The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.426(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(a), (b), and (e), Florida Statutes, 1/ by: acting as a broker; failing to deposit money in escrow; committing fraud, deceit, or dishonesty; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0585127. In September, 1992, Respondent's real estate license had lapsed. It was renewed on October 22, 1992. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a sales person at 457 Loma Bonita Drive, Davenport, Florida. Respondent is a British citizen doing business in Florida. Respondent owns 50 percent of the outstanding stock of Newbay Florida Associates ("Newbay") and Newbay Properties of Central Florida, Inc ("Newbay Properties"). Mr. Paul Chandler is a British citizen confined to a wheelchair by osteogenesis imperfecta, a bone disease. Mr. Chandler was injured in an automobile accident by a drunken driver in 1989. As a result, Mr. Chandler was awarded a jury verdict of $600,000. From the net proceeds of the jury verdict, Mr. Chandler purchased four houses in Florida from Respondent. The houses were for Mr. Chandler and members of his family who have disabilities similar to Mr. Chandler's. 2/ Mr. Chandler paid the remainder of his jury award, approximately $225,000, to Respondent to purchase a furniture franchise. The franchise was to be operated as Flamingo Interiors, Inc. ("Flamingo"), in Kissimmee, Florida. In September, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Chandler negotiated and executed a Franchise Rights Agreement (the "agreement"). The agreement identifies Mr. Chandler as the "franchisee" but otherwise conceals material facts and contains misrepresentations, false promises, false pretenses, and amounts to dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. The agreement illustrates Respondent's fraud and breach of trust in a business transaction. The agreement contains the name "NEWBAY FLORIDA ASSOCIATES" across the top of the front page of the document. However, the agreement identifies the "franchisor" as Flamingo Interiors of Wells, Somerset, England. The agreement requires Flamingo Interiors to perform numerous obligations. The obligations include: setting up a retail store; providing all necessary training, licensing, qualifications, visas, and inventory; conveying an exclusive area of operation within an "eight (8) miles radius from the Newbay office;" and establishing the location and size of the retail store at the discretion of Newbay. The agreement represents that Newbay owns 25 percent of the outstanding stock in Flamingo Interiors. However, the agreement conceals Flamingo Interiors' place of formation, organization, and current status, and conceals Newbay's authority, or lack of authority, to bind Flamingo Interiors to the obligations of the franchisor in the agreement. Respondent is the only signatory to the agreement other than Mr. Chandler. Respondent signed the agreement on behalf of Newbay. No one from Flamingo Interiors is a signatory to the agreement. The purchase price under the agreement requires Mr. Chandler to deposit $45,000 upon execution of the agreement. The balance of $180,000 is to be paid by December 31, 1992. Mr. Chandler paid the $225,000 required under the agreement in three checks made payable to "Newbay Clients Account." Respondent represented that the amounts paid by Mr. Chandler would be held in the escrow account of Newbay Properties until the obligations of the franchisor were completed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. All negotiations were conducted in the offices of Newbay Properties. Newbay Properties had no escrow account. Respondent failed to place the $225,000 paid to him by Mr. Chandler into any escrow account. The obligations of the franchisor were never satisfied, in whole or in part. Neither Respondent, Newbay, nor Flamingo Interiors made any attempt to obtain performance of the obligations of the franchisor. After repeated efforts and requests by Mr. Chandler, Respondent failed to account for or return Mr. Chandler's money. Respondent never explained his failure to return the money deposited with Respondent by Mr. Chandler.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(k), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(a); guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b); and revoking Respondent's real estate sales license. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February 1995.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following factual matters: The Respondent was, at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint in this cause, a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number OliB294. From February 2, l9B4 to August 13, l9B4 Respondent was licensed and operating as the sole qualifying broker and officer of Commercial International Realty, Inc., a corporation licensed as a real estate broker, 219 Commercial Boulevard, Lauderdale- By-The-Sea, Florida. At all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Elaine Sherban was president, sole stock holder and owner of Commercial International Realty, Inc., 219 Commercial Boulevard, Lauderdale-By-The-Sea, Florida. Elaine Sherban is not now, nor was she ever, licensed or a holder of a valid and current license as a real estate salesman, broker-salesman or broker in the State of Florida. On or about December 29, l9B4, Respondent and Commercial International Realty, Inc., via Elaine Sherban, entered into an employment agreement whereby Respondent was employed as a real estate broker. The Respondent has not paid any sum whatsoever to Bobbi Jo Magee. Based upon the evidence received and the demeanor of the witnesses who testified, the following additional findings of fact are made: On or about March 7, 1984, Bobbi Jo Magee, as purchaser, executed a purchase agreement with Robert E. Moon, seller, for an establishment known as Cowboy's Lounge and Restaurant, Inc. The purchase agreement provided for a purchase price of $257,500 and a $10,000 non-refundable deposit. The date of closing was specified in the agreement to be June 7, 1984. In connection with this purchase agreement, Bobbi Jo Magee also executed a promissory note, dated March 7, 1984, in the amount of $35,000, payable to Elaine Sherban or her assigns. The promissory note was due and payable on March 12, 1984 and stated it was for "consulting fees and cash loan." Bobbi Jo Magee testified that she had no money of her own for the deposit called for in the promissory note, but that her mother, Mary Rose Turner, was financially backing her in this transaction. On March 30, 1984, Mary Rose Turner executed a wire transfer in the amount of $35,000 plus an additional $500 to Commercial International Business Brokers Corp., a business owned by Elaine Sherban. Commercial International Business Brokers was located in the same building as Sherban's other business, Commercial International Realty, Inc., but was a separate business with different telephone lines and financial accounts. Turner and Magee testified that this wire transfer was for the deposit on Cowboy's Lounge, and was for an amount greater than the $10,000 deposit called for in the purchase agreement because Sherban told them that Moon would not accept a deposit of only $10,000 on this transaction. Respondent did place several telephone calls to Turner, who was out of the state, on behalf of Sherban in which Sherban made requests for more money. Respondent's role was to make the phone call and leave a message that Sherban needed to talk to Turner or to turn the phone over to Sherban who then discussed the details with Turner. Respondent did not discuss the financial, or any other, details of the transaction with Turner in these calls, but simply placed the calls for Sherban and facilitated discussions between Sherban and Turner. Elaine Sherban was acting through Commercial International Business Brokers in this transaction with Magee, Turner and Moon. She had Magee execute the $35,000 promissory note to cover the $10,000 deposit and consulting fees she charged for her services. Respondent had no knowledge of the reason for this promissory note or what, if any, services Sherban had performed. Respondent did not participate in the execution of the promissory note and purchase agreement other than as-typist, notary and witness. She was not involved in any substantive discussions which caused Magee to sign either document, nor were any part of the funds that were wire transferred by Turner ever received or used by either Respondent, or Commercial International Realty, Inc., the real estate office in which she was employed. The funds which were transferred by Turner on behalf of Magee were received by Commercial International Business Brokers and were used thereafter by Elaine Sherban. The sale of Cowboy's lounge did not close on June 7, l9B4, due to concerns which Magee and Turner developed in late May regarding the business records of Cowboy's Lounge. Because they could not get information which they felt was satisfactory about the financial history of this business, they sought legal advice and notified Sherban and Moon that they would not close. Neither Magee nor Turner have ever received a refund on any part of the $35,500 which was transferred by wire on March 30, l9B4.~_ Between March 7, 1984, and late May Respondent met with Magee on several occasions and with Turner on one occasion at Cowboy's Lounge. Others were also present, including Sherban and Moon. Respondent's role in these meetings was purely social, making casual conversation She did not discuss any aspect of the transaction, or the financial condition of Cowboy 's. Despite the fact that Respondent did not intend to actively participate in the transaction involving Cowboy's Lounge, and in fact did not solicit, negotiate or otherwise intentionally assist with this sale, she did give the appearance of working with and assisting Sherban in this transaction. Magee and Turner made the reasonable assumption that Sherban and Respondent were partners for purposes of this sale. This appearance was given by tlle fact that Sherban said they were acting as partners, the very close proximity of the offices of Commercial International Business Brokers and Commercial International Realty, Inc., common ownership by Sherban of both businesses, Respondent's placing phone calls to Turner on behalf of Sherban, meeting with Turner and Magee at Cowboy's along with Sherban, and her functioning as typist, witness and notary for some of the documents involved in this transaction. No demand by either Turner or Magee has ever been made on Respondent for return of part or all of the $35,500. Through counsel, they did make demand for return of this sum upon Sherban and Moon. There is no evidence that Respondent ever employed Sherban. The evidence is that Respondent was employed by Commercial International Realty, Inc., which was owned by Sherban.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht broker.1 She is the yacht broker for Yachting Consultants, Inc. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In April 1999, Respondent was the listing broker of record regarding the sale of a 43-foot Pilgrim yacht. The selling broker was Mark Lipkus, a licensed yacht broker. John Pribik, a licensed salesperson, was Respondent's representative in the sale of the Pilgrim yacht. Mr. Pribik was under the supervision and control of Respondent and Respondent was responsible for his actions. Respondent had a buyer for the Pilgrim yacht, and the closing for the sale of the yacht was scheduled for April 13, 1999. The buyer was financing the purchase of the yacht. In a sale situation, a buyer and a seller have different responsibilities. The seller is responsible for providing all of the documents needed for a sale. The buyer is responsible for providing the funds for a sale. In the sale of the Pilgrim yacht, the responsibilities of the Seller and the Buyer did not change. There is a commission from the sale of a yacht, which is paid by the seller and, in accordance with standard industry practice, paid at closing. By standard industry practice, the commission split is 70/30, but can differ upon agreement. Mr. Lipkus received a down payment of $15,000.00 from the Buyer and placed the down payment in his escrow account. Mr. Lipkus was of the mistaken belief that the commission was payable by the Buyer, not the Seller. No co-broker agreement was entered into between Respondent or Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus regarding commission. There was no discussion regarding the split of the commission between them. On a prior sale involving Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, the commission split was 60/40. Mr. Pribik and Respondent assumed the commission split of the sale of the Pilgrim yacht would again be 60/40. Considering the prior sale, it was not unreasonable for Respondent and Mr. Pribik to assume a 60/40 split of the commission. Mr. Lipkus assumed the commission split would be 70/30. A power of attorney had been prepared by the Seller who was unavailable for closing due to being in a remote area in the Philippine Islands. Mr. Pribik provided the power of attorney to the documenting agent who reviewed the power of attorney and found it to be satisfactory. The mortgage broker received a copy of the power of attorney prior to closing and forward a copy to the lending institution. The lending institution notified the mortgage broker at some point before closing that the power of attorney was unacceptable. In turn, the mortgage broker contacted the documenting agent regarding the unacceptability of the power of attorney and informed the documenting agent that a new power of attorney was required before closing could take place. Mr. Pribik was notified by the mortgage broker that a new power of attorney was required. The responsibility to obtain the new power of attorney was the responsibility of the listing broker, who was Respondent via Mr. Pribik. As far as Mr. Pribik was concerned, with the time remaining before closing2 and with the Seller being in the Philippine Islands, he believed that it was virtually impossible to obtain a new power of attorney by the time of closing. The mortgage broker, taking the position that he should do whatever he could to effectuate a closing, encouraged Mr. Pribik to attempt to contact the Seller. Complying, Mr. Pribik was able to make telephonic contact with the Seller and Mr. Pribik and the mortgage broker spoke with the Seller, who agreed to provide a new power of attorney. Based on the verbal assurance by the Seller to provide the new power of attorney, the lending institution agreed to proceed with the closing, which was re- scheduled for April 14, 1999. A new power of attorney was faxed to the Seller, and the Seller executed it and faxed it back. According to industry standard, all commissions are paid at closing when a seller receives the funds. Also, according to industry standard, closing is not delayed until a commission is paid. Mr. Lipkus mistakenly believed that the commission was paid by a buyer, coming out of a buyer's deposit. As a result, he expected to take the commission out of the Buyer's down payment, which was held in Mr. Lipkus' escrow account. After obtaining his commission, Mr. Lipkus was going to forward the remaining monies. On April 13, 1999, the original date for the closing, the closing could not take place because the financing from the lending institution was not available, based upon the absence of a new power of attorney. Also, Mr. Lipkus had not made arrangements for the deposit monies to be at closing or forwarded a settlement statement to closing, which were both needed for the closing. Respondent contacted Mr. Lipkus by fax regarding the commission monies and the settlement statement, demanding both items in order for closing to take place. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Respondent demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Respondent was threatening to delay the closing unless she had the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Respondent was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Additionally, on the original closing date, closing was to take place at the office of the mortgage broker. Mr. Pribik, the Buyer, and the mortgage broker were present for the closing. Mr. Lipkus did not intend to attend, and did not attend, the closing. Since the commission monies were not available at closing, Mr. Pribik telephoned Mr. Lipkus and demanded that the commission monies be available and, told him that if not made available, the closing could not take place. In Mr. Pribik's opinion, the monies were needed for closing. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Mr. Pribik demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Mr. Pribik was threatening to delay the closing if he did not have the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Mr. Pribik was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Furthermore, for the first time, Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, during the telephone conversation, became aware of their disagreement as to the proper commission split, whether 60/40 or 70/30. Believing that Mr. Pribik would prevent a timely closing, Mr. Lipkus agreed to Mr. Pribik's split of 60/40. Closing occurred on April 14, 1999. The necessary documents and finances were present. At the final hearing, Respondent expressed with sincerity that, if she did anything wrong, she wanted to know exactly what it was, so that she would not engage in the same conduct again. Furthermore, Respondent expressed the frustration that, prior to hearing, no one had explicitly told her what she had done wrong and that, at hearing, she continued to be unsure what she had done wrong because she had not been explicitly told what she had done wrong. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Finding that Giovanna Gallottini did not violate Rule 61B-60.008(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Not sustaining the Notice to Show Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent's yacht and ship salesman's license should be disciplined for the reasons set forth in the notice of intent to revoke license dated June 14, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility to regulate persons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. On April 30, 1993, the Department received an application for a yacht and ship broker or salesman license (the application) submitted by Respondent, Thomas I. Davis, Jr. The application provided, in pertinent part: LICENSES AND CERTIFICATES: Have you now or have you ever been licensed or certified in any other profession such as real estate, insurance, or securities in Florida or any other state? Yes No If you answered yes, please describe: Profession License # First Obtained Status of License (a)Has any license, certification, registration or permit to practice any regulated profession or occupation been revoked, annulled or suspended in this or any other state, or is any proceeding now pending? Yes No (b) Have you ever resigned or withdrawn from, or surrendered any license, registration or permit to practice any regulated profession, occupation or vocation which such charges were pending? Yes No If your answer to questions (a) or (b) is Yes, attach a complete, signed statement giving the name and address of the officer, board, commission, court or governmental agency or department before whom the matter was, or is now, pending and give the nature of the charges and relate the facts. In response to the application questions identified above, Respondent entered the following answers: "No" as to questions 11, 12(a), and 12(b). As a result of the foregoing, Respondent was issued a yacht and ship salesman's license on May 10, 1993. Thereafter, the Department learned that Respondent had been censured by the NASD. In a decision entered by that body accepting Respondent's offer of settlement, Respondent was given a censure, a fine of $20,000.00, and a suspension in all capacities from association with any member for a period of two (2) years with the requirement that at the conclusion of such suspension that he requalify by examination for any and all licenses with the Association. The censure also provided a specific payment plan for the $20,000 fine which was assessed. To date, Respondent has not complied with that provision of the settlement. From 1973 through 1991, Respondent was registered with several different firms pursuant to Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. Additionally, Respondent has been licensed to sell securities in the following states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and New York. Respondent has also been licensed in Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico. Respondent has been a licensed stock broker with the Securities and Exchange Commission since 1971. Respondent answered questions 11 and 12 (a) and (b) falsely. Respondent knew he was licensed to sell securities and knew of the sanction from the NASD at all times material to the entry of the answers. Pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003, when the Department receives an application for licensure which is in the acceptable form, it is required to issue a temporary license. Had the Respondent correctly answered questions 11 and 12 on the application, the Department would not have issued Respondent's license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order dismissing Respondent's challenge to the notice of intent and revoking his license. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 13th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4258 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 9, 11, 13, and 15 through 17 are accepted. Paragraph 10 is rejected as repetitive. Except as to findings reached above, paragraphs 12 and 14 are rejected as irrelevant. It is found that Respondent falsely answered question 11. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Respondent's proposed findings of fact are rejected as they do not comply with Rule 60Q-2.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. However, to the extent findings do not conflict with the findings of fact above, they have been accepted. Such proposed findings of fact are paragraphs: 1, 7 and 8. The remaining paragraphs are rejected as they are not supported by the record cited (none), irrelevant, argument, or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 E. Harper Field Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 David M. Goldstein LAW OFFICE OF DAVID M. GOLDSTEIN 100 S.E. 2nd Street Suite 2750 International Place Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent has violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.010(1) and section 475.25(1)(e) and (k), Florida Statutes, by failing to place immediately into escrow a security deposit of $5482; violated section 475.25(1)(u) by not being involved with the daily operations of Advantage International Realty, Inc. (AIR), by being hired to qualify AIR and receiving payment from AIR, and failing to direct, control or manage Jennifer Briceno, a sales associate employed by Respondent, while she provided real estate services to two individuals; and violated section 475.25(1)(d)1. by failing to refund $5308 upon demand by Mr. Mansour and Ms. Haddad on December 20, 2011. If so, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license numbers 69234 and 3093422. He has never been disciplined. Licensed as a sales associate since 2000, Respondent served as a sales associate with three brokers. Licensed as a real estate broker in 2002, Respondent served as a broker associate with two brokers until, in August 2002, Respondent served as the broker for his first real estate brokerage. He served as a broker for two brokerages, much of the time simultaneously, from 2002-05 and 2007-09. For the last five months of 2008, Respondent worked as a broker sales associate for a third brokerage, and, from 2009-11, Respondent was registered as a sole proprietorship broker. From November 14, 2011, through January 6, 2012, Respondent served as the broker for AIR. On November 7, 2011, Respondent was listed as a director of AIR with the Department of State, Division of Corporations. AIR became licensed as a Florida real estate brokerage on November 14, 2011, holding license number 104302. Respondent was the qualifying broker of AIR from November 14, 2011, to January 6, 2012. No longer a brokerage after Respondent resigned as its qualifying broker, AIR resumed operations as a brokerage on March 1, 2012, when Jennifer Briceno served as the qualifying broker. She served in this capacity until March 4, 2013, at which point Petitioner suspended the licenses of AIR and Ms. Briceno by separate emergency orders. Ms. Briceno was first licensed as a sales associate in 2008. She served as a sales associate with an unrelated corporation in Tamarac, Florida from May 28, 2008, to October 24, 2011. Her license was inactive until November 14, 2011, on which date she became a sales associate with AIR. On February 17, 2012, she became licensed as a broker and served as a broker associate with AIR until March 1, 2012, at which time she served as its qualifying broker. As noted in paragraph four, from January 6 to March 1, 2012, AIR's brokerage license became invalid due to the lack of a qualifying broker. As noted in paragraph five, Ms. Briceno served at AIR as a sales associate from January 6, 2012, and then as a broker associate from February 17, 2012, until March 1, 2012--an eight-week period during which AIR's brokerage license was invalid due to its lack of a qualifying broker. On November 7, 2011, Respondent was listed as a director of AIR with the Department of State, Division of Corporations. At no time was Respondent ever a signatory on the operating account of AIR. Jackie and Sam Haddad and Morris Mansour are residents of Canada and friends. They decided that they wanted to enter into a lease of a residence in Fort Lauderdale for a vacation during the winter of 2011-12. They agreed that Mr. and Ms. Haddad would occupy the residence for two months, and Mr. Mansour would occupy the residence for the ensuing two months. For the sake of simplicity, they agreed that Mr. Mansour would take in his name the lease for the entire four months, which was to run from December 15, 2011, through April 15, 2012. Ms. Haddad found the subject property on the Internet and got in touch with Ms. Briceno at an unspecified point in time. At some point, Ms. Briceno sent to Mr. Mansour a blank Agreement to Enter into a Lease and asked him to complete, sign, and return the form to her with a check for the entire rent. Mr. Mansour objected to paying the entire rent and asked that he be allowed to pay half at that time and half upon occupancy. Ms. Briceno agreed. Accordingly, on November 12, 2011, Mr. Mansour wired $5500 to AIR and faxed to Ms. Briceno a completed Agreement to Enter into a Lease. AIR did not have an escrow account. Although there was a listing broker for the rental property, Ms. Briceno did not give the deposit check to her. Nor did Ms. Briceno present the funds to AIR's qualifying broker. It appears that Ms. Briceno conducted this real estate business and received the funds prior to AIR's obtaining a qualifying broker. In any event, it appears that Ms. Briceno deposited the funds in AIR's operating account. However, on November 12, 2011, Ms. Briceno faxed the signed Agreement to Enter into a Lease to a sales associate of the listing broker. The net of $5482 posted on AIR's general operating account on November 16. On the same day, AIR's bank statement shows a "counter debit" of $5010. From November 16 through the end of January 2012, this account never had sufficient funds to repay the $5500 or net $5482. After receiving the offer to lease from Ms. Briceno, the sales associate of the listing broker spoke with the owner and learned that the cost of short-term insurance precluded a lease for less than one year. By email dated December 1, the sales associate informed Ms. Briceno that the owner would not accept the offer. After not hearing from Ms. Briceno for some time, Ms. Haddad and Mr. Mansour tried to reach Ms. Briceno, but repeated calls to her business and cellphone numbers went unreturned. Mr. Mansour, who intended to occupy the subject property first, finally contacted the sales associate of the listing broker and learned that the offer had not been accepted. At some point, Darwin Briceno, Ms. Briceno's husband, became involved. By email to Ms. Mansour dated November 29, 2011, Mr. Briceno sent a release covering a refund of $5308, net wire fees and an application fee. On December 8, Ms. Haddad sent an email to someone at AIR stating that they were still waiting for their refund of $5308. Getting no response and having learned Respondent's name in the interim Ms. Haddad re- sent the December 8 email to the administrator of AIR-- attention: Respondent--and warned that they would retain counsel if they did not hear from Respondent within 24 hours. No one heard from Respondent, who cashed AIR checks on January 31 and May 1 in the amounts of $1610 and $3225, respectively. On February 24, 2012, Mr. Briceno sent Mr. Mansour an AIR check in the amount of $5308, but it bounced. The Haddads and Mr. Mansour have never recovered any of their deposit. During the investigation, Respondent admitted to Petitioner's investigator that he was not involved with the day- to-day operation of AIR, and he did not know anything about how AIR had handled the money that Mr. Mansour had sent. Respondent specifically admitted that he was a "broker for hire" at AIR, meaning that he had rented his broker's license to qualify AIR as a real estate brokerage. Respondent's lack of involvement in the business of AIR is confirmed by Karrell Brett, whom Mr. Briceno hired, on behalf of AIR, as a sales associate, as of December 9, 2011, Ms. Brett interviewed with Mr. Briceno, not Respondent. While employed by AIR, Ms. Brett did not know Respondent and believed her broker was Mr. Briceno. Although Ms. Brett decided on her own to advise her clients to deposit any escrow funds with a title company, she never received any instruction from Respondent to deposit escrow funds with a title company. Respondent never made any attempt to supervise any sales associate or other employee of AIR in the conduct of real estate business on behalf of the corporation that Respondent had qualified as a real estate brokerage. Respondent had been the qualifying broker for two days when the deposit was posted to AIR's account; he was responsible for AIR's failure to account for this money from the point of deposit forward until his resignation. Likewise, Respondent had been the qualifying broker for about six weeks when he received the latter of Ms. Haddad's emails demanding a refund of the deposit. Respondent did not ensure that AIR refunded the deposit at that time.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of Counts 2, 3, and 4, dismissing Count 1 as duplicative of Count 2, and revoking Respondent's real estate broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Nancy Pico Campiglia, Esquire Your Towne Law, P.A. 5465 Lake Jessamine Drive Orlando, Florida 32839 Daniel Brackett, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 42 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Respondent Heidt Neil "Cap" Fendig, Jr., and his corporate alter ego, Go Fish, Inc., do business under the name Golden Isles Charter Company. Aside from operating the marina he leases on St. Simons Island, Georgia, Mr. Fendig hires out as a captain (for $175 a day), arranges charters, and acts as a yacht broker in Georgia. When Kirby J. Bourgeois acquired the Westwind, a 55-foot "Ocean Super Sportfisherman," the man to whom the boat had previously belonged recommended respondent to Mr. Bourgeois, an Oklahoman who knew little about boats, as somebody who could assist him. When Messrs. Fendig and Bourgeois met on October 5 or 6, 1990, respondent agreed to register the Westwind in the name of a corporation (Mandela Corp.) Mr. Bourgeois specified, and to equip the boat in accordance with Coast Guard requirements. Later he took Mr. Bourgeois out on "training trips." For each of these services, respondent prepared invoices which Mr. Bourgeois paid in due course. Around Thanksgiving of 1990, Mr. Fendig acted as the Westwind's captain on a cruise Mr. Bourgeois took to the Bahamas. They left the boat docked in Marsh Harbor. In January of 1991, Mr. Bourgeois told Mr. Fendig on the telephone that he wanted to sell the Westwind. At that time, if not before, Mr. Fendig mailed Mr. Bourgeois a packet of information about selling boats, which included a form yacht brokerage agreement. Instead of signing the yacht brokerage agreement, Mr. Bourgeois decided to show the Westwind at the Third Annual Brokerage Yacht Show in Miami Beach, one of the alternatives Mr. Fendig had suggested. Mr. Fendig, who had once inquired of petitioner DBR about obtaining a Florida yacht broker's license, and been told he was ineligible because he lived and worked out of state, advised Mr. Bourgeois that he was not licensed in Florida and could not act as a yacht broker in Florida. From conversations he had with petitioner's employees at the time he discussed obtaining a Florida license, Mr. Fendig understood that Florida law permitted him to accompany and assist yacht owners in the sale or purchase of yachts in Florida so long as he did not buy or sell as an owner's agent. Mr. Fendig agreed to bring the Westwind over from Marsh Harbor for the show, which began on February 14, 1991, a Thursday. On January 23 or 24, 1991, respondent sent Mr. Bourgeois a facsimile transmission, described as confirmation of a telephone conversation, in which he wrote: "As per your instructions, I will transport the boat to the Miami show and look for your arrival in Miami at [sic] sometime during the show." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Although Mr. Bourgeois had informed respondent "that he would not be able to be there the first day" (T.24), Mr. Fendig arrived before the show began. He also filled out a form application and a contract for exhibit space, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, which, together with the application fee, had reached Yachting Provisions, Inc. in Ft. Lauderdale, on February 1, 1991. Mr. Bourgeois, whose name did not appear on the application and contract, later reimbursed him the fee. Reportedly delayed by a snowstorm, Mr. Bourgeois did not reach Miami before Saturday evening. Until Mr. Bourgeois arrived, Mr. Fendig stayed with the boat, moored at slip 221 on Collins Avenue. Available to anybody who visited the Westwind while he was on board were copies of his business card, which included the words "YACHT SALES-YACHT MANAGEMENT." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Also available to show goers (including those to whom respondent never spoke) were one page fliers describing the Westwind and concluding: "Asking $350,000 Looking for serious offers contact H. N. "Cap" Fendig, Golden Isles Yacht Sales & Charter Co. 912 638-7717 St. Simons Island, Ga." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Respondent had asked his brother to make up this flier. Like other paid captains, respondent told anybody who inquired the owner's asking price. When, on the first day of the boat show, investigators in petitioner's employ posed as potential buyers, Mr. Fendig told them they would have to speak to the owner, who would be arriving later in the show. He told "everybody that, if they wanted to make an offer, the owner was coming and they could drop by later in the show and . . . talk to him." T. 36. While at the boat show, Mr. Fendig slept on the boat, which was an economic benefit for him, at the same time it afforded the vessel a measure of security, which was an economic benefit for the owner. Mr. Bourgeois paid him for bringing the boat to Miami Beach, but not for the time he spent there. He had wanted to go to the boat show for his own purposes, in any event. The yacht show closed on Monday without the Westwind's changing hands. Mr. Bourgeois still owned the Westwind on March 11, 1991, when he signed a yacht brokerage agreement with respondent Fendig. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Before that time Mr. Fendig had no agreement for or expectation of any compensation on account either of the Westwind's sale or of his efforts to accomplish a sale (other than bringing the boat to Miami, for which he received a fixed amount.)
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3108 Petitioner's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, he was off and on the boat during the last two days. Before Mr. Bourgeois' arrival, it had been necessary to stay with the boat for security reasons. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the proof did not show that anybody asked the owner's name, address or phone number. Respondent testified he did not distribute this information because it "wasn't necessary, because the owner was going to be there." T.36. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 10, the taking of evidence had closed and respondent was making legal argument. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, respondent (who appeared pro se) answered a speculative question about what "could" happen. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 H. N. "Cap" Fendig 205 Marina Drive St. Simons Island, GA 31522 Henry M. Solares, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000
The Issue The issues in these two cases are whether Respondent violated provisions of chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ regulating real estate sales brokers, as alleged in the Administrative Complaints, by (1) failing to return a rental deposit to a potential tenant; (2) serving as the qualifying broker for Friendly International Realty, Inc. (“Friendly”), but failing to actively supervise Friendly’s operations and/or sales associates; failing to preserve Friendly’s transaction records and escrow account documents; and (4) acting in a manner that constitutes culpable negligence or a breach of trust. If there was a violation, an additional issue would be what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency that regulates the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165, and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Ms. King is a licensed real estate broker registered with the Department (license numbers BK 3203595, 3261628, 3293588, 3306619, 3335771, 3354773, and 3363985). Ms. King is registered with the Department as the qualifying broker for 16 brokerages located throughout the state of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Ms. King’s registered address with the Department was 4430 Park Boulevard North, Pinellas Park, Florida 33781. Friendly International Realty, LLC Friendly was a Florida licensed real estate corporation, holding license number CQ 1040825. Records reflect that James Berthelot was the registered agent for Friendly at the time of incorporation, June 2011. At all times relevant, Mr. Berthelot was a licensed Real Estate Sales Associate (license number SL 3226474) registered with Friendly. In May 2014, Respondent drafted and entered into a Limited Qualifying Broker Agreement (“Broker Agreement”) with Friendly and its owner, Ivania De La Rocha.2/ Friendly and Ms. King entered into the Broker Agreement, “in order to comply with the requirements of the Florida Department of [Business and] Professional Regulation.” Under the terms of the Broker Agreement, Respondent was not paid by Friendly per transaction. Rather, Respondent agreed to serve as the “Corporate Broker of Record” in exchange for a payment of $300 a month “as a flat fee for any and all real estate business conducted by [Friendly].” The Broker Agreement also provided for a “late fee” penalty if Friendly was delinquent in this monthly payment. Section 1.1 of the Broker Agreement outlined Respondent’s duties to Friendly, requiring her to: (1) keep her and Friendly’s licenses active and in good standing under Florida law; (2) keep her other business interests separate from those involving Friendly’s interests; and (3) provide Friendly notice of any governmental inquiry involving her serving as Friendly’s broker. There was no mention in the Broker Agreement of either Respondent’s or Friendly’s responsibilities regarding oversight of transactions, training for sales associates, or day-to-day operations. Regarding document retention, the Broker Agreement provided: Section 9.0 AUDIT & REVIEW RIGHT: Broker shall have the right to enter [Friendly’s] offices upon reasonable advance written notice to verify compliance with the real estate laws of the State of Florida. There was no evidence that Ms. King ever provided Friendly with the kind of notice described in section 9.0 of the Broker Agreement. Although the Broker Agreement did not prohibit Friendly from holding funds or assets on behalf of third parties, section 10.0 (Miscellaneous) explicitly prohibited Friendly from operating an escrow account. (g) Escrow and Ernest Money Accounts. [Friendly] shall not be permitted to hold any escrow account(s). On July 31, 2014, Ms. King was registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, as “manager” of Friendly. Ms. King was the qualifying broker for Friendly (license number BK3303898) from August 6, 2014, through September 30, 2015, and November 4, 2015, through January 13, 2016.3/ During the time Ms. King served as the qualifying broker, Friendly operated from a number of addresses in Miami- Dade County, including 11900 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 292, Miami, Florida 33181; and 2132 Northeast 123rd Street, Miami, Florida 33181. The office door of the Friendly office located on Northeast 123rd Street was painted in large letters, “FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL REALTY” and “ALICIA KING” painted underneath. At the hearing, when asked about Friendly’s address, Ms. King could only confirm that when she became the broker the office was “on Biscayne.” The Biscayne Boulevard address is the one listed on the Broker Agreement. At the hearing, Ms. King was wrong about when the Friendly office had moved from the Biscayne Boulevard to the Northeast 123rd Street location, insisting it was over the Christmas holidays in 2015. Records establish Friendly moved from the Biscayne Boulevard location to the Northeast 123rd Street location sometime between April and July 2014. In January 2016, Ms. King believed the office was still on Biscayne Boulevard. In reality, it had been over a year since the office had relocated to that location. At the hearing, when asked by her own counsel how many transactions a month Friendly handled, Ms. King replied, “That’s hard to say. It was not many at all. Ten, maybe.” Respondent could not give the exact number of employees or sales associates affiliated with Friendly; when asked, she stated she could not remember the exact amount, but knew it was “very limited.” Respondent did not have any agreements or documentation related to how many sales associates were registered under her broker’s license. Respondent could not name any other sales associates affiliated with Friendly while she was the qualifying broker, except for Mr. Berthelot. While she was Friendly’s qualifying broker, Respondent did not perform any of the training for the sales associates at Friendly. Respondent did not have any face-to-face meetings with any Friendly sales associates, except for Mr. Berthelot. Respondent did not have phone or e-mail contact with any of the Friendly sales associates, except for Mr. Berthelot. Respondent did not have copies of any forms, handbooks, reports or files related to Friendly. All of these documents were in paper form and kept in the Friendly office. Respondent had no access or signatory authority for any of Friendly’s bank accounts. Natalie James was a registered real estate sales associate affiliated with Friendly for approximately five months, from November 2015 through March 2016. Ms. James worked out of the Friendly office and was physically present at the office at least three or four times a week. Ms. James was involved in several rentals and one sales transaction while at Friendly. For each transaction she assembled a file, which was kept in the Friendly office. For rental transactions, Ms. James would negotiate and facilitate lease agreements. When she represented potential tenants, she received deposit funds that she deposited with Friendly. Ms. James attended meetings at Friendly; Ms. King was not present at any of them. Ms. James never had any telephonic, electronic, personal, or other contact with Respondent. While at Friendly, neither Mr. Berthelot nor any of Ms. James’ co-workers mentioned Ms. King to Ms. James. Although Ms. King’s name was on the door of Friendly’s office, Ms. James was unaware Ms. King was Friendly’s broker. There was conflicting testimony as to how often Respondent visited the Friendly office. Ms. King’s testimony at the hearing was at odds with the Department’s evidence and testimony regarding this issue. Ms. King insisted that while she was Friendly’s broker, she would travel from Pinellas Park to the Friendly office once or twice a week. This was not believable for a number of reasons. First, had Ms. King visited Friendly’s office as often as she stated, she would have known about the change in location; she did not. Second, Ms. King could not give one concrete date or detail about her travels to the Friendly office. Third, and most compelling, was the testimony of Ms. James (who worked at Friendly for at least two months while Ms. King was its broker) that she had never seen, communicated with, or heard mention of Ms. King while at Friendly. Ms. James’ unbiased and compelling testimony alone supports a finding that Ms. King did not visit the Friendly office as frequently as she indicated. Ms. King was aware that Friendly and Mr. Berthelot provided rental or “tenant placement” services.4/ Friendly collected security deposits and other move-in funds from potential renters and held them in an escrow account. Ms. King was not aware Friendly had an escrow account until January 2016 when she was contacted by the Department in an unrelated case. On January 13, 2016, Respondent resigned with the Department as the qualifying broker for Friendly effective that same day. On January 14, 2016, Respondent filed a complaint with the Department against Mr. Berthelot for operating an escrow account and collecting deposit funds without her knowledge. Facts Related to the Viton Case In November 2015, during the time Ms. King was Friendly’s qualifying broker, Christian Viton signed a lease agreement to rent an apartment located in Miami at 460 Northeast 82nd Terrace, Unit 8 (“Viton transaction”). The Viton lease agreement listed Friendly as the holder of the deposit monies and required Friendly to transfer the deposit and move-in funds to the owner of the property. Pursuant to the terms of the Viton lease agreement, Mr. Viton remitted an initial deposit of $500, and received a written receipt from Friendly dated November 2, 2015. Mr. Viton gave Friendly a second deposit of $380, and received a written receipt dated November 4, 2015. Mr. Viton never moved into the apartment and demanded a refund of his deposit from Friendly. On December 8, 2015, Friendly issued a check to Mr. Viton in the amount of $530. Three days later, Friendly issued a stop-payment order on the $530 check to Mr. Viton. On February 29, 2016, Mr. Viton filed a complaint with the Department seeking a return of the $880 he had given to Friendly. As a result, the Department initiated an investigation into Mr. Viton’s complaint and contacted Respondent. Upon learning about the Viton complaint, Ms. King contacted Mr. Berthelot who admitted Friendly had stopped payment on the $530 refund check, but had reissued the full amount of the deposit to a third-party not named on the lease. There is no evidence Mr. Viton ever received a refund of his $880 deposit. Facts Related to Dorestant Case In June 2015, during the time Ms. King served as Friendly’s qualifying broker, Cindy Dorestant entered into a lease agreement to rent a condominium located at 1540 West 191 Street, Unit 110 (“Dorestant transaction”). In the lease, Friendly was listed as the “broker” and holder of the deposit; TIR Prime Properties (“TIR”) was listed as the owner’s agent. The Dorestant lease agreement required Friendly to transfer the deposit and move-in funds collected from Ms. Dorestant to TIR. Pursuant to the terms of the Dorestant lease agreement, Ms. Dorestant gave Friendly $1,050 as an initial deposit, and received a written receipt dated June 24, 2015. In late July 2015, Ms. Dorestant contacted TIR’s property manager and sales agent to ask for information about the status of her move into the condominium. TIR explained to Ms. Dorestant that Friendly had not conveyed any of monies collected from Ms. Dorestant to TIR. Both Ms. Dorestant and TIR attempted to contact Friendly, but Friendly was non-responsive. The TIR sales associate relayed this information to TIR’s broker, Mariano Saal, who in turn tried to reach Friendly to resolve the issue. Eventually, TIR was told by Mr. Berthelot that Friendly would release the move-in funds to TIR and that Mr. Berthelot would schedule the move-in. TIR did not receive any funds from Friendly, nor did Mr. Berthelot facilitate Ms. Dorestant’s move into the condominium. On August 31, 2015, Mr. Saal contacted Mr. Berthelot and informed him that if TIR did not receive the move-in funds for the Dorestant transaction by 5:00 p.m. that day, it would be required to find another tenant. Ms. Dorestant did not move into the condominium and demanded a refund from Friendly and TIR. On September 14, 2015, Mr. Saal sent an e-mail to what he believed was Respondent’s address, demanding the $1,050 from Friendly because it considered Ms. Dorestant’s failure to move into the property a default of the lease agreement. Respondent, however, did not have access to Friendly’s e-mails. The e-mail was also sent to Mr. Berthelot, and Ms. De La Rocha. TIR did not receive any funds from Friendly for the Dorestant transaction. After discovering she could not move into the condominium because Friendly had not transferred the deposit to TIR, Ms. Dorestant demanded a refund of her deposit monies from Friendly. She did not receive it. On February 10, 2016, Mariano Saal, TIR’s qualifying broker, filed a complaint against Mr. Berthelot and Friendly with the Department regarding the Dorestant transaction. Ms. Dorestant initially did not receive a refund from Friendly and, therefore, filed a police report against Mr. Berthelot and sued him in small claims court. Eventually, Mr. Berthelot refunded Ms. Dorestant her deposit monies. Department Investigations of Friendly Upon receiving the Viton complaint, the Department assigned the case (DPBR Case No. 2016018731) to Erik Lluy, an Investigator Specialist II in the Miami field office. Similarly, on or around the same time the Department received the Dorestant complaint; it was also assigned to Mr. Lluy (DPBR Case No. 2016018069). On April 25, 2016, Mr. Lluy officially notified Ms. King of each of the complaints. On May 25, 2016, the Department transferred both the Viton and Dorestant complaints from Mr. Lluy to Percylla Kennedy. Ms. King provided a written response to both complaints via e-mail to Mr. Lluy on May 26, 2016. At that time, Mr. Lluy indicated the case had been transferred to Ms. Kennedy and copied Ms. Kennedy on the response. Ms. Kennedy was familiar with Friendly, Mr. Berthelot and Ms. King. In January 5, 2016, she had conducted an investigation of Friendly in an unrelated complaint filed against Friendly by Borys Bilan (“Bilan complaint”). As part of the investigation into the Bilan complaint, Ms. Kennedy arrived at the Friendly office address registered with the Department on Biscayne Boulevard to conduct an official office inspection. When she arrived, however, she found the office vacant. As a result, that same day Ms. Kennedy contacted the registered qualifying broker for Friendly–-Ms. King-–by phone. During that call, Ms. Kennedy asked Ms. King where Friendly’s office was located, but Ms. King did not know. Eventually, Ms. Kennedy determined the Friendly office had relocated to the Northeast 123rd Street location. Ms. Kennedy testified that during this call, Ms. King admitted to her that she had not been to the Northeast 123rd Street location. Respondent testified she did not tell Ms. Kennedy this and as proof insisted that the January call was inconsequential and “a very short call.” The undersigned rejects Respondent’s version of events and finds Ms. Kennedy’s testimony and report regarding the January 2016 interview more reliable. First, although Ms. King describes the conversation as occurring on January 7, 2016, both Ms. Kennedy’s testimony and the Inspection Report establish the conversation occurred on January 5, 2016. Second, Respondent’s characterization of the call as inconsequential contradicts her own May 26, 2016, written response to the Department in which Ms. King outlines a number of substantive issues discussed during this phone conversation, including: the nature of Friendly’s practice, whether Friendly had an escrow account, the type of payment accepted by Friendly, and the address of Friendly’s office. After speaking with Ms. King about the Bilan complaint, Ms. Kennedy conducted the inspection at Friendly’s Northeast 123rd Street location. Respondent was not present when Investigator Kennedy conducted the office inspection. Ms. Kennedy then e-mailed the Office Inspection form to Respondent. As a result of the January 5, 2016, phone conversation with Ms. Kennedy, Ms. King contacted Mr. Berthelot about the Bilan complaint. On January 13, 2016, Mr. Berthelot provided Ms. King with the transaction file related to the Bilan complaint. When Ms. King reviewed the lease agreement, she realized that Friendly was holding deposit funds in escrow. As a result, on December 13, 2016, Ms. King filed a resignation letter with the Department explaining she was no longer the qualifying broker for Friendly. Ms. King did not ask Mr. Berthelot or anyone else at Friendly for any other transaction records at this time, nor did she make any effort to review any of Friendly’s transaction files to determine whether Friendly had obtained other deposit funds or conducted other transactions similar to the one that was the subject of the Bilan complaint. After having knowledge of the Bilan complaint and transaction, and suspecting Friendly had been operating an escrow account, Ms. King made no immediate effort to access the operating or escrow bank accounts or reconcile the escrow account. After resigning as Friendly’s qualifying broker with the Department, Ms. King filed a complaint with the Department against Mr. Berthelot for unlicensed activity involving an escrow deposit.5/ Despite no longer being Friendly’s qualifying broker, on January 21, 2016, Ms. King executed and sent back to Ms. Kennedy the Inspection Report related to the Bilan complaint. Five months later, on or around May 25, 2016, Ms. Kennedy notified Ms. King she was taking over the investigation into the Viton and Dorestant cases. Ms. Kennedy testified that as part of her investigation into the Viton and Dorestant complaints, she interviewed Respondent again. Respondent denies she was interviewed by Ms. Kennedy regarding the Viton and Dorestant complaints, and instead insists she was only interviewed in January 2016 in connection with the Bilan complaint. Ms. King testified she believed Ms. Kennedy lied about interviewing her more than once because Ms. Kennedy was “lazy.” The undersigned rejects this assertion. Ms. Kennedy’s testimony was specific, knowledgeable, and credible, unlike Ms. King’s testimony, which was intentionally vague. Moreover, Ms. Kennedy specifically attributes her findings to specific sources such as Ms. King’s written response, her interview with Ms. King relating to the Viton and Dorestant transactions, and to her previous conversation with Ms. King during the Bilan investigation. The citations to information gleaned from the January 5, 2016, call were marked by the following sub-note. SUBJECT was previously interviewed by this Investigator in January 2016 for the unrelated complaint and was unaware that FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL REALTY LLC had moved from license location 11900 Biscayne Blvd.[,] Suite 292 Miami, FL 33181 to 2132 NE 123ST[,] Miami, FL 33181 (See Ex. 9). At that time, SUBJECT was unable to provide the transaction file. Ms. Kennedy would have no reason to fabricate the source of the conclusions she reached in her report or the number of times she contacted Ms. King. Ms. Kennedy submitted her original investigative report to the Department for the Viton complaint on October 31, 2016. Per the Department’s request, Ms. Kennedy interviewed Mr. Viton and submitted a supplemental report on December 13, 2016. In this report, Ms. Kennedy determined that on February 25, 2016, Friendly issued a check in the amount of $875 to a person who was not listed on either the lease agreement, the receipts Friendly issued to Mr. Viton, or any other paperwork. Similarly, Ms. Kennedy submitted her original investigative report to the Department for the Dorestant complaint on October 31, 2016. Per the Department’s request, Ms. Kennedy interviewed Ms. Dorestant and submitted a supplemental report on December 13, 2016, indicating Ms. Dorestant did eventually receive a refund. During the course of the Viton investigation, Mr. Lluy and Ms. Kennedy requested that Respondent provide the Department with the file related to the Viton transaction, and documentation for Friendly’s escrow account. Although Respondent provided the Department a response (consisting of a written explanation with a copy of the Bilan file and some communications between Mr. Berthelot and herself from May 2016), she did not provide the Department with the transaction file related to the Viton transaction or Friendly’s escrow account documentation. During the course of the Dorestant investigation Mr. Lluy and Ms. Kennedy requested that Respondent provide the Department with the file related to the Viton transaction, and documentation for Friendly’s escrow account. Although Respondent provided the Department a response (consisting of a written explanation with a copy of the Bilan file and some communications between Mr. Berthelot and herself from May 2016), she did not provide the Department with the transaction file related to the Dorestant transaction or Friendly’s escrow account documentation. Professional Standards Mr. Saal, TIR’s qualifying broker, testified he had served as a broker for approximately ten years. As TIR’s qualifying broker, he kept the documentation related to the transactions handled by TIR’s six sales associates. The testimony of the TIR sales associate and property manager established that they relied on Mr. Saal for advice and to resolve issues. For example, when Ms. Dorestant began contacting TIR’s sales associate and property manager regarding the move-in and then for a refund of her deposit, the sales associate went to Mr. Saal to discuss the situation. Mr. Saal then attempted to resolve the issue by attempting to communicate with Friendly, Mr. Berthelot and Ms. King. Mr. Trafton, an experienced real estate broker and expert in brokerages, reviewed the Department’s investigative files and reports relating to the Viton and Dorestant complaints, as well as applicable Florida Statutes and rules. Mr. Trafton’s testimony and report established that in Florida the usual and customary standard applicable to brokers is that they must promptly deliver funds in possession of the brokerage that belong to others. Petitioner showed that Mr. Viton was entitled to a refund of his deposit from Friendly and that Respondent erred in not ensuring he received this refund. Mr. Trafton also testified that the standard of care applicable to a broker in supervising sales associates requires active supervision. “Active supervision” is not defined by statute or rule, but by usual and customary practices exercised statewide. “Active supervision” requires a broker to: have regular communications with all sales associates, not just communicating when there is a complaint; be aware of problems, issues and procedures in the office and among sales associates; have access to and signatory power on all operating and escrow accounts; hold regular scheduled office/sales meetings; conduct in–person training meetings; provide guidance and advice for sales associates; be intimately involved in how transaction forms and other documents are stored and retrieved; and be available to provide advice and direction on short notice. In other words, a broker should set the tone at the brokerage by overseeing her sales associates’ conduct of transactions. Ms. King failed to manage, direct, and control her real estate sales associate, Mr. Berthelot, to the standard expected of a qualifying broker in both the Viton and Dorestant transactions, if not all of Friendly’s transactions. She did not actively supervise Mr. Berthelot as a sales associate. Mr. Trafton also testified that a broker, not the brokerage, is ultimately responsible for preserving transaction files, forms related to transactions, and other related documents. Although less certain than Mr. Trafton about whether a broker or the brokerage firm is responsible for preservation of transaction files, Mr. Saal testified “the broker is responsible for the . . . transactions. It’s [the broker’s] client at the end of the day.” Ms. King failed to preserve accounts and records relating to Friendly’s accounts, the files related to the Viton and Dorestant rental transactions, or any other documents related to Friendly. Petitioner also clearly established that Respondent was guilty of either “culpable negligence” or “breach of trust” in the Viton or Dorestant transaction. As Investigator Kennedy testified, and as corroborated by cost summary reports maintained by the Department, from the start of the investigation of the Viton complaint through September 14, 2017, the Department incurred $1,625.25 in costs, not including costs associated with an attorney’s time. As Investigator Kennedy testified, and as corroborated by cost summary reports maintained by the Department, from the start of the investigation of the Dorestant complaint through September 14, 2017, the Department incurred $1,608.25 in costs, not including costs associated with an attorney’s time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission: Case No. 17-3989 Finding Respondent Alicia Faith King in violation of sections 475.25(1)(d)1., 475.25(1)(u), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.25(1)(b), as charged in Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint in the Viton case. Imposing an administrative fine totaling $2,500 ($500 fine per count for Counts I, II and III; and $1,000 fine for Count IV). Imposing license suspension for a total period of nine months (one-month suspensions each for Counts I, II, and III; and a six-month suspension for Count IV). Imposing costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case in the amount of $1,625.25. Case No. 17-3961 Finding Respondent Alicia Faith King in violation of sections 475.25(1)(u), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.25(1)(b), as charged in Counts I through III of the Administrative Complaint in the Dorestant case. Imposing an administrative fine totaling of $2,000 ($500 fine per count for Counts I and II; and $1,000 fine for Count III). Imposing license suspension for a total period of eight months to be imposed consecutive to the suspension in Case No. 17-3989 (one-month suspensions each for Counts I and II; and a six-month suspension for Count III). Imposing costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case in the amount of $1,608.75. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in the activities of a yacht broker without a license in violation of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is charged with licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. In May 1993, the Department issued a yacht and ship salesman's license to Davis. In 1995, after a formal hearing, the Department revoked Davis' license for misrepresentation in entering false answers on his license application. Davis had been a licensed stock broker with the Securities and Exchange Commission between 1971 and 1991. He failed to tell the Department on his application that the National Association of Securities Dealers had censured him, imposed a fine of $20,000, and suspended his license for two years. Davis attended a Department workshop on yacht and ship brokerage laws during the time he held a license. The workshop covered Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, brokerage activities, and administrative rules. In June 1997, Davis approached Don Gilman of Gilman Yachts with an offer to co-broker the purchase of the Princessa del Mar by his client, William Bond Elliott (Elliott). Davis suggested that Gilman split the commission on the purchase with him on a 50/50 basis. Gilman is a licensed yacht and ship broker. Gilman, who knew Davis personally and knew that Davis had been licensed by the Department, agreed to co-broker the transaction. Gilman was unaware that Davis' license had been revoked. Davis had an office in Palm Beach, Florida, with a local telephone and facsimile machine number. Diana Harvey, an employee of Gilman Yachts who handled the closing and paperwork associated with the sale of the Princessa del Mar, thought that Davis had represented himself to her as a licensed broker. The Princessa del Mar is a 105-foot Broward yacht built in 1984. Throughout the negotiations for Elliott's purchase, the Princessa del Mar was moored at docks in West Palm Beach, Florida. The listing broker for the Princessa del Mar was Richard Betram Yachts, Inc. Gary Fisette (Fisette) was the licensed broker handling the listing. Davis requested that Fisette send him the listing specifications on the Princessa del Mar. Fisette sent the specifications to Davis by facsimile transmission and by mail to Davis' Palm Beach office. Davis and Gilman met with Elliott onboard the Princessa del Mar in June 1997 for Elliott to view the yacht. The two discussed the yacht, including the purchase of the yacht, with Elliott. Davis also discussed placing the yacht into charter service to cover some of the costs of the purchase, operation and maintenance of the yacht. Davis met with both the buyer and seller alone and with Gilman and Fisette. On July 3, 1997, Elliott signed an initial purchase contract, offering $1.5 million for the Princessa del Mar on the condition of a sea trial and survey satisfactory to him. Davis signed the contract on the witness line. On July 16, 1997, Fisette sent a letter by facsimile transmission to Davis at his Palm Beach office with information on the engine rebuild on the Princessa del Mar that Davis had discussed with him. Fisette also wrote that the owner would sign and return the agreement by facsimile transmission. Davis arranged for William Seger to conduct the survey. Davis also arranged for the sea trial, which was conducted along the Intracoastal Waterway in Florida. Davis, Gilman, and Elliott attended the sea trial. Captain John Lloyd piloted the yacht. Davis arranged for some engine repair to the yacht. On August 5, 1997, Diana Harvey sent the executed purchase agreement and addendum to Davis at his Palm Beach office. On the same day, Gilman advised Elliott by facsimile transmission with a copy to Davis at his Palm Beach office that the yacht should be hauled for an inspection of the bottom. Gilman and Elliott met to negotiate the final offer. The closing was scheduled in the Bahamas. On September 3, 1997, Gilman confirmed his conversation with Davis about their agreement to reduce their commission by $4,000 toward the seller's request of an additional $12,000 to close the transaction. At the conclusion of the transaction, Gilman received a commission check from the attorney handling the closing. Davis directed Gilman and Harvey to pay his share of the commission, $19,500, in five separate checks: $5,000 to himself as his commission, $1,000 to Foley Law Office for legal fees for the yacht, $1,000 to A. Stokes and $9,500 to Peter Gollsby for reimbursement for expenses for the yacht, and $3,000 to Bill Seger for the survey. A check for $2,850 was also given to Davis for repairs to the yacht. Davis picked up the checks in person from Ms. Harvey at Gilman Yachts. Davis claims that any brokering activities that he may have done were not done in the State of Florida. He claimed that calls to his Palm Beach office were forwarded to Rhode Island, and that only conversations between him and Elliott concerning chartering services and assisting with Elliott's due diligence activities took place in Florida. Davis' claims are rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered requiring Thomas I. Davis to cease and desist from engaging in yacht and ship brokerage activities in Florida and imposing a civil penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Susan B. Kirkland Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Janis Sue Richardson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Ashley R. Pollow, Esquire Atrium Financial Center 1515 North Federal Highway, Suite 300 Boca Raton, Florida 33432-1994 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Ross Fleetwood, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October of 2000, a licensed real estate sales associate in the State of Florida, holding license number 695252. He is currently associated with AAA Realty, Inc., a broker corporation doing business in Broward County, Florida. From March 1, 2001, through June 26, 2001, Respondent was an active real estate sales associate with Allen Real Estate, Inc. (Allen), a broker corporation doing business in St. Lucie County, Florida. From June 27, 2001, through August 13, 2001, Respondent was an active real estate sales associate with Realty Unlimited, Inc. (Unlimited), a broker corporation (affiliated with GMAC Real Estate) with offices in Port St. Lucie and Stuart, Florida. Unlimited is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, owned by Kevin Schevers, a Florida-licensed real estate broker. Gary Sprauer is a Florida-licensed real estate sales associate. He is currently associated with Unlimited. Like Respondent, Mr. Sprauer began his association with Unlimited on June 27, 2001, immediately after having worked for Allen. Respondent and Mr. Sprauer worked as "partners" at both Allen and Unlimited. They had an understanding that the commissions they each earned would be "split 50-50" between them. On February 7, 2001, Allen, through the efforts of Respondent and Mr. Sprauer, obtained an exclusive listing contract (Listing Contract) giving it, for the period of a year, the "exclusive right to sell," in a representative capacity, commercial property located at 3800 South Federal Highway that was owned by Vincent and Renee Piazza (Piazza Property). Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Listing Contract addressed the subjects of "compensation," "cooperation with other brokers," and "dispute resolution," respectively, and provided, in pertinent part as follows as follows: COMPENSATION: Seller will compensate Broker as specified below for procuring a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property or any interest in the Property on the terms of this Agreement or on any other terms acceptable to Seller. Seller will pay Broker as follows (plus applicable sales tax): 8% of the total purchase price or $15,000 maximum, no later than the date of closing specified in the sales contract. However closing is not a prerequisite for Broker's fee being earned. * * * (d) Broker's fee is due in the following circumstances: (1) If any interest in the Property is transferred . . . , regardless of whether the buyer is secured by Broker, Seller or any other person. * * * COOPERATION WITH OTHER BROKERS: Broker's office policy is to cooperate with all other brokers except when not in the Seller's best interest, and to offer compensation to: Buyer's agents, who represent the interest of the buyer and not the interest of Seller in a transaction, even if compensated by Seller or Broker Nonrepresentatives Transaction brokers. None of the above (if this box is checked, the Property cannot be placed in the MLS). * * * 10. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This Agreement will be construed under Florida law. All controversies, claim and other matters in question between the parties arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof will be settled by first attempting mediation under the rules of the American Arbitration Association or other mediator agreed upon by the parties. . . . Shortly after they left the employ of Allen and began working for Unlimited, Respondent and Mr. Sprauer showed Nicholas Damiano the Piazza Property. Mr. Damiano thereafter made a written offer to purchase the Piazza Property, which the Piazzas accepted, in writing, on July 4, 2001. The sales price was $165,000.00. Mr. Damiano put down a $10,000.00 deposit, which, in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of the contract between Mr. Damiano and the Piazzas (Sales Contract), was "held in escrow by [Unlimited]." The obligations of Unlimited, as escrow agent, were described in paragraph 6 of the Sales Contract, which provided as follows: ESCROW. Buyer and Seller authorize GMAC, Realty Unlimited Telephone: . . . Facsimile: . . . Address: . . . to receive funds and other items and, subject to clearance, disburse them in accordance with the terms of this Contract. Escrow Agent will deposit all funds received in a non- interest bearing account. If Escrow Agent receives conflicting demands or has a good faith doubt as to Escrow Agent's duties or liabilities under this Contract, he/she may hold the subject matter of the escrow until the parties mutually agree to its disbursement or until issuance of a court order or decision of arbitrator determining the parties' rights regarding the escrow or deposit the subject matter of the escrow with the clerk of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the dispute. Upon notifying the parties of such action, Escrow Agent will be released from all liability except for the duty to account for items previously delivered out of escrow. If a licensed real estate broker, Escrow Agent will comply with applicable provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. In any suit or arbitration in which Escrow Agent is made a party because of acting as agent hereunder or interpleads the subject matter of the escrow, Escrow Agent will recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs at all levels, with such fees and costs to be paid from the escrowed funds or equivalent and charged and awarded as court or other costs in favor of the prevailing party. The parties agree that Escrow Agent will not be liable to any person for misdelivery to Buyer or Seller of escrowed items, unless the misdelivery is due to Escrow Agent's willful breach of this Contract or gross negligence. Paragraph 12 of the Sales Contract addressed the subject of "brokers" and provided as follows: BROKERS. Neither Buyer nor Seller has utilized the services of, or for any other reason owes compensation to, a licensed real estate broker other than: Listing Broker: Allen Real Estate, Inc. who is a transaction broker and who will be compensated by x Seller _ Buyer _ both parties pursuant to x a listing agreement _ other (specify) Cooperating Broker: GMAC Realty Unlimited who is a transaction broker who will compensated by _ Buyer x Seller _ both parties pursuant to _ an MLS or other offer of compensation to a cooperating broker _ other (specify) (collectively referred to as "Broker") in connection with any act relating to the Property, included but not limited to, inquiries, introductions, consultations and negotiations resulting in this transaction. Seller and Buyer agree to indemnify and hold Broker harmless from and against losses, damages, costs and expenses of any kind, including reasonable attorneys' fees at all levels, and from liability to any person, arising from (1) compensation claimed which is inconsistent with the representation in this Paragraph, (2) enforcement action to collect a brokerage fee pursuant to Paragraph 10, (3) any duty accepted by Broker at the request of Buyer or Seller, which duty is beyond the scope of services regulated by Chapter 475, F.S., as amended, or (4) recommendations of or services provided and expenses incurred by any third party whom Broker refers, recommends or retains for or on behalf of Buyer or Seller. The Damiano/Piazza transaction was originally scheduled to close on July 25, 2001. At the request of the Piazzas, the closing was rescheduled for August 7, 2001. A few days before August 7, 2001, Mr. Sprauer asked Respondent "where the closing was going to take place" and "what title company" would be handling the matter. Respondent replied that the closing was "going to be delayed again because Mr. Damiano . . . was going to have to have some type of cancer surgery." It turned out that the closing was not "delayed again." It took place on August 7, 2001. At the closing were Mr. Damiano, the Piazzas, Respondent, and the closing agent from the title company, First American Title Insurance Company (First American).3 Neither Mr. Schevers, nor Mr. Sprauer, was in attendance. Mr. Sprauer did not even know that the closing was taking place. He was under the impression, based on what Respondent had told him, that the closing had been postponed. Had he not been misinformed, he would have attended the closing. Respondent did not contact Mr. Sprauer following the closing to let him know that, in fact, the closing had occurred. Mr. Schevers, on the other hand, was made aware that closing would be held on August 7, 2001. He was unable to attend because he had "prior commitments." It was Respondent who informed Mr. Schevers of the August 7, 2001, closing date. The morning of August 7, 2001, Respondent went to Unlimited's Stuart office and asked Mr. Schevers for the $10,000.00 Unlimited was holding in escrow in connection with the Damiano/Piazza transaction, explaining that he needed it for the closing that was going to be held later that day. Before complying with Respondent's request, Mr. Schevers contacted First American and asked that he be faxed a copy of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement (HUD Statement) that First American had prepared for the closing. As requested, First American faxed a copy of the HUD Statement to Mr. Schevers. Upon reviewing the document, Mr. Schevers "immediately noticed that [it indicated that] the entire commission [of $7,000.00] was going to Allen." Mr. Schevers "then proceeded to call First American" and asked why Unlimited was not "reflected on this settlement statement." Mr. Schevers was told that a First American representative "would get right on it and get back to [him]." Mr. Schevers did not wait to hear back from First American before handing an "escrow check" in the amount of $10,000.00 to Respondent. He instructed Respondent, however, to "not give anybody this check unless that statement [the HUD Statement] [was] changed and reflect[ed] [Unlimited's]" share of the commission earned from the sale of the Piazza Property. He further directed Respondent to telephone him if this change was not made. Respondent did not follow the instructions Mr. Schevers had given him. He delivered the $10,000.00 "escrow check" to the closing agent at the closing, even though the HUD Statement had not been changed to reflect Unlimited's sharing of the commission. At no time during the closing did Mr. Schevers receive a telephone call from Respondent. According to the HUD Statement that Mr. Damiano, the Piazzas, and the closing agent signed at the closing, Allen received a commission of $7,000.00 "from seller's funds at settlement." The document makes no mention of any other commission having been paid as part of the closing. On or about August 9, 2001, Respondent received a "commission check" from Allen. The check was made payable to Respondent and was in the amount of $3,000.00. Under the "DOLLARS" line on the check, the following was typed: 4200 Total Comm[4] 1200 ADVANCE[5] Typed next to "MEMO" on the bottom left hand corner of the check was "DAMIANO-PIAZZA 165,000 S&L." It has not been shown that the "commission check" Respondent received from Allen was for anything other than the commission Allen owed Respondent for services performed when Respondent was still employed by Allen. Mr. Schevers' consent to Respondent's receiving this $3,000.00 "commission check" was neither sought nor given. Less than a week after the closing, having spotted Mr. Damiano mowing grass on a vacant lot that Mr. Damiano owned, Mr. Sprauer walked up to him and asked "how his surgery [had gone]." Mr. Damiano "acted very surprised [like] he didn't know what [Mr. Sprauer] was talking about." Mr. Damiano's reaction to his inquiry led Mr. Sprauer to believe "that the closing had probably taken place." He "immediately contacted [Mr. Schevers] and asked him to check into it." Mr. Schevers subsequently learned from First American that Allen "had gotten all of the [commission] check" at the closing. Mr. Schevers then telephoned Respondent. This was the first communication he had had with Respondent since before the closing. Respondent told Mr. Schevers that "he got the check" and "he would be right over with it." Respondent, however, did not keep his promise. After his telephone conversation with Respondent, Mr. Schevers discovered that Allen "had cut [Respondent] a check and [Respondent] had gone immediately and deposited it." This discovery prompted Mr. Schevers to place another telephone call to Respondent. This telephone conversation ended with Mr. Schevers telling Respondent "he was terminated." Mr. Schevers thereafter notified Petitioner in writing that Respondent was no longer associated with Unlimited. He also filed with Petitioner a complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent had "acted inappropriately" in connection with the Damiano/Piazza transaction. Mr. Schevers had expected Unlimited to receive, for the role it played in the Damiano/Piazza transaction, "50 percent of the total commission," or $3,500.00, in accordance with the provisions of the "multiple listing service for St. Lucie County."6 He holds Respondent responsible, at least in part, for Unlimited's not receiving these monies.7 At the time of the Damiano/Piazza transaction, Unlimited had contracts with its sales associates which provided that the associates would receive "70 percent of the net" of any commission Unlimited earned as a result of the associates' efforts. Had Unlimited received a commission as a result of the Damiano/Piazza transaction, it would have "split" it with Respondent and Mr. Sprauer as required by the contracts it had with them.8
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2004.
