The Issue Whether Respondent should be dismissed from his employment as an instructor at Chipola Junior College for alleged misconduct in office, incompetency, willful neglect of duties, and drunkenness, as set forth in the Complaint Recommending Dismissal, dated July 31, 1981. This proceeding commenced with the issuance of a Complaint Recommending Dismissal by the Interim President of Chipola Junior College alleging that Respondent James T. Sims, an instructor, should he dismissed for misconduct in office, incompetency, willful neglect of duty, and drunkenness. Respondent filed a petition for formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on August 13, 1981. The matter thereafter was referred to this Division for the appointment of a Hearing Officer. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. Richard E. Morley, Interim President of Chipola Junior College; Dean James A. Lewis, Dean of Academic Studies; and Alice J. Story, Chairman of the Division of Natural Science and Mathematics. Respondent testified in his own behalf, and submitted the testimony of Dr. Jack Golden, Director of the Alcoholism Treatment Program at Capital Medical Center, Tallahassee, Florida. Four exhibits were received into evidence. The memorandum brief of Petitioner, and Respondent's memorandum have been fully considered and those portions thereof not adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary, irrelevant, or unwarranted in fact or law.
Findings Of Fact Respondent James T. Sims has been an instructor at Chipola Junior College, Marianna, Florida, since 1959. In 1962, he entered into a continuing contract with the Beard of Public Instruction of Jackson County, Florida to continue in the capacity of a teacher at the college. At some undisclosed date, responsibility for the college became vested in a Board of Trustees at which time existing continuing contracts with the county Board of Public Instruction were apparently honored by the Board of Trustees without execution of new contracts. (Testimony of Respondent, Morley, Exhibit 1) Respondent's personnel file reflects that he was the subject of a number of memoranda from his supervisors commencing in 1975, concerning late or non-attendance of faculty meetings, early dismissal of classes, award of high grades to students who did not attend class, and unexcused absences. A "confidential" letter from Joiner Sims, Chairman, Division of Natural Science and Mathematics at the college, to Respondent, dated October 17, 1977, expressed concern over a "serious personal problem" that Respondent had had for several years which Sims had offered to help him solve, but stated that if he were found under the influence of alcohol on campus in the future, he would recommend Respondent's dismissal or return to annual contract. A memorandum from Chairman Joiner Sims to Respondent in March, 1978, recited that Respondent had been absent from classes on two occasions during the semester without advance notification. In September, 1979, President Raymond M. Deming met with Respondent, Dean of Academic Studies James A. Lewis, and Miss Josephine Story, then Chairman of the Division of Natural Science and Mathematics. A memorandum in Respondent's personnel file, dated September 10, 1979, of President Deming, reflects that during this conference Dean Lewis advised Respondent to quit drinking with the assistance of medicine, and that Respondent acknowledged that he liked to drink and had done quite a bit of drinking, but denied doing so on the college campus. The college officials offered to do anything they could to aid Respondent and he expressed appreciation for their consideration. (Testimony of Lewis, Story, Exhibit 1) A further memorandum from Dean Lewis to Miss Story on November 19, 1979, reviewed his concern about complaints from members of the community about Respondent's behavior off campus and his lessened effectiveness as an instructor over the past several months as a result of his "alcoholic problem," such as dismissing class early and absences from his office during office hours. By the memorandum, Dean Lewis requested that Miss Story direct Respondent to meet assigned classes for the full period, observe posted office hours, adhere to college rules, and insure that he understood that an immediate and permanent change in his performance was expected. Accordingly, by memorandum of November 20, 1979 to Respondent, Miss Story reviewed student complaints she had received concerning Respondent's late arrival at classes, assigning problems with little or no explanation, dismissing classes early, and coming to school sometimes smelling of alcohol. Miss Story had frequently failed to find Respondent in his office during office hours and she also noted this in her memorandum. The memorandum therefore directed Respondent specifically to cure the stated deficiencies. The memorandum had been preceded by a conference with Respondent on November 19th at which time Miss Story had reviewed Respondent's shortcomings, offered suggestions for improvement, and told him that if he found it impossible to abide by the conditions she had stated in her memorandum of November 20th, she would recommend that he be given the option of taking a semester's leave of absence to seek professional help. At the conference, Respondent assured her that he would take appropriate action to prevent further complaints. (Testimony of Story, Exhibit 1) Respondent's personnel file reflects that the President of the college Student Government Association wrote to President Deming on November 29, 1979, stating that Respondent had come to class several times unable to properly teach because of his "current problem of alcoholism" which prevented him from doing his job, that it was common knowledge to the students and faculty that he had a severe alcohol problem, and that his reputation would hurt the college greatly. In a letter to Miss Story dated December 12, 1979, Respondent denied the allegations. (Exhibit 1) In a letter dated December 17, 1979, President Deming informed Respondent that his image at the college and in the community should be a subject of great concern and that it may become necessary to request that Respondent submit himself to a physical examination if deemed necessary, and that if he ever came on the campus under the influence of alcohol he would be removed from the classroom and "immediate action would be taken." In another memorandum from Miss Story to Respondent dated June 3, 1980, she noted that although he had made a real effort toward improvement during the spring semester she had observed that several of his summer session classes had been dismissed before the end of the period, and cautioned him about maintaining class schedules. She explained the contents of her memorandum to Respondent in a conference on June 23rd and confirmed this with a memorandum dated June 25, 1980. In a further memorandum dated July 1, 1980, Dean Lewis reviewed past memoranda concerning Respondent that were contained in the latter's personnel file, and noted that "a pattern has developed that appears to be growing progressively worse." (Testimony of Story, Lewis, Exhibit 1) On March 31, 1981, Dean Lewis went to talk with Respondent during scheduled office hours but found that he had dismissed a class early and had not returned to his office. After searching around the campus, Lewis went to Respondent's home and, after no one answered his knocks at the door, went inside fearing that Respondent might be ill. He found Respondent watching television with a drink of some kind in his hand. Respondent told Lewis that he had gone home to take his medicine. Based on this incident, Dean Lewis sent a memorandum to President Deming with a copy to Respondent recommending that Respondent be given the opportunity to take off both 1981 summer sessions and the fall semester to seek professional help "with his problems" and that if he did not elect to do so, that either dismissal or some lesser action be taken against him. President Deming reprimanded Respondent in a letter dated April 10, 1981, wherein he again reviewed Respondent's past actions as reflected in memoranda in his file, restated the requirements that had previously been placed upon him as to his conduct, and stated that even one deviation from any of those directives would result in an immediate suspension and recommendation of dismissal. Respondent, by letter to President Deming, dated April 23rd defended his actions on March 31 by stating that he had been ill and attached copies of prescriptions for medicine issued on March 24 and 26 for throat pain. He claimed that he was only drinking a glass of water when Dean Lewis arrived at his home, and that his only dereliction was in failing to notify anyone that he was leaving the campus. (Testimony of Lewis, Exhibit 1) In another incident that occurred on June 15, 1981, during registration for the summer session, at which time Respondent was supposed to be counselling students, Dean Lewis observed that Respondent could not walk straight and did not appear rational. He appeared to be either sick or under the influence of alcohol, but Lewis could not smell anything on his breath. He felt that Respondent was in no condition to counsel students and carry out his duties. (Testimony of Lewis, Exhibit 1) On July 27, Miss Story recommended to Dean Lewis that Respondent be relieved of his teaching duties, and Lewis recommended to Dr. Morley, the Interim President, that Respondent be removed as a member of the faculty. Interim President Morley thereafter had a conference with Respondent at which he gave him the opportunity to resign or face dismissal action. Respondent declined to resign, and the Complaint Recommending Dismissal was issued by Morley on July 31, 1981. (Testimony of Morley, Lewis, Story, Exhibit 1) Miss Story and Respondent have philosophical differences regarding grading practices. Respondent uniformly gave high grades to his students and Miss Story felt that this was not in keeping with standard college practices. Respondent consistently received satisfactory evaluations of his performance regardless of his deficiencies, and both Dean Lewis and Miss Story justified this as an effort to encourage him to improve his performance. Neither questioned his knowledge of subject matter or teaching ability, but are of the opinion that his cumulative record establishes that his instructional ability has been impaired and he is a detriment to the institution. (Testimony of Lewis, Story, Exhibit 1) Respondent received treatment in the Alcoholism Treatment Program at Capital Medical Center, Tallahassee, Florida, in late August, 1981, for the program period of 28 days. The program involves psychotherapy which assists one suffering from the disease of alcoholism to regain his "self-concept," and learn about the addiction process and the person's own value and belief system. After the inpatient phase, the individual becomes involved in an aftercare program which includes a weekly meeting with counselors at the Medical Center, participation in Alcoholics Anonymous, and regular use of "Antabuse" to prevent lapses from abstention. A year is the normal recovery period. Since his discharge from Capital Medical Center in September, 1981, Respondent has been involved with the aftercare program. He has missed several of the meetings and on at least one occasion failed to take his Antabuse, became intoxicated, and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in Marianna on October 21, 1981. Dr. Jack Golden, the Director of the Alcoholism Treatment Program, finds that it is not unusual for someone in Respondent's situation to not follow up completely with the aftercare treatment, or to experience at least one period of drinking during the first year of recovery. About 95 percent of his cases, including that of Respondent, involve the "denial process" for varying periods in which the individual cannot make sound judgments and refuses to recognize that he has a problem with alcohol. The disease, which has been recognized as treatable, is biological in nature in which the chemical system of a patient reacts differently to the drug of alcohol than does that of normal individuals. In most cases, persons will not seek assistance unless some crisis arises, or they are placed under coercion of some sort. In Respondent's case, the fact that he was being considered for dismissal prompted him to seek assistance. The treatment program has been experiencing about a 90 percent success rate if an individual remains in the program for one year with a six-months follow-up period thereafter. Although public intoxication has been decriminalized and alcoholism primarily placed in the health care system, it does not serve as an excuse for criminal activities. A state policy adopted in 1973 applicable to Career Service employees provides for termination of employment of persons suffering from alcoholism only if they refuse to seek treatment. (Testimony of Golden, Respondent) Respondent conceded at the hearing that he is an alcoholic and that he had committed himself to treatment which has benefited him to the point where he believes he can resume his normal career after successful completion of the treatment program. He admitted that he had dismissed classes early at various times and failed to keep proper office hours. However, he denied that he had ever been under the influence of alcohol while on the college campus and, in fact, had not consumed any alcohol for approximately six (6) months prior to the filing of the instant charges against him. He admitted that there was truth to the various other complaints that had been made against him over the years, but that some had been exaggerated to some extent. He did not take any initiative to reguest a leave of absence to seek treatment during the lengthy period because he was in what had been described as the "denial stage" of alcoholism. He produced a doctor's statement to the effect that he had had episodes of acute syncope, bradycardia, hypertension, cardiac arrhythmia, and fluid retention. The statement reflected that his "intermittent confusion, unstable gait and extreme weakness at times have probably been directly related to his electrolyte imbalance." Respondent also submitted a number of letters from various individuals, including students, attesting to his excellence as a mathematics instructor and to their lack of knowledge as to any problems with alcohol while on campus. (Testimony of Respondent, Exhibit 3, Composite Exhibit 4)
Recommendation That the Board of Trustees of Chipola Junior College dismiss Respondent, James T. Sims, from his employment as an instructor for incompetency and willful neglect of duty pursuant to Rule 6A-14.411(6), Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Wayne Grant, Esquire 209 North Jefferson Street Post Office Box 209 Marianna, Florida 32446 Philip J. Padovano, Esquire Post Office Box 872 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John E. Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 854 Marianna, Florida 32446
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for an alcoholic beverage license should be denied because of the direct or indirect interest of John Lee Johnson, a person allegedly lacking good moral character.
Findings Of Fact In May, 1982, petitioner Betty Jean Johnson applied for a 2 APS (beer and wine) alcoholic beverage license to be used in connection with a business known as Johnson's Corner Grocery, 1400 North J. Street, Pensacola, Florida. On her application, petitioner indicated that she owned the business and that no other person had a direct or indirect interest in the business. (R-1) Prior to the petitioner filing her application, John Lee Johnson, her husband, had applied for a beverage license for the same location under his own name. When he failed to disclose his criminal history on the application, his application was denied and he was charged with the crime of filing a false official written statement. On May 12, 1982, he was convicted by the County Court of Escambia County. (Testimony of Baxley; R-3) John Johnson's filing of a false official statement supports an inference that he lacks good moral character. Petitioner did not present evidence sufficient to rebut or negate this inference. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, John Johnson has a direct or indirect interest in Johnson's Corner Grocery. He owns the underlying real property. He signs, and is authorized to sign, checks on the business account of Johnson's Corner Grocery. The business's utilities, light, water, and gas accounts are all in his name. (Testimony of Baxley, Johnson, Kelly; R-4) Petitioner, however, manage's the day-to-day operations of Johnson's Corner Grocery. On her application, she indicated that she had purchased the business for $80,000, with $25,000 down, and $55,000 financed by the Barnett Bank. She now admits that the $25,000 down payment was provided by John Johnson, her husband, and that he also co-signed the $55,000 note and mortgage. Her application, however, does not disclose Mr. Johnson's participation in the purchase and financing of, the business. (Testimony of Johnson; R-1, R-4) On November 9, 1982, three days before hearing, Mr. Johnson leased the Johnson's Corner Grocery property to petitioner for $675.00 per month for three years. The handwritten lease, which was not signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, states that Mr. Johnson will not be "responsible for . . . the operations of . . . [the] business." This assertion is rejected as unworthy of belief in light of his extensive involvement in purchasing and setting up the business, and his continuing access to its funds. (P-1)
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Emad F. Abdelmeseh, d/b/a Emad's Texaco is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs in defending the charges made against him in the case of Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco vs. Emad F. Abdelmeseh, d/b/a Emad's Texaco, Division of Administrative Hearings, Case No. 91-1618, under the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code (formerly 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code) and, if so, the amount which Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was licensed by the Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, to sell alcoholic beverages from the premises of Emad's Texaco, having been issued license number 63-2090, 2APS. The Petitioner timely filed the petition in the instant case in accordance with Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code (now Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code). The Respondent timely filed a written response alleging that Respondent was substantially justified in issuing the Notice To Show. With its response the Respondent filed an Affidavit challenging the amount of attorney's fees and cost requested by the Petitioner. However, this Affidavit was subsequently withdrawn and the Respondent made no further effort to contest the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Petitioner. Emad Abdelmeseh is domiciled in the state of Florida and is the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business known as Emad's Texaco, located at 101 East Memorial Boulevard, Lakeland, Florida. Emad's Texaco employs less than 25 employees, and the Petitioner's net worth is less than Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00). Petitioner is a "small business party" as that term is defined under Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes. On July 11, 1990, agents for the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division), John Blair and Brad Nelson, participated in a joint investigation with the City of Lakeland Police Department (CLPD) in the illegal selling of alcoholic beverages to minors. Throughout the course of this investigation the Division's agents were on official duty. Agents Blair and Nelson met with the CLPD detectives and Smalley prior to the investigation and remained with the investigation until its conclusion, including the investigation of Emad's Texaco. The Division, through its agents Blair and Nelson, fully participated in the investigation conducted on July 11, 1990, including Emad's Texaco, and did not simply rely on the CLPD's independent investigation to institute action against Emad's Texaco. This case was not what the Division considers an "adopted case" - one handled entirely by another law enforcement agency which request the Division to prosecute. Therefore, the investigation, as far as agents Blair and Nelson were concerned, should have been conducted in accordance with the Division's Policy and Procedure. The investigation of July 11, 1990, involved the use of an underage operative by the name of J. Karen Smalley n/k/a J. Karen Raschke (Smalley) with previous experience working with the Division, and documented as an underage operative by the Division. Prior to July 11, 1990, Smalley had also been used as an underage operative by the CLPD. During the July 11, 1990 investigation, Smalley was being paid by, and was under the direction of, the CLPD. Before leaving the Police Department to assist in the investigation on July 11, 1990, Smalley was instructed by both Detective Phillips and Agent Blair, on separate occasions, concerning her duties and responsibilities in regard to the investigation. During the course of the investigation on July 11, 1990, Smalley was sent on to the premises of Emad's Texaco for purposes of attempting to purchase an alcoholic beverage. Smalley went to the cooler area in Emad's Texaco's licensed premises and took a six-pack of beer to the check-out counter. Amad Abdelmeseh asked to see Smalley's identification. Smalley either handed her driver's license to Amad Abdelmeseh or laid her driver's license on the check-out counter. Emad Abdelmeseh looked at Smalley's driver's licenses which showed her date of birth to be July 24, 1970, just a few days short of being 20 years of age. Although the photograph of Smalley on the driver's license was taken in 1986, she still maintained her youthful appearance on July 11, 1990. On July 11, 1990, Smalley's hair was blonde, having dyed her hair which was brown when the driver's license was issued. However, Smalley did not dress-up or wear make-up on July 11, 1990, so as to appear older than her age of almost 20 years. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that at the time Smalley was attempting to purchase the six-pack of beer on July 11, 1990, that she: (a) told Emad Abdelmeseh that she was 21 years of age or older or; (b) produced a driver's license, other than the driver's license referred to above, that listed a date of birth which would have indicated an age of 21 years or older or; (c) in any fashion attempted to misrepresent her age as being 21 years or older After looking at Smalley's driver's license, Emad Abdelmeseh sold Smalley the six-pack of beer. After making the purchase of beer, Smalley exited Emad's Texaco and advised Detective Phillips that she had made a purchase of beer from the person inside the store. Detective Phillips advised Detective Tim Snyder of the purchase. Detective Snyder then went inside Emad's Texaco and identified Emad Abdelmeseh as the person who had sold the beer to Smalley. On August 8, 1990, Agent Blair served a Notice of Intent To File Administrative Charges against Emad Abdelmeseh's alcoholic beverage license as a result of his sale of alcoholic beverage to Smalley. On August 8, 1990, Abdelmeseh complained to Agent Blair about the lapse of time between Smalley making the purchase of beer on July 11, 1990 and the serving of the Notice of Intent on August 8, 1990. Emad Abdelmeseh did not complain to Agent Blair on August 8, 1990 that Smalley had misrepresented her age to him when she made the purchase of beer on July 11, 1990. In fact, Emad Abdelmeseh did not advise Agent Blair, or anyone else with the Division, of his allegation that Smalley had misrepresented her age to him on July 11, 1990, when she purchased the beer from him until after the Notice To Show Cause was issued by Lt. Robert Bishop. After the Notice of Intent was served on Emad Abdelmeseh, Agent Blair prepared a draft Notice To Show Cause and a synopsis for review by Lt. Robert Bishop, District Four Supervisor. Lt. Bishop has been a supervisor with the Division for 23 1/2 years. On August 16, 1990, Lt. Robert Bishop, acting with authority from the Division Director, issued a Notice To Show Cause which was served against the Petitioner's alcoholic beverage license on August 17, 1990 alleging that Petitioner had sold alcoholic beverages from the premises of Emad's Texaco to a person under the age of 21 years contrary to Section 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The issuance of the Notice To Show Cause was the initiation of the case against the Petitioner and the Division was not a nominal party in this case. In issuing the Notice To Show Cause, Lt. Bishop relied solely on the information in the Notice To Show Cause and the synopsis prepared by Agent Blair without any further investigation or discussion with Agent Blair. The Division had used Smalley as an underage operative on several occasions prior to the investigation on July 11, 1990, and had found her to be a credible and reliable underage operative. Therefore, the Division reasonably relied on Smalley in the issuance to the Notice To Show Cause to Emad Abdelmeseh, notwithstanding that on July 11, 1990, Smalley was being paid by, and was under the direction of, the CLPD. Agent Blair has been an agent with the Division for 16 years and his reports, according to Lt. Bishop, are impeccable. Therefore, Lt. Bishop had no problem in issuing the Notice To Show Cause to Emad Abdelmeseh based solely on Agents Blair's report, notwithstanding that Agent Blair's report did not specifically indicate that he had strictly adhered to the Division's Policy and Procedure. Although the record reflects that Agent Blair did not strictly adhere to the Division's Policy and Procedure on July 11, 1990, there is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the CLPD detectives basically filled in the gaps, so the speak. It is clear from the testimony of Lt. Bishop that even if had he made further inquiry of Agent Blair concerning Agent's Blair's adherence to policy and procedure, it would not have changed Lt. Bishop's mind about issuing the Notice To Show Cause because there was a reasonable basis in law and fact to issue the Notice To Show Cause - there was credible evidence that Emad Abdelmeseh had sold an alcoholic beverage to an underage operative in violation of the Florida Statutes. Along with the Notice To Show Cause served on Emad Abdelmeseh there was a Notice Of Informal Conference which provided for an Informal Conference between the Division and Emad Abdelmeseh on August 28, 1990 at 3:00 p.m. It was at this informal conference on August 28, 1990, that Emad Abdelmeseh first advised anyone from the Division of his allegation that Smalley had misrepresented her age to him on July 11, 1990. The Informal Conference did not resolve the issues and a Request For Formal Hearing signed by Emad Abdelmeseh and dated September 4, 1990 was filed with the Division. In the Request For Hearing Emad Abdelmeseh sets out what he considers to be the disputed issues of fact. In this request there is an allegation that the underage operative was misleading in that when asked if she was 21 years of age she continued to purchase the beer as if she was an adult. There was no mention of Smalley presenting her driver's license By letter dated February 12, 1991, Emad Abdelmeseh again sets out what he considers to be the facts. Among other things, he alleges that Smalley claimed that she was over the age of 21 years and that she did present her driver's license for identification. On March 11, 1991, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for conduct of a formal hearing. The Division prosecuted this action in the case of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco vs. Emad Abdelmeseh, d/b/a Emad's Texaco, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 91-1618. On October 30, 1991 the Division exercised its administrative discretion and entered an Order of Dismissal dismissing the charges against Emad Abdelmeseh set forth in the Notice To Show Cause issued on August 16, 1990. The reasons behind the Division's dismissal of the case were not presented at the hearing on April 29. 1992 or November 17, 1992. The Petitioner is the prevailing small business party as that term is defined in Section 57.111(3)(c), Florida Statutes. The hourly rate and the total number of hours expended by Petitioner's attorney, and others under his control, and the costs incurred in the defense of the Petitioner as set out in Amended Affidavit and attached as Exhibit B to the Petitioner's Amended Petition in the amount of $11,429.77 are reasonable, and should be the amount awarded in the event Petitioner is successful in presenting his Amended Petition. There is competent, substantial evidence to establish facts to show that at the time the Notice To Show Cause was issued on August 16, 1990 the Division had made a meaningful inquiry into the matter and there was a reasonable basis in fact and law to initiate the action. No special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
Findings Of Fact Aki-San held an alcoholic beverage license which expired October 1, 1977. Only on January 10, 1978, did Aki-San make application for "delinquent renewal" of its license. In the unlicensed interim, one of respondent's truckdrivers continued to deliver Kirin beer to Aki-San. At all pertinent times, respondent was licensed as a distributor of alcoholic beverages. Respondent employs numerous truckdrivers to distribute alcoholic beverages to some 2,000 licensees under the beverage law. Each driver has a route book containing the license number of each of the customers for which he is responsible. The truck drivers have standing instructions to insure, before delivering alcoholic beverages, that the licensees they serve have renewed their licenses for the year. Posted on a bulletin board on respondent's premises, in October of 1977, was a notice reminding the drivers to ascertain whether their customers' licenses had been renewed.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause issued in this case. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Clifford Distributing Company 990 S.W. 21st Terrace Ft. Lauderdale, Florida Mary Jo M. Gallay Staff Attorney 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issues for determination are whether the undisputed actions of Respondent constitute just cause to terminate his employment as an educational support employee, and, if not, what penalty is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Most of the material facts in this proceeding are undisputed. The parties dispute the reasonableness of the proposed termination of Respondent's employment. From December 3, 2001, through April 3, 2007, when Petitioner suspended Respondent without pay, Petitioner employed Respondent as an educational support employee, defined in Subsection 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Petitioner employed Respondent as an Electrician in Petitioner's Maintenance Services Department. The terms of employment are governed by the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (the CBA).2 Respondent is a recovering alcoholic, but his alcoholism has not previously affected his job performance. That changed on January 12, 2007. After receiving work assignments on the morning of January 12, 2007, Respondent became loud and agitated. Respondent's supervisor asked Respondent what was wrong, and Respondent indicated he was having problems at home. The supervisor asked if Respondent had been drinking alcohol. Respondent denied the implicit accusation. After the encounter with the supervisor, Respondent drove one of Petitioner's vans to his home and consumed vodka for most of the day. At about 3:00 p.m. that day, Respondent returned the van to the parking lot of the Maintenance Department and had difficulty parking, according to the observations of Respondent's supervisor. Respondent stopped the van and got out. He was unable to walk without staggering. His eyes were red and watery. He had difficulty standing, and his shirt was soiled with vomit. The supervisor asked Respondent again if Respondent was intoxicated, and Respondent voluntarily reported his alcohol- related problem. Respondent's supervisor and two zone service managers called for assistance from the Fort Myers Police Department (the police). The police first attempted to have Respondent admitted to the Detoxification Unit, but the Unit was full. The police drove Respondent to the hospital, and the hospital admitted Respondent. The incident on January 12, 2007, was not the first time Respondent had voluntarily reported his alcohol-related problem to a member of management. In November of the previous year, Respondent experienced some personal problems and resumed the compulsive consumption of alcohol. Respondent voluntarily reported the alcohol-related problem to his supervisor and to his department director and obtained a 30-day leave of absence to complete a 28-day residential alcohol treatment program. Respondent completed only 17 days of the 28-day program. Respondent exhausted his insurance benefits after 17 days and could not afford the daily rate of $833 to complete the remaining 11 days. Respondent returned to duty sometime between January 8 and 10, 2007. Respondent informed his supervisor that Respondent had not completed the residential treatment program because he had exhausted his insurance benefits. Petitioner did not refer Respondent to another treatment program. After the incident on January 12, 2007, Respondent voluntarily entered an outpatient treatment program with Southwest Florida Addiction Services. Respondent successfully completed the program on March 30, 2007. Petitioner paid for the outpatient program and Respondent kept Petitioner notified of his progress. Respondent has maintained after-care treatment with a physician who specializes in addiction disorders and has regularly attended Alcoholic Anonymous meetings. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. During the period of employment that began on December 3, 2001, Respondent received one probationary performance assessment and four annual performance assessments. Petitioner consistently evaluated Respondent at an "effective level of performance" in all areas targeted for assessment, with the exception that the assessment for the 2002-2003 school year scored two areas as "focus for development/feed back." The comment section in three annual assessments provides that Respondent "continues to do an excellent job." The department director recommended renewal of Respondent's contract for the five school years ending in 2007.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent from his employment without pay for four months from April 3, 2007, as a penalty for personal business on school time and driving a school vehicle for personal use, and requiring Respondent, as a condition of his continued employment, to maintain his current regimen of addiction treatment with a physician and regular intervention from Alcoholics Anonymous. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 2007.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2006),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Penansky has been licensed as an A.R.N.P. in Florida, having been issued license number ARNP1302962 in 1982. From 1993 through August 2006, Ms. Penansky was employed as an A.R.N.P. at the Dover Clinic of Suncoast Community Health Centers, Inc. (Suncoast). She was the primary certified nurse midwife at the facility and saw the obstetric/gynecology patients. During 2004, Carmen Laguerra, who was the office manager at the Dover Clinic, smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath at work and observed Ms. Penansky’s hands trembling. A couple of times, Ms. Laguerra observed that Ms. Penansky was having trouble walking at work and would put her hand on the walls to support herself. Ms. Penansky came to work at times with bruises on her arms and face. In the fall of 2004, the coordinator of medical records at the Dover Clinic asked Ms. Laguerra to observe Ms. Penansky in the medical records room. Ms. Laguerra observed Ms. Penansky murmuring to herself. Prior to 2004, Ms. Penansky had demonstrated a quiet demeanor. In 2004, Ms. Laguerra observed a change in Ms. Penansky’s demeanor. Ms. Penansky became more outspoken and opinionated. In 2004, Yolanda Guzman, the supervisor of nurses at the Dover Clinic, noticed the smell of alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and body while at work. Ms. Guzman also noticed that Ms. Penansky’s hands were trembling and that Ms. Penansky’s speech was not clear. Ms. Guzman observed bruises on Ms. Penansky’s arms and face. Ms. Guzman reported her observations to Ms. Laguerra and to Subhakrarao Medidi, M.D., who was the associate medical director at the Dover Clinic. Dr. Medidi smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath one time in 2004. On multiple occasions, he observed Ms. Penansky’s hands shaking. After receiving patient complaints, Dr. Medidi confronted Ms. Penansky about the smell of alcohol. Ms. Penansky denied the use of alcohol, claiming that the smell resulted from the use of mouthwash. Dr. Medidi also recalled one time, in particular, when Ms. Penansky came to work with bruises. George Hammond, the chief administrative officer at Suncoast, met with Ms. Penansky to discuss the observations of employees at the Dover Clinic. Ms. Penansky denied the use of alcohol at work. He directed Ms. Penansky to get a blood- alcohol test. She did as directed, and the result of the test was negative. Mr. Hammond directed Ms. Penansky to contact the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN), which is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Nursing. IPN is an independent program that monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired nurses. IPN oversees random drug screens and provides for the exchange of information between treatment providers, evaluators, and the Department. Ms. Penansky contacted IPN and was referred to Martha E. Brown, M.D., for an evaluation. As part of the evaluation, Ms. Penansky underwent a drug test, which was negative for drugs and alcohol, but was considered dilute. When a drug test is dilute, it usually means that the individual tested consumed a significant amount of fluids prior to the test. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that she averaged drinking almost every day, but had stopped drinking about ten days prior to the evaluation. As a result of abstinence, Ms. Penansky told Dr. Brown that she felt better and was able to stay up later and get up earlier. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that her brother had a problem with alcohol and had not had a drink in 20 years. In a report dated November 8, 2004, Dr. Brown opined that there was suspicion for Ms. Penansky having a substance abuse problem. She recommended that Ms. Penansky enter into an abuse contract with IPN for two years with a one-year review. Ms. Penansky entered into an IPN contract in December 2004. Her participation in the program included random drug screening, joining a support group, attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and being evaluated by her supervisor. During her participation in the program, she was tested for alcohol 17 times, and each time the test was negative. Ms. Penansky completed the program in one year. While Ms. Penansky was participating in the IPN program, employees at Suncoast observed positive changes in her. Ms. Penansky’s appearance and mood improved, and the tremors in her hands disappeared. On July 31, 2006, Ms. Penansky was involved in an automobile accident. As a result of the accident, she sustained some bruises to her body, which were visible to employees at the Dover Clinic. In August 2006, while Ms. Penansky was at work, Ms. Guzman again smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and noticed Ms. Penansky’s hands were shaky, and her speech was not normal. Ms. Laguerra also smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky while Ms. Penansky was at work during the same time period. In August 2006, Dr. Medidi noticed that Ms. Penansky’s hands were shaking again. Ms. Penansky denies that she had alcohol on her breath at work in either 2004 or 2006. However, both Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra testified credibly that they smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and that the smell was different from the smell that would come from the use of mouthwash, which has a medicinal smell. Additionally, Ms. Penansky testified that in 2006 she was not using the mouthwash prior to going to work because she felt that in 2004 her fellow employees had mistaken the smell of the mouthwash for the smell of alcohol. Thus, the smell could not have come from mouthwash in 2006 because Ms. Penansky was not using it. Ms. Penansky commenced a change in her eating habits in which she had lost 50 pounds. In 2006, she was still losing weight, but not at a very rapid pace. At the final hearing, there were some allegations that the odor that Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra smelled was a result of a release of ketones due to Ms. Penansky’s diet. However, the smell caused by ketones is a “sweet smell,” which is different from the smell of alcohol. Another allegation at the final hearing was that the smell could be a result of Ms. Penansky’s periodontal disease, but the smell that would result from a periodontal disease would be different from the smell of alcohol. Neither Ms. Guzman nor Ms. Laguerra had any conflict with Ms. Penansky that would cause them to make false allegations against her. In fact, both Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra were highly complementary of Ms. Penansky’s work, aside from the use of alcohol and the hand tremors. The evidence is clear and convincing that in 2004 and in 2006, Ms. Penansky came to work at the Dover Clinic with alcohol on her breath while she was practicing as the primary midwife at the facility. In August 2006, the observations of Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra were made known to the management at Suncoast. Suncoast elected not to require Ms. Penansky to undergo a drug screening to determine whether she had ingested alcohol. On August 3, 2006, Ms. Penansky was terminated from her position with Suncoast for her use of alcohol and directed to contact IPN. After Ms. Penansky was terminated from Suncoast, she went to work for a private physician. Her employment was uneventful, and she continued in his employ until the Department suspended her license by emergency order. Ms. Penansky did not contact IPN, and Suncoast filed a complaint with the Department. An investigation ensued. The Department required Ms. Penansky to be evaluated. In January 2007, Ms. Penansky was again evaluated by Dr. Brown. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that she had returned to drinking occasionally after she completed her program with IPN, but denied drinking on the job or drinking in large amounts. A drug screen was performed on Ms. Penansky, and the result was negative. Dr. Brown diagnosed Ms. Penansky with alcohol abuse, "rule out alcohol dependency." Credibly, Dr. Brown opined that Ms. Penansky appeared “to be either in denial or minimizing the impact alcohol has had on her life and the problems she has had at work with others smelling alcohol on her breathe [sic] multiple time [sic].” It was Dr. Brown’s opinion that in order for Ms. Penansky to be able to practice with reasonable safety and skill that she should minimally complete an intensive outpatient program and have monitoring through IPN. Ms. Penansky was also evaluated by Raymond A. Johnson, M.D., who came to the conclusion that Ms. Penansky did not have an addiction and alcohol problem. He felt that she was safe to practice nursing without treatment or monitoring by IPN. In his report dated January 22, 2007, he stated that Ms. Penansky used mouthwash multiple times a day because of periodontal disease, and he concluded that the use of the mouthwash was the reason for the smell of alcohol on her breath. His argument loses plausibility based on Ms. Penansky’s testimony at final hearing that she was not using the mouthwash in 2006 prior to going to work so that people would not mistake the smell of mouthwash for the smell of alcohol. Dr. Johnson had a psychological evaluation performed on Ms. Penansky by Nicholas Anthony, Ph.D. In his report, Dr. Anthony stated that Ms. Penansky told him that her brother was no longer allowed to use alcohol because he had been diagnosed with diabetes. Based on Ms. Penansky’s representations, he concluded that she did not have a family history for addiction. Ms. Penansky’s account of her brother’s abstinence differed when she related her family history to Dr. Brown. She did not tell Dr. Brown that her brother had stopped drinking because he was a diabetic. At the final hearing, she did not mention that her brother refrained from drinking because of diabetes. At the final hearing, Ms. Penansky testified: Well, what he [her brother] told me, in fact, what he told the whole family was, at one point he said he just felt like he was drinking too much and decided to stop. That was it. He never said anything about being an alcoholic. He never said he was diagnosed by a physician. He made a personal choice. Dr. Anthony tested Ms. Penansky using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI), The Rorschach, and the Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI). The Rorschach, otherwise known as the “ink blot” test, is not commonly used in the field of addiction psychiatry to look at substance abuse diagnoses. In the field of psychiatry, alcohol abuse and alcohol dependency are considered Axis I, or primary, diagnoses. The MMPI and the MCMI are more accurate and effective in diagnosing other Axis I disorders such as psychosis than in diagnosing substance abuse or dependency. This is due to the fact that individuals with substance abuse or dependency problems often attempt to present themselves in the best possible light when answering the test questions. The test results themselves for these individuals are often invalid because the test either misses the substance abuse or dependency diagnosis or identifies the individual’s denial or minimization tendencies. The Adult Clinical Interpretive Report for Ms. Penansky’s MMPI test states: [Ms. Penansky] approached the test items in a somewhat defensive manner. Her overcautious approach to the items suggests that she is concerned with making a good impression and is reluctant to disclose much about her personal adjustment. Interpretations of the clinical and content scale profiles should allow for her possible minimization of problems. The Adult Clinical Interpretive Report for Ms. Penansky’s MCMI test states: Unless this patient is a well-functioning adult who is facing minor life stressors, her responses suggest an effort to present a socially acceptable appearance or a resistance to admitting personal shortcomings. Inclined to view psychological problems as a sign of emotional or moral weakness, the patient may protectively deny any unseemly traits or symptoms. This probably reflects either a broad-based concern about being appraised unfavorably by others or an active suspicion of the arcane motives of psychological inquiry. Her MCMI-II scores have been adjusted to compensate for her defensiveness, but the overall profile may remain partially distorted. An interpretation based on standard interpretive procedures is likely to be reasonably valid but may fail to represent certain features of either the patient’s disorders or her character. The BR scores reported for this individual have been modified to account for the defensiveness suggested by the prominence of Personality Patterns Scale 7 (Compulsive). Dr. Anthony interpreted the results of Ms. Penansky’s test scores as being negative for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependency. Dr. Johnson relied on Dr. Anthony’s interpretation of test results in forming his opinion that Ms. Penansky was negative for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependency. Dr. Brown reviewed the Adult Clinical Interpretive Reports of the MMPI and the MCMI performed on Ms. Penansky by Dr. Anthony and opined that the tests are bordering on invalid and that, given Ms. Penansky’s defensiveness on the test in answering questions, she would not use the test results as a total basis for concluding that Ms. Penansky did not have a problem with alcohol. Given Dr. Johnson’s reliance on the use of mouthwash as the explanation for the smell on alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath, the lack of credibility in Ms. Penansky’s account of her family history, and the defensive answers given by Ms. Penansky on her psychological testing, Dr. Johnson’s opinion concerning Ms. Penansky’s alcohol abuse lacks credibility. Current and former employees of Suncoast highly regarded Ms. Penansky’s work. Her evaluations were very good. She worked very hard, and the quality of her work was excellent. However, alcohol abuse can affect a nurse’s judgment and ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. Alcohol may slow concentration and thinking and thereby cause a nurse to miss a diagnosis or symptom while treating a patient. Alcohol abuse may cause tremors, such as those experienced by Ms. Penansky. Although Ms. Penansky’s alcohol abuse may not have resulted in patient harm, it does not mean that it will not result in harm in the future. It is not necessary to wait for a patient to be harmed to determine whether a nurse can practice with reasonable skill and safety by reason of use of alcohol.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that B.J. Penansky, A.R.N.P., violated Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $250; requiring her to undergo an IPN evaluation; suspending her license until such time as she undergoes an IPN evaluation; requiring compliance with all IPN recommendations, if any; and placing her on probation for three years with direct supervision. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2007.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner, Clara Carr, was an inmate at the Florida Correctional Institution. The Respondent Commission is responsible for establishing Presumptive Parole Release Dates (PPRD's) for all inmates in the custody of the State of Florida who meet the requirements of Section 947.173, Florida Statutes. Petitioner met all of the requirements of that section and was entitled to a PPRD initial interview on November 25, 1985. In the establishment of a PPRD, the inmate is first interviewed in the field by an examiner who evaluates and scores the inmates on a form which is then sent to the full Commission which also scores the individual based on salient factors which may be aggravated or mitigated because of other permissible factors. If the Commission decides to assess an aggravating factor, the amount of time is discretionary within certain time limits. Initially, the Commission looks at the offense and its severity in setting a salient factor score and uses that as a beginning. Then the jail time prior to the admission to the Department of Corrections facility, if any, is removed and the pre and post sentencing reports, the interview, and other reports of public hearings and the like are evaluated as aggravating or mitigating factors. The aggravating factors are generally set out in the rule in question here but the list in question in the rule is not all inclusive. The Commission may consider anything which can be founded on a valid or reasonable connection to the action taken. Petitioner was interviewed by Commission staffers on November 25, 1985, for the purpose of setting her PPRD. By action of the Commission at a meeting held on January 8, 1986, the PPRD was established to be December 28, 1988. This date was arrived at by initially utilizing the maximum matrix of 32 months set for her offense and the conditions thereof aggravated by a history of alcohol abuse listed in the pre-sentence investigation; the psychological interview; and the admissions summary, for which the Commission added an additional 36 months. When that time was applied to the commencement of sentence, April 28, 1983, the PPRD was established as stated above. On January 30, 1986, through counsel, Petitioner requested a review of her PPRD alleging that the rule under which the Commission had aggravated her PPRD (Rule 23-21.10(4)(a)2b) is invalid. Petitioner claimed that alcoholism is a treatable illness and it is improper and illegal to aggravate on such grounds. Petitioner cited Article 1 Section 2 of the Florida Constitution; Section 396.022(1), Florida Statutes; 42 USC 4541(a)(8), and other authorities. A commission meeting was held on February 26, 1986, to consider Petitioner's request for review of her PPRD. The Commission did not change it holding that the rule in question was appropriate and provided for the aggravation of a PPRD for history of alcohol abuse. Consequently, the PPRD remained at December 28, 1988. In the pre-sentence investigation conducted by officials of Marion County, Florida, in August, 1983, which was presented to the Judge at the time Petitioner was sentenced and which was considered by the Commission at the time the PPRD was established, Petitioner is alleged to have indicated that she had been drinking very heavily for several hours the night of the incident and does not remember any of the circumstances surrounding it. She described herself as a "weekend drinker" of beer and liquor and denies the use of any drugs, but it is significant to note that her nickname in the community is "Boozie." Though Petitioner denied having a prior arrest record, the records of the Marion County Sheriff's Office and the Ocala Police Department indicate a series of arrests going back to January, 1975, five of six of which relate to aggravated battery or assault and battery, in some cases with a deadly weapon. During the admissions examination conducted at the time Petitioner entered FCI, she indicated that she did not drink, but also that she is a weekend alcoholic. The evaluator was of the opinion that her alcoholic involvement was more than just weekends involvement and in addition, she was diagnosed by the institutional psychiatrist as having an adjustment disorder. She was described as being very aggressive and one who would probably display aggressive behavior if placed under too much stress. The Commission is required, under the provisions of Sections 947.16 and 947.172, Florida Statutes, to provide the Petitioner with a PPRD and to compute that date according to objective parole guidelines outlined in Section 947.165, Florida Statutes. In determining the PPRD, the Commission may use aggravating or mitigating circumstances but these circumstances must not be duplicative of the severity of the offense behavior or the salient factor score arrived at pursuant to Sections 947.1651 and 947.1722, Florida Statutes. The Commission was delegated rulemaking power by Section 947.07, Florida Statutes. Consistent with the authority, the Commission developed parole guidelines outlined in Rule 23-21.10, Florida Administrative Code. The aggravation factor which is the subject of the instant challenge is contained in Rule 23-21.10(4)(a)2b, Florida Administrative Code. This Petitioner is a 28-year old female serving her first felony conviction from Marion County, Florida, for aggravated battery with a dangerous weapon having been sentenced to a term of 10 years (less 81 days jail time), on July 18, 1983. She was received at FCI on July 22, 1983, and presently has a maximum release date of April 25, 1993. Under the provisions of the rule cited above, the Commission may aggravate a Parole Release Date if the inmate has demonstrated a history of alcohol or drug abuse. The Petitioner's PPRD was aggravated for that reason because the history of her alcohol abuse relates to negative behavior on her part. This history of alcohol abuse alone would not be sufficient to cause the Commission to aggravate a PPRD. Here, however, there was a showing of increased risk on the part of Petitioner as a potential parolee. The Commission felt that she was a risk due to the interrelation of her history of bad behavior and alcohol consumption. Even though the rule in question does not specifically refer to aberrant behavior as related to the alcohol abuse as grounds for aggravation, it is nonetheless implied therein and a logical and reasonable extension and interpretation of the rule. The Commission does not specifically consider that the alcohol abuse may stem from a medical condition. It deals with results or behaviors regardless of the cause of the behavior. It is not the function of the Commission to deal with the cause of the problem, but to evaluate each inmate for parole on the basis of that inmate's specific situation. There is no formula for evaluation but instead, it is the best collective judgment of the risk factors in the individual case as arrived at by the members of the Commission. The matrix time ranges are limits of foundation times and the other factors are add-ons or subtractables. If this were not so; if there were to be no independence of thought and judgment by members of the Commission; there would be no need for people to make up the Commission and to make the decision. This function could be performed by a machine on the basis of factors fed into it. Petitioner contests the validity of the rule on the basis that it does not consider the fact that alcoholism is a sickness rather than a mental condition. At the time the rule complained of was drafted, the Commission hired Florida Research Center, Inc. as consultants to help come up with appropriate matrices and salient factors which included alcohol and drug abuse. In addition to this, a survey was conducted in 1978 of 10 individuals including the Commissioners as to how certain factors should be rated. Five of the ten parties questioned rated drug and alcohol abuse as number one. Two others rated those conditions as second in importance. Further, the Commission was provided with the professional literature considered by authorities at the time the preponderance of which supported these evaluations. It is clear that the legislative intent behind Chapter 947, Florida Statutes, was to have rules in effect for the Commission to use in establishing PPRD which call for the use of objective parole criteria within certain limits. Under the statute, the rule need not specify a number of months or a range of months for aggravation due to alcohol abuse. The Commission has not suggested to Petitioner that she seek treatment for her alcohol abuse nor has it offered to reduce her sentence if she should do so. It would be inappropriate for the Commission to do this as a part of a determination but it would not be inappropriate for the interview staff to suggest it as a matter of course. It is not the role of the Commission to suggest the course of an inmate's confinement or rehabilitation. That subject is within the purview of the Department of Corrections. The Commission's function is to assess the propriety of returning the inmate to society and the issue to be decided by the Commission at its hearing is whether the inmate constitutes a threat to the community or not. In fulfilling this function, the Commission uses the Department of Corrections to prepare mental and medical examinations of the inmate and to produce reports. If the evidence indicates there is a mental health problem, the Commission considers it. In early 1984, the Commission published two policy letters dealing with the Commission operations; Numbers 4.17 and 4.20, both of which relate to medical or mental health status reports regarding inmates. The first, dealing with the request for these reports indicates that if the Commission requires an up- to-date report in these areas it may request it and in those cases where a hearing examiner for the Commission feels that the Commission would need it, it is the responsibility of the examiner to request it so that it is available for the Commission to consider at the time the inmate's PPRD is considered. Number 20 deals primarily with the language to be used by the Commission in citing a mental health status report as a source of new information used to alter the PPRD. Neither of these policy letters are necessarily pertinent unless it is considered that alcohol abuse, the language used in the rule in question here, is equated to alcohol dependency and alcohol dependency is considered either a mental health or medical condition. It cannot be found here that alcohol abuse, which may be a single incident of improper consumption of alcohol, is tantamount to or equates to alcoholism or alcohol dependency which may be a mental or physical condition. The term, "aggravation", is defined in Rule 23-21.02(1) as: . . . to exceed the matrix times ranges upper month limit. Alcohol abuse is not defined in the rule or anywhere else for specific use by the Commission. It is basically left up to each Commissioner to apply his interpretation of the term to the facts before him or her and most Commissioners have a common understanding of what the term means. The Commission considers there is a medical difference between alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence for setting PPRDs. The determination of whether to use a history of alcohol abuse may be based on whether the abuse played a part in the current offense or not. If so, the Commission generally will utilize the incident in its deliberations. If not, then it may not, but the issue of whether to use it as either aggravation or mitigation is discretionary with the Commission. Once it is determined to use alcohol abuse as aggravation in establishing a PPRD, then the amount of aggravation and time to be added is also based on the individual judgment of each Commissioner based on his or her evaluation of the degree of risk involved to the general public by the inmate. In arriving at this additional time, the Commission has a range within which it may assess a period of months, but there is no formula. In substance, the Commission is making an assessment of the risk - not a medical diagnosis and the issue is whether, because of that demonstrated alcohol abuse, the inmate constitutes a greater risk to the public if paroled. If so, then additional months are added on. If not, they are not. In that connection, expert evidence tends to indicate that abusers of either alcohol or drugs have a lesser chance of success than those who do not abuse. Alcohol addiction does generally lead to poor behavior and it is often a condition of parole that the inmate not drink to excess. Consequently, if a demonstrated alcohol abuser does drink to excess, the likelihood of his behavior becoming inappropriate again is high, but in addition, he will most likely be in violation of the conditions of his probation. It is again a question of risk assessment by professional judgment on an individual basis. Some experts define alcohol abuse as "a voluntary excess or inappropriate use of alcohol", whereas alcoholism is "involuntary." An abuser is not necessarily an alcoholic and trained medical expertise differentiates between alcoholism and alcohol abuse. Because of the fact that alcohol abuse is voluntary, some experts believe there is no reason to extend a prison term on the basis of alcohol abuse if the extension does not result in treatment for the behavior. Petitioner introduces the Commission's action with regard to inmate Nicky Berkart, wherein the Commission declined to utilize that inmate's alcohol abuse to aggravate his PPRD as evidence of the inconsistency of treatment of this factor. Mr. Burkart's situation is not comparable, however, to the issue here. None of the documentation considered by the Commission here was prepared by a doctor or medical professional with the exception of the psychologist's interview, but there is no indication that it need be. If the Commission had decided that additional medical or professional evaluation was necessary and pertinent, it could have requested it. What must be recognized is that an inmate has no right to parole. The sentence imposed by the court generates an expiration of sentence date (EOS) at which time the inmate will be released unless he or she has committed additional offenses. Parole, which is a release prior to expiration of sentence, is a privilege and if no parole is granted, the inmate will still get out at the EOS less gain time. Consequently, since nothing extends the sentence, denial of parole does not increase the penalty. The Commission may and does make abstinence from alcohol, or the use of antabuse, a condition of parole. Neither, however, is a guarantee that the individual will refrain from using alcohol. The evidence presented by Respondent indicates that it is not at all unusual for a parolee to commit offenses while under the influence of alcohol. Forty to fifty percent of all revocations of parole result from some sort of substance abuse. Many of those parolees have a history of alcohol abuse. Therefore, a history of alcohol abuse would appear to be a negative indicant of parole success. The aggravating factor in this situation is not that the inmate has the medical problem of alcoholism, but that the history of alcohol abuse shows that the inmate is not a good parole risk. It is generally a safe statement that people in prison who abuse alcohol are not a risk to society. Those who are released form prison with a demonstrated propensity to abuse alcohol are. In making this evaluation, the Commission is not, as was indicated previously, bound by any strict formula. Whatever qualification is applied, however, it must be applied on an individual basis and not across the board. Each Commissioner tailors his recommendation on what he knows about the individual before him. Based on the information provided, plus whatever information is requested as appropriate, an individual conclusion is drawn by each member of the Commission. These then are evaluated and a Commission vote is taken which results in the establishment of the PPRD.
The Issue The issues presented are those set forth in a notice to show cause filed by Petitioner against Respondents in Case No. AY-74-87-0201. In particular, it is alleged that on March 16, 1988, October 21, 1988 and February 24, 1989, that the Respondents or their agents, servants or employees sold alcoholic beverages to minors in violation of Sections 561.29, Florida Statutes and 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times which pertain to this Notice to Show Cause/Administrative Complaint, Respondents were doing business at 238-240 Atlantic Avenue, Daytona Beach, Volusia County, Florida under the business name Speidi Shack and pursuant to a beverage license issued by Petitioner. That license number was and continues to be number 74-01802, Series 2-COP. On March 16, 1988, and again on October 21, 1988, Michael Vanorder, whose birthday is March 27, 1969, purchased a Light beer from employees of the Respondents in the licensed premises. On February 24, 1989, Tina May purchased a Light beer from an employee of the Respondents in the licensed premises. Her date of birth is August 4, 1968. The Light beers that were purchased by those two individuals are alcoholic beverages. In the incident of March 16, 1988, Vanorder entered the licensed premises as an underage operative of the Petitioner. The purpose of underage operatives is to assist the Petitioner in investigations to ascertain whether suspected alcoholic beverage license holders will sell alcoholic beverages to minors. Vanorder was provided money from the Petitioner to purchase the alcoholic beverage if the licensees, their agents or employees would sell. Betty Warner and Tanya Pandarakis, who are Alcoholic Beverage Agents for Petitioner were in the bar and watched as Vanorder was asked by the bartender what Vanorder wanted. Vanorder indicated that he wanted a Light beer. Mark Barker, the bartender, brought a Light beer to Vanorder and accepted payment for that beer. In this purchase, Vanorder was not asked to produce any identification nor was he asked how old he was. Vanorder was under instructions from Petitioner's agents to validly respond to any questions about his age and to provide accurate identification in support of his remarks. The beer that he was given had been opened by the bartender. These events occurred around 8:35 p.m. The beer that was purchased was then given from Vanorder to Warner. Barker was then arrested by Warner and another Alcoholic Beverage Agent, Fred Dunbar, for selling alcoholic beverages to a minor. The arrest occurred when Dunbar entered the licensed premises following the sale and identified himself as an Alcoholic Beverage Agent. Prior to leaving the premises on that occasion, Respondent John M. Macker was told of the arrest and why an investigation had been made in the first place about suspected sales to minors in the licensed premises. Macker came the next day to meet with Dunbar at the invitation of Dunbar. Macker was told that a complaint file would remain open and that underage operatives would continue to be sent into the licensed premises to see if Macker had corrected the problem of selling to underage patrons. Respondent Macker promised that he would have closer supervision and would give training to his employees about proper identification techniques for sales of alcoholic beverages in the licensed premises. An official notice was given to the Respondents, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 which was admitted into evidence. That notice is dated March 17, 1988 and is issued from Dunbar and is acknowledged as having been received by Respondent Macker. It identifies the facts of the sale to a minor and the arrest of Mark Barker and warns Respondents that if the violation occurs again, that Respondents could be charged with the violation of March 16, 1988 and any future violations. Throughout this warning phase associated with the sale of March 16, 1988 Respondent Macker was cooperative in his attitude. As forecast, Petitioner sent Vanorder back into the licensed premises on October 21, 1988 to see if Respondents, their agents, servants or employees would sell him alcoholic beverages. Beverage Agent John Szabo, Agent Dunbar, Lt. Powell and Vanorder went to the licensed premises on that evening. Their activities at the licensed premises commenced around 8:55 p.m. At this time, there were around 10-20 patrons in the bar. Szabo went in first and sat down at the bar and ordered a beer. Vanorder came in some 2-3 minutes later and sat down at the bar. A white female bartender who was identified later as Beth Ann Marsden approached Vanorder and asked him what she could get for him. He asked for a Bud Light. The bartender went to the cooler and came back with an open can of Bud Light and said that the cost of that beer would be $1.25. Vanorder paid her and she gave him back change. Vanorder then went outside the licensed premises and gave the beer to Dunbar. During the course of this purchase, Vanorder was not asked his age or asked for any form of identification which would demonstrate his age. As before, Vanorder was prepared to show a valid identification and give his correct age. After Dunbar was given the beer, he came into the licensed premises and he and Szabo confronted the bartender with the fact that she had sold beer to an underaged patron. They asked if the owner was on the premises and she said that he was not. The bartender was then charged with selling to a minor. She was given a Notice of Appearance for October 25, 1988 which constituted of a letter of final warning to the licensee. A third phase of the investigation occurred on February 24, 1989 when Tina May, an underaged operative for the Petitioner assisted in the investigation of sales to minors. Around 10:50 p.m., Officer Szabo, Beverage Officer Sullivan and Tina May went to the licensed premises. Szabo went in the bar first. One customer was in the bar. Szabo asked for a beer and was asked for his identification and showed his license and was served a beer. Before Tina May entered the license premises, she had been instructed to dress in normal attire and to carry her drivers license and to tell the truth about her age and to give the correct identification. Once inside the licensed premises, May sat where she could be seen by Officer Szabo. The other patron left the bar. Around 11:00 p.m., May was approached by Beth Ann Marsden who asked May what she wanted. May replied that she wanted a Bud Light. The bartender asked for identification and a driver's license was produced which showed May to be underage. Marsden was seen to count on her fingers when shown the identification. She opened up a Bud Light beer for May and gave it to her and said that the price of the beer was $1.25. May gave her $5.00 and received change. She then gave the beer to Szabo. Szabo then told the bartender that he was a Beverage Officer. Marsden recognized Szabo from the prior incident with Vanorder on October 21, 1988. Marsden told Szabo that May was 21 years old. Szabo got the driver's license from May and showed it to the bartender who admitted that she had made a mistake and that she didn't look at the month of the birth. She had only looked at the year, 1968. Out of this incident, an Official Notice was prepared, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. It sets out the violations of March 16, 1988, October 21, 1988 and February 24, 1989 and the intention of the Petitioner to file administrative charges against the Respondents for sales to minors. Since the Respondents were not there, the list was left with a Rosemarie Savini. That notice was served on November 2, 1989. Before the time of the final hearing in this case, the sole ownership of the licensed premises had been left with John M. Macker. Linda F. Williams no longer is involved with the license in question. Respondent Macker's principle business is that of a commercial fisherman. During the pendency of this investigation, he was gone a lot from his licensed premises because of his other work and relied on his employees to act appropriately concerning sales to minors. In the period 1985 until January, 1989, he had not experienced problems with this. He had posted notices around the bar about sales to minors and had instructed his employees about being careful not to sell to minors. He has calendars from beer distributors which assist in ascertaining the age of minors. March 16, 1988 was Barker's first day on the job, as was October 21, 1988 the first day on the job for Beth Ann Marsden. His instructions to his employees was to check identification if people did not look at least in their fifties or older than Respondent. Since these events, Respondent has taken more detailed steps and placed other signs to avoid sales to minors. He doesn't wish these problems to occur again and regrets that they happened on this occasion. On the other hand, he did not ask for help from the Petitioner after the October 21, 1988 incident as was offered. Following the third sale, he has moved into the licensed premises to maintain better control of the circumstance. No other incidents were reported to have occurred beyond that adjustment concerning sales to minors.
Recommendation Having considered the facts, and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which fines the Respondents in the amount of $500 for these violations. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-2457 Those facts as suggested by the Petitioner are subordinate to facts found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Ivey, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 John B. Fretwell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 John M. Macker 238-240 North Atlantic Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32018
