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ROBYN COHEN vs CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, 10-001665 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 26, 2010 Number: 10-001665 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 2010

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating against Petitioner, due to her handicap, in providing a public accommodation, in violation of Section 760.08, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner suffers from a panic disorder for which she requires the assistance of a service animal. Her service animal is a 40-pound German Shepherd mix named "Rocky." Rocky enables Petitioner to overcome certain specific disabilities associated with her condition, but she does not always require Rocky's assistance. In the summer of 2009, Petitioner's mother organized a family vacation in the form of a Caribbean cruise on a vessel operated by Respondent. She selected a cruise departing Port Everglades on August 9, 2009. The group included Petitioner's father, Petitioner's sister, her fiancé, and others. The first port of call for the cruise after departing Fort Lauderdale was Key West, after which the vessel would sail to various ports under the jurisdiction of other countries. On the morning of the departure, Petitioner's then- boyfriend John McCarthy drove her and Rocky from Key Biscayne, where they live in the same condominium building. Mr. McCarthy proved to be a useful witness. He and Petitioner are no longer in a relationship. Mr. McCarthy portrayed the events largely in agreement with Petitioner's version of events, although his reliability is somewhat undermined by the fact that he and Petitioner have discussed many times what exactly took place on that day. However, he displayed a spirited independence from Petitioner, as when he described her decision to file this "lawsuit" as "ridiculous," and, more importantly, admitted that, while in the terminal, he was unsure whether Petitioner wanted to take Rocky with her on the cruise. Much, but not all, of his testimony has been credited. Leaving Key Biscayne that morning, Petitioner did not, in fact, intend to have Rocky accompany her on the cruise. Among other possible reasons, Petitioner's mother had asked her not to bring Rocky, and Petitioner had acceded to her mother's wish. It was Petitioner's intent only for Rocky to see her off. Without incident, Petitioner, Mr. McCarthy, and Rocky left the car at the cruise terminal parking area and made their way into the cruise lobby. The trio entered the lobby amidst swarms of embarking and disembarking passengers. Respondent hosts on its cruises many passengers with disabilities, including some passengers with service animals. Two Carnival managers described Respondent's policies for accommodating disabled passengers. The Guest Access Support manager, Kay Strawderman, explained the process by which persons purchasing cruise tickets are directed to complete a form that provides information about disabilities or special needs. If a passenger is bringing a service animal, Respondent informs the passenger that he or she must contact the U.S. Department of Agriculture for current regulations, by port, governing animals, such as requirements for vaccination records. These regulations are imposed by the countries visited by the vessel and may be enforced even if the animal does not leave the ship. Neither Respondent nor the U.S. government has the authority to permit any deviations from these foreign laws. Using the information provided in the completed forms, the Guest Access Support department compiles a list of special- needs passengers, including passengers who will be bringing service animals. The Guest Access Support department sends this list to the Guest Logistics department. Assigned to the terminal and in direct contact with passengers, Guest Logistics employees ensure the efficient boarding and exiting of the vessels and movement through the terminal. The Guest Logistics manager, Doris Enamorado, testified that her employees use the special-needs lists to ensure that special-needs passengers and, if applicable, their service animals are directed to special boarding areas, so they can board without any delay. Ms. Strawderman and Ms. Enamorado both considered the question of what they would do if a special-needs passenger failed to fill out and return the forms, but arrived at the terminal seeking to board with her service animal. The question is hypothetical because this has never previously happened, including on the day in question. Ms. Strawderman insisted that, if a special-needs passenger failed to return the forms, Respondent would not deny boarding. Ms. Enamorado added that, if one of her employees encountered a passenger with an animal in the terminal seeking to board, the employee would determine if the animal were a service animal, including how it services the disability, and then examine the vaccination records, without which a service animal may not sail due to the requirements of the laws of foreign countries. Shortly after they entered the terminal, Petitioner, Mr. McCarthy, and Rocky were approached by a Carnival employee named "Alex." Respondent invites the inference that Petitioner spontaneously exploded into anger and hysterics. At the hearing, Petitioner displayed a tendency toward combativeness, but none toward spontaneous anger or hysterics. More likely, Alex, upon encountering Petitioner, Mr. McArthur, and a dog in a crowded terminal, momentarily failed to display the composure and dedication to service of Respondent's managerial employees who testified at the hearing. Mr. McCarthy's testimony is especially useful at this point and is largely credited. Approaching Petitioner, Alex abruptly informed her that Rocky could not proceed. It is likely that Alex assumed that Rocky was a mere pet, as he does not wear a special cape or harness and Petitioner does not bear any obvious indication of a disability. Petitioner replied that Rocky was a service dog, and he was present only to see her off on the cruise. Alex replied that Petitioner did not appear to suffer from a disability. As Mr. McCarthy aptly notes, "the fight was on." Each side called for reinforcements. Petitioner spoke on her cellphone with her sister and mother. Alex summoned his supervisor, who joined the fray. Mr. McCarthy and Rocky wisely stood to the side. By now, Petitioner was crying out of control. In this condition, she could not reliably report on what she said to Respondent's employees or what they said to her. Mr. McCarthy seems to have been unable to hear much of what the parties were saying to each other. Respondent's employees report that their behavior was impeccable. Regardless, there is no reliable evidence that Petitioner ever demanded that Rocky, her service animal, board the vessel with her. Much evidence suggests that Petitioner never intended to take Rocky on the cruise. As far as Petitioner's mother or Mr. McArthur knew, Rocky was staying home. Petitioner herself had failed to pack any food for Rocky, nor did she at any time instruct Mr. McArthur to drive to a nearby store to obtain any. No evidence suggests that Petitioner had brought with her any proof of Rocky's vaccinations, which might be required by the various countries that they were visiting. Once on board, Petitioner did not even demand that Respondent allow Rocky to board in Key West. To convince her daughter to board the vessel, Petitioner's mother said that Rocky could join them in Key West. Even after the vessel had sailed, Petitioner, still agitated, spoke constantly with Mr. McCarthy until the vessel sailed out of cellphone range. She directed him to drive Rocky to Key West to join her on the cruise, but Mr. McCarthy, citing a bad back and the fact that his birthday was the next day, declined to do so, instead taking Rocky to South Beach the following day. Mr. McCarthy's testimony suggested a boyfriend who was unwilling to cater to his girlfriend's capricious decision to make an issue with Rocky, not a boyfriend who was unwilling to help right a wrong that his girlfriend had suffered. At some point prior to arriving in Key West, Petitioner realized that Mr. McCarthy had no intention of driving Rocky to Key West. Rather than disembark in Key West, as she wanted, Petitioner acceded to her mother's exhortations and remained on board, but she was very unhappy for the remainder of the cruise.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's amended petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Marcy I. LaHart, Esquire Marcy I. LaHart, P.A. 4804 Southwest 45th Street Gainesville, Florida 32608 Martha deZayas, Esquire Carnival Cruise Lines 3655 Northwest 87 Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Kara S. Nickel, Esquire Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. 150 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200 Miami, Florida 33130 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 2000a42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.68509.092760.02760.08760.11
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LAWRENCE BERTON KUTUN vs FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 94-006033 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 26, 1994 Number: 94-006033 Latest Update: Apr. 24, 1995

The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a yacht and ship broker's license.

Findings Of Fact Applicants for yacht and ship salesman licenses and for broker's licenses are furnished with copies of Chapter 326 F.S. and applicable agency rules with the application forms. Petitioner originally applied and was licensed as a yacht and ship salesman in June, 1992. To be a salesman, one must be associated with a licensed broker who prominently displays the salesman's license. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner contacted Respondent agency by telephone to discuss renewal of his salesman's license issued June 3, 1992 and due to expire under its own terms on June 3, 1994. At that time, Kathy Forrester told Petitioner that his file reflected that his license had been "cancelled" effective March 10, 1993 due to a letter received on or about March 1, 1993 from Petitioner's employing broker, Frank Stanzel. Mr. Stanzel's letter showed that he was relocating his business from Miami to Ft. Lauderdale and that he wanted his two salesmen's licenses transferred to the new location. He enclosed with his letter the two salesmen's licenses for agency action, as required by agency rules. Mr. Stanzel further reported that Petitioner had left his employ on October 19, 1992, taking his license with him, so Mr. Stanzel could not return Petitioner's license to the agency. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted he had left Mr. Stanzel's firm on October 19, 1992 to pursue a construction job due to the vigorous insurgence of the construction industry following Hurricane Andrew. He took the original of his salesman's license with him and left only copies with Mr. Stanzel in Stanzel's Miami office. Petitioner asserted, however, that since "all it takes to sell yachts is a computer and a telephone," he continuously attempted to sell yachts from his own home after October 19, 1992. After October 19, 1992, Petitioner worked at least 40 hours a week in construction, did not sell any yachts or ships, and had no contact with Mr. Stanzel as his employing broker. Mr. Stanzel did not supervise Petitioner's sales activities after October 19, 1992. Petitioner never returned to Mr. Stanzel's Miami office after that date. Petitioner has never been in Mr. Stanzel's new office in Ft. Lauderdale. Mr. Stanzel paid Petitioner a commission in December 1992 for prior sales work on a yacht sale to Petitioner's father, which sale ultimately closed in December 1992, but since October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel has not considered Petitioner his employee. Petitioner received no IRS 1099 form (commission salesman's equivalent of employee's W-2 form) from Mr. Stanzel after 1992. After October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel did not display Petitioner's license, as required by agency rules for salesmen in a broker's employ. Nothing precludes a licensed salesman from selling yachts and ships out of his home if he is overseen by an employing broker. Petitioner had done so while employed by Mr. Stanzel prior to October 19, 1992. However, by law, all yacht and ship sale closings must be done through the employing broker's trust account. Petitioner has closed no sales on his own through Mr. Stanzel's trust account since October 19, 1992. The two have never discussed a return to work by Petitioner. They did not communicate on any subject between October 19, 1992 and April 15, 1994. Even if Mr. Stanzel had not written his March 1, 1993 letter, Petitioner still would not have been able to show that he has attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. On March 22, 1993, five months after Mr. Stanzel heard the last of Petitioner and approximately three weeks after he notified the agency of Petitioner's leaving his employ, Mr. Stanzel's broker's license expired. Under the terms of the agency rules, Mr. Stanzel was required to apply for a new license. He applied. His broker's license was not renewed retroactively, and his new license became effective August 30, 1993. For approximately five months, from March 22, 1993 to August 30, 1993, Mr. Stanzel was not a licensed Florida broker. Neither Mr. Stanzel nor the Respondent agency notified Petitioner of this fact nor did anyone notify Petitioner at that time that his salesman's license was deemed "cancelled" during the broker's lapse. After finding out for the first time on April 15, 1994 that the agency presumed his salesman's license "cancelled" by Mr. Stanzel's notification that Petitioner had taken his salesman's license and left Mr. Stanzel's employ, Petitioner and his father prevailed upon Mr. Stanzel to execute an affidavit dated May 19, 1994 to the effect that Mr. Stanzel had misunderstood, now believed Petitioner had been diligently working at yacht sales after October 19, 1992, and wanted Petitioner's salesman's license reinstated. The affidavit was submitted to the agency. Although Ms. Forrester had misgivings about the affidavit, the agency reinstated Petitioner's salesman's license, effective April 29, 1994, after receiving the affidavit (TR 25-28). The reinstated license still had the original expiration date of June 3, 1994. The agency did not reinstate Petitioner's salesman's license retroactive to October 19, 1992 when Petitioner went into construction work fulltime, to the date of Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expiration, or to the date of Mr. Stanzel's new broker's license. Petitioner accepted his salesman's license as reinstated. Petitioner did not renew his salesman's license on June 3, 1994, so it expired by its own terms. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner filed an application to be licensed as a yacht and ship broker, together with the required bond, fee, and fingerprints. On August 2, 1994, Peter Butler, Head of the Section of Yacht and Ship Brokers, wrote Petitioner a deficiency notice, explaining that the agency regarded Petitioner's salesman's license "cancelled" during the lapse of his employing broker's license. The agency has no rule which specifically states that when an employing broker's license expires, his salesmen's licenses are automatically cancelled. The language employed in the deficiency notice was, "any salesman licenses held by [the employing broker] were considered cancelled (sic) for that period of time [the period while the employing broker's license was expired/lapsed] because they did not have an actively licensed broker holding their license." [Bracketed material added for clarity.] This language became the focus of the concurrent Section 120.535 F.S. proceeding. The deficiency notice did not refer to the prior "cancellation" of Petitioner's salesman's license based on Mr. Stanzel's March 1, 1993 notice that Petitioner had left his employ effective October 19, 1992. The deficiency notice cited Section 326.004(8) F.S. [1993] which provides: Licensing.- (8) A person may not be licensed as a broker unless he has been a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years, and may not be licensed as a broker after October 1, 1990, unless he has been licensed as a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years. The deficiency notice also specified that if Petitioner paid another dollar for a fingerprinting fee and provided an explanation of his 1992 yacht sales, the agency would issue a new salesman's license. There was no way Petitioner could alter the past lapse of the broker's license. Petitioner did not pursue relicensure as a salesman. Bob Badger, an agency investigator, submitted a report to Mr. Butler dated September 1, 1994 expressing his opinion that even with Mr. Stanzel's after-the-fact affidavit, Petitioner's salesman's license would have been interrupted by the fact that he had no licensed broker holding his salesman's license during Mr. Stanzel's broker's license lapse of five months. He further concluded that Petitioner's salesman's license was "suspended" for a short period for not renewing his salesman's license bond. After review of the investigation report, on September 19, 1994, the agency issued its Intent to Reject Petitioner's broker's application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. alluding to the deficiency notice and citing Section 326.004(8) F.S., for Petitioner's failure to complete two consecutive years as a salesman. Even if Mr. Stanzel's broker's license had been reinstated without lapse, thereby by implication reinstating Petitioner's salesman's license without lapse, it would not retroactively change the fact that Petitioner has not attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. Petitioner claimed that he was "cancelled by ambush," because the agency did not timely notify him of Mr. Stanzel's lapsed broker's license, and further asserted that the agency's failure to timely notify him constituted a violation of Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. At the present time, the agency writes a letter to salesmen advising them when their employing broker's license is cancelled. However, such a letter would not have been written to Petitioner, even if it were being used by the agency on March 22, 1993 when Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expired, because Petitioner's license had already been effectively cancelled by his own removal of his license from Mr. Stanzel's office, by his assuming other full time employment in construction, and by his removing his yacht-selling activities, if any, from Mr. Stanzel's immediate oversight. Section 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and rules enacted thereunder clearly place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesmen's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of a salesman's license when a broker is no longer associated with the selling entity. Typically, salesmen turn in their licenses through the original broker for cancellation by the agency and receive new ones when they move from one broker's oversight to another's. Salesmen who are employed by one broker also switch their salesman's licenses to another active broker whenever the first broker disassociates from a yacht sales company and moves to another company, quits, retires, or lets his broker's license lapse. Due to the common dynamics of the employment situation whereby salesmen are under the active supervision of their employing broker in the company office, they usually know immediately when a broker's license is in jeopardy or the broker is not on the scene and supervising them. This knowledge is facilitated by the statutes and rules requiring that all licenses be prominently displayed in the business location. Anybody can look at anybody else's license on the office wall and tell when it is due to expire. If licensees are in compliance with the statute and rules, no active salesman has to rely on notification from the agency with regard to the status of his own or his broker's license. In the present case, Petitioner removed himself from all contact with Mr. Stanzel as of October 19, 1992. Therefore, he did not know what was occurring in the office or with any licenses. All agency witnesses testified substantially to the effect that since they have been employed with the agency and so far as they could determine since its inception, agency personnel have relied on Sections 326.002(3), 326.004(8), 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and Rules 61B-60.005 and 61B-60.008(1)(b) and (c) F.A.C. to preclude licensing someone who has not been actively supervised by a Florida licensed employing broker for two consecutive years. More specifically, agency personnel have always applied Sections 326.004(14)(a) and (b) to place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesman's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of the salesman's license when his broker is no longer associated with the sales entity. The agency has always interpreted the word "broker" as used in Chapter 326 F.S. and Chapter 61B-60 F.A.C. to mean "Florida licensed broker." See also, Section 326.002(1) and 326.004(1) F.S. and Rule 61B-60.001(1)(g) F.A.C. These interpretations are in accord with the clear language of the applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner asserted that he had been treated differently than others similarly situated because other salesmen were notified by the agency when their employing broker's license lapsed and because the agency cancelled their salesman's licenses for other reasons but did not cancel their salesman's licenses because of their broker's license's lapse. The facts adduced did not closely parallel his own situation so as to demonstrate disparate treatment. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the agency affirmatively set out to notify any other salesman that his salesman's license was cancelled due to a lapse of his employing broker's license. Rather, the agency was tipped off by a complaint that Bryan Long's salesman's license had expired February 27, 1993. The agency investigated and determined that the license of Mr. Long's broker had expired on February 14, 1993, before Long's own salesman's license had expired. The broker's name was Herbert Postma. Upon discovering that Long and Postma were selling yachts without licenses, the agency investigated the broker's transactions and commissions paid. As a result of its investigation, the agency discovered that two more salesmen, Villalon and Grzeszczak, held salesman's licenses which, like Long's license, had expired during the time Postma's license was lapsed. As with Petitioner, the agency did not attempt to notify any of the salesmen when their broker's license lapsed. The disciplinary investigation of Long's sales and of Postma's transactions and commissions peripherally notified the other salesmen of their lapsed salesman's licenses and of the broker's lapsed license. Petitioner is correct that none of the four licensees were listed as "cancelled" in the agency's records, and Brian Long entered into a Consent Order with the agency which did not mention he was "cancelled" because of the broker's license's lapse. However, the duration dates of each type of license were shown in the agency records. Like the current situation, the new licenses were not issued retroactive to the date of each salesman's prior license's expiration or retroactive to the date of the broker's prior license expiration. Also like Petitioner's reinstatement, none of these licenses showed a reinstatement without a lapse. The agency printout for yet another salesman, Preston, showed that like Petitioner, he was "cancelled" when he had no broker and was reinstated 21 days later. The printout also shows that like Petitioner, Preston was not reinstated retroactively. None of the named salesmen were shown to have been granted a broker's license as having been employed by a broker for two consecutive years.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship broker. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6033 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted except that legal argumentation pejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as not credible. Covered in substance in FOF 5, 6, and 8. Accepted that this is what the letter stated. However, not dispositive due to the facts as presented. See FOF 11. Rejected as mere legal argument. 9-10 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 11 Rejected as mere legal argument. 12-19 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 20 Rejected as mere legal argument. 21-25 Rejected in FOF 32-37 upon the greater weight of the evidence as a whole and in part as mere legal argument. 26-42 These proposals are mixed legal argument and some fact proposals, largely without any citation to the record. The legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts. The facts not accepted are either rejected as covered specifically within the recommended order or are rejected as not dispositive. Ms. Forrester's testimony is mischaracterized in proposed fact 24, and it is rejected for that reason. The legal arguments are addressed in the conclusions of law. Respondent's PFOF: 1-19 The proposed facts have been accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. The interspersed legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts, but has been addressed in the conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire GUSTAFSON & TILTON, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. Harper Field, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57326.002326.004 Florida Administrative Code (5) 61B-60.00161B-60.00261B-60.00461B-60.00561B-60.008
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs DOUGLAS BUCHHEIT, 95-004418 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Stuart, Florida Sep. 05, 1995 Number: 95-004418 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57326.002326.004
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DIVISION OF GENERAL REGULATION vs. WILLIAM G. GANNAWAY, 76-000829 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000829 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1976

Findings Of Fact Notices to Show Cause were issued by the Department against Roy D. Mathew, and William Gannaway on April 9, 1976. (See: Agency Exhibits 1 and 2). The final hearing was scheduled by notice dated May 12, 1976. (See: Agency Exhibit 3). Roy D. Mathew, d/b/a Anchorline Yacht Brokerage holds Yacht and Ship Broker License No. 12433, issued by the Department on December 18, 1975. (See: Agency Exhibit 5). Mathew has at all material times held a yacht and ship broker license issued by the Department. William G. Gannaway holds Yacht and Ship Salesman License No. 12657, issued by the Department on December 18, 1975. (See: Agency Exhibit 4). Gannaway has at all material times held a yacht and ship salesman license issued by the Department. Gannaway has at all material times served as a yacht and ship salesman for Roy D. Mathew and Anchorline Yacht Brokerage. Prior to July, 1975, R. A. McKenzie, the owner of a yacht called The Anokone, decided to sell the yacht. The yacht was housed at Anchorline Yacht Brokerage in St. Petersburg, Florida, and McKenzie agreed to pay Anchorline a commission for selling the yacht. On or about July 8, 1975, Jean C. Noll, a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, saw the yacht, and believed that it was the sort of vessel that she and her husband had been looking for. She entered into a purchase agreement with the understanding that her husband, the Reverend Joseph E. Noll, Jr., would have the opportunity to make a personal inspection. William G. Gannaway represented Anchorline Yacht Brokerage in the transaction, and received a deposit from Mrs. Noll. (See: Agency Exhibit 6). On or about July 15, 1975 Reverend Noll came to St. Petersburg from Jacksonville and inspected the yacht. Gannaway at that time advised Reverend Noll that the starboard engine on the yacht was broken down and would require extensive repairs. Reverend Noll liked the yacht, and hired the Wilkinson Company to conduct a survey of the yacht. Dean Greger conducted the survey on behalf of the Wilkinson Company. A very thorough inspection was performed by Greger. He made 24 recommendations respecting & repairs, some of which were significant, and some of which were minor. He was not able to conduct a sea test of the vessel because of the broken down engine. His report was issued on July 22, 1975. (See: Agency Exhibit 7). McKenzie was somewhat disturbed about the large number of discrepancies, and he offered the following alternatives to the Nolls: He would sell the boat "as is" for $15,000; he would sell the boat "as is" with a new starboard engine installed for $17,000; or he would sell the boat for $19,500 with a new engine, with him making all additional repairs up to $1,000 and with all remaining repairs being split evenly three ways between the Nolls, McKenzie, and Anchorline. The Nolls accepted the latter option, and a contract reflecting it was signed. (See: Agency Exhibit 28). All work was to be performed at Whistlers Yacht Service, Inc., which was located adjacent to Anchorline. Shortly after July 22, 1975, it became apparent that a new replacement starboard engine could not be obtained, because the engine was no longer in production. Gannaway advised the Nolls that Whistlers indicated to him that they could replace the "shortblock" of the engine, rebuild the engine, and that they would stand by their work. Gannaway told the Nolls that he thought the rebuilt engine would carry a one year guarantee. Reverend Noll believed that the guarantee would be for no more than 90 days, and he agreed to a rebuilt engine rather than a new engine. Extensive work was performed by Whistlers Marina, and more than $2,100 was paid to Whistlers to perform the repairs. (See: Agency Exhibits 14, 22, 23, 24, 25). Dean Greger conducted a supplemental survey, including a sea test of the vessel on or about August 14, 1975. Fourteen of the 24 discrepancies noted in the original report were found to have been satisfactorily corrected. It was noted that the generator, the depth sounder, the auto pilot, the signal horn, the marine air conditioning, and the docking lights were not performing properly. (See: Agency Exhibit 8). The Nolls were aware of these problems when they closed the transaction and purchased the yacht on approximately August 20, 1975. The closing took place at a Federal Credit Union in Jacksonville. No representative of Anchorline was present at the closing. Following the closing the Nolls took possession of the yacht, and renamed it "Escape Hatch II". The Nolls were advised by several persons, including personnel at Whistlers Yacht Basin, and personnel at Anchorline, that they should familiarize themselves with the vessel in the immediate area prior to their taking any long excursions. The Nolls nonetheless left St. Petersburg in early September to return to Jacksonville. On this return trip the Nolls experienced many mechanical difficulties. Major repairs needed to be performed on the vessel in Ft. Myers (See: Agency Exhibit II), and minor repairs were performed in Stuart and Melbourne (See: Agency Exhibits 12 and 13). Upon return to Jacksonville major repairs were required and are continuing to be performed. (See: Agency Exhibits 16, 17, and 27). It is apparent that the starboard engine was not properly repaired, and that considerable dry rot remained on the vessel. The Nolls are presently engaged in litigation respecting their liabilities in connection with the vessel. Whistlers disclaimed any liability for making repairs, but Mrs. Coe, the general manager at Whistlers testified that she would have performed any repairs within 90 days if the vessel had been returned to the yacht basin. Mr. Gannaway and Mr. Mathew had sound reason to believe that there were no discrepancies respecting the operability of the yacht other than those set out in the marine surveys. Mathew and Gannaway had sound reason to believe that all of the repairs required to rectify these discrepancies had been performed at Whistlers. There was no evidence offered to show that either Gannaway or Mathew intentionally misstated any facts to the Nolls, or that they knew or should have known that any statements they made to the Nolls were false. There was no evidence to establish that Mathew had any personal knowledge of any of the dealings or discussions between Gannaway and the Nolls.

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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs PAT RAUM, 99-000602 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 04, 1999 Number: 99-000602 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent acted as a yacht broker in Florida without holding a yacht broker's license issued by petitioner?

Findings Of Fact Respondent, presently retired, was formerly employed with Sun Yacht Charters located in Camden, Maine. He has never been licensed by the State of Florida as a yacht and ship salesperson or broker. Respondent attended the 57th Annual Miami International Boat Show and Strictly Sail (boat show) held February 12-18, 1998. Respondent was in attendance at the Sun Yacht Charters Exhibit Booth, a booth in the Strictly Sail portion of the boat show. Investigators and other Petitioner employees regularly attend this specific boat show in order to find unlicensed activity, such as selling and brokering of regulated yachts by persons not holding valid salesperson or broker’s licenses. On February 13, 1998, Petitioner investigators James Courchaine and Peter Renje attended the boat show. They carried fictitious business cards with false names and the designation "Yacht Consultant" on the cards. Courchaine’s fictitious name was James K. Ramson. Renje’s card bore the name Pete Benson. While walking through the Strictly Sail portion of the show, the investigators saw the booth for Sun Yacht Charters and Respondent. Respondent’s name tag read "Pat Raum." Outside the tent, the two investigators checked their list of licenses and did not find Pat Raum’s name listed. Although a license is not required in the sailboat portion of the show, Courchaine, posing as James K. Ramson, went back into the show and introduced himself to Respondent, handing him the fictitious business card with the name James K. Ramson, Yacht Consultant, displayed on it. Courchaine, a/k/a Ramson, inquired of Respondent that he was looking for a boat for a client for an outright purchase for a client. Courchaine asked if there were any boats for sale through Sun Yacht Charters. Respondent replied that sometimes people in their charter program wanted to sell a boat and that Sun Yacht Charters would sell it for them. He gave Courchaine his business card identifying himself as Pat Raum, Director of Yacht Sales for Sun Yacht Charters. The business address on the card was Camden, Maine. Respondent also gave Courchaine a specifications sheet on the Southern Belle, destined to come out of the charter program in April of 1998. The specifications sheet listed an asking price of $9,000 for the boat. From conversations he had with Petitioner's employees at a previous time when he discussed obtaining a Florida license, Respondent understood that Florida law did not permit him to sell or purchase yachts in Florida as an owner's agent. On February 17, 1998, following contact with Sun Yacht’s Camden office, Courchaine learned that Respondent was still in Florida. Courchaine contacted Respondent and asked for a contract. Believing that he was dealing with a licensed Florida Yacht broker, Respondent agreed to what he thought was an appropriate arrangement between himself and Courchaine whereby the sale of the Southern Belle would involve a 30/70 split on the commission from the sale. Respondent later confirmed to Courchaine in a fax message that same day that Courchaine, a/k/a Ramson, would get three percent of the sales commission. Also, he included in the fax to Courchaine a blank Yacht Purchase and Sale agreement. It was Respondent’s understanding that in the event of a sale, the matter would have to be handled by Courchaine a/k/a Ramson, or another Florida broker, that he, Respondent could not act as a broker in Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the notice to show cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pat Raum Post Office Box 302 Kennebunkport, Maine 04046 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.57326.002326.004326.006
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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. HOLIDAY INTERVAL OWNERSHIP, INC., D/B/A OCEAN 80, 86-001765 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001765 Latest Update: Mar. 31, 1987

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: The Respondent, Holiday Interval Ownership, Inc., is the developer and seller of Ocean 80 Resort, a condominium and time-share plan. Ocean 80 Resort is located in the Florida Keys on U.S. Highway 1, mile marker 80, Islamorada, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. William Seibert II received an advertisement concerning Ocean 80 Resort which promised prospective buyers a free trip to Mexico simply for visiting the condominium and listening to a sales presentation. On May 28, 1983, Mr. and Mrs. Seibert went to Islamorada and visited Ocean 80 Resort. The Seiberts were given a sales presentation by Bonnie Seide, a sales agent for Respondent. Ocean 80 Resort consists of 79 separate units located in one building. There are 8 different types of units, ranging from the Mako units which are efficiencies consisting of approximately 520 square feet, to the Tarpon units which are 2 bedroom, 2 bath units consisting of approximately 1,056 square feet. The Seiberts first listened to a description of the program and facilities of Ocean 80 Resort and then were taken by Bonnie Seide to see a model on the fourth floor. The Seiberts told Ms. Seide that they were only interested in the large Marlin units, which are 2 bedroom, 2 bath units consisting of approximately 944 square feet. The Seiberts were taken to Model Unit 404, a Marlin unit located on the fourth floor. Ms. Seide told the Seiberts that there was a similar unit available on the third floor below. The exact words used by Ms. Seide to describe the third floor unit were not established by the witnesses at the hearing with any degree of persuasiveness. Neither party presented the testimony of Ms. Seide. The Seiberts believed that the "similiar" third floor unit would be located directly beneath the model unit with an identical view of the pool as was enjoyed by the model unit. The model unit was situated in the middle of the corridor, with its balcony directly overlooking the pool. The Seiberts and Ms. Seide went down to the third floor, but were unable to walk down the hall and visit the unit that the Seiberts were to purchase because of construction. The Seiberts and Ms. Seide looked down the corridor towards the unit. There were no numbers on the doors at that time. Even though they were unable to inspect the unit, the Seiberts decided that they would purchase it anyway. The Seiberts then went to the sales office where they entered into a purchase agreement with Respondent for Unit 300, week 52 in Ocean 80 Resort. Although the Seiberts believed that their unit would be located directly beneath the model unit which they were shown, they were apparently unconcerned that the model unit's number was 404 and their unit was numbered 300. The purchase agreement provided that the price of the unit would be $9,270 and that the Seiberts would be entitled to occupancy of the unit during the appropriate week of 1983. The purchase agreement specifically advised the Seiberts of their right to cancel the contract without penalty or obligation within 10 days from the date of signing the agreement. The purchase agreement contained an exclusionary clause in bold print which stated as follows: Oral representations cannot be relied upon as correctly stating the representa- tions of the developer. The developer makes no representations other than those contained in this contract, the offering statement and the condominium documents. Upon entering into the purchase agreement on May 28, 1983, the Seiberts received several condominium documents, including a prospectus text, declaration of condominium, articles of incorporation and a floor plan. Because 1983 was a leap year, week 52 entitled the Seiberts to two weeks occupancy. The Seiberts decided that they would rent out one of the weeks and "spacebank" the other with Resort Condominiums International, Inc., (RCI). RCI is an organization which trades and transfers time share units. The Seiberts were interested in exchanging their unit week for a unit week in another facility in Paris. The Seiberts submitted a form to Ocean 80 Resort indicating that they desired that one of their weeks in 1983 be placed in a rental pool. At some point, the Seiberts were advised by Ocean 80 Resort that their unit would not be ready for occupancy in 1983. Nevertheless, the Respondent mailed the Seiberts a check for $371.02 reflecting a rental fee for the unit. In January of 1984, the Seiberts were advised by RCI that their request to "spacebank" and exchange their unit was denied because the unit was not yet ready for occupancy. A few weeks later, Ocean 80 Resort spacebanked a substitute unit with RCI on the Seiberts' behalf. Because their unit was not completed and ready for occupancy in 1983 and because their initial request to space-bank with RCI had been denied, the Seiberts became increasingly irritated and dissatisfied with Ocean 80 Resort. On March 17, 1984, the Seiberts went to Ocean 80 Resort and visited their unit for the first time. Much to their dismay, the Seiberts discovered, apparently for the first time, that unit 300 was not in the middle of the corridor, directly opposite the pool. Unit 300 afforded a view of the pool, but the unit was located at the end of the corridor directly opposite the roof of a common area. The pool was visible from unit 300 when looking at an angle from the balcony. Although some attempts were made by Ocean 80 Resort to resolve the matter by substituting a different unit, the Seiberts decided that they wanted nothing further to do with Ocean 80 Resort and desired a cancellation of the agreement. The Seiberts have never used their unit at Ocean 80 Resort. Stan Zabetakis received an advertisement for Ocean 80 Resort Condominium in 1983 and went to a sales presentation primarily because he was interested in receiving a promised free trip to Mexico. After listening to the sales presentation, Mr. Zabetakis purchased unit #202, week 2 for a total cost of $5400. On December 29, 1984, Mr. Zabetakis visited Ocean 80 Resort to "take a look around" and spoke with a sales representative. After this discussion Mr. Zabetakis decided to enter into a purchase agreement with Respondent whereby he would trade his current unit in on a larger, more expensive unit. The purchase agreement, signed by both parties on December 29, 1984, reflects that Zabetakis purchased unit 414, week 5 at a total purchase price of $8,500. Zabetakis was credited with $5,400 as equity in his previous unit (202) and the balance of $3,100 was financed with Respondent at 14 percent interest for 5 years, with monthly payments of $72.14. The Purchase Agreement specifically provided that the buyer had the right to cancel the contract without any penalty or obligation within 10 days from the date the contract was signed and executed. On January 6, 1985, Mr. Zabetakis wrote Respondent a letter indicating his desire to cancel the purchase agreement for unit 414, week 5. The Respondent received Mr. Zabetakis' letter of cancellation on January 8, 1985. Initially, Respondent refused to honor Mr. Zabetakis' cancellation and claimed that the letter was not received within the statutory 10 day period. On August 17, 1985, the Respondent changed its position and wrote Zabetakis a letter acknowledging the timely receipt of his letter of cancellation and enclosing a Quit-claim Deed for unit 414, week 5, which Zabetakis was asked to sign and return. However, by this time, Respondent had resold Mr. Zabetakis' original unit week. Further complicating Mr. Zabetakis' dilemma, by the time Respondent agreed to cancel the purchase agreement, the Respondent had sold the note and mortgage to a third-party financial institution. Mr. Zabetakis made his first payment of $72.14 in March 1985 and has made a timely payment of $72.14 each month, up to the date of the final hearing. Because Mr. Zabetakis' original unit and his mortgage note had been sold, he was leery of signing the Quit-claim Deed and did not return it to Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Assessing a civil penalty of $5,000 against Respondent; and Requiring that Respondent honor the right of Mr. Zabetakis to cancel his contract and receive an appropriate refund. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of March, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1765 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Sentence 4 is rejected as misleading and contrary to the weight of the credible evidence presented. The credible evidence did not establish that Ms. Seide stated that the similar unit would be located directly below the unit which the Seiberts were shown. Sentence 1 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Sentences 2 and 3 are rejected as misleading but addressed in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Sentences 4 and 5 are adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10 and 11. Sentences 1 and 2 are adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 17. Sentences 3 and 4 are rejected as misleading but addressed in Finding of Fact 18. Sentence 1 is rejected as misleading but addressed in Finding of Fact Sentences 2 and 3 are adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 24, 25, 26 and 27. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Presnell, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 John A. Ritter, Esquire 9040 Sunset Drive - Suite 20 Miami, Florida 33173 James Kearney Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Richard Coats Director Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Florida Laws (4) 721.05721.10721.11721.26
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KLOSTERS REDERI, A/S, D/B/A NORWEGIAN COARIBBEA vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 76-000428 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000428 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 1977

Findings Of Fact The claim imposed by the Department of Revenue stems from an audit conducted by Mr. George Thomas Lloyd, Jr., an employee of the Department of Revenue. Mr. Lloyd examined the books of the corporation and the receipts for items purchased and compiled a ledger of particular items which, in Mr. Lloyd's opinion, were not parts of the ship and upon which a use tax was due. At the hearing on this case this ledger was introduced as Joint Exhibit No. 1. It is a composite exhibit consisting of 157 pages. This ledger reflects purchases in the amount of $1,953,426.13 upon which the Department of Revenue claims tax is due. The total tax claimed by the Department of Revenue is $72,630.19 for taxes, penalties, and interest through February 16, 1976. The Petitioner is a Norwegian corporation with principal offices located in Oslo, Norway, and an office in Miami at Biscayne Boulevard. Petitioner owns three cruise vessels of Norwegian ownership and registration which sail out of the port of Miami, Florida to ports in the Caribbean. These cruises last several days. The parties have agreed that the Petitioner is in the exclusive business of transporting passengers and goods in foreign commerce. Mr. Lloyd, who conducted the audit above mentioned, testified that he prepared Joint Exhibit No. 1 by evaluating the items described in the corporation's records and used his own independent judgment in a determination as to whether those items were, or were not, parts of a vessel. If he determined they in fact were not parts of the vessel, he concluded that a use tax was owed to the State on the purchase price of those items. Mr. Lloyd stated that his determination as to whether a particular item was indeed a part of a ship was based on his independent judgment which was largely a question of whether the item was physically attached to the vessel. The individual items are far too numerous to describe in any detail herein, but they range from napkins, stirrers, postage meters, paper products, grinding wheels, coffee pots, towels, party favors, games, sandpaper, repairs to a shotgun, movie rentals, hardware items, batteries, flowers, bug spray. The items in question were delivered to Petitioner's warehouse on Dodge Island, Miami, Florida for lading on board one of Petitioner's three cruise vessels. The cruise vessels tie up next to the warehouse where the goods are stored and from time to time these goods are brought aboard each of the vessels. The items in question are all used aboard each vessel during the vessels' passenger cruises. The only time the cruise vessels spend within the territorial limits of Florida are for a period of time on Saturday of each week for the purpose of embarking and disembarking passengers for each weekly cruise. These articles, somewhat above described, are all used in connection with the ship's operation which is the conduct of weekly pleasure cruises from Miami to the Caribbean. The question of whether a particular item is a part of a vessel is one of definition and common sense. The auditor, Mr. Lloyd, appeared to accept a definition similar to what one would use in determining whether or not an item was a fixture in regard to realty. However, there are all types of vessels and it appears to this Hearing Officer that what may be a part of one type of vessel would have no function on another. There is really no relationship between what may be considered a part of real estate and what may be considered a part of a ship. There also appears to be no logic behind a definition which limits "parts of a ship" to those items which are physically attached to the vessel. Most would agree that pumps are parts of a ship; even though they may not be attached and can be easily removed, they are necessary in keeping a vessel afloat. Similarly, a compass and other navigational equipment may be removed, but that would hardly make them any less a part of a ship. As the Petitioner points out in its Memorandum, the most logical approach to a finding as what is truly a part of a vessel must ultimately hinge on the nature of the vessel, and a broad definition of seaworthiness. What are clearly parts of some ships have no purpose on others. A cargo freighter would need hoists and cranes which are not required on a tug. Each type of vessel uses equipment suited to that ship's purpose and type of cargo. While a tanker may be in the business of transporting oil, a very specialized cargo, a cruise ship is in business of transporting people and catering to their needs and entertainment. Therefore the equipment of a cruise ship would appear more frivolous to those accustomed to ships transporting basic raw materials. Both vessels, however, are in the shipping business. Since the parts of a ship must be defined as those items which serve a useful purpose to the operation of the ship, the decision then depends not on the nature of the item, but of the vessel. An oil tanker might conceivably have equipment or parts which are so specialized that they could serve no other useful purpose except aboard that type of vessel. The cruise ships in question in this case, however, use equipment which are apparently commonplace and equally useful on land as on sea. What items may properly be considered parts of a cruise ship depend on how those items relate to the operation of the vessel. While the equipment of an oil tanker would hardly be expected to be directed toward mirth; likewise, it is unreasonable for the equipment of a cruise ship to be limited to the bare necessities of a spartan voyage. As the testimony on behalf of Petitioner indicated, all the items listed on Joint Exhibit No. 1 do serve a purpose aboard the vessel and all items were purchased for use aboard the company's three vessels. It is therefore concluded that all the items listed on that schedule are in fact parts of the vessels owned by the Petitioner. The Petitioner has raised several other issues in its defense to tax assessment of the Department of Revenue. Among other things the Petitioner claims that the items in question are not stored for use in Florida. The facts above indicated that the items were purchased by the corporation and no sales or use tax has yet been paid upon them. The items are stored at the Dodge Island Warehouse owned by the Petitioner and are from time to time placed aboard vessels operated by the Petitioner corporation. From the facts presented at this hearing, the ships only spend several hours in the port of Miami each Saturday of every week. The items, therefore, are principally used while the vessels in question are on the high seas or in foreign ports. Except for this period of time on each Saturday when the vessels are in port, these items are used while the vessels are in engaged in foreign commerce.

Recommendation For reasons that the items in question are parts of the vessels and that they are used and consumed outside the state of Florida the tax assessed by the Department of Revenue should be disallowed. ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel G. LaPorte, Esquire 150 Southeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 E. Wilson Crump II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Ed Straughn, Executive Director Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE KLOSTERS REDERI A/S, d/b/a NORWEGIAN CARIBBEAN LINES, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-428 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (4) 212.05212.06212.08212.12
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. JOHN GRIFFIN BLANC AND SANDRA S. KIRKLAND, 87-002082 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002082 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1988

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondents were licensed real estate salesmen in the State of Florida, with Mr. Blanc's license being 0406481 and Ms. Kirkland's license being 0399466. The Division of Real Estate is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of real estate in this state. In November, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. William A. McKie were owners of Week 43 in Unit 1 of a time share condominium located at the Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club in Key Largo, Florida. About that time, they received a card issued by the Florida Bay Club to visit a time share condominium there. Because they were somewhat disappointed in the condition of their Anchorage unit, they went to see the Florida Bay Club facility and met with Respondent Kirkland who took them on a tour of the facility and the model apartment. Mrs. McKie was quite impressed with it, but indicated she could not afford it, because she and her husband already owned a time share unit at the Anchorage. When told that, Ms. Kirkland introduced the McKies to Respondent Blanc, who in the course of his sales presentation, suggested that the McKies use their ownership at the Anchorage as a trade-in worth $4,000 off of the in excess of $11,000 price of the Florida Bay Club unit. The McKies agreed and signed certain documents incident to the purchase including a worksheet, purchase agreement, disclosure agreement, and settlement statement, all prepared by Respondent Blanc. The worksheet reflected that the unit being purchased by the McKies, Week 44 in Unit A-5, had a purchase price of $6,500 toward which the McKies made a down payment of $650 by three separate charges to their Master Card and Visa cards, two for $300 each and one for $50. This left a mortgage balance to be financed of $5,850 payable for 7 years at 15 1/2 percent with monthly payments of $114.54. No reference was made in the worksheet to a trade in of the Anchorage unit. The purchase agreement also signed by the McKies and by Respondent Kirkland for the Florida Bay Club reflects a purchase price of $6,500 with a down payment of $650. The truth in lending form reflects that the amount financed would be $5,850 at 15.5% resulting in a finance charge of $3,771.36 with a total monthly payment amount of $9,621.36 which, when added to the $650 deposit, showed a total sales price of $10,271.36. The settlement statement signed by the McKies reflects a sales price of $6,500 with a $650 deposit. At no place, on any of the documentation, is the $4,000 trade-in for the Anchorage unit reflected. As a part of the transaction and at the suggestion of Respondent Blanc, the McKies were to sign a quitclaim deed to him as the representative of the seller to receive credit for the $4,000 trade-in. The documents, except for the quitclaim deed, were signed by the McKies on their first visit to Florida Bay Club on November 17, 1985. Mrs. McKie does not recall either Respondent signing the documentation, but there is evidence that Ms. Kirkland signed the purchase agreement and the worksheet and Mr. Blanc approved the worksheet. Neither the disclosure statement, the settlement statement nor the quitclaim deed, which was prepared by Respondent, Blanc, and furnished to the McKies on their second visit, was signed by either Respondent. The McKies went back to Florida Bay Club approximately a week later to sign for the prize they had been notified they had won and to sign the quitclaim deed, which had not been ready for them on their first visit. Respondent Blanc explained what the quitclaim deed was for and according to both McKies, they would not have purchased the property at Florida Bay Club had they not been able to trade-in their Anchorage unit. They definitely could not afford to pay for both units, a fact which was repeatedly explained to Respondents on both visits. Mrs. McKie believed that when she signed the quitclaim deed to the Anchorage unit, she would no longer be responsible for making payments there and in fact, the McKies notified the Anchorage Resort Club that Respondent Blanc had assumed their Week at the Anchorage, a fact which was confirmed by the Anchorage to Mr. Blanc by letter dated February 13, 1986. It is further noted that on January 30, 1986, Ms. Berta, general manager of the Florida Bay Club, by letter of even date, notified Mr. Blanc who was no longer an employee of Florida Bay, that the McKies' payment book, invoices for taxes due on the Anchorage property, and the quitclaim deed were being forwarded to him as evidence of the change of ownership of the Anchorage Resort unit from the McKies to Respondent Blanc. In this letter, Blanc was requested to notify the Anchorage of the change so the McKies would not be dunned for continuing payments. At the closing of the Florida Bay unit, when Mrs. McKie and her husband signed the quitclaim deed, Respondent Blanc told her she would continue to get payment notices from the Anchorage while the transfer was being processed, but she should bring those payment notices to him at the Florida Bay Club and he would take care of them. When Mrs. McKie received the first notice, she brought it to the Florida Bay Club to give to Mr. Blanc, but he was no longer located there. On this visit, she spoke to Ms. Berta, who advised her that the Florida Bay Club did not take trades. Ms. Berta called Respondent Blanc at his new place of business by phone in Mrs. McKie's presence and Respondent indicated at that time that he would buy the Anchorage unit himself and assume the payments. As a result, Mrs. McKie sent the delinquent notices to him at his new place of business, Gulf Stream Manor. In the meantime, she continued to make her new payments at the Florida Bay Club. Notwithstanding Respondent Blanc's agreement to assume payments, Mrs. McKie continued to receive mortgage payment delinquent notices from the bank for the Anchorage unit. During later negotiations with the bank regarding this, Mrs. McKie was told that she would still be responsible for making the payments even if Respondent Blanc took over and didn't pay and as a result, in order to relieve herself from this impending burden, she made arrangements to pay off the entire amount due for the Anchorage unit. After that she made several efforts to get Respondent Blanc to pay her back for the amount paid. Respondent Blanc agreed to make the payments and said he would pay the taxes on the unit, but he never reimbursed the McKies for any of the amount they had to pay. The McKies now own the Anchorage unit and have worked out a settlement agreement with the Florida Bay Club to get out of the responsibility for the unit there. Review of the quitclaim deed in question, prepared by Respondent Blanc and signed by the McKies, reflects that the McKies are both the grantors and grantees of the property and that Respondent Blanc's name nowhere appears on the document. It is of no force and effect. Respondent contends that when the McKies indicated they were unable to purchase a new unit since they still had a prior unit to pay for, relying on his understanding that the marketing organization selling the Florida Bay Club units had in the past taken a unit in trade, he discussed the matter with his supervisor who advised that he could offer up to $4,000 in trade on the unit. In order to do this, Respondent Blanc had to price the new unit at $10,500 and credit the McKies with $4,000. However, none of the documentation shows this was ever done. At no place on any of the documentations is the $4,000 trade-in referenced. It is clear the offer of a trade-in was a sham to induce the McKies to purchase a unit at Florida Bay Club. Ms. Berta, who was manager at Florida Bay Club at the time in question, indicated that no trade-ins were ever taken by the club. The prior trade-in referenced by Mr. Blanc was a unit which was completely paid for as opposed the McKies' which still had a substantial outstanding balance on it. Respondent Kirkland who was not a party to any of the negotiations subsequent to her initial interview with the McKies indicates that she "probably" quoted the McKies a price of $10,500. When Mrs. McKie indicated that they could not afford such a high price, she turned them over to Mr. Blanc who thereafter handled the entire transaction. Respondent Blanc tells a somewhat different story about the reaction of the McKies when his failure to assume responsibility for the trade-in unit at the Anchorage Bay Club came to light. He indicates that it was never intended that he would take title to this unit at first. The trade in was to be absorbed by the marketing company, Resort Sales International, for whom he worked, and he assumed, when he left the following week to go to a different facility, the company would follow through with its agreement to assume the McKie's Week at the Anchorage. He was quite surprised, he contends, to learn that this had not been done and since he wanted a unit in the Key Largo area anyway, he agreed to then assume it personally after first offering Mrs. McKie the opportunity to back out of the purchase. When she said that she wanted to be at Florida Bay Club, he was sent the payment books and the deed. He called the bank to notify them that he was going to assume responsibility for the loan, but the bank would give him no information regarding it and the bank official, Ms. Brown, was adamant in her representation that the McKies could not quitclaim deed the property to him. No reason was given for this, however. Mr. Blanc claims he made a series of telephone calls between January 30 and March 31, 1986, in an attempt to straighten out the difficulty involved. These included sixteen calls to Ms. Berta, eight calls to his former supervisor at Resort Sales, four calls to the Anchorage, three calls to the bank and three calls to Mrs. McKie. Mrs. McKie denies receiving calls from the Respondent and contends that her numerous calls to him remained unanswered. In a call he made after she paid off the loan on the Anchorage and settled with Florida Bay Club for approximately $2,183, Mrs. McKie advised Blanc to forget about it, that they were tired of messing with him and with the property. As a result, he admittedly gave up and did and heard nothing more regarding the property until he was contacted by a DPR investigator. On January 30, 1988, Mr. Blanc offered to buy Mrs. McKie's unit at the Anchorage for $2,900 which was exactly the amount owed on the property when she paid it off. She refused to accept that offer since she had paid $6,800 for the unit initially.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Sandra Kirkland be dismissed and that Respondent Blanc's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee this 19th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Darlene F. Keller Department of Professional Acting Executive Director Regulation DPR, Division of Real Estate Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sandra S. Kirkland Post Office Box 9264 Panama City, Florida 32407 John G. Blanc 17501 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32407

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs ROBERT O`BRIEN III, D/B/A O`BRIEN YACHT SALES, INC., 96-001614 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Apr. 03, 1996 Number: 96-001614 Latest Update: Nov. 22, 1996

The Issue On February 28, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued a Notice To Show Cause to Robert O'Brien (O'Brien) alleging that O'Brien violated Section 326.006(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. Specifically, O'Brien was charged with allowing an unlicensed person to attempt to sell a 52' Hatteras known as "Watermellon" on behalf of O'Brien Yacht Sales. The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. On May 15, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued an Amended Notice To Show Cause to David Sandmann (Sandmann) alleging that Sandmann violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Sandmann was charged with offering or negotiating to sell a 52' Hatteras, known as "Watermellon". The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT Petitioner filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes, states that: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence. A thorough review of the record has been made. The Division adopts and incorporates by reference the first sentence of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Petitioner's exceptions to the remainder of Finding of Fact number 15 are accepted because the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The second sentence, "The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat." is rejected because, the Petitioner presented testimony which proved that Sandmann: offered "to help" the Division investigators when they approached the boat. (T. 20, 38-39). gave the Division investigators a business card with his name and O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc. written on it. (T. 19, 38-19, 52)( P's Exh. 2) gave the Division investigators a spec sheet containing information about the boat. (T. 21, 32, 39, 52). (P's Exh. 3). told the Division investigators that the price of the boat was negotiable. (T 22, 29-30, 39-40, 52). told the Division investigators that the commission would be paid by the seller. (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43) had a copy of a blank sales contract faxed to him (from O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc.) at the boat show. (T. 22- 23, 41, 52) Also at Recommended Order, page 5, paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12. Additionally, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact that Respondent Sandmann was not offering or negotiating to sell the boat, because these actions were uncontroverted. Respondent Sandmann never denied that he was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. Furthermore, the sentence in question is not a Finding of Fact, but rather a Conclusion of Law. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of this as a Finding of Fact, does not make it so. In Hernicz v. State Dept. of Professional Reg., 390 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), facts were undisputed that a nurse practitioner had done certain acts, and when the Board concluded that the actions were a violation of the statute, the court held that that amounted to a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. The "facts" were the individual actions that were taken by the Respondent, whether these acts violated the statute was a Conclusion of Law. As stated above, the acts, themselves, in this case were neither denied nor disputed. The second sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The third sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 states that "[I]t is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts". The "expectation of receiving compensation" was the argument relied on by the Respondents at hearing as their defense to participating in the boat show. Because "compensation" is an integral part of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, its interpretation should be left to the expertise of the agency. It is a well settled principle that the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great weight, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985); Shell Harbor Grou, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 487 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Division believes that "compensation" can be other than a monetary commission, as claimed by Respondents. "Compensation" can be "perks" such as transportation or use of a house or yacht, or something intangible, such as friendship and affection. The existence of a quid pro quo is what is looked for. Furthermore, from a thorough reading of the record, it was proven by substantial competent evidence that a commission was anticipated being paid, because Petitioner's investigators were told that "the commission would be paid by the seller". (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43). Possibly, no monetary commission was paid to Sandmann, because the yacht did not sell. Regardless, the Division finds that the friendship between Mr. Mellon and Sandmann was adequate compensation under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The third sentence of Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The fourth sentence, "Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the `Watermellon' solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner", is also rejected. The Division does not dispute the long standing friendship of Respondent Sandmann and Mr. Mellon, however being someone's "friend", does not exempt them from Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. There was uncontroverted testimony that Respondent Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. That is all that is necessary for him to be within the jurisdiction of the Division, and require him to have a license. Although his friendship could be his motivation or compensation for being on the yacht, his actions, while there, show that he was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon". The fourth sentence of Finding of Fact Number 15 is stricken in its entirety. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner filed an Exception to Conclusion of Law number 23 contained in the Recommended Order. This conclusion stated that the Petitioner had failed to meet its burden as to Sandmann because it failed to establish that he was attempting to sell the yacht, and, if the case against Sandmann failed, then the case against O'Brien failed. The Division rejects this Conclusion of Law because it believes that Petitioner proved by substantial competent evidence that Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon", and that friendship is adequate compensation.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that administers and enforces the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent O'Brien has been licensed as a Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent O'Brien owns and operates O'Brien Yacht Sales. Respondent O'Brien resides in and has his principal place of business in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Sandmann is a resident of Essex, Connecticut. He has never been licensed as a yacht salesman or as a yacht broker. Mr. Sandmann makes his livelihood as the owner of a dog collar manufacturing business. Henry Mellon, the boat's owner, held a salesman's license issued by Petitioner that expired in August 1994. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Mellon was not licensed by the Petitioner. Respondent Sandmann, Respondent O'Brien, and Mr. Mellon have been close friends for many years. Mr. Mellon formerly worked for O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon and Respondent Sandmann are old friends from college. The Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show permitted only new yachts or brokered yachts. Individuals were not supposed to sell boats in this show. Respondent O'Brien was aware of this restriction. In October 1995, Respondent O'Brien had the boat "Watermellon" displayed and listed for sale at the 36th Annual Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show. The asking price for the sale of the Watermellon was $425,000. Mr. Mellon is neither an officer or a director of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon signed a form styled "Application and Contract for Exhibit Space" so that the Watermellon could be exhibited at the boat show and on this application represented that he was a vice president of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Neither Respondent O'Brien or his company paid to put the Watermellon in the Boat Show and neither expected to receive any commission from the sale of the Watermellon. Respondent O'Brien was acting out of friendship with Mr. Mellon. 1/ On October 27, 1995, Peter Butler and Robert Badger, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, attended the Boat Show and went to the Watermellon. They observed a sign on the back of the boat that advised that the boat was being offered by O'Brien Yacht Sales and gave its telephone number. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger approached the boat and asked a person, later identified as Respondent Sandmann, whether Respondent O'Brien was aboard. Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that Respondent O'Brien was not aboard, asked if he could help them, and gave them a business card with his name and the name of O'Brien Yacht Sales on it. No licensed salesman was on board at this time, but Mr. Mellon, the owner of the boat, was aboard. 2/ Respondent Sandmann gave Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger a copy of a printed sheet containing basic information about the Watermellon. This sheet, referred to as a spec sheet, contained errors that Respondent Sandmann verbally corrected when he gave them the sheet. In response to questions, Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that the price of the boat was negotiable and that the commission would be paid by the seller. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger asked Respondent Sandmann if they could see a copy of the contract that a buyer would need to sign if he purchased the boat. In response, Respondent Sandmann contacted the O'Brien Yacht Sales office and had someone fax to him a copy of the contract used by O'Brien. Respondent Sandmann then gave the form contract to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger. The business card given by Respondent Sandmann to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger was printed in 1994 when Respondent Sandmann, who is fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian, accompanied Mr. Mellon to a boat show in Europe. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger did not inquire as to the amount of the commission that would have been paid by the seller of the Watermellon because Petitioner does not regulate commissions. None of Respondent Sandmann's acts, when considered individually, required a license from the Petitioner. 3/ The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat. It is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts. Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the Watermellon solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order as to these consolidated cases that dismisses the charges filed against these respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1996.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68326.002326.004
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES vs OCEAN JEWELERS, INC., 09-003480 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jun. 24, 2009 Number: 09-003480 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024
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