The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Community Association Manager by Examination should be granted.
Findings Of Fact When Petitioner was 20 years old, he and a group of other young adults stole approximately $15 worth of chrome off of a car in a used car lot. Petitioner was arrested on November 11, 1983, by the Deland, Florida, Police Department. On February 1, 1984, Petitioner appeared in Volusia County Court and pled guilty to "Petit Theft" under Section 812.014(3)(a), Florida Statutes. This offense is a second degree misdemeanor punishable as provided in Sections 775.082 or 775.083, Florida Statutes. The court withheld adjudication of guilt, placed Petitioner on six months' probation and assessed Petitioner $75 in costs. Petitioner was again arrested on March 12, 1993, by the Daytona Beach Shores, Florida, Police Department. Petitioner was charged with "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol." Section 316.193, Florida Statutes, does not equate "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol" with either a felony or a misdemeanor until the fourth conviction. Petitioner appeared in Volusia County Court on May 11, 1993, and pled nolo contendere to the lesser charge of "reckless driving," under Section 316.192, Florida Statutes. Florida Department of Law Enforcement documents created at the time list this charge as a first degree misdemeanor. In actuality, the offense of "reckless driving" is grouped under the "State Uniform Traffic Control" statutory Chapter. Without specifying whether or not "reckless driving" constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, Subsection 316.192(2)(a) provides that upon a first conviction of reckless driving the offender shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not more than 90 days or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, or by both. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of "reckless driving" and assessed $300 in fines and costs. Petitioner's sentence fits the statutory category of a "first conviction," so it is concluded that this was his first reckless driving offense. There also is no evidence of any other traffic offenses committed by Petitioner. The statutory trail of "reckless driving" runs through Sections 316.192, 322.291, 318.17, and 921.0012, and the undersigned has been unable to determine that a first offense under Section 316.192 constitutes either a misdemeanor or a felony. Sections 775.04 and 775.08(2), Florida Statutes, suggest that a first offense of "reckless driving" is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor. From this information, it is concluded that there is no affirmative proof that Petitioner was convicted of a first degree misdemeanor. It is further concluded that there is no presumption created by his plea of nolo contendere to the reckless driving charge that Petitioner lost his civil rights. On February 10, 1997, Petitioner submitted an application for licensure by examination to become a Community Association Manager. Prior to his application for licensure, Petitioner had been the subject of an investigation by the Respondent Department for the unlicensed practice of community association management. As a trusted maintenance man for the same employer for over nine years, Petitioner had been trusted with money, with purchasing supplies and with doing maintenance work. He had acquitted himself honestly and honorably. Petitioner and his employer believe that the investigation arose out of a complaint that Petitioner also was giving instructions to other maintenance personnel or advising tenants, which arguably constitutes an element of the practice of Community Association Managment. They believe that the complaint was made by a rival condominium owner and/or by a resident manager whom the employer terminated. The investigation has been abated pending the instant application licensure proceeding. The application submitted by Petitioner contained the following question regarding the applicant's criminal history: Have you ever been convicted or found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or misdemeanor? Yes ( ) No ( ). This question applies to any violation of the laws of any state, territory, or country without regard to whether the matter is under appeal or you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled or pardoned. If you answer "NO" and it is later determined that the records have not been sealed or expunged, it will be considered that you knowingly provided inaccurate information on this application. Petitioner marked the space for "No," and submitted no history of his offenses and pleas with his application. On March 12, 1997, the Agency notified Petitioner that his application was deficient because the 1983 and 1993 arrests and case dispositions were not fully disclosed and documented on his application. He was given 60 days in which to submit the required information, which he did. On May 28, 1997, Respondent sent Petitioner its Intent to Deny Community Association Manager's Application for Licensure by Examination for failure to establish good moral character as required by Section 468.433, Florida Statutes. Petitioner explained that he thought the withholding of adjudication on the second degree misdemeanor guilty plea charge meant it was erased and need not be revealed. Although Petitioner conceded that no one told him adjudication was withheld on his 1993 reckless driving charge, he first testified that somehow he initially assumed that adjudication had been withheld. The remainder of his testimony, together with Petitioner's Exhibit 1, are construed to prove that, prior to Petitioner's completion and submission of his application for licensure in January of 1997, Petitioner had been informed that adjudication of guilt had not been withheld on his 1993 plea of nolo contendere to the charge of reckless driving, because the charge and conviction had shown up in a computer check when he tried to insure a new car prior to his professional licensure application. While testifying at formal hearing, Petitioner initially stated that he had not fully read the application question concerning any criminal record. Then, he represented that he had not fully comprehended it. Finally, he said he thought the 1993 conviction constituted a traffic offense and was not a misdemeanor. Based on the difficulty of determining the classification of the 1993 conviction, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner did not willfully withhold that information, and need not have disclosed it as the application question was drafted. The question is ambiguous in first requesting information about nolo contendere pleas to felonies or misdemeanors and then adding "violation of the laws" as an afterthought. Petitioner has not had any criminal charges or traffic offenses lodged against his record since 1993. Petitioner has never been the subject of any civil law suit involving fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts. Petitioner is highly respected by his direct supervisor and one of the owners of the buildings he maintains, both of whom testified to Petitioner's veracity, trustworthiness, and good moral character spanning 1988 through the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a Final Order permitting Petitioner to sit for the examination. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward D. Broyles, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Professions Regulatory Council of Community Association Managers Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 R. Michael Kennedy, Esquire Kennedy & Pyle 687 Beeville Road, Suite A South Daytona, Florida 32119 Thomas G. Thomas Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds a Class "D" Security Officer license number D92- 03311. The license was issued in 1992. Beginning in 1992, the Petitioner resided with his companion, Tiatiana Aleksandrova, and their children Ruth and Ilia Shuvalov. On December 18, 1992, the Respondent and Tiatiana were arguing and he shoved Tiatiana. Daughter Ruth, 14 years old, was present and saw the incident occur. Apparently attempting to protect her mother, Ruth became involved in the altercation. At the point of her involvement, the Respondent grabbed Ruth by the arm and throat, and pushed her into the kitchen wall. Ruth, much younger and smaller than the Respondent, posed no threat of harm to him. Immediately after the December 18 incident, Tiatiana, Ruth and 12 year old Ilia went to the Gulfport, Florida, Police Department where they discussed the incident with Officer Michael J. Bieluwka. Officer Bieluwka went to the Respondent's home. The Respondent refused to cooperate in the investigation. Based on the accounts of the events provided by Tiatiana and the children, Officer Bieluwka believed he had probable cause to arrest the Respondent. He attempted to effect the arrest at the Respondent's home. As Officer Bieluwka placed the Respondent under arrest, the Respondent pulled his arm from the officer's grasp and attempted to get away from him. The Respondent was charged with resisting arrest without violence. Eventually, the Respondent entered a plea of no contest and was convicted of resisting arrest without violence. On June 22, 1993, Tiatiana and the children were asleep in the Respondent's home. Just before dawn, the Respondent entered the room where Tiatiana slept, kicked her, pulled her hair, and demanded that she get up. Based on the June 22 event, the Respondent was charged with criminal battery. He entered a plea of no contest and was convicted of battery. On July 20, 1993, the Respondent had shut off the water line to the house at the main valve. Tiatiana, attempting to bathe, went outside and turned the water back on. An argument ensued outside the house and continuing when they reentered the structure. As Tiatiana stood in the kitchen, the Respondent entered through a screen door. The door closed on and broke a drinking glass he held in his hand. He threw the broken glass towards Tiatiana. The glass struck and cut her right leg just below the knee. Based on the July 20 event, the Respondent was charged with criminal battery. He entered a plea of no contest and was convicted of battery. There is no evidence that Tiatiana posed a threat of harm to the Respondent at any time or that she consented to the violence. There is no evidence that commission of violence or use of force on any person was required to protect the Respondent or another person from physical harm.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department Of State, Division Of Licensing, enter a Final Order revoking the Class "D" Security Officer license of Edward Shuvalov, license number D92-03311, and imposing a fine of $1,500. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of March, 1995 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4482 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent's proposed recommended order is a statement of the financial hardship which will allegedly be imposed if he does not prevail in this case. The Hearing Officer's responsibility is to determine whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. The imposition of penalties is governed by the Rules cited herein. The Respondent's proposed recommended order is rejected as legally irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Richard Whidden, Jr., Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Edward Shuvalov Post Office Box 5057 Gulfport, Florida 33737
Findings Of Fact As described in Respondent's exhibit 3, on May 18, 1987 Petitioner made application with Respondent for licensure. In response to question 13 about the number of arrests he had had, he noted that in 1947 that he had been arrested for the offense of "None (sic) tax liquor" and the outcome was said to be "six months". This is perceived as reference to the fact that the violation related to a liquor law in which Petitioner says he was given a six month sentence. A Federal Bureau of Investigation offense report, part of Respondent's exhibit 5, speaks to an arrest on February 3, 1949 related to violation of an Internal Revenue regulation of liquor laws and shows a jail commitment upon default of a $500.00 bond. The application also stated that the Petitioner had been arrested several times for fighting, but the cases had been dismissed. Petitioner was licensed by Respondent based upon the 1987 application previously referred to. Subsequent to his licensure he was arrested on November 8, 1987 for battery, in particular spouse abuse. This was an alleged violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. The Florida Department Law Enforcement offense report, part of the Respondent's composite exhibit 3, shows the disposition of the offense by an adjudication of guilt. Petitioner through his testimony identified that he had pled nolo contendere to this offense. As a consequence of this incident he lost his license through revocation proceedings. On May 8, 1989 Petitioner reapplied for licensure. A copy of his application may be found as part of Respondent's composite exhibit 2. In this instance in response to question 13 he indicates that he was arrested in 1958 for making moonshine whiskey and served five months and 29 days. Again this is perceived as an acknowledgment of the offense of February 3, 1949 previously described. In answer to question 13 he also referred to the 1987 offense related to his wife as "spousal abuse" and stated that he had stayed overnight in jail. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement offense report which is part of Respondent's exhibit 3 refers to "2D credit", taken to mean two days credit for the time he had served. In the 1989 application Petitioner sought the assistance of counsel in offering a supplemental answer to question 13 which gives a more complete explanation of the non-tax whiskey case and the 1987 battery. In the course of this explanation by counsel he states that adjudication of guilt was withheld on the plea of nolo contendere for the 1987 offense. Citation is made to the case of Kinney v. Department of State, 501 So.2d 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). In addition a disclaimer is given about other offenses in 1971 for larceny; in 1985 for carrying a concealed weapon; in 1983 for loitering and the belief that these items must pertain to someone other than the present Thomas Felton. Given the close proximity in time of the 1989 application to the loss of the license issued in 1987 through revocation, Petitioner withdrew his request for licensure. In the 1989 application the information that had been placed on the application form had been put there by Petitioner's wife. On February 7, 1990 Petitioner submitted his present application for classes "D" and "G" licenses. On this occasion the form application was filled out by his employer in the person of a Ms. Ross. Petitioner doesn't know what Ms. Ross used as an information base for filling out the 1990 application. She was aware of the fact that he had spent the night in jail in 1987. This is related to the incident with his wife in which he was arrested for battery. In the 1990 application, Respondent's exhibit 1, in answer to question 13 Petitioner says that in April 1948 that he had been arrested for moonshine selling and was given six months. Again this is seen as a comment on the February 3, 1949 incident related to the liquor laws. In the 1990 application he also mentions that he had been arrested several times for fighting and that the cases had been dismissed. He makes no reference to the 1987 incident of battery against his wife. Petitioner describes his omission of the 1987 arrest as that of someone who is careless as opposed to someone attempting to hide the facts. He accurately points out that the Respondent had a record of the 1987 battery offense against his wife. Having considered his explanation in the context of other facts presented, Petitioner is not found to have intended to misrepresent information concerning the 1987 battery offense against his wife when submitting the 1990 application. On March 13, 1990 as shown in the joint exhibit 1, Petitioner rejected the request for licensure. It gave as reasons the existence of the battery charge of November 8, 1987 in that the failure to disclose information about that charge was seen as a fraudulent or willful misrepresentation in applying for the license, in violation of Section 493.319(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Further, the existence of that offense was seen as the conviction of a crime directly related to the business being sought for licensure, in a circumstance where a plea of nolo contendere had been entered, in violation of Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes. This matter was seen as being in violation of Section 493.319(1)(j), Florida Statutes in that Petitioner was alleged to have committed a battery or use of force or violence against his wife. There is the overall reference within this explanation of denial which allows the agency in certain instances to deny a license for violation of any provision within Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. In particular that reference is Section 493.319(1)(p), Florida Statutes. For all these statutory reasons the application was denied. On March 27, 1990 Petitioner filed a formal petition requesting a hearing. This request was submitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration. The final hearing ensued. According to Petitioner the incident of spousal abuse occurred as follows: On the night he was arrested he was awakened by his wife who said that their children were fighting and one of those children had a knife. He used a metal walking stick to stop the daughter with the knife and hit his wife on the left forearm which became swollen after that blow. At the time he hit her she was behind him. He was then taken to jail and spent the night. He pled no contest without benefit of consultation with counsel. The judge told him he could go home. At the time he entered his plea he told the judge that he had hit his wife accidentally. Petitioner didn't indicate that he was trying to restrain the wife at the time he struck her. He stated that he was unacquainted with what the wife may have told the police about the incident. When cross-examined Petitioner said that he could not recall if he had been arrested for striking his wife before this incident, but that he didn't think so. He was then confronted with information concerning a 1969 incident of striking his wife and upon being reminded of that circumstance admitted that he had been fighting with his wife in that year. He also acknowledged that he could have been fighting with her in 1967. The wife in 1969 was the same wife as in 1987. The 1969 incident with his wife was felt by the Petitioner to have been another occasion of problems related to his children. As part of Respondent's composite exhibit 5, the Federal Bureau of Investigation offense report, there are items related to "DC" taken to mean disorderly conduct. The disposition of the disorderly conduct case in 1967 is shown as being discharged from municipal court. The 1969 incident of disorderly conduct is one disposed by a fine of $20.00 in municipal court. Both the incident in 1967 and the incident in 1969 occurred in Jacksonville, Florida, as did the 1987 incident with his wife. In her testimony Petitioner's wife says that she was hit on her right hand in the 1987 incident. She testified that the children called the police and that a lady officer took Petitioner to jail. She indicates in the testimony that the Petitioner and his wife were not fighting. She acknowledges that she was hit with a walking cane. She says she told the police that she was hit on her hand by her husband. She said she doesn't know whether she was hit intentionally. She does acknowledge that there was a scuffle of some sort. She states that in the past that she has called the police and that her husband was arrested when they have fought. In 1969 both she and her husband were arrested for that incident, according to the wife. She has no specific recollection about the incident in 1967. On the night that her husband was arrested in 1987 she did not attempt to stop the police from making the arrest. According to Mrs. Felton, at a later time Petitioner told her that he didn't intend to hit her. She says that six or seven kids were involved in the incident from ages 16 to 25. She states that she forgave her husband for the incident on the next day following the November 8, 1987 fracas. Kathy Evans offered testimony. She is an officer with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Department in Jacksonville, Florida. She responded to the incident on November 8, 1987 and arrested the Petitioner. By report that was given to her at the scene after she arrived, gathered from unidentified sources at the scene, she was led to believe that the Petitioner and his wife had had an argument about the children. This lack of identification of the reporters is associated with the officer's inability to recall at hearing who had made the report. By report, Petitioner sided with one of the daughters and the wife favored the other daughter's position. Petitioner got angry with his wife and hit her. In sequence, there had been a verbal argument between the daughters and the parents became involved and the wife was struck. As the officer recalls the nature of the injury, it was to the right arm of the wife and left a black and blue welt. The wife didn't object when the husband was arrested for spouse abuse. The officer observed four people at the scene of the event, two of these people being the Petitioner and his wife and the others the children. Having considered the testimony of the three witnesses who appeared at hearing, the officers account of what she observed after the incident and recount of what she was told at the scene is credited. The explanations by the Petitioner and his wife are not credited. This decision is reached in consideration of the demeanor of those witnesses, their motives for truth and veracity and the fact that they were not forthcoming in the explanation of the incident. Nor has the Petitioner been convincing in any suggestion that the circumstance of his plea of nolo contendere to the offense of battery related to the 1987 incident was under circumstances less than proper. Petitioner through his proof has failed to overcome the presumption created by the nolo contendere plea to the offense. Under the circumstances Petitioner has not shown sufficient rehabilitation to allow licensure following the revocation.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached it is recommended that a final order be entered which denies Petitioner's application for class "D" and "G" licenses. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2210 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts found in Respondents proposed recommended order. Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the second sentence which is rejected. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ken Rouse, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 David B. Ferebee, Esquire Tassone and Ferebee 1833 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, FL 32207 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this administrative complaint, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at the Putnam Correctional Institution (Putnam). He was certified August 14, 1987 by certificate #14-87-502-13. He is 26 years old. In September 1987, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Special Agent Jimmie Collins was tipped off by Michael Adkins, an inmate at Putnam, that a correctional officer was interested in selling one or two kilograms of cocaine. Collins approached Adkins' wife, Phyllis, who agreed to assist Collins in a criminal investigation. At Collins' instructions, Phyllis Adkins set up a meeting with Respondent, telling him she was a mediator or broker for a cocaine buyer named "Joe." Mrs. Adkins wore an electronic transmitter to a meeting with Respondent on September 2, 1987 and her conversation was monitored and taped by Agent Collins. At the September 2, 1987 meeting, which took place in the open at a restaurant parking lot, Respondent and Mrs. Adkins discussed in the most general terms an exchange of "coke" for money. "Samples" were discussed. No one made any commitment to anyone with regard to samples or a sale. The Respondent's behavior was described by both participants as "freaked" or frightened. Later, Mrs. Adkins set up another "meet" with Respondent for September 23, 1987 under similar conditions. At that time, she had with her another FDLE agent, Joe Nickmier, who posed as the imaginary narcotics dealer named "Joe." Respondent brought with him another person, Chris Sanford. Agent Collins was surprised that Respondent brought someone with him because such an exposure of a proposed drug deal to several persons was contrary to his experience with the secretive, suspicious, and paranoid behavior of "real dopers." As a result, Agent Collins felt that Respondent was involved in something he did not know about. Collins was further surprised when the masquerading "Joe" concurred with Respondent's ordering Chris Sanford to stand back away from their conversation, since Sanford's involvement had the potential of raising the circumstances to a standard sufficient for FDLE to make a charge against both Respondent and Sanford for "conspiracy" in use, trafficking, or selling of a controlled substance. During the conversation involving Respondent, Phyllis Adkins, and "Joe," on September 23, 1987, which conversation was also monitored and taped by Agent Collins, there is a suggestion that Respondent would exchange 17-18 or 22 ounces of some kind of drug for money, but the language employed by all concerned is vague and unconnected. Respondent avoided any commitment to the others, including giving them his phone number. At the conclusion of this meeting, Agent Collins had formed the opinion that Respondent did not fit the category of "a real doper" but was just an individual out to make some money. Collins felt that he had a reasonable expectation that the Respondent would sell cocaine if he could get it but that Respondent could not get cocaine from the Putnam County Sheriff's Office or the Daytona Police Department. It is not clear where Agent Collins got the idea that Respondent had offered to obtain any controlled substance from the respective evidence rooms. This concept was not volunteered or admitted by Respondent in either of the taped meetings with Phyllis Adkins and/or "Joe." Phyllis Adkins and "Joe" suggested to Respondent several times on September 23, 1987 that Respondent's contact must be in law enforcement in Daytona, but no "evidence room" was ever mentioned. It may be that Agent Collins relied on out-of-court (hearsay) information from Michael or Phyllis Adkins, but his reliance on such hearsay statements, in the absence of some direct supporting evidence, does not support a finding that Respondent ever made an offer to get contraband drugs from any sealed evidence room. In a subsequent March 1988 interview, Respondent admitted to prison inspectors and to Agent Collins that he had, indeed, made both parking lot contacts with Phyllis Adkins and that he knew he was operating outside the scope of his employment duties as a correctional officer when he did so, but that he was just conducting his own investigation into drug dealing to "set up" inmate Michael Adkins for FDLE. Respondent's stated purposes were to further his career and to impress his father, a Florida highway patrolman. Respondent admitted that he knew the prison investigator at Putnam but that he did not report his activities to the prison investigator. Special Agent Jimmie Collins consulted FDLE legal personnel and determined not to prosecute the Respondent criminally because there was insufficient evidence of either conspiracy or of a substantive statutory violation. Two times in January 1986, far previous to any of the events giving rise to the current charges, Respondent had approached another FDLE Special Agent, Paul Fuentez, giving him the names and addresses of several known drug dealers and requesting the opportunity to go undercover with Fuentez to acquire evidence against them. Fuentez met twice with the Respondent, face to face, and at that time, Respondent admitted to using drugs with such persons. Fuentez instructed Respondent not to "do" drugs with suspects and not to proceed with any independent investigation on his own. Respondent told Fuentez at that time that he had been awake all night. Fuentez felt that Respondent was "hyper," and might still be on drugs, and therefore Fuentez told Respondent that they could not work together as long as Fuentez had the opinion that the Respondent was on drugs. On September 23, 1987, the day of the Respondent's second meeting with Mrs. Adkins and his only meeting with "Joe," Respondent phoned Fuentez twice. The first time, the Respondent said he had been talking to a prisoner named Michael Adkins who was dealing drugs with a Puerto Rican named "Joe." The Respondent specifically asked Agent Fuentez if Adkins had been dealing with "Joe" when Adkins had been arrested for the crime for which Adkins was currently incarcerated. Fuentez' testimony indicated that Respondent was clearly asking about the past status, not the present status, of the people named. At the time of this first call, Fuentez knew about Collins' investigation at Putnam but did not know Respondent had been specifically targeted. Fuentez formed the opinion that Respondent was trying to find out about FDLE investigations. He told Respondent he did not have time to look up information about the people Respondent had named and ended the phone call. Later the same day, Respondent called back to Fuentez and told him to forget the whole thing. Since the "meet" of September 23 occurred after dark and Respondent's phone calls to Fuentez seem to have occurred during business hours, the undersigned infers that both Respondent's phone calls to Fuentez preceded his "meet" with Phyllis Adkins and "Joe" on September 23, 1987. Respondent also had a conversation with Robin Edwards, a local police officer. Respondent related to him that he had been approached by a Putnam inmate, Michael Adkins, to buy or sell drugs. Mr. Edwards advised Respondent to talk to his trooper father or his superiors. At formal hearing, Edwards could not date this conversation closer than that it could have been in September 1987, but even so, it appears not to be an afterthought devised by Respondent only due to the March 1988 confrontation of Respondent by investigators. Lenard Ball is a Correctional Officer Inspector II. Upon his testimony, it is accepted that a standard of correctional officer behavior prohibits them from operating outside a correctional institution. Unless they are acting as prisoner escorts, correctional officers' authority ends at the boundary of their respective institutions. Upon Officer Ball's testimony, it is also accepted that each correctional institution may institute a policy permitting criminal investigations within that institution to be pursued by only one correctional officer, and that at Putnam, all officers are required to report all such conversations as Respondent was having with Michael Adkins to one of two superiors. In Ball's opinion, Respondent's actions were clearly prohibited by anti-fraternization rules and by rules prohibiting Respondent from placing himself and others in danger. Respondent was never an institutional investigator. In fact, he had only been certified as a correctional officer for approximately one month when the material events occurred. At formal hearing, Respondent testified credibly that the entire episode was only intended by him to achieve more in his position, that he had no connection with anyone in the local police department or the sheriff's office who could give him access to drugs, and that he had no other access to those evidence rooms. Respondent had consistently denied any mention of evidence rooms since the March 1988 investigation. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent had ever had any access to any controlled substances through any evidence rooms or otherwise. (See Finding of Fact 5) Further, Respondent represented that his phone conversations with Agent Fuentez scared him, that he only attended the September 23, 1987 meeting with Phyllis Adkins and "Joe" because he had been threatened by Michael Adkins with being turned in to FDLE, and that he took Chris Sanford, a Fire Department employee, with him to the September 23, 1987 "meet" as a witness for his own protection. Chris Sanford did not testify. Michael Adkins did not testify. There is therefore no further support or dispute to Respondent's intent or motivation from original sources.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of bad moral character as defined in Rule 11B-27.001(4)(c) F.A.C., issuing a reprimand accordingly, and placing his certificate on probationary status for two full years, subject to specific terms and conditions for appropriate education, training and supervision to be imposed by the Commission in its expertise, and providing for revocation of his certificate in the event those conditions are not timely met. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-2450 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Except where subordinate or unnecessary, PFOF 1-7, 10- 13, 16, 19-21 are accepted. PFOF 8-9 are accepted to the degree described in the RO. The PFOF contain argument and the quotation is only part of several pages and does not accurately reflect the exhibit or record as a whole. PFOF 14-15 and 17 are only part of several pages and do not accurately reflect the exhibit or record as a whole. PFOF 18 is rejected as unproved. Respondent's PFOF: None filed to date. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert S. Smith 2720 Edgemore Palatka, Florida 32077 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffery Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses of malicious harassment, unlawful battery (two counts), and unlawful entry of a structure (two counts) as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated October 17, 1997. Whether Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his correctional officer's certification.
Findings Of Fact Christopher Horne (Respondent), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 29, 1989, as a correctional officer, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 70581. Respondent was employed by the Orange County Sheriff's Office, Department of Corrections, as a correctional officer during the period of October 1, 1990, until his termination on November 14, 1997. Patricia Johnson is currently employed with the Orange County Sheriff's Department of Corrections as a correctional officer and has been employed as such for the past twelve years. She is certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer. Johnson first met Respondent in the summer of 1993 at work. They became friends and eventually began dating each other in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. This relationship continued for approximately two and a half years, until Johnson made the decision to end it. Johnson told Respondent on New Year's Eve 1995 that their relationship was over. Johnson began dating another man. When Respondent found out that she was dating someone else, he began calling her repeatedly at work and at home. Respondent continued to harass Johnson by calling her late at night and by driving repeatedly past her home at night. This behavior began in January 1996 and continued through August 1996. The Respondent used abusive language when speaking with Johnson. He threatened harm to her date, if he found her with someone. Johnson was afraid of Respondent and was afraid that he might harm her. On July 21, 1996, Respondent went to Johnson's home unannounced and knocked on her door. When Johnson opened the door and saw who it was, she told Respondent to leave. He did not; instead he pushed his way into her home, physically struggled with her, and eventually pushed her onto her bed. Respondent pinned her down with his knees and threatened her. Johnson repeatedly told him to leave her home. Respondent eventually left the house. Johnson reported Respondent's actions to the police. They documented the incident in a report. She told the police that she did not want to press charges against Respondent, but did want someone to talk to him about his actions. The police contacted Respondent and discussed the incident with him, but did not arrest him. On November 10, 1996, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Johnson received a phone call at her house from a person she believed to be her brother. The person told her that he had forgot his keys and asked to be let into the house. A short time later, there was a knock at the door. When Johnson opened the door, Respondent was standing there. He said, "Bitch let me in" and proceeded to push his way into her home. He then grabbed her hair and hit her head against the wall several times. He continued to pull her hair and push her up against the wall. She begged him to leave and told him to stop hitting her. She broke free and ran to her brother's room and started banging on the door. Her bother, Bobby Hunter, came out. Johnson told him that she wanted Respondent out of her house. Her brother asked Respondent to leave. Eventually, Respondent did leave without further physical confrontation. Johnson reported the incident to the police. After investigating the incident, the police completed a report and arrested the Respondent. Respondent was charged with burglary, battery, and aggravated stalking. Respondent pled in circuit court to the misdemeanor charge of trespass to an occupied dwelling and was placed on one- year probation. Respondent was suspended for 10 days from his employment with the Orange County Sheriff's Department of Corrections as a result of his actions involving Johnson. He was later terminated from his employment on November 14, 1997. Respondent is currently not employed as a correctional officer. Respondent's description of the events from January 1996 through August 1996 and on the night of November 10, 1996 is not credible. On December 11, 1992, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issued an official Letter of Guidance to the Respondent. This prior action by the Commission is an aggravating factor in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission find Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and it is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Warren Turner, Esquire 609 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Based on the exhibits received in evidence and the testimony of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent holds a Class "D", unarmed security guard license, No. GD-0106713, which was most recently renewed on July 3, 1983. The Respondent also holds a Class "G", statewide gun permit (armed security guard license) , No. GG-0025231, which was issued on July 3, 1983. The Division of Licensing of the Department of State did not approve or deny the Respondent's application for a Class "G" license within a 90-day period from the date of receipt of the application and, accordingly, by operation of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division was required to, and in fact did, issue a Class "G" license to the Respondent. Except for the operation of the 90-day provision in Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division of Licensing would not have issued the Respondent a statewide gun permit because of the Respondent's criminal record. For the same reason, it was a mistake for the Division of Licensing to renew the Respondent's Class "D" license in 1983. On February 28, 1977, the Respondent was arrested on the roof of a department-store and charged with burglary, to which he entered a plea of nolo contendre. Adjudication was withheld and the Respondent was placed on probation for 5 years. During the summer of 1980, the Respondent and two of his friends apprehended two thieves who had stolen some personal property from a vehicle. Later, the Respondent appeared in court to testify against the two thieves. On April 15, 1981, the Respondent was arrested for grand larceny. On November 9, 1981, the Respondent entered a plea of guilty to a larceny charge of failing to redeliver a hired motor vehicle. Adjudication was withheld and the Respondent was placed on probation for one year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is recommended that the De- partment of State issue a Final Order which (a) Would revoke Respondent's Class "D" and Class "G" licenses and (b) would order Respondent to forthwith return such licenses to the Department of State. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of September, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1984 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James V. Antista, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Stuart Phillip Coon 12824 Southwest 114 Terrace Miami, Florida 33183
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offense charged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent, Frank L. Hiler, was employed as a correctional officer at the Martin Correctional Institution (MCI). Although no direct proof was offered on the issue, it is inferred that, since respondent held such a position, he was appropriately certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. In April 1989, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), at the request of the Department of Corrections (DOC), commenced an investigation to address allegations that narcotics were being smuggled into MCI. During the course of such investigation, information was developed which implicated respondent in such illegal activity. Pertinent to this case, the proof demonstrates that in June 1989, respondent, on behalf of an inmate, picked up a package containing two ounces of cannabis, commonly known as marijuana, and one or two ounces of cocaine from the inmate's wife in Miami, Florida, for delivery to the inmate at MCI. At the time respondent took possession of the narcotics he was dressed in the uniform of a correctional officer and was driving a van with the DOC logo on the side. Such narcotics were not, however, delivered to the inmate because of events that were to have occurred a day or so later. Acting on a tip that respondent might be attempting to smuggle narcotics into MCI, FDLE stopped the vehicle in which he was riding outside the complex and conducted a search. Such search uncovered a "small quantity" of marijuana in the vehicle. 1/ Respondent was then offered the opportunity to give a urine sample to test for narcotics, which he declined, but offered to do so at a later date. Respondent did not, however, return to MCI, and his employment was terminated on June 28, 1989, premised on job abandonment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner render a final order revoking respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of December 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December 1992.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Petitioner on the basis of an alleged violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by sleeping while on duty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent currently holds a Class "D" Security Officer License, Number D92-08606, issued pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, effective June 2, 1994. During September and October of 1994, Motivated Security provided security services to Shurgard Storage, located at 1650 West Oakland Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On September 30, 1994, the Respondent was employed as a security officer by Motivated Security. On that date the Respondent's assigned post with Motivated Security was at the Shurgard Storage premises described above. On that date, the Respondent was assigned to the 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on September 30, 1994, while the Respondent was on duty at the post described above, the Respondent was sound asleep in a golf cart for a period of at least one-half hour.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case finding that the Respondent committed the violation charged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing a penalty consisting of a six-month suspension of the Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August 1995. APPENDIX The following are the specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner. Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraphs 7 through 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. (All of these proposed details are essentially correct; it is simply not necessary to repeat them.) Findings submitted by Respondent. (None.) COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Gerald Brown 3551 N.W. 41st Street Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33309 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact On or about October 1, 1990, in Case No. 90-233 CF, pending in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sumter County, Florida, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere to: one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony under Section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes; one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, a second degree felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes; and one count of resisting arrest with violence, a third degree felony under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes. On the same day, the Petitioner also was adjudicated guilty on all three charges. Sentence was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed in an adult community control program for two years subject to certain conditions. The Petitioner's nolo plea was entered notwithstanding a June 26, 1990, "No Information" filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. On July 28, 1991, the Petitioner was arrested for alleged spouse battery. As a result, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of his community control conditions. On September 19, 1991, a "No Information" was filed in the battery case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Nonetheless, an Order of Modification of Community Control was entered on October 28, 1991, adding a condition that the Petitioner attend and successfully complete marriage/family counseling. On or about April 19, 1992, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged spouse battery. On July 21, 1992, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. Notwithstanding the April 19, 1992, arrest, there was no evidence that the Petitioner's community control program was further modified, and the Petitioner successfully completed the two-year program, as previously modified on October 28, 1991. On April 29, 1993, the Petitioner's civil rights, other than the right to possess and carry a firearm, were restored by Executive Order of the Office of Executive Clemency of the State of Florida. On or about October 4, 1993, the Petitioner again was arrested for alleged battery. (The record is not clear as to the identity of the alleged victim.) On November 29, 1993, a "No Information" was filed in the case stating that the State Attorney's Office had taken testimony under oath at a State Attorney's investigation and that the facts and circumstances revealed did not warrant prosecution at the time. There was no evidence of any other criminal arrests or convictions after October 4, 1993. The undisputed testimony of the Petitioner and his character witnesses was that there have been none. The Petitioner and his character witnesses also testified persuasively and without contradiction that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and integrity. The Petitioner now understands the importance of avoiding the circumstances that can lead to violations of the criminal law, he appears to have learned how to avoid them, and he appears to be determined to avoid them. Meanwhile, he also has proven himself to be a responsible and caring single father for his children and has made valuable contributions to his community as an adult volunteer, especially in community children's programs. It is found that, with the passage of time, the Petitioner has rehabilitated himself and that he is now a person of high character and approved integrity so as to qualify for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvie Edwards, pro se 1544 Bay Street Southeast St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
