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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs GEORGE LEMPENAU, PRESIDENT; FOUR MARNA, INC.; AND ARCADIA PEACE RIVER CAMPGROUND, 99-000780 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Arcadia, Florida Feb. 22, 1999 Number: 99-000780 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to give timely written notice of rent increase on mobile home lots, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent owned the Arcadia Peace River Campground (Campground) located in DeSoto County, Florida, whose mailing address is 2988 Northwest Highway 70, Arcadia, Florida 34266. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, the Campground had 14 or more of its mobile home lots occupied by mobile homes. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, seven or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by residents of the Campground other than Respondent. Furthermore, these mobile homes were placed on lots leased by the mobile home residents from the Campground. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, four or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by Respondent's employees and placed on lots in the Campground. The rental for these lots was considered as part of the employees' compensation. On January 1, 1997, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $30.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1997, monthly lot rental increase on November 26, 1996, some 36 days prior to the effective date (January 1, 1997) of the increase. No other notice of the lot rental increase was given to the affected mobile home owners. Respondent collected the $30.00 lot rental increase from the affected mobile home owners during the period from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998. On January 1, 1998, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $15.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1998, monthly lot rental increase on October 28, 1997, some 65 days prior to the effective date of the increase. Respondent collected the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998. Each of the following affected mobile home owners paid both the $30.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998 and the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998: Charles Collins; Arthur P. McRae; Harold Martin; Maurice W. Jackson; Robert F. Martin; Irene K. Apps and; Reba Conner. On March 21, 1998, the Peace River flooded the Campground. The mobile homes located in the Campground were damaged. Subsequently, the mobile homes were removed from the Campground, purchased by Respondent, or were purchased by one or more new employees of Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having specifically reviewed the factors set out in Section 723.006(5)(c), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order assessing Respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00. It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to refund to Charles Collins, Arthur P. McRae, Harold Martin, Maurice W. Jackson, Robert F. Martin, Irene K. Apps, and Reba Conner all sums collected from these individuals as increases in lot rental during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 21, 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 George Lempenau, Qualified Representative 2998 Northwest Highway 70 Arcadia, Florida 34266

Florida Laws (6) 120.57723.002723.003723.006723.007723.037 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61B-35.002
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AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES vs MEADOWVIEW PROGRESSIVE CARE CORPORATION GROUP HOME, OWNED AND OPERATED BY MEADOWVIEW PROGRESSIVE CARE CORPORATION, 19-001812FL (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Apr. 05, 2019 Number: 19-001812FL Latest Update: Nov. 26, 2019

The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 393.0673(1), Florida Statutes (2018), Respondent, which holds a license to operate a group home facility, was identified in a verified report by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) as the perpetrator of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, failed to disclose on a renewal application a perpetrator of "the . . . abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult" (Maltreatment),1 and allowed a new employee to begin working at the group home before completing all of the background screening requirements; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's license.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, as authorized by the License, Respondent, a Florida not-for-profit corporation, has provided services to intellectually disabled persons residing at the Group Home. At all material times, Respondent's directors have been Etha Griffith, her daughter Kim Griffith, and Francis Griffith. The record does not disclose if Respondent has any members. Etha Griffith, who is 79 years old, serves as an officer and the onsite manager of the group home, for which Kim Griffith and Francis Griffith serve as the backup managers or supervisors of the Group Home. Petitioner presented no admissible evidence in support of Count I. Prominent among the excluded evidence is the Verified Report, as to which Petitioner failed to demonstrate its relevance, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, or its authenticity, given that it is unsigned and bears other indicia of an investigation that, although closed, was never completed.5 In support of Count II, Petitioner introduced the Application,6 which was filed on November 12, 2018. Etha Griffith7 completed the Application by providing the information requested on Petitioner's application form, which serves a natural person or legal entity who or that is an applicant or licensee seeking the issuance or renewal of a group home facility license (Application Form). Etha Griffith signed the Application as Respondent's designated representative, and her signature was notarized on November 8, 2018. The Application states the answer, "no," to the question posed in Section V, Item 2: "Have you or ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application ever been identified as responsible for the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult?" For several reasons, Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the material facts in support of Count II. First, "no" was correct because the question refers to a determination, not allegation, of Maltreatment. The Application Form does not define "identified," whose common meaning is not "alleged," but "established,"8 such as after a completed investigation. As explained in endnote 5, the evidence fails to establish that DCF determined that Etha Griffith is the perpetrator of Maltreatment. Second, even if there had been a determination of Maltreatment in the Verified Report by November 12, 2018, "no" was not a willful or intentional misstatement or a false statement because neither Etha Griffith nor any other agent of Respondent knew about the Verified Report or DCF's determination of Maltreatment--and not for a lack of inquiry. Aware that an investigation had taken place during the summer of 2018, in October 2018, Kim Griffith contacted the DCF protective investigator who had conducted the investigation and asked for any findings. The investigator returned to her, not the Verified Report, but a Notice of Conclusion, stating only that the investigation was "complete" and "closed," and DCF had recommended no additional services. Etha Griffith has never received a copy of the Verified Report. No agent of Respondent knew anything about the Verified Report until preparing for the hearing in this case. On these facts, Etha Griffith and Respondent's other agents had no reason to think, as of November 12, 2018, that DCF had determined that Etha Griffith had perpetrated Maltreatment. Third, even if, by November 12, 2018, Etha Griffith were aware that DCF had determined that she had perpetrated Maltreatment, the failure to disclose this fact or the Verified Report was not material. An audit of the Group Home by Petitioner led to DCF's protective investigation, and the findings of the protective investigation, such as they were,9 implied that any misappropriation involved substantially smaller sums than those specified in the audit.10 Knowledge of the audit findings would thus include knowledge of the protective investigation findings. Fourth, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, "no" is correct because, in the question posed in Section V, Item 2, "you" refers to the applicant or licensee, and "ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application" does not effectively refer to Etha Griffith. The Application Form does not define these terms. Items 1, 3, and 4 also contain questions posed to "you." The questions in Items 1 and 3 alternatively address a "controlling entity affiliated with this application," so, except for dropping "ownership," the questions in Items 1 and 3 are directed to the same addressee as is the question in Item 2. The question in Item 4 is directed only to "you." All four of these items frame questions seeking potentially important information about past license discipline and adverse action involving the Medicaid and Medicare programs.11 Judging from her testimony at the hearing, Etha Griffith possesses modest language skills. Given the level of analysis required to determine the meaning of "you" and "ownership controlled entity affiliated with this application," Etha Griffith could not possibly have understood that the question in Section V, Item 2 addressed her. The two key issues in Count III are whether Ms. Meliard was an employee or a covered volunteer, as defined in the Conclusions of Law, and, if so, whether she had completed her local screening. Ms. Meliard did not testify, nor did Petitioner direct any questions to Kim Griffith as to Count III. Petitioner's investigator testified that, upon his unannounced arrival at the Group Home at 2:05 p.m. on January 1, 2019, he found Ms. Meliard "seated in a chair by the front window," presumably in a common area of the house, such as a living room. Tr., p. 63. Ms. Meliard was alone in the Group Home, as the residents typically returned from their day programs around 3:00 p.m. Tr., p. 63. On the investigator's arrival, Ms. Meliard called Etha Griffith, who arrived at the Group Home very shortly after the call. Tr., p. 64. On her arrival, Etha Griffith told the investigator that she was "trying to give [Ms. Meliard] a job." Tr., p. 64. The testimony recited in this paragraph is credited. Petitioner's witnesses were in conflict as to the screening that Ms. Meliard had cleared. Petitioner's operations management consultant testified that Ms. Meliard had not cleared level 1 or 2 screening. Tr., p. 44. Petitioner's investigator testified to the same effect, but immediately corrected himself by saying that she had cleared Level 2 screening, but not local screening. Tr., pp. 65-66. Petitioner is unable to produce documentary evidence of screenings because this material is confidential, even in hearings of this type, according to Petitioner's counsel. Tr., p. 46. When asked if Ms. Meliard had cleared her level 2 screening, Etha Griffith testified, "That is the one we got, yeah." Tr., p. 95. No one asked Etha Griffith directly if Ms. Meliard had not yet passed her local screening. In a clear-and-convincing case, no finding is possible based on the negative implication inherent in Etha Griffith's statement. Her modest communication skills and laconic communication style betray a lack of mental acuity, so no inference is possible by Etha Griffin's use of the definite article, "the." A personnel file, which may be opened for a candidate for employment, typically contains evidence of a local screening, which comprises an inquiry to the relevant local law enforcement agency and a response from the agency. Tr., p. 83. Proof of a failure to obtain a local screening thus depends on a negative-- the absence of documentation in the personnel file. Unable to recall clearly whether he had seen evidence of a level 2 screening, Petitioner's investigator testified that he recalled not seeing evidence in Ms. Meliard's personnel file of clearing the local screening. Tr., p. 83. The testimony on the issues of employment and local screening is too vague and uncertain to support findings by clear and convincing evidence that, on January 10, 2019, Ms. Meliard was employed by Respondent and had not passed her local screening. The investigator presented himself as exceptionally capable and articulate, but nothing in the record suggests that he investigated with any diligence the employment or local screening issues involving Ms. Meliard.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of all counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2019.

Florida Laws (25) 1.01120.52120.54120.56120.569120.5720.197393.062393.063393.0655393.067393.0673393.13408.803408.815415.102415.104415.107435.01435.03435.0457.105617.01401617.060190.401 Florida Administrative Code (6) 28-106.201565G-2.00165G-2.00265G-2.00765G-2.00865G-2.012 DOAH Case (1) 19-1812FL
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs CHESTER YU, RONAL YU AND CAROL YU, 01-002350 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Jun. 12, 2001 Number: 01-002350 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondents imposed upon mobile home owners an invalid "pass-through" charge to pay for the cost of work on the park's electrical distribution system, in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc., owns the Tanglewood Mobile Home Park located at 345 Weatherbee Road, Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida (Tanglewood). The Patricia Yu Irrevocable Trust owns Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc. Respondents Chester Yu and Ronald Yu are the trustees of the trust; Respondent Carol Yu is not a trustee. References to "Respondents" shall include only Chester Yu and Ronald Yu. Tanglewood was developed in 1969. The park was originally owned and operated for many years by Respondents' father. An undated prospectus for Tanglewood Mobile Home Park (Prospectus) contains several provisions that have some bearing on this case. Prospectus Section VI.A.1 requires each mobile home owner to bear the expense of "electrical connections." Prospectus Section VI.A.2.a states that, "to the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." Prospectus Section VIII.3 states that the Owner may assess, on a pro rata basis, "pass-through charges" as rent increases. Prospectus Section VIII.3.a prohibits more than one increase in lot rental annually, except for "pass-through charges." Section VIII.1.c defines "pass-through charges" as "those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile homeowner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company." Section VIII.3.b.4 states: "To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." The Prospectus states that Tanglewood has 158 lots. In reality, only 148 lots are improved and available for rent. One of these lots is the park office. At present, 139 lots are leased. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene caused flooding in Tanglewood. After the flooding had receded, the power company restored power to the area, but a submerged transformer blew out and damaged part of the Tanglewood's electrical distribution system, leaving 16 mobile homes without power. After repairing or replacing the transformer, the power company employee responsible for reconnecting Tanglewood's electrical distribution system reenergized eight mobile homes, but refused to reenergize the remaining eight due to the deteriorated condition of their meter bank. Meter banks are located in groups at various points in the park. Power enters the park either above- or below-ground and is fed into individual meters for each mobile home. Each meter bank typically contains eight meters, and each meter typically has a junction box and a disconnect box. The concern of the power company employee was that the mechanical force required to reconnect power to one meter bank could possibly be too great for the deteriorated supports to withstand. As was typical of many meter banks at Tanglewood, the meter bank for these eight lots was poorly supported due to the deterioration of its support structure. Most supports at Tanglewood were made of wood, which required close monitoring and careful maintenance. Exposed to the elements, wood suffered considerable damage over time from wood rot. If the support failed, a meter bank would fall over to the ground, exposing live electrical lines in close proximity to the mobile homes and their occupants. Many meter banks throughout Tanglewood also suffered from deteriorated supports. Many meter banks were deficient because of the use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes as conduit, which are of a decreased thickness, when compared to PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use and, when exposed to sunlight, tend to deteriorate faster than the type of PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use. The use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes may not have been legal at the time it was used. Other meter banks also suffered from rusted and missing components, which might allow rainwater to enter the system and damage the parts. Some of the larger missing components left gaps large enough to allow a child's finger to penetrate and touch a live wire. Meter cans were damaged, masts (for above-ground supply lines) were inadequately supported, and drop wires (for above-ground supply lines) were too low. Confronted with the problem of eight lots without electrical service, Respondents contacted a local electrical contractor, who replaced the meter bank and its supports, using new pressure-treated wood. He also increased the service for these eight meters from 100 amps to 150 amps. The power company promptly restored electrical service after these repairs were completed. Respondents did not try to assess the mobile home owners a pass-through charge for this work. Instead, on January 28, 2000, Respondents sent the mobile home owners a notice that their monthly rent would increase by $15 (net, $12, after relieving the tenants of the obligation to pay a $3 monthly administration fee for water and sewer). The notice states that the rent increase is effective May 1, 2000, which may reflect a common commencement date on all lot leases. The letter notes that the park owner "has expended and will expend substantial sums for improvements and upgrades in the park," but warns that the park owner does not know if "any additional tax, utility or assessment prorations will be necessary." The rent increase covered, among other things, the cost of the work to restore electrical service to the eight lots whose meter bank required replacement. On February 12, 2000, the St. Lucie County Building Inspector inspected the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. He noted the conditions described above and issued numerous citations, which were submitted to the St. Lucie County Code Enforcement office. In 1998, St. Lucie County adopted the National Fire Protection Association code, which is based on the 1996 National Electrical Code. The new code requirements prohibit a wood support system, require the placement of meters within 30 feet of the mobile home, and require underground wiring, but do not require service above 100 amps, which was the minimum level of service at Tanglewood prior to any electrical work following Hurricane Irene. On May 25, 2000, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued a notice of citations to Respondents for unsafe electrical equipment. The officer required the replacement of the remainder of the electrical distribution system. When work stopped at Tanglewood, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued other notices of citations in June 2000. Respondents responded to these demands from the County by undertaking extensive work to Tanglewood's electrical distribution system. The result was a modern electrical distribution system--at a cost of $161,912, plus $28,977.76 in finance charges, for a total of $190,889.76. By Notice of Pass-Through Charge dated August 14, 2000, Respondents advised the mobile home owners of a monthly pass-through charge of $28.61 per lot from December 1, 2000, through November 1, 2004. The notice discloses that the reason for the pass-through charges is the electrical distribution system upgrade that had recently been completed. The evidence is clear that, except for the upgrade to 200-amp service, the electrical work done in this case was governmentally mandated. This finding is supported by the reluctance of Respondents to attend to the electrical system unless a mobile home was without electricity. Despite Respondents' electrical invoices, their park-management policy obviously deferred maintenance, at least with respect to the electrical distribution system. The closer question in this case is whether the work was a capital improvement or a repair. The addition of 50-100 amps of service was a capital improvement, but it was not mandated by the government. So the capital improvement versus repair question applies to the remainder of the work. In their proposed recommended order, Respondents contend that the electrical distribution system was "completely functional" prior to the inspection and citations. This is true as to the function of conducting electricity; this is untrue as to the function of conducting electricity safely. Weakened and sometimes nonexistent supports, rusted holes, holes from missing components, and occasionally exposed wiring substantially undermined the safety of the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. Respondents argue that new code requirements forced them to relocate disconnects closer to the mobile homes, use four-wire (not three-wire) feeder line to all mobile homes, use electrical-grade conduit, and use metal supports for meter banks. However, these are subsidiary costs of repair, not capital improvements. As contrasted to the expansion of service, the remaining work does not enlarge the capacity of the electrical distribution system. The remaining work repairs the system to make it safer, with some additional work required to meet current code requirements. Respondents argue that the work increases the value of the land. The record does not support this assertion. Even if such evidence were present in this case, it would not be determinative. Although a capital improvement normally adds value, a residential safety hazard subtracts value, so its elimination would have the appearance of adding value. Respondents argue that the work substantially extends the life of the electrical distribution system. This argument would be more appealing in the presence of an effective preventative maintenance program covering such basic needs as replacing wooden supports and metal covers when needed. However, the nature of the work, other than raising the service from 100 amps, is more retrospective than prospective; the work is really only catching up on preventative repairs and maintenance that was not done for years. Once Respondents allowed the system to fall into such a state of disrepair, the secondary costs of bringing the system up to code, such as adding four-wire feeds and relocating disconnects, do not change the nature of the expenditures; they are repair expenses, not capital improvements. Respondents have proved that a portion of the work was clearly the responsibility of individual mobile home owners. For instance, about two-thirds of the mobile homes required $150-$200 of work to separate the grounded conductors from the grounding conductors. However, it is unclear that any of such work, for which individual mobile home owners were directly responsible, was performed on all lots. Even if this work were a capital expenditure, which it is not, it could not be passed "proportionately" among all of the mobile home owners, if only some of them required the work. Respondent contends correctly that the pass-through charges are a minor violation, as defined in Section 723.006(9), Florida Statutes. Respondents fully disclosed the pass-through charges prior to assessing them. The pass-through charges did not endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the mobile home owners; to the contrary. The charges arose from a substantial expenditure by Respondents to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of the mobile home owners. The pass-through charges caused no economic harm to the mobile home owners because Respondents were authorized by the Prospectus to raise the rent by a sufficient amount to compensate for the entire cost of the work on the electrical distribution system. For these reasons, alone, neither a penalty nor a refund is appropriate; a cessation of the assessment of further pass-through charges and the imposition of the maximum civil penalty for a minor violation are sufficient. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the collected pass-through charges may have a disproportionately disturbing effect on Respondents and the mobile home owners. Respondents borrowed the full cost of the work on the electrical distribution system, and this note is payable in 48 equal monthly instalments ending on August 4, 2004. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the monies already collected may result in a significant disruption in the anticipated cash flow to Respondents, necessitating an even greater increase in rent to cover the loss of these funds. Mobile home owners who have left the park between the time of the electrical work and the time of the rent increase would unfairly be relieved of their proportionate share of the cost of this work, and mobile home owners coming to the park after this rent increase would unfairly be imposed with a disproportionately larger share of the cost of this work.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice To Show Cause against Respondent Carol Yu. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order finding that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu have assessed a pass-through charge in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes; that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall cease and desist from assessing this pass-through charge upon the effective date of the final order; that the violation is a minor violation and no refund is appropriate under the circumstances; and that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall pay a single civil penalty of $250, for which they are jointly and severally liable. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross Fleetwood Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Janis Sue Richardson Attorney for Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Bernard A. Conko Attorney for Respondent Cohen, Norris, Scherer, Weinberger & Wolmer 712 U.S. Highway One Fourth Floor North Palm Beach, Florida 33408

Florida Laws (10) 120.57723.003723.006723.011723.016723.031723.033723.035723.037723.059
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs DALE B. DOWNING, R. E. DOWNING, AND H. W. WHITCOMB, D/B/A CORLEY ISLAND MOBILE MANOR, 92-005692 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Sep. 21, 1992 Number: 92-005692 Latest Update: Jun. 01, 1993

The Issue Whether the amount collected from the tenants of Corley Island Mobile Manor by the Respondent for improvement and repairs to its sewage treatment plant was a "pass-through charge" as defined in Section 723.003(10), Florida Statutes, or was it collected as a matter of custom between the mobile home park owner and the mobile home owner or disclosed prior to tenancy in accordance with Section 723.031 (6), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Petitioner is the state agency governing the landlord tenant relationship in mobile home parks subject to Chapter 723, Florida Statute. The Park is, and at all times pertinent to this proceeding, has been a mobile home park subject to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The Park is owned equally by Respondents, Dale B. Downing, R. E. Downing and H. W. Whitcomb. The Park is operated under the name of Corley Island Mobile Manor. The Park's wastewater is handled through a package treatment plant owned and operated by the Respondents (the WWTF). Under its original configuration, wastewater entered the WWTF through an aeration tank. The Park utilized two separate aeration tanks where the wastewater was agitated and allowed to come in contact with oxygen and enzymes. This started the treatment process. After the wastewater flowed through the first and the second aeration tanks, it spilled into a clarifier. The clarifier is a quiet tank where solids are allowed to settle into a hopper shaped bottom for removal or additional treatment. The clear wastewater at the top of the clarifier flows into a chlorine contact chamber and then out to percolation ponds which allow the wastewater to filter into the ground water through the bottom of the ponds. Prior to November of 1987, the Park was experiencing increased flows of wastewater through the WWTF. The Respondents first investigated the collection system for the infiltration of ground water into the system. The Park also inspected the mobile homes and fixed any leaky faucets, toilets, etc. The Respondents retained Altair Maintenance to examine the collection system using television cameras and to make necessary repairs. On July 8, 1983, Altair Maintenance invoiced the Park for $3,450.00 for these services. Altair Maintenance was called back for additional work in December of 1985 for the repair of manholes at a total charge of $4,124.25. Altair was again called on July 1, 1992 for maintenance of the WWTF at a cost of $1,898.75. Extensive repairs to the manholes and other parts of the WWTF were completed by Roto-Rooter Plumbing. Roto-Rooter was paid $24,090.00 for a May 13, 1983 invoice and $5,891.50 for a July 22, 1983 invoice. Even further repairs to the Park's WWTF were made by Superior Asphalt. It was paid $3,413.00 for replacement of a manhole. The above-described sums were not charged to the residents of the Park. In spite of the maintenance activities described above, the Park continued to experience problems with increased wastewater flows into the WWTF. During peak flow hours (approximately 11:00 A.M.) the normally clear wastewater flowing out of the clarifier into the chlorine contact chamber would become cloudy. This wash through of solids resulted from increased flows during peak flow hours. Wastewater would not remain in the clarifier for a sufficient period of time for the solids to settle out. These solids would spill out of the clarifier or "wash through" causing the wastewater flowing into the chlorine contact chamber to become dark due to the heavy solids content. The agency of state government having jurisdiction over the permitting and operation of wastewater treatment facilities is the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER"). On November 3, 1987, the DER issued a warning notice to the Park because of an abnormally high amount of solids content and a high BOD level in the wastewater flowing from the WWTF. The DER issued a notice of violation on the same grounds on December 1, 1987. The agency of local government having jurisdiction over the WWTF is the Lake County Pollution Control Department. Respondent, Dale Downing, spoke with an employee of the Lake County Pollution Control Department, Roy Green, to determine the measures necessary to resolve this "wash through" of solids. Green told Dale Downing that he would not be able to make the plant perform unless the Park modified the WWTF by adding a digester and surge tank. A digester is a holding tank for solids, a by-product of the treatment process. Solids remain in the holding tank until removed by a removal service. A surge tank is a large tank placed at the front of a wastewater treatment facility which catches the initial inflow of wastewater. Regardless of the rate of flow into the surge tank, pumps release the wastewater from the tank at a uniform rate. A surge tank allows an operator to balance the flow of wastewater through the WWTF eliminating these peak flow problems. The DER permit for the Park's WWTF was due to expire in January of 1988. The Respondents applied for a new permit but were told that the standard five year operating permit could not be issued because of the warning notices and notices of violation the Park had received because of high suspended solids and BOD levels in the effluent. The DER suggested that the Park get a temporary permit while corrections were being made to bring the plant up to performance standards. Respondent, Dale Downing, traveled to the DER's office in Orlando for a meeting with its permitting supervisor, Lee Miller. Miller confirmed that the Park's only options to alleviate its WWTF problems were a connection to the City of Leesburg's municipal system or the addition of a surge tank and digester to the existing plant. The Park's engineer, Richard Newman, prepared plans and specifications for the addition of a surge tank and digester to the WWTF which were submitted to the DER for approval. The DER accepted the modifications on the condition that the Park eliminate its single-cell percolation pond and construct a two-cell percolation pond system. The modifications were completed by the Respondents. As a result, the DER issued a standard five year permit. The WWTF has been trouble free since the modifications were placed in service. The actual expenses necessary for the plant modifications and the construction of the two-cell percolation ponds were passed through to the Park residents. The total costs of these improvements were divided by the Park's 151 lots and charged to each resident on a pro rata basis ($61,644.31/151= $408.24). The Respondents considered this charge as a "pass-through charge". The maintenance, or lack of maintenance, of the Park's WWTF had no impact on the need for the modifications (capital improvements) to the Park's WWTF. There is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the capital improvements, including the two-cell percolation pond, made to the Park's WWTF by the Respondents were governmentally mandated in that DER would not have granted a permit to the Respondents for the operation of the Park's WWTF without these minimum capital improvements. And, the costs of such capital improvements come within the definition of "pass-through charges" as defined in Section 723.003(10), Florida Statutes. The prospectus for the park discloses in Article VIII that each resident's lot rental amount could be increased to recover the cost of the modifications to the WWTF.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Notice To Show Cause filed in this case and any enforcement action against the Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5692 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 4, 8 through 13 and 15 through 21 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 5 through 7 and 14 are rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 26 and 28 through 35 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 27 and 28 are covered in the Preliminary Statement and Conclusions of Law, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Harper Field, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 J. Allen Bobo, Esquire LUTZ, WEBB, PARTRIDGE, BOBO & BAITTY, P. A. Suite 504, One Sarasota Tower Two North Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 34236 Janet Ferris, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums And Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Florida Laws (4) 120.57723.003723.006723.031
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs HAINES CITY INVESTMENT, INC., 89-007037 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Dec. 26, 1989 Number: 89-007037 Latest Update: Nov. 26, 1990

The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether, on three separate occasions, the Respondent raised the rent at Minerva Mobile Home Park without first delivering to the lessees an approved prospectus, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause, Docket No. MH89446, issued on November 1, 1989; and (2), if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Haines City Investment, Inc., is the owner of Minerva Mobile Home Park located in Haines City, Florida. There are approximately 72 lots for lease in Minerva Mobile Home Park. On or about January 6, 1988, a Final Order was entered by the Petitioner finding, among other things, that the Respondent had raised the rent on lots in Minerva Mobile Home Park, effective January 1, 1986, without first filing a prospectus with the Petitioner (and therefore also without delivering to the homeowners an approved prospectus.) Among other things, the Final Order fined the Respondent $3,000 and ordered the Respondent to deliver an approved prospectus to each homeowner entitled to receive one within 15 days. During the pendency of a court appeal of the Final Order, on or about April 29, 1988, the Respondent entered into an Agreement to Remit Civil Penalty and Annual Fees. Effective January 1, 1987, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $11. Effective January 1, 1988, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $4.50. Effective January 1, 1989, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $6. Effective January 1, 1990, the Respondent increased the monthly lot rental in Minerva Mobile Home Park by $12.50, to $134.50 per month. The 11 homeowners who testified all paid all rent increases charged by the Respondent. The Respondent first filed a prospectus for Minerva Mobile Home Park for approval by the Petitioner in October, 1986. By this time, the Respondent had given the homeowners a copy of the proposed, but unapproved prospectus. However, the proposed prospectus was not approved by the Petitioner, and several revisions were made. The final revision was not approved until May 20, 1987. The approved prospectus was not delivered to the homeowners of the Minerva Mobile Home Park until some time in March, 1990.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order requiring that the Respondent refund the illegal rent increases to the homeowners (or former homeowners) in Minerva Mobile Home Park and requiring the Respondent to pay a $1,500 civil penalty. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra Roberts, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Albert Labossiere, President Haines City Investment, Inc. 2800 Minerva Park Haines City, Florida 33844 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1007

Florida Laws (4) 723.006723.011723.012723.031
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. ROBERT E. POLAND AND JACQUELINE POLAND, 88-005983 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005983 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1989

Findings Of Fact After a realtor told Robert Edward Poland that the Flagship Bank was foreclosing on Villa Rosa Mobile Home Park in Jacksonville Beach, Mr. Poland and his wife offered to purchase the property. The incompetency of the owner, Mrs. Ritchie, then in her eighties, together with ensuing legal proceedings, complicated negotiations. But on August 21, 1986, Robert Edward Poland and Jacqueline Poland became joint owners of Villa Rosa Mobile Home Park. A portion of the park they acquired in fee simple, but another portion (now known as Beach Boulevard Trailer Park) they acquired only as a life estate pur autre vie. On the death of Mrs. Ritchie in mid-October 1987, the life estate was extinguished, and that portion has become the property of Mrs. Ritchie's daughter, Elizabeth Drey, and possibly the daughter's husband, Richard Drey. Only beginning with rent for February of 1989, however, have the Dreys begun receiving income from the trailer park. Rent Raised On August 21, 1986, the day they acquired ownership, the Polands gave tenants written notice of their intention "to adjust rent effective December 1, 1986" to $130 a month for a single mobile home lot and to $155 monthly for a double wide mobile home on a single lot. This proposed rental increase did not pertain to lots 3, 6, 13, 15, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, or 007, which were rented only to over-nighters. Perhaps misunderstanding the notice, Tom Williams on Lot C began paying a higher amount on October 1, 1986, before the increase took effect. The following month, Debra Black Wood, J. E. Turner and James Mahoney also paid the increased rent prematurely. In their cases, and in the case of Mr. Williams, the Polands accepted the money but credited the surplus to the tenant. Not counting the lot which the boundary between the Drey property and the Polands' property divides, Mr. and Mrs. Poland offered for rent or lease 26 or more mobile home lots as residences, both before and after Mrs. Ritchie's death. The following tenants' monthly rent increased by the amounts indicated on December 1, 1986: Name of Tenant Lot No. Amount of Increase Ila Story 1 $30.00 Rosa Robinson 2 30.00 Rick Tahey 4/5 55.00 Virginia Dawson 7 5.00 Isabe Sutcliffe 8 30.00 Deborah Blackwood 9 5.00 B. E. Turner 12 30.00 Ingrid C. Fegan 14 30.00 Helen Marin 17 40.00 Alden Waterman 18 30.00 Ethel Dunsmoor 19 30.00 Martina O'Hare 20 30.00 Zora Hyde 21 30.00 William Vollkmer 22 30.00 Richard Rasmussen 23 5.00 Marjorie Barnes 24 30.00 James Mahoney 26 30.00 Roger Zucco 27 5.00 George Bunting 29 55.00 Robert Grabel 30 55.00 David Escopie 31 30.00 Catherine Stevens 32 30.00 Richard Law 33 30.00 Maxwell Page 35 30.00 Helen Hines 36 5.00 Norman Peterson 37 5.00 Hernandez/Johns 38/39 25.00 Lester Rogers 40 30.00 Rita Boyer 41 30.00 Thelma Thornton 42 30.00 Maxwell Page 43 30.00 Kenneth Driscoll 44 55.00 Edna Praine 45 55.00 Cassus Powell 100 30.00 David Koehler 101 5.00 Jerry Welker 102 62.50 John Embleton 103 5.00 Corrine Beach 104 55.00 Clyde Wiley 105 30.00 Candie Blasman 106 30.00 Harry Wilson 107 30.00 Stanley Dolka A 30.00 Goffery Riser D 5.00 William Page E 30.00 Pat Pattillo F 40.00 Roy Pike G 30.00 Frieda Suomella H 5.00 Charlotte Reid I 30.00 Bernard Hakes J 30.00 Herbert Davis K 30.00 Lee Haley L 30.00 Heide Alexander M 30.00 Joseph Moore N 5.00 Mary Lo Wampler O 40.00 Ernest Grizzard P 30.00 Bertha Martin Q 40.00 Cathy Lumbar R 65.00 Ruth Pooley S 5.00 Norma Baker U 5.00 H. W. DeMoss V 30.00 Arthur Pitman W 40.00 Jesse Wagnor X 5.00 James Hicks Y 5.00 Robert Wilder 00 20.00 At hearing, Mr. Poland testified to a total of 85 lots of which "seventy-three are singlewide [including some devoted to overnighters], and the balance would be overnighters or doublewides." T.88. According to DBR records, respondents reported 87 lots when applying for approval for their prospectus. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, pp. 000017, 000021. Past Practice Historically, the park had been run on the basis of oral agreements, creating month-to-month tenancies. Such records as existed when the Polands acquired ownership of the mobile home park reflected 13 different amounts charged different tenants for equivalent mobile home lots. Apparently Mrs. Ritchie had played favorites. A longtime resident testified that the rental rate structure was "kind of on the buddy/buddy system." T. 68. From time to time, and on no more than a month's notice, Mrs. Ritchie had raised rents. Robert L. Davis, who moved to the trailer park in October of 1976, originally paid $50.00 a month. On September 1, 1983, monthly rent increased from $50.00 to $75.00; and on December 1, 1983, from $75.00 to $100.00. One longtime resident, Katherine Stevens, "imagined" (T.127) that Mrs. Ritchie had asked for rent increases to defray utility rate hikes, but written notices of increases offered no explanation. T.48-49. Like Mr. Davis and Ms. Stevens, Robert Wilder, who seeks no money in this proceeding (T.75), was a tenant at the mobile home park before June 4, 1984. Until May of 1986, nobody ever received a prospectus. On June 10, 1983, however, rules and regulations were drawn up which provided in paragraph 20: Management specifically reserves the right to increase rental rates, fees, charges or assessments imposed on resident either by amendment or by addition to these rules, provided thirty (30) day written notice is given. Rosa Ritchie herself gave Ms. Stevens and other tenants a copy of the rules and regulations which first set out in writing her practice of giving thirty days' notice before raising rents. Regulatory Approval Only after the Polands had acquired the property, and announced their intention to raise rents, did Mr. Poland learn of the requirement that a prospectus be furnished tenants. On September 9, 1986, he wrote Mr. John D. Floyd of DBR as follows: With regards to the prospectus of Villa Rosa, please find enclosed a copy of the Rules and Regulations which are provided each tenant prior to renewing or extending `an existing rental agreement and prior to entering into a new rental agreement. This document was previously submitted to your Division and I assume that it remains acceptable. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In response, Senior Clerk Pamela T. Parker of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, wrote Mr. Poland on September 19, 1986, listing various "deficiencies for form." With regard to the prospectus, she wrote, among other things: The prospectus fee was not in accordance with Section 723.011(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Please submit a check for the appropriate amount. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Having received this reply, Mr. Poland wrote Ms. Parker on September 25, 1986, as follows: Enclosed please find the Mobile Home Prospectus, Filing Statement and Filing Fee. Currently, there are no rental agreements in writing for the mobile home park. All agreements are oral, to the best of my knowledge. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, p. 000018. Petitioner received Mr. Poland's letter of September 25, 1986, the following day. The letter is marked "RECEIVED FISCAL SEP 26 1986." DBR's Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes did not "process" the $150 check which accompanied the letter, until October 15, 1986, however, when somebody marked the letter "RECEIVED FISCAL OCT 15 1986" and crossed through the earlier received stamp. Another eight days passed before a form letter from the Division went out to Mr. Poland advising him of the Division's intention to examine the contents of his filing, to ensure its adequacy, and promising him he would "be notified as to the results of this examination within" forty five days of October 15, 1986. On November 20, 1986, more than 45 days after the prospectus had been received, the Division sent another letter to Mr. Poland, signed by Bridget St. Clair, apprising Mr. Poland of a number of deficiencies in the prospectus. On December 2, 1986, Mr. Poland made a second submission. In a cover letter addressed to Ms. St. Clair, he wrote: During our recent telephone conversation, you indicated that a prospectus is not necessary unless a rate increase Is anticipated. Since I have no intention of raising rates for the next year, I do question why this prospectus is necessary. Your thoughts on this point would be greatly appreciated. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, p. 000013. In May of 1987, after several further emendations, Mr. Poland was told over the telephone that the prospectus submitted in December passed muster, as revised. Having received oral approval, he asked an employee, Jack N. Justice, to deliver prospectuses. Mr. Justice delivered by hand to every resident who was home a copy of the prospectus and, whenever somebody was not at home, put a copy in the mail box. (Before these deliveries, the planned increase in rent had taken effect, as of December 1 of the previous year.) Petitioner gave written notice of approving the prospectus by letter dated May 27, 1987. The approved prospectus apprised tenants of the landlord's intention to pass on "ad valorem property taxes or utilities charges ... during the term of the lot rental agreement ... [p]rorated equally among all lots," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 46, and warned tenants that an increase in water, sewer or garbage collection charges or property taxes "may result in an increase in the home owner's lot rental amount." Id. Rent Raised Again On June 25, 1987, Mr. Poland sent out a second notice proposing another increase of rent, to take effect on October 1, 1987, "due to the increase in real estate taxes and for capital improvements, including the water pressure problems complained of." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The increase amounted to $15.00 per month for each single mobile home on a single lot, and to $20.00 for double wide mobile homes (or other mobile homes on double lots.) Id. On April 7, 1987, the City of Jacksonville Beach increased water and sewer rates. Mr. Poland's claim that the increase resulted in an average additional charge of approximately $14.12 per month per lot went unrebutted. A garbage collection container had to be added at $100 ($1.15 per lot) a month; $330 was expended to install a new water meter. Ad valorem taxes increased between 1985 and 1986, but were not shown to have risen at any time after December 1, 1986. The following tenants paid increased rent in the following monthly increments, effective October 1, 1987: Name of Tenant Lot No. Amount of Increase *Ila Story 1 $15.00 Mark Robson 2 15.00 *Rick Tahey 4/5 25.00 Seahorn/Gulledge 7 15.00 *Isabe Sutcliffe 8 15.00 William R. Hernandez 9 15.00 Bertie Willis 10/11 25.00 *B. E. Turner 12 15.00 *Ingrid C. Fegan 14 15.00 Ray Brozoski 16 5.00 *Helen Marin 17 15.00 *Alden Waterman 18 15.00 *Ethel Dunsmoor 19 15.00 *Martina O'Hare 20 15.00 *Zora Hyde 21 15.00 *William Vollkmer 22 15.00 William E. Wolfe 23 15.00 H. D. Seahorn 25 15.00 *James Mahoney 26 15.00 *Roger Zucco 27 15.00 Roland Page 28 15.00 *George Bunting 29 15.00 *Robert Grabel 30 15.00 Joseph Mickey 31 5.00 *Catherine Stevens 32 15.00 *Richard Law 33 15.00 Edna Barrett 34 15.00 *Maxwell Page 35 15.00 *Helen Hines 36 15.00 Christ. Hooley 37 15.00 *Hernandez/Johns 38/39 20.00 Arminta Rogers 40 15.00 *Rita Boyer 41 15.00 *Thelma Thornton 42 15.00 *Maxwell Page 43 15.00 *Kenneth Driscoll 44 15.00 *Edna Praine 45 15.00 James Wilson 46 15.00 Nancy C. Lane 100 15.00 *David Koehler 101 15.00 *Jerry Welker 102 15.00 *John Embleton 103 15.00 *Corrine Beach 104 20.00 *Clyde Wiley 105 15.00 *Candie Blasman 106 15.00 *Harry Wilson 107 20.00 *Stanley Dolka A 15.00 Tom Williams C 15.00 *Goffery Riser D 15.00 *William Page E 15.00 *Pat Pattillo F 15.00 *Roy Pike G 15.00 *Frieda Suomella H 15.00 *Charlotte Reid I 15.00 Michelle Holt J 15.00 *Herbert Davis K 15.00 *Lee Haley L 15.00 *Heide Alexander M 15.00 Joseph Morris N 15.00 *Mary Lo Wampler O 15.00 *Ernest Grizzard P 15.00 Juanita Holliman Q 15.00 *Kathalee Lombar R 15.00 *Ruth Pooley S 15.00 *Norma Baker U 15.00 *H. W. DeMoss V 15.00 *Arthur Pitman W 15.00 *Jesse Wagnor X 15.00 *James Hicks Y 15.00 W. Crowe Z 15.00 *Robert Wilder 00 20.00 Asterisks indicate those who were tenants on December 1, 1986. No lot rental agreements were in writing.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondents for raising rents before distributing prospectuses to their tenants. That petitioner require respondents to return the amounts by which rents collected for December of 1986 and January, February, March and April of 1987 exceeded rents charged the same tenants for November of 1986. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5983 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4 recite procedural matters only. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5 through 11, 13, 15 through 19, and 21 through 25 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as immaterial. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, ad valorem taxes may also have contributed to the 1986 increase. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 is rejected. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Mrs. Ritchie distributed something she called rules and regulations. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 26, the charges themselves were included but not increases. Respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4, 6, 7, 10 through 12, 14 through 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26 have been estopped, in substance insofar as material. Respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 5 in immaterial. With respect to respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 8 and 9, the change in garbage collection charges, except for addition of a dumpster, occurred before respondents acquired the property; and the tax increase was $5,000.00 not $10,000.00. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 13, respondents' selective (DBR advised them not to raise rents before distributing prospectuses) reliance on DBR for legal advice, whenever it may have ended, does not give rise to an estoppel. With respect to respondents' proposed findings of fact Nos. 18 and 19, utility rate charges are only one variable; usage was not proven. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 20, Leroy Kierstaedt and Haze Studivant were apparently overnighters. With respect to respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 24, Ms. Stevens said she "imagined" this was so. Respondents' proposed finding of fact No. 27 was not established by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Reynold Meyer Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1070 Jeffrey C. Regan, Esquire 1300 Gulf Life Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 120.68723.006723.011723.014723.021723.031723.037723.059
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DONALD L. HILGEMAN, D/B/A DLH ENTERPRISES, LAKE WALDENA RESORT vs DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 89-006598RX (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 27, 1989 Number: 89-006598RX Latest Update: Apr. 18, 1990

The Issue The issues for consideration in this case concern the petition and challenge to the validity of Rule 7D-32.001(4); Rule 7D-32.003 and Rules 7D- 32.004(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for the challenge is premised upon an alleged vagueness, inadequacy in the establishment of standards for agency decisions, the vesting of unbridled discretion in the agency and the contention that the rules are arbitrary and capricious.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Lake Waldena Resort, a mobile home park located in Marion County, Florida. That park is regulated under the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a mobile home park owner within the definition set out in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. In addition, Petitioner is presently charged, through a notice to show cause/administrative complaint, with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 7D- 32.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, by his alleged refusal to meet with a designated homeowners' committee within 30 days of the giving of notice of a proposed increase of lot rental. That disciplinary case was heard on the same date as the present case and is awaiting disposition through a recommended order. If Petitioner is found to have violated provisions within Chapter 723, Florida Statutes and Chapter 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, he may be subjected to a civil penalty or have other administrative sanctions imposed. The rules that are under challenge are related to the formation of the homeowners committee; the activities of that committee in ascertaining the basis for the park owners' reason for a lot rental increase; the obligation of the park owner to meet with the committee and the opportunity of the park owner to request certification of the committee's selection to participate in the meeting envisioned by Section 737.0037(3), Florida statues. Respondent by the authority set forth in Section 732.006(6), Florida Statutes, is authorized to promulgate rules which it deems to be necessary to implement, enforce, and interpret the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. In accordance with that authority and the authority set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, it enacted the rules which are the subject of this dispute. Intervenor is a Florida non-profit corporation which represents over 150,000 mobile home owners and tenants in Florida and has as its purpose the representation of those mobile home owners in various activities, to include legal issues. The Petitioner and Respondent and the mobile home owners whom the Intervenor represents are substantially affected by the decision concerning the validity of the aforementioned rules.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68723.003723.006723.037723.038
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NANCY E. CRONK vs BROADVIEW MOBILE HOME PARK AND LAMONT GARBER, 09-000037 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Palm Bay, Florida Jan. 06, 2009 Number: 09-000037 Latest Update: Sep. 04, 2009

The Issue The issues are whether the respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by discriminating against Petitioner, on the basis of her alleged disability, and by harassing Petitioner and retaliating against her.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former resident of Broadview Mobile Home Park (Broadview), located at 1701 Post Road, Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner resided in Broadview for approximately six years from an undisclosed date in 2002 through September 8, 2008. Mr. Lamont Garber holds an ownership interest in Broadview. The record does not quantify the ownership interest of Mr. Garber. Mr. Garber manages Broadview with his brother, Mr. Wayne Garber. Broadview rents sites within the mobile home park to residents who own mobile homes. Each site has access to water and electric service. Each resident arranges his or her water and electric service directly with the respective utility provider. Sometime in 2005, Petitioner purchased a mobile home for approximately $6,500.00 and moved within Broadview to Lot 24. The rental agreement for Lot 24 required rent to be paid on the first day of each month. The rent for July 2008 was due on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to pay the rent payment that was due on July 1, 2008. On July 9, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner, by certified mail, with a notice that she had five business days in which to pay the rent due (the five-day notice). Petitioner received the five-day notice on July 10, 2008. The five-day period expired on July 17, 2008, with no rent payment from Petitioner. Petitioner had paid rent late in the past, but Petitioner had never been more than four or five days late. After July 17, 2008, Broadview initiated eviction proceedings. Petitioner tendered the rent payment on July 20, 2008, but Broadview proceeded with the eviction. Petitioner did not appear and defend the eviction proceeding. On August 26, 2008, the County Court for Brevard County, Florida, issued a Final Default Judgment of Eviction awarding possession of Lot 24 to Broadview. Law enforcement officers thereafter executed the Court's order and evicted Petitioner from Broadview on or about September 8, 2008. After Petitioner received the notice of eviction, she filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (DBPR). DBPR is the state agency responsible for regulating mobile home parks, including Broadview. The allegations in the complaint that Petitioner filed with DBPR were substantially similar to the claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and unlawful rent increases Petitioner asserts in this proceeding. DBPR rejected Petitioner's allegations and found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent. The final agency action of DBPR is substantially similar to that of HUD and the Commission's proposed agency action in this proceeding. Each agency found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent and rejected the allegations of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The DOAH proceeding is a de novo consideration of the proceeding before the Commission. A preponderance of the evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped. Petitioner has cancer and is receiving chemotherapy and radiation treatment. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the medical condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Petitioner also alleges that she is disabled and handicapped by a mental condition. Petitioner submitted no medical evidence of the alleged disability or handicap. A preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that, if such a mental condition exists, the condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Assuming arguendo that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Petitioner were disabled or handicapped, a preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that either of the respondents discriminated against Petitioner, harassed her, or evicted her in retaliation for Petitioner's disability or handicap. It is undisputed that Petitioner conducted neighborhood organization efforts to protest a rent increase at Broadview and repeatedly called law enforcement officials to report alleged drug and prostitution activity in Broadview.2 However, Broadview did not evict Petitioner for those activities, and Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is neither credible nor persuasive. Rather, Petitioner engaged in other activities that the respondents found objectionable. Petitioner baby sat for one or more dogs in violation of Broadview's prohibition against pets. Some of the dogs were dangerous to other residents. Petitioner also verbally abused Mr. Wayne Garber when he attempted to mediate with Petitioner concerning the presence of dogs and Petitioner's conduct toward management at Broadview. On July 1, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner with a seven-day notice concerning Petitioner's compliance with lease requirements. The notice, in relevant part, alleged that Petitioner harassed management and impaired the ability of management to perform its duties. The testimony of respondents describing the activities of Petitioner that precipitated the seven-day notice is credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondents had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for requiring Petitioner to comply with the terms of the seven-day notice and for requiring Petitioner to comply with the requirement for rent to be paid on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to comply with either requirement, and Broadview evicted Petitioner for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The respondents did not harass or retaliate against Petitioner.3

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that the respondents did not engage in an unlawful housing practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2009.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.595760.20760.37
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FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC. vs FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 95-000630RU (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 10, 1995 Number: 95-000630RU Latest Update: Dec. 05, 1996

The Issue Whether the proposed repeal of Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Further, whether certain agency policies constitute rules and violate the provisions of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. (FMHA) is a Florida not for profit corporation organized to represent the interests of the owners of approximately 750 mobile home parks. All of the parks owned by FMHA members are regulated by the Respondent. The FMHA's members will be substantially affected by the proposed repeal of the rule. The FMHA has standing to participate in his proceeding. The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Respondent), is the state agency charged with implementation, administration and enforcement of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, relating to Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies. The Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc. (Federation) is a Florida not for profit corporation organized to represent a substantial number of mobile home owners residing in Florida mobile home parks. The Federation's members will be substantially affected by the proposed repeal of the rule. The Federation has standing to participate in this proceeding. Insofar as is relevant to this case, a mobile home owner commonly rents a mobile home park lot upon which the home is placed. Pursuant to Section 723.011(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the owner of a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots must deliver a prospectus to the home owner prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for the mobile home lot. A mobile home park prospectus is intended to provide full and fair disclosure of the terms and conditions of residency and sets forth the regulations to which the home owner will be subjected after signing a lot rental agreement with the park owner. The prospectus must be filed with and approved by the Respondent. The challenged rule was adopted as Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, in 1985. Without alteration, it was subsequently renumbered as Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, and provides as follows: The Prospectus distributed to a home owner or prospective home owner shall be binding for the length of the tenancy, including any assumptions of that tenancy, and may not be changed except in the following circumstances: Amendments consented to by both the home owner and the park owner. Amendments to reflect new rules or rules that have been changed in accordance with procedures described in Chapter 723, F.S., and the prospectus. Amendments to reflect changes in the name of the owner of the park. Amendments to reflect changes in zoning. Amendments to reflect a change in the person authorized to receive notices and demands on the park owner's behalf. Amendments to reflect changes in the entity furnishing utility or other services. Amendments required by the Division. Amendments required as a result of revisions of Chapter 723, F.S. Amendments to add, delete or modify user fees for prospective home owners. Neither the statute nor the rule defines what is meant by the term "tenancy." Historically, the Respondent has taken the position that the prospectus was binding on the park owner and the mobile home owner until the mobile home no longer occupied the lot or the tenant was evicted, whichever occurred first. In other words, the "tenancy" existed for as long as the mobile home remained on the lot, and the prospectus was binding during the length of the "tenancy", including any assumptions of the "tenancy." However, several legal cases, most recently in 1992, have essentially stated that a mobile home "tenancy" exists for the period of time during which a mobile home rental agreement is effective. The effect of the legal decision is to permit Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, to be construed to provide that a prospectus is valid only for the period covered by a rental agreement. The Legislature has not adopted legislation subsequent to the case which would affect the substance of the decision. On January 20, 1995, the Respondent published notice of the proposed repeal of Rule 61B-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 3. The Respondent's purpose in repealing the rule is primarily to eliminate the language relating the period of validity for a prospectus to the "tenancy." Although the Respondent asserts that it has no current policy as to the period of validity for a prospectus, the Respondent acknowledges taking the continuing position that the prospectus is binding for longer than the period of a rental agreement. The Petitioner challenges the agency position as being an unpromulgated, and therefore invalid, rule. The Petitioner also challenges as being an unpromulgated and invalid rule, the Respondent's decision to discontinue the review and approval mechanism for amendments to any previously approved prospectus. The Respondent asserts that, notwithstanding prior practice, it has no statutory authority to review and approve amendments to a previously approved prospectus and that it will no longer do so.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.54120.56120.68723.004723.011723.012 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61B-31.001
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. A AND M MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A SWISS VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, 85-004221 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-004221 Latest Update: Jun. 06, 1986

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a mobile home park in Winter Haven, Florida, known as Swiss Village Mobile Home Park, in which lots are leased to mobile home owners on an annual lease. There are 383 lots in this park and this park has held a permit issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services since 1980 (Exhibit 1). Edward G. Ackerman and his wife entered into a lease with Respondent for the use of a mobile home lot for the period January 15, 1981 until December 31, 1981, at a monthly rental of $75.07 (Exhibit 2). That lease provides for year-to-year renewal with rent for future years based on the Cost of Living Index as determined by the U.S. Government at the nearest reporting period to the end of each calendar year (Exhibit 2). A Guaranteed Lifetime Rent Agreement (Exhibit 3) was executed by the lessor concurrently with the lease in Exhibit 2, which guarantees the rental on the lot leased to Ackerman shall not be increased more than the U. S. Cost of Living Index as long as Ackerman resides in a mobile home located on the leased lot. Using the annual change and CPI to recompute Ackerman's monthly rental has resulted in the rent increasing from $75.00 per month in 1981 to $89.50 per month in 1985 (Exhibit 4). Prior to the time of this hearing Ackerman had purchased a condominium to which he had moved and he was no longer a tenant at the Swiss Village Mobile Home Park. All leases negotiated in years subsequent to 1981, have a similar escalation clause in the rent with the additional proviso that the monthly rent would be increased each year a minimum of $5.00 per month, with the maximum increase not exceeding the CPI. Respondent has used the October All Items Consumer Priced Index For All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in determining the annual rent increase since operations commenced. This report is received in November and by promptly advising tenants the amount their rent will change, because of changes in the CPI-U, each. tenant receives approximately 30-days notice prior to the January 1 effective date. If the terms of the lease agreement are literally complied with and the December CPI is used, Respondent would have to calculate the rent due January 1 on the CPI which it receives in January. By the time tenants are notified of the effects of the CPI on their rent for the coming calendar year, they would already have paid an inadequate sum for the January rental, and perhaps for the month of February also, and would be billed for the deficiency. There is an active Home Owners Association at Swiss Village Mobile Home Park. This association has not complained of the failure of Respondent to provide 90 days notice prior to the automatic rent change which comes every January, nor have they requested arbitration. In order to insure tenants receive 90 days notice of the rental change, due to changes in the CPI, Respondent would have to use the July Consumer Price Index, which it receives in August. Had Respondent used the July CPI report and given tenants 90 days notice of the annual rental increases since 1981, these increases would have exceeded the increase computed using the October CPI (Exhibit 6). Exhibit 6 indicates the actual adjustments of rentals since 1981, has been $5.00 per month or the CPI, whichever is less.

Florida Laws (2) 723.012723.037
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