Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Peter Alagona, Jr., is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He is board-certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiology and has practiced cardiology since 1981. There is no evidence that the Respondent has been the subject of professional discipline except for this proceeding. In 1989, the Respondent became acquainted with V.P., who worked as a receptionist at a hospital where he had practice privileges. Their work relationship became friendly and, although the Respondent was married and had children, he and V.P. responded to each other's friendly manner by mutual flirtation. At first, their flirting was discrete but later became more open and romantic. The Respondent began to write V.P. notes and greeting cards and send her flowers. In approximately May, 1989, V.P. indicated her willingness to begin an intimate and sexual relationship. The Respondent did not hesitate to oblige her. There is no evidence that the Respondent used a doctor-patient relationship to induce V.P. to engage in sexual activity with him, as alleged. When the sexual relationship began, there was no doctor-patient relationship between them. During her tenure at work at the hospital, V.P. from time to time complained of a rapid heart beat, and one of the four cardiologists at the hospital would respond to her complaint. The Respondent was one of the several doctors who had occasion to respond. No treatment ever was required. V.P.'s heart beat would soon return to normal, and everyone would return to work. No true doctor-patient relationship was established, and neither the Respondent, the other doctors nor V.P. ever thought one had been established. The allegation that the Respondent essentially intentionally used drugs he prescribed for V.P. during the course of their affair to control her and prolong the sexual relationship with V.P. against her will hinges on the following reference in V.P.'s deposition transcript: Q. Just so that I'm clear, did Alagona ever tell you that if you did not have sex with him, he would not write prescriptions for you? A. Those aren't the words. He has made comments about, "Where are you going to get your prescriptions?" Q. When did he make those comments? A. I don't know. During the relationship, at the end of the relationship. Q. Give me some of the circumstances surrounding those comments. A. It was, I'm sure, during an argument or something. I don't know. In view of all the evidence, that allegation is rejected as not proven. It is factual that, in another poor judgment that flowed from the poor judgment in initiating and conducting the affair in the first place, the Respondent began to act as V.P.'s personal physician for limited purposes during the course of the affair. When she complained of migraine headaches, he prescribed pain medication such as Tylox, a Schedule II controlled substance containing oxycodone, and Inderal, a beta-blocker and a legend drug. For stress, he prescribed Valium, which contains diazepam, also a legend drug. Although the Respondent clearly was acting as the doctor in a doctor-patient relationship when he prescribed these drugs, he still did not view himself as acting in that role and did not keep a written record of the drugs or the course of treatment in connection with those prescriptions. The allegation that the Respondent failed to practice medicine in accordance with required standards of care by not ordering the patient to receive mental health counseling but instead inappropriately allowing the patient to remain on Tylox also depends in large part on the testimony of V.P. In view of all the evidence, V.P.'s testimony pertinent to this allegation is rejected. The evidence was that the Respondent repeatedly advised V.P. to seek counseling, albeit not for drug abuse. Until April, 1990, the Respondent was not aware that V.P. was abusing drugs. The Respondent's Tylox prescriptions were not excessive and would not, in and of themselves, have indicated to the Respondent that V.P. was abusing Tylox or inappropriately remaining on Tylox; nor did V.P. exhibit clear signs of drug abuse or addiction prior to April, 1990. However, V.P. apparently was obtaining Tylox and other legend drugs from other sources without the Respondent's knowledge. She was seeing other physicians for the purpose of obtaining prescriptions, and she also was forging the Respondent's and other doctors' names to prescriptions to obtain additional drugs illegally. (One of the doctors whose name she forged predeceased the date of the forged prescription.) In April, 1990, the Respondent was notified that V.P. had been hospitalized for a drug overdose. In response to the request for advice from the attending physician, the Respondent recommended a psychiatrist for counseling. However, V.P. did not cooperate. She attended only one counseling session and refused further counseling. After the overdose hospitalization, the Respondent did not prescribe any more Tylox. However, again without the Respondent's knowledge, V.P. continued to obtain Tylox and other drugs from her other sources. The Respondent's judgment continued to be distorted and poor as a result of his intense sexual and romantic relationship with V.P. He continued to urge V.P. to obtain counseling for several reasons but, again, not specifically for drug abuse. By mid-1990, V.P. had dissolved her marriage, and she began putting pressure on the Respondent to divorce his wife and marry her. She began acting erratically, and her judgment also was poor. During a week- long visit to her family's home during the summer of 1990, she contacted an old boy friend, married him, changed her mind, and began annulment proceedings. By late 1990, V.P. started dating another doctor, and the pressure on both V.P. and the Respondent increased. The Respondent was unable to decide what to do, and the stress got ever greater as V.P. threatened to end the affair with the Respondent. While probably genuinely concerned for V.P.'s welfare, the Respondent probably also believed that, if V.P. got counseling, she would "see the light" and decide not to end their affair. Finally, the Respondent himself felt the need for counseling due to the stress of the affair, and he probably believed that she felt the same stress. Eventually, in early 1991, V.P. followed through on her threat and made it known to the Respondent that she was dropping him and choosing the other doctor. For some time, the Respondent was devastated and continued to try to persuade V.P. to return to him. Meanwhile, V.P. remained less than resolute, holding out to the Respondent some hope that she would return to him if he divorced his wife. Finally, practically an emotional wreck and despairing of any other way to get over his affair with V.P., the Respondent checked himself into an out-of-town residential psychiatric program. He purposely did not tell V.P. where he was, but she found out and, on the day of his discharge, sent him flowers with a card saying that she would never let him go. Eventually, the affair ended, and V.P. married the other doctor soon after.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent not guilty under Counts I and II but guilty under Count III; (2) placing him on probation for two years; (3) requiring him to take appropriate continuing medical education, if available, dealing with the physician-patient relationship and the prudence of avoiding the dual sexual/physician-patient relationship; and (4) imposing on him an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2467 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-5. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, as to second sentence of 5., although he cannot now remember when he prescribed Tylox, the Respondent's testimony is accepted that, at the time, and for this extraordinary patient, he was able to bear in mind adequately approximately when and what he last prescribed so as not to expose V.P. to a health risk. 6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, as to the last sentence, although he cannot now remember his prescriptions, the Respondent's testimony is accepted that, at the time, and for this extraordinary patient, he was able to bear in mind adequately when and what he last prescribed so as not to expose V.P. to a health risk. 7.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that patients need to be kept under "surveillance." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. As to last sentence, rejected as not proven that all "drugs," in all doses, "control a patient's emotional state and level of pain." Accepted that some can, in certain doses, and otherwise accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted that it is not the only indication; subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. 13.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent "did not follow through with V.P.'s medical problems." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First two sentences, rejected as not proven; third, accepted that she said it, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. First sentence, rejected as not proven; rest, accepted that she said it, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Rejected as not proven that he reviewed all of the prescription and hospital records. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. To the extent not conclusion of law, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven; second, cumulative; third, in part cumulative and in part rejected as not proven (that he had no justification); fourth, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found (he did some diagnostic testing); and last two rejected as not proven in that the evidence was that V.P. rejected the Respondent's repeated recommendations to her that she seek mental health counseling, but otherwise accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, accepted but not necessary; rest, rejected as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-22. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate. Conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. 26.-27. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In large part, argument and conclusion of law; in part, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "clear . . . that V.P. feels that Alagona left her." (Much of their behavior is difficult to explain, such as why V.P. would act as if she did not want to let Alagona go, while chosing Palay over Alagona.) Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence of C), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "safe to infer that V.P. forged these prescriptions." (The evidence raises the question and possibility of forgery, especially in the absence of testimony on the subject from V.P. and Palay, but it is not "safe to infer.") Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. First four sentences, argument and subordinate. Rest, generally accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, while V.P. may have been "in the emotional driver's seat," it does not appear that she knew where she was going.) Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. As to the third and fourth sentences, there was no evidence as to the nature of doctors' "orders." But, based on the evidence, the Respondent did not "order" counseling. He suggested or recommended it and offered to help her get it, and V.P. declined. If the Respondent had "ordered" counseling, the patient still may or may not have followed his "order." In either case, it would appear that the critical decision is what a physician does in the face of the patient's failure to comply. It would seem that the only thing a physician reasonably can do in this situation is stop prescribing and, if necessary, terminate the physician-patient relationship. As to the rest, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 39.-42. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Rothenburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Regional Office VI-Legal Division 9325 Bay Plaza, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33619 L. D. Murrell, Esquire 319 Clematis Street, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-4618 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted the exemption from disqualification from employment that she is seeking.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On August 5, 1994, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County on drug charges. Later that same month, she was found guilty of (in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 94-26435-A), pursuant to a plea of no contest, the "purchase or possession with intent to purchase cocaine, possession of cocaine, and unlawful possession of cannabis as set forth in Counts 4, 5 & 6 of the Information." Adjudication of guilt was withheld. Petitioner was "sentenced [as a first-time offender] to credit for time served: to wit: SIX (6) DAYS as to Counts 4 & 5; and as to Count 6 the entry of [a] sentence [was] suspended." Thereafter, Petitioner voluntarily enrolled in a six- month, outpatient drug treatment program offered by the Family Health Center. While participating in the program, she attended Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings. Petitioner successfully completed the Family Health Center drug treatment program in February of 1996. (She has not participated in any drug treatment program since that time, although she has remained in contact with her counselor who had worked with her at the Family Health Center.) Some time following her successful completion of the Family Health Center drug treatment program, Petitioner began experiencing personal problems and started using illegal substances again as her way of dealing with these problems. She continued to engage in such unlawful conduct until approximately nine months ago, when she had a "spiritual" awakening and came to the realization that "[t]he lifestyle that [she was] liv[ing was] not for [her]." She started attending church on a regular basis and relying upon her religious beliefs, rather than drugs, to weather the difficult periods in her life. Since that time, she has remained drug-free, and it appears that she is fully committed to continuing her abstinence from the use of illegal substances. In or about March of 1999, after passing a drug test, Petitioner was hired by United Cerebral Palsy (UCP) to work as a patient technician serving disabled clients. Petitioner was employed by UCP for approximately six weeks. Her employment was terminated after background screening revealed the findings of guilt that had been entered against her in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 94-26435-A in August of 1994, which disqualified her from employment by UCP as a patient technician. Petitioner was told that she could reapply for a patient technician position if and when she obtained an exemption from disqualification from the Department. On April 5, 1999, Petitioner submitted such a request to the Department. Petitioner's request was reviewed by a committee composed of three Department employees. Petitioner appeared before the committee on May 6, 1999. She forthrightly told the committee about her post- treatment drug use. Two of the committee members recommended that Petitioner's application for an exemption be granted. The remaining committee member recommended that the application be denied. The matter was then referred to the District 11 Legal Office, which recommended denial of the application. The Acting District 11 Administrator, Sara Herald, followed the Legal Office's recommendation and, by letter dated May 13, 1999, notified Petitioner of her (Ms. Herald's) determination to deny Petitioner's application and of Petitioner's right to "request an administrative hearing" on the matter. Petitioner requested, and subsequently was afforded, such a hearing. Having considered the evidence presented at that hearing, including Petitioner's testimony (particularly that portion of her testimony concerning the lifestyle changes that she has made over the past nine months and the reasons for these changes, which testimony the undersigned finds credible), the undersigned is convinced that Petitioner has rehabilitated herself and that she will not present a danger if her exemption request is granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting the exemption that Petitioner has requested. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1999.
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Margie V. Gray Denomme worked the 3- to-11 shift as a licensed practical nurse on the orthopedic floor, 3 North, of West Florida Hospital, in Pensacola. On or about September 9, 1980, respondent was counseled for failing to record the administration of Stadol and Demerol, controlled substances, "on MAR." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. CHART NO. 670613 On December 19, 1980, Dr. Hooper ordered, inter alia, 10 to 12 milligrams of morphine sulfate for a patient (Chart No. 670613) "q 3-4 hrs prn pain." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. According to a Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, respondent administered 10 milligrams of a 15-milligram tubex of morphine (sulfate) to the patient at five o'clock on the afternoon of December 26, 1980, and wasted the other five milligrams, the wastage being witnessed by another licensed practical nurse, Ms. Grant. The December 26, 1980, patient progress notes for the patient, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, contain an entry reflecting administration of medication at five o'clock in the afternoon: [complaining] o[f] pain, medicated [with] M[orphine] S[ulfate] 10 mg IM . . . as stated by M. Denomme LPN." The entry is signed, "G. Grant LPN." The PRN medication administration record for this patient was signed by "G. Grant LPN" for the 3-to-11 shift on December 26, 1980. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. CHART NO. 667312 On December 17, 1980, Dr. Batson ordered morphine sulfate for this patient "1/4 to 1/6 IM q 34 PRN Pain." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. At quarter of seven on the evening of December 17, 1980, respondent administered 15 milligrams of morphine sulfate to the patient, using one 10-milligram tubex and half of another, the wastage being witnessed by another licensed practical nurse, Ms. Grant, all according to the Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. "v. Robertson, GPN" signed the patient's PRN medication administration record for the 3-to-11 shift on December 17, 1980. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. The nurses' notes contain this entry for 6:45 (pm.): "c/o pain-Medicated E MS 15 mg IM as stated by V. Robertson GPN-G. Grant GPN." CHART NO. 67194-3 For this patient, Dr. Batson ordered, among other things, "Morphine gr 1/6-gr 1/4 IM q 3-4 h prn pain. or Demerol 50-75-100 mg q 3-4 h IM prn pain. Tylenol #3 po T-TT q 3-4 h prn pain" on December 17, 1980, the date of his admission to West Florida Hospital's orthopedic ward. At half past six on the evening of December 17, 1980, the patient was given two tablets of Tylenol #3. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. He got another two tablets of Tylenol #3 about noon the following day. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On December 19, 1980, Randy Godwin, a licensed practical nurse at West Florida Hospital, signed a Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record indicating he had administered 15 milligrams of morphine to the patient at 6:20 p.m. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Attached to this Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record is an interoffice memorandum to the hospital pharmacy from Cynthia Ayres, R.N., Assistant Director of Nursing. Ms. Ayres wrote, "I have met with Randy Godwin, LPN and discussed his specific narcotic errors. He was terminated from employment at WFH. I did not allow him to correct these errors." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. There is no indication on this patient's PRN medication administration record that he was given any morphine on December 19, 1980. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. No administration of morphine on December 19, 1980, was charted in the patient's progress notes. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Respondent administered 75 milligrams of Demerol, the entire contents of a tubex, to this patient at half past seven on the evening of December 19, 1980, according to a Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. (Count II) At nine o'clock that night, the patient was watching television, and had no complaint of pain. JANUARY 24, 1981 As she administered narcotics to patients during the 3-to-11 shift on January 24, 1981, respondent dropped waste paper and other debris in the narcotics drawer of the medication cart she had charge of. Toward the end of the shift, she was in the process of cleaning out the narcotics drawer when she felt something wet. Exclaiming something like, "Oh God, look at this," (T. 156; Testimony of Peat), she retrieved a cardboard container soaked to the point of disintegration with a solution of morphine sulfate, in the presence of Sandra Jean Peat, Randy Godwin, and other nurses who were in the medical room on the orthopedic floor at the time. Respondent recorded these events in an incident report and took the five-tubex plastic sleeve to the hospital pharmacy, about quarter of eleven. She asked the hospital pharmacist, James Thomas Allred, "to swap them out for five good ones." (T. 88.) At Mr. Allred's request, respondent prepared a second incident report in which she stated: When I was cleaning the Narcotics drawer, I picked up some of the packages and felt moisture on my hands. I then took the cartridges out of the PCK & found solution in bottom of Plastic Jacket. Two cartridges had the stopper out & 1 cartridge was broken. The tabs were intact as wit- nessed by R. Godwin LPN. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. After the wet plastic sleeve had been exchanged for a new one, respondent returned to the floor to catch up on charting. By this time, Randy Godwin had left the hospital. Mr. Allred jotted down his own contemporaneous account on the Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record: Replaced a packet of five morphine sulfate 15 mgs. for a packet of five returned by M. Denomme LPN. The packet returned had two syringes with their rubber plungers out. One of these two syringes was broken. All tabs were intact except for the broken syringe. The cart count will remain the same. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. When respondent noticed broken glass in the five-tubex plastic sleeve, after another nurse had seen the sleeve with all tabs intact but before respondent took it to the pharmacy, she opened a tab to fish out syringe shards. The evidence clearly and convincingly established that somebody tampered with more than one of the disposable syringes or tubexes inside the plastic sleeve. Although factory defects . . . do occur, this was not a case of defective manufacture; a needle had punctured the sleeve. As the medication nurse for the 3-to-11 shift, respondent had signed for the narcotics and controlled drugs in the medication cart and taken the keys at three o'clock on the afternoon of January 24, 1981. Petitioner's Exhibit No. When she counted narcotics, before assuming responsibility for them, respondent did not pick up each item. Looking down into the narcotics drawer, she would not necessarily have known whether the bottom of the cardboard container holding two plastic sleeves, each of which contained five 15-milligram tubexes of morphine sulfate, was wet. Respondent was the third person to sign the Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record as "oncoming nurse." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. She had the keys to the medication cart during the entire 3-to-11 shift except when she went to supper or took a break. No patient on the orthopedic floor received any morphine sulfate during the whole 24-hour-period. CHART NO. 682231 Also on January 24, 1981, respondent administered two tablets of Tylenol #3 to this patient at 5:30 and another two tablets of Tylenol #3 at 9:35, according to a Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. This "patient had been medicated with Tylenol #3 since January 20th, and this medication had held her . . . for a period of at least four hours." (T. 55.) Respondent signed out for 75 milligrams of Demerol for this patient but wasted it, in the presence of Randy Godwin. Randy Godwin did not sign the Narcotics and Controlled Drug Administration Record as a witness, however. OTHER MATTERS There was absolutely no evidence that respondent acted strangely or as if under the influence of a controlled substance at any time between September, 1980, and February, 1981. No evidence was adduced regarding anything that happened on or about February 8, 1981. On or about January 30, 1981, Altha Steen Chandler, then a ward clerk on the 3-to-11 shift for the orthopedic floor, told Gail Price that, two weeks earlier, while cleaning in the conference room, she had knocked respondent's purse off a table; that the purse opened when it fell; and that she saw containers of codeine, Demerol, and Benadryl. On hearing this, Ms. Price promptly relayed it to Bonnie Ellen Ripstein, then departmental nursing supervisor over surgical floors. The truth of this allegation, repeated under oath at the hearing (T. 5), was not clearly and convincingly established, considering all the evidence. There was no proof that any codeine was ever missing or unaccounted for at West Florida Hospital at any time between September of 1980 and February of 1981. The only record keeping irregularity with which respondent has been charged regarding Demerol has to do with records kept on January 24, 1981, after the ward clerk claims to have seen a vial of Demerol in her purse. The substances themselves were not in evidence. Ms. Chandler's testimony about their packaging was contradictory: "The demerol and the codeine was in a plastic like container and had red writing on it. The benadryl was in a brown container, and it had yellow writing on it . . . . The benadryl was a glass vial, but the other two vials, seemed like they were plastic to me." (T. 16.) Respondent admits that she regularly carries a vial of Benadryl in her purse; she testified that she is allergic to bee stings. She denied that there was codeine or Demerol in her purse on or about January 16, 1981, and claimed to be allergic both to codeine and to Demerol. At some point,, Ms. Ripstein was given the assignment of auditing narcotics records with which respondent, Randy Godwin, Nancy Torch, and Debra Mann, now Rezzarday, had been involved. None of the four is now employed at West Florida Hospital. This audit turned up most of the charges made against respondent in these proceedings. STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS The nurses at West Florida Hospital were strongly encouraged to finish their duties before shift's end to avoid their employer's having to pay overtime wages. Once, when respondent stayed late to finish her charting, she was reprimanded even though she had clocked out. On the orthopedic floor, a nurse who was "caught up" with her work would chart for other nurses who were busy, indicating on the records that she was relying on oral representations of another nurse. This practice was against hospital policy and does not conform to minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. It is also a departure from minimal standards to waste a controlled substance like Demerol without a witness's signing the control sheet at the time the drug is wasted. It was not shown that any patient suffered any injury at respondent's hands or on her account. The written closing argument of respondent and petitioner's proposed recommended order have been considered in preparation of the foregoing findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance, except where unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for thirty days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Moody, Jr., Esquire Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary 119 North Monroe Street Department of Professional Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Allen W. Lindsay, Jr., Esquire Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Post Office Box 586 Milton, Florida 32570 Helen P. Keefe Executive Director Board of Nursing 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent's license as a practical nurse should be disciplined for the violations as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent, Deborah Breski, held a license as a practical nurse in the State of Florida, license number 0584471. On August 26, 1990, Ms. Breski was employed at Sunrise Manor Nursing Home, Ft. Pierce, Florida, worked the morning shift on Hoffman A Wing, and was assigned to care for patient G. M. G. M.'s physician had ordered that 20 mg of Morphine be administered orally to G. M. no more often than every 4 hours, as needed for pain. Due to his throat cancer, G.M. had difficulty swallowing. On August 26, 1990, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Respondent signed-out 20 mg Morphine liquid for patient G. M. on this patient's Controlled Drug Record. Respondent subsequently initialed patient G. M.'s Medication Record and Profile to indicate her administration of Morphine liquid to this patient at approximately 2:00 p.m. Respondent charted the administration of 10 cc Morphine [the same as 20 mg] to patient G. M. at approximately 2:00 p.m. on August 26, 1990, on the Nurse's Medication Notes. She did not watch the patient ingest the drug, because it takes him a long time to swallow, and she had other patients who needed their medication. She did not, however, chart the effectiveness of the drug on the patient later in her shift. At approximately 3:15 p.m. on August 26, 1990, Respondent was relieved from her assignment on Hoffman Wing by LPN Michelle Delancy. Ms. Delancy prepared patient G. M.'s 6:00 p.m. dose of Morphine liquid. When she came to the patient she discovered a cup of liquid at the patient's bedside. Nurse Delancy asked G. M. if he had taken his pain medication earlier, and he respondend "no". Ms. Delancy then summoned Mr. Breski to patient G. M.'s room and questioned her as to the cup and its contents. Ms. Breski asked Ms. Delancy what Respondent should do with the unused medication, and Ms. Delancy indicated that it was Ms. Breski's Morphine and that she should take care of it. Ms. Breski then poured the unused Morphine back into patient G. M.'s original prescription bottle, in an effort to allow its reuse, and save the patient expense. The proper procedure for wasting medications such as Morphine is to dispose of the medication in the presence of another nurse, and to obtain that nurse's signature as verification that she had witnessed the wastage. Ms. Delancy did not witness Respondent's "disposal" of patient G. M.'s unused Morphine. The Department does not contend that Ms. Breski improperly took the Morphine herself or gave it to anyone else; it was poured back into the bottle. Ms. Breski did not document patient G. M.'s failure to consume his Morphine liquid, or her disposal of the medication by pouring it back into the prescription bottle; neither did she correct her previous charting. Patient G. M.'s records indicate that he received and ingested his scheduled 2:00 p.m. dose of Morphine. Ms. Breski's failure to observe the patient consume his medication created a potentially harmful situation. The patient G. M. could have taken his medication just prior to receiving his next scheduled dose, and would then have received a double dose of Morphine, which would have exceeded his physician's order. An expert for the Department opined that based upon a review of the evidence presented by Petitioner, Ms. Breski inaccurately and falsely recorded that she had administered medication to a patient when she had not actually done so; that Respondent did administer medication in a negligent manner, by not watching (and therefore ensuring) that the patient took the medication; and she made or filed a false report or record which she knew to be false, by documenting that she had administered the medication to the patient when she had not actually done so.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Nursing enter a Final Order finding that Deborah Breski has violated Sections 464.018(1)(f) and (h), Florida Statutes, (1989) and Rule 210-10.005(1)(e)(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent should therefore be reprimanded by the Board, fined an administrative fine of $250.00, and placed on probation for a period of one year, subject to the requirement of taking an appropriate continuing education course which includes instruction on the administration, charting and proper means to waste medication. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of October, 1991. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Tracey Scott Hartman Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Deborah Breski 803 Cory Campbell Road Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Judie Ritter, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Nursing 111 Coastline Drive, East Room 50 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witness and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida authorized to regulate the licensure and discipline of physicians practicing within this state. Respondent, Charles C. Vassar, M.D., is a licensed physician in this state, license no. ME 0021039. In October, 1984, while investigating a complaint which had been filed with the Department, Hugh Fitzpatrick interviewed the Respondent with regard to activities conducted by the Fountain of Life Medical Clinic located in Miami, Florida. During the course of the interview, Respondent admitted he was employed at the clinic but his specific duties and role there were not disclosed. Also unknown is the period of time the Respondent was employed by the clinic. The record in this matter does not indicate what medical services were rendered by the Respondent or the clinic. Apparently, other doctors were also employed at the clinic but their responsibilities are also unknown. Burden of proof for the revocation of a license is that the evidence must be clear and convincing. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1987). Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, which have, in some instances, been renumbered since the filing of the administrative complaint. All subsections have, however, remained substantially in effect at all times material to the allegations. Count one claimed Respondent had violated section 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes. This subsection provides, in part: The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (2) may be taken: (g) Prescribing, dispensing, administering, mixing, or otherwise preparing a legend drug, including any controlled substance, other than in the course of the physician's professional practice. The Department has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent prescribed, mixed or dispensed a legend drug. Assuming that a procaine compound was mixed at the clinic, there is no evidence which clarifies that such substance is or was at the time a "legend drug." Further, the only evidence which links Respondent to the mixing of a procaine drug is an admission allegedly made, to investigator Fitzpatrick. Assuming further that the procaine mixed at the clinic by Respondent was a legend drug, there is no evidence which would suggest the substance was prepared and administered other than in the course of the physician's practice. Consequently, Count one must fail. Count two claimed Respondent had violated Section 458.33l(1)(g), Florida Statutes. This subsection, now numbered 458.331(1)(f) , provides: Aiding, assisting, procuring, or advising any unlicensed person to practice medicine contrary to this chapter or to a rule of the department or the board. The Department has not proved by clear and convincing evidence the allegations contained in count two. The Department presented no evidence regarding unlicensed persons at the clinic. The only reference to other employees related to other physicians at the clinic. In this case it is impossible to determine whether or not unlicensed individuals practiced medicine at the clinic and whether such individuals were somehow aided by Respondent. Consequently, Respondent cannot be found guilty of Count two. Count three maintained Respondent had violated Section 458.331(1)(1), Florida Statutes. That subsection, now numbered 458.331(1)(k), provides: (k) Making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine. The Department Presented no evidence of Respondent having made deceptive or untrue statements in the practice of medicine. The Department did not offer a single witness who had allegedly been treated by Respondent. Further, there was no documentary evidence which indicated Respondent had made false or fraudulent representations to anyone. Accordingly, Count three must fail. Count four alleged Respondent had violated Section 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes. This subsection, 458.331(1)(m), provides: (m) Failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including, but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results. In this case, the Department did not establish what records, if any, were kept by the Fountain of Life Clinic. The investigator in this case did not request copies of the relevant medical records at the time the complaint was made. Respondent may have kept adequate records or may not have. By the time the Department sought the records from the clinic, the owners or others in control of the records had disappeared and Respondent was no longer employed there. Further, there was no evidence linking Respondent to the ownership or control of the clinic. As a result, there is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to keep medical records justifying the course of treatment given to patients. The Department's delay of several months before it attempted to subpoena information and the fact that records were not found does not establish that the proper records were never kept by Respondent. Count five of the administrative complaint claimed Respondent had violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. This subsection provides, in part: (t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The record in this case is totally void of any evidence which would support Count five. The testimony of Mark Montgomery, the toxicologist, did not suggest that the allegations against Respondent, if true, constituted gross or repeated malpractice. The Department offered no other expert to establish a reasonably prudent similar physician would have found Respondent had failed to practice medicine with the requisite skill under similar conditions and circumstances. Consequently, Count five has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence. Count six alleged Respondent had violated Section 458.331(1)(h), Florida Statutes. This subsection, now 458-.331(1)(g), provides: Failing to perform any statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licenced physician. The Department has not shown what statutory or legal obligation Respondent failed to perform. Since the Department has not, by clear and convincing evidence, established a specific violation, Respondent cannot be found to have violated any statutory obligation. Similarly, the Department has not shown a violation or legal obligation. Therefore, based upon the allegation of Count six, Respondent must be found not guilty. Count seven based its allegations on the previous counts and concluded that Respondent had Violated Section 458.33l(1)(x), Florida Statutes. This subsection Provides: Violating any provision of this chapters - a rule of the board or department, or a lawful order of the board or department previously entered in a disciplinary hearing or failing to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena of the department. Based upon the conclusions reached above as to each count of the administrative complaint, Count seven must also fail. Since there is insufficient proof that Respondent violated a provision of the chapter, and since the Department did not argue a rule or order violation, Respondent must also be found not guilty of Count seven. In reaching the conclusions found herein, consideration has been given to the admissions Respondent allegedly made to Mr. Fitzpatrick. However, the weight given to the investigator's testimony in this matter was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing burden. Mr. Fitzpatrick used an investigative report to refresh his recollection. This report was apparently prepared many weeks after his interview with the doctor. While there is certainly nothing improper in the use of the document to refresh recollection, the inconsistencies between his refreshed recollection and his recollection without the report suggest that Mr. Fitzpatrick had no independent recollection of the pertinent specifics of the interview. In several instances Mr. Fitzpatrick recited information directly gleaned from the report for which he admitted no recollection. Further, it is clear that the report contained information beyond the scope of the interview with Respondent which Mr. Fitzpatrick may have relied upon in reaching the facts adduced in his testimony. For these reasons the investigator's testimony was given little weight in adjudging the record in this cause.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine enter a final order finding the Respondent not guilty of all counts of the administrative complaint and dismissing the cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs A. 1-3 are accepted. Paragraphs B.1-7 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs B.8-l6, the weight of Mr. Fitzpatricks testimony and the admissions Dr. Vassar allegedly made during one interview (the notes of the interview were not transcribed timely) is insufficient to make findings of fact as specified. Mr. Fitzpatrick did not appear to have independent knowledge (aside from the report) of the facts which he testified to and did not indicate whether the source of the information offered as fact was a direct result of the conversation with Dr. Vassar or other information gathered in this investigation. See findings made in paragraphs 3-6. Paragraphs B. 17-18 are accepted but are unnecessary, irrelevant, or immaterial to the findings in this cause. Paragraphs B. 19-32 are accepted as a recitation of Montgomery's testimony but do not constitute findings of fact that the Respondent utilized the procaine compound described by Montgomery or falsely represented its value to treat old age. In other words, the Petitioner failed to establish the underlying facts to justify Montgomerys conclusion. Further, Montgomery did not testify that such conduct, if true, violated a standard of failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Were there clear and convincing evidence Respondent used the substance described by Montgomery and Misrepresented its value, the testimony would support the misrepresentation claim but that is not the record in this cause. Paragraph B. 23 is accepted. Paragraphs B. 34-35 are rejected since they are not findings of fact but constitute argument, comment, or conclusions. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-2 are accepted. Paragraphs 2-4 -are rejected since they represent a recitation of rulings made in this case and do constitute a finding of fact. Paragraphs 5-6 are rejected as argument, comment or conclusions which are not findings of fact. Paragraphs 7-8 are accepted only to the extent that they find it is unclear from this record whether or not procaine is a legend drug. No findings of fact are made in Paragraphs 9-20, accordingly they are rejected as argument, conclusions of law, or comment. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter S. Fleitman Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Michael I. Schwartz 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 22301 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 forth Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
