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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs KENNETH MICHAEL WHITAKER, 93-005436 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 17, 1993 Number: 93-005436 Latest Update: Aug. 13, 1996

The Issue Whether Petitioner should be disciplined pursuant to a nine count administrative complaint, each count containing allegations of multiple violations of the Insurance Code.

Findings Of Fact Emerald Coast Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Emerald Coast) is a nonstandard automobile insurance agency, insuring high risk drivers who normally have a difficult time procuring insurance. Emerald Coast advertises. Some customers named in the administrative complaint responded to advertisements featuring "high risk, low down payment." At all times material, Respondent was licensed as a life agent, as a life and health agent, and as a general lines agent and was the corporate president, director and registered agent of Emerald Coast. Respondent was present and actively overseeing all of the applications involved in this case, even when information was written on forms by the customer, another agent, or an unlicensed employee. Most of the complaining witnesses were able to identify Respondent as being present and/or assisting while their forms were made out. DOI did not affirmatively prove that any unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast spent more than 10 percent of his employment time interacting with customers. Prior to these proceedings, DOI has never taken action against Emerald Coast or Respondent. Respondent went to DOI on two occasions prior to the filing of this administrative complaint and discussed optional coverages in an effort to avoid situations that might lead to disciplinary action. Emerald Coast has four offices in three cities. All of the events underlying the charges herein occurred in Tallahassee. Emerald Coast has written between 15,000 and 18,000 automobile insurance policies in the three years it has been open. Approximately 70 percent of Emerald Coast's customers who purchase automobile insurance policies cancel those policies prior to the renewal date. Eighty percent of these cancelled policies are cancelled for nonpayment of premium. Among these cancellations are individuals called "tag runners." Tag runners purchase the minimum required insurance for receipt of an automobile license tag, with the intent of having the policy cancelled after they have made one or two payments and taking the chance that the Division of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles will not catch up with them to suspend their licenses because insurance cancellations may take up to six months, even for non-payment. Once the policy information is taken from the customer, it is entered in a computer and, within three to five days, checks are written from Emerald Coast to the insurance carriers for initial premiums. If the proposed insured fails to make a payment or stops payment on a check, the agency loses money on the transaction because the agency has already forwarded the money to the insurance company. Emerald Coast provides the option of financing a premium if a customer cannot pay it in a lump sum annually. When a customer cannot pay in full for an insurance policy, Emerald Coast offers the option of purchasing an ancillary product like an auto club for a set price in addition to paying for the insurance with a low down payment. The club cost is in addition to the total insurance premium, and the low down payment for the insurance premium is conditional upon the customer's paying for the club's product. If the customer does not want the auto club product, Emerald Coast still permits him to finance his insurance premium with a 50 percent down payment. Emerald Coast's purpose of requiring a 50 percent down payment or payment in full, or the purchase of the auto club when a small down payment is made, is to offset cancellation rates and the agency's losses incurred thereby. The premium finance companies which finance insurance policies require fees. There are no premium finance companies that require Respondent to sell auto clubs in order to sell their premium finance products. The insurance carriers charge a premium for the risk they assume with the contract of insurance. There are no insurance carriers that require Respondent to sell auto clubs in order to sell their insurance. Approximately 60 percent of the people to whom Emerald Coast has sold policies also purchased auto clubs, including towing and rental features. The larger the fee paid by the customer for the club, the greater the towing, rental and other benefits that the club provides and the greater amount the seller makes. Respondent received a 90 percent commission from Atlantic Travel Association of North Florida, Inc. for the auto clubs he sold and sent to them. Respondent also sold American Travelers Association death and dismemberment benefit contracts at a similar commission. Respondent and Emerald Coast used to sell Atlantic Travelers Association, Inc. auto clubs. As of January 1, 1992, they switched to selling Atlantic Travelers Association of North Florida, Inc. clubs. The two clubs are not associated in any way. By agreement with the new club's owner, Respondent and Emerald Coast continued to use the old forms bearing the wrong company name and submitted them to the new club. The forms do not provide the address of the club, and members are expected to submit claims through Emerald Coast. Atlantic Travelers Association of North Florida, Inc. is a valid auto club and pays valid claims. Atlantic Travelers Association of North Florida, Inc.'s owner testified that his company was prepared to honor each misnamed form that Respondent sent to him with a fee, but it is probable that the form issued in the wrong name would not be legally binding. If the form was never received by the new club, Emerald Coast's customer would have an even more tenuous claim. Therefore, Respondent's auto club customers were protected only at the new club's whim as to whether or not a contract they paid for would be honored, and each form issued by Respondent or Emerald Coast with the wrong auto club name on it constituted a misrepresentation, deceptive to the customer on several levels. Respondent also continued to use the Atlantic Traveler's Association, Inc. name on all the acknowledgments he asked his customers to sign, signifying that they understood that the auto club cost was optional and in addition to their automobile insurance. The use of the wrong name on these acknowledgment forms also was a misrepresentation. Due to space considerations, and for greater clarity, Atlantic Traveler's Association, Inc. will hereafter be referred to as "the old auto club," and Atlantic Traveler's Association of North Florida, Inc. will hereafter be referred to as "the new auto club." None of the customers named in the administrative complaint lost money as a result of any auto club sold by Respondent or Emerald Coast. The auto club contracts offered 38 different choices of benefit levels. Each of the benefit levels was an option which should have been discussed with and knowingly accepted by the customer. Respondent gave the individuals selling the auto clubs no instructions on which of the options they should sell to a customer or how they should judge which option(s) a customer needed. Routinely, neither Respondent nor any of his employees ever offered all 38 options to each customer. Rather, dependent upon the car insurance coverage the customer selected, or upon the unbridled discretion of the salesperson, each salesperson sold what he felt like. Respondent and Emerald Coast use an acknowledgment form to let the customer know he is purchasing an ancillary product, that the total cost of the ancillary product is in addition to insurance premiums, and that the ancillary product is optional and not required by law. They use a document called an "affidavit" to inform the customer of other coverages and when the coverages will go into effect and to hopefully insure that the information received from the customer is accurate. These so-called "affidavits" are neither notarized nor attested-to by anyone. Respondent acknowledged that the DOI and the insurance industry consider the word, "premium," as applying to insurance premiums only, not ancillary products such as auto clubs. See, Section 627.041(2) F.S. Laymen likewise regard the word "premium" as reflecting the cost of insurance. Respondent and Emerald Coast use generic receipts which say "premium," not "insurance premium." Where insurance premium collections and ancillary product sales were conducted simultaneously, Respondent used the word "premium" on these receipts to cover the total amount tendered by each customer as a down payment on both the insurance policy premium and on the ancillary product. He then listed only the insurance premium down payment (total amount tendered by the customer minus ancillary product full fee or down payment) on the insurance premium finance agreement because only insurance premiums can be financed on those forms. Where receipts specified "total premium" he lumped in the cost of the ancillary product. Respondent thus misused the word "premium" on receipts issued to customers. Accordingly, the receipts provided to Respondent's customers were misrepresentations and deceptive. One result of the misuse of the term "premium" was that customers sometimes were led to believe that their deposits against both auto clubs or death and dismemberment policies and insurance coverage were down payments on the insurance policies alone, even where the receipts specified "premiums" and "deposit." Accordingly, Respondent's deductions of all or part of the ancillary product fee up front resulted in false statements on other documents that the full down payment for premium or financing of premium had been made when it had not. Respondent testified that his standard operating procedure was for himself or another licensed insurance agent to explain the coverages on each of the policy application forms executed at Emerald Coast; that where marks occurred on the summary of coverage pages, they were made by himself or another Emerald Coast representative during these explanations; that he explained the cost coverage breakdown for each customer he saw; and that he instructed each customer he saw to read all documents before signing. However, the juxtaposition of the "total" space block and the column where premiums and other costs are added on the "summary of coverages and cost breakdown" form makes it impossible for the customer to quickly add up the premiums for each type of insurance coverage and the cost of ancillary product in a straight line. Also, due to the confusion of Respondent's use of the word "premium" for different purposes on different documents, the figure for total "premium" frequently cannot be reconciled among the receipt, the financing document, the insurance application, and/or the summary of coverages and cost breakdown form. Even a reasonably attentive customer would be confused by the several forms. Reading the summary before signing it would not necessarily have revealed what funds were being applied to which purpose. In some instances, more specifically set out by customer and count infra., the completed summary of coverages and cost breakdown forms were misleading or unexplainable as to what amounts were being charged to the customer. Count I (David K. Register) On January 31, 1992, David K. Register went to Emerald Coast to purchase insurance. The applications made out at that time were executed by Respondent as brokering agent. Mr. Register signed all documents without reading them. Nonetheless, he understood that he was purchasing personal injury protection, property damage coverage, comprehensive and collision coverage, and what the deductibles were at the time he signed the documents. He also knew he was purchasing an auto club at the cost of $150. The total cost of the insurance coverage he was seeking was approximately $750. Respondent required Mr. Register to purchase an auto club contract as a condition of obtaining premium financing for his insurance policies. Respondent completed a premium finance agreement for financing the unpaid premiums for the policies showing that Mr. Register had tendered a $197 premium down payment. Respondent advised Mr. Register that he owed an additional $135, due February 14, 1992. Respondent issued a receipt to Mr. Register showing the total premium was $937. When he applied with Emerald Coast, Mr. Register had four offenses on his driving record, three for unlawful speed and one for violation of the alcoholic beverage open container law. His complete driving record was not disclosed on the documents prepared. If it had been disclosed, an additional premium would have been charged. The testimony is in direct conflict on whether or not Mr. Register orally disclosed his prior violations to Emerald Coast: Mr. Register maintained that he did; Respondent maintained that he did not. There is no direct evidence to show which witness was accurate on this issue. Circumstantially, there was no reason Respondent should fail to write down violations told him by Mr. Register since Respondent was prepared to write insurance in the high risk category anyway and one way or another Respondent could have insured Mr. Register for the amount Mr. Register was prepared to pay that day. Subsequently, Mr. Register made a down payment and executed an insurance application with Progressive Insurance through Swann Insurance Agency on which he also failed to disclose his entire driving record. He did so with the explicit understanding at that time that the new carrier would run a license check on him and an additional premium would be required due to his bad driving record which he had disclosed orally to Swann Insurance Agency. The "safety net" when a bad driving record is not disclosed on an application is that carriers routinely run independent driving license checks and adjust the premium upward or refuse coverage if they discover an undisclosed bad driving record. What Swann Insurance Agency and its carrier did after the carrier researched David Register's driving history is not clear on the record. When Emerald Coast and its carrier discovered his history, they demanded a higher premium. The evidence falls short of showing that Respondent deliberately left information provided by Mr. Register off his application at Emerald Coast. On February 6, 1992, Armor, the carrier with whom Emerald Coast had placed Mr. Register's PIP and property damage coverage, notified Mr. Register and Respondent that the policy binder would be cancelled if required photographs of the vehicle were not received. On February 10, Mr. Register took the vehicle to Emerald Coast for photographs. On February 13, Respondent wrote Mr. Register a letter threatening to cancel his "policy" if the $135 "premium" were not paid by February 14. Respondent testified that the letter referred to cancellation of the auto club towing "policy" and therefore he was not threatening to cancel Mr. Register's automobile insurance policy for failure to pay for an ancillary product. However, on its face, the letter was misleading. Respondent's unique "wordology" had the effect on Mr. Register of a threat to cancel his automobile insurance policy for non-payment of the ancillary product fee. On February 14, David Register and his father wrote Respondent requesting cancellation of the insurance policies and return of all money paid, since they had purchased duplicate coverage at Swann Insurance Agency. Respondent did not forward the cancellation request to Nu-Main, general agent for the carrier with whom he had placed Mr. Register's comprehensive and collision policy. Respondent did not forward the car photographs to Armor. As a result of the photographs not being received, on February 18, Armor cancelled its binder to David Register. On March 9, 1992, the finance company sent David Register and Emerald Coast its cancellation notice for nonpayment of premiums. David Register never paid the additional $135 due on February 14 for the auto club and the new auto club had no record of his old auto club form being received. Due to his February 14 cancellation, Respondent eventually refunded Mr. Register $140 of the $212 he had paid on January 31, 1992. Mr. Register's father testified that the $72 difference was accounted for by the cost of coverage from January 31 to February 14 and cancellation fees charged by the carriers. Count II (Diedre Hawks Johnson) On August 15, 1992, Diedre Hawks went to Emerald Coast to buy minimum insurance for a used car she had just purchased and financed. She executed an application for property damage, comprehensive, collision, and PIP insurance coverages. These coverages are more than the minimum required by law, but may not be more than the minimum required by the financing of Baldwin-Foster Motors, where Ms. Hawks had just purchased the car. The record is unclear on this distinction. Ms. Hawks tendered $165. Respondent actively supervised Dan Allison, a licensed insurance agent, during this transaction. Contrary to Ms. Hawks' testimony, it is found that she understood on August 15 that she had purchased an auto club. Although she did not read them at the time, Ms. Hawks executed the premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the automobile insurance policy premium and the application for an auto club at $150. Ms. Hawks likewise signed both an acknowledgment showing she knew she was getting an auto club for $150 and an "affidavit." She also signed a summary of coverages and cost breakdown acknowledging that Emerald Coast employees had explained the coverages, that she fully understood them, and that she had received a completed copy of that document. Her explanation at formal hearing for why she did not read what she signed was that she was in a hurry because it was late in the day and the Emerald Coast employees were rushing to get out. However, she acknowledged that Respondent gave her an opportunity to read the documents which clearly set out that she was buying an auto club for $150. However, even if she had read them, the documents presented to Ms. Hawks were ambiguous as to what the amounts paid or owing were to cover. The enumerated coverages on the cost breakdown form add up to $745 (including a $150 auto club) plus a policy fee of $25 and a "grand total" of $770. The financial agreement shows a $620 premium total with $465 financed, a $155 down payment and $65.49 per month due in monthly payments. The receipt issued to Ms. Hawks by Emerald Coast on August 15 showed that she had tendered a $165 deposit, was paying for a $770 annual premium, and owed an additional $140 deposit. Upon the foregoing, Ms. Hawks' testimony was convincing that even though she initialled the receipt requiring the additional deposit, she did not know that she still owed a $140 down payment when she left Emerald Coast and that she believed that she only had to pay her premium in monthly increments of $65.49. The next day, August 16, 1992, Underwriters Guaranty Insurance Company issued Ms. Hawks an insurance policy with an annual premium of $620. The difference of $150 between the $770 and $620 figures was the total $150 cost of the auto club which she was required to buy in order to get financing with Emerald Coast. Ms. Hawks signed a contract with the old travel club. Emerald Coast sent the contract to the new travel club. Ten dollars of Ms. Hawks' initial $165 had been applied by Emerald Coast as a down payment on the auto club. No paper specifically shows this diversion of funds. On September 8, Emerald Coast wrote Ms. Hawks that she must come in and pay $140 more on her down payment for "premium" or her insurance would be cancelled. Ms. Hawks purposefully ignored the letter since communications with the carrier clarified that the money was actually to be applied to the auto club fee. Beginning September 13, Respondent telephoned her several times to come in and make the payment. Ms. Hawks still did not pay the $140. Therefore, Respondent refused to turn over to her a copy of her automobile insurance policy when it was issued. Ms. Hawks again dealt with the carrier directly and the carrier assigned her to a new agent. She never paid the auto club fee. Count III (Christine Maddux Vollenweider) On March 16, 1992, Christine Maddux asked to finance part of a $242 premium. Respondent told her that the additional cost of financing insurance with the $242 annual premium would be $317. Respondent also told her that Emerald Coast had a condition of financing which required her to buy an auto club. Ms. Maddux executed an application for a PIP and property damage automobile insurance policy with a total annual premium of $242. Respondent told her that she must pay a $143 down payment. Ms. Maddux had only $80 with her, so she tendered $80 to Respondent, who told her she must pay the remaining $68 the following week. On her first visit, the "total premium" was $317 on the receipt ($80 received and $68 deposit due). She paid the $68 the following week, as agreed. That amount was also receipted as "total premium." On March 16, Ms. Maddux executed a premium finance agreement to obtain premium financing on the balance of the premium amount and applied for an auto club. The premium financing agreement showed that she had tendered only $73 down payment on the insurance premium. The $7 balance of her $80 went for the auto club, but no document specifically shows that diversion of funds. Ms. Maddux did not read the summary of insurance coverages and cost breakdown prior to signing it. She was not told that she could not read the document, and she signed a statement acknowledging that the coverages had been explained to her, that she fully understood them, and that she had received a completed copy of the document. All of the documents except the financing agreement consistently reflect the $75 for the auto club. Ms. Maddux applied for the auto club at a cost of $75 even though she already received equal or better auto club benefits from AAA-Plus, and had told Respondent so. No one at Emerald Coast told Ms. Maddux that she was required by law to purchase it. She applied for the auto club only because of Respondent's specific agency business practice to require an auto club purchase of any customer who had to finance insurance premiums after a down payment of less than half of the entire annual premium. The auto club contract Ms. Maddux signed was with the old club showing a cost of $75. Emerald Coast sent the contract to the new club. Ms. Maddux was issued a policy by Security Insurance Company of Hartford. Count IV (Candy Bassett) On March 16, 1993, Candy Bassett wanted to purchase the minimum required non-owner's automobile insurance to get back her driver's license, which had been suspended. She incorrectly stated to Emerald Coast that she had only four points on her driving record, when in fact she had twelve points. The points had been accumulated for speeding tickets, for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) with serious bodily injury, and for a conviction for failure to identify upon an accident. Ms. Bassett signed Emerald Coast's summary of coverages and cost breakdown form and the policy application form, stating therein that her violations and offenses as revealed by her were accurate and acknowledging that the coverages had been explained to her and were fully understood by her. Ms. Bassett executed both a cost breakdown and summary and an acknowledgment. The cost breakdown and summary showed she was purchasing a travel club including accidental death coverage for $100. Her acknowledgment showed she was purchasing a motor club including towing and rental reimbursement for $187. Ms. Bassett executed an application for an automobile insurance policy to be issued by Underwriters. The application listed the total annual premium as $334. Ms. Bassett tendered her down payment check in the amount of $187. The receipt showed the "total premium" to be $449 and the amount received to be $187. Ms. Bassett executed a premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the policy premium. It showed that Ms. Bassett had tendered only an $87 down payment on a total premium of $349. Underwriters issued Ms. Bassett an insurance policy for an annual term. Respondent actively supervised her transaction and executed the policy application as brokering agent. As part of this transaction and as part of a specific Emerald Coast business practice, Respondent required Ms. Bassett to execute an American Travelers Association, Inc. accidental death and dismemberment benefits contract reflecting a fee of $100, not a towing contract as reflected on some of her other paperwork. The $100 for this death and dismemberment product constituted the difference between the $87 shown on the finance agreement as the amount tendered and the $187 check Ms. Bassett actually tendered. There is no evidence as to the status of American Travelers Association Inc. or whether it received Ms. Bassett's contract. Contrary to other documents she executed, Ms. Bassett signed an acknowledgment form to the effect that she knew the club, including towing and rental reimbursement, were optional at a fee of $187 separate from her automobile insurance and that she understood that it was not insurance. Ms. Bassett testified that she thought the death and dismemberment benefits were included in her insurance, that she was not informed that she would have to pay an additional $100 for those benefits, and that she did not intend to pay any monies for such benefits. The foregoing testimony is not entirely credible in light of the rest of the evidence. Ms. Bassett also specifically testified that she was told that the travel/accident feature was "included in the -- I can't remember how much the premium was, it was four hundred and something, he said it was included in that." (Emphasis supplied.) She also signed an acknowledgment indicating the towing fee would be in addition to the insurance premium and a paper showing the amount for financing the insurance premium totalled only $349, and she was asked to name, and did name, a beneficiary on the death and dismemberment form. Further, she admitted that she understood that she was receiving travel/accident benefits through American Travelers, and that it was required for premium financing. However, she is credible and clear that all the amounts she had paid and was going to have to pay were not fairly represented to her and that Respondent made out forms showing she was being charged $187 for an auto club or towing feature which, having no car she could not very well use, as well as forms showing she was purchasing a death and dismemberment feature at $100, purely as a requirement of financing automobile insurance. Count V (Cynthia Mann) On January 24, 1992, Cynthia Mann made application for full coverage automobile insurance. Respondent actively supervised her transaction. Respondent was the brokering agent for the policy. Ms. Mann tendered a check for $180 and was advised that an additional down payment of $95 was due on the policy. She tendered the additional $95 down payment to Respondent on February 3, 1992. Charter American Casualty Insurance Company issued her standard automobile policy. Ms. Mann also executed a premium finance agreement to obtain premium financing for the policy. This agreement indicated that the total down payment for the policy was $165. Respondent required Ms. Mann to execute an old auto club contract in order to get the financing. She signed an acknowledgment that she had been offered an opportunity to purchase insurance from Emerald Coast without any auto club. The new auto club had no record of receiving Ms. Mann's Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. contract. The record is silent as to whether or not the old auto club received her contract. The annual fee specified on the old auto club contract was $110. Emerald Coast took $110 from Ms. Mann's $180 deposit and applied it to the auto club contract. Ms. Mann signed an application form, an acknowledgment form similar to those signed by the other complainants, and an "affidavit." Ms. Mann contended that Respondent had told her that she had a towing benefit as part of the automobile insurance policy purchased. The reconciled and understandable portion of her paperwork shows otherwise. She was not told she could not read the documents placed before her for reading and signature, but she did not read any of the documents prior to signing. She did not want to spend additional time reading documents because she "knew [she] had to have insurance." However, reading the documents would not have eliminated some of the contradictory and therfore false statements as to what constituted insurance premium. Count VI (Jacque Flowers) Respondent was actively involved in both of Jacque Flowers' transactions. At all times material, Paul Wettrich, an unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast, spent less than ten percent of his time actually filling out forms for customers or taking information from customers. On December 31, 1992, Jacque Flowers went to Emerald Coast to purchase automobile insurance and executed an application for various coverages for two automobiles. On December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers tendered $160 as a down payment to Mr. Wettrich. Mr. Wettrich signed a receipt as "salesman," and assisted Ms. Flowers in filling out the required forms. The receipt showed a total premium of $849. The Respondent executed the application as brokering agent. Mr. Wettrich never signed any of the applications on behalf of Respondent or any other licensed agent. Also, on December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers executed an Underwriters Financial premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the policy premium. Respondent executed that agreement as agent of record. The agreement incorrectly specified that a $187 down payment already had been made. As part of the December 31, 1992 transaction, and pursuant to Emerald Coast's standard business practice, Ms. Flowers was required to contract with Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. for an auto club at a $100 fee. The $100 auto club fee was deducted from the $160 cash payment made on that date. On December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers was in a hurry to complete her transaction because she had her three-year-old child with her. Without reading them, Ms. Flowers signed an application form, a premium finance agreement, an acknowledgment form, an Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. form, and a summary and cost breakdown form, acknowledging the truth and accuracy of the statements contained in each document, that the coverages had been fully explained to her, and that she understood them. Effective January 1, 1993 and pursuant to the policy application, Underwriters issued to Ms. Flowers a policy with a total annual premium of $749. On January 27, 1993, pursuant her agreement on December 31, 1992, Ms. Flowers tendered to Respondent an additional $127. ($160 plus $127 would equal $287 paid up to that date.) Also on January 27, 1993, Ms. Flowers deleted one car from the policy. On February 15, 1993, Ms. Flowers deleted the second car from the policy and added a third car. This resulted in an increased premium and an addendum to the policy which had been issued January 1. Ms. Flowers paid $92 more to Respondent's brother Scott, an unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast, who signed the receipt. The addendum stated that the additional policy premium was $167, and that $67 had been the cash down payment. Respondent executed the addendum as brokering agent. In accord with its standard business practice, Emerald Coast, through Scott Whitaker, required Ms. Flowers to execute an accidental death and dismemberment contract with American Travelers Association, Inc. Twenty-five dollars for this item was taken from her $92 paid that day. The receipts and other documents provided Ms. Flowers at this time were inconsistent, and Respondent was unable to explain the inconsistencies at formal hearing. Although Ms. Flowers testified that the two ancillary product packages (auto club and death and dismemberment benefits) were never explained to her and that she would never have purchased either package if she had understood that there were additional charges therefor, her paperwork shows otherwise. Also, she specifically testified that when she went to Emerald Coast the first time, on December 31, 1992, her insurance had just been cancelled by Florida Farm Bureau due to her husband's driving record, and that when she requested full coverage, she understood "full coverage" to include towing, based on her experience with Florida Farm Bureau. Therefore, it is concluded that she wanted the towing benefit however she could get it. She also admitted that each paper was explained to her before she signed on December 31, 1992. Therefore, she knew on December 31, 1992 that she was getting towing and was paying for it through an auto club, even though the totality of the paperwork is misleading as to what amounts were paid for each purpose, and even though the several options within each type of ancillary product were not explained to her and the Emerald Coast employees chose what benefit amount to sell her each time. The December 31, 1992 old auto club package was sent to the new auto club. The record is silent as to what became of the February 15, 1993 American Travelers Association, Inc. death and dismemberment form. Count VII (Sebrena McPhaul) On September 21, 1992, Sebrena McPhaul went to Emerald Coast to purchase automobile insurance and executed applications for bodily injury, property damage, and PIP coverages with Underwriters and for physical damage coverage with Nu-Main, for a total premium of $651, to be divided appropriately between the two carriers as they required. Ms. McPhaul executed a finance agreement stating that the down payment for her insurance policies was $163. Ms. McPhaul tendered a $163 down payment check with the understanding that she would tender an additional $100 in two subsequent $50 installments. Ms. McPhaul also signed an Atlantic Travel Association, Inc. form, even though she informed Emerald Coast employees that she did not need an auto club since she had AAA. The application she signed was for an auto club at a cost of $130, a portion of which was to be taken from the down payments to be made by Ms. McPhaul. Ms. McPhaul signed a summary of coverages and cost breakdown form which stated that an auto club was covered, including payment for bail bonds, towing and labor and owner protection at a cost of $130, but she did not read it before she signed it. Ms. McPhaul admitted that the coverages had been explained to her by Scott Whitaker, an unlicensed employee of Emerald Coast, prior to her signing the summary of coverages and cost breakdown form, but maintained that he had not adequately explained that the $130 for the auto club was in addition to her insurance premium instead of part of it. Ms. McPhaul signed an acknowledgment form concerning the purchase of the auto club and an "affidavit" concerning the truthfulness of her responses, but she read neither of them, either. She conceded that if she had taken the time to read the acknowledgment form instead of just signing it, she would have understood the difference. Scott Whitaker issued her a receipt showing her total premium was $781. Respondent was in charge of the office, was actively involved in her transaction, and signed the applications as brokering agent. Emerald Coast sent the old club form to the new club. Ms. McPhaul executed a premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of the premiums for her policies which were executed by Respondent as agent of record. Ms. McPhaul was issued insurance policies for her purchased coverages, on September 21 and 22, respectively. At this point, Ms. McPhaul understood that she was paying $130 for an auto club above and beyond her premiums and financing costs. Previously, she had thought that towing was part of her standard automobile insurance contract. She blamed the misunderstanding upon misrepresentations made by Scott Whitaker, but the acknowledgment she signed is clear on this portion of the disclosure. Ms. McPhaul stopped payment on a check she had used to pay the down payment on her insurance. Emerald Coast thereby incurred a loss of $90 it had forwarded to the carriers, and also lost the cost of processing her applications. The receipts and other documents provided Ms. Flowers were inconsistent. Respondent was unable to explain the inconsistencies. Count VIII (Steve Reeves) On March 20, 1993, Steve Reeves went to Emerald Coast to purchase automobile insurance for a new truck he was leasing. He did so because he had unilaterally formed the opinion that his current truck insurance would not cover a new truck he had just leased. Mr. Reeves tendered to Emerald Coast a down payment of $175 with the understanding that he would make an additional $45 premium payment to Emerald Coast. That additional premium payment was paid by Mr. Reeves at a later date. Mr. Reeves executed a premium finance agreement to obtain financing for the remainder of his policy premium. The financing agreement showed the down payment was $120, not $175. This is the only significant discrepancy among Mr. Reeves' documents except for the wrong use of the word "premium" on the receipt and the wrong auto club being named in the acknowledgment and auto club form. Respondent executed the policy application as agent of record. The application stated that the premium was $453 plus a $25 policy fee for a total of $478. The receipt to Mr. Reeves for the down payment lists the total premium as $578, as does the cost breakdown form. The $100 difference was applied to an auto club fee. Mr. Reeves also purchased an auto club from Emerald Coast. He knew he had purchased the auto club as a condition of getting his insurance from Emerald Coast. His companion suggested going elsewhere for cheaper insurance without the auto club, but Mr. Reeves declined this suggestion because it was late in the day and he wanted to get his truck insured right then and drive it home. The auto club contract reflected a fee of $100 and bore the name of the old auto club. It was sent to the new auto club. Mr. Reeves signed an acknowledgment form which also reflected a $100 auto club fee, an "affidavit," a summary and coverage cost breakdown form, and a travel association form, but did not fully read them. Executive Insurance Company issued a policy to Mr. Reeves, which he paid on monthly for five or six months. He eventually allowed the policy to lapse for non-payment because he got in a dispute with Emerald Coast about the agency's refusal to accept payments made in its office by way of a third party check.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Insurance enter a final order suspending Respondent's licenses for thirteen months for eight violations of Section 626.9541(1)(x)4. and eight violations of Section 626.621(6) F.S. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-5436 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 6-7 Rejected as not proven. 8-10 Subordinate to the facts as found. 11-15 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer counts. Subordinate to the facts as found. Rejected as a conclusion of law 19-29 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 30-31 Subordinate to the facts as found. 32 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective count. 33-38 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 43-47 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 48 The first sentence is rejected as a conclusion of law. The second sentence is accepted,. 49-50 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 51 Accepted as covered in FOF 18. 52-53 Subordinate to the facts as found. 54-55 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 56 Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. The remainder is covered in substance. 57-59 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 60 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 61-62 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 63 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 64-71 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 72 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 73-74 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. Otherwise accepted. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 78-79 Accepted in part and rejected in part upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. See FOF 66-68. 80-83 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 86-87 Accepted in part and rejected in part upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. See FOF 20,24, 72-76. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 90-95 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected because not proven as stated. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 98-99 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 100-102 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 106-111 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 117-118 Rejected in part and accepted in part as covered in FOF 90-91. 119-124 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as misstating the primary party. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 123 and respective customer count. 128-130 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 133-138 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 139 Rejected as contrary to the record as a whole. 140-145 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 146-147 Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. 148-150 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Accepted as modified to more closely approximate the record as a whole. See FOF 23 and respective customer count. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 153-157 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 158 Rejected as a conclusion of law. 159-162 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Respondent's PFOF: 1-18 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 19-20 Rejected because misleading and non-dispositive as stated. See FOF 17-20. 21 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 22-25 Unnecessary. Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. Immaterial 28-37 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 38 Accepted but not dispositive 39-42 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 43 Rejected as not proven. 44-103 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized, and some further explanation has been added. Some matters have been considered on the issue of credibility but not incorporated. 104 Rejected because not proven as stated. 105-108 Covered only as necessary in FOF 23-24 109-112 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. The primary party has been indicated. 113-124 Rejected as quoting isolated, unreconciled testimony, as mere legal argument, and as stating a conclusion of law. 125-128 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Legal argumentation has also been excluded. 129-133 Rejected as quoting isolated, unreconciled testimony, as mere legal argument, an as stating a conclusion of law. 134-137 Accepted in substance, except that unnecessary, subordinate and/or cumulative material has not been utilized.Legal argumentation has also been excluded. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael K. McCormick, Esquire David D. Hershel, Esquire Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Bill O'Neil, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Sumner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (14) 120.57120.68624.124626.112626.611626.621626.641626.651626.951626.9521626.9541626.9561626.9581627.041
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs TARA JEANNE SMITH, 95-004048 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 15, 1995 Number: 95-004048 Latest Update: Sep. 06, 1996

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner takes exception to the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order at paragraphs 12, 19, and 27, wherein the Hearing Officer found that the evidence did not prove that the Respondent had committed the violations charged as referenced in each finding. This conclusion is not supported by competent and substantial evidence as required by section 120.57(1)(a) 10., Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer was convinced that the multitude of forms utilized by the Respondent in selling the non-insurance products (motor clubs) to Hulan Mitchell, Jenna Chester and Michele Humose demonstrated that they had given their informed consent. However, the Hearing Officer overlooked the blatant misrepresentation and false statement contained in the "premium" receipts issued to each of the insureds. Although the Hearing Officer is free to determine the credibility of the witness' testimony, the Hearing Officer cannot ignore or reject unrefuted competent and substantial evidence in the record that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the premium receipts are a misrepresentation of fact or false statement. No witness testimony is necessary to make this finding. The documents speak for themselves and were not otherwise questioned or refuted. The record unequivocally established the following: Hulan Mitchell - The "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "1") issued to Mr. Mitchell indicates a total premium of $378. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $328 with a downpayment of $98 required. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "1") This is absolutely unrefuted on the record. The premium receipt includes $50 for the cost of the motor club, which is not a policy of insurance and accordingly is not "premium". Also the downpayment required, purportedly for insurance, included $50 for the motor club ($98 + $50 = $148). Furthermore, based on clear documentary evidence in the record, Mr. Mitchell was again subject to a misrepresentation of fact (undisputed) wherein on July 9, 1993 he received a letter (Pet. Ex. "1") threatening to cancel his "insurance" policy because he did not pay a $48 balance due on the motor club. Accordingly the record clearly indicates that the Respondent has made a false or misleading statement with reference to the insurance transaction for Mr. Mitchell. The fact that the Hearing Officer held that Mr. Mitchell knew (despite his testimony otherwise) that he had purchased a motor club, does not negate the fact that the Respondent made a false or misleading statement. JENNA CHESTER - The deceptive premium receipt practice was visited upon Ms. Chester on two occasions. First on February 1, 1994 a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "2") was issued in an amount of $670 for "total premium" due and a required downpayment of $261. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $585 with a required downpayment of $176. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The "premium" receipt and downpayment included a non-insurance fee for a motor club in the amount of $85. On May 23, 1994 Ms. Chester went to the Respondent to repurchase coverage which had been cancelled. At that time, another "premium" receipt was issued to her in the amount of a "total premium" of $719 and a required downpayment of $286 (Pet. Ex. "2") The actual cost of the insurance was $619 and a required downpayment of $186. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The additional $100 was for the non-insurance motor club which was sold to Ms. Chester. Although the Hearing Officer held that Ms. Chester knew she was purchasing this motor club (despite Ms. Chester' s testimony otherwise) this does not negate the fact that the Respondent has made false or misleading statement in this insurance transaction with Ms. Chester. Michelle Humose - The unrefuted documentary evidence indicates that on May 5, 1994, Ms. Humose was issued a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "3") indicating a "total premium" in the amount of $926 and a required downpayment of $348. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $826 with a required downpayment of $248 See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "3") The additional $100 included in the "premium" receipt was for the non-insurance motor club sold to Ms. Humose. Again despite the Hearing Officer's finding contrary to Ms. Humose's direct testimony that she did not know she was purchasing a motor club, the Respondent has clearly and convincingly made a false or misleading statement with respect to this insurance transaction with Ms. Humose. It is implicit in the Findings of Fact by the Hearing Officer that each referenced transaction took place as described herein. The Hearing Officer merely failed to explicitly state in the Recommended Order that the unrefuted documentary evidence establishes a prima facie misrepresentation of fact. Indeed, the exact factual scenario established herein was determined to constitute a misrepresentation in In the Matter of: Kenneth Michael Whitaker, Case Number 93-L-432DDH (Final Order dated July 3, 1995). It was specifically determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of combining the costs of insurance coverages with the costs of the auto club memberships and then calling such costs "total premium" on receipts issued to customers constituted a misrepresentation and was deceptive." Also, it was further determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of deducting all or part of the ancillary product fee up front resulted in false statements on other documents that the full downpayment for premium or financing of premium had been made, when in actuality it had not." Whitaker Final Order at pp's 9-10. The Department determined that this activity was a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. This finding was also affirmed on appeal in Whitaker v. Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Case No. 95-2702, (21 FLW 1353, Slip Opinion dated June 13, 1996). The court upheld this violation when it summarized the practice in the opinion as follows: Appellant took all or part of the ancillary product from the required premium downpayment and gave the consumer a receipt which listed the full downpayment as "Total Premium". The receipt did not reveal that part of the "premium" went to purchase an ancillary product. Whitaker Slip Opinion at pp's 3-4. This type of fraudulent and deceptive practice also constitutes a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. The Hearing Officer has already considered the unrefuted facts on the record and was clearly in error to make a finding otherwise. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(a)(a) 10., Florida Statutes, which reads in part: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact, including findings of fact that form the basis for an agency statement, unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, and states with particularity in the order, that findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. the Department may modify the findings of fact. In this case there was no competent and substantial evidence to make a finding that the Respondent did not make a false or misleading statement with the premium receipts issued in this cause. A review of the entire record demonstrates unrefuted documentary evidence which supports the modified findings of fact contained herein. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to findings of fact 12, 19 and 27 are hereby GRANTED. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Petitioner takes exception to conclusions of law at paragraphs 30 and 31, based on the Hearing Officer's rejection of unrefuted facts established on the record, i.e., deceptive and misleading premium receipts. Conclusions of Law 30 and 31 are revised to reflect that the premium receipts issued to insureds constitute fraudulent and deceptive practices as well as placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Conclusion of Law 30 is modified as follows: In this case, the Respondent was charged with violating sections 626.611(4), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), 626.611(13), 626.621(2), 626.621(6), 626.9541(1)(b), 626.9541(1)(e), 626.9541(1)(k)1., and 626.9541(1)(z), Florida Statutes. Boiled down to the essentials the Department alleged that Respondent violated the provisions listed above by unlawfully selling insureds motor club memberships without their informed consent, made false and misleading statements regarding the coverage provided and falsely represented and illegally required insureds to purchase motor club membership as part of their purchase of automobile insurance and that Respondent engaged in the prohibited practice of "sliding" additional coverages or products into the purchase of the insured without the informed consent of the insured. This revision is necessary because the Hearing Officer failed to include sections 626.9541(1)(b) and 62.9541(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as alleged violations. Conclusion of Law 31 is likewise revised as follows: The Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent attempted to "slide" coverage or ancillary products involved in this case. Likewise, the evidence did not clearly or convincingly demonstrate that Respondent did not obtain the informed consent of her customers prior to selling them the auto club memberships involved here. However, based on the unrefuted evidence in the record, the Respondent has violated sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by issuing "premium receipts" which falsely and deceptively represented "total premium" which included a fee for a non-insurance product, ie. motor club membership. Accordingly, the Respondent is guilty of three counts of violating sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's exceptions to conclusions of law 30 and 31 are hereby GRANTED. RULING ON EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDATION The Petitioner takes exception to the recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. The Penalty Guidelines contained in Chapter 4-231, Florida Administrative Code, should be applied in this case. There are three documented violations (one for each count) of engaging in fraudulent and dishonest practices as prohibited in section 626.611 (9), Florida Statutes, and placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading in violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 9 months per count. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 6 months per count. Based on Rule 4-231.040, Florida Administrative Code, the highest penalty per count should be assessed, therefore the appropriate penalty is three counts at 9 months for a total suspension period of 27 months. Since the total required suspension exceeds 2 years, the appropriate sanction is the revocation of the Respondent's licenses in accordance with section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, permits the assessment of an additional fine on top of any other administrative sanction, pursuant to section 626.9521, Florida Statutes. This section permits fines for wilful violations of up to $10,000 per violation not to exceed $100,000. The Petitioner recommends that a fine of $3,000 be assessed against the Respondent. However, insufficient grounds have been demonstrated to justify the assessment of a $3,000 administrative fine. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to the recommendation are hereby GRANTED, except for the Petitioner's argument for an additional sanction in the form of a $3,000 administrative fine which is hereby DENIED. PENALTY Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, prescribes the aggravating and mitigating factors which the Department shall consider and, if warranted, apply to the total penalty in reaching the final penalty. Aggravating factors in this matter, as delineated in Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, are the willfulness of the Respondent's conduct and the existence of secondary violations established in Counts I-III of the Administrative Complaint. Only minimal mitigating factors exist which are outweighed by the aggravating factors. The existence of these aggravating factors would increase the Respondent`s total penalty, thereby resulting in a higher final penalty. Increasing the Respondent's total penalty would be pointless, however, for section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes, limits a licensee's period of suspension to a maximum of 2 years. The Respondent's 27-month total penalty already exceeds the two-year statutory limit. Consequently, the Department has determined that a revocation of the Respondent's insurance agent license is warranted and appropriate in this matter, and is necessary to adequately protect the insurance-buying pubic. IT IS THEREBY ORDERED: All licenses and eligibility for licensure held by TARA JEANNE SMITH, are hereby REVOKED, pursuant to the provisions of sections 626.611, 626.621, 626.641(2) and 626.651(1), Florida Statutes, effective the date of this Final Order. As of the date of this Final Order, the Respondent shall not engage in or attempt or profess to engage in any transaction or business for which a license or permit is required under the Florida Insurance Code, or directly or indirectly own, control or be employed in any manner by an insurance agent or agency. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. BILL NELSON Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner COPIES FURNISHED: Tara Jeanne Smith 2588 Panther Creek Road, Apt. A Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5628 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Diane Cleavinger, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Stephen C. Fredrickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Chapter 626, Florida Statues and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SunCom 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 16 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 26 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted. The facts contained in paragraph 23 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Frederickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 645A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Bill Nelson Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68626.611626.621626.641626.651626.9521626.9541
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs RICHARD ROSENBLUM, 02-001316PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 02, 2002 Number: 02-001316PL Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. LLOYD ELDO REGISTER, 82-002048 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002048 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact THE INSURANCE AGENCY At all times material to the instant case, Lloyd Eldo Register was a licensed insurance agent in the State of Florida, licensed as an Ordinary Life, including Disability, General Lines and Disability Agent. The Respondent, Lloyd Eldo Register (hereinafter Register) at all times material herein, was the president, owner, and registered agent for Friendly Auto Insurance, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as Friendly Auto). In his capacity as president and registered agent, the Respondent, Register, was responsible for and exercised supervision and control over the employees and sales agents employed by Friendly Auto. At all times material herein, Respondent, Shirley Jean Hopkins was a licensed insurance agent and was employed by Friendly Auto to sell various types of auto insurance and coverages. Specifically, Shirley Hopkins was licensed as an Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent, General Lines Agent, and an Independent Adjuster. As an employee of Friendly Auto, she worked under the supervision and control of the Respondent, Lloyd Register. At the time of the various transactions which are the subject of this administrative proceeding, Florida law required personal injury protection (hereinafter PIP) insurance coverage for each owner of a motor vehicle in Florida. (See Section 627.733 and 627.736, Florida Statutes (1981)). Because it was necessary to show proof of such PIP coverage in order to purchase a license tag for an automobile, this type of insurance was and is commonly referred to as "tag insurance." Friendly Auto offered and sold PIP or tag insurance as well as other types of insurance, including motor club policies, which included as its primary benefit an accidental death benefit. The accidental death benefit (hereinafter referred to as ADB) which was sold by Friendly Auto, was one of the benefits under a motor club policy very similar to that sold by AAA (American Automobile Association). The motor club policies also included such benefits as theft reward, hit and run services, rental car discounts, credit card services, vacation travel arrangements, trip routing, and lost baggage service. The amount of premium paid and type of plan applied for determined the benefits to be received. During the period of the transactions in this action, the Respondent, Lloyd Register, had established a policy of not selling PIP alone. Customers were required to buy PIP coupled with a motor club policy. The reason for this policy was that the commission on minimum PIP coverage was too low to justify the cost of selling it alone. The commission on the motor club policies was as high as 80 percent of the premium charged. The sales agents were instructed by Mr. Register to not sell a customer PIP unless they also purchased the ADB policy. This policy was followed by the sales agents during 1981 and the first eight months of 1982. Customers, upon entering the Friendly Auto office, would indicate the kind of insurance they wanted and they were then given a quote by a sales agent for the coverage requested plus ADB. The cost of the ADD or ADB policy was added to the cost of the coverage requested without informing the purchaser and a single quote was given to the customer. If a customer inquired about the ADB coverage, they were told it was part of the coverage and that the requested coverage could not be purchased without the accidental death benefit. The customers were not informed by the salesperson nor the forms used in the transaction that they were being charged a separate and distinct premium for the ADB or that they could reject the ADB coverage. The basic PIP coverage also included a death benefit Although the Respondent, Lloyd Register, testified that in order to make a profit, it was necessary to sell the ADB with the minimum PIP coverage, the ADB was sold inn the same manner to persons purchasing PIP, as well as liability and collision coverage. The premium for the ADB ranged from $15 to $25. The decision as to which premium to charge was made by the employee of Friendly Auto and was not discussed with the customer. The sales agents had been instructed by the Respondent, Lloyd Register, to base premium charged for ADB on the customer's driving record. However, the premium charged only affected what motor club benefits would be received. No reason was given as to what effect a person's driving record had upon the premium or benefits or risk involved. After the customer was given the quote and agreed to purchase, the sales agent then filled out and gave to the customer several documents to be signed and initialed. The places to be initialed were marked by the sales agent with a red square, rubber stamped onto the appropriate points of the forms by the sales agent, and a check mark or "X" was placed next to where they were to sign. One of the documents was an application for the motor club or ADB. Respondents contend that by signing the application and the acknowledgement at the bottom of the liability coverages rejection form, the customers were made aware that they were purchasing a separate coverage for ADB. However, when inquiry was made by customers about the ADB, they were told it was part of the coverage and had to be purchased. They were not told a separate premium was involved or that it was a separate policy. The majority of the complaining witnesses in this case were not even aware they had purchased the motor club or ADB. Most of the complaining witnesses admitted they did not read the documents they were asked to sign. The sales agents did not pressure them to sign or hurry them in any way that prevented them from reading the documents. Most of the complaining witnesses had limited education, very little knowledge of insurance and basically relied upon the sales agent to give them the coverage they requested. No complaining witness requested ADB or motor club coverage. Anne Zugelder, office manager for Friendly Auto, and Shirley Hopkins testified generally regarding the procedures used, but neither person testified about the facts of the specific transactions in this case. Shortly after January 18, 1982, Mr. John A. Hoback, an investigator for the Department of Insurance, went to the offices of Friendly Auto where he reviewed approximately 35 to 40 files relating to customers who had purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. He discovered that many of these files contained the original policy for ADB coverage; the identification card on PIP coverage; and the original policy for PIP coverage. Some of these policies had been in the files for four, five, and six months. Specifically, Mr. Hoback examined the file of James Richard Johns and found the original copy of the auto policy issued by Fortune and the ADD policy issued by American Travelers Association. The auto policy had been issued on June 4, 1981. Mr. Hoback examined the file of Charles Meadows and found that the Fortune PIP policy had been issued on June 2, 1981, and the original was still in the file. The original ADD policy issued by American Travelers was also in the file. In the file of Phillip Johnson, Mr. Hoback found the original copy of the Fortune auto policy issued to Mr. Johnson on June 1, 1981, and also found the original ADD policy in the file. The file relating to Ruben Simpson was also examined and the original copies of the Fortune auto policy and the ADD policy were still in the file. These original policies were supposed to have been sent to the insureds by the agency upon receipt from the insurance company. The deposition of Mr. James T. Harrison, Jr., was admitted and considered. However, because Mr. Harrison's opinion was based upon incomplete facts in terms of the actual sales procedures used, his opinion relating to Respondents' meeting the standard of care in the industry was given no weight. FORMS In each of the purchases involved in this action, Friendly Auto's agents used several preprinted forms as part of each sale. These forms include primarily: (1) a quote sheet, (2) rejection of liability coverages form, (3) prenumbered receipts, and (4) motor club or ADB application. QUOTE SHEET The quote sheet is a small yellow form with spaces for entering information about the insured and the cars to be insured. The quote sheet in the Section titled "Type of Coverage" reflects "PIP, LIAB, COMP, COLL". These terms refer to personal injury protection, liability, comprehensive, and collision. Nowhere on the form does ADB or motor club coverage appear. There is a space at the bottom of the form for computations. LIABILITY COVERAGES REJECTION FORM The Rejection of Liability Coverages form is divided into four main parts. The top part of the form informed the customer that they had the right to purchase liability coverage and that they can also reject liability coverage. If the customer desired to reject liability coverage, there was a signature block where the customer signed rejecting such coverage. The second portion of the form dealt with PIP and had optional blocks to be checked in order to reflect the deductible desired. The deductible ranged from $250 to $8,000. There were also optional blocks to select the type of PIP coverage and at the bottom of this section was again a signature block. The third section dealt with uninsured motorist coverage and had a block where the customer entered the limits of coverage desired if they were purchasing uninsured motorist coverage. There was a block to be checked if the customer was rejecting uninsured motorist coverage. At the bottom of this section, was again a signature block. The last section referred to an accidental death benefit and contained the following language: I UNDERSTAND THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT THROUGH MY NATION MEMBERSHIP IS A SEPARATE ITEM, THAT PAYS IN ADDITION TO MY AUTO INSURANCE POLICY. I UNDERSTAND THE ADDITIONAL CHARGE FOR THIS COVERAGE IS INCLUDED IN WITH MY DOWN PAYMENT. The above language was followed only by a signature block. There were no blocks to be checked or initialed rejecting or accepting the accidental death benefit. (this statement is referred to hereafter as the acknowledgement.) The Rejection of Liability Coverages form was used in all sales of automobile insurance at Friendly Auto. The reference in the acknowledgement above to "MY NATION MEMBERSHIP" refers to a company which provided an ADB policy prior to the time Friendly Auto began using American Travelers Association. Once Friendly Auto decided to stop using the Nation Company, the Respondent, Register, elected not to reprint the form. He also considered, but did not feel it necessary, to have the sales agents mark through Nation and pencil in American Travelers Association. Mr. Register felt that the American Travelers Association policy could be interpreted to be a "Nation membership" because it covered the insured anywhere in the nation. However, Mr. Register could not specifically recall having instructed his sales agents to give this explanation to the customers. Prior to July or August of 1982, Mr. Register had not instructed his employees to explain that the accidental death benefit referred to in the form was optional. Beginning in July or August, 1982, Mr. Register instructed his sales agents to begin telling customers the ADB was optional. This change occurred about the same time the law relating to the $8,000 deductible PIP changed and was due in part to "heat" which Friendly Auto had been getting from the Department of Insurance. RECEIPT The receipt form contained basic information blocks for date, amount, received from, and signature block for the sales agent of Friendly Auto. There was a line preceded by "In re:" which was used to reflect the coverages for which the premium was being paid. A copy of the receipt was kept in the Friendly Auto file on each customer. AMERICAN TRAVELERS ASSOCIATION APPLICATION The last of the four forms was a motor club application for "Travel/Accident Benefits including Accidental Death and Dismemberment Coverage." The form contained spaces for the name and address of the applicant and name and address of their beneficiary. Just above the signature block of the applicant, were spaces for the effective date, the expiration date, the plan, amount of ADD coverage, and the fee. (See Respondent's Exhibit 24.) An almost identical form was used when the ADB policy was written with Southern Management Company. THE SALES Each count of the First Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Lloyd Register, relates to a sale to a particular customer. Several of these same transactions were also the subject of the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. The following facts are found as to both the counts of the First Amended Administrative Complaint against Lloyd Register and the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Shirley Hopkins: (the count number refers to the First Amended Administrative Complaint in Case No. 82-2048). COUNT I SALE TO BRENDA CONNER On October 9, 1981, Brenda Conner went to Friendly Auto to purchase PIP insurance. She informed the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, that she wanted to purchase PIP only. No other coverages were explained to her, but there was some discussion about who she wanted as her beneficiary. She signed the documents she was requested to sign but did not read them. She thought she had paid for PIP only. Her receipt from Friendly Auto was for $37.00 and listed only PIP as the only coverage purchased. The receipt was signed by the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. She never received a policy from American Travelers Association. She was charged $15.00 as part of the $37.00 premium for the American Travelers Association ADB policy. She received her policy for the PIP coverage. COUNT II SALE TO BRUCE T. EDWARDS On September 15, 1981, Bruce T. Edwards purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Edwards was sold the insurance by Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. The receipt received by Mr. Edwards reflected a total premium of $43.00 and listed only "PIP" as the coverage purchased. Mr. Edwards was unaware that as part of the $43.00 premium, he purchased accidental death and dismemberment coverage (ADB) from American Travelers Association. The premium for the ADB was $20.00. Mr. Edwards signed but did not fill out the yellow ADB application form. Shirley Hopkins explained the PIP coverage but made no mention that he was purchasing a separate ADB insurance policy. He did not read the documents he signed, but merely initialed and signed the blocks Ms. Hopkins marked. He did not request ADB coverage and thought he was getting PIP only. He had no intention of buying any insurance other than PIP. Prior to Mr. Edwards going to Friendly Auto, his wife had called and obtained a quote of $43.00 for tag insurance. She specifically told the person on the phone that her husband wanted the cheapest coverage necessary to get a tag. COUNT III SALE TO PATRICIA EDWARDS On or about August 28, 1981, Patricia Edwards purchased insurance from Friendly Auto through its sales agent Shirley Hopkins. Patricia Edwards first called Friendly Auto and requested a quote for PIP coverage only. She also gave the person all the necessary information over the phone for the needed documentation. The person who actually went to Friendly Auto and purchased the insurance and signed the documents was Bruce Edwards, Patricia Edwards' husband. Patricia Edwards requested only minimum coverage needed to get her tag. She was given a quote of $37.00. The receipt given by Friendly Auto was signed by the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, and reflected a $37.00 payment for PIP coverage only. The total payment of $37.00 included a $15.00 payment for an Accidental Death and Dismemberment (ADB) and travel benefits with Southern Management Company. Mr. Edwards signed the Accidental Death and Dismemberment application as well as the accident death benefits acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. The acknowledgement referred to "Accidental Death Benefit Through My Nation Membership" and not to an "Accidental Death and Dismemberment" coverage with Southern Management Company. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5.) Neither Bruce Edwards nor Patricia Edwards requested Accidental Death and Dismemberment coverage and neither was aware that such coverage had been purchased. COUNT IV SALE TO ELIZABETH JONES On September 1, 1981, Elizabeth Jones purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. She first called and asked for a quote for PIP and liability insurance for a `71 Oldsmobile Delta 88. She was given a quote of $42.00 for PIP and liability. Ms. Jones then went to the office of Friendly Auto where she first talked with two different men and then Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. Shirley Hopkins informed her the premium would be $63.00 rather than $42.00. Ms. Jones had obtained quotes from several agencies for the PIP and liability in an attempt to obtain the needed coverage for no more than the 560.00 which she had available for insurance. Ms. Jones has a fifth grade education and had never purchased insurance before. She specifically told the sales people at Friendly Auto that she did not understand insurance. Because the cost was $63.00 rather than $42.00, Ms. Jones had to return home to obtain additional money. When she returned, Ms. Hopkins had the forms prepared and had marked with an the places where she needed to sign. The receipt from Friendly Auto reflects that Ms. Jones purchased "Liab. PIP. ADB" for a premium of $63.00. Ms. Jones signed the accidental death and dismemberment coverage application and the accidental death benefit acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverage form. Prior to returning home, Ms. Jones was told by one of the sales agents that she needed the accidental death benefit that could be willed to her daughter. Ms. Jones asked if that was included in the liability and PIP and did not recall whether the person replied or not. She was not aware nor did she understand that she was purchasing a separate travel and accidental death benefit policy and paying a separate premium. She did not read the documents before she signed them and relied upon Ms. Hopkins and the other two agents to give her the coverage she had requested. Ms. Jones did not receive her ADB policy. COUNT V SALE TO BARBARA BARBATO On September 21, 1981, Barbara Barbato purchased insurance from Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, at the Friendly Auto agency. Before going to the agency, Ms. Barbato called and obtained a quote for "full coverage" on her new Camero. She spoke with a gentleman named Mike. When she arrived at the agency, she informed Ms. Hopkins that she wanted full coverage on her Camero. Ms. Hopkins did not explain the various coverages to her. Ms. Barbato paid for the insurance and signed the documents without reading them. The Friendly Auto receipt received by Ms. Barbato was signed by Shirley Hopkins and reflected a payment of $138.00 for "Liab. and Coll. and Comp.". Ms. Barbato signed the ADD coverage application and the accidental death benefit acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. She named her mother as beneficiary of the accidental death benefit and understood that benefit to be part of the auto insurance she was purchasing. She was not aware the accidental death benefit was separate and extra. She did not receive a policy for the ADB coverage with American Travelers Association. COUNT VI Count VI was voluntarily dismissed by Petitioner and no evidence was presented as to Count VI. COUNT VII Mary Beth Jones did not appear and testify and no other testimony was presented as to Count VII. COUNT VIII SALE TO JOANN BROOKS On September 1, 1981, Joann Brooks purchased insurance from Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, at the Friendly Auto Agency. Ms. Brooks is a farm laborer who completed the eleventh grade. Upon arriving at Friendly Auto, Ms. Brooks informed Ms. Hopkins that she wanted full coverage on her automobile. Ms. Brooks understood full coverage to include collision, liability, and PIP and she had no intention of purchasing any type of coverage other than these. Although Ms. Brooks received some explanation of the accidental death and dismemberment coverage, she signed the accidental death application form and named herself as beneficiary. Ms. Brooks thought the death benefit was part of the full coverage she requested. This was the first time she had purchased insurance and did not understand insurance matters. Ms. Brooks signed and initialed the documents she was given by Ms. Hopkins. She did not read them. The receipt Ms. Brooks received from Friendly Auto was signed by Shirley Hopkins and reflected that she paid $86.00 for "Liab. & Comp. & Coll.". COUNT IX SALE TO RUBEN SIMPSON On May 7, 1981, Ruben Simpson purchased auto insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Simpson is from Jamaica and does not read because of his very limited education. When he arrived at Friendly Auto, Mr. Simpson informed the sales agent that he wanted to buy PIP insurance in order to get his tag. Mr. Simpson could not recall the full details of the discussion but remembered giving them his mother's name as the person who would receive money if he were killed in an accident. Mr. Simpson signed his name where he was shown to sign. When he left the agency, Mr. Simpson believed he had purchased only the PIP insurance required to get his tag. Mr. Simpson signed the Southern Management Company Accidental Death and Dismemberment application and received a copy of it when he left the agency. (See Respondent's Exhibit No. 13.) The receipt given to Mr. Simpson at Friendly Auto reflects he paid $44.50 for "PIP ADB". The premium for the ADB was $22.50. At no time did Mr. Simpson request or agree to purchase anything other than tag insurance. Mr. Simpson signed the acknowledgement of the ADB at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form, but was unaware that he was paying a separate premium for a policy which was neither PIP nor required to obtain his tag. COUNT X Prior to taking evidence in the formal hearing, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed Count X of the First Amended Administrative Complaint. No evidence was presented in support of Count X. COUNT XI On September 3, 1981, Mr. Ellison J. Eady, Jr., purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Eady informed the sales agent at Friendly Auto that he wanted the necessary minimum insurance to get a tag for a new car he had purchased. The agent asked Mr. Eady some brief questions about his driving record and then gave him a quote for the price of the insurance he requested. The agent did not suggest any coverages in addition to what Mr. Eady had requested, but included the cost of an ADB policy in the quote he gave Mr. Eady. Mr. Eady agreed to the price quoted, and the agent then brought out several forms for Mr. Eady to fill out and sign. All Mr. Eady wanted was insurance for his tag and to his knowledge, that was all he purchased. At the time he purchased his insurance, Mr. Eady signed and received a copy of the American Travelers Association application form. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) He did not ask any questions about the form. Mr. Eady thought that the American Travelers Association coverage was part of the insurance he was purchasing. However, the agent did not specifically tell him it was part of the insurance he was purchasing. At the time he purchased his insurance, Mr. Eady already had a motor club policy with Montgomery Ward which provided similar services to the American Travelers coverage. Mr. Eady did not read the various forms he signed. The agent gave him a brief explanation of what each form was. Mr. Eady just relied upon what the agent told him. Mr. Eady had no knowledge of Florida insurance. When he left Friendly Auto, he thought the only thing he had purchased was the minimum required by the state. One of the documents he signed was the acknowledgement of the accidental death benefit at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. (See Respondent's Exhibit 14.) Mr. Eady already had separate life insurance coverage. The agent did not explain the accidental death benefit to him. Mr. Eady did not request any coverage other than the state minimum to get his tag. The receipt given Mr. Eady reflected an $82.00 payment for "PIP. . . ADB. . . C&C". (See Respondent's Exhibit 14.) Fifteen dollars of the premium paid by Mr. Eady was for the American Travelers Association motor club policy. COUNT XII SALE TO MARY GOOD On March 17, 1981, Mr. Edward T. Good and his wife Mary Good purchased insurance at Friendly Auto. Mr. Good informed the sales agent at Friendly Auto that he wanted the cheapest insurance required by the state to get his license tag. The agent explained to him the other auto coverages he could obtain, but Mr. Good insisted that he only wanted minimum tag insurance. He was then given a lump sum quote by the agent. One of the forms Mr. Good signed was an ADB application for Southern Management Company. The agent explained that this would pay he or his wife money if they were killed in an auto accident. The agent did not explain that there was an extra charge for this benefit or that it was optional. Mr. and Mrs. Good understood the ADB coverage to be part of the PIP coverage they had requested. The receipt they were given at Friendly Auto reflected a payment of $37.00 but did not list the coverages purchased. (See Respondents' Exhibit 1.) When Mr. and Mrs. Good left Friendly Auto, they thought they had purchased only tag insurance. However, $15.00 of the $37.00 premium paid was for the ADB policy with Southern Management Company. COUNT XIII SALE TO ALICE LEAR DICKSON On or about September 3, 1981, Alice Lear Dickson (formerly Alice J. Lear) purchased auto insurance from a sales agent of Friendly Auto. Ms. Dickson called Friendly Auto to obtain quotes for full coverage for a newer automobile and minimum coverage for an older one. After obtaining these quotes, Ms. Dickson went to the office of Friendly Auto where she informed the sales agent on duty that she wanted full coverage insurance on two autos. She informed the sales agent she wanted fire, theft, windstorm, collision, liability, and uninsured motorist coverage. The sales agent also suggested a coverage for such things as towing charges. Ms. Dickson informed the agent she did not want that coverage because she already was a member of an auto club. In signing the various documents to purchase the insurance, Ms. Dickson was asked to sign a document designating a beneficiary of a life insurance benefit. She did not want this life insurance coverage, but was told by the sales agent that it was required and went along with her automobile policy and had to be purchased. In reliance upon this representation, Ms. Dickson accepted the coverage. Ms. Dickson paid a total premium of $144.03 for collision, liability, PIP, and accidental death benefit. Her receipt from Friendly Auto reflected the $144.03 was for "C&C, LIAB., PIP, ADB." (See Respondents' Exhibit 11.) The accidental death benefit purchased by Ms. Dickson was one of the travel and accident benefits provided in the American Travelers Association policy which cost Ms. Dickson $15 of the $144.03 premium she had paid. At the bottom of a Rejection of Liability Coverage form used by Friendly Auto, Ms. Dickson signed the acknowledgement relating to the ADB, but she was not aware that she could reject this coverage or that it was part of a separate motor club policy. Ms. Dickson did not desire to purchase a motor club policy and would not have purchased the motor club policy had she been aware that it was not required as an included coverage with the PIP coverage. COUNT XIV Prior to the taking of evidence at the formal hearing, the Petitioner voluntarily dismissed Count XIV of the First Amended Administrative Complaint and presented no testimony in support of that Count. COUNT XV SALE TO CHARLES MEADOWS On June 2, 1982, Charles Meadows purchased auto insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Meadows went to Friendly Auto to purchase PIP insurance, and upon arriving at Friendly Auto's office, he informed the sales agent he wanted only PIP insurance. When he left the Friendly Auto office, Mr. Meadows thought he had only purchased PIP. At the time he purchased his insurance, Mr. Meadows signed an American Travelers Association application. (See Respondents' Exhibit 2.) The only explanation he was given by the sales agent regarding this coverage was that if he were killed, someone would receive some money and he needed to designate who that would be. The amount of the fee charged for the American Travelers Association policy was not reflected in the appropriate block on the application form. He was not given any explanation regarding the price of this coverage. In purchasing the insurance, Mr. Meadows initialed and signed several forms. He did not read them before signing. Mr. Meadows does not read and write very well and has a problem understanding insurance policies. He completed the seventh grade in school. One of the forms signed by Mr. Meadows was the acknowledgement relating to the accidental death benefit at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. The quote sheet used to give Mr. Meadows his quote of $48.00 makes no reference to any coverage other than PIP. PIP is circled on the form. The receipt Mr. Meadows received from Friendly Auto reflects a $48.00 premium for "PIP. . .ADB". The cost of the PIP coverage was $23.00 and the cost of the American Travelers Association policy was $25.00. Mr. Meadows never received a policy or certificate informing him of the coverages under the American Travelers Association policy. Mr. Meadows never intended to purchase any coverage other than PIP to obtain his tag. He never requested any coverage other than PIP. COUNT XVI SALE TO PHILLIP JOHNSON On July 1, 1982, Mr. Phillip Johnson purchased auto insurance from a sales agent at Friendly Auto. Mr. Johnson went to Friendly Auto to purchase tag insurance. He informed the sales agent that he wanted just the PIP or tag insurance. The agent then prepared the necessary forms and Mr. Johnson initialed and signed the documents where he was instructed by the agent to sign and initial. No explanation of the coverages was given by the agent. Mr. Johnson was asked to name a beneficiary and was given a pink copy of an American Travelers Association application which he had signed. That form reflects a $20.00 fee was charged for the American Travelers Association policy. The receipt which Mr. Meadows received at Friendly Auto reflects a $42.00 premium paid for "8,000 PIP". (See Respondents' Exhibit 3.) Mr. Johnson also signed the accidental death benefit acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. Mr. Johnson felt when he left Friendly Auto that he had purchased only PIP insurance. Mr. Johnson completed the ninth grade in school and has difficulty reading and writing. COUNT XVII SALE TO JAMES RICHARD JOHNS On June 4, 1982, Mr. James Richard Johns purchased insurance from the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins at Friendly Auto. Mr. Johns told Shirley Hopkins he would like to purchase PIP insurance in order to get his tag for his car. Ms. Hopkins then gave him a quote for PIP and also a quote for liability coverage and she then gave him several forms to initial and sign. She gave no explanation regarding the forms and he did not read them before signing. Although Mr. Johns thought he was only purchasing PIP insurance, he was, in fact, sold PIP with an $8,000 deductible plus an American Travelers Association policy. The cost of the PIP coverage was $24.00 and the cost of the American Travelers Association policy was $25.00. Mr. Johns signed the American Travelers Association application and was given a copy of it. He also designated a beneficiary. At the time of purchase, Mr. Johns understood that the death benefit was part of the PIP insurance he was purchasing. No explanation was given by Ms. Hopkins regarding the American Travelers Association policy or coverage. Mr. Johns also signed the acknowledgement of the accidental death benefit at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. The receipt he received from Friendly Auto was for $50.23 paid for "PIP. . . ADB. . . 123(illegible)". When Mr. Johns left the Friendly Auto Agency, he felt he had purchased only PIP insurance. He did not receive an American Travelers Association policy and did not receive his Fortune Insurance policy for his PIP insurance until December of 1982 or January, 1983.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Lloyd Register, guilty of the violations as set forth above and that his insurance licenses be suspended for a period of one (1) year. That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, guilty of the violations as set forth above and that her license be suspended for a period of 90 days and that she be required to pay a civil penalty of $500. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Dennis Silverman, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (10) 624.03626.611626.621626.9521626.9541627.421627.733627.736627.839627.843
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JAY LAWRENCE POMERANTZ, 03-003655PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 07, 2003 Number: 03-003655PL Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2004

The Issue Whether the Petitioner committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed October 14, 2003, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for issuing licenses for insurance agents in the State of Florida, and for regulating and disciplining licensed insurance agents. Sections 626.016, 626.611, and 626.281, Florida Statutes (2004). At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Pomerantz was licensed in Florida as a property and casualty general lines insurance agent, which is referred to as a "2-20 license." At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Pomerantz did business as A Able insurance agency, an unincorporated entity located at 124 South Federal Highway, Pompano Beach, Florida. Mr. Pomerantz owned the A Able insurance agency, worked in the office in Pompano Beach, and was the agent in charge of the office. Automobile insurance was the primary product sold at the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency. No primary agent for the A Able insurance agency office in Pompano Beach was registered with the Department, but Mr. Pomerantz functioned as its de facto primary agent at that location. An insurance agency known as the Wide World of Insurance was, and perhaps still is, located in Margate, Florida. Mr. Pomerantz's brother, Randy Pomerantz, operated this agency. In the summer of 2000, the two offices merged, but the merger dissolved in the early spring of 2002. During the time that the two agencies operated as a single entity, they continued to maintain the two office locations. Applications and other paperwork generated in the Pompano office were, as a rule, sent to the Margate office for processing. Prior to May 2003, however, when he began working in a general administrative capacity at the Margate office, Mr. Pomerantz did not work in the Margate office and had no personal knowledge of the operations of the Margate office or the applications for automobile insurance handled by that office. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Pomerantz was the appointed agent for Ocean Harbor Insurance Company ("Ocean Harbor"), Southern Group Indemnity, Inc. ("Southern Group"), and U.S. Security Insurance Company ("U.S. Security"). As an appointed agent, Mr. Pomerantz, as well as agents working in the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency, acted on behalf of these companies, and the agents could bind coverage with the companies and accept premium payments on behalf of these companies. An insurance agent can "bind" automobile insurance coverage with an insurance company that has appointed or registered the agent as its representative by calling the insurance company and getting a binder number and time of day. A binder obligates the insurance company to provide the coverage specified until the binder is converted into an insurance policy or the binder is cancelled. Southern Group's agreement with Mr. Pomerantz required him to send the signed application for a new automobile insurance policy, for a renewal of an existing policy, or an amendment to an existing policy, together with a check or draft for the premium net commissions, postmarked within 72 hours of the time at which the coverage was bound. Although not reduced to writing, the standard policy of U.S. Security requires its appointed agents to mail the application and payment to the company immediately upon coverage being bound. Ocean Harbor's general rules applicable to its appointed agents require that a completed application and the required premium, together with other documentation, be received by the company within five working days of the date on which coverage is bound. Within 20 to 30 days after coverage is bound on an application, each of these three companies sends a notice to the agent listing the binders for which the company has not received the application, premium, and other required paperwork. The notice advises the agent that the binder is cancelled. This means that the insurance company no longer provides automobile insurance coverage under the binder. If the application, premium, and other required paperwork is subsequently forwarded to the insurance company, the company, after review by its underwriters, can accept the application and issue a policy with an effective date retroactive to the effective date stated on the application for the policy. In some circumstances, the underwriting review will result in an additional premium being charged on the policy. In this circumstance, a notice is sent to the insured advising them of the additional premium due. At the time the application for automobile insurance coverage is completed and the coverage is bound by an agent appointed or registered by the company, the customer pays the insurance agent either the full amount of the premium determined by the agent to be due or a down payment on the premium when the premium is financed by a premium finance company. Insurance companies using appointed or registered agents do not, as a rule, accept payment directly from the customer; rather, the payment received from a customer is deposited in the agency's account, and the agency, after deducting its commission, sends an agency check to the insurance company. When the premium is financed, the down payment is deposited in the agency account, and the agency, after deducting its commission, sends an agency check to the premium finance company. When a customer finances his or her insurance premium through a premium finance company, the customer signs a premium finance agreement in which he or she agrees to pay monthly installments to the premium finance company for the total owed under the agreement; the premium finance company, in turn, pays the full premium to the insurance company at the time the application is submitted to the insurance company. Premium finance companies provide agents with whom they do business company drafts, which are prepared by the insurance agent on behalf of the premium finance company. Mr. Pomerantz and the A Able insurance agency did business with the premium finance company ETI Finance Corporation ("ETI Finance"), and A Able insurance agency was supplied with ETI Finance premium finance agreements and ETI Finance drafts. In ETI Finance's premium finance agreement, the customer agrees to assign to ETI Finance a security interest in any unearned return premiums that may become due upon the cancellation of the insurance policy. The insurance company sends this unearned return premium directly to ETI Finance if the insurance policy is cancelled. ETI Finance deducts any amounts owed under the premium finance agreement; if the amount of unearned return premium exceeds the amount the customer owes ETI Finance under the premium finance agreement, ETI Finance remits the balance owed to the customer to the insurance agent; if the amount of unearned return premium is insufficient to cover the amount the customer owes ETI Finance, ETI Finance bills the insurance agent for the balance owed under the premium finance agreement. ETI Finance handles unearned return premium credits and debits on an account current basis whereby a bi-monthly statement is prepared for each of the agents with whom it does business. The statement lists customers and all debits and credits to the agent's account for each of the customers listed. When an insurance policy is cancelled, the agent statement includes the amount of unearned return premium received by ETI Finance from the insurance company, and shows whether the customer is owed money, which is shown as a credit to the agent's account, or whether the agent owes ETI Finance money, which is shown as a debit to the agent's account. All of the debits and credits are totalled on the bi-monthly statement; if a total credit is shown, an ETI Finance check is included with the statement; if a total debit is shown, the agent is required to send ETI Finance a check to cover the amount owed. ETI Finance's agent statement advises the agent to review the statement carefully because the agent might owe a customer a refund. If a customer pays the agent the full premium and the agent then pays the premium with an agency check, the insurance company sends the agent an unearned return premium. It is the agent's responsibility to refund the unearned return premium to the customer. In addition to paying a customer any unearned return premium received upon cancellation of a policy, the agent is responsible for refunding any unearned commissions the agent was paid on the policy. Either the insurance company or the agent calculates the amount of the unearned commission, and this is included in the payment to the customer. At all times material to this proceeding, Alida High, nee Watson, held a "2-20 license" allowing her to sell property and casualty insurance in Florida. She was employed by the A Able insurance agency and worked in the office located at 124 South Federal Highway, Pompano Beach, Florida. She began working for the A Able insurance agency in July 1999, and was paid a weekly salary plus commissions Mr. Pomerantz and Ms. High were authorized signatories on the A Able insurance agency's Bank of America checking account number 91895073. Ms. High and Mr. Pomerantz signed the signature card on February 18, 2000. Ms. High functioned as a licensed insurance agent in the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency, and her responsibilities included working with customers to prepare applications for automobile insurance coverage, binding coverage with the insurance companies, receiving payment for the premiums on the policies or for the down payment on a premium finance agreement if the premium was financed, preparing the application package to be sent out to the insurance company, and issuing temporary identification cards. If a customer of the A Able insurance agency paid his or her premium for a policy in full, the cash or check was deposited in the agency's account, and the insurance agency issued a check payable to the insurance company for the premium minus the agency's commission. In this circumstance, Ms. High prepared the application package and placed it on Mr. Pomerantz's desk so that he could write the agency's check and send the application package and check to the appropriate insurance company. Ms. High followed this procedure throughout her employment at the A Able insurance agency, in accordance with the directions Mr. Pomerantz gave her when she began working for the A Able insurance agency. If one of Ms. High's customers financed part of the premium with a premium financing company, Ms. High routinely issued the drafts of the premium finance company for the premium owed for an insurance policy, and she mailed the draft and the application package to the insurance company. Ms. High also occasionally prepared and signed checks on the A Able insurance agency's Bank of America checking account payable to "BCRC"2 to pay for automobile tags and titles issued by Broward County and other, minor, miscellaneous items. During the summer and early fall of 2002, Ms. High prepared checks at Mr. Pomerantz's request and signed his name. Most of these checks were to "BCRC", but several were to pay for office expenses, and one was written to U.S. Security Insurance Company to pay a customer's additional insurance premium. Ms. High wrote checks on the A Able insurance agency account only when she had Mr. Pomerantz's permission to do so. Writing checks was not among her normal responsibilities at the A Able insurance agency, and Ms. High would not write checks on the agency's account without Mr. Pomerantz's express permission because she did not know anything about the account balance. Beginning in the summer of 2002, Mr. Pomerantz's interest in the business of the A Able insurance agency waned, according to Ms. High, and his visits to the office became more and more infrequent. Initially during this period Mr. Pomerantz came in every few days and wrote checks and sent application packages out to insurance companies, but eventually applications for insurance prepared and bound by Ms. High began to accumulate on Mr. Pomerantz's desk. When Ms. High reminded Mr. Pomerantz that the applications on his desk had been bound and needed agency checks cut so they could be sent to the insurance companies, Mr. Pomerantz told her to leave them, that he would take care of it. Ms. High became more and more concerned about the backlog of applications on Mr. Pomerantz's desk, and, when he was in the office, she constantly reminded him of the need to send the applications to the insurance companies. Count I: John Thierwechter In February 2002, John Thierwechter went to the A Able insurance agency to purchase the minimum amount of automobile insurance required by law for a 1993 Nissan Sentra. The total premium quoted was $1,550.00 for personal injury protection/physical damage/comprehensive/collision coverage with Ocean Harbor and for a policy covering reimbursement of the $500.00 deductible on the Ocean Harbor policy. Mr. Thierwechter decided to finance the premium, and Ms. High completed an ETI Finance premium finance agreement, which Mr. Thierwechter signed on February 21, 2002. The first installment on the Premium Finance Agreement signed by Mr. Thierwechter was due on March 23, 2002. Mr. Thierwechter owed a down payment of $289.00 under the Premium Finance Agreement. On February 22, 2002, he paid $200.00 of the down payment in cash, and he received a receipt signed by Mr. Pomerantz. Mr. Thierwechter returned to the agency on February 25, 2002, to pay the remaining $89.00, and he received a receipt signed by Ms. High. Mr. Thierwechter had previously had a bad experience with Ocean Harbor, and, within a few weeks, he purchased automobile insurance coverage from GEICO Casualty Company. This coverage was effective March 16, 2002. In a letter dated March 15, 2002, that he hand-delivered to the A Able insurance agency, Mr. Thierwechter requested that his Ocean Harbor policy be cancelled and that he receive a refund of "the unearned premium" . . . within the next 30 days." On March 16, 2002, Ms. High completed an All Purpose Endorsement requesting that Ocean Harbor cancel Mr. Thierwechter's insurance coverage effective March 16, 2002. This request was received by Ocean Harbor on March 23, 2002. Because Mr. Thierwechter had financed the premium for his Ocean Harbor policy with ETI Finance, Ocean Harbor sent the unearned return premium to ETI Finance, pursuant to the Premium Finance Agreement signed by Mr. Thierwechter. ETI Finance received the cancellation notice and check for the unearned return premium from Ocean Harbor on April 9, 2002. The amount of the unearned return premium was included on the agent's statement for the A Able insurance agency dated May 1, 2002. That statement reflected return premium in the amount of $757.35. This amount was less than the amount Mr. Thierwechter owed ETI Finance because Mr. Thierwechter had not made any of the monthly installments required by the Premium Finance Agreement. As a result, the May 1, 2002, agent's statement recorded a $63.47 debit against the account of the A Able insurance agency. The A Able insurance agency was responsible for paying Mr. Thierwechter the amount of unearned commission, if any, that exceeded the $63.47 it owed to ETI Finance. Pursuant to Mr. Pomerantz's calculations, Mr. Thierwechter was owed $70.16 in unearned commission retained by the A Able insurance agency, and Mr. Pomerantz wrote Mr. Thierwechter a check for that amount on the A Able insurance agency account on July 1, 2002. Mr. Thierwechter picked up the check on or about July 22, 2002. Count III: Shirley Shaffer On or about June 11, 2001, Shirley Shaffer purchased a 1996 Kia Sephia from the Coral Springs Auto Mall. Before Ms. Shaffer could drive the car off of the car lot, the car dealer required her to secure automobile insurance. The dealer called a person to assist Ms. Shaffer, and a man arrived at the dealership within a short period of time. This man presented Ms. Shaffer with a card on which was printed "Wide World of Insurance"; there was no individual's name on the card, but the card showed a Margate, Florida, address. Ms. Shaffer wanted to purchase only the basic coverage, and a U.S. Security application for a "physical damage only" policy was prepared specifying comprehensive and collision coverage only. The application identified the insurance agency as the A Able insurance agency, located in Pompano Beach. According to a notation on the application, the comprehensive and collision insurance coverage was bound with U.S. Security at 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 2001.3 In addition, Ms. Shaffer signed a Summary of Coverages and Cost Breakdown form carrying the name "Wide World of Insurance" and an address in Margate, Florida. This form was also dated June 12, 2001. At some point during the application process at the Coral Springs Auto Mall, the person representing the insurance agency went outside the dealership offices, telling Ms. Shaffer that he was going to take photographs of her car to attach to the application for insurance coverage. Ms. Shaffer financed the premium for her automobile insurance policy, and she paid a deposit of $200.00, which she charged on her credit card. U.S. Security received Ms. Shaffer's application for comprehensive and collision coverage on June 18, 2001, and a Physical Damage Policy was issued to Ms. Shaffer on June 26, 2001, with a policy term of June 13, 2001, to June 13, 2002. Ms. Shaffer received a copy of this policy. The agent identified on the policy was the A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach. A Notice of Cancellation dated July 18, 2001, was sent to Ms. Shaffer by U.S. Security. In the notice, Ms. Shaffer was advised that her insurance policy would be cancelled effective September 2, 2001, because her application was incomplete. After she received the cancellation notice, Ms. Shaffer called the Margate office of the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency because that was the office whose address was on the card she was given when she applied for the U.S. Security insurance policy. Someone at the Margate office told her that, because she lived in Pompano Beach, her account was handled by the agency's Pompano Beach office and that she should call that office. Ms. Shaffer contacted the Pompano Beach office and spoke to a man who told her that everything about her policy looked fine in the computer and that she should not worry about the letter from U.S. Security. After this conversation, she contacted the Margate office again and was told that they knew nothing about the problem with the policy at that office. Ms. Shaffer then telephoned U.S. Security and was told that her insurance agent needed to take care of the problem, which she was led to believe was minor. Finally, Ms. Shaffer received a letter dated August 7, 2001, from a person named Gary. The letter carried the name "Wide World of Insurance" and the Margate address. In the letter, Gary requested that Ms. Shaffer "PLEASE STOP BY OUR OFFICE SO WE MAY TAKE PICTURES OF THE KIA. ORIGINAL ONES DID NOT COME OUT. ALSO NEED REGISTRATION. IMPT!!!!!" Gary stated in the letter that Ms. Shaffer needed to provide the requested information by August 21, 2001, "to avoid any further delays or cancellation requests from the insurance company." When she received the August 7, 2001, letter, which she recalled was on a Friday, Ms. Shaffer called the Margate office and arranged to bring her car in for photographs at 8:00 a.m. the following Monday.4 Ms. Shaffer arrived at the Margate office slightly before 8:00 a.m., and a few minutes later the man who had taken her application at the Coral Springs Auto Mall arrived at the office and took pictures of her car. Ms. Shaffer also provided a copy of her automobile registration, as requested in the August 7, 2001, letter. Ms. Shaffer also purchased personal liability insurance coverage from the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency, and she charged the $659.00 premium on her Visa credit card. Ms. Shaffer handled the entire transaction during a telephone conversation with a person in the Pompano Beach office, but she does not know the name of the person with whom she spoke. When Ms. Shaffer went to the Margate office in response to Gary's letter of August 7, 2001, she was given a receipt dated August 6, 2001, for the $659.00 premium she had paid for "addl liability coverage"; it was stated on the receipt that the coverage would be effective from September 1, 2001, to June 12, 2001. The person who signed the receipt was not identified, and the signature is indecipherable. The transaction date shown on Ms. Shaffer's credit card statement was August 7, 2001, and the statement showed that the charge was credited to "A ABLE WIDE WORLD OF I POMPANO BEACH FL." Ms. Shaffer also received a Florida Automobile Insurance Card confirming that she had personal injury protection benefits, property damage liability, and bodily injury liability coverage with U.S. Security; the agent identified on the card was "A Able Wide World of Insurance," with a post office box address in Margate, Florida. U.S. Security cancelled Ms. Shaffer's physical damage policy effective September 2, 2001, because her application was incomplete. U.S. Security sent a check dated September 26, 2001, to ETI Finance for $323.85, which was the unearned return premium owing on Ms. Shaffer's policy. U.S. Security never received an application for the "additional liability coverage" Ms. Shaffer requested and paid for on August 7, 2001. On October 22, 2001, Ms. Shaffer was caught in a flash flood, and she drove her Kia automobile into an area of water that was so deep her automobile floated. At one point, a bus drove through the water near the Kia, and the wake caused the Kia to wash into railroad ties that were used in the yard of a nearby home for landscaping. The railroad ties tore off the front of the car. The damage to the Kia was so extensive that it was considered a total loss. Ms. Shaffer filed a claim with U.S. Security, and received a letter dated October 25, 2001, from Corporate Claim Services, Inc., acknowledging receipt of her claim on behalf of U.S. Security. Ms. Shaffer then received a letter from Corporate Claim Services, Inc., dated October 26, 2001, advising her that her insurance policy with U.S. Security was cancelled effective September 2, 2001. Because Ms. Shaffer had no automobile insurance at the time her car was damaged, she had the Kia repaired at her own expense and incurred substantial expense and inconvenience because she had to arrange for alternative transportation during the year-and-a-half it took to have her car repaired. Ms. Shaffer did not receive any unearned premium or unearned commission refund after the cancellation of her policy. Ms. Shaffer never did business in person with Mr. Pomerantz. In fact, she met him for the first time the week before the final hearing, when her deposition was taken. Count IV: Terensinha Honczarenko On or about March 30, 2001, Terensinha Honczarenko went to the Margate office of the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency to purchase automobile insurance for a newly- purchased Toyota Corolla.5 Ms. Honczarenko had done business with the insurance agency located in Margate for a number of years. A man working at the Margate office named Greg completed Ms. Honczarenko's application for automobile insurance coverage with Southern Group, which she signed.6 The A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach was identified in the application as the agent producing the application. Coverage on Ms. Honczarenko's policy was bound on the policy on March 30, 2001, and Southern Group received the application on April 4, 2001. The underwriting review of Ms. Honczarenko's application was completed on May 29, 2001, and Southern Group issued a policy to Ms. Honczarenko on June 26, 2001, with an effective date of March 31, 2001, through March 31, 2002. The A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach was identified on the policy as the insurance agent. Ms. Honczarenko paid a $275.00 down payment on the total policy premium of $1098.00, and financed the remainder of the premium with ETI Finance.7 The Premium Finance Agreement was dated March 30, 2001, and was processed by ETI Finance on April 18, 2001. Ms. Honczarenko made payments pursuant to the Premium Finance Agreement from April 30, 2001, until August 2001. Ms. Honczarenko regularly made these payments at the Margate office, sometimes paying in cash and sometimes paying by check. When she took her August 2001 payment to the Margate office, Greg told her that there was a problem with her insurance policy and that she should come back in two days. When she returned to the Margate office, she was told that her automobile insurance policy had been cancelled. When she asked for her money back, Greg refused. At some point in June 2001, Southern Group sent Ms. Honczarenko a notice at her correct address advising her that she owed $263.00 in additional premium on Southern Group automobile insurance policy. She was given three options: To pay the additional premium by June 28, 2001, and keep the policy in force; to request by July 18, 2001, that Southern Group cancel the policy and refund any unearned premium; or to do nothing, in which case the policy would be cancelled effective July 18, 2001, and the unearned premium refunded. Ms. Honczarenko claims she never received this notice. Southern Group also sent Ms. Honczarenko a notice dated June 21, 2001, to her correct address, advising her that the vehicle identification number on her insurance application did not correspond to the vehicle identification number in their records. Southern Group asked Ms. Honczarenko to check her registration and return the letter to Southern Group with the correct information set forth on the bottom of the letter. Ms. Honczarenko claims she never received this notice. Southern Group also sent a copy of the notice to the "Wide World of Ins Pompano Bch." In a letter dated June 29, 2001, "Gary" advised Ms. Honczarenko that she needed to supply the Margate office with a copy of the registration for her 1985 Toyota. This letter was sent to the same address as the notices sent Ms. Honczarenko by Southern Group. Ms. Honczarenko received the June 29, 2001, letter from the Margate office of the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency.8 Because Southern Group received no response from Ms. Honczarenko to its notice that she owed additional premium on her automobile insurance policy, it cancelled her policy effective July 18, 2001, and sent her a notice of cancellation dated June 29, 2001. The notice was sent to the same address as was the notice of additional premium and the notice that there was a discrepancy in her automobile identification number. Ms. Honczarenko received the notice of cancellation. On August 10, 2001, Southern Group sent a check to ETI Finance for unearned return premium on Ms. Honczarenko's automobile insurance policy in the amount of $572.90. ETI Finance received the check on August 16, 2001, and included Ms. Honczarenko's unearned return premium in the statement it sent to the A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach on or about August 31, 2001. The statement showed that ETI Finance had received $572.90 in unearned return premium on Ms. Honczarenko's account, and it included a credit to the A Able insurance agency of $71.95. Ms. Honczarenko did not receive any refund of unearned return premium or unearned commission from A Able insurance agency. Count V: Cecil Worrall On June 10, 2002, Cecil Worrall went to the A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach to renew his automobile insurance within Southern Group. At that time, he had done business with A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach for eight-to-ten years. Mr. Pomerantz completed Mr. Worrall's application, which Mr. Worrall signed. Mr. Worrall gave Mr. Pomerantz a check in the amount of $570.00 as payment of the full amount of the renewal premium. Mr. Pomerantz gave the application to Ms. High and expected her to bind the coverage and process the application. According to a notation of the application, coverage was bound on June 19, 2002, at 3:46 p.m., and, as was her custom, Ms. High put the application package on Mr. Pomerantz's desk for him to review, prepare an agency check for the premium net commission, and mail the application package and payment to Southern Group. Mr. Worrall's June 10, 2002, check was deposited into the account of "A Able Wide World of Insurance." Southern Group did not receive the application and agency check for the premium net commission on Mr. Worrall's renewal within the 72 hours required by Southern Group's agreement with Mr. Pomerantz. On July 12, 2002, a notice was sent to "Wide World of Insurance Pomp" at the A Able insurance agency address in Pompano Beach advising that Mr. Worrall's binder coverage had expired because Southern Group had not received the application.9 Southern Group advised the A Able insurance agency to check its records to make sure that the application package was not misplaced and further advised that a claim against the binder might result in a claim against its "Errors & Omissions Insurance." The Department of Insurance10 made an inquiry of Southern Group on October 16, 2002, regarding the status of Mr. Worrall's insurance policy, and Southern Group replied in a letter dated October 28, 2002, that, although coverage had been bound for Mr. Worrall, it had no record of having received Mr. Worrall's application and the premium payment or a response to its July 12, 2002, notice to the A Able insurance agency that the binder had expired. After Southern Group received the inquiry from the Department of Insurance, it sent a representative to the A Able insurance agency Pompano Beach office, where the Southern Group application for Mr. Worrall was retrieved. On December 10, 2002, Southern Group issued an automobile insurance policy to Mr. Worrall, with an effective date retroactive to June 26, 2002, the date the policy would have been effective had the application and premium payment been transmitted to Southern Group timely. Count VI: Cynthia Mousel Cynthia Mousel was a client of the A Able insurance agency Pompano office, and primarily Ms. High handled her business. On or about September 18, 2002, Ms. High completed an application within U.S. Security for automobile insurance coverage on behalf of Ms. Mousel. Ms. Mousel signed the application, and coverage was bound on September 18, 2002. Ms. Mousel paid the full premium of $524.00. As was her custom, Ms. High put the application package on Mr. Pomerantz's desk for him to review, prepare an agency check for the premium net commission, and mail the application package and payment to U.S. Security. In October 2002, the Department of Insurance sent an inquiry to U.S. Security regarding the status of Ms. Mousel's automobile insurance policy. In a letter dated October 30, 2002, U.S. Security advised the Department of Insurance that it had no record that, as of that date, it had received an application for automobile insurance coverage under Ms. Mousel's name.11 Count VII: Fred Hublitz Fred Hublitz was a long-time customer of the A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach. On September 13, 2002, Mr. Hublitz visited the office, and Ms. High completed an Endorsement Request Form on his behalf to add coverage to his automobile insurance policy with Ocean Harbor for a 2000 Mercury Sable automobile. Mr. Hublitz signed the endorsement and wrote a check for $260.00, which was the full amount of the premium to add this coverage. The coverage was bound on September 13, 2002. As was her custom, Ms. High put the endorsement package on Mr. Pomerantz's desk for him to review, prepare an agency check for the premium net commission, and mail the endorsement and payment to Ocean Harbor. The check written by Mr. Hublitz on September 13, 2002, was deposited into the account of "A Able Wide World of Insurance." In a letter dated October 16, 2002, the Department of Insurance inquired of Ocean Harbor regarding the status of Mr. Hublitz's automobile insurance policy. Ocean Harbor responded in a letter dated November 7, 2002, that it had no record of having received the endorsement or premium payment for Mr. Hublitz's 2000 Mercury Sable. An Ocean Harbor representative went to the A Able insurance agency office in Pompano Beach on November 15, 2002, and picked up applications and endorsements for automobile insurance coverage. Among these documents was Mr. Hublitz's endorsement, and Ocean Harbor added the 2000 Mercury Sable to Mr. Hublitz's existing Ocean Harbor automobile insurance policy, effective retroactively.12 Count VIII: Lori O'Connell Lori O'Connell had obtained automobile insurance coverage from the A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach. She had received a notice that her policy with Southern Group was to expire on August 14, 2002, and a friend, Joseph Balsamo, went to the A Able insurance agency office on July 9, 2002, and gave Ms. High a check for $364.00, which was full payment for the policy renewal. Ms. High bound the renewal on July 12, 2002. As was her custom, Ms. High put the application package on Mr. Pomerantz's desk for him to review, prepare an agency check for the premium net commission, and mail the renewal application package and payment to Southern Group. A month later, Ms. O'Connell had not received an insurance card or renewal policy, and Mr. Balsamo telephoned the A Able insurance agency Pompano Beach office and inquired about the policy. Ms. High told him that the insurance company was slow in processing the renewals and that Ms. O'Connell should receive the materials shortly. Ms. High knew, at the time, that the renewal application was sitting on Mr. Pomerantz's desk, waiting for him to write a check and mail the application and payment to Southern Group. Southern Group did not receive the renewal application and agency check for the premium net commission on Ms. O'Connell's renewal within the 72 hours required by Southern Group's agreement with Mr. Pomerantz. On August 2, 2002, a notice was sent to "Wide World of Insurance Pomp" at the A Able insurance agency address in Pompano Beach advising that Ms. O'Connell's binder coverage had expired because Southern Group had not received the renewal application.13 Southern Group advised the A Able insurance agency to check its records to make sure that the application package was not misplaced and further advised that a claim against the binder might result in a claim against its "Errors & Omissions Insurance." The Department of Insurance made an inquiry of Southern Group on October 16, 2002, regarding the status of Ms. O'Connell's renewal policy, and Southern Group replied in a letter dated October 28, 2002, that, although coverage had been bound for Ms. O'Connell on July 12, 2002, it had no record of having received Ms. O'Connell's renewal application and the premium payment or a response to its August 2, 2002, notice to the A Able insurance agency that the binder on Ms. O'Connell's renewal had expired. After Southern Group received the inquiry from the Department of Insurance, it sent a representative to the A Able insurance agency Pompano Beach office, where the Southern Group renewal application for Ms. O'Connell was retrieved. On November 26, 2002, Southern Group issued an automobile insurance policy renewal to Ms. O'Connell, with an effective date retroactive to August 14, 2002, the date the renewal would have been effective had the application and premium payment been transmitted to Southern Group timely. Count IX: Carol Scott On July 10, 2002, Ms. High prepared an application for automobile insurance coverage with Southern Group on behalf of Carol Scott. The premium for the coverage specified in the application was $655.00. Ms. High bound the coverage on July 10, 2002. Southern Group did not receive Ms. Scott's application and the agency check for the premium net commission within the 72 hours required by Southern Group's agreement with Mr. Pomerantz. On August 2, 2002, a notice was sent to "Wide World of Insurance Pomp" at the A Able insurance agency address in Pompano Beach advising that Ms. Scott's binder coverage had expired because Southern Group had not received the application. Southern Group advised the A Able insurance agency to check its records to make sure that the application package was not misplaced and further advised that a claim against the binder might result in a claim against its "Errors & Omissions Insurance." The Department of Insurance made an inquiry of Southern Group on October 16, 2002, regarding the status of Ms. Scott's automobile insurance policy, and Southern Group replied in a letter dated October 28, 2002, that, although coverage had been bound for Ms. Scott on July 10, 2002, it had no record of having received Ms. Scott's application and the premium payment or a response to its August 2, 2002, notice to the A Able insurance agency that the binder on Ms. Scott's application had expired. After Southern Group received the inquiry from the Department of Insurance, it sent a representative to the A Able insurance agency Pompano Beach office, where the Southern Group application for Ms. Scott was retrieved. On November 26, 2002, Southern Group issued an automobile insurance policy renewal to Ms. Scott, with an effective date retroactive to July 11, 2002, the date the renewal would have been effective had the application and premium payment been transmitted to Southern Group timely. Count X: Janice Misconis On or about June 25, 2003, Janice Misconis visited the A Able insurance agency office in Pompano Beach to renew her Ocean Harbor automobile insurance policy. Ms. High prepared a Summary of Coverages and Premium covering a 1990 Buick Skylark. Ms. High bound the coverage on June 24, 2002, for a renewal with a policy period commencing July 8, 2002. The premium shown on the summary totalled $570.00, and Ms. High prepared a receipt affirming that Ms. Misconis had paid the $570.00 renewal premium in full on June 25, 2002. In a letter dated October 16, 2002, the Department of Insurance inquired of Ocean Harbor regarding the status of Ms. Misconis's automobile insurance policy. Ocean Harbor responded in a letter dated November 7, 2002, that it had no record of having received an application or premium payment for Ms. Misconis's policy renewal. An Ocean Harbor representative went to the A Able insurance agency office in Pompano Beach on November 15, 2002, and picked up applications and endorsements for automobile insurance coverage. Among these documents was Ms. Misconis's renewal application, and Ocean Harbor issued a policy of automobile insurance coverage, effective retroactively to the date it would have been effective had the application and premium payment been forwarded to Ocean Harbor timely.14 Count IX: Diane Carroll In October 2001, Diane Carroll, a/k/a Diane Heinen, purchased an automobile insurance policy with the Aires Insurance Company ("Aires") from the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency in Margate. After she had an accident and her car was sitting in a repair shop, she cancelled this policy. In late January 2002, Ms. Carroll went again to the Wide World of Insurance office in Margate, and a person working in that office took her application for another automobile insurance policy. The policy was placed with Aires, and the total premium was $2,637.00. The effective date of the policy was February 1, 2002, for the term of one year. Ms. Carroll made a down payment of $660.00, and financed the balance of the premium with Assured Premium Finance Corporation, a company that is serviced by ETI Finance. Ms. Carroll made all of the payments required under the Premium Finance Agreement she signed in January 2002. Ms. Carroll took each of the payments to the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency office in Margate. On January 8, 2003, Ms. Carroll had an automobile accident. She called the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency in Margate to report a claim, and she was told that she did not have an insurance policy, that Aires "went under." The person at the Margate office of the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency told Ms. Carroll that she had been sent notification by mail. Ms. Carroll requested a copy of the letter, which she claims she did not receive. The letter is dated November 27, 2002, and bears the letterhead of "Wide World of Insurance," with a Margate post office address. The letter is addressed to Ms. Carroll at her then-correct address and provides notice that Aires has been "PLACED IN LIQUIDATION ON NOVEMBER 14, 2002, BY THE STATE OF FLORIDA. ALL INSURANCE POLICIES WITH THE ABOVE- CAPTIONED INSURANCE COMPANY SHALL CEASE AS OF 12:01 AM, DECEMBER 14, 2002. PLEASE CONTACT OUR OFFICE IMMEDIATELY TO REPLACE THIS INSURANCE COVERAGE." The name "A Able Wide World of Insurance" is included on the letter. There is no indication on the letter that it was sent by certified mail.15 Summary Count I: Mr. Thierwechter The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that the refund of unearned commission on Mr. Thierwechter's cancelled Ocean Harbor automobile insurance policy was not made timely by the A Able insurance agency, but was held by the A Able insurance agency from early May 2002, when the A Able insurance agency received the agent statement from ETI Finance showing the debit to the A Able insurance agency's account, until July 1, 2002, when Mr. Pomerantz issued a check for the amount of unearned commission the A Able insurance agency owed to Mr. Thierwechter. Count III: Ms. Shaffer The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that either Mr. Pomerantz or the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency was involved in any meaningful way in any transactions relating to Ms. Shaffer's physical damage automobile insurance policy. Although, during the summer and fall of 2001, the A Able insurance agency located in Pompano Beach and the Wide World of Insurance agency located in Margate had merged and were doing business as a single entity, Mr. Pomerantz was the agent in charge of the Pompano Beach office. There was no evidence presented to establish that Mr. Pomerantz ever operated in the Margate office or supervised the agents in that office. Even though the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency is identified as the agent on Ms. Shaffer's U.S. Security policy, there was no creditable evidence presented to establish that anyone in the Pompano Beach office prepared the application for Ms. Shaffer's physical damage insurance policy or was responsible for servicing the policy. The evidence presented by the Department regarding the "additional liability coverage" purchased by Ms. Shaffer is scanty. Although Ms. Shaffer handled the transaction over the telephone with a man in the Pompano Beach office of the insurance agency and the charge on Ms. Shaffer's credit card was credited to the A Able insurance agency in Pompano Beach, there is no evidence identifying the person who prepared the receipt for the premium payment. The totality of the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to support an inference that Mr. Pomerantz was personally involved in the transaction or that he knew or should have known of the transaction. Count IV: Terensinha Honczarenko The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Pomerantz caused Ms. Honczarenko's automobile insurance policy to be cancelled, either directly or through his negligence or the negligence of any of the agents working in the A Able insurance agency Pompano Beach office. All of her dealings were with the Margate office, and there was no evidence that a copy of the notice from Southern Group advising Ms. Honczarenko that she owed additional premium on her policy was sent to the A Able insurance agency at the Pompano Beach address or that it was the practice of Southern Group to send such notices to agents as well as to its insureds.16 The evidence presented by the Department is, however, sufficient to establish that A Able insurance agency received notice from ETI Finance that it owed Ms. Honczarenko a refund of unearned return premium in the amount of $71.95 and that Ms. Honczarenko did not receive this refund. Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X: Mr. Worrall, Ms. Mousel, Mr. Hublitz, Ms. O'Connell, Ms. Scott, and Ms. Misconis The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Mr. Pomerantz was personally responsible for writing agency checks for premium net commission and for sending applications for automobile insurance coverage generated in the A Able insurance agency Pompano Beach office and premium checks received in that office to the various insurance companies. During the summer and early fall of 2002, Ms. High constantly reminded Mr. Pomerantz that the applications accumulating on his desk needed attention, and Mr. Pomerantz assumed the responsibility for handling the applications when he told her that he would handle them. The evidence presented by the Department is also sufficient to establish that Mr. Pomerantz failed to forward the applications and premiums for Mr. Worrall, Ms. Mousel, Mr. Hublitz, Ms. O'Connell, Ms. Scott, and Ms. Misconis and that the A Able insurance agency had the benefit of the premium payments made by these individuals from the time the coverage binders expired until such time as the policy applications and payments were received by the various insurance companies who issued policies with coverage retroactive to the date of the applications and premium payments. Count XI: Ms. Carroll The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that either Mr. Pomerantz or any employee of the Pompano Beach office of the A Able insurance agency was involved in the transactions with respect to Ms. Carroll's automobile insurance policy with Aires. All of Ms. Carroll's business dealings with regard to this policy were at the Margate office of the Wide World of Insurance insurance agency. Even though the name "A Able Wide World of Insurance" appears on the letter dated November 27, 2002, notifying Ms. Carroll that Aires was in liquidation and that she needed to replace her automobile insurance policy, there was no evidence presented to establish that anyone in the Pompano Beach office prepared the application for Ms. Carroll's policy or had any dealings with her on this or any other automobile insurance policy.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding that Jay Lawrence Pomerantz 1. Violated Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(4), (7), and (10), and 626.621(2) and (6), Florida Statutes (2002) with respect to Counts I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of the Amended Administrative Complaint filed October 14, 2003; Dismissing Counts II, III, and XI of the Amended Administrative Complaint20; and Revoking the property and casualty insurance agent's license of Jay Lawrence Pomerantz. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2004.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57626.016626.281626.561626.611626.621626.641627.7283631.341
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs JOANNE MARIE SHEPHERD, 94-004167 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jul. 26, 1994 Number: 94-004167 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 1996

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the following sections of the Florida Statutes: 626.041(2), 626.561(1), 626.592(1), 626.611(4), (5), (7)-(10), (13), 626.21(2), (6), (12), 626.9521, 626.9541(1)(a)1, (b), (e)1., (k)1., (o)1., (z)3, 627.739(2), and 627.843. If so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Joanne Marie Shepherd (Shepherd), is currently and was at all times pertinent to this proceedings licensed in Florida as an authorized joint underwriter, association representative, life agent, life and health agent, general lines-property casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agent, health insurance agent, independent adjuster, and dental health care service contract salesman. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Shepherd was the president, secretary, and treasurer of Coral Springs Auto Tag and Insurance Agency, Inc. (Coral Springs Agency). Coral Springs Agency is an insurance agency incorporated and existing pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding Shepherd would be present at the Coral Springs Agency office during approximately 90 percent of the operating hours of the business. In early 1992, Shepherd organized an automobile club, Quality Motoring Association (QMA). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Shepherd was the vice president, secretary, treasurer, director, and resident agent of QMA. QMA provides one or more of the following services: coverage for automobile towing and road service, rental reimbursement, emergency travel expense, and theft reward. Shepherd's employees were paid a commission for each QMA contract which they sold. Contracts for QMA services were on a printed form and contained the following language: THIS CONTRACT IS NOT AN INSURANCE POLICY AND DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE FINANCIAL RESPONSI- BILITY OR NO-FAULT LAWS OF ANY STATE OR TERRITORY. Jo Ann Jones and Kelly Conley were employed by Coral Springs Agency beginning in 1987 and 1991, respectively. They worked under the direct control and supervision of Shepherd. On February 26, 1993, Ms. Jones received a limited customer representative license for automobile insurance. She received her 220 license in December, 1994. During 1993, Ms. Conley spent approximately 60 to 70 percent of her work time performing tag and title work for Coral Springs Agency. In addition, her other duties included filing, answering the telephone, assisting in preparing correspondence concerning late payments and intentions to cancel, and selling QMA services. Her duties did include giving quotes for renewals and specific coverage requests, taking applications and receiving premium payments; however the evidence did not establish that Ms. Conley spent more than ten percent of her time performing these duties. She received her 220 license in October, 1994. On October 26, 1994, Shepherd originally filed the name of the primary agent for Coral Springs Agency as Kelly Gorton. This filing was amended on December 15, 1994, to change the name of the primary agent to Jo Connors. The records of the Department do not show that Shepherd filed the name of the primary agent for Coral Springs Agency for 1990 through 1993. Shepherd did not file the name of the primary agency for Coral Springs Agency for 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. In 1992, Andrew Coombs came to Coral Springs Agency to procure an automobile insurance policy. Shepherd explained the coverages to him. Mr. Coombs was issued a policy for PIP and property damage. Based on Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, Mr. Coombs was also issued comprehensive and collision coverage with Executive Insurance Company for a policy period of July 5, 1992 through July 5, 1993. The declaration sheet for the Executive Insurance Company policy showed that Mr. Coombs had a conviction for DUI/DWI on 6-11-90. In 1992, Mr. Coombs signed a contract with QMA for towing and rental services. However, Mr. Coombs was under the impression that the rental and towing services were included as part of his insurance policy. The contract which he signed did not indicate the fee amount for the contract. In June, 1993, Mr. Coombs called and discussed with Jo Ann Jones his need for a policy renewal and received a written quote from her on June 17, 1993, which stated: As per your request, please see the following renewal quote. 25,000 property damage, basic PIP w/a 2000 ded. Comp and coll. w/a 500 ded each. Your annual premium is 1278. w/a down payment of 302.62 and 6 months payments of 170.56. If you have any questions please call me. Thank you. The following Saturday, Mr. Coombs went to the Coral Springs Agency and gave Ms. Jones $200 in cash and a check for $1,078. He received a receipt from Ms. Jones for that amount showing that it was for "ins. paid in full." Mr. Coombs was in a hurry on that day and he executed a power of attorney appointing Coral Springs Auto Tag and Insurance Agency as his attorney-in-fact and authorizing the Coral Springs Agency to sign and execute applications for automobile insurance. The power of attorney did not authorize Coral Springs Agency to execute a contract with QMA for Mr. Coombs. Jo Ann Jones witnessed the execution of the power of attorney and dated it 7-3-93. The power of attorney was used on July 3, 1993 to execute a contract with QMA for towing and rental services. The charge for these automobile club services was $100 and was so indicated on the contract. Mr. Coombs did not know that the power of attorney would be used to purchase towing and rental services with QMA. The power of attorney was used also to execute Mr. Coombs' application for an insurance policy with Progressive. The application showed that the total premium with Progressive was $1,178. The policy with Progressive was for property damage, PIP, comprehensive and collision. In completing the application, it was the understanding of the Coral Springs Agency that the latest conviction that Mr. Coombs had was the DUI in June, 1990. However, Mr. Coombs had confused the date of the occurrence of the violation with the date of conviction and had not revealed that in October, 1990, his license had been revoked because of the DUI violation. When Progressive learned of the revocation, it notified Mr. Coombs that an additional $98 premium would be due. As a result of the notification from Progressive, Mr. Coombs learned that Progressive had received $1,178 instead of the $1,278 which he had given Coral Springs Agency and that he had been charged $100 for QMA's towing and rental services. Surprised and upset by this revelation, Mr. Coombs contacted the Department of Insurance and made a complaint. On July 24, 1993, Wayne LeBlanc went to the Coral Springs Agency to purchase automobile insurance. His current policy was with Allstate and he told Ms. Conley that he wanted similar coverage. The Allstate policy included towing and rental coverage for approximately eight dollars. Ms. Conley gave Mr. LeBlanc a quote. Ms. Conley filled out Mr. LeBlanc's application for insurance with Progressive and a contract with QMA for rental and towing services. She placed "X's" on the documents indicating where Mr. LeBlanc should sign and he signed the documents. Mr. LeBlanc did not know that he was purchasing towing and rental services from an automobile club. Ms. Conley did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. LeBlanc. The Progressive application showed that the total premium for the insurance was $512. The QMA contract showed the amount of the fee for QMA services as $100. Mr. LeBlanc gave Ms. Conley a check for $228. Ms. Conley applied $128 for payment of the insurance coverage and $100 for the QMA coverage. A short time later, Mr. LeBlanc received a statement from Progressive indicating that his insurance premium had increased from $512 to $702 because he had failed to show proof of insurance for the six months prior to the purchase of the Progressive policy. Mr. LeBlanc cancelled his policy with Progressive. He received a check from QMA dated January 19, 1994 for $100 as a refund on his QMA coverage. In August, 1993, Eric Henry called Coral Springs Agency for a quote for automobile insurance for his 1984 Nissan. He wanted the minimum coverage which was legally required. Mr. Henry was given a quote of between $480 and $490. He, along with his father, went to Coral Springs Agency to purchase the insurance. Mr. Henry signed a Progressive insurance application. The Progressive application showed a total premium of $410 in two different locations on the contract as well as a breakdown of the premium by coverage. Additionally the application showed a $103 down payment with the remainder of the premium to be paid in installments. Mr. Henry signed a contract with QMA. The contract showed a fee of $80 as well as the benefits he was receiving under the contract. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. Henry. He did not know that he was purchasing towing and rental services from an automobile club. He did not ask for the automobile club services and did not want them. He had never had towing and rental coverage before. Mr. Henry gave Ms. Jones $183, of which $103 was applied to the insurance premium and $80 to QMA for towing and rental services. Mr. Henry was given a receipt by Ms. Jones that described the money as "DP on ins." Mr. Henry learned that he had purchased QMA coverage from a representative from the Department. He contacted the Coral Springs Agency and requested a refund for the QMA coverage because he did not want and had not asked for the QMA services. QMA refunded his money. Mr. Henry has continued to do business with Coral Springs Agency. On Saturday, August 21, 1993, JoAnne Strader called Coral Springs Agency for a quote for insurance on her automobile. Shepherd gave her a quote by telephone for coverage by Fortune Insurance Company. Ms. Strader wanted the minimum coverage required by law and nothing else. Coral Springs closed at one that afternoon so Ms. Strader hurried to the agency to purchase the insurance. When she arrived at the agency, Ms. Conley pulled up the quote from the computer. Ms. Strader signed the application for the Fortune Insurance, a contract with QMA for towing and rental services, and an agreement for financing the insurance premiums. The application stated that the total insurance premium was $207. The QMA contract showed that the fee for the QMA services was $55 for six months. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract. The financing agreement showed that the total premium was $207 with $102 being applied as the down payment. Ms. Strader gave Ms. Conley a check for $157 of which $102 was applied as a down payment for the insurance coverage and $55 for QMA services. The finance agreement provided that Ms. Strader would make three payments of $42.95 beginning on September 21, 1993. Ms. Strader was given a copy of the finance agreement on August 21, 1993. Ms. Strader later called Coral Springs Agency and advised Ms. Conley that she had misplaced her insurance documents. Ms. Conley sent Ms. Strader a duplicate set, including a copy of the finance agreement, in October, 1993. Ms. Strader was unaware at the time she purchased the insurance that she had also purchased automobile club services from QMA. She learned for the first time that she had purchased such services when a representative from the Department contacted her in January, 1994 and told her. In February, 1994, Ms. Strader made a claim to QMA for reimbursement of towing expenses. She received a check dated February 18, 1994 from QMA. On November 9, 1993, Daniel Link went to the Coral Springs Agency to purchase minimum automobile insurance coverage for his two vehicles. He was given a written quote by Jo Ann Jones. Mr. Link asked Ms. Jones to prepare the application and stated that he would come back later in the day to sign the application. When he returned to the agency the application was prepared and he signed it. The application showed that the total insurance premium was $1023 with a breakdown by vehicle of the costs for the coverages. Mr. Link gave Coral Springs Agency a check for $356, which he thought would be applied to the insurance premium; however only $256 was applied toward the insurance premium. Mr. Link signed an agreement to finance the outstanding premium balance. The finance agreement showed that the total premium was $1023 with a down payment of $256 with the remainder to be paid in eight payments. His testimony was not clear whether he received a copy of the finance agreement on the day that he signed the agreement. Mr. Link did not want to purchase towing and rental coverage. When he came into the agency to sign the application, he also signed a contract with QMA for automobile club services which showed a fee of $100. The blanks in the contract had been filled out by someone at Coral Springs Agency, and he signed where an "X" was placed. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. Link. He did not know that he had purchased such services. Of the amount which Mr. Link paid the Coral Springs Agency, $100 went to pay for QMA coverage. In November, 1993, Andrew Prisco and his father went to the Coral Springs Agency to purchase insurance for a 1985 Nissan. Mr. Prisco's father had transferred the title to the car to Mr. Prisco. The vehicle has previously been insured through the Coral Springs Agency. Mr. Prisco's father handled the transaction for Mr. Prisco and discussed the coverage with Ms. Jones. Mr. Prisco signed an application for Progressive Insurance. Jo Ann Jones had filled out a portion of the application. The application showed that the total premium was $410. Mr. Prisco gave the Coral Springs Agency a check for $490, thinking it was for insurance premiums. Mr. Prisco did not want towing and rental services, but he signed a contract with QMA. Ms. Jones filled out the QMA agreement and put an "X" where Mr. Prisco was supposed to sign. Mr. Prisco signed where Ms. Jones indicated; however he was unaware that he was purchasing automobile club services. Ms. Jones did not explain the QMA contract to Mr. Prisco. The QMA contract showed that the fee for the services was $80. Of the $490 which he paid Coral Springs Agency, $80 was for QMA. Mr. Prisco learned from a Department representative that he had purchased QMA services. Mr. Prisco and his father requested a refund from QMA. QMA refunded the fee paid by Mr. Prisco. Mr. Prisco has continued to do business with Coral Springs Agency. Shepherd has been a licensed insurance agent in Florida since 1982. Other than the instant proceeding, Shepherd has never had a disciplinary action taken against her insurance agent license.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Counts III, VI, and VII of the Administrative Complaint; finding that Joanne Shepherd violated Section 626.592(1), Florida Statutes; finding that Shepherd violated Sections 626.9541(1)(x)3., 626.611(5), (7), and (9), Sections 626.621(2)(6), and 626.9521, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Counts II, IV, V, VIII and IX of the Administrative Complaint; and suspending Joanne Shepherd's license for two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4167 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance that Ms. Jones was employed as an employee of Coral Springs Agency during the time period relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 10: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Ms. Jones was a limited customer representative. Paragraphs 11-19: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance that Progressive asked for an additional $98 but denied that the reason for the additional premium was because Shepherd failed to send Progressive $1,278. The reason of the increase was because Coomb's license had been either suspended or revoked in 1990. Paragraph 21: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Ms. Conley took an application from Mr. Leblanc but not that she solicited or procured the application. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is rejected as to soliciting. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 25-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 33: The first sentence is accepted in substance that Ms. Conley took an application from Ms. Strader for automobile insurance with Fortune but rejected that she solicited or procured the application. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: The first sentence is accepted in substance except as to soliciting. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 37-39: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 41-42: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 44-49: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance except as to Mr. Coombs. He did not sign the application. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 8: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 11-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 13-17: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 18: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen R. Moayad, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson and Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (14) 120.57120.68626.0428626.611626.621626.641626.734626.911626.9521626.9541627.736627.739627.839627.843
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs SHIRLEY ARLENE COOK, 93-007105 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Dec. 17, 1993 Number: 93-007105 Latest Update: Feb. 02, 1995

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Shirley Arlene Cook, is currently licensed by Petitioner as a life agent, a life and health agent, and a general lines agent, and has been so licensed since February 17, 1982, February 17, 1982, and February 13, 1980, respectively. Respondent has been employed in the insurance business since 1954. She has operated her current agency, American Family Insurors, since January 1990. During times material, Respondent engaged in the business of insurance through the corporate entity, American Family Insurors, Inc. (Family Insurors). Respondent was the sole officer and director of Family Insurors, Inc. from May 25, 1990 through February 26, 1992. As corporate officer and director of Family Insurors, Respondent was personally liable and accountable for wrongful acts, misconduct, or other violations of any provision of the insurance code committed by herself or agents who worked under her direct supervision and control. During times material, Respondent maintained a business bank account No. 1263147295 at Barnett Bank, in the name of Family Insurors. Respondent and Richard Rock were the authorized signators on the Respondent's account. Sometime in 1990, Rock was taken from the account as an authorized signator. Richard Rock was employed by Respondent as an outside producer and primarily solicited new accounts and canvassed existing accounts to pick up deposits and insurance applications which were collected by auto salesmen. He paid such salesmen ten dollars for every property damage referral that materialized into a policy with Family Insurors. Richard and his wife, Michelle Rock, who was also employed by Respondent, left Respondent's agency during June 1992. They left Respondent's agency due to personal problems stemming from Richard's drug and alcohol abuse, and when Respondent learned that he was paying referral fees to auto salesmen. Richard paid the salesmen the referral fees from Respondent's petty cash account, an account which was maintained and controlled by his wife, Michelle. Respondent was not aware of the referral fees and other gratuities which Richard would give to outside salesmen from time to time. The gratuities consisted of gift certificates to various retail establishments which were primarily restaurants. Funds received by Respondent and deposited into bank account No. 1263147295, which were received from or on behalf of consumers, represented premiums for insurance polices and were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity. As such, they were to be accounted for and paid over to an insuror, insured, or other persons entitled thereto in the applicable regular course of business. During times material, Onyx Underwriters, Inc. (Onyx) was the sole managing general agent for Orion Insurance Company, now known as Aries, and American Skyhawk Insurance Company (American Skyhawk). On January 16, 1990, Respondent entered into an Insurance Broker's Agreement with Onyx. The broker's agreement was cancelled on March 19, 1992. While the broker's agreement was effective, all insurance placed by Respondent with Orion/Aries or American Skyhawk was pursuant and subject to the provisions of the broker's agreement with Onyx and constituted brokerage business. Pursuant to the broker's agreement with Onyx, Respondent retained agency commissions on policies issued and was responsible for forwarding the net premium to Onyx. This procedure is known in the industry as "netting authority" and is a procedure whereby the agent deducts the commissions that he or she is entitled to from gross premiums received on policies and forward the net premium to, in this case, Onyx. THE BARBARA CECIL TRANSACTION On October 13, 1990, Barbara Cecil (Cecil) purchased an automobile from Tony Taylor of Taylor Automotive in Pinellas Park. In connection with the sale, Tony Taylor, an unlicensed individual, solicited automobile insurance from Cecil on behalf of Respondent. Cecil paid Tony Taylor eighty dollars ($80.00) as the premium down payment, and Respondent later deposited Cecil's payment into her bank account. Respondent represented to Cecil that she was bound on October 13, 1990; however, the insurance documents indicate that coverage was bound for Cecil on October 27, 1990, or approximately fourteen (14) days after the date that she purchased her auto from Taylor Automotive. Cecil was, however, given a binder on October 13, 1990. Respondent later completed a policy application and submitted it to Orion Insurance Company (Orion). Orion thereafter issued a policy to Cecil for the policy period of October 27, 1990 through October 27, 1991. Orion cancelled Cecil's policy on February 6, 1991, due to the absence of photographs of her automobile. In this connection, Respondent had previously submitted a set of photographs to Orion which did not clearly depict the automobile. Therefore, a second set of photos were requested by Orion. The second set of photos was not sent to Orion prior to the cancellation date. The cancellation of Cecil's policy resulted in an unearned premium of one hundred eighty dollars and ninety-two cents ($180.92), and an unearned commission of thirty-eight dollars and seventy cents ($38.70). Cecil was without automobile insurance from February 6, 1991 to October 27, 1991, and she was informed of the cancellation. During times material, Tony Taylor was not licensed in Florida as an insurance agent, customer representative, or solicitor. THE KIMBERLEY JONES TRANSACTION On June 20, 1991, Kimberley Jones purchased an automobile from Tony Taylor of Taylor Automotive. In connection with this automobile purchase, Tony Taylor solicited insurance on behalf of Jones from Respondent's agency. Kimberley Jones paid Taylor one hundred dollars ($100.00) as the premium down payment and Taylor issued a receipt to Jones. Respondent did not bind coverage with American Skyhawk for Jones until one week later, i.e., June 27, 1991. The Jones' policy ran its full term. THE KAREN KLEIN TRANSACTION On August 26, 1991, Karen Klein purchased an automobile from Keith Rice of Car Stop Automobile Sales. In connection with this purchase, Keith Rice, an unlicensed insurance individual, solicited automobile insurance from Klein on behalf of Family Insurors. Klein paid Keith Rice approximately one hundred dollars ($100.00) as a premium down payment for issuance of an insurance policy on her newly purchased automobile, which was to be effective on August 26, 1991. American Skyhawk issued a policy to Klein for the period effective August 27, 1991 through August 27, 1992. Onyx cancelled Klein's policy on December 3, 1991, for underwriting reasons. That cancellation resulted in an unearned premium of three hundred thirty-three dollars and thirty-one cents ($333.31), and an unearned commission of seventy-three dollars and sixty-eight cents ($73.68). THE EDITH PURCELL TRANSACTION On September 27, 1991, Edith Purcell purchased an automobile from Bill Hoskins of Taylor Automotive. In connection with that purchase, Hoskins solicited automobile insurance from Purcell on behalf of Family Insurors. Hoskins advised Purcell that her coverage would be effective September 29, 1991, upon receipt of her down payment of one hundred dollars ($100.00). Purcell paid Hoskins the premium down payment on September 29, 1991, and Hoskins issued a receipt indicating Family Insurors as the recipient. Hoskins, on behalf of Family Insurors, represented to Purcell that she had full coverage for the policy period, September 27, 1991 through September 26, 1992, pursuant to binder number P91-1022. American Skyhawk thereafter issued a policy to Purcell for the period of October 3, 1991 through October 3, 1992. Purcell's policy was cancelled on December 26, 1991, for underwriting reasons. That cancellation resulted in an unearned premium of four hundred forty-two dollars ($442.00), and an unearned commission of seventy-seven dollars and thirty-five cents ($77.35). THE JOHN J. NARKIN, III TRANSACTION On October 4, 1991, John J. Narkin, III (Narkin) purchased an automobile from Bill Hoskins of Taylor Automotive. In connection with that purchase, Hoskins, an individual who was not licensed as an insurance agent, representative, or solicitor, solicited an automobile insurance policy for Narkin on behalf of Family Insurors. Hoskins requested and Narkin paid him the one hundred dollar down payment for issuance of the policy. Hoskins issued Narkin a receipt from Family Insurors for the down payment indicating full coverage for the period October 4, 1991 through October 3, 1992, pursuant to binder number N91-1059. American Skyhawk issued a policy to Narkin effective for the period of October 7, 1991 through October 7, 1992. American Skyhawk issued a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of an additional premium of fifty-four dollars ($54.00), because Narkin failed to provide proof of holding a Florida Driver's License when he was requested to do so. Respondent notified Narkin of this request by letter dated December 7, 1991. Narkin was told that he had until December 27, 1991 to remit his payment. Narkin paid Respondent the additional premium by check on December 13, 1991, which deposit was entered into Family Insuror's business bank account on December 18, 1991. The additional premium was not forwarded by Respondent to Onyx prior to the December 27, 1991 cancellation date with the result that Narkin's policy was cancelled. Narkin was without insurance from December 27, 1991 through October 7, 1992, and he had no knowledge of this fact. The cancellation of Narkin's policy resulted in an unearned premium of six hundred fifty dollars and eighty-two cents ($650.82), and an unearned commission of one hundred forty-nine dollars and sixty-three cents ($149.63). THE WENDY WARDLE TRANSACTION On May 17, 1991, Family Insurors solicited an American Skyhawk application for automobile insurance from Wendy Wardle. Wendy Wardle paid Respondent ninety-eight dollars ($98.00) as the premium down payment, and the policy was thereafter issued to Wardle. On August 19, 1991, American Skyhawk cancelled Wardle's policy for underwriting reasons, resulting in an unearned premium of two hundred dollars and fifty-seven ($200.57), and an unearned commission of sixty-one dollars and seventy-eight cents ($61.78). THE MARY ANN MAFETONE TRANSACTION On October 28, 1991, Mary Ann Mafetone purchased an automobile for her daughter, Cindy Mafetone, from John Rosa of River Auto Sales. In connection with this purchase, John Rosa, an individual who was not licensed as an insurance agent, broker, or solicitor, solicited automobile insurance for the Mafetones from Family Insurors. Mafetone paid Rosa one hundred twelve dollars ($112.00) as the premium down payment for issuance of a policy in the name of her daughter, Cindy. In exchange for soliciting insurance on behalf of or from Family Insurors, Family Insurors, through Richard Stock, paid various automobile salesmen commissions, ranging from ten dollars to twenty per transaction. These commissions were based on specific coverage being purchased by the consumer. Respondent's Position Andrew Beverly, an expert in the field of insurance, is a chartered property and casualty underwriter, a chartered life underwriter and a chartered financial consultant. He is the owner and operator of the Florida Insurance School, a statewide firm that prepares individuals for entry level positions in the insurance industry. Beverly reviewed Respondent's binder books and practices respecting the subject insureds in this proceeding. The binder book and procedures utilized by Respondent are typical industry practices for agents and agencies writing policies with nonstandard companies. In the process of taking an insurance application to an actual hard copy policy, three sets of numbers are used. They are the binder number signed by the agent in numerical sequence as customers make application for coverage, the working number which is assigned by an underwriter until the actual (hard copy) policy is issued and the policy number which is computer generated by the company. Discrepancies between the binding date and the coverage date is normal within the industry and coverage is effective as of the binder date. Thus, in all of these transactions, the insureds had coverage the instant they received binders from Respondent. Respondent's files indicate that Barbara Cecil was timely notified that the pictures taken on her vehicle were not properly developed and she needed to return to the agency with her vehicle to take new pictures to be forwarded to her insuror. Mrs. Cecil did not return in a timely manner and her policy was therefore cancelled. Respondent's records respecting Edith Purcell indicate that Purcell was given a quote, and coverage for her was bound on October 3, 1991. An application for insurance was taken and she was provided the paperwork including a copy of the premium finance agreement. Purcell was notified on November 13, 1991, that her driver license information could not be verified. On November 21, 1991, Purcell visited Respondent's office and provided the necessary information. Respondent telecopied the information to the underwriting company; however, she was not reinstated. Respondent contacted the company about the cancellation, but the company refused to rescind the cancellation and underwrite that risk. Kimberly Jones was given a quote of $276.00 for insurance coverage by Respondent and she paid a $100.00 down payment. The balance was to be paid in installments. However, during the policy period, Ms. Jones was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in an increase in her premiums. Respondent advised Ms. Jones to pay the additional premium of approximately of forty percent as required by the company and add the balance of that additional premium to her contract. Ms. Jones complied and her policy remained in effect the full term. Ms. Mafetone paid Respondent a down payment of $112.00 and Respondent notified her that an additional $32.00 was required. Ms. Mafetone erroneously remitted the additional money to the (premium) finance company instead of the insurance company. As a result, her account was not properly credited and her policy was cancelled. Respondent thereafter notified the premium finance company and found that she had been given a credit on her monthly account statement. Respondent had not been provided a statement to reflect that credit when Mafetone's policy was cancelled. A portion of Respondent's statement was telecopied to her and she immediately remitted the $212.00 to the insuror to reinstate Ms. Mafetone's policy. Ms. Mafetone's policy was reinstated and remained in full force for its term. Respondent's files respecting Wendy and Douglas Wardle indicate that Mr. Wardle did not have a valid Florida driver's license at the time his policy was purchased. Based on Mr. Wardle's failure to provide proof of a driver's license, the company cancelled his policy. Karen Klein was provided a quote by Michelle Rock. An application was prepared for her on August 17, 1991, and coverage was bound on August 27, 1991. Klein's policy was cancelled because she did not have a valid Florida driver's license. Ms. Klein was notified in writing and she did not return to Respondent to handle the matter. As a result, the company cancelled her policy. Respondent's file relating to Narkin reveals that he was given a quote of $320.00, of which he paid $100.00 as a down payment. Narkin was billed the balance of the premium. Narkin's policy was issued on October 7, 1991, and he paid the balance. Respondent notified Narkin that the company was unable to ascertain that he had a valid Florida driver's license. This problem was ultimately resolved and his policy was reinstated. However, an additional premium was required from Narkin because of his license status at the time he made his application. The additional $54.00 was remitted by Narkin to the agency and Respondent forwarded it on to the company. Narkin was cancelled for failing to timely make the payment. Although Respondent maintains that it was the insuror's obligation to notify Narkin that his policy was cancelled, the records indicate that Narkin promptly paid Respondent and the amount was not timely remitted to the company which resulted in the cancellation. Respondent therefore did not timely remit the additional premium amount paid by Narkin to his policy was cancelled. Respondent utilizes a practice of binding coverages on applications the moment a completed application is filed. In each of the above referenced transactions, Respondent timely issued binder numbers and each applicant was bound the moment their application was completed and when the binder was issued. In each instance, Respondent promptly bound each of the above referred insureds. Respondent was unaware that Michelle and Richard Rock were providing kickbacks and other gratuities to automobile salesmen who are not insurance agents, customer representatives, or solicitors. When she did discover that this activity was ongoing, she took immediate steps to terminate this practice. As a result of that activity, she terminated her relationship with Michelle and Richard Rock.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine of $500.00 to be payable to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the entry of its Final Order for the violation derived in paragraph 50. In all other respects, Petitioner shall enter a Final Order dismissing the remaining allegations of the first Amended Administrative Complaint filed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, IN CASE NO. 93-7105 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 37-46 recommended order. Paragraph 56 adopted as modified, paragraphs 36 and 46 recommended order. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Respondents proposed findings are in the form of a review of the testimony and written argument on that testimony. As such, although considered, no specific rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (2) 120.57626.611
# 7
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. JEFFREY ALLAN AZIS, 80-001278 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001278 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey Allan Azis, is licensed by the Florida Department of Insurance as a General Lines Agent and did business as the American Automobile Insurance Agency, Inc., 603 NW 10th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, during the period of time delineated in the Amended Administrative Complaint. The Respondent transacted the sale of motor vehicle insurance and an automobile club membership to the persons identified in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Complaint. Each of the persons identified in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Amended Administrative Complaint was charged for membership in an automobile club by the Respondent or his employees. With respect to Counts I through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, the following findings are made: Count I James E. Rippy, Jr., purchased automobile insurance directly from the Respondent at the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc., Gainesville, Florida, on or about June 10, 1979. He requested the minimum coverage necessary to insure his vehicle to obtain a license tag. (Vol. 1, T-35) Mr. Rippy did not request motor club coverage and was not aware of what a motor club covered. (Vol. 1, T- 32) Sometime after purchasing insurance from the Respondent, Mr. Rippy discovered that his coverage included membership in a motor club. (Vol. 1, T- 33-34) At the Respondent's office, Mr. Rippy and his wife Norma, signed documents which included a membership application in Nation Motor Club with a membership fee of $25.00 [Respondent Exhibit 2(1)] and an application for coverage which included the following disclosure statement also signed by Mr. Rippy in addition to the application form: I understand the Nation Motor Club (NMC) membership applied for this date 6/30/79, through the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. is a separate item, that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge for this coverage is included with my down payment. Applicant (signed) Mr. Rippy was not pressured by the Respondent to sign these documents and could have taken additional time to read and ask questions if he had desired. (Vol. 1, T-49-50) write and do mathematics at a basic level. Count II On or about December 4, 1979, Deborah M. Zapp purchased automobile insurance from American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. Gainesville, Florida, from an employee of the Respondent's identified as "Judy". (Vol. 1, T-17) Ms. Zapp was unclear regarding the coverage she requested from Judy, but was sure that she would not have purchased motor club membership since she regarded it as an "extra". (Vol. 1, T-18-20) While at the agency on December 4, 1979, Ms. Zapp was asked to sign various papers which she read before signing. (Vol. a, T-20) These included a membership application in Nation Motor Club (Respondent's Exhibit 1) and an application form which contained the following disclosure statement: I understand the Nation Motor Club membership applied for this date 12/4/79, though the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. is a separate item, that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge for this coverage is included in my down payment. Applicant (signed) (Respondent's Exhibit 1) Ms. Zapp was not rushed while reading the documents presented to her for signing and could have taken as much time as she wanted to go over them. (Vol. 1, T-20) However, notwithstanding reading and signing the membership application and disclosure statement regarding the motor club, Ms. Zapp did not know she had purchased motor club coverage when she left the Respondent's office. (Vol. 1, T-21) Ms. Zapp is a graduate of Sante Fe Community College and attended a university for one year following her graduation. (Vol. 1, T-16) At the hearing on February 5, 1981, she appeared bright and fairly assertive. Count III In Count III, Petitioner alleges that the Respondent in the conduct of business under his license violated various provisions of the Insurance Code. The allegations of Count III requires an application of the facts found in Counts I and II to Sections 626.9521, 626.9541(11)(a), 626.9541(5)(a), 626.9541(15)(b), and 626.621(b), Florida Statutes. Count III is duplicated by Count VI and calls for legal conclusions which will be discussed in the conclusions of law section of this Recommended Order. Count IV The deposition of Charles D. Smith was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 10. Mr. Smith currently holds an insurance license and has a bachelor's degree. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 4) Mr. Smith purchased automobile insurance from the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. on or about May 1, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at Appendix) Mr. Smith thought he was purchasing only Personal Injury Protection (PIP). (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 4) In order to get an auto tag, Mr. Smith requested the minimum coverage. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 5) Like Mr. Rippy and Ms. Zapp, Mr. Smith signed an application for motor club membership and disclosure statement stating he understood he was purchasing motor club coverage at the time of his application for insurance. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 7) Mr. Smith intended to purchase the minimum amount of insurance at the lowest price but did not require of either the Respondent or his employees whether motor club coverage was included in the price quoted. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 8,9) Neither the Respondent nor his employees orally explained motor club coverage to Mr. Smith. At the bottom of Mr. Smith's insurance application the following disclosure statement was signed by him: I understand the interstate membership applied for this date 5/1/79, through the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. is a separate item that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge for this coverage is included in my down payment. Applicant (signed) (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at Appendix) Mr. Smith's decision to purchase from the Respondent was based solely on cost and not on any information provided by the Respondent or his employees. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 13). Count V The deposition of Richard B. Divins was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 11. Mr. Divins' testimony parallels the other witnesses in that he also signed an application for motor club membership and a disclosure statement acknowledging the purchase and price. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 11, 15, 16, 26) He purchased insurance and motor club coverage on July 13, 1979, from an employee of the Respondent at American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc., 603 NW 10th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 4,5) Mr. Divins thought he was purchasing only minimum liability insurance and was unaware that he had also purchased motor club coverage. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 7,8) Mr. Divins is a senior in the School of Architecture at the University of Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 4. Count VI In Count VI, Petitioner alleges that the Respondent in the conduct of business under his license violated various provisions of the Insurance Code. Count VI requires an application of the facts found in Counts IV and V to Sections 626.9521, 626.9541 (11)(a), 626.9541(5)(a), 626.9541(15)(b) and 626.621(b), Florida Statutes. Count VI duplicates Count III and calls for legal conclusions and will therefore, be discussed in the legal conclusion section of this Recommended Order. Assuming that the witnesses who testified at the final hearing were representative of the Respondent's customers, his business was generally directed at persons who desired minimum automobile insurance coverage at the lowest possible price. (Vol. 1, T-17 and 31, Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 7-8, Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 8,9) An economic incentive existed to sell motor club memberships among agents whose customers desired minimum coverage due to the high commission rates associated with motor club policies. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9, Vol. 1, T-94-95, 97) Mr. Andrew Beverly was qualified as an expert witness on insurance matters and testified on behalf of the Respondent. (Vol. 1, T-29) Mr. Beverly owns the Florida Insurance School, serves as a consultant for several hundred insurance agencies and is a member of the Advisory Committee on Insurance Education of the Florida Insurance Department. (Vol. 1, T-78-79) A study by Mr. Beverly completed in 1979 for the Professional Insurance Agents Association of Florida demonstrated that insurance agents have been contacted by claimants or attorneys for claimants for failure to provide coverage or what is known in the industry as "errors and omissions." (Vol. 1, T-81-82) The Respondent is the first agent that Mr. Beverly has ever encountered who had difficulties arising from selling too much coverage. (Vol. 1, T-82-83) Mr. Beverly's conclusion concerning the value of motor club coverage and supplemental coverage generally is shared by Dr. Ronald T. Anderson, a colleague of Mr. Beverly's on the national faculty of the Society of Certified Insurance Counselors and an Insurance Commissioner of Colorado. (Vol. 1, T-83-85) In particular regard to this case, Mr. Beverly examined the application and disclosure statement signed by the witnesses for the Petitioner and responded to questions from counsel as follows: Q. Now, these documents -- if you would just take a look through those, you'll see in Respondent's Exhibits 3 and 4, I believe -- Respondent's Exhibit 1, for example, where in boldface type, the applicant for the insurance signs a statement regarding Motor Club. is that a common practice in the industry? A. It's a practice that is becoming extremely common with the careful and appropriate insurance agents to have a thorough documentation of each coverage, accepted or rejected by an injured. Q. And why is that? A. Partially because of the high incidents (sic) of Errors and Omissions insurance, claims coming in against insurance agents, and then partly so that the client himself will be completely aware of what it is that he's throwing away when he rejects a coverage so he'll know he hasn't bought that. Q. Does the type of procedure meet the standards of the industry in Florida for fire and casualty agents? A. It exceeds them. Q. Okay. What else, in your opinion, could Mr. Azis do in this type of situation other than have him sign the statements and advise him as he has testified to. A. Mr. Woods, there's nothing an insurance agent could possibly do, in my opinion, beyond explaining the coverage to the insured and then having him sign in his own handwriting. I can't believe that there is anything else that he could do. He's being as cautious as he possibly can. Q. You're not aware of any other practices or procedures that might even be better than this? A. I can't think of anything that you could do that could add to this great amount of documentation of the insurers election of what they purchased. Q. In your experience, is it common for people who have bought insurance to come back and question coverages? A. Yes, sir, it happens all the time. I have more than a hundred insurance agencies under contract at this hour, and I am constantly receiving long distance calls from agents: What do you do with this? What's the answer to it? Q. So, that's why they require the need for this documentation? A. Yes, sir. (Vol. 1, T-85-87) Mr. Beverly's testimony was not rebutted by the Petitioner and is accepted as credible. Although Respondent's license as a general lines agent in Florida expired as of August 30, 1980, he retains eligibility to become licensed for a period of two years from the date of licensure. Section 626.221(3)(f), Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8)

Recommendation It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the licensee, Jeffrey Allan Azis, be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of June, 1981. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard P. Harris, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Yon, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (6) 626.221626.611626.621626.9521626.9541626.9641
# 8
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. ROOSEVELT KING JONES, 83-002151 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002151 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact By Emergency Suspension Order dated May 23, 1983, Petitioner suspended Respondent's Florida licenses as an Ordinary Life Insurance Agent, as an Ordinary Life, including Disability Insurance Agent, and as a General Lines Insurance Agent. At all times material to the charges in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent held those licenses above-noted. During the times of the hearing he was under the Emergency Suspension. The continuance of the hearing from August 2 to September 26, 1983, was requested by Respondent. Roosevelt King Jones is the owner of Heart of Florida Insurance Agency, Tampa, Florida, and was the sole owner of that agency at all times here relevant. All of the charges relate to automobile insurance policies. Respondent employed an underwriter, who does not require licensing by petitioner, to assist in the preparation of applications for insurance, quote rates to applicants, take deposits, give receipts for payments, issue cards to show insurance in effect for applicant, and make changes in policies as necessary; a secretary; receptionist; and an office manager. At times more than one underwriter was employed. Respondent testified that a former employee, Shirley Cook, was licensed and authorized to accept applications for the agency, but Cook was not in the employ of Respondent at the time the transactions here involved occurred. Respondent is also President of Heart of Florida Bank Supply and Heart of Florida Mining Company, and he is involved with the creation of the National Association of Federated Churches. Respondent spent two or three hours per day at the insurance agency where he signed the applications and handled complaints his secretary or underwriter were unable to resolve. Respondent was the only person authorized to accept the applications on behalf of the insurance company after Cook's employment had been terminated. The office procedure was for the receptionist/secretary to refer a person seeking insurance to the underwriter who would look up the rates for the coverage desired, advise the applicant, prepare the application form for the signature of the applicant, accept applicant's payment, or down payment if the premium was to be financed, and, if so, prepare the premium finance agreement. The underwriter would issue an insurance card to the applicant, give applicant a receipt for any moneys received, call the insurer for a Binder number if required by the insurer, and, when all of the documents were completed, put them on Respondent's desk, with the payment received, for Respondent's signature. Respondent was the only person authorized to draw checks on the agency's bank account, although he testified that while Shirley Cook was employed she had "banking authority." The quoted phrase was not explained, so it is unclear that Cook could write checks against this account. After Respondent bad checked the application file placed on his desk and signed the necessary documents, a check would bed cut to be signed by Respondent to forward to insurer with the application. Henry C. Daniels was notified by Heart of Florida Insurance Agency that his automobile insurance was up for renewal. He went to the agency on February 1, 1983, paid $335 cash for which he was issued a receipt (Exhibit 1). Daniels never received a policy. When an investigator from the Department of Insurance visited Daniels on May 8, 1983, the latter was unaware that he did not have insurance on his car. Daniels contacted Respondent to ask why he had not received a policy and Jones told him the company had not sent out the policies. Respondent, on May 10, 1983, executed an insurance Binder on Integrity Insurance Company effective February 1, 1983 (Exhibit 1). When Associated Insurance Brokers, who represented Integrity Insurance Company, was contacted in May, 1983, no record of an application from Daniels could be found in their files and they had not issued a policy. Before the August 2 hearing, Associated Insurance Company again checked their files and found an application for Daniels dated May 10, 1983 (Exhibit 2). A policy was issued to Daniels for one year effective May 16, 1983. Associated Insurance Company does not issue Hinders. When their agents call in an application, the agent is given a Binder number which is good only after the insurer gets the application and premium payment. Respondent corroborated Daniels' testimony that the latter visited him on May 10, 1983, with the news that the Department of Insurance had advised Daniels he was without automobile insurance, that he, Jones, checked the file and found his application had not been sent in, that he had Daniels execute another application dated May 10, 1983, which was sent in and the policy was issued. Respondent provided no explanation for the failure to submit Daniels' original application. Darlene Thompson went to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency for automobile insurance on July 30, 1982. She paid the premium of $125.30 by check dated July 30, 1982 (Exhibit 6) and was given a receipt (Exhibit 7). She was told her policy would be received In three to four weeks. When the policy did not arrive, she called the agency several times and was assured the policy was in the mail. She finally went down to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency and talked to Jones. She was shown an application dated September 27, 1982, on which she recognized her signature was forged (Exhibit 4) and was told she owed additional premiums. She demanded her policy be cancelled and her money refunded. By letter dated October 27, 1982 (Exhibit 8) Jones refunded $76.00 to Ms. Thompson as her prorata share of the premium for the period 7/31/82 to 12/31/82. Her check (Exhibit 6) was deposited by Heart of Florida Insurance Agency October 19, 1982. Heritage Insurance Company, on whose application form Thompson's signature had been forged, never issued a policy to Ms. Thompson (Exhibit 9). Following an inquiry by petitioner's branch office, Respondent remitted the additional $49.30 to Thomspon (Exhibit 65). Patrick Mulkins went to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency on September 23, 1982, and made a cash payment of $449 for automobile insurance to be paid in installments (Exhibit 12). The application was prepared on Allstate Insurance Company as a member of Florida Joint Underwriting Association. A couple of months later Mulkins was advised by the bank that was financing his car that he had no insurance. He went to Heart of Florida agency and was issued a Binder (Exhibit 15) dated January 4, 1983. When his bank again notified Mulkins he had no insurance he again advised the agency. At this time a forged application dated April 18, 1983, was prepared and forwarded to the insurance company with the proper payment, and the insurance policy was issued--some seven months after Mulkins initial application. By letter dated May 26, 1983 (Exhibit 23) Allstate Insurance Company notified Mulkins that his policy was void because the check accompanying the application drawn on the account of Heart of Florida group was dishonored. Respondent testified that when be learned his employee, Hunt, who prepared Mulkins' application, had not forwarded the $449 to the carrier, he referred the matter to the State's Attorney apparently claiming Hunt had absconded with the funds. No evidence was submitted that Mulkins received a policy or refund of the $449 paid by him to Respondent. Lisa Vallenga went to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency on December 15, 1982, to procure automobile insurance for her husband, Perry Vallenga. She paid $56 for the coverage, was issued an insurance identification card (Exhibit 17) with effective date of 12-15-82, and a receipt for the $56 paid (Exhibit 18). Vallenga never received a policy for the coverage his wife purchased, but was unaware he did not have coverage until he received his policy from Allstate Insurance Company in May, 1983, showing coverage from April 16, 1983, to April 16, 1984 (Exhibit 19). The application Mrs. Vallenga had signed December 15, 1982 (Exhibit 20) had been altered to show the date of 4-15-83 vice 12-15-82. By letter dated 5/18/83 (Exhibit 21) Allstate advised Vallenga the policy previously issued to him (Exhibit 19) was declared void because the Heart of Florida check in the amount of $56 which accompanied the application was stamped Check Returned Uncollected Funds." In explanation of the Vallenga transaction, Respondent only stated the policy shows Vallenga was issued PIP coverage and the signature on the application was not that of Respondent. No evidence was submitted that Vallenga received the insurance for which he paid Respondent or a refund of the premium. Mary Coy went to Hear of Florida Insurance Agency in April, 1982, to purchase automobile insurance. She completed an application, paid $66 and executed a premium finance agreement whereby she agreed to make monthly payments to Insurance Services, Inc., to cover the balance of tee premium of $155 plus interest (Exhibit 30). The application was forwarded to Florida International Indemnity Company, who issued a policy (Exhibit 26) covering the period 5/22/82 to 5/22/83. By check dated 5-25-82 Insurance Services, Inc., sent $312 to Heart of Florida Insurance (Exhibit 29) to cover the premiums of $155 for Coy's policy. Coy made the monthly payments to Insurance Services, Inc., in compliance with her agreement to do so (Exhibit 27). By Notice of Cancellation dated 10-28- 82, Florida International Indemnity notified Ms. Coy that the policy was cancelled effective 11-9-82 for nonpayment of premium (Exhibit 28). Florida International Indemnity's witness claimed his company was never notified the policy was financed, and that when policies are financed the carrier is usually paid by the premium finance company. Respondent testified that once his company submits the application for a premium finance policy they have no further input in the process unless there is a change to the policy. He presented no reason for not forwarding the $155 premium received from Insurance Services, Inc., for Coy's policy, but contended the carrier had no right to cancel Coy's policy because Respondent was the representative of the carrier and their dispute should have been with him rather than the policyholder. Eloise Philyor went to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency on February 2, 1983, to purchase automobile insurance. She made a down payment of $102 (Exhibit 32), executed a premium finance agreement with Insurance Services, Inc. (Exhibit 34) and was issued an insurance Binder effective 2-3-83 (Exhibit 33) on Integrity Insurance Company by Respondent. Integrity Insurance Company received the Philyor application dated 5/10/83 on May 16, 1983. Before the application was processed Capital Premium Plan, Inc., on whom Respondent had written the draft for the financed premium payment cancelled the draft and Integrity did not issue a policy. In the interim Ms. Philyor was making payments to Insurance Services, Inc. When the latter realized no policy had been issued, they returned Ms. Philyor's payment by check dated May 18, 1983 (Exhibit 38). A copy of the application that should have been signed by Philyor on February 3, 1983, was not produced. What was produced was a copy of a combination car policy application dated 5-10-83 written on Associated Insurance Brokers, Inc., who represents Integrity Insurance Company. What is clear from the evidence is that on February 3, 1983, Ms. Philyor applied for insurance, executed a premium finance agreement, paid $102 to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency as the difference in the cost of the premium over that part of the premium financed, commenced payment to the premium finance company, but was not issued the insurance policy for which she had paid. Freddy McGruder went to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency on January 3, 1983, to purchase automobile insurance. He paid $59 to the agency (Exhibit 41), was issued an automobile insurance identification card (Exhibit 42), executed a premium finance agreement dated 1-3-83 (Exhibit 43) which was later changed to 3-3-83 without the knowledge or consent of McGruder, and signed an application for an insurance policy to commence 1-4-83 on Allied Fidelity Insurance Company. This application was signed by Respondent as brokering agent. After about two months had passed, McGruder received a premium payment book, but no policy. When he went to make his second payment to the finance company, he was advised he might not have been issued a policy and it was suggested he contact the Department of Insurance. McGruder called the Heart of Florida Insurance Agency and requested his policy be cancelled. McGruder has not received the policy. A combination car policy application form dated 5-9-83 (Exhibit 48) has McGruder's name in the applicant's signature spaces. This is not McGruder's signature and no portion of the premium he paid has been returned to him. Respondent could give no explanation for failure of the insurer to issue a policy to McGruder. The automobile insurance identification card given to McGruder has the insurer's name, Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, typed thereon. Allied Fidelity issues such a card with its name printed there on only after it receives and approves the application. It then sends the card to the agent for delivery to the insured. Agents of Allied Fidelity are not authorized to issue identification cards until the policy is accepted. Andrew Archible went to Heart of Florida Insurance Agency on January 5, 1983, to purchase automobile insurance. He paid $51 down (Exhibit 50), executed a premium finance agreement dated 1-5-83 to finance the balance of the premium (Exhibit 53) and was given an automobile identification card dated 1-5- 83 (Exhibit 51)(on the same card form used for McGruder) The original application was subsequently offered into evidence as Exhibit 59. This exhibit clearly shows the dates opposite McGruder's signature on the back of the document to have been altered, as the dates 3-3-83 (in-three places) have been written over white-out. The gold copy of the premium finance agreement (Exhibit 55) also clearly shows the dates to have been altered. Exhibit 52 appears to be a facsimile copy of Exhibit 55. Archible made two payments on the Premium finance agreement, but has not received a copy of his policy. Casualty Underwriters, to whom Archible's and McGruder's applications should have been sent (as agent for Allied Fidelity Insurance Company) had no record of these applications. Their date stamp of March V, 1983, is contained on the original applications of Philyor, McGruder, and Achible. The procedure in effect at the time the applications of Philyor, McGruder, and Archible were presented was for the agent (Respondent) to write a draft to the insurance company on Insurance Services, Inc., and to send this draft with the application. When the draft is presented to the bank, the bank calls Insurance Services, Inc., to clear the draft before honoring it. Insurance Services never received the call from the bank to clear a draft for the McGruder or Archible policies. Respondent offered into evidence a draft dated 1-3-83 payable to Autosure Underwriters in the amount of $136 for applicant Freddy McGruder (Exhibit 57). This draft was marked "VOID" and there was no indication it had ever been presented for payment. A check drawn on Heart of Florida group dated 3-3-83 payable to Autosure Underwriters, Inc., in the amount of $50.15, signed by Respondent for the policy of Freddy McGruder, was admitted as Exhibit 60. This check was also marked "VOID" and showed no evidence that it had ever been presented for payment. Shirley Cook was office manager for Respondent from August, 1981, until June, 1982. Cook was a licensed 220 agent. She and Respondent had disagreements which led to her departure. Cook complained to the Department of Insurance about office practices resulting in clients not receiving policies and about bad checks being written by Heart of Florida group. After her departure Respondent forwarded to Petitioner documents tending to show Richard Heaney, another former employee of Respondent and son of Cook, had filed a fraudulent insurance claim (Exhibit 63) and suggested the claim be forwarded to the fraud division. As a result of Cook's complaints and consumer complaints regarding Heart of Florida Insurance Agency, Petitioner commenced an investigation In August, 1982. Bobbie Graham started working for Respondent in September, 1982, as an underwriter. When she began getting threatening calls from clients about not receiving policies, she called the local office of Petitioner to ascertain what problems she might be subject to as a result of her work for Respondent. She was contacted by the investigator and she provided names of individuals, including those named in the charges involved in this Administrative Complaint, who had not received policies they had paid for. When called as a witness by Respondent; Graham denied she had ever withheld policies, wrongfully taken or withheld any money, failed to deliver all applications to Respondent with all moneys received, ever took policies or files from the office, or ever changed the date on any application or other form without being directed to do so by Respondent. Graham further testified she made timely entries in a "binder" book or ledger regarding policies. Respondent was unaware there was such a ledger book in the agency and if there was one, testified it was not authorized by him, but was personal to the underwriter. The investigator in charge of the investigation of Respondent was also called as a witness by Respondent. This agent met with Respondent in August, 1982, and told Jones that he was investigating complaints received about Heart of Florida Insurance Agency. Respondent's testimony, that he first became there was any problem with the Archible policy was when he saw the charge in the Administrative Complaint, is not credible. Respondent also testified that after Ms. Cook left he was the only one in the agency authorized to accept applications and all application files were put on his desk for his signature. A review of the applications admitted into evidence in these proceedings show only three were signed by Respondent, three were signed by employee Leamon Hunt, and someone in the agency wrote Respondent's name on the other two. One of the three Binders admitted into evidence was signed on behalf of the agency by Delores Janacek, the secretary; the other two were signed by Respondent. These facts, plus the limited time Respondent spent at the office, lend credibility to Respondent's testimony that he let the people he hired run the business.

Florida Laws (4) 626.561626.611626.621626.9541
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs RAPHAEL ALMENDRAL, 95-000317 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 26, 1995 Number: 95-000317 Latest Update: Jun. 07, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed in this state by the Petitioner as an insurance agent. Respondent was licensed, pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code (Chapter 626, Florida Statutes) as a general lines agent, a health insurance agent, and a residential property and casualty joint underwriting association representative. In February 1990, Maria del Carmen Comas, who was subsequently known as Maria del Carmen Diaz (hereinafter referred to as Maria Diaz), was licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent. By Final Order entered September 20, 1994, the licensure of Ms. Diaz was revoked by the Petitioner. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent and Ms. Diaz maintained a close personal and professional relationship. On October 12, 1990, an entity known as The First Assurance, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as FIRST) was incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the president and sole officer of FIRST, which is a Florida incorporated general lines insurance agency. FIRST operated out of offices located at 10680 Coral Way, Miami, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the Coral Way location) until June 1994, when Respondent moved the office of FIRST to 8780 Sunset Drive, Miami, Florida. On September 21, 1993, an entity known as The First Assurance of Miami, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as FIRST OF MIAMI) was incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida by Respondent and Maria Diaz. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the president and sole officer of FIRST OF MIAMI, a Florida incorporated general lines insurance agency doing business at 8780 Sunset Drive, Miami, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the Sunset Drive location). Respondent and Ms. Diaz were equal owners of FIRST OF MIAMI until that corporation ceased its operation in February 1995. On August 26, 1994, an entity known as Marlin Insurance Agency, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as MARLIN) was incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent was the sole incorporator of MARLIN. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the president and sole officer of MARLIN, a Florida incorporated general lines insurance agency doing business at the Sunset Drive location where Respondent operated FIRST and FIRST OF MIAMI. MARLIN was originally incorporated for the purpose of purchasing the business of Rodal Insurance Agency in Hialeah, Florida. After the purchase of Rodal was rescinded by court order, MARLIN remained dormant until February 1995, when MARLIN began operating as a general lines insurance agency at the Sunset Drive location. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the supervising agent of MARLIN. As long as FIRST and FIRST OF MIAMI maintained separate offices, Respondent managed the day to day affairs of FIRST and Ms. Diaz managed the day to day affairs of FIRST OF MIAMI. After FIRST moved its offices into those of FIRST OF MIAMI, the separation of management became less distinct. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Carlos Gonzalez was an employee of FIRST or of FIRST OF MIAMI. Mr. Gonzalez was hired and trained by Respondent and worked under his direct supervision. At no time pertinent to this proceeding did Mr. Gonzalez hold any license or appointment under the Florida Insurance Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Alvaro Alcivar was an employee of FIRST OF MIAMI or of MARLIN. Mr. Alcivar acted under the supervision of either Maria Diaz or of Respondent. At no time pertinent to this proceeding did Mr. Alcivar hold any license or appointment under the Florida Insurance Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had sole signatory authority of the FIRST's account number Number33080870-10 (the FIRST expense account) and of FIRST's account Number0303043975-10, both maintained at Ready State Bank in Hialeah, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had joint signatory authority with Maria Diaz of the FIRST's account number Number33095150-10 maintained at Ready State Bank in Hialeah, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had joint signatory authority with Maria Diaz of the FIRST OF MIAMI's account number Number33095630-10 maintained at Ready State Bank in Hialeah, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had sole signatory authority of the FIRST OF MIAMI's account number Number0303116492-10 maintained at Ready State Bank in Hialeah, Florida. All premiums, return premiums and other funds belonging to insureds, insurers, and others received in transactions under his license were and remain trust funds held by Respondent in a fiduciary capacity. Respondent obtained a power of attorney from his customers as a routine business practice. Respondent has repeatedly issued checks in payment of fiduciary funds that have subsequently been dishonored by the bank because the account on which the checks were drawn had insufficient funds. ARCAMONTE TRANSACTION (COUNT ONE) On or about July 14, 1993, Susan Arcamonte of Miami, Florida, purchased a new car. Susan Arcamonte needed insurance for this automobile and discussed that need with Carlos Gonzalez, who was employed by FIRST. As a result of her discussions with Mr. Gonzalez, Ms. Arcamonte agreed to purchase a policy of insurance that would be issued by Eagle Insurance Company. The annual premium quoted by Mr. Gonzalez for this policy totaled $1,618.00. Mr. Gonzalez advised her that there would be additional charges if the premium was paid by a premium finance company. Because she did not have the funds to pay the lump sum annual premium and did not want to finance the premium, she had her parents, Edmond and Nancy Arcamonte, pay the annual premium. As instructed by Carlos Gonzalez, this check was in the amount of $1,618.00 and was made payable to "The First Assurance, Inc." This check was in full payment of the annual premium for the automobile insurance policy that was to be issued by Eagle Insurance Company. After receiving the check from Mr. and Mrs. Arcamonte, Mr. Gonzalez issued to Susan Arcamonte an insurance card containing the name "The First Assurance, Inc." and binder numbers 12873 and 931374 written across the top. Mr. Gonzalez represented to Ms. Arcamonte that this was a binder of the coverage they had discussed. Mr. Gonzalez thereafter delivered the check and the completed application for insurance to FIRST. Respondent reviewed the application for insurance and signed the application. The Arcamontes' check was thereafter deposited by Respondent into the FIRST expense account at Ready State Bank, Hialeah, Florida. In July 1993, Respondent or some person in his employ at FIRST and acting with his knowledge under his direct supervision and control, affixed the signature of Susan Arcamonte to a Century Premium Insurance Finance Co., Inc. (Century PFC) premium finance agreement and, in the space provided for her address, filled in the office address of FIRST. Ms. Arcamonte's signature was affixed to this agreement without her knowledge or consent. Respondent personally signed the premium fiance agreement that was sent to Century PFC. Because the address of FIRST was inserted on the premium finance agreement, Ms. Arcamonte did not receive payment coupons, cancellation notices, and other correspondence from Century PFC. Consequently, the existence of the premium finance agreement was concealed from Ms. Arcamonte. The original application for insurance signed by Susan Arcamonte contained a power of attorney purporting to grant Respondent the authority to sign Ms. Arcamonte's name to "applications or similar papers including premium finance contracts". There was no disclosure that the signature on the premium finance agreement was not that of Ms. Arcamonte or that FIRST was executing her signature pursuant to a power of attorney. Respondent contends that the premium finance agreement was executed pursuant to the power of attorney because the check from Mr. and Mrs. Arcamonte was inadvertently separated from her application for payment and erroneously deposited into the FIRST expense account. This contention lacks credibility and is rejected. The fact that Respondent deposited the check in his expense account, that the paperwork for the premium finance agreement contained the FIRST address, that Respondent took no action to rectify this alleged error even after receiving correspondence from the finance company, and that Ms. Arcamonte's signature was forged on the application belie Respondent's contention that this was an innocent mistake. On or about September 20, 1993, the Eagle Insurance policy that Ms. Arcamonte purchased was cancelled for nonpayment of premiums because Respondent, or persons acting under his direct supervision and control, failed to make a regular installment payment on the premium finance agreement. Ms. Arcamonte never received the 10 Day Notice of Cancellation Notices that Century PFC mailed to FIRST's address. It was not until October 1993 when she received a Notice of Cancellation from Eagle mailed September 27, 1993, that she learned that her policy had been cancelled effective September 20, 1993. As a result of Respondent's actions and those of Carlos Gonzalez, Susan Arcamonte failed to timely receive automobile insurance, suffered a finance charge for automobile insurance without her knowledge or consent, had her automobile insurance cancelled, and incurred higher premium charges for subsequent coverage because of a gap in her coverage. Following a criminal complaint filed against him by Ms. Arcamonte, Respondent was arrested and placed in a pretrial intervention program. It was only after this action was taken that Respondent made restitution to the Arcamontes for the $1,618.00 premium they paid. At no time during the transaction, did the Arcamontes deal with anyone from the FIRST other than Carlos Gonzalez. Mr. Gonzalez held himself out to be and acted as an insurance agent during this transaction. Specifically, Carlos Gonzalez did the following: Was introduced to the Arcamontes as an insurance agent and did not correct that misidentification. Interviewed Susan Arcamonte to gather the information necessary to determine level of coverage and to quote a premium for that coverage. Discussed coverage options and requirements including whether Ms. Arcamonte needed personal injury protection. Discussed deductible options and answered general questions about insurance. Selected an insurer for Ms. Arcamonte, quoted a premium for that coverage, and made representations as to the quality of the insurer. Offered to bind insurance coverage for the automobile Ms. Arcamonte was in the process of purchasing and sent a binder to her at the automobile dealership via fax. Personally completed the insurance application and related paperwork. Personally completed an insurance identification card, including binder numbers, as proof of insurance, and presented the identification card to Ms. Arcamonte. Presented Ms. Arcamonte with a business card that identified himself as a representative of FIRST. Respondent knew or should have known of the acts of Carlos Gonzalez. Respondent received from Mr. Gonzalez the application for insurance he had completed for Ms. Arcamonte so that all Respondent had to do was sign it. JOHNSON - MOREL TRANSACTION (COUNT TWO) On May 31, 1993, Linda E. Johnson and her husband, Miguel Morel, visited the residence of Wilfreido Cordeiro, an employee of FIRST who was acting on behalf of FIRST. As a result of their conversation with Mr. Cordeiro about their insurance needs, Mr. Morel and Ms. Johnson completed an application for automobile insurance from Armor Insurance Company (Armor) to be issued through FIRST. Mr. Cordeiro, who was not licensed by Petitioner for any purpose, held himself out to be an agent. He represented to these consumers that coverage with Armor was bound and gave them an identification card with the FIRST name on it that purported to be a binder of coverage. The FIRST insurance identification card was issued without authorization from Armor and in violation of the established policies and practices of Armor. Because Mr. Cordeiro was unlicensed, Respondent acted as the agent of record for this transaction. On or about May 31, 1993, Mrs. Linda E. Johnson tendered to Respondent, or persons acting with his knowledge and under his direct supervision and control, a check in the amount of $500.00 payable to FIRST as a premium down payment for the automobile insurance from Armor. On or about June 4, 1993, Respondent, or persons acting with his knowledge and under his direct supervision and control, deposited Mrs. Johnson's check in the FIRST expense account at the Ready State Bank. On or about June 29, 1993, Mrs. Johnson was contacted by her bank and informed that she had no automobile insurance. She immediately contacted Respondent who provided the bank with a certificate of insurance indicating coverage was placed with American Skyhawk Insurance (American Skyhawk) effective June 1, 1993. No authority to bind coverage had been extended by American Skyhawk prior to the submission of the application two and one-half months after the coverage effective date indicated on the certificate of insurance. On or about August 18, 1993, Respondent, or persons acting with his knowledge and under his direct supervision and control, completed a Century PFC and affixed thereto the signature of Mr. Morel without his knowledge or consent. This agreement reflected that Mr. Morel had paid the sum of $400.00 as a downpayment, despite the fact that Mrs. Johnson's check, in the amount of $500.00, had been received and deposited in the Respondent expense account. As a result of Respondent's action, Mrs. Johnson and Mr. Morel failed to timely receive automobile coverage; suffered a finance charge for automobile insurance without their knowledge or consent; and suffered the loss in at least the amount of $100.00. At no time during the transaction with FIRST did Mr. Morel or Mrs. Johnson knowingly execute a power of attorney. HWANG TRANSACTION (COUNT THREE) On August 29, 1992, Mr. Show Ming Hwang of Miami, Florida, purchased via telephone a policy of insurance for a car he was purchasing. Mr. Hwang called from a car dealership and spoke to an employee of FIRST who was acting under Respondent's direct supervision. Mr. Hwang tendered to FIRST a check in the amount of $869.00 as the full premium for this insurance, which was to be issued by an insurer named Security National. Respondent was the agen t of record for this transaction. Security National issued policy NumberSN00127048 providing insurance coverage for Mr. Hwang effective August 29, 1992. On December 22, 1992, Mr. Hwang asked FIRST to cancel his policy with Security National because he had moved and had secured other coverage. On January 15, 1993, Security National cancelled insurance policy NumberSN00127048 in response to Mr. Hwang's request. On January 26, 1993, Security National sent to Respondent its check Number216878 in the sum of $366.35 payable to Mr. Hwang. This check was a refund of the unearned premium for the cancelled policy. In addition to the unearned premium, Mr. Hwang was also entitled to a refund of the unearned commission from FIRST. The amount of the unearned commission was $64.55 and should have been paid by FIRST directly to Mr. Hwang. On February 8, 1993, Respondent, or an employee of FIRST acting under his direct supervision, endorsed the check from Security National in the name of Mr. Hwang and deposited that check in the FIRST expense account at Ready State Bank. Mr. Hwang was unaware that his name had been endorsed on the check and had not authorized such endorsement. This endorsement was not pursuant to a validly executed power of attorney. Mr. Hwang made repeated attempts to obtain the refunds to which he was entitled. Finally, he secured the intervention of the Petitioner. After that intervention, Respondent issued a FIRST check on December 17, 1993, payable to Mr. Hwang in the amount of $431.00 as payment of the refunds. Less than a month later, this check was dishonored because there were insufficient funds in the account on which it was drawn. After further intervention by the Petitioner, Respondent issued a cashier's check in the amount of $431.00 payable to Mr. Hwang. This check, dated March 22, 1994, was thereafter received and deposited by Mr. Hwang. Respondent failed to return the refunds to Mr. Hwang in the applicable regular course of business and converted the refund from Security National to his own use until the intervention of the Petitioner. As a result of Respondent's actions, Mr. Hwang failed to timely receive these refunds. MARIA DIAZ (COUNT FOUR) On September 20, 1994, the Petitioner entered a Final Order that revoked all licenses that it had previously issued to Maria Diaz (who was at that time known as Maria del Carmen Comas). In September 1994, Ms. Diaz, accompanied by Respondent, visited the Petitioner's office in Miami where she was told that the revocation of her license was forthcoming. After that information was given to them, Respondent and Ms. Diaz knew or should have known that the revocation of her licensure was imminent. There was insufficient evidence to establish when Ms. Diaz received a written copy of the order revoking her licensure. Ms. Diaz and Respondent assert that they did not know about the revocation until the end of January, 1995. The order entered in September 1994 prohibited Ms. Diaz from engaging in or attempting to engage in any transaction or business for which a license or appointment is required under the Insurance Code or directly owning, controlling, or being employed in any manner by any insurance agent or agency. After Respondent and Ms. Diaz had been told that the revocation of her licensure was imminent, Ms. Diaz engaged in transactions requiring licensure and acting in violation of the order revoking her licensure. This activity included applying to Seminole Insurance Company (Seminole) in December 1994 seeking appointment as a general lines insurance agent by Seminole, the submission of a large number of applications to Seminole, and the mishandling of an insurance transaction with Johannah Rexach in July and August 1995. Ms. Diaz began a business as a travel agent at the MARLIN office and continued to be present in the MARLIN office long after she had received written notice of the revocation of her licensure by Petitioner. At least on one occasion in May 1995, Ms. Diaz answered the MARLIN telephone by saying "insurance". Ms. Diaz continued to greet her former insurance customers and mailed out renewal notices after both she and Respondent had actual knowledge of the revocation of her licensure. Respondent knew or should have known of Ms. Diaz's activities. While there was insufficient evidence to establish that Ms. Diaz was formally on MARLIN's payroll, the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent permitted Ms. Diaz to share office space while she attempted to develop her travel agency and that, in return, Ms. Diaz helped out at the MARLIN office. Respondent employed the services of Ms. Diaz and he placed her in a position to engage in transactions that required licensure after he knew or should have known that her licensure had been revoked. MARTINEZ TRANSACTION (COUNT FIVE) On April 23, 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Santiago Martinez of Miami, Florida, completed applications for automobile insurance from Fortune Insurance Company (Fortune) and Aries Insurance Company (Aries). The record is unclear as to whether the insurance was to be issued through FIRST or FIRST OF MIAMI. The individual with whom Mr. and Mrs. Martinez dealt was Alvaro Alcivar. This was during the time that FIRST and FIRST OF MIAMI maintained separate offices and it was before Respondent and Ms. Diaz had been told that her licensure was about to be revoked. The greater weight of the evidence established that Mr. Alcivar was, at that time, an employee of FIRST OF MIAMI and that he was working under the supervision of Maria Diaz. Succinctly stated, premiums paid by Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were deposited into a FIRST OF MIAMI bank account that showed First Assurance of Miami, Inc., d/b/a Complete Insurance as the owner of the account. The premium payment was not forwarded to the insurer. Because of this failure, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez did not receive insurance coverage for which they had paid. While Petitioner established that Mr. Alcivar and whoever was his supervising agent mishandled this transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was aware of this transaction until Mr. and Mrs. Martinez demanded a refund of the premium they had paid. At that juncture, he attempted to resolve the problem. Consequently, it is found that the evidence failed to establish that Respondent was responsible for these violations of the Florida Insurance Code. ZAFRANI TRANSACTION (COUNT SIX) In July 1992, Mr. Issac Zafrani and his son, Ramon, of Miami, Florida, purchased automobile insurance with Oak Casualty Insurance Company (Oak) after dealing with Carlos Gonzalez. The various documents associated with this transaction refer to the agency issuing this policy as FIRST, FIRST OF MIAMI, or Rodal Insurance Agency. Mr. Gonzalez was an employee of FIRST and operated under the direct supervision of Respondent. The entire transaction was completed by Mr. Gonzalez at the automobile dealership where Mr. Zafrani was purchasing an automobile. All subsequent dealings by Mr. Zafrani was through Mr. Gonzalez by telephone or at locations other than the offices of FIRST. Mr. Gonzalez held himself out to be and acted as an insurance agent during this transaction. Specifically, Carlos Gonzalez did the following: Was introduced to the Zafranis as an insurance agent and did not correct that misidentification. Personally completed the insurance application and related paperwork. Discussed coverage and deductible options. Selected an insurer for the Zafranis, deter- mined the premium for the coverage, and accepted the payment for the premium. Personally completed an insurance identifi- cation card, including what purported to be proof of insurance, and presented the identification card to the Zafranis. Presented the Zafranis with a business card that identified himself as a representative of FIRST. The Zafranis paid for the renewal of their policy through FIRST each year on an annual basis. On September 1, 1994, the Zafranis tendered to Mr. Gonzalez their check in the amount of $1,748.00 as payment in full of the annual premium for the policy year 1994-95. This check was made payable to FIRST OF MIAMI and was deposited in the FIRST Expense Account at Ready State Bank ( Number0303080870- 10). Respondent was the only person with authority to sign on this account. On September 30, 1994, an employee of FIRST completed a premium finance agreement that purported to finance the Zafranis' premium for the Oak Casualty insurance and forged Issac Zafrani's signature to that agreement. This false document reflected that the total premium was $1,748.00 and that the Zafranis had made a downpayment of $524.00 and had an unpaid balance of $1,224.00. This action was taken without Issac Zafrani's knowledge or consent. Mr. Zafrani had not executed a power of attorney to authorize these acts. Respondent knew or should have known of this act. On September 30, 1994, Respondent, or an employee of FIRST working under his direct supervision, issued a premium finance draft from Artic to Oak in the amount of $1,485.80 based upon this false application. A few weeks after they paid the renewal premium, the Zafranis complained to Mr. Gonzalez that they had not received their renewal policy from Oak. Mr. Gonzalez advised them that the company had cancelled their policy in error. He promised that he would investigate the matter and take corrective action. On December 23, 1994, Respondent, or an employee of FIRST acting under his direct supervision, submitted an automobile insurance application to Seminole Insurance Company indicating that coverage had been bound for Issac Zafrani. On December 23, 1994, Respondent issued FIRST check Number1196 payable to Seminole in the amount of $1,681.65 in payment of the policy he was attempting to secure on behalf of the Zafranis. On or about December 27 1994, Mr. Gonzalez issued to the Zafranis a FIRST card with what purported to be a binder number from Seminole Insurance Company. No authorization to bind that coverage had been issued by Seminole. On January 3, 1995, Artic issued a cancellation notice on the Oak Casualty policy because of missed payments on the premium finance agreement. The Zafranis did not know about this premium finance agreement and Respondent failed to make the payments. In January 1995, FIRST check Number1196 that had been tendered to Seminole was dishonored by Respondent's bank because the account on which the check was drawn had insufficient funds to pay the check. As a result of these actions, the Zafranis failed to timely receive automobile insurance for which they had fully paid and suffered the loss of the sum of $1,748.00. Respondent knew or should have known of these actions. DEBT TO WORLD PREMIUM FINANCE COMPANY (COUNT SEVEN) On August 29, 1995, a final judgment was entered in a Dade County Court action brought by World Premium Finance Co., Inc. (World PFC) against FIRST OF MIAMI and the Respondent, individually, as defendants. This final judgment awarded damages against FIRST OF MIAMI in the sum of $7,203.03 and awarded damages against both defendants in the sum of $15,000 plus attorney's fees of $1,000. The World PFC complaint was based on worthless checks FIRST OF MIAMI and Respondent had issued in connection with premium finance contracts and included debts for unpaid downpayments and unearned commissions on premium finance contracts that had been cancelled. Respondent's assertion that these debts were the responsibility of Maria Diaz is rejected. While Ms. Diaz initially made the arrangements for FIRST OF MIAMI to finance through World PFC and was the agent responsible for some of these transactions, it is clear that Respondent was the agent for many of these underlying transactions. Further, some, if not all, of these worthless checks were drawn on accounts for which Respondent was the only person with signatory authority. The downpayments and unearned commissions constitute fiduciary funds for which Respondent is responsible. Respondent has failed to pay these fiduciary funds to World PFC after repeated demands for payments. GUTIERREZ TRANSACTION (COUNT EIGHT) On October 11, 1993, Ms. Madalina N. Gutierrez of Miami, Florida, completed an application for automobile insurance. Aries Insurance Company was the insurer for this policy and FIRST was the insurance agency. The premium for this policy was to have been $574.00. The person with whom Ms. Gutierrez dealt with was Carmen "Mela" Babacarris, an employee of FIRST OF MIAMI. Ms. Babacarris has never held any license or appointment under the Florida Insurance Code. Ms. Gutierrez paid to FIRST the sum of $287.00 on October 11, 1993, when she applied for this insurance. On that date, Ms. Babacarris gave to Ms. Gutierrez an insurance card that purported to bind coverage with Aries. She returned on November 1, 1993, and paid to FIRST the balance owed of $287.00. Both of these payments were tendered to and received by Ms. Babacarris on behalf of FIRST. The sums paid by Ms. Gutierrez for this insurance coverage were not remitted by the FIRST to Aries or to any other insurer. As a consequence, Ms. Gutierrez did not receive the insurance coverage for which she had paid. Ms. Gutierrez was unable to obtain a refund of the sums that she had paid to FIRST. Respondent knew or should have known of the acts pertaining to this transaction by Ms. Babacarris since the transaction was processed through the FIRST, the agency for which Respondent was the sole supervising agent. RICO TRANSACTION (COUNT NINE) On June 27, 1994, Mr. Rafael Rico of Miami, Florida, completed an application for automobile insurance from Aries Insurance. It is unclear from the documents whether this insurance was to be issued through FIRST or through FIRST OF MIAMI. This confusion in the record is attributable to the fact that the persons involved in this transaction and associated with these two agencies made little distinction between the two agencies. This application was completed at the automobile dealership from which Mr. Rico was purchasing the vehicle to be insured. The individual with whom Mr. Rico dealt was Alvaro Alcivar. At all times during the transaction with Mr. Rico, Mr. Alcivar held himself out to be and acted as an insurance agent. Specifically, Mr. Alcivar did the following: Personally completed the insurance application and related paperwork. Discussed coverage and deductible options and answered Mr. Rico's general insurance questions. Selected the insurer for Mr. Rico's coverage. Personally completed an insurance identification card, including a policy number, as proof of insurance and provided it to Mr. Rico. Indicated that coverage was bound immediately and gave to him a card that purported to be a Florida Automobile Insurance Identification Card indicating that Mr. Rico had insurance coverage through Aries. Developed the premium and downpayment. Accepted payment from Mr. Rico. Presented Mr. Rico with a business card identifying himself as a representative of FIRST OF MIAMI. Mr. Alcivar was the only representative of the FIRST or of the FIRST OF MIAMI with whom Mr. Rico dealt. On June 27, 1994, Mr. Rico tendered to Mr. Alcivar the sum of $947.00 as payment for this insurance with the sum of $500.00 being paid in cash and the balance being charged to Mr. Rico's Mastercard. This Mastercard entry was processed through the account of the FIRST, not that of the FIRST OF MIAMI. Despite the payments by Mr. Rico, the premium to which Aries was entitled for this coverage was not remitted by FIRST or by FIRST OF MIAMI. As a result of this failure, Aries cancelled the binder that had been issued to Mr. Rico. Mr. Rico was damaged as a result of this failure. He lost the premium he had paid and the lending institution that financed his vehicle placed insurance on the vehicle at a higher premium than that charged by Aries. Based on the relationship between FIRST and FIRST OF MIAMI, the relationship between Respondent and Ms. Diaz, the repeated references to FIRST in the documentation of this transaction, and the deposit of at least $447.00 in the Mastercard account of FIRST, it is concluded that Respondent knew or should have known about this transaction. CHERI TRANSACTION (COUNT ELEVEN) On November 19, 1994, Mr. Dieuseul Cheri of Miami, Florida, completed an application for automobile insurance that was to be issued by Seminole Insurance Company as the insurer. The application for insurance reflects that Maria Diaz was the agent for this transaction, but the name of the agency is FIRST, not FIRST OF MIAMI. Likewise, the premium finance agreement pertaining to this transaction reflects that FIRST is the producing agency. The entire transaction was handled by Alvaro Alcivar at an automobile dealership where Mr. Cheri was purchasing a vehicle and occurred after Ms. Diaz had been told in September that the revocation of her licensure was imminent. Mr. Cheri gave to Mr. Alcivar the sum of $205.00 in cash as the downpayment for the premium for this Seminole policy. At all times Mr. Alcivar held himself out to be and acted as an insurance agent. Specifically, Mr. Alcivar: Was introduced to Mr. Cheri as an insurance agent and did not correct that misidentification. Personally completed the insurance application and related paperwork. Discussed coverage and deductible options and answered Mr. Cheri's general insurance questions. Selected the insurer for Mr. Cheri's coverage. Personally completed an insurance identification card, including a policy number, as proof of insurance and provided it to Mr. Cheri. Completed a named driver exclusion agreement for Mr. Cheri's policy, which had a significant effect on the coverage provided under the policy, and completed a vehicle inspection. Developed the premium and downpayment. Accepted payment from Mr. Cheri on behalf of FIRST OF MIAMI. Presented Mr. Cheri with a business card identifying himself as a representative of FIRST OF MIAMI. Mr. Alcivar was the only representative of the FIRST or of the FIRST OF MIAMI with whom Mr. Cheri dealt. FIRST OF MIAMI failed to bind coverage with Seminole on Mr. Cheri's behalf until November 22, 1994. As a result, there was a lapse in Mr. Cheri's coverage from November 17 until November 22, 1994. On November 19, 1994, FIRST OF MIAMI submitted a premium finance agreement on Mr. Cheri's insurance policy to World Premium Finance Co., Inc. (World PFC). The World PFC contract as well as the application were signed by Maria Diaz. Ms. Diaz never met Mr. Cheri. The premium finance agreement submitted to World PFC by FIRST OF MIAMI indicated that he had made a premium downpayment of only $105.00 despite the fact that Mr. Cheri had made a downpayment of $205.00. The evidence is not clear that Respondent knew or should have known of this transaction because of the involvement of Ms. Diaz. Instead, this is an example of the Respondent permitting Ms. Diaz to continue to participate in insurance transactions that require licensure after Respondent and Ms. Diaz had been told in September 1994 that revocation was imminent. ALVARO ALCIVAR (COUNT TWELVE) Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Alvaro Alcivar performed acts and made representations to consumers that require licensure pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code. Petitioner also established that Respondent knew or should have known of these acts and that he aided and abetted these violations by Mr. Alcivar. CARLOS GONZALEZ (COUNT THIRTEEN) Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Carlos Gonzalez performed acts and made representations to consumers that require licensure pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code. Petitioner also established that Respondent knew or should have known of these acts and that he aided and abetted these violations by Mr. Gonzalez.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that Petitioner revoke all licensure and appointment held by Respondent pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code and that it impose against Respondent an administrative fine in the amount of $10,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0317 The following rulings are made as to the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 126, 127, 139, 140, 141, and 142 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The testimony at the formal hearing that the office was moved in June 1994. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 10, 17, and 81 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 26, 32, 72, 74, 75, 76, 83, 129, 130, 131, 136, 137, 143, and 144 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 46, 61, 82, and 124 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 77, 78, 79, 80, 128, 132, 133, 134, 135, and 136 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The following rulings are made as to the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 64, 72, and 73 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected in part since Respondent moved the offices of the FIRST from Coral Way to Sunset Drive at a time pertinent to this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6 and 52 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 10, 11, 21 and 27 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by credible evidence. The evidence that supports these proposed findings lacks credibility. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 31 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent the proposed findings mischaracterize the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 16 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 24 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent they are contrary to the finding that they knew that the revocation of Ms. Diaz's licensure was imminent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 25, 28, 30, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 51, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 29 and 57 are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 31 are rejected since they contain an inference that Respondent told Ms. Diaz to move as soon as he knew of her interaction with insurance customers. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 42 are rejected as being a mischaracterization of the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 48, 63, 68, and 70 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Dunphy, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (13) 120.57203.03626.112626.561626.611626.621626.641626.681626.734626.951626.9521626.9541626.9561
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