The Issue The issue to be presented is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, having been issued certificate number 281123. Respondent was employed by the City of Madison Police Department from December 2008 through July 2009. At the beginning of 2009, Respondent was 23 years old. Sometime in late December 2008 or early in 2009, Respondent received the telephone number for E.B.H. from Paige Bell, a friend of E.B.H.'s. At the time Ms. Bell gave Respondent E.B.H.'s number, E.B.H. was 16 years old. Respondent knew that E.B.H. was under the age of 18. Although the exact time-frame of the communications is unclear, in approximately January or February of 2009, Respondent and E.B.H. texted and called each for a one to two-week period. They never met in person. During their short period of communication, the two sent each other pictures of themselves so that each knew what the other looked like. E.B.H. testified that the first pictures sent were normal photos where she was clothed. After receiving those, she testified that Respondent asked her for "sexy" photos of herself wearing no underclothing. In response, E.B.H. sent him two pictures of herself, either nude or partially nude. The communication between Respondent and E.B.H. was brief, lasting no more than a few weeks. Once E.B.H. learned that Respondent was a law enforcement officer, she stopped texting him because she did not want either of them to get in trouble. Sometime after the texting stopped, the police chief for City of Madison Police Department received an anonymous complaint alleging that Respondent had possession of nude pictures of a minor female. On July 7, 2009, Sergeant Benton Ebberson was assigned to conduct an internal investigation in response to the complaint. As part of his investigation, Sergeant Ebberson spoke to several individuals who did not testify at hearing. What those individuals told him during the investigation is clearly hearsay. However, from these interviews, Sergeant Ebberson was able to gather enough information to get descriptions of the photos and identify E.B.H. as the subject of the photos. As a consequence, Sergeant Ebberson located and, with the permission of her parents, interviewed E.B.H. She admitted sending the photos to Respondent, but no longer had possession of the phone from which the texts were sent or copies of the pictures. Her father had discovered her actions and the pictures earlier in the year, and had deleted the photos and confiscated her telephone. Respondent also was interviewed as a consequence of the internal investigation. Consistent with the information he gave during his interview, he denies asking for the photos and claims E.B.H. sent them to him on her own volition. Whether he asked for the pictures is not particularly relevant. There is no dispute that E.B.H. sent and Respondent received at least two pictures of E.B.H. in which E.B.H. was wearing little or no clothing. Respondent claims that, while he received the pictures and looked at them, he did not know they were pictures of E.B.H., and therefore a minor, because the pictures did not include her face. However, he knew that the pictures were received from E.B.H.'s telephone number. Respondent did not report receiving the pictures to either his supervisors or to E.B.H.'s parents. Respondent also claims that upon receiving the pictures, he simply deleted them. His testimony to this effect is not credible. E.B.H. testified credibly that while she had sent inappropriate photographs to a former boyfriend on a separate occasion, she had sent these photographs to Respondent only. Regardless of the possible motives involved for complaining, it makes no sense that anyone would be able to complain to the police department and that the photos could be described in sufficient detail for Sergeant Ebberson to be able to locate E.B.H. unless Respondent either talked about receiving the photos or showed the photos to someone else. The photos, however, are not in evidence. E.B.H. knew she was either completely nude or only partially dressed, but could provide very little other information about the photos. No evidence was presented to indicate that the photos included a depiction of sexual conduct.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kerra A. Smith, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ernest M. Page, IV, Esquire Post Office Box 167 Perry, Florida 32348 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Health has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found probable cause to suspect that the licensee has committed one or more disciplinable offenses. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 10658. Background On February 3, 2012, T.S., a 26-year-old single mother, presented to Respondent's medical office as a new obstetrical patient. At that time, T.S. was carrying her third child. For the next five months, T.S. and Respondent enjoyed what was, by all appearances, a productive and appropriate physician-patient relationship. However, as discussed below, Respondent would transgress the bounds of that relationship during an office visit on the evening of July 11, 2012. First, though, it is necessary to sketch the relevant background. On the morning of July 11, 2012, T.S.——who was then nine months pregnant——appeared at Respondent's office for a routine examination. During the visit, T.S. advised Respondent that she was experiencing substantial cramping and discomfort. In response to these complaints, Respondent performed a pelvic examination and a sonogram, both of which yielded normal results. Later that day, at approximately 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., T.S. telephoned Respondent's office and informed his staff of a new symptom: namely, that significant pain was making it difficult to lift her right arm. Although a member of the staff advised T.S. that she could be seen immediately, logistical constraints made it impossible for her to report to Respondent's office prior to the close of business. Over the course of the next several hours, T.S. communicated with Respondent by phone and text (his cell number was available to all patients) concerning the new symptom and her preference to be seen that evening. Ultimately, Respondent informed T.S., via a text message sent at approximately 6:15 p.m., that she could meet him at his office for an examination. The Misconduct T.S. arrived at the office at 6:30 p.m., whereupon Respondent unlocked the front door and invited T.S. inside. Upon entering the lobby area, which was only partially illuminated, T.S. saw no sign of Respondent's office staff. At that point, Respondent asked T.S. to sign a form that read as follows: I give consent to be seen at Dr. Miller's office, by Dr. Miller, without an assistant present, at my request, in order to have a medically urgent need addressed. The foregoing document, although signed by T.S., is of dubious propriety, as obstetrical treatment without a chaperone present is rarely, if ever, appropriate.3/ This issue is of no moment, however, for most of what occurred next——as established by the credible testimony of T.S. and Petitioner's expert witness——was not a legitimate medical examination but, rather, nonconsensual sexual contact perpetrated under the guise of an examination. Upon the execution of the "consent" document, Respondent directed T.S. to an examination room and informed her that the likely cause of her arm pain was either a clogged milk duct or the positioning of the fetus. Respondent then requested that T.S. disrobe her upper body, at which point he left the room for a few moments. Upon his return, Respondent asked T.S. to recline on the examination table, purportedly so he could examine her right breast to rule out the possibility of a clogged duct. T.S. complied and, for the next 30 to 45 seconds, Respondent squeezed her breast in a manner quite dissimilar to examinations she had undergone in the past. In particular, T.S. thought it peculiar that Respondent "cupped" her entire breast with his hand——as opposed to examining the breast from the outside in with the pads of his fingers.4/ Even more troublingly, Respondent asked T.S., while his hand was still in contact with her breast, whether "it felt good."5/ After removing his hand from T.S.'s breast, Respondent remarked to T.S. that her arm pain was not the result of a clogged milk duct. Respondent further stated that her symptoms would be assuaged upon the baby's delivery, an event which, according to him, could be facilitated by sexual activity. Before proceeding further, it is important to note that T.S.'s symptoms of arm pain arguably warranted, at most, a legitimate breast examination. In other words, there were no symptoms or aspects of T.S.'s history that justified a pelvic examination at that time,6/ particularly since Respondent had performed such a procedure (along with a sonogram) earlier in the day. Nevertheless, Respondent informed T.S. that he "needed" to measure the dilation of her cervix; then, in a disturbing and conspicuous departure from accepted obstetrical practice,7/ Respondent applied lubricant to one of his ungloved hands. Moments later, Respondent inserted two fingers into T.S.'s vagina and, for the next 30 seconds or so, positioned his penetrating hand in such a manner that his thumb was in continuous contact with T.S.'s clitoris——something that would never occur during a proper examination.8/ Tellingly, this was not the only physical contact incongruous with a legitimate pelvic examination, for at one point Respondent used his free hand to pull on one of T.S.'s nipples.9/ By now suspicious of Respondent's conduct, T.S. attempted to maneuver her body toward the head of the examination table. As she did so, Respondent began to remove his fingers from T.S.'s vagina while stating that she "needed to have sex" in order to induce labor. This could be accomplished, Respondent further suggested, by having sex with him, an invitation T.S. sensibly declined.10/ On the heels of this rejection, Respondent told T.S. that the only other means of inducing labor would be to "strip her membranes." Owing perhaps to an urgent desire to give birth——the reader should recall that she was nine months pregnant and in significant discomfort——T.S. acceded to Respondent's suggestion. Respondent then penetrated T.S.'s vagina with his (ungloved) hand for a second time and, prior to the removal of his fingers, repeatedly implored T.S. to engage in sexual intercourse with him.11/ When T.S. refused and tried to move to the other end of the table, Respondent grabbed her by the hips and pulled his midsection into her exposed vaginal area. By virtue of this aggression, T.S. could feel that Respondent's penis, albeit clothed, was erect.12/ Wishing to extricate herself from this situation, T.S. pushed Respondent away, at which point he attempted to "laugh off" his abhorrent behavior. T.S. dressed herself and, a short time later, drove to the home of an acquaintance to seek advice. Later that evening, T.S. made a report of the incident to the appropriate authorities,13/ which ultimately resulted in the filing of the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of violating section 459.015(1)(l), as charged in Count I of the Complaint. It is further determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of violating section 456.072(1)(v) and, in turn, section 459.015(1)(pp), as alleged in Count II of the complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Osteopathic Medicine finding Respondent guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; revoking Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine; and imposing a fine of $10,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by the State of Florida, Board of Medicine (the Board), against Respondent's physician assistant's license for alleged inappropriate conduct in relation to Patient T.S.?
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts: Petitioner is the state department charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this Complaint, Respondent was a licensed physician assistant within the State of Florida, having been issued license number PA 3346 on May 28, 1997. Respondent's address of record is 2608 Maywood Street, Eustis, Florida 32726-2063. Respondent is a physician assistant at Care First of Central Florida (hereinafter "Care First"), 15050 U.S. Highway 441, Eustis, Florida 32726. Patient T.S., (a.k.a. T.B.), and her daughters had been patients of Care First for several years for various family medical matters. On or about November 16, 2004, Patient T.S. met Respondent for the first time when Patient T.S. accompanied Patient R.P., her significant other, to Patient R.P.'s appointment with Respondent at Care First. During Patient R.P.'s appointment, Patient T.S. discussed a problem she was experiencing with fibromyalgia (a condition that causes widespread muscle and soft tissue pain and tenderness, especially in the trunk, neck, and shoulders). Respondent suggested Patient T.S. make an appointment with him for a checkup of her condition. Patient T.S. made the appointment for the following day, November 17, 2004, and attended her appointment accompanied by Patient R.P. Respondent thoroughly and appropriately examined Patient T.S. on November 17, 2004. On or about November 26, 2004, Patient T.S. presented herself unattended to Care First with complaints of coughing and chest congestion. Respondent met with Patient T.S. in an examination room with no other persons present. Respondent returned to the examination room, gave Patient T.S. some medication for her condition, and exited the room.1/ Prior Disciplinary History: There was no indication that Respondent had been accused of any prior wrongdoing involving his practice as a physician assistant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Angelo Britton, failed to maintain good moral character required of correctional officers by committing the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, matters subject to official recognition, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Findings Regarding the Parties and Events Preceding the Incident at Issue The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing standards applicable to correctional officers, pursuant to section 943.12 and chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission certified Mr. Britton as a corrections officer in the State of Florida on July 1, 2015. He received Corrections Certification Number 325155. Mr. Britton and his ex-wife have been involved in a bitter custody battle over their six-year-old daughter since 2013. According to Mr. Britton, his ex-wife kept him from seeing their daughter after alleging that he sexually abused the child. Mr. Britton also claims that his ex-wife has been stalking him and suspects that she is responsible for initiating approximately 15 child abuse investigations of him by the Department of Children and Families. In February of 2017, Mr. Britton moved to an apartment complex in DeFuniak Springs, Florida, in order to be closer to his daughter. Soon thereafter, he met Larry Howard, who lives next door to him. Mr. Britton told Mr. Howard that he could not afford to pay for WiFi, and Mr. Howard agreed to let Mr. Britton use his WiFi in exchange for at least $10. Mr. Howard did not give his WiFi password to anyone else. Mr. Britton enjoys spending time with children. He babysits for friends and neighbors, and neighborhood children often play in his apartment. Findings Regarding the Incident at Issue and the Resulting Investigation On approximately May 23, 2017, three images of child pornography4/ were uploaded5/ to a Gmail account designated as “mysexyplay69@gmail.com” at an internet protocol (“IP”) address associated with DeFuniak Springs. An IP address is used to identify the location where someone has connected to the internet. That action prompted Google, Inc. to transmit a report to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”). The report included the aforementioned images and IP address. NCMEC then forwarded that information to the Walton County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”). The WCSO’s Special Victims Unit, which investigates online exploitation and abuse of children, subpoenaed Charter Communications in order to determine who owned the IP address from which the pornographic images where uploaded, and Charter Communications reported that Mr. Howard was the owner.6/ WCSO investigators obtained a search warrant and searched Mr. Howard’s apartment on August 8, 2017. They “triaged” several digital devices found on site. Triaging is a process that uses scanning software to document the data stored on digital devices. The investigators found no child pornography or incriminating evidence on any of Mr. Howard’s devices and concluded that he was not responsible for uploading the pornographic images at issue. Mr. Britton observed the search of Mr. Howard’s home. Mr. Howard disclosed to the investigators that he allowed Mr. Britton to use his WiFi and that Mr. Britton was the only other person who knew his password. The investigators then subpoenaed Facebook for records concerning when and where Mr. Britton used his Facebook account. The records produced by Facebook revealed that Mr. Britton had used Mr. Howard’s WiFi to log onto Facebook as late as June 23, 2017. As noted above, the child pornography images at issue were uploaded on approximately May 23, 2017. After obtaining a search warrant, the WCSO Special Victims Unit investigators searched Mr. Britton’s apartment on October 19, 2017. They seized a cellphone, and a subsequent forensics analysis revealed the cellphone contained search terms that had been used in 2015 to search for items pertaining to lactation, sex with pregnant women, and sex with minors. Mr. Britton acknowledges being interested in pornography involving lactation and pregnant women but denies being interested in child pornography. Mr. Britton had disposed of a tablet and a computer at some point prior to the search of his residence. The search terms found on Mr. Britton’s cellphone led the investigators to conclude that Mr. Britton uploaded the pornographic images at issue to the Gmail account. Ultimate Findings Either Mr. Britton or Mr. Howard uploaded the child pornography at issue to the Gmail account designated as “mysexyplay69@gmail.com.” After searching his residence and electronic devices, the WCSO found nothing indicating that Mr. Howard was the responsible party, and Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Britton was the only other person with access to his WiFi. Mr. Howard was a very credible witness and gave no reason for the undersigned to question the veracity of his testimony. In contrast, the substance of Mr. Britton’s testimony and his overall demeanor during the final hearing gave the undersigned considerable cause to question the veracity of his testimony. For instance, Mr. Britton offered two implausible explanations for why the searches for child pornography were found on his cellphone. His first explanation is that the searches were “redirects” from adult porn websites. However, internet searches cannot be redirects.7/ Mr. Britton’s second explanation is that his ex-wife placed the pornographic searches on his cell phone, but Mr. Britton offered no explanation as to how his ex-wife gained access to his phone during the three months in 2015 when the search terms in question were used. Mr. Britton acknowledged having a sexual interest in pregnant women and lactation, and some of the searches pertained to those topics. That undermines any suggestion that someone else initiated the searches in question. In sum, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Mr. Britton, rather than Mr. Howard, is responsible for uploading the pornographic images at issue to “mysexyplay69@gmail.com” and thus committed the violations alleged in the Department’s Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that Mr. Britton failed to maintain good moral character as required by law and revoking Mr. Britton’s correctional officer certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G.W. Chisenhall Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Facts Stipulated to By the Parties Embry-Riddle is an independent, nonsectarian, not-for- profit, co-educational university. Embry-Riddle serves culturally diverse students seeking careers in aviation, aerospace, engineering, and related fields, with residential campuses in Daytona Beach, Florida, and Prescott, Arizona, and an extended campus (a/k/a Worldwide Campuses) consisting of 156 teaching sites in the United States and Europe. Michael Perry began his employment with Embry-Riddle on November 30, 2001, as a part-time associate center director at Embry-Riddle's Tallahassee teaching site. His job responsibilities were to market Embry-Riddle's programs, enroll students and provide some student services, the timely completion of registration forms and matriculation applications, and basic administrative duties. Petitioner did not have authority to enter into a contract for cellular phone service on behalf of Embry-Riddle that Embry-Riddle would be obligated to pay. Embry-Riddle's Tallahassee teaching site is on the campus of Tallahassee Community College ("TCC"), along with the extended campuses of other higher-education institutions, including Flagler College-Tallahassee and Barry University. In February 2003, Petitioner began to work full-time with the same job title and responsibilities. In February 2004, Petitioner was promoted from assistant center director to associate center director. He received a pay increase, and was given the additional responsibility of supervising an assistant and a Veterans' Affairs ("VA") student employee. At all times, Petitioner's assistant was Katrina Alexander, an African-American female. At all times relevant to this claim, Petitioner's VA student employee was Kiesha Moodie, an African-American female. The Tallahassee teaching site was overseen by Center Director Albert Borovich from a remote site in the panhandle of Florida. On or about May 18, 2005, Ms. Alexander reported that Ms. Moodie advised her that she was uncomfortable about some interaction she had with Petitioner in his office. The precise nature of the interaction is in dispute. At some point after May 23, 2005, Mr. Borovich was given certain memoranda by Dr. Barbara Sloan, advising him of the complaints of sexual harassment by certain unnamed employees of TCC. On June 6, 2005, Mr. Borovich received a copy of a memorandum from Maura Freeberg Wilson to Joketra Hall advising of complaints by female employees of Flagler College-Tallahassee about Petitioner. On June 10, 2005, Debbie Wiggins, the Southeast Regional Director of Operations for Embry-Riddle, and the direct supervisor of Mr. Borovich, provided copies of the alleged victim's statements to Petitioner for response. Petitioner responded to the charge by a report, dated June 15, 2005, denying the claims of sexual harassment and inappropriate behavior. Respondent has a human resources department housed in its headquarters in Daytona Beach, Florida. The human resources department is responsible for investigating complaints of sexual harassment and inappropriate behavior by an employee. The human resources department had not started its investigation of the complaints against Petitioner at the time Ms. Wiggins gave the alleged victim's statements to Petitioner. Rick Snodgrass was appointed by Linda Mobley to investigate the claims of sexual harassment and inappropriate behavior on behalf of Respondent's human resources department. Ms. Mobley was a human resource professional in Respondent's human resource department in Daytona Beach, Florida. Mr. Snodgrass was a human resource professional in Respondent's human resources department in Daytona Beach, Florida. On June 20, 2005, a telephone call was received at the Tallahassee teaching site from Nextel Partners Recovery concerning a delinquent account ("the Nextel Account"). On June 20, 2005, Mr. Borovich called Respondent's payroll department and asked whether Petitioner's paycheck could be held, but was advised that it was too late. At this time, Petitioner had made two payments to Nextel Partners on the Nextel Account at issue. The funds used to make this payment came directly from Petitioner and were not Embry-Riddle funds. On June 21, 2005, Mr. Borovich called Petitioner about the Nextel Account. On June 21, 2005, Petitioner was placed on administrative leave without pay. Petitioner told Mr. Borovich that he had opened the account at issue, that it was in his name, and that he had been paying the bills. The Nextel Subscriber Agreement lists "Embry-Riddle" in the section labeled "Full Customer Name." The Nextel Subscriber Agreement lists the address of the Tallahassee teaching site of Embry-Riddle in the section labeled "Mailing Address." The Nextel Subscriber Agreement lists Petitioner's home address in the section labeled "Shipping Address." The Nextel Subscriber Agreement has Petitioner's signature in the section labeled "Customer Signature." The Nextel Subscriber Agreement has "Assist. Dir. Oper." in the section labeled "Title." The Nextel New Customer Checklist lists "Embry- Riddle/TCC" in the section labeled "Customer/Company Name." The Nextel New Customer Checklist lists "Michael" in the section labeled "Contact." The Nextel New Customer Checklist has Petitioner's signature in the section labeled "NEXTEL Customer Signature." Petitioner provided his driver's license to Nextel Partners in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. Petitioner provided his Embry-Riddle identification card to Nextel Partners in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. Petitioner provided his Embry-Riddle business card to Nextel Partners in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. Petitioner provided the address of Embry-Riddle's main campus in Daytona Beach to Nextel Partners in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. Petitioner provided the address of Embry-Riddle's Tallahassee teaching site for billing purposes in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. Petitioner directed that the bills be sent to Respondent's Tallahassee teaching site, "Attn: Michael L. Perry," in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. Petitioner provided Respondent's Consumer Certificate of Exemption (Embry-Riddle's certificate of tax exemption) to Nextel Partners in conjunction with opening the Nextel Account. On June 20, 2005, Nextel Partners asserted that $936.55 was past due and owing on the Nextel Account. The alleged past due balance was sent to collection by Nextel Partners. The debt collection firm of Lamon, Hanley & Assoc., Inc., sought payment of the alleged past due amount from Embry- Riddle. The debt collection firm of J.J. MacIntyre Co., Inc., sought payment of the alleged past due amount from Embry-Riddle. Mr. Snodgrass was charged with investigating the events surrounding the Nextel Account by Ms. Mobley. The investigations of the claims of sexual harassment and the Nextel Account occurred simultaneously. Mr. Snodgrass traveled to Tallahassee on June 23, 2005, during which he met with several individuals regarding the claims of sexual harassment. The complainants from TCC, Flagler College- Tallahassee, and Barry University declined to participate in the investigation on the advice of their legal counsel. Ms. Moodie indicated to Mr. Snodgrass that she had addressed her concerns directly with Petitioner, and she withdrew her complaint. Mr. Snodgrass interviewed Petitioner last, in the presence of Mr. Borovich. Mr. Borovich was not present during the interviews of the female witnesses. At that time, Mr. Borovich found that there was insufficient evidence to make a finding on the claims of sexual harassment, and he recommended no direct discipline of Perry on the claims of sexual harassment. Mr. Snodgrass also discussed the Nextel Account with Petitioner during the meeting of June 23, 2005. Petitioner again asserted that the Nextel Subscriber Agreement was an agreement personal to him, and not an agreement between Nextel Partners and Embry-Riddle. Petitioner was advised that his employment was being terminated because of the actions surrounding the Nextel Account, but he was offered the opportunity to resign instead. Petitioner chose to resign his employment with Embry- Riddle. Petitioner's termination was involuntary. Respondent employs African-Americans in its extended campuses across the United States, including faculty, center directors, and associate center directors. Additional Findings of Fact Not Stipulated to By the Parties Petitioner is a 49-year-old African-American male, who has always lived in the southern United States. Petitioner was qualified for his position and had not been the subject of discipline in connection with his employment until January 2005, when he received a letter of reprimand from his supervisor, Mr. Borovich. In addition to his employment at Embry-Riddle, Petitioner has served as a minister, and has had experience counseling others who have been the victims of racial discrimination. Petitioner testified to his belief that Respondent discriminated against him by automatically concluding that he was guilty of committing fraud by obtaining the Nextel cellular phone because he was an African-American male. Petitioner testified to his experience, and as a minister counseling other victims of discrimination, that African-American males are considered guilty regardless of proof, and may still be considered guilty if they stand up for their rights. Petitioner believes that society generally feels that African-American males cannot tell the truth. Petitioner also testified that he was hurt the most by being accused by Respondent of being a thief without the opportunity to provide documents to rebut Respondent's accusation. Petitioner testified to his experience and belief that African-Americans, who have been the victims of racism in the South, have often been put in the position of having no chance to present evidence disproving the charges levied against them. Petitioner testified that he received a telephone call from Mr. Borovich, on May 23, 2005, ordering him to immediately apologize to the three alleged victims of sexual harassment or inappropriate conduct. He believed he was not given an opportunity to dispel Mr. Borovich of any notion that he had acted inappropriately towards the three women, nor had any investigation been performed at that point. Petitioner complied with the order to apologize to the three alleged victims of the sexual harassment, and testified he felt humiliated as a result of the experience. He believes he was "taken back" to a time in our society when he would have been guilty just because a white man said he was guilty. Mr. Borovich testified at the hearing that he did not recall ever speaking with Petitioner on May 23, 2005, nor did he recall "ordering" Petitioner to apologize to the alleged victims. Petitioner testified that he complained about the fact that he was forced to apologize to the three alleged victims of sexual harassment, and that his complaints were ignored by his superiors. Respondent is an equal opportunity employer that regularly trains its employees in seminars about equal opportunity employment, sexual harassment, and disability. Respondent maintains extensive employment policies in a policy manual referred to as both a POM and an APPS. These policies are reviewed with Embry-Riddle personnel at orientation, and made available to all personnel electronically through an intranet site at any time from any computer. Respondent has policies prohibiting sexual harassment and racial discrimination. Respondent's policies and procedures provide that individuals reporting sexual harassment should contact human resources, which would then conduct an investigation. This investigation is then conducted according to Respondent's policies and procedures. At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent had three employees physically located in the administrative offices of the Tallahassee teaching site: Petitioner, Ms. Alexander, and Ms. Moodie. According to Mr. Borovich, Petitioner was a good marketer, but had some difficulty in meeting deadlines. Ms. Alexander determined that her interaction with Petitioner on May 18, 2005, fit within Respondent's definition of sexual harassment. Respondent's policy requires that a supervisor who is made aware of sexual harassment must report the incident. Ms. Alexander attempted to contact Mr. Borovich on May 18, 2005, but he was not in his office. She, thereafter, consulted the policy and procedures manual and determined she was to contact the faculty chair when the center director was unavailable, which she did. Once he received the complaint from Ms. Alexander, Mr. Borovich began gathering information from the people involved, and then he reported the alleged sexual harassment to Respondent's human resources department pursuant to Embry-Riddle policy. Ms. Moodie told Ms. Alexander that she did not believe she was sexually harassed, but that she felt uncomfortable standing on top of a table and writing on a white board while Petitioner and Mr. Deric Mordica, a student, watched her from behind. Petitioner believes that Ms. Moodie's complaint to Ms. Alexander "started this whole thing." Both Ms. Moodie and Ms. Alexander are African-American. Maura Freeberg Williams, during the relevant time period, was employed in a supervisor capacity by Flagler College, whose offices were located in the same building as Embry-Riddle's Tallahassee teaching site. Joketra Hall, during the relevant time period, was employed in a supervisor capacity by TCC on whose campus Respondent is located. Debbie Wiggins, during the relevant time period, was the Southeast Regional Director of Operations for Respondent, and Mr. Borovich's direct supervisor. Her office was not located on the Tallahassee teaching site. When Ms. Wiggins provided Petitioner with copies of the alleged victims' statements on June 10, 2005, she was told by Ms. Mobley that she had breached investigative protocol which dictated that the human resources department was to interview Petitioner prior to him seeing the statements. This is done in order to maintain the anonymity of the victim until human resources has had the opportunity to investigate. Ms. Mobley directed Ms. Wiggins to refrain from involving herself in the investigation, which was to be conducted by the human resources department. These discussions were memorialized in electronic mail between Ms. Mobley and Ms. Wiggins. Mr. Snodgrass testified that this breach in protocol nearly compromised the investigation, but it was caught in time to conduct a proper investigation. Mr. Snodgrass determined how the investigation would be handled, decided whom Respondent would interview, and decided which statements from individuals would be taken. Mr. Snodgrass also determined the outcome of the investigation. Mr. Snodgrass made a trip to Tallahassee on June 23, 2005, during which he met with and questioned several individuals regarding the claims of sexual harassment. Since Ms. Moodie refused to discuss the alleged incident because she had already discussed it with Petitioner and withdrawn her complaint, and since the employees of TCC, Flagler College-Tallahassee, and Barry University declined to speak with Mr. Snodgrass, he concluded the sexual harassment complaints could not be sustained. Mr. Snodgrass met with Petitioner during his June 23 trip to Tallahassee and requested that Mr. Borovich attend the meeting as a witness. Mr. Snodgrass performed the questioning without comment by Mr. Borovich. The first part of the meeting dealt with the sexual harassment claims. Following the questioning, Mr. Snodgrass determined that the evidence was insufficient to make a finding of sexual harassment. He put aside his folder concerning this claim. The second part of the meeting concerned the Nextel cellular phone contract. Mr. Snodgrass asked Petitioner how he came to have two phones in Embry-Riddle's name. Petitioner repeated the information he had given to Mr. Borovich. Mr. Snodgrass presented the documents concerning the Nextel Account to Petitioner. Mr. Snodgrass believed that the Nextel documents were more credible than Petitioner's answers to his questions concerning the Nextel Account. Petitioner testified that he contracted with Nextel to obtain personal cellular telephones for himself and his wife. Petitioner entered into the Nextel contract to receive a discount being offered to public employees and people working for universities which he learned about through a document that was faxed to the machine he shared with others at TCC. Petitioner met with the Nextel representative at his office to complete the paperwork. Petitioner agreed to have his monthly bills sent to his office where he also received other personal bills. Petitioner paid for his cellular telephone usage with his own funds. Petitioner received the benefit of using Respondent's tax exempt certificate on his contract with Nextel. Petitioner entered into a dispute with Nextel over the quality of his telephone service, which led to the matter being turned over by Nextel to its collection agents. Petitioner never resolved the matter of his dispute with Nextel over the quality of his telephone service. After Petitioner's termination from employment, Respondent paid the past due amount for Petitioner's phone to Nextel out of funds owed to Petitioner for unused leave time during his employment. Mr. Snodgrass advised Petitioner at the time of termination of his employment that he had violated school policy by entering into the cellular phone contract. Petitioner was informed that his "employment was being terminated due to the fact that he opened [the Nextel] account without proper permission." Petitioner did not have contracting authority to bind Respondent. Respondent provides cellular telephone allowances for some of its employees who travel a great deal. None of Respondent's employees have cellular telephones that are owned or contracted for by Respondent. The decision to terminate Petitioner was made by Ms. Mobley. Mr. Borovich was not involved in the decision to terminate Petitioner. Ms. Mobley was not aware of Petitioner's race until she reviewed the documents regarding the Nextel Account, which included a photocopy of Petitioner's identification card. Ms. Mobley testified that the investigative protocols used concerning Petitioner were the same she would use regardless of the employee's race or gender. Following Petitioner's resignation, Ms. Alexander performed Petitioner's prior duties, and was the only person designated to the Tallahassee teaching site for the next 18 months. At that time, the position formerly held by Petitioner was given to a white female. Petitioner sought unemployment benefits, giving as his reason for his termination a "permanent layoff" due to "reduction in force due to lack of student enrollment." Ms. Alexander testified that she worked closely with Petitioner and Mr. Borovich, and that she socialized outside of work with Mr. Borovich. Ms. Alexander never witnessed Mr. Borovich act in a racially discriminatory manner towards her or Petitioner. Petitioner was not aware of any African-American males employed at his level or higher in the organizational structure of Embry-Riddle. Embry-Riddle employs 190 African-Americans out of 1,500 total employees in its worldwide campuses, including faculty, center directors, and associate center directors. Ninety percent of those African-American individuals were in positions equal to or higher than that held by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael O. Murray, Esquire Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 600 South Clyde Morris Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Bill Reeves, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Thomas J. Leek, Esquire Cobb & Cole Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2491 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.
