The Issue Whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, (the "Department"), acted arbitrarily or illegally in deciding to award the Intervenor, Intergraph Corporation, the contract for RFP-DOT-93/94 9008? The parties stipulated that the Department did not act fraudulently or dishonestly in issuing its notice to award the contract to Intergraph.
Findings Of Fact Data Voice and its Relationship to Intergraph Data Voice, Inc., is certified by the Department of Management Services as a minority business enterprise within the following specialty area: Intergraph microstation CAD software, computer equipment, IBM computer equipment, NEC computer equipment, and other micro-computer equipment, software and accessories. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Data Voice has had a business relationship with Intergraph Corporation at least since December 5, 1991, when it entered into a Distribution Agreement with Intergraph. The agreement described Intergraph as the marketer and manufacturer of highly sophisticated CAD/CAM equipment, including hardware and software. Recognizing that users would be properly served only with professional pre- sale and post-sale demonstration, orientation, training and support, and upon Data Voice's representation that it had the experience and resources necessary to explain, demonstrate and support Intergraph products, Data Voice undertook, among other responsibilities, the business of licensing, installing and supporting certain Intergraph products. Petitioner's Ex. No. 14. Data Voice later became a Value Added Dealer ("VAD") for Intergraph under the name "Intergraph Solutions Center" in an agreement effective June 7, 1993. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. Data Voice is one of a number of companies that Intergraph refers to as Intergraph Solutions Centers. The relationship was upgraded on August 27, 1993, when Data Voice became a Value Added Reseller, ("VAR"). Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10. Data Voice's status with Intergraph as a VAR was renewed in an agreement effective January 4 of this year. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9. Intergraph has approximately 176 VARs in the country; seven in Florida in 10 locations, one of whom is Data Voice, headquartered in Melbourne. A VAR is a higher caliber reseller than a VAD. Daniel Thomas Marshall, Intergraph's Regional Channel Manager for the Southeast, refers to them as "professional" whereas VADs are low-level dealers or "storefronts," in a position to provide some support, but not to be "proactive" in all cases. Tr. 54. In contrast, "[VARs] have more of the application products in addition to the products listed under our VAD agreement." Tr. 54. The use of value added resellers is common in the computer industry. Other companies that utilize this indirect method for sales of their products include IBM, Hewlett-Packard, DEC, Sun Microsystems, Autodek, GeoPack, ESRI, and Pro-Engineer. VAR Pricing Benefits to End-Users End-users are the parties ultimately using the software or computer product. In this case, the Department will be the end-user. Because Intergraph sells products to its VARs at a discount, VARs are in a position to offer Intergraph products to end-users at a price below that offered by Intergraph itself. If the contract is awarded to Intergraph, Data Voice, as a VAR, will be selling Intergraph products directly to the Department at a price lower than if the Department were buying the products directly from Intergraph. Besides lower prices, a VAR can provide services to the user of an Intergraph product, such as installing Intergraph products and integrating those products with non-Intergraph software. Data Voice, however, despite customary arrangements and its own contractual power as an Intergraph Solutions Center, is not described in Intergraph's proposal as the provider of any specific services. See Findings of Fact 17 et seq., below. The RFP and the Responses of Intergraph and GDS Through the RFP, the Department sought proposals to implement a pilot project for the Office of Right of Way. The pilot project will result in the establishment of an automated system that meets the capability of importing graphic data from Department and local government CAD and GIS systems while maintaining the object intelligence of the graphic entities, if possible. Using graphic data imported from the CAD system to create a base map of the project, the prototype application would be developed by the proposer to access data stored in the Department's Right of Way Control System and link that data to the appropriate parcels identified in the base map. The system will be menu-driven and geared toward a user who has very little technical knowledge of computers. (Emphasis omitted.) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 16. The RFP provided further that The Department will add up to 20 points to the scores of firms (Non-CMBE) utilizing Certified MBE's as subcontractors for services or commodities as follows: 10 percent - 19 percent of total project dollars - 8 points. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 16. Both GDS and Intergraph submitted timely responses to the RFP. Joint Exhibit No. 1. Intergraph's response included Form "D", a form provided by the Department for "MBE Preference Points Certification." On the form, Intergraph stated that it would use Data Voice as a Minority Business Enterprise. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. One of the reasons Intergraph included Data Voice in its proposal was to obtain MBE preference points pursuant to the RFP. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The type of work to be provided by Data Voice is listed in Form "D" as "Software and services." (emphasis supplied). The dollar amount of Data Voice's participation is just enough to qualify for eight preference points for use of a certified minority business enterprise as a subcontractor. It is listed as $21,900, precisely 10 percent of the Total Maximum Amount of the price of Intergraph's work as shown on Form "C," the "Price Proposal Form" for "Implementation of a Geographic Information System (GIS)." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. (Part II-Price Proposal Number RFP- DOT-93/94-9008, "Intergraph Corporation's Approach to the Implementation of a Geographic Information System (GIS) Pilot Project for the Office of Right of Way.") Despite the reference on Form D to Data Voice's provision of services in addition to software, the remainder of the proposal does not describe services to be provided by Data Voice. Moreover, it is not clear from the rest of Intergraph's proposal what "services" are left to be performed by Data Voice. For example, despite testimony from Intergraph's Southeast Regional Channel Manager that Data Voice could install the Intergraph software for the Department and provide other support to assist the Department in making the software operational, Section 5.3 of a document included in Intergraph's proposal states: "Intergraph shall be responsible for unpacking, uncrating, and installing the ... Software and in all other respects making the ... Software operational." (emphasis supplied). Petitioner's Exhibit 3. See "Purchase Agreement Between State of Florida Department of Transportation and Intergraph Corporation." Furthermore, in Appendix A-1, Software Services of Intergraph's proposal the following is stated in Section 5.0, Scope of Work - Software: For the charges itemized in Appendix A of this Contract, Intergraph agrees to provide software services to maintain the software in operating condition. On-call service will be provided from Intergraph's Huntsville, Alabama, office via telephone communications between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 7 p.m. Central Standard Time (Monday through Friday), or via other appropriate media when deemed necessary. If in-depth software maintenance is required, Intergraph may provide on-site services. (emphasis supplied). Intergraph's proposal abounds with other examples indicating that Intergraph will perform services related to software, ranging from Intergraph personnel listed as a software analyst and in other capacities to providing a toll-free phone-in service to Intergraph software support groups on a 24-hour basis. In none of these examples is Data Voice involved as a provider of services related to software or, for that matter, even mentioned. Nonetheless, witnesses in the employ of Intergraph maintained that Data Voice, as a supplier of software to the Department, would install the software and provide other support services. It is standard procedure for the entity that provides the software, in this case Data Voice, to install and support the software. Testimony to this effect was offered after Intergraph had written to the Department that, "Per our recent telephone conversation, we understand that Data Voice would now be precluded from providing the additional services as it was not so specified in our proposal." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Unlike Intergraph, GDS determined after close examination that, without a subcontractor being part of their technical team in the effort to develop the application, there was no way to subcontract any meaningful part of its response. As a result, GDS did not propose to subcontract with a certified minority business enterprise and gained no preference points when the responses were opened and the results tabulated and posted. Opening of the Responses, Posting of the Results, and the Department's Decision The Department opened the responses to the RFP on January 14, 1994. On February 4, 1994, the Department posted the following results: GDS Intergraph Criteria Criteria 1: 2: Management Plan Technical/ Presentation Plan 20.33 30.33 22.00 34.33 Criteria 3: Work Plan 16.00 12.67 Criteria 4: Price 10.00 7.03 Criteria 5: Certified MBE 0.00 8.00 TOTAL 76.66 84.03 Based on these scores, the Department gave notice of its intent to award the contract to Intergraph. Had Intergraph not received 8 preference points for the participation of Data Voice as a subcontractor, GDS would have outscored Intergraph by 0.63 points, 76.66 to 76.03. With such scores, presumably the Department would have issued a notice of intent to award the contract to GDS. Concern of the Project Manager Intergraph's winning score led to a concern for Susan Day, an administrator of corridors and facilities for the Department, and project manager of the RFP with responsibility for compliance as to CMBE participation. She contacted the Department's legal counsel "to check into whether the MBE points were legal." Tr. 91. She contacted the Department's contractual services office to discuss it. And she contacted two people at the Department of Management Services. On February 9, 1994, she wrote Lee Kallett, Senior Sales Representative for Intergraph seeking "[i]mmediate clarification ... regarding the 'software and services' to be provided by the sub-consultant (Data Voice, Inc.) ...". The letter ended with a request, "Please provide me with the specifics regarding the software and services that will be provided by Data Voice, Inc." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Mr. Kallett provided the Department with the requested quick response. On February 11, 1994, he wrote, In addition to reselling Intergraph products, Data Voice is also equipped to provide programming and data conversion services as well as customized documentation and training. It had been our original intent to have Data Voice perform some of these functions in conjunction with this project, thereby increasing the CMBE content of our bid. However, at the time that proposals were due, we had been unable to determine exactly how much of these activities could be addressed by Data Voice and so we identified them as the software provider only. Per our recent telephone conversation, we understand that Data Voice would now be precluded from providing the additional services as it was not so specified in our proposal. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. In reply, Ms. Day asked for more specificity. In a February 15 letter she asked Mr. Kallett to "identify the products, by name, and the cost per item to be provided by Data Voice, Inc." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. She needed complete information because the Department wanted to make an informed decision in light of the receipt of an intent to protest. Id. The next day, Mr. Kallett, by letter, provided a list of the software with Data Voice's price, as follows: Modular GIS Environment Systems Nucleus $5781 MGE Analyst 4129 MGE Projection Manager 4129 ORACLE RDMS Base Product 3302 ORACLE SQL * Plus Database Utility 306 DB Access - Runtime NT 124 CogoWorks 1652 MGE TIGER Translator 826 DB Access-Runtime Windows/DOS 413 MGE Project Viewer 1239 Total Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8. $21,901 The products are owned and developed exclusively by Intergraph with the exception of three: ORACLE RDMS Base Product priced at $3,302; ORACLE SQL * Plus Database Utility priced at $306; and, CogoWorks priced at $1652. The total price of the three non-Intergraph products is $5,260 leaving the total price of the Intergraph products to be $16,641. Data Voice Inventory The software products listed by Lee Kallett are not all kept in stock by Data Voice. Instead, Data Voice uses a "just- in-time" system of inventory. Under this system, products can be delivered to Data Voice overnight or within two days and, therefore, there is no necessity to keep products in inventory. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17. The "just-in-time" system of inventory is standard in the computer industry. Tr. 49-50. There are exceptions to the "just-in-time" system of inventory used by Data Voice. For example, Oracle products are kept in stock. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17, p. 18. Opinion of the DMS Bureau of Minority Business Assistance Thaddeus Fortune, compliance administrator, was one of the people at the Department of Management Services contacted by Susan Day. Ms. Day asked him whether credit would be approved for a minority business enterprise if they received a product from a prime contractor, did nothing to it, and then sold it back to the prime contractor. He indicated that such credit would not be approved. Tr. 82. But Raymond Bryant, certification administrator in the Bureau of Minority Business Assistance at the Department, testified that a vendor with expertise to sell computer products, install them, and provide support for those products, and certified by the Department as a minority business enterprise in those areas would not be regarded by him as a "pass-through." Tr. 80. And Mr. Fortune, when asked about this case, said that investigation would need to be conducted to determine whether Data Voice has some other role besides simply purchasing software from Intergraph and selling it back to Intergraph. Tr. 83. If, for example, the product was sold directly by Data Voice to the end-user, in this case to the Department rather than back to Intergraph, then Data Voice, in Mr. Fortune's opinion, would not be a conduit but a legitimate supplier. Tr. 84. If Data Voice provided support services to the Department, in addition to the software, it would not be considered a conduit by Mr. Fortune. Tr. 85. And Mr. Fortune would approve credit for CMBE participation if Data Voice in the capacity of a sub-contractor installed the software as well as provided it as part of a single price under the contract. Tr. 87. But, if Data Voice did not install it and only provided technical support as a consultant, Mr. Fortune would need to know the degree of technical support before reaching an opinion. Mere training by Intergraph of Data Voice to provide technical support by way of answering the end-users' questions, for example, would not reach a high enough level of support to allow approval of CMBE credit by Mr. Fortune. Tr. 87-88.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order which dismisses the bid protest brought by GDS. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-905BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Graphic Data Systems Corporation. Petitioner's findings of fact Nos. 1-15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25- 29 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact 16, the evidence did not establish clearly whether Data Voice's participation is limited solely to supplying software. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact 19, the evidence established that the products referred-to are not kept in stock by Data Voice, but that a "just-in-time" system is used by Data Voice. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact 22, 23 and 24 are rejected. Data Voice has sold before to the general public at least Oracle RDMS base product. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17, Deposition of James Witherspoon, p. 18, lines 6-10. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Department of Transportation Intervenor's proposed findings of fact 1-16 are accepted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Intervenor's proposed finding of fact 17, the first sentence is a conclusion of law. The second sentence is not accepted. It was not clearly established that Data Voice will provided services, only that it is standard procedure for Data Voice to do so. The proposal indicates Intergraph will provide services related to software but it may be that the proposal simply recognizes Intergraph's ultimate responsibility as the prime contractor for providing those services. It was not clearly established that Data Voice will not provide services either. The third sentence is accepted insofar as it is both useful and common in the industry for Data Voice to provide software directly to the Department at a lower price than would Intergraph. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Intergraph Corporation Respondent's findings of fact 1-17, and 20-24, in substance, are accepted insofar as material. With respect to finding of fact 18, see the ruling on Intervenor's finding of fact 17, above. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire Lindsey & Williams 1343 East Tennessee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ellen T. Chadwell, Esquire Beck, Spalla, & Barrios 1026 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Thomas H. Duffy, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Martha Harrell Chumbler, Esquire Paul Vazquez, Esquire Carlton, Fields, et al. 215 South Monroe Street Suite 500 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Petitioner should receive a passing grade on the September 1997 Hearing Aid Specialist examination.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In September 1997, Petitioner was a trainee and candidate for licensure as a hearing aid specialist, pursuant to Chapter 484, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64B6-8, Florida Administrative Code. A trainee studying hearing aid dispensing must do so under the direct supervision of a “sponsor” who is an active Florida licensed hearing aid specialist with an established place of business. Section 484.0445, Florida Statutes; Rule 64B6- 8.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner’s sponsor was Gerald Amato, a hearing aid specialist of over 20 years’ experience. Mr. Amato was a franchisee of Beltone, a manufacturer of audiometric equipment, including hearing aids and audiometers. Beltone supplied all of the equipment used by Petitioner. An “audiometer” is a piece of equipment that measures a person’s ability to hear, and is regularly used by hearing aid specialists and trainees. Petitioner testified that, shortly before he commenced his training program, Beltone converted from manual audiometers to computerized audiometers. Petitioner contends that he was placed at an unfair disadvantage because the examination proctors would not allow him to plug in his computerized audiometer for use during the examination. Petitioner argued that the older, manual audiometers provide visual cues such as dials and meters even when they are not plugged in, cues that assist the trainee to successfully complete the examination. The computerized audiometer, on the other hand, presents nothing but a blank screen when it is not plugged in. Petitioner acknowledged that no one taking the exam was allowed to plug in an audiometer. However, he contended that this was a situation in which technology had outpaced the testing procedures, and that Respondent should have made provisions for persons with computerized equipment to take the exam on an even footing with persons using manual equipment. Ms. Wilma Ferrer, a psychometrician familiar with the hearing aid specialist examination procedures, testified that candidates were informed they could not plug in their audiometers at least three times before they sat for the exam. The “Candidate Information Booklet,” sent by mail to candidates about a month before the exam, expressly states: “Each candidate is required to bring an audiometer with recorded speech and/or live voice capability to be used during the candidate’s examination. Do not plug in audiometer during examination.” During the hands-on portion of the exam, candidates demonstrate proper procedures, using the proctors as their subjects. If the audiometers were plugged in, there would be some chance of damaging the proctors’ hearing during the exam. Ms. Mary Lou Lauster, an expert regarding hearing aid specialists, testified that the purpose of the audiometer portion of the exam is to permit candidates to demonstrate they know which buttons to push to perform each audiometer function, and that they know how to properly fit the headset. Ms. Lauster conceded that some of the older audiometers provide visual cues, but stated her opinion that Petitioner would not be disadvantaged by his use of the computerized audiometer, if he knew how to run it. According to Ms. Lauster, the exam is simply an opportunity for the candidate to talk his or her way through the procedures, and it should make no difference whether the audiometer is plugged in. In other words, the candidate should not need visual cues to successfully negotiate the examination. Ms. Lauster denied the implication that the examiners and the agency itself were unprepared to deal with Petitioner’s new equipment. She testified that other candidates have used the same computerized equipment with success and without incident. At the hearing, Petitioner suggested that a better policy might be to require all candidates to be tested on a single, standard audiometer, so that no candidate could be perceived to have an unfair advantage. Ms. Lauster disagreed with this suggestion, stating that candidates are generally more comfortable using the audiometers with which they were trained. It is found that Respondent’s decision not to allow candidates to plug in their audiometers during the examination was rational and supported by legitimate concerns for the proctors’ hearing. Petitioner was given ample notice that he would not be allowed to plug in his audiometer. Other candidates using the same or similar equipment have successfully completed the examination. All candidates were treated equally in this regard, and Petitioner was not entitled to a special exemption from Respondent’s clearly stated testing policy. Respondent was well aware of the trend in the industry away from manual audiometers, and considered the existence of newer, computerized equipment in deciding to maintain its testing policy of not allowing audiometers to be plugged in during the examinations. Petitioner suggested that his equipment presented a brand new situation that Respondent had not anticipated, but this suggestion was not supported by the evidence presented at hearing. Petitioner also claimed that the proctor engaged him in unnecessary conversation regarding his audiometer, and that this conversation distracted him during the examination. Even crediting Petitioner’s version of events, this conversation cannot be found to have caused Petitioner’s poor performance on the practical portion of the examination. For reasons that cannot be attributed to Respondent, Petitioner entered the examination anticipating that he would be allowed to plug in his audiometer. The undersigned does not doubt Petitioner’s assertion that his performance on the examination was adversely affected when he was not allowed to plug in his audiometer. However, the fault lies with Petitioner, not with Respondent. Petitioner is not entitled to the award of any additional points in the practical portion of the examination. In his challenge letter, Petitioner also contested Questions 1 and 20 of the written, multiple choice portion of the examination. At hearing, Petitioner withdrew his challenge of Question 20. Each of the written questions was worth one point. Petitioner failed the examination by three points. Thus, even if it were found that he should be awarded one point for Question 1, Petitioner would not achieve a passing score. Petitioner’s challenge of Question 1 will nonetheless be addressed, to ensure a complete record in this proceeding. Question 1 referred to the effect that the addition of an “air” vent would have on an earmold. Petitioner chose the answer that it would “accentuate the low frequencies.” The correct answer was that it would “reduce the feeling of pressure in the ear canal.” Ms. Lauster testified that, while venting may accentuate frequencies, it does not necessarily relate to high or low frequencies. A vent may accentuate high or low frequencies, depending on the size of the vent. The general tendency is for a vent to enhance high frequencies. Ms. Lauster's opinion was supported by a standard textbook on hearing instrument science and fitting practices. It was undisputed that the addition of an air vent does relieve pressure in the ear canal. Thus, the best answer to Question 1 was “reduce the feeling of pressure in the ear canal.” Respondent correctly found that Petitioner’s response to Question 1 was not the best answer, and correctly denied him credit for that question. Petitioner alleged that Question 1 was of such difficulty that it should either not be counted, or his answer should be counted as correct. Respondent demonstrated that 26 out of 50 candidates answered the question correctly, thus negating Petitioner’s contention in this regard. Question 1 was properly graded as a question of medium difficulty, and is a valid and acceptable item on the examination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Health, Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s challenge to the grade assigned him for the September 1997 Hearing Aid Specialist licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry L. Allman, pro se 110 St. Lucia Loop Apollo Beach, Florida 33572 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Florida Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building Six, Room 240 1309 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Six, Room 306 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been subjected to discrimination based upon her race by the disciplinary actions imposed upon her by the Respondent, her employer, because of the alleged factual events depicted in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Childhood Development Service, Inc. (CDS), is an agency that acts as a centralized administrator of programs for low- income children and families in a five (5) county area in central Florida. It provides educational services with its pre-kindergarten and Head Start programs and provides social services and referrals to needy program member-families. The Petitioner, Marilyn J. McNeely, is currently employed by CDS. Ms. McNeely is contesting several employment actions taken against her by the above-named employer, including unsatisfactory evaluations and suspensions. Specifically she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), on July 7, 1995. She charged that the following three (3) actions had been taken against her and constituted racial discrimination because of her race, which is Black. Those actions were: On June 22, 1995, I was given an unsatisfactory evaluation by Sandra Rios. There are seven (7) Family Service Specialists: Two White, one Hispanic and four Blacks. The two Whites and the Hispanic received satisfactory evaluations. One Black (17 years service) initially received unsatisfactory, but had it upgraded after consultation. Three Blacks received unsatisfactory with no changes granted. On April 11, 1995, I was suspended on hearsay for removing records. My belongings were not checked. In fact, the files were never removed. On September 30, 1994, I was suspended for misuse of position. This came about because I was assisting in community affairs, and had nothing to do with my job. Twelve "Disciplinary Notices" had been given to Ms. McNeely since 1991, including four (4) suspensions lasting from one to ten days, and four (4) "Work Plans" which in essence consist of a written instructions and procedures for employee performance improvement. The Petitioner has received more than ten (10) formal evaluations, with scores ranging from a high of 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, to a low of 23 on a scale of 0 to 60, with a satisfactory rating on that scale being a rating of 30. The Petitioner received an overall rating of "satisfactory" on her most recent evaluation. On April 18, 1991, she was warned for using her position to obtain unauthorized, confidential client information. In the course of that warning she was informed that any further misuse of her position would result in a ten (10) day suspension or termination. She appealed this disciplinary action and it was affirmed by the Administrative Director at that time, Mr. Henry Whittier. Ms. Linda Foy became the CDS Executive Director shortly before learning, on September 23, 1994, that the Petitioner had solicited money from a physician in Ocala, Florida, on behalf of a local family who were facing eviction from their residence. In the course of this solicitation of funds from this private individual the Petitioner used her CDS position, name, and the CDS telephone number in the solicitation effort. The family for whom the Petitioner solicited the funds was not enrolled in a CDS program at that time or otherwise associated with CDS. In order to be eligible for social services offered by CDS, including referrals to other agencies that help needy families, a family must be registered with a CDS program. Ms. Foy investigated the Petitioner's actions in this incident and determined that they were unauthorized and inappropriate. It is not within the job requirements or authority of a CDS employee to request a cash donation for a family, even if that family was a CDS client family. If a CDS client family needed help with housing, CDS staff would confer with other agencies which might provide funds for housing or actually assist with providing housing. In the course of the solicitation effort the Petitioner left the physician and his office staff with the impression that the Petitioner was soliciting the funds for and on behalf of CDS. She informed them in the telephone call that she was calling from CDS and left her CDS office telephone number as a return call number. Ms. Foy, in conducting her investigation of the matter, obtained written statements from the doctor and his staff concerning the character and nature of the telephone solicitation. Ms. Thelma Griffith is the Head Start Director. Ms. Foy discussed this matter with Ms. Griffith in the course of her investigation and learned, during the course of her investigation, of Ms. McNeely's previous disciplinary action for misuse of position. Misuse of position is classified as a Group III offense by CDS policy. Disciplinary action for a second Group III offense ranges from a ten (10) day suspension without pay to termination of employment. Based upon the information she gathered in her investigation, Ms. Foy ultimately suspended the Petitioner for ten (10) days without pay. Ms. Griffith concurred in that suspension as being appropriate for the offense committed. At the time she made the decision to suspend Ms. McNeely, Ms. Foy was unaware that she was Black and only learned that she was Black when she met with Ms. McNeely to actually discuss the suspension. Ms. Foy did not take this disciplinary action against Ms. McNeely because Ms. McNeely is Black. In April 1995, the Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Sandra Rios, told her supervisor Ms. Griffith, the Head Start Director, that certain confidential files assigned to Ms. McNeely were missing. The files, called "master files," contained confidential information regarding each child, such as abuse and health information about the children in the CDS programs. Head Start policy and regulations and CDS policies require that such master files be maintained in a strictly confidential manner and remain at the CDS offices at all times. Ms. Griffith directed Ms. Rios to "double-check" and ascertain that the files were missing. This was after regular business hours and Ms. McNeely had already left the building. After Ms. Rios again searched the location of the files she again informed Ms. Griffith that the files were indeed missing. Ms. Griffith instructed Ms. Rios to leave the Petitioner a note so that the Petitioner would know that both Ms. Rios and Ms. Griffith were aware that files were missing. Because the files were missing when they should have been locked up in the file cabinet the Petitioner was suspended for five (5) days by action of Ms. Rios. After consulting with Ms. Rios, Ms. Griffith concurred that the five (5) day suspension was appropriate for the offense of unauthorized removal of the confidential files. Ms. Griffith was aware that Ms. McNeely had been working on those files to bring them up to date. Ms. Griffith did not direct Ms. McNeely to take home any files and has never authorized an employee to take the confidential master files home to complete unfinished work on them. Master files are not the same as "classroom files," which can be taken from the CDS offices to a classroom site where a particular child is located. Ms. Griffith was unaware of any other instance where an employee had removed master files from CDS offices at the time the Petitioner was disciplined for doing so. Ms. Griffith is unaware of any employee who has ever since removed such confidential files from CDS offices. If she were so aware she would have promptly initiated appropriate disciplinary action. Jennifer Lund is the Human Resources Manager for CDS, and is also unaware of any employee who has ever removed master files from the CDS offices. It is her policy that such a violation be promptly brought to the appropriate supervisor's attention, with her recommendation for disciplinary action consistent with past practice. The Petitioner received a score of 25.5 out of a possible 60 on her May 16, 1995, annual evaluation. Ms. Rios, Ms. McNeely's supervisor, gave her this evaluation. After discussing the basis of the evaluation with Ms. Rios and reviewing documentation from events occurring that year, Ms. Griffith was satisfied that the evaluation was appropriate and accurate and she approved it. The Respondent's "EEO-1" (report) for 1994, reflects that the percentage of Black employees employed by the Respondent entity is almost three (3) times the percentage of Black employees in Marion County, Florida generally. Further 56.4 percent of CDS's work force is White, where as 87.2 percent of the general Marion County work force is White. Forty-Three and sixth tenths of a percent of the CDS work force is non-White according to this report, one of whom is Ms. Griffith.
The Issue Whether WKDR II, Inc. (WKDR), is jurisdictionally time-barred from bringing the challenges in Case Nos. 21-0844 and 21-0845 to contest the Department of Revenue's (Department) tax assessment and subsequent freeze of WKDR's bank account to attempt to collect on the assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department administers Florida's sales tax statutes and performs audits to ensure compliance with sales tax laws. WKDR is a Ford franchise car dealership operating as LaBelle Ford. WKDR is organized as an "S" corporation and is wholly owned by Douglas Plattner (Mr. Plattner). WKDR's address is 851 South Main Street, LaBelle, Florida 33935 (851 South Main Street). Mark Smith (Mr. Smith) is a self-employed certified public accountant (CPA) at the firm of Smith and Waggoner CPAs. He is the CPA for Mr. Plattner and WKDR. Mr. Smith's business mailing address is 115 Tamiami Trail North, Suite 7, Nokomis, Florida 34275 (115 Tamiami Trail). On or about March 21, 2019, the Department began a sales tax audit of WKDR for the period of March 1, 2016, through February 28, 2019 (audit period). WKDR was notified of the audit through a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, dated March 21, 2019. Jeff Barnard (Mr. Barnard) was a tax auditor for the Department. Mr. Barnard was responsible for examining the books and records of various taxpayers for compliance with Florida tax laws. Mr. Barnard retired from the Department in May 2021. He was employed by the Department for 30 years. He spent the last 15 years with the Department as a Tax Auditor IV—the most senior tax auditor position at the Department. Mr. Barnard was responsible for the tax audit of WKDR for the audit period. On or about July 30, 2019, Mr. Smith sent the Department a fully executed Power of Attorney/Declaration of Representative form (POA form) to appear as WKDR's representative in connection with the Department's audit. The POA form was completed and signed by WKDR's owner (Mr. Plattner) and its CPA (Mr. Smith). The POA form gave Mr. Smith authority to speak and act on WKDR's behalf for the Department's audit. The POA form correctly states the mailing addresses of both WKDR and its CPA/representative, Mr. Smith. It also correctly states the e-mail address and fax number for Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith entered WKDR's address in section 1 of the POA form. The POA form included spaces for a contact person's name, telephone number, and fax number at WKDR, but those spaces were left blank in the form signed by Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner. The POA form signed by both Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner set forth the name, address, telephone number, and fax number of Mr. Smith’s CPA firm in section 2 of the POA form. Section 6 of the POA form provides as follows: Notices and Communication. Do not complete Section 6 if completing Section 4. Notices and other written communications will be sent to the first representative listed in Part I, Section 2, unless the taxpayer selects one of the options below. Receipt by either the representative or the taxpayer will be considered receipt by both. If you want notices and communications sent to both you and your representative, check this box. If you want notices or communications sent to you and not your representative, check this box. Mr. Smith completed section 6 by checking option "a," indicating that they wished to have notices and communication sent to both the taxpayer (WKDR) and the representative (Mr. Smith). Mr. Smith's e-mail address was added on the POA form by the Department's employee, Lisa Weems, after she called Mr. Smith's telephone number to obtain his e-mail address. All other information was added by Mr. Smith after consultation with Mr. Plattner, before they both signed the form. Throughout the audit, the Department's auditor, Mr. Barnard, primarily communicated with WKDR through its designated representative—Mr. Smith—at his mailing address and e-mail address. This included multiple requests for documents. At times, Mr. Barnard communicated directly with Mr. Plattner while copying Mr. Smith on the correspondence. Mr. Barnard sent a letter dated November 14, 2019, by regular mail, to WKDR at 851 South Main Street, with a copy to Mr. Smith at 115 Tamiami Trail. Mr. Smith testified that he received and read this letter. The November 14 letter provided WKDR and Mr. Smith with notice that, as things stood on that date, a NOPA was imminent. The letter stated, in pertinent part: On September 20th, we wrote you a letter requesting the information needed to complete the audit of WKDR II Inc. and the DR54 Formal Notice of Demand to Produce Certain Records. The letter stated that your failure to provide the information be [sic] September 27, 2019 may result in an assessment. That is, the implementation of alternative audit procedures to estimate a liability based on the best available information. As of the date of this letter you have not complied with our request. Therefore, enclosed is the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (DR1215) and the audit work papers, which are an estimate based upon the best information available as provided in Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes. You have 30 days to review the audit adjustments, which expires on December 16, 2019. * * * If we do not hear from you by December 16, 2019, the audit file will be sent to Tallahassee so that the Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) can be issued to you. The NOPA is the formal notice of the amount due. The NOPA will also provide the procedures for filing informal and formal protests. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, which was included with the November 14 letter, listed a "balance due through 11/14/2019" of $1,157,025.16. This sum included taxes of $801,967.01, a penalty of $200,491.75, and interest of $154,566.40. The notice also explicitly laid out WKDR's opportunities to informally protest this preliminary sum through a conference with the auditor or the auditor's supervisor. It provided that after the 30-day informal conference period expired, a NOPA would be issued. On December 20, 2019, Mr. Barnard sent an e-mail to Mr. Plattner with a copy to Mr. Smith. Attached to the e-mail was a letter of the same date. The letter provided as follows: On November 14, 2019, a Notice of Intent to Make Tax Audit Changes (DR-1215) was issued with additional tax due of $801,967.00. The 30 day informal protest period with the Service Center was up December 13, 2019.[2] Although your representative, Mark Smith, did provide some sales invoices after issuance of the DR-1215 they did not represent a full month of invoices as requested. Please be advised all sales invoices for December 2018 must be provided by January 3, 2020 for any changes in the assessment to be considered. These invoices should consist of same for all new and used vehicle sales, parts sales, service invoices/tickets, and autobody invoices for December 2018. As indicated in the December 20 letter, one month before the NOPA was issued, Mr. Barnard notified Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner that the 30-day informal protest period expired on December 13, 2019. Mr. Smith's testimony on this matter was evasive. At first, he acknowledged that he received the December 20 letter. However, after objection from WKDR's counsel, Mr. Smith backtracked and denied receipt. His attempted denial was not credible and is not credited. The undersigned finds that Mr. Smith received the December 20 letter. Mr. Barnard sent another letter, dated January 7, 2020, by regular mail to Mr. Plattner, and by e-mail to both Mr. Plattner and Mr. Smith, which stated as follows: Please be advised the information necessary to make an adjustment to the audit results issued on November 14, 2019 has not been provided. As stated in our December 20, 2019 letter this information was sales invoices for all new and used vehicle sales, parts sales, service invoices/tickets, and autobody invoices for the entire month of December 2018. 2 The Notice of Intent to Make Tax Audit Changes sent on November 14 provided a deadline of December 13 for the 30-day informal conference period, while the e-mail sent on December 20 referenced a deadline of December 16. The discrepancy in the December 20 letter is immaterial as both deadlines (December 13 and 16) had passed by the date of the December 20 letter. The audit will be closed and a Notice of Proposed Assessment will be issued shortly. Once again, Mr. Smith’s testimony was evasive. After seemingly admitting he received and read the January 7 letter, Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive the January 7 letter. The undersigned found Mr. Smith's testimony on this point wholly untruthful. At the hearing, during cross-examination, the Department's counsel asked Mr. Smith about his actions and impressions after receipt of the January 7 letter in the following exchange: Q. Let's go to Exhibit 22, which is Bates Number 00081. This is another e-mail sent to you on January 7th, 2020 to Mr. Plattner showing a carbon copy to Mr. Mark Smith CPA POA. The third sentence states; "The audit will be closed and a notice of proposed assessment will be issued shortly." Does that mean that the audit is still open or the audit is closed? A. That, like I said, I mean, I've -- I've dealt with audits where they say they're going to do this and do that and it's taken them two years to send anything. Q. This letter dated January 7th, 2020 does not give a new deadline, does it? A. It does not appear to but -- yeah, it does not appear to. Q. In fact, it says the audit is closed. That means that it's done, right? A. No. I don't -- I -- not necessarily. Q. It also says that the notice of proposed assessment will be issued shortly. So you knew at this time, the NOPA was imminent, right? A. Not necessarily. Q. Is there any language in this letter indicating that WKDR has any more time to provide additional documents? A. I've worked with the State before and they've provided us additional time quite often. Q. In fact, the auditor did provide you a deal -- a great deal of additional time to have the audit, didn't he? A. Well, we provided him so many documents that we thought he needed more time too. The whole tenor of Mr. Smith's testimony was to acknowledge that he read and understood the January 7 letter to say the NOPA was imminent, but that he knew from his experience the NOPA was "not necessarily" imminent. Notably, when asked if he knew at that time that the NOPA was imminent, Mr. Smith did not say that he did not know that because he did not receive or read the January 7 letter when it was sent to him by e-mail. Mr. Smith provided answers to these and several other questions about what he did or did not do in response to the January 7 letter. It was not until after an objection by WKDR's counsel that, as before, Mr. Smith backtracked to say that he did not receive the letter. In making the finding that Mr. Smith was untruthful when he testified that he had not received the January 7 letter, the undersigned had the distinct opportunity to observe the demeanor of Mr. Smith during testimony on this issue. He was not credible and his belated denial is not credited. The undersigned finds that Mr. Smith received the January 7 letter, reviewed it, and hoped that he could buy more time as he had thought he might be able to. Testimony of Lisa Weems Ms. Weems is a Revenue Specialist III for the Department. She has worked for the Department, in its Compliance Standards Section, for over 15 years. In addition to other tasks, Ms. Weems is responsible for printing NOPAs to send out to taxpayers and their representatives. Ms. Weems testified in great detail about the process she uses to send out NOPAs. When a NOPA is issued, it is uploaded to the Department's system overnight and cannot be printed until the following morning. Because of this, Ms. Weems sends out NOPAs only four days a week—Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays. Ms. Weems prints and mails out approximately 400 NOPAs per week. On the day of the final hearing, she had mailed out 88 NOPAs. Ms. Weems has a system in place to keep track of the NOPAs she sends out. Ms. Weems clearly and credibly testified about the process she used to send out NOPAs and when and by what means she used to send the NOPA to WKDR and its representative in this case. Each NOPA is mailed out in a packet that includes four documents: the NOPA, NOPA Remittance Coupon, Tax Audit Satisfaction Survey, and a document titled How to Pay Your Audit Assessment and Notice of Taxpayer Rights. The packets are sent by USPS first-class mail. WKDR's NOPA was issued on January 13, 2020. It had to load in the Department's system overnight, so it was printed on January 14, 2020. WKDR's NOPA assessed taxes of $801,967.01, a penalty of $200,491.75, and interest of $166,431.12, for a total due by WKDR of $1,168,889.88 following the audit.3 3 The amount of the taxes assessed and penalty remained the same as was listed in the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes. The amount of the interest had increased. The interest listed in the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes was for the period up to November 14, 2019. The NOPA specified that the deadline to request a formal hearing before DOAH was May 12, 2020, or 60 days from the date the assessment becomes a final assessment. The Notice of Taxpayer Rights provided detailed instructions on how to contest the assessment and provided further details on the timelines and deadlines to do so. Ms. Weems sent WKDR and Mr. Smith copies of the NOPA by USPS first-class mail on January 14, 2020. On January 14, 2020 (the day after the NOPA was uploaded), Ms. Weems printed an original and copy of WKDR's NOPA. She placed the original NOPA and the other three documents in a window envelope, addressed to WKDR at 851 South Main Street. A copy of the NOPA, along with the three other documents, were placed in another envelope, addressed to Mark Smith, CPA, at his business mailing address, 115 Tamiami Trail. Ms. Weems testified that she created a mail log sheet, wrapped the log sheet around the envelopes, and placed both of these NOPA envelopes in the outgoing mail basket. After placing the items in the outgoing mail basket, a Department employee from Building L picks up the outgoing mail and mails it out. Ms. Weems testified that she has mailed NOPAs this way for over 10 years. Ms. Weems testified that it was her practice, and what she was taught by the Department, to send NOPAs that had assessments for over $100,000.00 by fax and e-mail, in addition to regular mail.4 WKDR's assessment was for an amount greater than $100,000.00. On January 16, 2020, Ms. Weems sent a copy of the NOPA to Mr. Smith by fax transmission. 4 It must be noted that the Department's internal policy to send NOPAs with assessments over $100,000.00 by e-mail and fax is an unadopted rule; however, it is not necessary to rely on it as the basis for the determination in this matter. See § 120.57(1)(e)1., Fla. Stat. Ms. Weems sent the fax to Mr. Smith's fax number, which was provided on the POA form. Ms. Weems used a fax coversheet when sending the fax. The coversheet recorded several important pieces of information. It provided the case number and the taxpayer's name (WKDR). Two boxes on the fax coversheet were checked—a box indicating there was a "POA" (Power of Attorney) in the file and a box indicating the NOPA was to be sent to the "POA." Ms. Weems also made some notes on the fax coversheet. She wrote: "original notice mailed 1/14/20," "email: mark@swagcpa.com," and "(8) pages." Ms. Weems testified that the reference to eight pages represented the amount of pages she faxed. These pages included the four documents sent by USPS first-class mail mentioned above. After faxing the documents to Mr. Smith's fax number, Ms. Weems received a fax transmission report. The report indicated "Results OK." The term "OK" on a fax transmission report is generally accepted as meaning that the transmission was completed successfully. On January 16, 2020, Ms. Weems also sent a copy of the NOPA and Notice of Taxpayer Rights to Mr. Smith by e-mail. Ms. Weems sent the e-mail to Mr. Smith at mark@swagcpa.com—the e-mail address she obtained from Mr. Smith's office, and which he confirmed was his through testimony at the hearing. The e-mail's subject line stated "Audit Number 200262550-010 WKDR II, INC." The e-mail stated as follows: Please respond back to me by e-mail letting me know you did receive the Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) and Taxpayer Rights by Email and Fax please. Good afternoon, Mr. Smith. I'm e-mailing you the Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) & Taxpayer Rights. I also faxed you the Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) & Taxpayer Rights to fax number 941-866-7691. The Original Notice of Proposed Assessment (Nopa) & Taxpayer Rights was mailed out on 1/14/2020. Any questions call the Nopa Line at 850-617-8565. Thanks, Lisa Weems. The e-mail included an attachment labeled "3125_001.pdf." Ms. Weems testified that the attachment was a copy of the NOPA and Taxpayer Rights. Ms. Weems requested a "delivery receipt" and "read receipt" through her e-mail platform for the e-mail she sent to Mr. Smith. This was her customary practice when sending e-mails. A few seconds after sending her e-mail, she received a "delivery receipt" confirmation that the e-mail was delivered to mark@swagcpa.com. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Weems received a "read receipt" confirmation that her e-mail was received by Mr. Smith and was "read." The use of delivery and read receipts are not novel practices. Delivery and read receipts are used by a sender of an e-mail to confirm that the e-mail sent has been delivered to the addressee and, subsequently "read," that is, opened by the recipient. Ms. Weems keeps a monthly log of the NOPAs she sends out by fax and e-mail. Ms. Weems's monthly log for January 2020 includes entries that confirm she sent the WKDR NOPA by e-mail and fax to Mr. Smith at the contact information he provided. In addition to her personal monthly log, Ms. Weems also used SAP—a Department computer system that employees work in every day—to document her activities. On January 16, 2020, Ms. Weems made a notation in SAP that stated as follows: "I faxed the Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) & taxpayer rights to Mark Smith on 1/16/20 to fax number 941-866- 7691. I e-mailed the Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) and taxpayer rights to Mark Smith on 1/16/20 to e-mail address (mark@swagcpa.com). See attachments and notes." Testimony of Mark Smith Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive the NOPA by USPS first- class mail, fax, or e-mail. If the undersigned took Mr. Smith's testimony as true, all three of the Department's avenues of sending the NOPA failed. Mr. Smith testified that the NOPA, sent by USPS first-class mail, in the same fashion used for several other letters that he had received from the Department, was not received. Other than Mr. Smith's denial, WKDR provided no evidence that the NOPA and accompanying documents Ms. Weems mailed in separate packages to WKDR at its address and to WKDR's representative's address were not received. Mr. Smith testified that during the time the NOPA was sent, his business utilized an electronic faxing service called MyFax.com. Through this service, he received faxes in e-mail format, with the contents of the fax attached to the e-mail as a PDF document. Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive the fax from Ms. Weems. Mr. Smith also testified that he rarely read faxes because "90 plus percent of our faxes are payroll-related" and belonged to his business partner. Mr. Smith did not credibly explain how he comes to know about the ten percent of faxes directed to him. While perhaps his business partner screens faxes, it is inconceivable that a business firm would not ensure that incoming faxes are directed to the person to whom they are sent. That is particularly true where, as here, Mr. Smith has provided his business fax number as a means to give him notices regarding WKDR's audit. Although the Department provided documentation of a delivery and read receipt of the NOPA sent by e-mail to Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith testified that he did not receive it. Mr. Smith offered no credible explanation for the delivery and read receipts. Once again, it is not credible that a CPA who serves as the POA for taxpayer WKDR would not be reviewing e-mails delivered to his e-mail address, when his office has provided that e-mail address to the Department. Notably, he acknowledged reviewing other e-mail communications from the Department with regard to WKDR's audit. Mr. Smith's feigned ignorance of an e-mail delivered to him and opened by him is not credible and is not credited. The competent substantial evidence establishes that the Department mailed the NOPA to both Mr. Smith and WKDR at the addresses provided on the POA form. The testimony that Mr. Smith did not receive the NOPA is not credible. WKDR did not deny that it received the NOPA mailed to it; WKDR offered no testimony on the subject.5 The NOPA was mailed to the same addresses provided by Mr. Smith and Mr. Plattner on the POA form and used by the Department to successfully communicate with Mr. Smith during the audit. WKDR and Mr. Smith were on notice that a NOPA was forthcoming. The Department advised WKDR and Mr. Smith by letter through regular mail and e-mail, on at least two occasions, that a NOPA was going to be issued and that the Department anticipated an assessment of additional taxes of approximately $801,967.00. The Department provided notice of the NOPA in a manner reasonably calculated to inform WKDR and its representative of WKDR's rights and of the deadlines to take action to protect those rights. WKDR and the Department communicated frequently during the audit, but after issuance of the NOPA, communications with WKDR and Mr. Smith ceased for several months. Mr. Smith did not reach out to the Department to find out why communications ceased. The reasonable inference is that Mr. Smith was fully aware of why the previous communications during the audit stopped: because the audit had culminated 5 In its post-hearing submittal, WKDR argued that the NOPA mail should have been sent to Mr. Plattner. But the NOPA package was addressed to WKDR, the taxpayer, at the mailing address given on the NOPA. WKDR had the opportunity in the POA form to designate Mr. Plattner as the taxpayer contact person but chose not to do so. in the NOPA and it was up to WKDR to contest the NOPA in a timely hearing request. On or around February 18, 2021, the Department issued an NIL against WKDR, by which it notified WKDR that it intended to freeze funds from WKDR's bank account in the amount of $999,999.99. The NIL provided that WKDR had 21 days from the date of receipt of the NIL to dispute the matter. On February 19, 2021, WKDR submitted a petition for a chapter 120 administrative hearing to challenge the NOPA. WKDR's petition challenging the Department's NOPA was filed with the Department 403 days after the date on the NOPA (January 13, 2020) and 286 days after the deadline for filing a petition to request an administrative hearing had passed. On February 23, 2021, WKDR timely filed a petition for an administrative hearing to dispute the NIL. WKDR's dispute of the NIL is solely based on its challenge to the NOPA, and its claim that it did not receive the NOPA when issued the year before. WKDR failed to timely exercise its opportunity to protest the amount of the Department's assessment, the underlying audit findings, and the methods the Department used to reach the amount in the assessment. There is no claim by WKDR in this case that the content of the Notice of Taxpayer Rights was unclear regarding the deadline to request a hearing or the manner in which a hearing must be requested; its claim is solely that it did not receive the NOPA and the accompanying Notice of Taxpayer Rights, a claim which is not credible. In sum, the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that the Department sent the NOPA to WKDR's representative by USPS first-class mail, e-mail, and fax, and to WKDR directly by USPS first-class mail; and that Mr. Smith received the NOPA by USPS first-class mail, e-mail, and fax, and that WKDR received the NOPA by USPS first-class mail. WKDR did not submit a timely request for hearing to dispute the NOPA.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Michael J. Bowen, Esquire Akerman LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 3100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 For Respondent: J. Clifton Cox, Esquire John G. Savoca, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order dismissing DOAH Case Nos. 21-0844 and 21-0845. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2021. Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Kristian Oldham, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Jacek Stramski, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Doug Plattner 3118 Walter Travis Drive Sarasota, Florida 34240 James H. Sutton, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, PA 8875 Hidden River Pkwy, Suite 230 Tampa, Florida 33637-2087 J. Clifton Cox, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Allison M. Dudley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John G. Savoca, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael J. Bowen, Esquire Akerman LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 3100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 James A. Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The factual issues presented for determination are as follow: Are the allegations of the Administrative Complaint true? Did Respondent have the required scienter with respect to the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? Various legal and procedural issues were raised and previously disposed of by written order prior to the final hearing. This order will not contain a recital of those interlocutory actions. Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent was employed by and president of Gainesville Hearing Aid Company, and registered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for the fitting and sale of hearing aids. On or about September 13, 1979, Respondent sold to Lawrence J. Murphy a certain Dahlberg hearing aid, serial #VEI7AA, while representing to Mr. Murphy that the hearing aid was new, when in fact the hearing aid had been previously owned by Peter Fancher. The written contract of sale for this hearing aid did not indicate whether the hearing aid was new or used. The Dahlberg hearing aid sold to Murphy had been sold to P. D. Fancher on April 25, 1977, by Respondent. The hearing aid was returned to Gainesville Hearing Aid Company on May 17, 1977, by Mr. Fancher for full refund. The inventory records of Gainesville Hearing Aid Company show the sale and the return for refund. This hearing aid was used. On or about September 12, 1979, Respondent sold to Oran Ledbetter a certain Audiotone hearing aid, serial #28S-7963102, while representing to Mr. Ledbetter that the hearing aid was new and indicating on the written contract of sale that it was new, when in fact that same hearing aid had previously been owned by D. L. Bentley. The Audiotone hearing aid sold to Ledbetter had been sold to D. L. Bentley on March 27, 1979, by Gainesville Hearing Aid Company together with another hearing aid not material to these proceedings. These hearing aids were delivered to Mr. Bentley on April 16, 1979. The subject hearing aid was returned to Gainesville Hearing Aid Company by Bentley some four to five months later and was returned to the inventory of the company as a used hearing aid. This hearing aid was used. On or about February 2, 1978, Respondent sold to Virginia Collette a Dahlberg hearing aid, serial #TW22AH7, representing to Ms. Collette and showing on the contract of sale for the hearing aid that it was new, when in fact the hearing aid had been previously owned by Joseph E. McIntire. This hearing aid was used. The Dahlberg hearing aid sold to Ms. Collette had been sold to J. C. McIntire by Gainesville Hearing Aid Company on October 14, 1977, on an installment contract calling for $95 down and monthly payments of $43 per month for 24 months. Mr. McIntire fell behind in his monthly payments and subsequently died. An unidentified member of the family returned the hearing aid to Gainesville Hearing Aid Company, and the company subsequently collected some $989 from McIntire's estate. While the inventory records reflected that the hearing aids above were used, there is no evidence that Respondent was aware of this information in the cases of Murphy and Ledbetter. At the time Respondent left the offices of Gainesville Hearing Aid Company to make the sale of the Dahlberg hearing aid to Ms. Collette, he requested his employee, William Glance, to bring him a hearing aid from inventory. Mr. Glance brought Respondent the Dahlberg hearing aid and at that time advised him it was a used hearing aid. Respondent permitted his daughter, Angie Gardner, who did not hold a certificate of registration or a learner's permit, to conduct audiograms, to fit and sell hearing aids, and to conduct hearing aid examinations at various times during 1979. This included in particular November 2, 1979, when Angie Gardner was permitted to run a hearing test on a Mrs. Jones, who objected to the performance of the examination by Respondent's daughter. Respondent subsequently sought the advice of Ralph Gray as to the legality of permitting Angie Gardner to conduct these tests and, on being advised that it was contrary to law, discontinued this practice.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent, William Hunter Gardner, be fined administratively $500 for each violation of the statute for the three violations of Section 468.130(1) and thereby Section 468.129(3), Florida Statutes, and have his license suspended for a period of two years for the violation of Section 468.130(2), Florida Statutes, the enforcement of the suspension to be suspended upon Respondent's demonstrated good conduct and adherence to the statutes, rules and regulations during that period. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph E. Hodges, Esquire Department of HRS 2002 North West 13th Street Oak Park Executive Square Gainesville, Florida 32601 George L. Waas, Esquire 1114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of HRS 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Respondent Charley O. Young & Sons Trucking, Inc. (Company) is engaged in the business of hauling United States Mail between various United States Postal Service's post offices in the State of Florida, and is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Charley O. Young (Young), president of the Company, has been involved in the business of hauling United States mail for over 35 years. The mail which the Company hauls from post office to post office comes from places throughout the United States and the world. Such mail is considered to be in a continuous flow in interstate commerce from the moment it is mailed until it reaches its ultimate destination. Petitioner Dennis Bonville has been employed by the Company from time to time as an employee and as a subcontractor. Petitioner's last employment with the Company was as an employee driving a truck hauling mail from Tampa, Florida to Ruskin, Florida. The Company hired Petitioner with the full knowledge and understanding that Petitioner had a handicap known as monocular vision (vision capacity in one eye). Notwithstanding his handicap, Petitioner had been granted medical certification and was qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Florida in intrastate commerce in accordance with Section 316.302(2)(j), Florida Statutes. The position held by Petitioner was created as a result of the Company being awarded an emergency mail hauling contract between Tampa, Florida and Ruskin, Florida by the U. S. Postal Service beginning February 10, 1990, for an indefinite period. At the time Petitioner was hired, he understood that his employment with the Company was indefinite since the contract for the Tampa to Ruskin run with the U. S. Postal Service was for an indefinite period. On or about April 27, 1991, the Company was audited by the United States Department of Transportation, Office of Motor Carrier Safety, Florida Division (USDOT). The USDOT agent reviewed, among other things, the personnel and medical files of all the Company's drivers. During the audit, the agent discovered that Petitioner had monocular vision. The contract for the Tampa to Ruskin mail run required the Company to comply with all state and federal regulations, including those promulgated by the USDOT. Under USDOT rules, monocular vision disqualified Petitioner from driving a commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce. The agent demanded that Young immediately remove Petitioner from the Tampa to Ruskin run since it involved operating a commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce. However, since Young had no qualified driver to relieve Petitioner, the agent agreed to allow Petitioner to complete the run for the day with the understanding that the Petitioner would be relieved upon his return. The agent then advised Young that he would return the next day to complete the audit, and if the Petitioner had not been relieved, he had the authority to, and would, put a padlock on the door and shut down the Company's business. It was the agent's position that the Company was engaged in interstate commerce due to its hauling mail that was in interstate commerce, notwithstanding that the Company's vehicles never left the State of Florida. Therefore, the Petitioner's monocular vision rendered him unqualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle operating in interstate commerce under the USDOT rules which governed drivers under mail contracts. When the Petitioner returned that night to the Company's office, Young informed the Petitioner that due to the agent's position and his threat to shut down the Company's business if Petitioner continued to make the Tampa to Ruskin run, he had no alternative but to relieve the Petitioner of the Tampa to Ruskin run. When the agent returned to complete the audit the next day, the Petitioner had a heated discussion with the agent concerning the agent's position and its effect on the Petitioner's employment. The agent maintained his position that Petitioner was not qualified to drive the vehicle being used in the Tampa to Ruskin mail run which was considered to be in interstate commerce. At the conclusion of the audit, the Company was issued, among others, citations for violating 49 C.F.R. 391.11(b)(6), using a physically unqualified driver, and was fined $6,000. At this time, the Company had no other positions which it could offer the Petitioner that would accommodate his handicap. Therefore, as a result of the audit and the agent's threat to "shut down the business", the Petitioner was terminated by the Company effective April 27, 1991. At the time Petitioner was terminated he was earning $11.19 per hour and working 40 hours per week. Petitioner's job performance was not an issue in the Petitioner's termination. The Company's bid for the renewal of the Tampa, Florida to Ruskin, Florida contract was unsuccessful, and on April 30, 1991, the Company's contract for the Tampa to Ruskin mail run expired. Petitioner was replaced by a Company employee who was qualified under the USDOT rules to operate the vehicle used on the Tampa to Ruskin run for the three days remaining on the contract. After Petitioner's termination, sometime around October, 1991, the Petitioner was offered employment with the Company driving a van, which Petitioner was qualified to drive, delivering special delivery mail. However, this employment offered less money than Petitioner's previous employment with the Company and was turned down by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition For Relief filed by the Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this day 29th of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Findings Based on Stipulations The Petitioner is MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI), whose business address is Suite 400, 400 Perimeter Center Terrace NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30346. The Respondent is State of Florida, Department of General Services (Department), whose address is 614 Larson Building, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. Rule 13A-1.001(1)(c) and (d), Florida Administrative Code (the "challenged rule"), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 13A-I. 001 Definitions. A Purchase -- A purchase is defined as an acquisition by contracting in any manner, whether by rent, lease, lease/purchase or installment sales contract which may provide for the payment of interest on unpaid portions of the purchase price, or outright purchase, from a source of supply for either commodities or contractual services. Within the meaning of this definition of a purchase, the following are not a purchase: Regulated utilities. Regulated Public Communications, i.e., telephone, telegraph. (emphasis added) MCI is certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to provide intrastate long distance telecommunications services within the State of Florida and is authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to provide interstate telecommunications services throughout the United States. On November 10, 1987, the Division of Communications of the Department of General Services awarded contracts to provide intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS, and interstate WATS for the State of Florida following a "negotiation" process. According to the Department of General Services, such "negotiations" were conducted as a joint venture between the Division of Communications and the Division of Purchasing. MCI was one of the suppliers involved in the "negotiations," but it was not issued a CSA for intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS, or interstate WATS. On November 23, 1987, MCI filed with the Division of Communications a formal written protest of that award and of the process leading up to the award. The Florida Public Service Commission has granted long distance certificates to a number of competitive long distance companies, including MCI, AT&T, Microtel, U.S. Sprint, and others. MCI and other competitive carriers today provide both intrastate and interstate long distance service in the State of Florida. MCI, Microtel, AT&T, Southland, and USTS are all interexchange carriers authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to provide, among other things, interstate WATS. MCI, AT&T, Southland, and Microtel are all interexchange carriers certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to provide, among other things, intermachine trunks and intrastate WATS. Prior to 1982, intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS and interstate WATS were available from only a single source within the State of Florida (the Bell System). Currently, intermachine trunks, intrastate WATS, and interstate WATS are all available from more than one source within the State of Florida. Findings Based on Evidence Adduced at Hearing The Intervenors are Microtel, Inc., whose address is 7100 West Camino Real, Suite 311, Boca Raton, Florida 33433, and United States Transmission Systems, whose business address is 320 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. The Department from time to time procures long distance telephone service of the types provided by MCI for the State of Florida. The Department regards long distance telecommunications services or facilities as "regulated public communications" that are covered by subsection (d) of the challenged rule. The Department does not regard long distance telecommunications services or facilities as "regulated utilities" that are covered by subsection (c) of the challenged rule. Under subsection (d) of the challenged rule, the Department can procure long distance telephone services or facilities without competitive bidding or competitive negotiations simply by picking up the telephone and negotiating a contract with a single vendor, or by issuing a communications service authorization (CSA) to a particular vendor. The Department uses subsection (d) of the challenged rule as a basis for procuring telephone services or facilities approximately four to five times a year. The Department used subsection (d) of the challenged rule as authority for a negotiated procurement of interstate long distance telephone services or facilities for the State in 1985. The Division of Communications would have to approve the purchase of any transmission service or facility for any agency of the State of Florida. The Department did not rely on subsection (d) of the challenged rule as a basis for authority to negotiate the purchase of interstate and intrastate long distance telephone services or facilities for the State in 1987. However, the Department could have relied on subsection (d) of the challenged rule for authority to negotiate that 1987 purchase. There have been a number of amendments to Rule 13A-1.001. From September 7, 1978, to until August 25, 1982, the rule exempted the procurement of "utilities" and "public communications" from the definition of purchase. Since August 26, 1982, the rule has exempted the procurement of "regulated utilities" and "regulated public communications" from that definition. No section or subsection of Chapter 282 is referred to in the note to Rule 13A-1.001, either as authority for the rule or as the law implemented by the rule.
The Issue Whether Respondent's Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing should be dismissed and whether the Board of Trustees of Florida A and M University should issue a final order dismissing Respondent from employment?
Findings Of Fact By letter dated November 10, 2011, Petitioner, the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (the University) notified Respondent, Laurence Tromly, that his employment with the University was terminated effective immediately. Respondent filed a Petition for an administrative hearing through his attorney to contest the dismissal. The University transmitted the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (Division) on or about January 17, 2012, for the purpose of conducting a formal administrative hearing. A Notice of Hearing and Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions were issued on January 26, 2012, setting the case for hearing on April 10 through 13, 2012. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions required the parties to meet no later than ten days prior to the date of the hearing to discuss the possibility of settlement and many pre-hearing matters, and to file a pre-hearing stipulation a week prior to the hearing or, if for any reason the pre-hearing stipulation could not be executed by all parties, to file separate proposed pre-hearing statements no later than five days before the final hearing. On March 12, 2012, counsel for Respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. In the Motion, Respondent's attorney stated that she had made repeated attempts to contact her client by certified mail, numerous phone messages, e-mail correspondence, and regular U.S. mail. Despite these attempts to communicate with her client, she was unable to do so. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rules 28-106.103 and 106.204, the undersigned waited the requisite number of days to rule on the motion, giving Respondent ample opportunity to file an objection or any clarification as to why the motion should not be granted. On March 27, 2012, the undersigned entered an Order granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, mailing a copy to Respondent at the last known address for Respondent as reflected in his former counsel's motion. On April 4, 2012, the University filed a Unilateral Pre- hearing Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss. Counsel for the University stated in the unilateral statement that she sent correspondence via e-mail and U.S. Certified Mail to Petitioner enclosing a copy of the Pre-Hearing Instructions as asserted that the parties are expected to discuss the possibility of settlement and any pre-hearing stipulations. Counsel for the University also requested Respondent to contact their office for a mutually convenient time to meet to comply with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. At the time of filing the Unilateral Pre-hearing Statement and Motion to Dismiss, counsel for the University had not received any response from Respondent. On the morning of the scheduled hearing, the undersigned attempted to convene the hearing as scheduled. However, the court reporter had not arrived yet. Shortly after 9:30 a.m., the undersigned's assistant entered the hearing room to inform that Respondent had called and told her that he was on the interstate and that his car was broken down. This was the first communication this office received from Respondent. The undersigned informed counsel for the University, who were present in the hearing room and prepared for hearing, that the hearing would convene at 10:30 a.m., and that Respondent would be connected to the room by speakerphone. The undersigned then left the hearing room, to return at 10:30. Immediately after leaving the hearing room, the undersigned instructed her assistant to call Respondent at the phone number provided to her by Respondent. Upon calling the number at approximately 9:45 a.m., she reached Respondent's voice mail and left a message for Respondent to call her. Not having received a return call from Respondent, the undersigned's assistant again called Respondent at approximately 10:25 a.m. and left another voice mail message to call her immediately. The hearing commenced at 10:30 a.m. Counsel for the University renewed the Motion to Dismiss.1/ Counsel for the University also stated that Respondent did call her the week prior to hearing, apparently in response to her correspondence to him, and that she (the attorney for the University) stressed to Respondent the importance of complying with the Order of Pre- Hearing Instructions and of his appearance at the hearing. No request for a continuance of the hearing was ever made by Respondent. Due to Respondent's repeated actions of avoidance and delay, including avoiding all communications with his attorney, failure to respond timely to the University's attorney, failure to make any attempt to comply with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions, failure to contact the undersigned's office prior to the date of the hearing regarding any request for a continuance, and failure to appear at the final hearing, the Motion to Dismiss was granted and the hearing adjourned. Shortly after the hearing was adjourned, Respondent called the undersigned's assistant at approximately 10:50 a.m. He was informed that the hearing had adjourned and that the undersigned would enter an order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida A and M University Board of Trustees enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Administrative Hearing and Dismissing Petitioner from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Peter N. Brawn, M.D., committed violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner, the Department of Health, on January 21, 2004, in DOH Case Number 2002-15991; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. § 20.43 and Chs. 456 and 458, Fla. Stat. (2005). Respondent, Peter N. Brawn, M.D., is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 75202. Dr. Brawn is board-certified in pathology. Dr. Brawn has not previously been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding in Florida. Dr. Brawn's address at the times relevant to this proceeding was 525 Caroline Street, Key West, Florida 33040. His telephone number was (305) 292-1917. Dr. Brawn's Prescription Dispensing Log of May 14, 2002. Dr. Brawn's prescription dispensing log for May 14, 2002, indicates that Carisoprodol was dispensed to an individual whose initials are J.T. This individual's name is identical, except for the last letter of his last name, to Patient J.T., the patient at issue in the Administrative Complaint. The last letter of the individual listed in the log is "r" (hereinafter referred to as "J.Tr"), while the last letter of the patient in the Administrative Complaint is a "z" (hereinafter referred to as "J.Tz"). The Events of May 17, 2002. On or about May 17, 2002, Douglas Lee Howard, a police officer with the police department of the City of Tustin, Orange County, California, was serving as a resource officer at Tustin High School. Officer Howard was summoned to the assistant principal's office at approximately noon. When he arrived, he observed a student, J.Tz, who had been removed from his classroom, leaning against the wall, falling asleep. J.Tz is the same individual identified in the Administrative Complaint as Patient J.T. J.Tz was 16 years of age at the time of this incident. Officer Howard told J.Tz to go into the assistant principal's office and sit down. J.Tz complied, running into a lobby counter and the office doorjamb on the way. When he attempted to sit, he sat on the arm of the chair, nearly tipping the chair over. When asked if he had taken any drugs, J.Tz produced a white plastic medicine bottle (hereinafter referred to as the "Medicine Bottle"), from his pants pocket. The permanent manufacturer's label on the Medicine Bottle indicates that it contained 100 350 mg tablets of Carisoprodol, commonly referred to as "soma." This is the same medication which Dr. Brawn dispensed on May 14, 2002, to J.Tr. Carisoprodol is a legend drug which acts as a muscle relaxer and is used for muscle strains. Physiologically, it causes drowsiness, dizziness, and loss of coordination or ataxia, all symptoms that were exhibited by J.Tz on May 17, 2002. The Medicine Bottle also contained a printed label (hereinafter referred to as the "Added Label") which had been pasted onto it which included the following information: Peter Nelson Brawn, M.D. 525 Caroline St. Key West Florida 33040 305.292-1917 1-888-491-4545 Patient Name J[] T[] Date Dispensed 5/14/02 Name & Strength of Drug Directions for Use 1 tablet 4X/day The "Patient Name," "Date Dispensed," and "Directions for Use" had been written in ink on the Added Label. The last name of the patient name written on the Added Label can be read as either J.Tz or J.Tr. Officer Howard confiscated the Medicine Bottle from J.Tz. Officer Howard and a school nurse counted 84 pills remaining in the Medicine Bottle. Officer Howard, after asking J.Tz where he had obtained the pills, called the toll-free telephone number listed on the Added Label, a number listed next to Dr. Brawn's name and his address and phone number of record. He spoke to an individual who identified himself as Peter Brawn. The individual he spoke with indicated that, while he had no record of dispensing any medication to J.Tz, he did have a record of having dispensed Carisoprodol to J.Tr on the date in question. The individual Officer Howard spoke with also indicated that J.Tr had reported his age to be 18. The information disclosed to Officer Howard was medical information which would not have been generally known by anyone other than Dr. Brawn. Officer Howard had never spoken to Dr. Brawn and, therefore, could not have identified the individual he spoke to as Dr. Brawn through voice recognition. Based upon the fact that the phone number Officer Howard called was listed on the Added Label next to Dr. Brawn's name, address, and phone number, the fact that the individual identified himself as "Dr. Peter Brawn," and the fact that the individual disclosed medical information which Dr. Brawn was privy to, it is found that the individual Officer Howard spoke to was in fact Dr. Brawn. Dr. Brawn explained to Officer Howard that he had prescribed the Carisoprodol to J.Tr after being contacted by him through two e-mails. Dr. Brawn admitted that he had not spoken to J.Tr and that he had not confirmed any medical history. Having not spoken to J.Tr, it is found that he also did not perform any physical examination of J.Tr. Finally, given the foregoing, it is found that J.Tr and J.Tz are the same individual. It is, therefore, concluded that the J.Tr Dr. Brawn dispensed Carisoprodol to on May 14, 2002, is the Patient J.T. of the Administrative Complaint. Medical Records. Based upon the admissions against interest made by Dr. Brawn to Officer Howard during the May 17, 2002, telephone conversation Officer Howard testified about, it is found that Dr. Brawn, not having taken any medical history of J.Tr and not having given him an examination, did not make any medical record to support his dispensing Carisoprodol to Patient J.T. Without Dr. Brawn's admissions against interest, the evidence failed to prove that Dr. Brawn did not have medical records relating to the medications he provided to J.Tr. No direct evidence, other than phone conversation, was presented that would support a finding that such records do not exist. On or about February 27, 2003, the Department had served a subpoena on Dr. Brawn, through counsel, requesting the following: All medical records and reports for J[] T[z], DOB . . . including but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, treatments, x-rays, test results, records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or administered, and reports of consultations and hospitalizations. In the "Application Affidavit for Patient Records Subpoena Without Patient Release" which was used to get permission for serving the subpoena on Dr. Brawn, J.Tz is also referred to as "a/k/a Tr." Despite the Department's awareness of the possibility that J.Tz and J.Tr were the same individuals, the subpoena actually served on Dr. Brawn did not request any medical records or other information relating to J.Tr. By letter dated March 12, 2003, Dr. Brawn, through counsel, informed the Department that he had "no medical records responsive to th[e] subpoena." The Standard of Care. Keith Fisher, M.D., accepted as an expert, testified convincingly and credibly that a reasonably prudent physician, similarly situated to Dr. Brawn, would, before dispensing Carisoprodol, a legend drug: (a) obtain a complete medical history of the patient; (b) make a diagnosis, prepare a treatment plan for the patient, and keep a medical record for the patient; and (c) perform a physical examination of the patient to determine that the patient was truly in need of Carisoprodol. Dr. Brawn failed to take any of the steps Dr. Fisher opined were necessary before dispensing Carisoprodol. Dr. Brawn dispensed the Carisoprodol to Patient J.T. based upon two e-mails he received. He did not conduct any examination of Patient J.T. and he did not obtain a medical history of Patient J.T. These findings, again, are based upon the telephone conversation between Dr. Brawn and Officer Howard. Without those admissions, the evidence in this case failed to prove, however, that Dr. Brawn did not carry out the responsibilities described by Dr. Fisher when he dispensed Carisoprodol to who he believed was J.Tr, but was actually Patient J.T. The Admissibility of Officer Howard's Deposition. Officer Howard's deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, was taken by telephone on July 12, 2002, just over two weeks before the final hearing. Officer Howard's deposition was taken by telephone because he works and resides in California. No order was obtained from this forum or any court to take the deposition by telephone. The Notice of Taking Deposition sent to Dr. Brawn scheduling Officer Howard's deposition indicates that it was to be taken by telephone. It also put counsel for Dr. Brawn on notice of the following: "This deposition is being taken for purposes of discovery, for use at an administrative hearing, or any other purpose for which it may be used under applicable laws of the State of Florida." [Emphasis added]. At no time before or during the deposition was any objection made by counsel for Dr. Brawn to the manner in which the deposition was taken. In particular, no objection was made to taking the deposition by telephone. By his silence, Dr. Brawn gave tacit agreement to the taking of Officer Howard's deposition by telephone. In addition to the foregoing, the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed by the parties only two days after Officer Howard's deposition was taken does not list Officer Howard as a witness, and the transcript of Officer Howard's deposition is listed as a potential Petitioner's exhibit. Given these facts and the fact that Dr. Brawn was aware that Officer Howard works and resides in California, it is inferred that Dr. Brawn knew or should have known that the deposition would be offered in lieu of Officer Howard's appearance and testimony at hearing. Yet, counsel for Dr. Brawn waited until hearing to raise any objection to the admissibility of Officer Howard's deposition testimony. While part of Officer Howard's testimony constitutes hearsay testimony, in particular, comments made to him by J.Tz, no finding of fact has been based upon such testimony. For example, while Officer Howard testified that J.Tz told him who he obtained the pills from and how, that testimony has not been relied upon to make a finding as to how J.Tz got the pills. During Officer Howard's testimony, he referred to seven photographs which he had taken of the Medicine Bottle. Those photographs were taken by Officer Howard on May 17, 2002. While Dr. Brawn objected during the deposition to their admissibility, he did not state the basis of his objection. At hearing, Dr. Brawn objected to the admissibility of not only the photographs, but also to the entire deposition, suggesting that he had not been able to effectively cross examine Officer Howard about the photographs because he did not have them before him while the deposition was being taken. Officer Howard, however, used the photographs to refresh his memory and described adequately what they depicted. His testimony alone, without regard to any consideration of the photographs, supports the findings made herein. Additionally, the Department's file on Dr. Brawn, which had been provided to Dr. Brawn, contained a single-page copy of an e-mail with all the photographs testified to by Officer Howard. Those smaller photographs, which were available during the deposition, and Officer Howard's description of the Medicine Bottle and its labels, were adequate to eliminate any prejudice to Dr. Brawn.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that Peter N. Brawn, M.D., has violated Section 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (2001), as described in this Recommended Order; suspending his license for a period of two years from the date of the final order; and requiring that he pay an administrative fine of $15,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick L. Butler Ephraim D. Livingston Assistants General Counsel Prosecution Services Unit Office of General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Sean M. Ellsworth, Esquire Ellsworth Law Firm, P.A. 404 Washington Avenue, Suite 750 Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Timothy M. Cerio, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. John O. Agwunobi, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701