balfour Beatty to file claims. A lawyer for DOT eventually became involved in the project in an attempt to settle the disputes which resulted in the preparation of Supplemental Agreement Number 73. SA-73 settled the claims up to that date, set new dates for project completion and paid money for completion by those dates. SA-73 was entered into based upon DOT's assurance that a constructibility review had been completed to make sure that the remainder of the project could be constructed in accordance with the existing plans and there would be no further design problems. However, the constructibility review was not complete and new design problems occurred immediately. The design of the parking lots was changed as they were being built. Core holes, used to determine the depth and density of the pavement had not been drilled. This caused more delays and claims. Balfour Beatty filed a lawsuit against DOT, Morrison Knudsen, the CEI on the project, and DOT personnel on site. The case was settled against DOT and its personnel for $4,750,000 and a jury awarded $4,300,000 against Morrison Knudsen. Balfour Beatty remains qualified to bid on DOT projects and was awarded a contract to build the Fuller Warren Bridge in Jacksonville. Kelly and Palmer, as consultants to Balfour Beatty, participated in preparing the bid for the Fuller Warren Bridge and that project is currently staffed with many of the same personnel who worked on the Broward County I-95 project, including the project manager, Dan White. The Broward County I-95 project was awarded on a bid of $82,000,000. DOT paid Balfour Beatty $97,000,000. The completion of the I-95 project was one to two years late and resulted in over 100 claims being filed. The Fuller Warren Bridge project was awarded on a bid of $81,000,000 and has cost to date approximately $94,000,000 to $96,000,000. None of the problems on the I-95 project were caused by Kelly or Palmer. Neither Kelly nor Palmer was involved in the preparation of the lawsuit or its settlement. ALLEGATION (g): Statements in the Application on Affiliations According to DOT's application, "The term 'affiliate' means a predecessor or successor of a contractor under the same, or substantially the same, control or a group of business entities which are connected or associated so that one entity controls or has the power to control each of the other business entities. The term 'affiliate' includes the officers, directors, executives, shareholders active in management, employees and agents of the affiliate. The ownership by one business entity of a controlling interest in another business or a pooling of equipment or income among business entities shall be prima facie evidence that one business entity is an affiliate of another." In its application for bid qualification, Morse Diesel listed Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. as its affiliates. Morse Diesel did not identify either MDI or KPG as "affiliated companies" in response to question number 8 in the application. The application was prepared under the direction of Morse Diesel's President, Mitchell Becker who has a master's degree in civil engineering and a law degree. Based upon his interpretation of the definition, he determined in good faith that MDI and KPG were correctly omitted from the response to question 8 because neither met the criteria for "affiliate" as defined in the application. The answer to question 8 is the same in both the 1998 application and the 2000 application and DOT did not request additional information in the 1998 application related to the response nor did it list the failure to name MDI and KPG as affiliates as a ground for denial of the additional classes of work in 1999. There was a notation on page 2 of 19 in the 1998 application referring to MDI as a "sister company." The question requested letters of recommendation. Morse Diesel was a newly formed company, and did not have recommendations for projects it had completed. Instead, it supplied the recommendations of MDI. It became apparent to Morse Diesel through subsequent requests for additional information that DOT was interested in recommendations about the principals and management of Morse Diesel, not MDI. Consequently, when filing its 2000 application, Morse Diesel did not supply MDI letters of recommendation and instead provided recommendations on previous work completed by Morse Diesel personnel while associated with other companies. The only entities that are predecessor entities or have any control over Morse Diesel are Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. KPG is not a predecessor or successor of Morse Diesel and has no ability to control it with 20 percent ownership. Similarly, MDI is not a predecessor or successor entity and has no controlling interest in Morse Diesel. There was no intent to hide the nature of Morse Diesel's relationship with MDI or KPG. The fact that Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both Morse Diesel and MDI is clearly stated in their résumés in the application. It is DOT's policy to deny application for misrepresentation only when it is intentional. Morse Diesel listed MDI as an affiliate in its Virginia application because the definition of "affiliate" in that application was broader and appeared to encompass MDI. Footnote 3 on page 7 of the audited financial statements refers to a transfer of funds from MDI to Morse Diesel. Mr. Becker, as president of Morse Diesel testified that the footnote in the financial statement attached to the application was a mistake. MDI has never advanced money to Morse Diesel. The advances made to Morse Diesel were made by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. Mr. Becker as president of Morse Diesel is aware of the financial condition of the company and reviews the financial statements each month. There is no pooling of equipment or income between Morse Diesel and MDI. Allegation (h): Notice of the MDI Default Question 19-2 on page 16 of 23 of the application asks whether "any officer or partner of your organization has ever been an officer, partner or owner of some other organization that has failed to complete a construction contract?" In response to that question, Morse Diesel explained in the application that Kelly and Palmer had been associated with S. J. Groves when it defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge project in Alabama, but otherwise answered the question "no." Although Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both MDI and Morse Diesel, the application did not reveal the default of MDI on a project in St. Louis because the company is contesting the default and has not as yet failed to complete that construction contract; it is in litigation. There is no credible evidence that Morse Diesel or Mr. Becker intentionally omitted any information from the 2000 application. Allegation (i): See Findings for Allegation (g). Morse Diesel has demonstrated that it is competent and has experience to prosecute the work requested in the application. DOT has allowed at least one other applicant to amend its application to identify related companies as affiliates after DOT has denied certification on that basis. The résumés in the application and evidence presented at hearing reflect the work experience of the management of Morse Diesel and indicate extensive experience in heavy civil construction, including highly complex projects. The management of Morse Diesel has experience constructing all the types of road and bridges for which qualification is sought. Morse Diesel has been qualified in New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Pennsylvania qualified Morse Diesel on the condition that Mr.Palmer remain associated with Morse Diesel and involved in any project awarded there.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Morse Diesel be permitted to supply DOT with corrections to the unintentional inaccuracies in its application and be pre-qualified in the classifications for which it applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Brian A. Newman, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Brian A. Crumbaker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.569120.57120.60120.68337.14337.16337.167 Florida Administrative Code (5) 14-22.00214-22.00314-22.01214-22.01414-22.0141
# 5
THE WEITZ COMPANY, LLC vs BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 10-008182BID (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Aug. 23, 2010 Number: 10-008182BID Latest Update: Feb. 18, 2011

The Issue Whether Respondent's intended rejection of all responses to its solicitation of "qualifications" from entities interested in contracting with Respondent to perform construction management at risk services in connection with a project at Fort Lauderdale High School is illegal, arbitrary, and/or dishonest, as alleged by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a district school board responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) in Broward County, Florida (including, among others, Fort Lauderdale High School) and for otherwise providing public instruction to school-aged children in the county. As authorized by Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A- 1.012, Respondent has "establish[ed] purchasing rules" (denominated as "policies"). Respondent's Policy 3320 contains Respondent's "Purchasing Policies." Part III of Respondent's Policy 3320 prescribes "Purchasing Policies" for Respondent's Facilities and Construction Management Division, and it provides, in pertinent part, as follows: All additions, modifications, and alterations to School Board properties shall conform with the State Requirement for Educational Facilities (SREF), Florida Building Code (FBC) and the laws of the State of Florida. School Board administrators shall obtain assistance in preparing bid specifications and applicable building permit(s) from the Facilities and Construction Management division for these items. Part VIII of Respondent's Policy 3320 addresses the subject of "protests arising from the competitive solicitation process" and incorporates the protest procedures found in Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent's Policy 7003 is entitled, "Pre- Qualification of Contractors and Selection of Architects, Engineers, Design Builders, Construction Managers, and Total Program Managers Pursuant to the Consultants Competitive Negotiation Act." It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The School Board shall pre-qualify bidders for construction contracts, and, publicly announce, in a uniform and consistent manner, each occasion when construction and/or professional services are required to be purchased in compliance with governing statutes and regulations. The Superintendent shall establish procedures for the pre-qualification of contractors and selection of architects, engineers, design- builders, construction managers and total program managers consistent with this policy, applicable statutes and State Requirements for Educational Facilities (SREF). Rules The School Board authorizes the Superintendent to: Receive applications for Contractor Pre- Qualification on the attached application form in compliance with FS 1013.46 and SREF 4.1(8), as amended. . . . * * * 4. Designate an evaluation committee of eleven (11) voting members for the purpose of Pre-Qualification of contractors and selection of architects, engineers, design builders, construction managers and total program managers. * * * The committee shall make recommendations to the Superintendent regarding the pre- qualification of contractors. The Superintendent shall make recommendations to the Board: Along with a report from the committee containing findings of fact indicating the proposers' compliance with the procurement requirements and scoring criteria and the Board shall have the final approval of such recommendations. The Contractor Pre-Qualification Application Form "attached" to Policy 7003 contains the following description of the contractor pre-qualification process: The School Board ("Board") through the Superintendent or his/her designee, shall pre-qualify all "contractors" for construction contracts, and any other contracts that require a certificate issued pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, including, but not limited to, all bidders, construction managers, design-builders, job- order contractors, term contractors, and all other types of contractors on an annual basis or for a specific project according to the rules set forth in the State Requirements for Educational Facilities (SREF) Section 4.1(8). Contractors shall be pre-qualified on the basis of the criteria set forth in SREF and included in the foregoing application form. In addition to the foregoing criteria the applicant shall provide the Dun and Bradstreet report indicated in the application. The evaluation committee shall be as set forth in Board Policy 7003. The applicant shall complete the form in its entirety and submit all required documents by the deadline set forth in the public announcement. Separate applications shall be submitted for each desired contracting category. The School Board of Broward County shall receive and either approve or reject each application for prequalification within sixty (60) days after receipt of application in its entirety and all required documents. Approval shall be based on the criteria and procedures set forth in SREF. The Board shall issue to all pre-qualified contractors a certificate valid for one (1) year from the date of approval or for the specific project(s). That certificate shall include the following: A statement indicating that the contractor may bid, propose, or otherwise be considered, on the specific project(s) or for this specific time period. A statement establishing the total dollar value of the work the contractor will be permitted to have under contract with the Board at any one time. The maximum value shall not exceed the contractor's bonding capacity or ten (10) times the net quick assets. A statement establishing the maximum dollar value of each individual project the contractor will be permitted to have under contract with the Board at any one time. The maximum value of each project may be up to twice the value of the largest similar project previously completed but shall not exceed the Contractor's bonding capacity or ten (10) times the net quick assets. A statement establishing the type of work the contractor will be permitted to provide. The expiration date of the certificate. It shall be the responsibility of the contractor to renew annually certificates not for a specific project. Financial statements or written verification of bonding capacity on file with the Board shall be updated annually. Failure to submit a new statement or verification of bonding capacity within thirty (30) days written notice by the Board shall automatically revoke a pre-qualification certificate. 1. Pre-qualified contractors may request a revision of their pre-qualification status at any time they believe the dollar volume of work under contract or the size or complexity of the projects should be increased if experience, staff size, staff qualifications, and other pertinent data justify the action. These procedures are in accordance with requirements set forth in Section 4.1 of the State Requirements for Educational Facilities. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 6, "[o]n May 20, 2008, [Respondent] approved the Request for Qualifications No. 2008-030-FC (RFQ) entitled 'Construction Management at Risk Services for Districts 2, 3 and 4 Projects (Cooper City High School - Project No. 1931-99-02; Fort Lauderdale High School – Project No. 0951-27-01; Margate Elementary School – Project No. 1161-26-01; and Northeast High School – Project No. 1241-27-01),' and authorized the public announcement of the RFQ." "[In] [t]he summary explanation and background [section of] the Agenda Request Form [for this agenda item, it was] stated that the 'Facilities and Construction Management staff recommend[ed] the procurement of construction services utilizing Construction Management at Risk delivery method due to the complexity, scope and scale of the projects.'" This "delivery method" is to be distinguished from the "hard bid" or "design/bid/build" method of procurement, where a contractor is hired only after "the construction documents are completed." Under the "Construction Management at Risk delivery method," contrastingly, the construction manager typically assists in the development and "complet[ion]" of the "construction documents," offering advice and recommendations to maximize quality and cost efficiency. As a result, it is "not uncommon" for there to be post-solicitation changes in a project's scope and budget when this "delivery method" is employed. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 7, "[a]t the time of [Respondent's] approval of the RFQ, the portion of the RF[Q] pertaining to [the FHS Project] had an advertised Proposed Construction Budget of $29,150,340 and a project scope which was described [in RFQ] as follows: 'Concurrent replacement in two phases to include: Phase I – Construct a 3- story Administration Classroom Building of 68,940 GSF to include Administration, 3 general classroom[s], 5 resource rooms, 4 Science Labs and related spaces, a 4-classroom ESE Suite, 1 Business Technology Lab, 1 Family and Consumer Science (ProStart) Lab, 1 Health Occupations Lab, 1 Pre-Law Public Service Education Lab, Custodial spaces, Textbook Storage and Student, Staff and Public Restrooms. Demolish Buildings 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13 and 14.'" Phase II of the project was, at the time, described in the RFQ as follows: "Construct Parent drop off & pick up area and Staff/Visitor Parking; Construct Regional Athletic Facility; Renovate Building 8 into Science Labs; Demolish existing tennis courts & replace with 6 tennis courts; Demolish Swimming Pool; Construct basketball courts; Resurface Student Parking." These descriptions represented the "initial concept" of the FHS Project (the design of the project having been then only in the "conceptual stage" of development). Respondent wanted to have the benefit of the input and advice of a construction manager (working together with the architect selected for the project) in developing the project's design beyond the "conceptual stage." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Facts 12 through 19, "[b]etween the initial public release of the RFQ and the submission of proposed qualifications, [Respondent] issued seven (7) addenda revising the RFQ's terms and conditions," with "Addendum No. 4 chang[ing] the scope of the [FHS Project] component of the RFQ as follows": Delete the scope in Phase I to demolish Building #4. Delete the scope in Phase II to construct basketball courts and to resurface student parking. Revise the words "replace with 6 tennis courts" to be the words "construct five (5) tennis courts." Clarify phasing: In Phase I, demolish the existing track and athletic field and relocate existing baseball field. Clarify scope: In Phase II, for the staff parking construct a 3-story parking structure including required access road work. Clarify scope: Phase II includes renovation of existing courtyard to provide ADA access to existing gymnasium and auditorium. (Emphasis, by bolding, supplied in original). Addendum No. 6 "[r]evised the [RFQ's] Submittal Due Date to read 'No later than 2:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008.'" As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 20,"[a]fter [the] issuance of Addendum No. 7 to the RFQ, the scope of the [FHS Project] component of the RFQ was described as follows [with strike-throughs and underlining indicating, respectively, post-issuance deletions and additions]: Concurrent replacement in two phases to include: Phase I – Construct a 3-story Administration Classroom Building of 68,940 GSF to include Administration, 3 general classroom[s], 5 resource rooms, 4 Science Labs and related spaces, a 4-classroom ESE Suite, 1 Business Technology Lab, 1 Family and Consumer Science (ProStart) Lab, 1 Health Occupations Lab, [1 Pre-Law Public Service Education Lab], Custodial spaces, Textbook Storage and Student, Staff and Public Restrooms. Demolish the existing track and athletic field and relocate existing baseball field. Demolish Buildings 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13 and 14. Phase II – Construct Parent drop off & pick up area and a 3-story parking structure including required road access work for Staff Parking and /Visitor Parking[.] Construct Regional Athletic Facility[.] Renovate building 8 into Science Labs[.] Demolish existing tennis courts & replace with 6 tennis courts construct five (5) tennis courts. Demolish Swimming Pool. Renovate existing courtyard to provide ADA access to existing gymnasium and auditorium. Construct basketball courts. Resurface Student Parking." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Facts 10 and 11, on August 26, 2008, the date that Respondent issued its final addendum to the RFQ (Addendum No. 7), it also issued a Revised Public Announcement publicizing the issuance of the RFQ (as revised by the seven addenda). The Revised Public Announcement read, in pertinent part, as follows: In order to supplement the expertise of the Facilities and Construction Management Department, the Superintendent of Schools, pursuant to Florida Statutes, announces that The School Board of Broward County, Florida, is in need of Construction Management Services, related to new construction and renovations of educational facilities. Pursuant to this request for qualifications, The Board will consider contracts with one of more proposers to provide these services. Services under this contract include, but are not limited to the following items and shall be in accordance with SREF [State Requirements for Educational Facilities] 1999 Chapter 4: Bid and award activities including managing bidder listing, addendum, bidding, proposals, schedule of values, contracts, guaranteed maximum price, value engineering, and bonds. Construction activities including managing meetings, contract administration, monitoring procedures, contract records, inspections, non-conformances, owner- supplied equipment, testing, project accounting, and construction services. Warranty activities including managing claims and periodic inspections. Provide other basic services as required. Refer to the Request for Qualifications for more detailed project scopes. * * * RFQ No. 2008-30-FC Project Nos. 0951 27 01/P000687 Fort Lauderdale High School (proposed construction budget $29,150,340): Phase replacement in 2 phases to include: Phase I - Demolish selected buildings, tennis courts, swimming pool, track and athletic field. Construct a 3-story Administration Classroom Buildings[2] of 68,949 GSF; parent drop off/pick-up area and visitor parking; 5 tennis courts. Relocate existing baseball field. Phase II - Demolish selected building. Construct a 3-story parking structure including required access road work; Regional Athletic Facility. Renovate existing courtyard for ADA access to Gym and Auditorium. Renovate Building 8 into Science Labs. * * * Award: Project will be awarded by Facility. Proposed Construction Budget: Includes all costs inclusive of the Construction Manager's fees, Cost of Work, and any other costs related to construction. Minimum Selection Criteria: Will include the following as a minimum, (refer to document RFQ, Article X Submittal Requirements for expanded list of selection criteria): The company's history, structure, personnel, licenses, and experience. Related projects similar in scope or amount completed by the company, including name of client or its representative. Financial information such as balance sheet and statement of operations and bonding capacity. Project management, scheduling and cost control systems the company uses for similar projects. Proposed minority business involvement in the project. . . . Cost control, value engineering techniques and constructability reviews. Description of litigation, major disputes, contract defaults and liens in the last five (5) years. Interview. Confirmation of references. Consideration of the volume of work previously awarded to each firm, with the object of effecting an equitable distribution of contracts among qualified firms, provided such distribution does not violate the principle of selection of the most qualified firms. * * * The completed RFQ response must be delivered . . . . NO LATER THAN 2:00 PM SEPTEMBER 3, 2008 * * * Qualifications Selection Evaluation Committee (QSEC): After submission, proposers will be evaluated by the Qualification Selection Evaluation Committee (QSEC) based upon the above minimum criteria. The QSEC will select no less than three (3) proposers, ranked in order of tabulated score. The QSEC will recommend the finalist(s) for award of contracts to Construction Managers to the Superintendent. The Superintendent shall either recommend award of contract(s) to the finalist(s) selected by the QSEC or recommend rejection of all proposals to the Board. After the Board approves the recommendations of the QSEC the Board will authorize the Superintendent, or designee, to negotiate a contract for services for fees to provide direct management of the Construction Management at Risk Contract. Recommendations by the Qualification Selection Evaluation Committee do not guarantee a contract will be awarded by the Board. Award of a contract does not guarantee that work will be issued. Fees will be negotiated in accordance with Board Policy 7003 and Section 287.055, F.S. Article I of the RFQ (as revised) listed "General Requirements" that "proposers [had to] meet" "[i]n order to be considered." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 21, Article I.D. of the RFQ (as revised) provided, in pertinent part, as follows: All proposers must be prequalified according to 1013.46 F.S., SREF 4.1(8), and Board Policy 7003 at the time of submittal due date to this RFQ. Article I.H. of the RFQ (as revised) provided as follows: The School Board of Broward County, Florida reserves the right to reject any or all responses, to waive technicalities, or to accept the proposal that, in its sole judgment, best serves the interest of The School Board of Broward County, Florida. Article II of the RFQ (as revised) described the "Selection Process." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 22, Article of the RFQ (as revised) "was entitled 'Proposal Review by Staff' and stated as follows": Facilities and Construction Management Division staff will conduct a review of the proposer's submittal to determine whether the proposer meets the terms of this RFQ, requirements of the Florida Statutes, State Requirements for Educational Facilities regulations, Florida Building Code, and any other code, statute, or standard applicable at the time of response. Facilities and Construction Management Staff will provide information to the QSEC Members showing payments made by the district to the proposing firms over the past three (3) years. Non-compliant proposals will be recommended to the committee for rejection. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 23, Article of the RFQ (as revised) "was entitled 'Shortlist Selection' and stated as follows": The QSEC Members will assign points to each proposer, for each facility, based upon the Selection Criteria below and attached Selection Criteria Score Sheet in the shortlist evaluation process. Each QSEC Member shall assign points for each proposer according to the selection criteria and rank them according to their scores. The proposer receiving the most points by a QSEC Member will be considered the first choice of that QSEC Member. The firm that receives the most first choice votes from the committee will be the top-ranked proposer. The second-ranked proposer will be the proposer that receives the most points, other than the proposer who was already selected as the top-ranked, and so on. In the event of a tie a voice vote will be taken until the tie is broken. If the voice vote is not unanimous, then a roll-call vote will be taken. The selection process will establish a "shortlist" for each facility/project of not less than three (3) proposers and no more than five (5) proposers submitting proposals. Shortlist selection will be done by each facility. Article II.E. of the RFQ (as revised) called for "[p]resentations" to be made to the QSEC by the shortlisted proposers. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 24, Article II.G. of the RFQ (as revised) "was entitled 'Final Selection' and stated as follows": The QSEC will interview and rank the shortlisted firms. The QSEC will assign points to each proposer, for each facility, utilizing the Selection Criteria and point schedule included with the Selection Criteria Score Sheet to finalize the selection. Note, M/WBE staff will provide scores for M/WBE categories. However, such scores are recommendations by M/WBE staff and may be adjusted by individual QSEC Members. Each QSEC Member shall assign points for each proposer according to the selection criteria and rank them according to their scores for each project/facility. The proposer receiving the most points by a QSEC Member will be considered the first choice of that QSEC Member. The proposer that receives the most first choice votes from the committee will be the top-ranked proposer. The second-ranked proposer, will be the proposer that receives the most points, other than the proposer who was selected as the top-ranked proposer, and so on. In the event of a tie a voice vote will be taken until the tie is broken. If the voice vote is not unanimous, then a roll- call vote will be taken. The QSEC will recommend the finalist(s) for award of contract to Construction Manager to the Superintendent. The Superintendent shall either recommend award of contract(s) to the finalist(s) selected by the QSEC or recommend rejection of all proposals to the Board. After the Board approves the recommendations of the QSEC the Board will authorize the Superintendent, or designee, to negotiate a contract with the top-ranked firm according to Section 287.055, F.S. The Board shall have final approval of such recommendations. Final selection will be done by each facility. Article II.H. of the RFQ (as revised) contained the "Minimum Selection Criteria." This provision read as follows: Minimum Selection Criteria: Will include the following as a minimum, (refer to this document Article XI Submittal Requirements for expanded list of selection criteria): The company's history, structure, personnel, licenses, and experience. Related projects similar in scope or amount completed by the company, including name of client or its representative. Financial information such as balance sheet and statement of operations and bonding capacity. Project management, scheduling and cost control systems the company uses for similar projects. Proposed minority business involvement in the project (refer to this document Article I, J for requirements). Cost control, value engineering techniques and constructability reviews. Description of litigation, major disputes, contract defaults and liens in the last five (5) years. Interview. Confirmation of references. Consideration of the volume of work previously awarded to each firm, with the object of effecting an equitable distribution of contracts among qualified firms, provided such distribution does not violate the principle of section of the most qualified firms. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 25, Article III of the RFQ (as revised) "[was] entitled 'Competitive Negotiations' and state[d] as follows": After the QSEC ranks the firms, recommends the finalist(s) to the Superintendent, and the Superintendent recommends the finalist(s) to the Board[,] [t]he Superintendent, or designee will negotiate a contract for services for fees to provide direct management cost of the CM and Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP). The CM contract shall maintain an "open book" project accounting process, with any savings returned to the Board. Should the negotiations not result in a contract with the finalist at a price determined by both parties to be customary, fair, competitive, and reasonable, negotiations with that firm shall be formally terminated. The Superintendent, or designee, shall undertake negotiation with the second most qualified firm and thereafter, if necessary, with the third firm. Should the Board be unable to negotiate a satisfactory contract with any of the selected firms, additional firms will be selected in accordance with the above- described procedure. Negotiation should continue in accordance with Section 287.055, F.S., or until the Board determines not to proceed and to re-advertise and repeat the process. Article IV of the RFQ (as revised) addressed the "Scope of Services." It simply provided as follows: "Refer to attached Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager for requirements." Article 3 of the "attached Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager" (Sample Contract) enumerated the "Construction Manager's Services." Those services to be performed by the hired construction manager during the "Pre-Design Phase" were described in Article 3.2 of the Sample Contract as follows: The Construction Manager shall review project requirements, educational specifications, on and off-site development, survey requirements, preliminary budget, and make value engineering and constructability recommendations for revisions to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to the final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager shall, subject to Owner's approval and compliance with existing Owner completion schedule, establish a preliminary master project schedule identifying all phases, Critical Path elements, responsibilities of the Owner, Project Consultant, outside agencies, third parties and any other impacts which would affect project schedule and progress and update them monthly throughout the duration of the contract. When the project includes renovation or expansion of an existing Facility, the Construction Manager will assist the Construction Team in preparing an analysis package outlining the condition of the existing Facility, existing structure, existing finishes, and existing equipment, code deficiencies, energy use, and life expectancy of other building systems by providing constructability, value engineering, and cost estimates recommendations. The package should contain the Construction Manager's recommendations, cost estimates and preliminary schedules. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager shall prepare detailed cost estimates and recommendations to Owner and Project Consultant at S.D. (Schematic Design), D.D. (Design Development), C.D. (50% and 100% Construction Documents) phases of the project. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to final payment for each phase. The Construction Manager shall provide project delivery options for the design, bid, and bid packaging of the project for efficient scheduling, cost control and financial resource management. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager shall utilize information and reporting systems to provide the Owner with monthly reports containing accurate and current cost controls, work status, including but not limited to Work narrative, Work completed/anticipated, short term and long term schedules, estimated expenditures, and project accounting systems of the project at all times. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report, prior to final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager shall prepare a report with the Project Team's participation which shall describe, as a minimum, the Work plan, job responsibilities, and written procedures for reports, meetings, inspections, changes to the project, building systems, and delivery analysis and other relevant matters. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant prior to final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager shall provide market analysis and motivation for subcontractor interest and recommendations for minority business participation. This shall include analysis of the Construction Manager's historical data for subcontracting, communication with contractor and trade organizations requesting participation, review of the Owner's M/WBE data, advertising, outreach programs, mailings to all prospective bidders identified by these actions, and reporting of all of the for[e]going to the Owner. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager's personnel to be assigned during this phase and their duties and responsibilities to this project and the duration of their assignments are shown on Exhibit D to the General Conditions. All required reports and documentation shall be submitted and approved by the Owner as pre-requisite to progress payments to the Construction Manager by the Owner during this phase. Those services to be performed by the hired construction manager during the "Design Phase" were described in Article 3.3 of the Sample Contract as follows: The Construction Manager will be required to attend all project related meetings and include a summary of the meeting of its monthly report to the Owner as specified in Document 01310. The Construction Manager will periodically review to the best of their abilities all Contract documents for constructability and compliance with applicable laws, rules, codes, design standards, and ordinances. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report in the format as noted herein prior to final payment for this phase (Refer to exhibits G and H). The Construction Manager will be required to work with and coordinate [its] activities with any additional consultants, or testing labs and others that Owner provides for the project and report all findings as specified in Document 01310. The Construction Manager shall review all Contract documents for the new and existing buildings and/or building sites and provide value engineering recommendations to minimize the Owner's capital outlay and maximize the Owner's operational resources. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to final payment for this phase. All such recommendations shall be acknowledged and incorporated into the construction documents by the Project Consultant unless otherwise authorized by the Owner in writing. The Construction Manager will review construction documents and the new and existing buildings conditions and/or building site to reduce to the best of [its] abilities conflicts, errors and omissions and shall coordinate with the Project Consultant in order to eliminate change orders due to errors, omissions and unforeseen conditions. The Construction Manager shall periodically update the master project schedule and make recommendations for recovery of lost time. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report prior to final payment for this phase. The Construction Manager will coordinate with the Project Consultant and provide to the Project Construction Team permitting applications and requirements for the projects. The Construction Manager will periodically update cost estimates and make recommendations to keep the project within the FLCC. AT COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGER'S REVIEW OF THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS, EXCEPT ONLY AS TO SPECIFIC MATTERS AS MAY BE IDENTIFIED BY APPROPRIATE WRITTEN COMMENTS PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION, CONSTRUCTION MANAGER SHALL WARRANT, WITHOUT ASSUMING THE PROJECT CONSULTANT'S RESPONSIBILITES, THAT THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE CONSISTENT, PRACTICAL, FEASIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIBLE. CONSTRUCTION MANAGER SHALL WARRANT THAT THE WORK DESCRIBED IN THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE VARIOUS BIDDING PACKAGES IS CONSTRUCTIBLE WITHIN THE SCHEDULED CONSTRUCTION TIME. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY: THE OWNER DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTY THAT THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PROJECT ARE ACCURATE, PRACTICAL, CONSISTENT OR CONSTRUCTIBLE OR WITHOUT DEFECT. .10. The Owner may select certain projects for expediting using fast-track construction. When this option is exercised, in writing, by SBBC, it shall be implemented in accordance with the following: A. Design/Construction documents as noted herein shall be submitted by the Consultant for review and approval by SBBC (including Building Code review and Building permit issuance for 100% completion documents), the Construction Manager and others, as applicable, having jurisdiction: Foundation/Structural/LCCA/Site and Off- Site Package-100% Documents A separate 50% completion progress set (for information only) of Building Finish Package drawings shall also be submitted which shall show all of the major characteristics of the project utilities and service, detailed site and floor plans, elevations, section, schedules, etc. Construction may begin after approvals and building permit is obtained for above package. Building Finish Package-100% Documents As mutually agreed by the parties in writing. .11 Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP): Upon completion of the design phase [construction documents 100% complete] and prior to the bidding and award phase, the Construction Manager shall present to the Owner the GMP for the Owner[']s review and approval in accordance with Article 6 of this Agreement.[3] Those services to be performed by the hired construction manager during the "Bidding and Award Phase" were described in Article 3.4 of the Sample Contract as follows: At this stage the Construction Manager assumes the leadership responsibility for the project team. Upon obtaining all necessary approvals of the Construction Documents including a Building Permit as required by FBC and Owner approval of the latest Statement of Probable Construction Cost, the Construction Manager shall obtain bids and commence awarding construction contracts. The Owner will have the drawings and specifications printed for bidding purposes, either through its open Agreements with printing firms or as a reimbursable service through the Project Consultant, or as set forth in Article 26.03.08 in the General Conditions of this CM Agreement. The Construction Manager shall review the Owner[']s records of pre-qualified contractors, including Minority/Women Business Enterprises (M/WBE) and prepare a list of those recommended for work pursuant to this contract. The Owner reserves the right to reject any or all subcontractors recommended for approval. The Construction Manager shall maintain a list of all potential bidders, including M/WBEs and those who are approved as pre-qualified. The Construction Manager shall prepare and issue the bid packages to cover the scope of the Work for this contract. The Construction Manager, in coordination with the Owner, shall schedule pre-bid conferences as required and issue a written summary of the conference(s). Solicitation of Bids: .1 The Construction Manager shall enter into Contracts with the firm who submits the lowest, responsive and responsible bid. The Construction Manager shall advertise according to SBBC policies as amended from time to time for bids on Documents 00101 at least three (3) times, seven (7) days apart, and with the third (3rd) advertisement prior to a pre-bid conference if applicable and at least seven (7) days prior to the bid opening. Written proposals based on drawings and/or specifications shall be submitted to the Construction Manager. The written proposals shall be opened at the usual location for bid opening. A tabulation of the results shall be furnished by Construction Manager to the Owner. .6 The Construction Manager and Owner shall open at the Construction Manager location and evaluate at least three bids, if possible, for each portion of the Work solicited. The Construction Manager shall also make recommendations to the Owner for award to the lowest, responsive, and responsible bidder. A recommendation for award to other than the lowest bidder shall be justified in writing. Those services to be performed by the hired construction manager during the "Construction Phase" were described in Article 3.5 of the Sample Contract as follows: The Construction Manager shall fully comply with the provision[s] of the Owner's Project Manual, including but not limited to Division 0 and 1, and the attached General Conditions of this contract. In the event of a conflict between this Agreement and such documents the agreement shall control. The Construction Manager shall provide the minimum staffing level as set forth in Exhibit C-F for this project. The Construction Manager shall maintain and prepare monthly updates for all project schedules, including Critical Path elements, provide written progress reports, describe problems and corrective action plan(s) and conduct briefings as required by the Owner. Such information shall be provided to the Owner and Project Consultant in the form of a written report with progress payments requests. The Construction Manager may self perform certain construction work when it benefits the Owner, results in cost and time savings, and is pre-approved by the Owner in writing. The Construction Manager shall coordinate project close-out, operation, and transition to occupancy. The Construction Manager shall coordinate with the Project Consultant to provide complete project records including project manual and electronic Computer Assisted Drafting (CAD) drawings corrected to show all construction changes, additions, and deletions. (Construction Manager shall note all changes on the as-builts for the Project Consultant to reflect on the drawings and CAD disc.) The Construction Manager shall coordinate with the Owner's staff to prepare the Certificate of Final Inspection. The Construction Manager shall obtain and review all warranties, operation and maintenance manuals and other such documents, for completeness, have them corrected if necessary and submit them to the owner. The Construction Manager shall complete all punch list items generated by the Building Code Inspector (BCI), the Owner, the Project Consultant and any others having jurisdiction over the project during its inspections. Those services to be performed by the hired construction manager during the "Warranty Phase" were described in Article 3.6 of the Sample Contract as follows: The Construction Manager shall provide a minimum one (1) year warranty and shall coordinate and supervise the completion of warranty Work during the warranty period. Construction Manager shall participate with the Owner in conducting of warranty inspections held on the sixth (6th) and eleventh (11th) months after occupancy. Construction Manager shall deliver as-built drawings, warranties and guaranties to the Owner. Where any Work is performed by the Construction Manager's own forces or by subcontractors under contract with the Construction Manager, the Construction Manager shall warrant that all materials and equipment included in such work will be new except where indicated otherwise in Contract Documents, and that such Work will be free from improper workmanship and defective materials and in conformance with the Drawings and specifications. With respect to the same Work, the Construction Manager further agrees to correct all work found by the Owner to be defective in material and workmanship and not in conformance with the Drawings and Specifications for a period of one year from the Date of Owner Occupancy of the Project or a designated portion thereof or for such longer periods of time as may be set forth with respect to specific warranties contained in the trade sections of the Specifications or by Florida Law. The Construction Manager shall collect and deliver to the Owner any specific written warranties given by others as required by the Contract Documents. The Construction Manager shall provide a Warranty Summary Report at the end of the 6- month warranty period and 11-month warranty period. This report shall provide at a minimum: Description of each warranty item during the period. Date item reported to Construction Manager. Date item corrected. If more than one trip required, document each. Description of action taken to cure warranty item. Obtain signature of school principal or designee acknowledging warranty items have been completed. Other pertinent information, if applicable. Article V of the RFQ (as revised) provided the following information with respect to "Fees and Pricing": Successful proposers shall negotiate a fee for providing construction management services during the design phase and subsequently shall negotiate a GMP for construction services during the bidding and construction phase. Architectural/Engineering firms will develop Contract documents under separate contract with the Board. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 26, Article VII of the RFQ (as revised) "[was] entitled 'Board's Right to Reject' and state[d] in part as follows": The Board reserves the right to reject any and all proposals and readvertise the project(s) at any time prior to Board approval of the recommended proposer(s) and the negotiated agreement(s). All costs incurred in the preparation of the Proposal and participation in this RFQ process shall be borne by the proposers. Proposals submitted in response to this RFQ shall become property of the Board and considered public documents under applicable Florida law. The District reserves the right to accept or reject any and all submittals, or to waive any technicalities or formalities when and if it is in the best interests of the District. Rejection: A submittal shall be rejected for failure to comply with one or more of the following requirements: The proposer is not licensed or registered in the State of Florida to provide the proposed services. The submittal shall be rejected if not received by The School Board of Broward County, Florida by the specified deadline. Not Applicable. Article XI of the RFQ (as revised) discussed "Submittal Requirements" and contained the following provisions concerning "Related Projects Similar in Scope (to this RFQ)" and "References": Related Projects Similar in Scope (to this RFQ): List educational projects of related scope and size. Provide name and location of project, project owner, project owner name, address phone and contact person, project cost, current project status, firm[']s key personnel assigned to the project. . . . L. References: Provide a list of all projects, clearly stating name of project, using Construction Management at Risk, completed or in progress within the last five (5) years from due date of this RFQ. If Proposer[']s firm also has offices outside the tri-county area (meaning Broward, Miami-Dade, or Palm Beach), then at a minimum provide references for all Construction Management at Risk projects in the tri-county area. List projects that are 75 percent or greater of the construction budget statement in the Public Announcement for each listed project. Provide the address, telephone numbers and contact person(s) listed as references for each project. . . . As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 27, "[o]n or about September 3, 2008, [Respondent] received proposed qualifications to provide construction management at risk services for [the FHS Project] from 13 vendors including Petitioner." Among the other "vendors" submitting "proposed qualifications" were Elkins Constructors, Inc., the Morganti Group, Inc., and W. G. Mills, Inc. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 28, "[i]n accordance with the terms and conditions of the RFQ [as revised] and [Respondent's] governing statutes, rules and policies, Respondent's Qualifications Selection and Evaluation Committee ('QSEC') recommended the rejection of certain proposers for their failure to comply with [Respondent's] pre-qualification requirements or limits." There were three such "proposers": Elkins Constructors, Inc.; the Morganti Group, Inc.; and W. G. Mills, Inc. At the time of the "submittal due date to this RFQ [as revised]," neither Elkins Constructors, nor the Morganti Group, was "prequalified according to 1013.46 F.S., SREF 4.1(8), and Board Policy 7003" for any project. W. G. Mills, on the other hand, was "prequalified" for certain projects, but only within the following limits: a "[p]er [p]roject [l]imit [of] $25,000,000 [and an] [a]ggregate [l]imit [of] $250,000,000." The "advertised Proposed Construction Budget" of the FHS Project was $29,150,340, which was more than W. G. Mills' "[p]er [p]roject [l]imit [of] $25,000,000." As of the date "proposed qualifications" were due, there were 11 prequalified firms, including W. G. Mills, who had a "[p]er [p]roject [l]imit" of between $17,000,000 and $26,000,000. These firms were not eligible to be awarded the contract for the FHS Project because the project's "advertised Proposed Construction Budget" was in excess of their "[p]er [p]roject [l]imit." W. G. Mills was the only one of these 11 prequalified firms to respond to the RFQ (as revised). As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 29, "[i]n accordance with the terms and conditions of the RFQ [as revised] and [Respondent's] governing statutes, rules and policies, [the] QSEC next evaluated and short-listed the remaining proposers. It thereafter received presentations from the short-listed proposers and, after scoring those short-listed proposers, recommended Petitioner . . . to [Respondent] as the proposer with whom to negotiate a contract for services for fees to provide direct management cost of the construction manager and the project's guaranteed maximum price ('GMP')." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 30, "[o]n October 7, 2008, [Respondent] approved [the] QSEC's selection of Petitioner . . . as the vendor with whom negotiations would be had for [the] Fort Lauderdale High School component of the RFQ [as revised] and 'authorized negotiations for Construction Management at Risk Services.' The scope of Construction Management at Risk services was [as noted above] included within the RFQ [as revised]. The summary explanation and background portion of the agenda item to authorize negotiations stated that the 'Superintendent's designees will negotiate the selected Constriction Management at Risk Services fees for the projects and recommend award of contracts at a future School Board Meeting.'" As the parties stated in the "Statement of the Controversy" section of their Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation, "[n]egotiations between [Respondent] and [Petitioner] occurred between October 2008 [following Respondent's approval of the QSEC's selection of Petitioner] and December 2009." In December 2009, Cubellis, the architectural firm working on the FHS Project for Respondent, was "experiencing some financial difficulties" and there was uncertainty as to whether it would "be able to continue [on] the project." As a result, negotiations between Respondent and Petitioner were halted. Eventually, Cubellis "assigned [its] contract [with Respondent] to somebody else" (specifically, Manuel Synalovski Associates, LLC), but negotiations between Respondent and Petitioner never resumed. Petitioner's last written contract proposal was dated December 10, 2009. It was based on a proposed construction budget of $18,297,367 and provided for the following "Negotiated Contract Terms": Construction Manager Fees: Pre-Design Not Applicable Design Not Applicable Bidding & Award $37,685 Construction Phase Fee $1,172,370 Warranty $35,000 Overhead $289,200 Profit $185,385 General Conditions $659,846 Total $2,379,489 Above Fees based on scope of work issued "Project Scope" document dated 11/5/2009 per 11/9/2009 letter from M. Decker. CM Performance and Payment Bonds and GL Insurance are included based on budgeted contract amount of $18,297,367. Builders Risk, Contingency, and Subcontractor insurance costs are not included in the fees and will be shown in the schedule of values as separate line items as a cost of work. Should the cost of work increase Bonds and GL insurance fees are to be adjusted at insurance providers' invoiced amount. Overhead, profit and bond allowances for Change Orders: 10% Substantial Completion: 570 Final Completion in General Conditions 25.01.02: 600 Construction Phase Fee and General Conditions in 25.01.02: $3,050 per Consecutive Calendar Day Liquidation Damages for Substantial Completion: $1,000 per Consecutive Calendar Day Liquidation Damages for Final Completion: $600 per Consecutive Calendar Day This contract proposal was made following a December 8, 2009, negotiation session at which Denis Herrmann, Respondent's Director of Design and Construction Contracts, had stated that he had negotiated a construction management at risk contract for another project the previous day where the "Construction Manager Fees" were 13.8 percent of that particular project's proposed construction budget. Mr. Herrmann had relayed this information to Petitioner's representatives at the meeting to give them "a flavor for the range [Respondent was] talking about, not to give them a [specific] number [or percentage] that would be acceptable." The "Construction Manager Fees" proposed by Petitioner in its December 10, 2009, offer were slightly less than 13.8 percent of the $18,297,367 proposed construction budget (but they did not cover any "Pre-Design"-related or "Design"-related work). While Respondent has never, in writing, specifically rejected Petitioner's December 10, 2009, offer, neither has ever formally accepted it. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Facts 45 and 48, respectively, Respondent's "Superintendent of Schools has not placed an item on [the School Board] agenda recommending that [Respondent] enter into a contract with [Petitioner] concerning the RFQ [as revised]," and "[Respondent] has not approved a contract with [Petitioner] concerning [the] RFQ [as revised]." It has been two years since "[Respondent] approved [the] QSEC's selection of Petitioner . . . as the vendor with whom negotiations would be had." Significant changes impacting the FHS Project have occurred over that period of time. Respondent now finds itself in the midst of an "unprecedented budget crisis," making it especially imperative that it "take every [possible] step to maximize the purchasing power of the public's dollars." A precipitous decline in revenue available for capital projects (due, in large measure, to a decline in property values, coupled with a reduction in the capital outlay millage rate) has required Respondent to eliminate or scale back various planned projects. The FHS Project is among the projects that have been scaled back. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 31, "[p]rior to, during and subsequent to its negotiations with [Petitioner], [Respondent] determined on several occasions that the project scope of the [FHS Project] needed to be further adjusted, ultimately resulting [in] the following project scope [with strike-throughs and underlining indicating, respectively, deletions and additions]": Concurrent Replacement in two phases to include: Demolish existing swimming pool (buildings 15 and 16). Demolish existing tennis courts and replace with 6 tennis courts. Demolish Buildings 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, and 14. Construct basketball courts. Construct Regional Athletic Facility. Construct (2) 3-story buildings (1 – Administration & 1 - Classroom) of approximately 68,940 GSF combined to include Administration, 3 general classrooms, 5 resource rooms, 4 science labs and related spaces, 4-classroom ESE suites, 1 Business Technology lab, 1 Family and Consumer Science (ProStart) lab, 1 Health Occupations Lab, 1 Pre-Law Public Service Education Lab, Custodial spaces, Textbook Storage, and Student, Staff and Public Restrooms. Remodel Renovate existing Science Building (building 8). Construct Parent Drop Off and Pick Up area and Staff/Visitor Parking. Resurface Student Parking. Construct New Student parking area on the West side of the site to increase parking capacity by 92 spaces. Modify existing temporary bus loop to meet SREF code and ADA standards; modifications will include barricades and covered sidewalk. Redesign courtyard to meet current ADA standards.' As the parties further stipulated in Admitted Fact 31, "[t]he project scope was revised five (5) times between October 7, 2008 and December 2, 2009[,] [and Petitioner] was notified of the changes in scope and acknowledged the same." "[R]evis[ions]" have also been made to the project's budget. Respondent's "5-Year Plan" allocates funding for all costs (including, but not limited to, construction costs4) associated with each of Respondent's funded capital projects. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 32, "[Respondent] adopts and revises its 5-Year Capital Improvement Plan ('5-Year Plan') each year." As the parties further stipulated in Admitted Fact 33: [Respondent's] 5-Year Plan adopted for Fort Lauderdale High School for Fiscal Years 2009-10 to 2013-14 eliminated the $39,491,259 previously budgeted as "Capacity Additions" . . . . Instead, the 2009-10 to 2013-14 Five Year Plan provided $21,050,000 for Capacity Additions . . . . Respondent's current "5-Year Plan" (for the Fiscal Years 2010- 2011 to 2014-2015), which was adopted on September 7, 2010, allocates $22,366,085 to the FHS Project (as scaled back). The dour economic conditions responsible (in part) for the drop in tax revenues available to fund Respondent's capital projects have also led to increased competition in the construction industry and a resultant decline in construction prices. This increased competition is particularly pronounced "in the procurement area of hard bidding." During "the peak of the construction boom," before the downturn in the economy, it was not atypical for Respondent, when it "hard bid" a construction project, to get just one or even no bids in response to the solicitation. Now, Respondent "expect[s] to see between half a dozen [and] a dozen or more bidders." Moreover, recently, winning bids on "hard bid" projects have been, on average, well below these projects' advertised proposed construction budgets. Respondent has not experienced the same overall cost-savings results when it has used the "Construction Management at Risk delivery method." Given the market conditions that exist today, Respondent estimates that the construction costs for the FHS Project (as scaled back) would be no more than $16,950,000 and possibly as little as approximately $13,000,000 (if a "hard bid" were used). These amounts are considerably less than the "Proposed Construction Budget of $29,150,340" that had originally been "advertised." There are prequalified firms (including W. G. Mills) which were not eligible to be awarded the contract under the RFQ (as revised) because their "[p]er [p]roject [l]imit" was less than $29,150,340, but which would now be able to bid on a scaled-back FHS Project were it to be readvertised (with a proposed construction budget of $16,950,000). Another (and perhaps the most significant) difference between the circumstances existing at present and those that existed two years ago (vis-à-vis the FHS Project) is that the design of the project (as scaled back) has advanced to the point that, with a few revisions,5 the construction documents for the project will be 100 percent complete.6 As a result, Respondent no longer has a need for most, if not virtually all, of the "pre-design" and "design" services, described in Articles 3.2 and 3.3 of the Sample Contract, that, back in 2008, it had wanted a construction manager to perform. In April 2010, Respondent's Office of the Chief Auditor issued a report (April 2010 Audit Report) critical of Respondent's use of the "Construction Management at Risk delivery method" in connection with 14 projects "which were included in the Construction Management at Risk Kitchen/Cafeteria RFQ No. 2006-12-FC." The report read, in pertinent part, as follows: The projects included in RFQ No 2006-12-FC were sufficiently completed by the Architect/Engineer firm(s) prior to being advertised as CM at Risk construction projects. The inability [of] any CM firm to provide "professional services" and scheduling of both design and construction phases represents a deviation from the intent of Florida Statutes, SREF and the School Board's CM at Risk contract.[7] In nearly every executed CM at Risk agreement in the Kitchen/Cafeteria program, the Pre- Design and Design phase responsibilities of the CM were stricken from the contract. That is a further representation that the input required by a prospective CM to qualify for the committee selection process was not, nor was it intended to be provided. F.S. 1013.45(1)(c) also states that the use of the CM at Risk delivery method " . . . shall not unfairly penalize an entity that has relevant experience in the delivery of construction programs of similar size and complexity by methods of delivery other than program management." All of the projects in the Kitchen/Cafeteria program were originally intended to be "hard-bid" but were changed to the CM at Risk delivery method. One project was removed from the group prior to the due date of submittals for RFQ No. 2006-12-FC. That hard bid project, Margate ES, cost approximately $5.6 million, including nearly $466,226 in change orders, which was approximately $3.3 million less, on average, than the fourteen (14) projects that remained in RFQ No. 2006-12- FC. Due to the change in delivery method, general contracting firms could have been "unfairly penalized" by the decision to use the CM at Risk delivery method, as many local general contractors have the relevant experience in the delivery of construction programs of similar size and complexity by methods other than the CM at Risk delivery method.

Recommendation We recommend that Facilities & Construction Management discontinue developing construction procurement packages (i.e. RFQ and RFP) for award of CM at Risk agreements when construction management services requested are associated with reused, prototypical or otherwise sufficiently developed construction documents. Kitchen/Cafeteria program data indicates that the benefits associated with the CM at Risk delivery method were not realized using prototypical designs, as the program resulted in over $24 million in avoidable fees while circumventing applicable laws and regulations. On May 10, 2010, Mr. Herrmann sent a letter to Respondent's General Counsel requesting, in light of the April 2010 Audit Report, a "legal opinion related to the award of a Construction Manager at Risk Agreement (CM) to [Petitioner] and whether such an award would comply with Chapter 1013.45(1)(c), S. and State Requirements for Educational Facilities 1999 (SREF)," given that the FHS Project (as scaled back) was then "in the design phase and Phase III 100% Construction Documents [were] being prepared." The concluding paragraph of the letter read as follows: In this project, The Weitz Company has been selected by the board and we intend to recommend award of a contract within several months. An award of a CM agreement in this case would not violate the specific audit recommendation and we believe such an award does not violate statute or SREF. Please advise whether you concur. Mr. Herrmann has since changed his opinion. He now believes (reasonably so, in the undersigned's view) that "award of a CM agreement" in the instant case would be inconsistent with the "audit recommendation" inasmuch as the FHS Project (as scaled back) now has "sufficiently developed construction documents." On May 18, 2010, Mr. Herrmann sent another letter to Respondent's General Counsel. This letter read as follows: This is to provide you with additional information relating to a request for a legal opinion regarding the award of a Construction Manager at Risk Agreement (CM) to The Weitz Company. Please also refer to the attached memos dated 10/14/09, 11/16/09 and 5/10/10. In summary, we have requested opinions based on the following: Whether such an award would comply with applicable statutes, SREF, and board policy given the extent of the changes to the scope and budget. Whether such an award would comply with Chapter 1013.45(1)(c), F.S. and State Requirements for Educational Facilities 1999 (SREF). We have recently revised the construction cost estimate as a result of current market conditions, and the project consultant, Manuel Synalovski [Associates], LLC agrees with the revised estimate. The change in the cost estimate is as follows: In the RFQ: $29,150,340 October 2009 (Change in scope): $21,770,000 November 2009 (Market conditions): $18,297,367 May 2010 (Market conditions) $16,950,000 Please advise whether we should proceed with the award or reject all bids. Respondent's General Counsel responded to neither of these May 2010, letters from Mr. Herrmann. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 34, "[o]n June 15, 2010, [Respondent] approved Item J-15 during its June 15, 2010, Regular Meeting." The "Requested Action" and "Summary Explanation and Background" section of the Agenda Request Form for this agenda item (J-15) provided as follows: REQUESTED ACTION Approve the change in the delivery method from Construction Management at Risk to Design/Bid/Build and the First Amendment to the Professional Services Agreement with Manuel Synalovski Associates, LLC (MSA) for Fort Lauderdale High School, Phased Replacement Project No. 095-27-01, dated February 12, 2008. SUMMARY EXPLANATION AND BACKGROUND Scope of Work: Basic Services Amended 6/15/10: This item changes the delivery method from Construction Management at Risk to Design/Bid/Build. Demolish existing Swimming pool (Buildings 15 and 16); demolish existing tennis courts; demolish Buildings 1, 2, and 3; construct two 3-story buildings (1 administration and 1 classroom) of approximately 68,940 gross square feet combined to include administration, 3 general classrooms, 5 resource rooms, 4 science labs and related spaces, 4 ESE classroom suite, 1 business technology lab, 1 family and consumer science (ProStart) lab, 1 health occupations lab, 1 pre-law public service education lab, custodial spaces, textbook storage, and student, staff, and public restrooms. Remodel existing science building (Building 8). Construct new parent drop off and pick up areas and staff/visitor parking. Construct new student parking area on the west side of site to increase parking capacity by 92 spaces. Modify existing temporary bus loop to meet SREF, Florida Building Code and ADA Standards. ADA modifications will include barricades and covered sidewalk. Remodel existing courtyard for ADA access to gym and auditorium. MSA and the Superintendent's Negotiations Committee negotiated a total reduction in [architectural] fees from the February 12, 2008 Board approved amount of $2,021,000 to $1,683,650. This decrease in the Basic Services Fees totals $337,350 and is decreased as follows: Phase IV (Bidding and Award) by $54,357, Phase V (Construction Administration) by $269,250, and Phase VI (Warranty) by $13,743. This fee reduction is as a result of a reduction of the original scope as per Attachment 2 to the First Amendment. This First Amendment also reduces the Fixed Limit of Construction Cost (FLCC) from $29,150,340 to $16,950,000 as a result of the reduction in scope and construction costs resulting from current market conditions. The Risk Management Department and the Office of the Chief Auditor have reviewed this First Amendment. The School Board Attorney has approved this First Amendment as to form and legal content. As the parties stipulated in Admitted Fact 35, on June 30, 2010, "[Respondent] posted its Revised Recommendation[] and Tabulation for [the FHS Project, which] set forth the following recommendation": Per Article VII.A of the RFQ, based upon the recommendation of the Qualification Selection Evaluation Committee, the Facilities and Construction Management Division intends to recommend that The School Board of Broward County, Florida, at the School Board meeting on July 20, 2010, reject all responses received for Fort Lauderdale High School Project No. P.000687. The original, intended scope of work as set forth in the original RFQ is substantially and materially different than the revised scope of work and budget in the proposed contracts and such work should be re- advertised and re-bid. This decision to "reject all responses" and "re- advertise[] and re-bid" was based on an honest and good faith exercise of discretion, intended, ultimately, to allow Respondent to receive (in the words of Mr. Herrmann) "more bang for [its] buck." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Facts 39 through 41, Petitioner timely protested Respondent's intended "reject[ion] [of] all responses." As the parties stipulated in Admitted Facts 42 through 44, after the parties had unsuccessfully attempted "to resolve the protest by mutual agreement," Respondent, at Petitioner's request, referred the matter to DOAH on August 23, 2010.

Florida Laws (19) 1010.041011.011011.0121011.061013.351013.451013.461013.61120.569120.57120.68255.05255.103287.012287.017287.055287.09451320.03481.229
# 6
BOARD OF DENTISTRY vs. DENNIS SOUCEK, 82-002947 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002947 Latest Update: Dec. 29, 1983

Findings Of Fact The Respondent Dennis Soucek is a licensed dentist in Florida. On April 11, 1981, Ms. Elaine Yarbrough consulted the Respondent Soucek concerning dental treatment for extreme protrusion of her four front teeth. The Respondent and Yarbrough discussed various treatment plans including fixed and removable prostheses and orthodontics. On June 23, 1981, the Respondent Soucek extracted Yarbrough's four protruding teeth and provided her with a temporary bridge. The Respondent intended for Yarbrough to wear the temporary appliance until her gums had receded sufficiently to receive a permanent fixed bridge. In normal cases, a six-week period is advised after extraction and before impressions are taken for a permanent bridge to allow gum recision to take place. In this case, however, the Respondent allowed a period of approximately three months to transpire before the permanent impression was made. The added period of time was taken by the Respondent as a precautionary measure due to the extreme protrusion which was present in Yarbrough's mouth prior to the extractions. However, notwithstanding the three-month period, Yarbrough's gums continued to recede after the impressions were made and the bridge was installed, which caused a pronounced ledge to form around the gum line and the pontics. Approximately two months after permanent placement of the bridge, Yarbrough returned to the Respondent's office and asked him to solve a problem that had developed of air entering under her bridge. The Respondent attempted to solve the problem by using a porcelain repair kit. When the Respondent could not get the kit to properly bond to the teeth, he suggested to Yarbrough that more time be allowed for the unforeseen shrinkage to end before further repair attempts were made. The Respondent never saw Yarbrough again after this final visit. The Petitioner's expert, Dr. Mervyn Dixon, D.D.S., who examined Yarbrough, was primarily concerned that the pontics installed by the Respondent showed poor adaption to tissue in that the gingival facial aspect of the pontics exhibited the "heavy ledge" referred to previously and that the labial tissue surfaces of the central pontics were pressing against the incisive papilla to the extent that there was a blanching due to lack of circulation. Additionally, Dr. Dixon testified that it is not acceptable to use filling material to repair a new bridge.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Board of Dentistry finding the Respondent Soucek guilty of violating Section 466.028(1)(y), Florida Statutes (1981) in his treatment of the complainant, placing him on probation until such time as he furnishes evidence of completion of thirty (30) hours of continuing education in bridge work, and imposing a $1,000 administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Gallagher, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hugh Maloney, Esquire PATTERSON & MALONEY 790 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 030520 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33303 Fred Varn, Executive Director Florida Board of Dentistry Old Courthouse Square Building 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF DENTISTRY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION Petitioner, vs. CASE NOS. 0024080 (DPR) 82-2947 (DOAH) DENNIS SOUCEK, D.D.S., Respondent. /

Florida Laws (2) 120.57466.028
# 7
BAXTER`S ASPHALT AND CONCRETE, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-003373 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003373 Latest Update: May 21, 1990

The Issue Whether DOT should disqualify Baxter's bid on State Job 55320-3425, because Baxter's uncompleted work might hinder prompt completion of Job No. 55320-3425, or on account of Baxter's not being "responsible" within the meaning of Section 337.11(3), Florida Statutes (1983), or, under Rule 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, on account of Baxter's falsely certifying current capacity?

Findings Of Fact In their prehearing stipulation, the parties agreed that: Baxter submitted the lower bid on Project No. 55320-3425, on August 31, 1983. On September 19, 1983, DOT advised Baxter its bid would not be considered the lowest, responsible bid because of the failure of Baxter's to complete Job Nos. 49010-3535, 50060-3503, 49060-3508, 50030-3522, 50050-3506, 56010-3510, and 50010-3531 within the time allowed by their contract . . . . [E]ach of these projects w[a]s not completed within the allowed contract time and requests for extension of time are pending. The parties further stipulated that DOT's Bid Award Committee voted unanimously to award the job to Solomon and caused notice of intent to award Job No. 55320- 3425 to Solomon to be posted on October 10, 1983. At hearing, the parties stipulated on the record that Solomon is ready, willing and able to perform Job No. 55320-3425, and will perform, if the contract is awarded to Solomon. In Baxter's proposed findings of fact, Baxter concedes that "[t]here is no dispute that SOLOMON is a "responsible bidder?" In their prehearing stipulation, the parties also agreed that the form Certificate of Current Capacity filed by Baxter on August 31, 1983, did not list the status of the contracts it had on hand to which DOT was not a party. SPECIALTY JOB Solomon and Baxter were the only bidders on Project No. 1R-10-3 (71)198-55320-3425 (Job No. 55320-3425). The job involves light grading, installing underdrains and some small drainage structures, covering the underdrains with type III asphalt course, sealing the shoulder joint, miscellaneous asphalt and concrete paving, paving a ditch with concrete, installing guardrails, striping and marking the pavement, and grassing the shoulders on Interstate Highway 10, from Timberlane Road to a point 0.6 miles east of the intersection of I-10 and U.S. 90, a stretch of 6.903 miles, in Leon County. Installation of the underdrains would require about 300 tons of asphalt and some 2800 tons of asphalt would be required to do the whole job, but the production and spreading of asphalt is a relatively minor part of the whole project. Baxter's bid of $936,554.57 was lower than Solomon's by $21,255.63. The work is to be performed within 230 calendar days. TIME OVERRUNS Baxter finished on time at least five projects under contracts DOT let to Baxter in 1981, using all or virtually all of the time allowed to complete Job Nos. 56010-3508, 56020-3508 and 61080-3418, aggregating $2,568,784, but finishing substantially ahead of schedule on Job Nos. 51010-3522 and 53070- 3506, aggregating $384,069. Under contracts DOT let to Baxter in 1982, however, only two projects were finished within the time allowed. In all, DOT let twelve or thirteen contracts to Baxter in 1982. DOT's Exhibit No. 1. Of the 1982 contracts on which Baxter fell behind, DOT cited only five or six 1/ as evidence of Baxter's irresponsibility, in Secretary Pappas' letter of September 19, 1983. LATE STARTS Only one of the 1982 contracts was begun on or before the date specified in the contract as the date time charges were to begin to run. On Job No. 49010-3535 (U.S. 98 or SR 30 in Franklin County) Baxter did not begin work until after the completion date called for in the contract. The contract on U.S. 98 in Franklin County was for $1,170,887.72. On Job No. 50060-3503 (SR 65 in Gadsden County), on which time charges began to run on August 10, 1982, and which was to have been completed within 200 days, Baxter began work on January 7, 1983, which was 235 days after the contract was executed. The contract on SR 65 in Gadsden County was for $744,134.34. The contract DOT awarded Baxter for Job No. 49060-3508 (SR 65 in Franklin County) was for $1,380,270.15. Under the contract, time changes on SR 65 in Franklin County began on September 1, 1982, but Baxter did not begin work until February 23, 1983, which was 250 days after the contract was executed. The SR 65 Franklin County contract between DOT and Baxter contemplated completion of the project within 276 calendar days from the start of work. Both Job Nos. 50030-3522 and 50050-3506 (State Roads 10 and 12 in Gadsden County) were let under an agreement specifying that time charges would begin on November 4, 1982. Baxter started work on the first of these on February 11, 1983, and did not begin the second till well after the date it had agreed to have it finished. Baxter started work on Job 56010-3510 (State Road 20 in Liberty County) on April 13, 1983, about six months after the contract was executed and about four and a half months after time charges began. 1983 Secretary Pappas also cited Job No. 50010-3531 in his letter of September 19, 1983, as one of the jobs on which Baxter's performance had indicated, at least to DOT, Baxter's irresponsibility. This contract was for work on State Road 10 in Gadsden County and was referred to at hearing as the "mini-contract." The contract allowed 30 days for completion of the work and was in the amount of $34,975. Under this contract, time charges began on May 30, 1983, so that work should have been completed by the end of June. Baxter began work on September 9, 1983, more than two months after it had agreed it would finish the job. On the three other DOT jobs that Baxter was to begin in 1983, Job Nos. 53030-3521 (U.S. 231 in Jackson County), 61040- 3515 (SR 79 in Washington County), 54030-3507 (SR 19 in Jefferson County) , Baxter started work 26, 44 and 81 days late respectively. DELINQUENCY DISPUTED Whenever a contractor falls behind to the point that he has completed 20 percent less than he projected he would have on his progress chart and the amount he has completed expressed as a percentage of the whole is 20 points or more less than the amount of time elapsed expressed as a percentage of the total time allowed, DOT issues a preliminary notice of delinquency. The contractor has 15 days thereafter in which to request extensions of time. DOT may grant extension requests that render the contractor no longer delinquent, or it may issue a final notice of delinquency. Only if the contractor fails to file timely a petition for administrative proceedings does the "final" notice become final in law. Otherwise final agency action must await the outcome of proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1983). DOT has issued final notices of delinquency to Baxter with respect to both jobs on SR 10 in Gadsden County, and the jobs on SR 79 in Washington County, SR 19 in Jefferson County, State Road 20 in Liberty County, State Road 10 in Gadsden County, State Road 65 in Franklin County, State Road 65 in Gadsden County, and U.S. 98 in Franklin County. Since 1973, Baxter has received more final notices of delinquency from DOT than any other road contractor. As of final hearing, there was no other road contractor in the Tallahassee residency with as many as two jobs uncompleted as of the date time expired. With respect to each contract as to which DOT has issued a final notice of delinquency to Baxter, Baxter has filed requests for extensions of time. Some of these requests were granted. Others were not. If all of them had been granted, final notices of delinquency would not have issued. Baxter has also timely filed for formal administrative proceedings as to each final notice of delinquency directed to Baxter. At least one of these was scheduled for final hearing as early as August 5, 1983, but was, on Baxter's application, enjoined by court order. Baxter's Asphalt and Concrete, Inc. v. State of Florida, Department of Transportation; State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings; and R. T. Benton, II, No. 7-83-123 (Fla. 14th Cir.; Aug. 4, 1983). The parties stipulated that they have since agreed that the injunction be dissolved, although no order dissolving it has been entered. In arriving at the times specified in DOT road contracts, DOT staff estimates the number of work days necessary to complete the project, then multiplies by 1.825, on the assumption that the road contractor will only be able to work four days a week, fifty weeks a year. On paving jobs, considerable additional time is built into the estimates to allow contractors to bid on and schedule several jobs. DOT allows time extensions nevertheless for inclement weather, when the weather interferes with the controlling items of work, and also allows time extensions for certain unforeseen problems beyond the contractor's control. At hearing in the present case, Baxter made a colorable showing of a design problem on the SR 20 job in Liberty County, of a shortage of "friction course one materials" throughout 1982 and the first half of 1983, and of a shortage (of much shorter duration) of a chemical used to recycle milled asphalt, called HMA. Even if established, these claims would not excuse Baxter's lateness on all of the contracts mentioned in the Secretary's letter of September 19, 1983. For example, the evidence showed work had not progressed to the point that Baxter could have used the HMA during the time of the shortage. Baxter has even contended that it is not delinquent on jobs it did not begin until after the date by which Baxter had agreed to have finished. The evidence showed, however, that Baxter was delinquent in fact on these and other jobs. The specifications for Job No. 55320-3425 included the 1982 Edition of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Section 2-11 of which provides that a bidder may be disqualified on account of "Uncompleted work which in the judgment of the Department might hinder or prevent the prompt completion of additional work if awarded." Section 2-6 provides for rejection of qualified or conditional bids. ASPHALT PRODUCTION At all pertinent times, Baxter has had an asphalt plant in operation in Marianna, Florida (Plant No. 1). In the summer of 1982, Baxter erected a second asphalt plant in Liberty County. (Plant No. 2) After failing to obtain rezoning for a Gadsden County site, Baxter caused a third asphalt plant to be built in Franklin County. (Plant No. 3) By February of 1983, Baxter had obtained the requisite environmental permits for all three plants, although technical problems at Plant No. 3 were not overcome until later. Baxter can operate two, but not all three, of these plants simultaneously. The capacity of the Marianna plant is such that all the asphalt necessary for all the jobs Baxter contracted with DOT could have been produced there in time for Baxter to perform the DOT contracts on time. Baxter had other uses for some of its asphalt, however. Among them was a $4,000,000 job in Alabama in 1982 which Baxter finished more than 100 days early. The fraction of Baxter's total production used on DOT jobs varied from .02 percent in March of 1982, when Baxter produced 10,769.9 tons, and 7.31 percent in June of 1983, when Baxter produced 16,109.26 tons, to 97.96 percent in August of 1982, when Baxter's total production was 37,846.72 tons and 92.88 percent in April of 1983, when Baxter produced 13,210.34 tons. CAN DO William D. Baxter, who owns petitioner, and Louis W. Seay, Jr., petitioner's vice-president since 1979, are capable and successful businessmen. According to J. Vern Williams, a C.P.A. familiar with Baxter's operations, Baxter is very well managed, with the possible exception of the accounting department. Mr. Baxter began with a pick-up truck and a hot pot, and his company now has some $10,644,000 in heavy equipment and transportation equipment (original cost). If anything, Baxter's equipment inventory is larger than necessary. Baxter could perform Job No. 55320-3425 without buying or leasing any heavy equipment other than a trencher. Bonding companies reportedly stand ready to write an additional $14,000,000 in bonds for Baxter's. Its working capital and its capitalization generally are adequate for what it has undertaken. Among its 150 employees are 15 who have been with Baxter for ten to fifteen years, including H. H. Barber, the general superintendent, and Timmy Jones and Spud Berry, each of whom has worked as an asphalt superintendent for ten years. CHOSE NOT TO Baxter's managers deliberately postponed work on DOT jobs closer to the sites chosen for Plants Nos. 2 and 3 (including the Gadsden County site originally chosen for Plant No. 3), in order to avoid the costs of transporting asphalt the longer distances from Plant No. 1, even when it was uncertain when Plant Nos. 2 and 3 would go into production. They also decided not to purchase asphalt from any other producer closer to the job sites, as a means of performing timely under the DOT contracts mentioned in Secretary Pappas' letter of September 19, 1983. Notwithstanding the number of DOT contracts Baxter undertook to perform and notwithstanding the extent to which work fell behind on many of them, Baxter never had more than a single asphalt crew at work at any one time on the whole group of jobs listed in Secretary Pappas' letter of September 19, 1983. Since DOT indicated its intention to award Job No. 55320-3425 to Solomon, Baxter has made significant progress on the jobs listed in Secretary Pappas' letter. By January 18, 1984, it had completed four of them, all behind schedule, and was nearing completion on SR 65 in Gadsden County. Work on SR 65 in Franklin County was behind schedule and about one quarter completed. Delays of this kind cause problems for DOT, whose employees are permanent and full-time. Months in advance, DOT schedules at least one employee on each job site, for at least part of each day for the duration of the job. These schedules are based on the road contractors' commitments under the contracts DOT lets and on the progress charts they file. Inefficient use of DOT staff time is a common result when road contractors fail to perform work as scheduled. DOT schedules supervisory and testing personnel for 500 to 600 jobs annually. DOT WAFFLES On January 25, 1984, DOT issued a corrected notice of intent to award Job No. 59010-3514 to Baxter. This $594,174.56 asphalt paving job in Wakulla County will require significantly greater quantities of asphalt than Job No. 55320-3425, at issue in these proceedings. None of the other bidders on Job No. 59010-3514 protested the award to Baxter within the time allowed. ERRONEOUS CERTIFICATE Until recently, Baxter's consistent practice has been to omit contracts with parties other than DOT on the certificate of current capacity filed with bids on DOT jobs. Mr. Seay testified he had not realized that contracts with parties other than DOT were required to be listed. On the form certificate filed on August 31, 1983, in conjunction with its bid on Job No. 55320-3425, Baxter failed to report about $500,000 in uncompleted work under private contracts, while reporting $5,478,000 in uncompleted work for DOT. At the time, Baxter had approximately $22,000,000 in unused capacity. Perhaps this is why Peter J. White, Director of DOT's Division of Construction testified that there was no material irregularity in the bid papers. Petitioner submitted Baxter's proposed findings of fact and respondent filed a proposed recommended order which the intervenor adopted. Proposed findings have been adopted, in substance except to the extent they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, subordinate or cumulative.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DOT award Job No. 55320-3425 to Solomon. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1984.

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57337.11337.167.31
# 8
NETWORK ENGINEERING SERVICES, INC., D/B/A BOLTON PEREZ AND ASSOCIATES vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 19-005130 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 24, 2019 Number: 19-005130 Latest Update: Apr. 17, 2020

The Issue The issue in this administrative proceeding is whether the Florida Department of Transportation’s ("DOT" or "the Department") denial of Petitioner’s, Network Engineering Services, Inc. d/b/a Bolton Perez & Associates ("BPA"), 2019 application for qualification pursuant to section 337.105, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-75, was for good cause due to Petitioner’s participation in the construction of the Florida International University ("FIU") City Prosperity Project ("FIU Bridge project").

Findings Of Fact DOT is the state agency responsible for coordinating the planning, construction, and maintenance of a safe, viable, and balanced state transportation system. DOT relies on qualified contractors and professional consultants to provide services for Florida’s transportation needs. Section 287.055(3), Florida Statues, requires that any firm or individual desiring to provide professional services to a governmental agency must first be certified by the agency as qualified, pursuant to law and the regulations of the agency. The agency must find that the firm or individual to be employed is fully qualified to render the required service. Among the factors to be considered in making this finding are the capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, and experience of the firm or individual. Each agency is also required to evaluate professional services, including capabilities, adequacy of personnel, past record, and experience of the firm or individual. Section 337.105 and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-75 also governs the qualifications of professional consultants and other contractual services providers to DOT. Section 337.105 authorizes DOT to deny or suspend an application for qualification based upon a determination of "good cause," which includes, but is not limited to, nine illustrative examples specified in section 337.105(1)(a)–(i). DOT may, for good cause, deny or suspend for a specified period of time a person or firm from consideration for award of a professional service contract for a particular type of work. BPA is a multidiscipline engineering firm specializing primarily in transportation related engineering services, including bridge design, roadway design, civil works, construction engineering inspection ("CEI"), and program and construction management. At the time of the hearing, BPA had approximately 38 employees. BPA was formed by Joaquin "Jake" Perez, P.E., and John Bolton, P.E., in 1997 to provide transportation-related engineering services. BPA’s CEI qualifications are independent from, and do not necessarily mirror, BPA’s design qualifications. In some instances, BPA was qualified to serve as a CEI for categories of structures that the firm was not qualified to design. This is because BPA was internally divided into two core groups: design and CEI. Since inception, BPA’s design group was and continues to be headed by Mr. Perez, and the CEI group headed by Mr. Bolton. The operations of BPA’s CEI and design groups were completely segregated within the firm. CEI personnel did not work on design projects, and design personnel did not work on CEI projects. As President, Mr. Perez was involved in pursuing contracts for CEI services, but CEI services were provided only by CEI personnel. In or about 1999 or 2000, BPA first became qualified to respond to DOT’s request for qualifications to provide professional services to DOT. Mr. Bolton qualified the firm to provide CEI services, and Mr. Perez qualified it to provide design services. BPA remained qualified with the Department on an annual basis for both CEI and design work for nearly 20 years until July 2019. At that time, DOT issued a NOID removing BPA from consideration for award of professional service contracts with DOT for 2019- 2020. DOT issued the NOID based solely upon a report issued by OSHA and the investigation of NTSB regarding the collapse of the FIU Bridge project on March 15, 2018. THE FIU PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE PROJECT In 2014, DOT entered into a Local Agency Program ("LAP") Agreement with FIU for its pedestrian bridge project, a Category II, complex bridge, that would be constructed along Southwest 109th Avenue and Southwest 8th Street in the City of Sweetwater, Florida (the "project"). As the supervising agency of the LAP program, DOT was responsible for supervising and authorizing work by the local agency. The design of a Category II structure required an independent peer review by a firm with no other involvement in the project, which was prequalified with DOT. In September 2016, FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc. ("FIGG"), the Engineer of Record ("EOR") for the project, hired Louis Berger to review FIGG’s plans for bridge foundation, substructure (end bents and center tower), and superstructure. Those plans included construction sequencing (including construction sequence drawings), the covered main span pre-casting, transport of main span, and placement of the main span between end bent 1 (south pier) and the pylon pier. The plans also included the post-tensioning stressing and destressing sequences. As the Local Agency, FIU was in responsible charge of the day-to-day activities, including project safety issues. Alfredo Reyna, P.E., was the Department’s LAP Coordinator for the project. Mr. Reyna is a licensed professional engineer, although he is not a structural engineer. In January 2016, FIU entered into a design-build contract1 with Munilla Construction Management, LLC ("MCM"), to design the bridge and to perform all work and furnish all materials, equipment, supplies, and labor necessary to construct the project. The bridge was designed by FIGG, a member of the MCM design-build team and the EOR. FIGG is a reputable designer who has been recognized internationally for its work. FIGG has experience in designing complex bridges, such as the Sunshine Skyway Bridge near Tampa, Florida. On September 23, 2016, FIU entered into a Standard Professional Services Agreement with BPA for CEI services (the "CEI Contract"). At the 1 The interaction of the local agency, contractor, designer, EOR, DOT, and the CEI is different between a "conventional" and a "design build" bridge project. In a conventional project, the designer is hired by DOT or owner to create a new bridge. The design goes through a review process at DOT and a final set of plans goes to bid for a contractor. By the time the contractor is selected, the EOR has completed the plans. The EOR is essentially "on call" for the construction phase of the project because the design work is complete. The CEI begins its work when the contractor begins construction. If there is a question in the field, the CEI makes a request for information from the EOR. DOT supplies design and construction managers throughout the process. In contrast, for a "design build" project, the owner has a conceptual plan for the project. The designer and contractor bid for the job based on the preliminary conceptual plan. The Designer/EOR and contractor work hand in hand from the beginning of the project and are in constant communication. The CEI begins work when the contractor starts work on the project. The CEI facilitates the resolution of any issues between the EOR/designer and the contractor who continue to plan throughout the duration of the project. Like a conventional build project, DOT has construction managers and design project managers involved from the beginning of the project. If concrete cracking occurs, it is the CEI's obligation to document the cracking and speak to people in the process who can assess and address the cracking. For a conventional build bridge, if cracking is observed, the CEI documents it, copies DOT, and sends it to the EOR for assessment. The EOR provides an assessment by conducting a site visit. The EOR then prepares an Engineering Assessment Report (EAR) for the project team. In a design build bridge job, if cracks are observed, they are documented by the CEI who notifies the EOR. The EOR, who is already on the job site, assesses the cracks and works with the contractor to devise a solution. time, John Bolton was the CEI qualifier for BPA. As CEI, BPA was to act as the liaison between the project owner (FIU) and the contractor (MCM). The CEI handles quality control, materials, schedules, payments, documents the entire process, and monitors the project. Jose Morales, P.E., worked under John Bolton as the Senior Project Engineer for the project. Mr. Morales first obtained his professional engineer’s license in 2006. He had approximately 12 years of CEI experience at the time of the collapse. Although he was the Senior Project Engineer for the project, Mr. Morales had little-to-no design experience. Mr. Morales was first involved in the early stages of pursuing the CEI Contract for the project. After the project was awarded, BPA was not involved in the design phase, but was later brought back into the fold beginning in October 2016, when BPA received the Notice to Procced and fully staffed its CEI scope of services when construction was scheduled to begin in or about March of 2017. The "Scope of Services" section (Exhibit B) to the CEI Contract required BPA to be prequalified with the Department in the following work categories: Work Type 10.1--Roadway CEI; Work Type 10.4--Minor Bridge and Miscellaneous Structures CEI; and Work Type 10.5.1--Major Bridge CEI- -Concrete. For the FIU bridge project, Categories 10.1 and 10.4 were considered to be the "major" type of work while 10.5.1 was considered to be the "minor" type of work. As expressly permitted by the Standard Professional Services Agreement, BPA satisfied the 10.5.1 prequalification requirement through its sub-consultant, The Corradino Group, Inc. ("Corradino"). BPA’s scope of services for the project did not include any design responsibilities. BPA performed constructability review of the plans as part of its CEI scope of work, but it did not review the plans or drawings on a technical level. The FIU bridge was a Complex Category II structure as defined by the Department’s Design Manual. The structure had a unique, complex design that was meant to be a signature, architectural feature for the area. The relevant construction sequence for the main span (Span 1) of the FIU bridge consisted of: casting the main span superstructure in the casting yard; installing post-tension bars in the diagonal and vertical members of the structure; stressing of the main-span post-tensioning while the main span is in the casting yard; removing the temporary formwork and supports; transporting the main span from the casting yard using a self- propelled modular transporter and placing the structure in a "simply supported" condition on the south pier and pylon pier; and de-tensioning truss members 2 and 11. Generally, cracks in concrete are common and are not, in and of themselves, a cause for concern. On a design-build job, when cracks manifest themselves in a concrete element, the CEI must document the cracking and report it to the design-build team, which includes the EOR. Depending on the nature of the cracks, the CEI may request an EAR from the EOR. This process is set out in section 400, subsection 400-21, of DOT’s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (the "Standard Specifications"). DOT's Construction Project Administration Manual ("CPAM") includes the procedures to be followed by a CEI in addressing cracks in concrete. The CPAM requires that the CEI identify and document its observations and convey the information to the EOR for a final disposition as to the potential danger of the crack or the need for further evaluation. The FIU Bridge Cracking and Inspections by BPA On or about February 6, 2018, while Span 1 of the bridge was still in the casting yard, BPA became aware of certain cracks that had developed in the structure. Mr. Morales personally inspected the structure after the tendons on truss members 2 and 11 were stressed, and he noted that cracks had developed in other locations on the bridge. The cracks observed were very small, approximately 0.004 of an inch wide. On February 13, 2018, BPA submitted Crack Report #1 to MCM, FIU, and Corradino, documenting the cracks that had developed in the concrete truss members after completing the post-tensioning operations in the casting yard. Despite the small size of the cracks, BPA requested that the EOR provide an assessment of the cracks. FIGG, the EOR, responded to BPA’s request by stating that the current condition observed was temporary in nature and that the cracks were not an issue. BPA exercised independent professional judgment when it exceeded the requirements of section 400 of the Standard Specifications and the CPAM by documenting and reporting these initial cracks. In late February 2018, before the placement of the main bridge span on the permanent pylon and south pier supports, cracks were observed in certain truss members. BPA prepared and submitted Crack Report #2 to FIU and MCM on February 28, 2018, documenting the size and location of these cracks and requested that FIGG evaluate the cracks and provide a disposition. In its report, BPA called attention to certain cracks that were significant in size. As CEI, BPA was not qualified to determine whether these larger cracks posed an imminent danger of collapse. Further, BPA’s design team was not involved in the design of the bridge and was not qualified to evaluate these cracks from a design engineering perspective due to the category and complexity of the bridge. At this point, the cracks were not "structural" as defined by Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. Cracks more than one-half inch in depth are deemed "structural" and trigger the obligation of the CEI to notify the EOR. Nevertheless, BPA, again, exercised its independent professional judgment above and beyond the requirements of the Standard Specifications and CPAM by requesting that the report be forwarded to the EOR and requesting that the EOR provide a response and disposition of the cracks. On March 7, 2018, FIGG replied to Crack Report #2, stating, in part, that the cracks appeared small, that they were not concerned about these types of cracks in the particular region shown in the report, and that MCM would need to seal the cracks in accordance with the Department’s specifications. As the EOR, FIGG did not have any structural concerns regarding the cracks in Crack Report #2. On March 7, 2018, FIGG representatives were on site and observed the cracks referenced in Crack Report #2. After observing the cracks, FIGG did not delay the bridge movement that was scheduled to take place three days later on March 10th. As of March 8, 2018, BPA had no concerns regarding the integrity of the structure or public safety because the EOR had looked at the cracks in- person and assured the project team that the cracks were not a safety issue or structurally significant. These assurances came two to three days prior to the bridge being moved over Southwest 8th Street and placed on the permanent pylon and pier supports. The bridge movement was not delayed due to the cracks observed by the EOR. On March 10, 2018, Span 1 was moved from the casting yard and placed on the permanent pylon and south pier supports. After the placement and de-tensioning of diagonal members 2 and 11, cracks began to appear at the construction joint of diagonal 11, the deck, and at the top of diaphragm II. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 13, 2018, two days before the collapse, BPA circulated a draft of Crack Report #3 to MCM, recommending further monitoring and documenting of the cracks to determine whether they were active or dormant, and requesting that BPA be informed of the outcome of the EOR’s EAR and course of action. At 5:18 p.m. on March 13, 2018, the EOR responded to MCM with additional recommendations and stated "[a]gain, we have evaluated this further and confirmed that this is not a safety issue." Because BPA’s design team was not involved in the project, no BPA design personnel were aware of the documented cracking on the structure until sometime after Crack Report #3 was generated. At that time, Mr. Morales provided Mr. Perez with a copy of a draft of Crack Report #3. Mr. Perez briefly reviewed the draft report and confirmed with Mr. Morales that the CEI team had elevated the issue to the EOR. At all times in the documented communication relating to the cracks, the EOR and members of the FIGG design team represented to BPA that the cracks were not a safety concern, without reservation. Starting on March 13, 2018, FIGG directed MCM to implement an initial, temporary measure to address observed cracking in the member 11/12 nodal region. At that time, BPA was not aware of this communication between the EOR and the contractor. To restore the temporary support conditions when the structure was in the casting yard, MCM placed shims between diaphragm II and the pylon on March 13, 2018. FIGG also directed re-tensioning the post-tensioning rods in truss member 11 to begin on March 15, 2018. The re-tensioning operation was made as a "rushed request" to the post-tensioning subcontractor by MCM on March 14, 2018. "FIGG recommends to stress these PT bars as soon as possible but again, this is not a safety concern." MARCH 15, 2018, AND THE BRIDGE COLLAPSE Rather than waiting for the EAR, BPA once again exercised its independent, professional judgment and went above and beyond the requirements of the Standard Specifications, CPAM, and Contract Documents when it further escalated the issue of the cracks by calling for a meeting with the EOR. On the morning of March 15, 2018, a meeting requested by BPA and coordinated by MCM, was held in Miami, Florida. Representatives of FIGG, MCM, DOT, FIU, and BPA were present. At the March 15th meeting, BPA first became aware of the EOR’s instruction to MCM to proceed with a second temporary measure. This subsequent temporary measure was to reinstate the post-tensioning compression force back in member 11 as per the previous construction phase. As explained by the EOR, both temporary measures (shims and re- tensioning) were intended to restore the temporary support conditions when the structure was in the casting yard. Prior to the start of the meeting, the EOR, other FIGG engineers, and DOT’s LAP Coordinator inspected the bridge and the cracks in the nodal region of members 11/12. Only FIGG had structural engineers at the meeting. No other engineers present at the meeting had a background in structural engineering, including those in attendance on behalf of BPA. The meeting was called for purposes of discussing the concrete cracking on Span 1, and specifically the concrete cracking in nodal connection between truss members 11 and 12 and the bridge deck. At this meeting, BPA informed FIGG that the cracks in the bridge were lengthening and growing daily. Though not formally invited, Mr. Reyna attended this meeting in his capacity as DOT’s consultant/Assistant LAP Coordinator. At the March 15th meeting, the EOR presented FIGG's assessment of the cracking after having reviewed the three BPA crack reports and having personally inspected the cracks on at least the following two occasions: (1) prior to the bridge being moved from the casting yard over Southwest 8th Street; and (2) on the morning of the March 15th meeting. The EOR’s presentation consisted of a lengthy and comprehensive PowerPoint slide presentation on the conditions of the bridge, structural analysis by calculations and 3D modeling of the loads and forces the area of member 11/12 nodal region cracks, and an evaluation of the safety of the span over Southwest 8th Street for workers and the public. Throughout the March 15th meeting, BPA exercised its independent professional judgment by actively participating in the EOR’s presentation, questioning and challenging the EOR. For example, BPA: inquired as to whether temporary shoring was needed; sought clarification regarding the mechanism being used to capture the load from the node and whether it would have to be integrated with the pylon diaphragm; requested clarification on the amount of transferred post- tensioning assumed for the nodal shear stability analysis; inquired as to whether there were any restrictions on load; inquired as to whether there would be a crack monitoring plan; requested a copy of the EOR’s presentation; inquired as to whether it had been peer reviewed and commented that it wanted more eyes on the presentation calculations; and BPA requested a copy of the stressing procedure that was being recommended by the EOR. Throughout the presentation, and during the question and answer phase of the meeting, the EOR assured BPA and the other attendees that the structure was safe. These assurances were based on statements made by the EOR as well as its calculations and modeling, which were part of its slide presentation at the meeting. In the presentation on the slide entitled "Safety," FIGG stated that "…[it] had conducted sufficient supplemental/independent computations to conclude that there is not any concern with safety of the span suspended over the road." At the end of the presentation, the EOR concluded the meeting with "[b]ased on conservative calculations, it is concluded that the design meets LRFD strength requirements for this temporary condition and therefore there is no safety concern relative to the observed cracks and minor spalls." During the meeting, the EOR stated that some cracking similar to the ones on the structure, were expected. The EOR further stated during the meeting that the top deck spalls could not be replicated, but that the spalled areas were minor and they should be repaired during the next phase of work when the pylon concrete was to be placed. No engineer at the meeting, including DOT's representative, Mr. Reyna, requested or recommended a complete road closure to protect the public safety or that the bridge be shut down. BPA had no reason to request a full road closure of Southwest 8th Street. There was no preplanned complete road closure, there was no maintenance of traffic ("MOT") deficiency, and, based on the EOR’s presentation, BPA was reasonably satisfied that no safety issues required a road closure. Towards the end of the meeting on March 15th, MCM informed BPA that a specialty contractor, Structural Technologies ("VSL"), was already onsite to conduct the re-tensioning operation. Without BPA’s knowledge, VSL had already mobilized on site to perform the remedial re-tensioning. BPA was not involved in pre-coordination for the re-tensioning operation. Therefore, BPA’s sub-consultant, Corradino, was not onsite to participate in monitoring of the re-tensioning procedure. Corradino’s role, as BPA's sub-contractor, was that of a 10.5.1 CEI (Major Bridge CEI--Concrete). Corradino was responsible for monitoring and documenting the post-tensioning operations. The post-tensioning operation after placement of the span had already occurred and therefore, Corradino was not on-site on March 15, 2018. Based on the safety assurances and conservative calculations presented by the FIGG EOR that the structure was safe, BPA, and the other professional engineers present at the meeting, including those representing FIU and DOT, followed the recommendations of the FIGG EOR to bring the main span condition back to its pre-existing state when the span was in the casting yard. BPA did not have the expertise or the contractual duty to perform its own analysis of the cracking on this complex bridge and override, or even call into question, FIGG’s unequivocal assessment that the bridge was safe. During the restressing operation of member 11, the roadway below the bridge had two westbound lanes closed as per the blanket, two-lane, closure permit issued by DOT. This blanket, two-lane, closure permit was obtained by MCM to provide workspace underneath the bridge to conduct the remedial action. MCM obtained the blanket, two-lane, closure permit from the Department the morning of March 15, 2018, before conducting the remedial action. A CEI’s authority to request a partial or complete road closure is defined by the contract plans and roadway closure permits, which is implemented using the procedures outlined by the CPAM and the CEI Scope of Services of the CEI Contract. A CEI is authorized to request the contractor to either partially or fully close a road if there is an MOT deficiency, as contemplated by CPAM Section 9.1.8--"Recommended Action to Shut Down a Project Due to MOT Deficiencies." Lastly, a CEI has authority to request a partial or full road closure if it is aware of a safety issue. None of these conditions existed on the project in the days leading up to the collapse in light of the EOR’s comprehensive presentation regarding the cracking conditions of the bridge, strength in the area of member 11/12 nodal region, safety of the span over Southwest 8th Street, and repeated, unequivocal reassurances that the structure did not pose a safety concern. Ultimately, BPA’s authority to request a partial or complete road closure on the project was a collective effort with the Department and FIU. BPA did not have the authority or ability to act on its own to close the road. The FIU Pedestrian Bridge collapsed during the re-tensioning of the truss member 11 post-tensioning rods on the afternoon of March 15, 2018. Six people died as a result of the FIU bridge collapse, including one bridge worker and five vehicle occupants. Ten people were critically injured as a result of the FIU bridge collapse, including two BPA employees, Mr. Morales and Carlos Chapman. Mr. Chapman was on the canopy of the bridge during the re- tensioning operation, observing the work being performed by VSL and communicating the progress to Mr. Morales who was on the deck of the bridge. Because of the representations made by the EOR, neither Mr. Chapman nor Mr. Morales was concerned for his own safety or well-being when they went on the bridge on the day it collapsed. BPA’s role, responsibilities, and scope of work on the FIU Bridge project as the CEI was that of a contract administrator, not as a structural engineer with the capability to analyze the structural behavior of the bridge sufficient to determine if the cracks posed any danger of collapse. BPA had no basis, ability, or contractual obligation, to perform its own analysis of this complex structure sufficient to override the FIGG EOR’s unequivocal safety assessment and recommendations. BPA performed its CEI duties and utilized its independent professional judgement when it documented and monitored the cracks and requested an immediate structural evaluation by the FIGG EOR. Ultimately, the bridge collapse was caused by a fundamental design error. THE OSHA AND NTSB INVESTIGATIONS Shortly after the collapse, both OSHA and NTSB began investigating the causes of the collapse. OHSA completed its investigation and released a written report of its findings in June 2019.2 The June 2019 OSHA report was 2 DOT failed to enter into evidence the OSHA report on which it relies. However, prior to the final hearing, DOT filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of Reports Issued by Federal Agencies Concerning the FIU Bridge Collapse ("Motion"). The Motion was opposed by BPA on the basis that the first OSHA report was not final because a second report was issued, and is hearsay. By Order dated January 24, 2020, the undersigned officially recognized both the issued without prior review or comments from all party members who willingly cooperated with and were involved in the investigation, including NTSB and BPA. OSHA released an amended report on the collapse of the FIU Bridge project in July 2019; however, none of the amendments in the report pertained to the actions of BPA on the FIU Bridge project. NTSB completed its investigation and issued its report in October 2019. Significantly, no evidence was presented at the final hearing regarding from whom either agency conducted the investigations or drafted the reports, the qualifications or expertise of the investigators, the methodology used in the investigations, or the ability of any of the participants in the investigation to rebut the findings or conclusions. BPA willingly participated in both the OSHA and NTSB investigations, working with investigators and providing them with information, photographs, and details on the FIU Bridge project. Both OSHA and NTSB also conducted interviews of BPA personnel involved with the FIU Bridge project as part of their investigations. In its report, OSHA found that BPA failed to classify the concrete cracks, which were structural in nature, in accordance with DOT requirements. OSHA determined that BPA, as CEI, was expected to exercise its own independent professional judgment in accordance with their contract with FIU and DOT requirements. With intimate knowledge of extensive initial OSHA report and the NTSB report. Accordingly, references to the report in this Recommended Order are based upon the official recognition. As noted in the Order on the Motion, official recognition of the OSHA and NTSB reports, however, does not make the statements contained therein automatically admissible. "The distinction between noticing the contents of a record and noticing the truth of the contents resembles the distinction in the hearsay doctrine between offering an out-of-court statement simply to show it was said, and offering it for the truth of the matter asserted." C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 201.1 (2011 Edition)(quoting Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6337). Although the existence of the report and its findings were officially recognized, the greater weight of the evidence supports that the contents were not accurate as to the exercise of independent judgment of BPA. cracking on the bridge, BPA failed to recognize the bridge was in danger of collapsing, and did not recommend to FIU, MCM, or others to close the street and shore the bridge, regardless of the opinion held by the EOR. As a result, OSHA imposed a monetary fine on BPA for its conduct and failure to take appropriate action in the days leading up to the collapse of the main bridge span. In its October 2019 report (issued after the NOID to BPA in this case), NTSB found that beginning with the cracking identified on February 24, 2018, the distress in the main bridge span was active, continued to grow, and was well documented by all parties involved in the design, construction, and oversight of the bridge. Neither FIU, MCM, FIGG, nor BPA took responsibility for declaring that the cracks were beyond any level of acceptability and did not meet DOT standards. Further, NTSB concluded that under the terms and conditions of the CEI Contract, BPA had the authority to direct or authorize partial or complete road closures as necessary, acting in concert with DOT and FIU; however, none acted to close the road under the bridge, contributing to the severity of the impact of the bridge collapse. BPA POST-COLLAPSE ACTIVITIES AND 2018 APPLICATION FOR QUALIFICATION On May 3, 2018, BPA submitted its Request for Qualification for the July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019, fiscal year ("2018 Application"). BPA’s 2018 Application was for the same Work Groups that would eventually be included in the 2019 Request for Qualification. Each work category is tied to a distinct job function. There is no relationship or similarity between CEI services (Work Group 10) and the other work groups. On June 27, 2018, DOT accepted BPA’s Request for Qualification in all work categories. In processing the application, the Department did not ask BPA any questions regarding its involvement in the project, offer any criticisms of BPA in response to the application, request to interview any BPA employees, or raise any concerns at all regarding BPA’s participation in the project. From the date of the collapse on March 15, 2018, to December 2018, DOT awarded two contracts to BPA directly for CEI and design services, respectively. During the same period, DOT allowed BPA to participate as a qualified sub-consultant on one CEI contract, three design contracts, and one traffic task work order contract. During the 2018-2019 fiscal year, before DOT attempted to suspend BPA’s qualifications, BPA was able to win several jobs in both the prime and sub-consultant role, including projects in which BPA would be providing CEI services. In October 2018, approximately seven months after the collapse, BPA applied to change its CEI qualifier from John Bolton to Jose Morales because John Bolton wanted to retire. DOT approved the request and did not object or raise any concerns with respect to Jose Morales serving as BPA’s qualifier for CEI services. On December 19, 2018, nine months after the collapse, DOT expressed concern for the first time about BPA’s role in the bridge project, staffing of current DOT projects, quality assurance/quality control ("QA/QC") plans, and professional liability insurance. DOT sent BPA a "Qualifications Letter of Concern," stating that it had "serious concerns regarding [BPA]’s involvement as the Construction Engineering Inspection consultant on the Florida International University (FIU) pedestrian bridge project[.]" DOT requested in its letter, among other things, "a detailed explanation of the firm’s actions on the FIU pedestrian bridge project and… any controls or changes in personnel, policies or practices that [BPA] has implemented subsequent to the collapse." On December 21, 2018, BPA responded to the Letter of Concern addressing each concern raised by the Department, in detail, including providing a copy of its Certificate of Liability Insurance demonstrating that there was no lapse in professional liability insurance coverage. On February 12, 2019, DOT responded to BPA’s correspondence dated December 21, 2018, requesting additional detail from BPA relative to its revised QA/QC plan and punctuated the correspondence by stating that DOT would refuse to process any further qualification requests from BPA, including ministerial prequalification name changes, until the matter was addressed to the Department’s satisfaction. Around this time, BPA submitted a request to change its name with DOT to reflect its business name with the Division of Corporations. BPA requested that DOT update this information on its website, but DOT refused to process the request due to its concerns with BPA’s qualifications. On February 20, 2019, BPA provided further detail regarding the specific policies and procedures that have been implemented to its CEI services. Specifically, BPA provided extensive detail regarding its revised QA/QC plan, which included a section dedicated to Category II type bridge structures and included a copy of the revised QA/QC program for DOT review. DOT never responded or requested any additional information in this regard. On March 15, 2019, one year to the day after the collapse, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Suspend BPA’s existing certificate of qualifications. DOT attempted to suspend BPA’s qualifications in all Work Groups and declare BPA non-responsible for a period of one year for good cause. DOT further claimed that BPA "failed to adequately address the Department’s concerns regarding the firm’s performance of the contract, and the [BPA] staff directly involved with the FIU project who continue to work on other Department structural contracts." No further explanation was provided as to how BPA failed to address these concerns. BPA timely responded to the Notice of Intent to Suspend by way of a Notice of Contest, requesting an administrative hearing on the issues raised therein. Despite the Notice of Contest, DOT suspended BPA’s qualification, and sent written notice to its various offices stating, among other things, that BPA had been removed from DOT’s prequalification list. Ultimately, DOT reinstated BPA’s qualifications, but never formally withdrew the Notice of Intent to Suspend. However, in reinstating BPA’s qualifications, DOT neglected to reinstate BPA’s Small Business Enterprise ("SBE") designation, which negatively affected BPA’s ability to obtain points for SBE participation. The points add value in scoring competing responses to Requests for Proposals for DOT contracts. BPA repeatedly requested that this be corrected. BPA’s requests went largely ignored for nearly two months. On April 2, 2019, after BPA had an in-person meeting with Courtney Drummond, DOT's Assistant Secretary of Engineering and Operations, BPA submitted a qualifications modifications package to replace Jose Morales, P.E., with John Bolton, P.E., as the qualifier for the CEI Work Group to address Mr. Drummond's and DOT’s concerns about BPA staff involved on the FIU project working on other DOT contracts. On April 5, 2019, in response to the Notice of Intent to Suspend, BPA provided specific facts in support of BPA’s proper performance of the CEI Contract. As an accommodation to DOT, BPA further proposed a solution to DOT's concern about the staff involved in the FIU project. BPA stated that it was "willing to immediately remove the BPA staff directly involved in the FIU Bridge project from working on any Department contracts or qualifying the company for CEI services" and resubmitted its qualifications application with those changes. 2019 BPA REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATION REJECTION On May 7, 2019, BPA submitted its 2019 Request for Qualification to the Department early due to the lack of response from DOT on BPA's April 5, 2019, correspondence. BPA sought qualifications for design work and CEI services in the same work categories it was qualified in for the prior fiscal year. On June 10, 2019, BPA’s counsel met with DOT representatives in Tallahassee to discuss several outstanding issues relative to BPA’s current qualification, the upcoming renewal, and DOT’s failure to reinstate BPA’s SBE designation. DOT responded by promising to correct the "mistake" that same day. Inexplicably, it took another two weeks and several reminders from BPA for DOT to finally correct the SBE designation. BPA’s 2018-2019 qualifications expired on June 30, 2019. The next day, on July 1, 2019, DOT untimely responded to BPA’s Request for Qualification with a letter titled "Incomplete Renewal Applications for Pre- Qualification." DOT's letter raised the same concerns regarding BPA’s involvement in the bridge project and, again, requested "a detailed explanation of BPA’s actions on the FIU pedestrian bridge project and…any controls or changes in personnel, policies or practices that BPA has implemented subsequent to the collapse." This is the same request that had been previously made by DOT in its December 19, 2018, Qualifications Letter of Concern, February 12, 2019, Qualifications Letter of Concern, March 15, 2019, Notice of Intent to Suspend, and April 26, 2019, denial of BPA’s Submittal for Modification. BPA had already provided the information requested several months prior to DOT's July 1, 2019, correspondence. On July 11, 2019, DOT issued its Notice of Intent to Deny Request for Qualification directed to BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification. In issuing its denial of BPA’s Request for Qualification, DOT relied solely on the findings and conclusions of the June 2019 OSHA Report as they relate to the CEI services provided by BPA on the project and referenced the pending NTSB investigation. The Department’s Notice of Intent to Deny was executed by William Watts, the Department’s Chief Engineer. Mr. Watts admitted at final hearing that he does not have the training or experience necessary to evaluate a CEI’s performance on a CEI contract. Moreover, neither Mr. Watts nor DOT retained or consulted with any individuals with CEI expertise prior to issuing the Notice of Intent to Deny. When he issued the Notice of Intent to Deny, Mr. Watts was completely unfamiliar with the following: the terms of BPA’s CEI Contract; BPA’s Request for Qualification; BPA’s past performance on CEI or any other Department contract; and BPA’s professional reputation. Mr. Watts did not evaluate BPA under the criteria required by Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code prior to denying BPA’s Request for Qualification for good cause. Mr. Watts did not receive any analysis from the Department’s prequalification staff regarding their evaluation of BPA’s application under the statutory criteria. Mr. Watts admitted that he was aware that BPA documented the cracking on the bridge, reported the cracking to the design-build firm, and requested an EAR from the EOR--actions which were all in accordance with BPA's obligations as CEI pursuant to the CPAM and its contractual obligations with FIU. Mr. Watts’ only reason for issuing the Notice of Intent to Deny, as Chief Engineer for DOT, was because BPA was under investigation by OSHA and the NTSB, and OSHA’s release of its June 2019 Report. However, Mr. Watts did not know the author of the June 2019 OSHA Report, whether the author of the report was qualified to evaluate the performance of a CEI under Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, or whether the author of the OSHA report did anything to evaluate BPA’s performance relative to any other CEI, at the same time, and/or in the same community. DOT did not investigate the structure or organization of BPA to determine whether the issues raised in the OSHA report, regarding BPA’s performance of the CEI Contract, would reflect negatively on other groups or divisions within BPA that provided services exclusively under other non-CEI work categories (design services). Prior to issuance of the NOID, Mr. Watts did not undertake a review of BPA’s past performance or professional reputation--both of which were beyond reproach. DOT evaluates its consultants’ performance on all projects approximately every six to eight months. These evaluations produce a score that ranges from one to five, five being the highest possible score. A perfect score of five is uncommon and a score of four is outstanding. In the five years prior to the final hearing, DOT evaluated BPA’s performance on projects involving both design and CEI services. Specifically, DOT scored BPA’s performance in Work Groups 3.1, 3.2 (Highway Design), 4.12 (Bridge Design), 5.1 (Bridge Inspection), 7.2 (Traffic Operations Design), and 10.1 and 10.3 (CEI). During that period, BPA averaged a score of outstanding to nearly- outstanding on all projects, including outstanding and nearly-outstanding scores for inspection services on bridge rehabilitation projects, which involved cracking concrete elements. In May of 2019, prior to denying BPA’s request for qualifications for the fiscal year July 1, 2019, through June 20, 2020, Mr. Drummond personally presented BPA with an award from the American Council of Engineering Companies ("ACEC"), for excellence in major urban reconstruction. Specifically, the award was for CEI services on the State Road 7 project, and the ACEC recognized two-and-a-half-years of excellence in CEI services from late-2016/early-2017 through 2019. DOT's District Construction Engineer, District 6 Secretary, and Headquarters were intimately involved in the selection and vetting process that, ultimately, resulted in BPA receiving the award. In September 2019, after denying its request and three months after the release of the June 2019 OSHA Report, DOT voted that BPA receive another award for excellence in CEI services. As a member of the selection committee, DOT chose BPA to receive an award from the Florida Transportation Builders Association ("FTBA"), for excellence on the Baker’s Haulover Bridge rehabilitation project. By this award, FTBA and DOT recognized BPA’s excellence in CEI services, which spanned from one year before the collapse to one year after the collapse. The Experts 3 Gustavo Quesada, P.E. At the Final Hearing, BPA presented the expert testimony of Gustavo Quesada, P.E., a CEI with over 30 years of experience. The ALJ finds that Mr. Quesada is a qualified expert on the standard of care for a CEI and his opinions in that regard are based on competent substantial evidence. As explained by Mr. Quesada, the role of a CEI with respect to cracks in concrete is to identify the cracks and make sure they do not go unseen or undetected and that an EOR is engaged for purposes of addressing the cracking. Pursuant to the CPAM, when a CEI encounters cracks in concrete, a CEI is required to document the observation and make a disposition on the cracks based on Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. Moving forward, the CEI is also required to monitor any changes in the cracks. A CEI is not responsible for making a determination as to whether a crack is potentially dangerous. This is a determination for the EOR, who has an understanding of the structure, its design, and how the structure is expected to behave. A CEI is not charged with making judgment calls on the design of a structure or whether its integrity has been jeopardized. BPA documented, monitored, and reported the cracks on the project in compliance with the industry standards for CEIs working on Complex Category II Bridges, as well as the relevant sections of the CPAM and Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. BPA’s Senior Project Engineer, Mr. Morales, exercised his independent professional judgment in elevating 3 DOT intended to offer Mr. Watts at hearing as an expert to testify to the "good cause" DOT had when issuing the NOID to BPA. BPA filed a Motion in Limine to exclude or limit the testimony of both Mr. Watts and Mr. Robertson. The motion was argued at the outset of the final hearing. The undersigned precluded Mr. Watts from testifying as an expert in the field of CEI. Mr. Watts was allowed to testify as to DOT's qualification process and did so as a fact witness, rather than an expert. the issue of the cracks to the EOR even before he was required to do so under the CPAM and Section 400 of the Standard Specifications. At the meeting called by BPA on the morning of March 15, 2018, BPA exercised its independent professional judgment and complied with the applicable standard of care when Mr. Morales asked the EOR a series of questions in response to the EOR’s presentation and evaluation of the cracks on the bridge. According to Mr. Quesada, professional engineers are expected to rely on other engineers with superior or specialized knowledge when exercising their independent professional judgment. BPA’s role, responsibilities, and scope of work on the project as the CEI was largely that of a contract administrator, and a liaison between FIU and MCM--not as a structural engineer with the capability to analyze the structural behavior of the bridge sufficient to determine if the cracks posed any danger of collapse. Robert V. Robertson, P.E. DOT presented the testimony of Robert V. Roberson as an expert on the standard of care for CEIs. Mr. Robertson has served as DOT's State Structure’s Design Engineer for 13 years. Mr. Robertson has been a professional engineer for 35 years. Although preliminarily accepted by the undersigned as an expert in this field, it became apparent through cross-examination that Mr. Robertson has no significant CEI experience. Mr. Robertson has not worked in the CEI industry in the last 26 years, nor has he ever graded a CEI’s performance. Mr. Robertson was not involved in the Department’s evaluation of BPA’s performance of the CEI Contract. Accordingly, Mr. Robertson's testimony was of limited value. Mr. Robertson acknowledged that the FIU bridge was a complex concrete bridge structure that required a separate design qualification and that BPA did have such qualification. Mr. Robertson admitted that BPA’s contract with FIU did not require BPA to be qualified to inspect complex concrete bridges because BPA was allowed to satisfy that particular qualification requirement of the contract through a sub-consultant (Corradino). Mr. Robertson testified that any licensed engineer with a college degree in engineering should have known, based on the photographs in Crack Report #3, that the cracks were dangerous and should have acted to stop work on the project and close the road. However, DOT's LAP representative at the March 15, 2018, meeting held prior to the bridge collapse, Mr. Reyna, a licensed professional engineer with a college degree in engineering, failed to raise any concerns at the March 15th meeting or act to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, or close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge. Mr. Robertson opined that the re-tensioning operation of the bridge should have been peer reviewed. In his opinion, BPA failed to use sufficient independent judgment. BPA, as the CEI, should have recognized the bridge was in danger and known to stop traffic and shut down the road. However, Mr. Roberston admitted that he did only a cursory review of the PowerPoint presentation provided on the morning of March 15, 2018, in which FIGG, as the EOR, stated it had no safety concerns. Mr. Robertson stated that he performed no analysis on anything other than BPA's CEI work relative to the FIU bridge. He had no information about BPA's design group or its qualification in any work category. However, he suggested the denial of BPA's application for qualification across the board, in all work categories because he questioned "the culture at BPA." Significantly, concerns regarding "the culture" of BPA was not cited by DOT as a basis for the NOID. Most significantly, Mr. Robertson testified that six months prior to the issuance of the NOID, he had a conversation with Mr. Drummond during which Mr. Drummond recommended that the qualification of all parties involved with the FIU Pedestrian Bridge project should be suspended. Importantly, this was prior to the issuance of either the OSHA or NTSB reports and seemingly with no analysis of the role of any party to the possible prevention of the bridge collapse, injuries, or loss of life. Ultimate Findings of Fact DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise its independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, or close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge in light of the documented cracking on the structure in the days leading up to the collapse. The evidence shows that BPA documented, monitored, and reported the cracks pursuant to the CPAM, Section 400 of the Standard Specifications, and industry standards. BPA involved the EOR in evaluating the cracks even before it was required by the CPAM, Section 400 of the Standard Specifications, and industry standards. BPA was assured time and again by the EOR that the bridge did not pose a danger to the travelling public and that the structure was safe. At the meeting on the morning of March 15, 2018, BPA inquired as to whether temporary shoring was needed, and the suggestion was rejected by the EOR who had inspected the cracks on the structure just moments before the meeting. There is no evidence that BPA deviated from the standard of care for CEIs on design-build projects or that BPA failed to exercise its independent professional judgment. To the contrary, BPA met all of its obligations pursuant to contract and state regulation. DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, and close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge pending a peer review of the re-tensioning plan proposed by the EOR at the March 15th meeting. At the March 15th meeting, BPA was reasonably convinced by the EOR that the structure was safe and that the re-tensioning plan was a temporary measure that should be implemented as soon as possible. BPA had already engaged the EOR to prepare an EAR to address the cracking observed on the bridge, which would have included signed and sealed calculations and a repair protocol that would have been implemented in a later phase of construction. On March 15, 2018, the cracks were not a safety concern such that BPA should have overridden the EOR’s directive to MCM and required that the re-tensioning operation be postponed pending a peer- review of the re-tensioning plan. There is no evidence in the record that BPA deviated from the standard of care for CEIs on design-build projects or allegedly failed to exercise its independent professional judgment by allowing the re-tensioning procedure to proceed as directed by the EOR. Conversely, the evidence supports a finding that BPA acted appropriately in relying on the recommendations of the EOR who was uniquely qualified to evaluate the safety of the structure and who had specialized knowledge of its design. DOT failed to demonstrate that BPA, as the CEI, fell below the standard of care by failing to exercise independent professional judgment by not acting to cease bridge work, shore the bridge, and close Southwest 8th Street under the bridge until the Corradino Group could arrive on the project site to observe the re-tensioning operation proposed by the EOR during the meeting on March 15, 2018. Corradino’s role on the project was to monitor and document post-tensioning operations. By the time the meeting was over, MCM’s specialty contractor, VSL, was mobilized and prepared to proceed with the re-tensioning operation. BPA was not involved in the pre- coordination of this work. Ultimately, the bridge collapsed due to an inherent design error in the plans and not due to Corradino’s absence from the re- tensioning operations. The findings of the OSHA report and the pendency of the NTSB investigation, standing alone, were insufficient "good cause" for DOT to deny BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Transportation finding that good cause does not exist to deny BPA’s 2019 Request for Qualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: George Spears Reynolds, IV, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Scott Kirschbaum, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 Anthony Lopez, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 George Richard Truitt, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA 9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 Miami, Florida 33156 (eServed) John Ashley Peacock, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Erik Fenniman, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Kevin J. Thibault, P.E., Secretary Department of Transporation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57287.055337.105455.227471.003471.033 Florida Administrative Code (3) 14-75.002214-75.005161G15-19.001 DOAH Case (1) 19-5130
# 9
FLORIDA ENGINEERS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs FRED JONES, P.E., 08-006238PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Dec. 16, 2008 Number: 08-006238PL Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2024
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer