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DAVID J. GIBBY vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 03-000219 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 24, 2003 Number: 03-000219 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a waiver of his 1996 conviction for cruelty to animals in order to receive a pari- mutuel wagering occupational license.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an applicant for a pari-mutual wagering occupational license who wishes to be licensed as a greyhound owner in Florida. Respondent is the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, an executive agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's application, filed June 27, 2002, candidly disclosed a previous felony conviction of cruelty to animals. On or about June 20, 1996, Petitioner was, in fact, found guilty of a third degree felony (cruelty to animals: refusing medical care to a greyhound) under Section 828.12(2), Florida Statutes, by a jury in the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County in Case No. 96-30581CFAES. He was 26 years old at the time. Petitioner's conviction for cruelty to animals arose from the death of a greyhound puppy named "He's My Denny." The puppy was in Petitioner's care at the Daytona Beach Kennel Club. "He's My Denny" was bred and raised to be a racing greyhound. As a result of his aforementioned felony conviction, Petitioner served 57 days in the Volusia County Jail and the balance of five years via out-of-state probation. Petitioner entered into a Consent Order with the Division, whereby he was declared to be ineligible for any pari- mutuel occupational license under Section 550.105, Florida Statutes, for three years. On July 1, 2002, after his three-year suspension had run, Petitioner requested a waiver of his conviction of cruelty to animals, for the purpose of re-licensure. Stephen Toner, an Investigator for the Division, interviewed Petitioner on August 5, 2002, regarding his request for a waiver. During the interview, Mr. Toner completed a waiver interview form. Each page, with the exception of the last page of the form which contained Mr. Toner's comments, was initialed and dated by Petitioner. In commenting upon the interview and its form at hearing, Petitioner expressed concern that Mr. Toner had misunderstood him during the interview when he said something to the effect of "If I had known there would be this much trouble with such serious consequences, I would have just put the dog down." I accept that Petitioner meant, by this, or similar language, that he would have humanely euthanized "He's My Denny," rather than allowing the beast to suffer. However, this information is largely irrelevant. Petitioner received the Division's letter of license denial on September 20, 2002. The National Greyhound Association will not permit Petitioner to register a greyhound for racing purposes in any state unless the State of Florida will re-license him. Therefore, Petitioner is effectively precluded from his chosen line of work throughout the United States, by Florida's denial of his occupational license application. After being denied re-licensure by the Division, Petitioner received a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights, dated October 25, 2002. The Certificate states, in pertinent part: "grants [Petitioner] restoration of civil rights, except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm for any and all felony convictions in the State of Florida." Petitioner testified, without refutation, that, except for his cruelty to animals conviction, he has had no other trouble with the law except that when he was 19 years old, he was caught driving without a license and represented himself to police as his older brother, who did have a driver's license. At hearing, Petitioner did not list, or elaborate on, any signs of good moral character or rehabilitation since his 1996 Florida conviction for cruelty to animals.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for a pari-mutuel occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: David J. Gibby 6278 Stanleyville Drive Rural Hill, North Carolina 27045 Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (6) 120.5720.165550.105550.2415828.12849.25
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LABORERS` INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL NO. 666 vs. JESS PARRISH HOSPITAL, 75-001349 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001349 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1976

Findings Of Fact The Business of the Respondent Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital, the Respondent, is engaged in the operation of a hospital. The parties stipulated and I find that the public employer is such within the meaning of Section 447.203 (2), Florida Statutes. The Labor Organization Involved The parties stipulated and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10), Florida Statutes. The parties also stipulated that the labor organization is properly registered within the meaning of Florida Statutes and PERC Rules and Regulations with the exception by Respondent that the Union has not filed its financial statement. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practice 3/

Recommendation Respondent, Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital, its officers, agents, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and Desist from: Discouraging membership and activities on behalf of Laborers International Union, Local #666, or any other labor organization by discriminating in regard to the wages, hours and working conditions of their employees because they exercised their rights guaranteed in Section 447.301(1), (2) of the Act. Unilaterally effecting changes in its employees' wages, hours, or working conditions without notice to or bargaining with the above named union or any other labor organization during a time when there is pending a question concerning representation of its employees. In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or to refrain from any or all such activities. Post at its hospital, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, a copy of a notice to be provided by the Public Employees Relations Commission, after being signed by its representative, which in essence states that it will cease and desist from engaging in the activities set forth above which I have herein found to be unfair labor practices. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of June, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (4) 447.201447.203447.301447.501
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JOSEPH L. NACCA vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 05-003208 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 02, 2005 Number: 05-003208 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2006

The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Petitioner is qualified for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license; and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to waiver of his felony conviction in accordance with Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2006).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a racehorse owner on or about March 30, 2005. On his application, Petitioner accurately reported that he had been convicted on one count of Conspiracy to Transport Stolen Property and Evade Taxes, a felony. Due to Petitioner’s felony conviction, his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license was subject to denial. Consequently, Petitioner also requested that a waiver be granted so that he could obtain the license. Petitioner's application and his request for waiver failed to include any information which would establish his rehabilitation or demonstrate that he is of good moral character. In the regular course of the Division's review of Petitioner's application and request for waiver, on or about April 11, 2005, Petitioner was interviewed by Dennis Badillo, an investigator for the Division. During the interview, Mr. Badillo completed a waiver interview form based upon the answers provided by Petitioner. Petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to present information to establish his rehabilitation and to demonstrate his present good moral character, but Petitioner did not provide such information. In light of the information regarding Petitioner’s felony conviction, which is undisputed and admitted by Petitioner on his application form and at the final hearing, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements for the license he seeks. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to minimize his role in the crime of which he was convicted, and expressed the view that he "doesn't have much time" to fulfill his desire to "participate in the racing industry" in Florida, inasmuch as he has passed his 70th birthday. Petitioner failed to present any testimony from friends, relatives, associates, employers, probation officers, or other individuals to establish good conduct and reputation subsequent to the date of his felony conviction. Absent such evidence, the Division has no basis upon which to conclude that Petitioner is rehabilitated or that Petitioner is of present good moral character.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license and his request for waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Thomas Peavey Hoffer Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Joseph L. Nacca 268 West Walk West Haven, Connecticut 06516 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (3) 10.001550.0251550.105
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. ISAAC BUTLER, 82-000570 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000570 Latest Update: Apr. 27, 1983

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a registered building contractor, having been issued license number RB 0010555. On December 12, 1980, Benjamin Kyler entered into a contract with Sweet E. Glover to construct a house for her at 2020 Southwest First Street, Ocala, Florida. At no time material hereto was Benjamin Kyler properly licensed to perform contracting in the State of Florida. The Respondent obtained the building permit to enable Benjamin Kyler to perform the construction contract with Sweet Glover. Benjamin Kyler received approximately $1,650, but he performed only a minimal amount of construction on the Glover residence. The Respondent knew that Benjamin Kyler was engaged in the construction of a residence for Sweet Glover, and the Respondent also knew that Benjamin Kyler was not licensed to contract in the State of Florida. The Respondent was paid a fee for pulling the building permit for Benjamin Kyler.

Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Isaac Butler, be found guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(e) and 489.129 (1)(f), Florida Statutes, and that his license be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 1st day of February, 1983. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire 547 North Monroe Street Suite 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Isaac Butler RFD 1, Box 752 Anthony, Florida 32617 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Florida Laws (3) 120.57489.119489.129
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs JOSE PARADELO, 06-000736PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Feb. 28, 2006 Number: 06-000736PL Latest Update: Jun. 20, 2007

The Issue Whether Petitioner committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what discipline should be imposed against Respondent's Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License?

Findings Of Fact Respondent submitted an application to Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) on or about October 6, 2004, for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. The Division issued license number 7244830-1021, at Ocala Jai-Alai to Respondent. The nature of the license is an "owner's license" regarding owning racehorses. The Division is the state agency charged with regulation of pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for licensing employees of pari-mutuel facilities. The following question appeared on Respondent's application for licensure: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to, even if you received a withhold of adjudication? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE CHECKED AGAINST LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RECORDS. FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION ACCURATELY MAY RESULT IN THE DENIAL OR REVOCATION OF YOUR LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS QUESTION, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT. If an applicant answers "yes" to the above question, he or she is then required to complete form 0050-1. Respondent answered "yes" to the question and submitted form 0050-1 which contained the following explanation: Offense: Tax Evasion County: New York State: New York Penalty/ Disposition: Restitution misdemeanor-probation Date of offense: 1985 Have all sanctions been satisfied: yes Description: Sold property failed to pay tax liens-ultimately bank was money damaged so I had to pay restitution + serve 2y probation.[1/] In April 1995, the United State District Court for the Western District of New York issued a Judgment against Respondent finding him guilty of the crime of Bank Larceny and Theft. The Judgment lists the date the offense concluded as "03/03/89." Respondent was ordered to pay a special assessment of $25, restitution in the amount of $59,000 in installments to Empire of America, and was placed on one year probation. Steven Toner is an investigator for the Division. He was assigned Respondent's case and conducted an interview of Respondent. During cross-examination, Mr. Toner described part of the interview: Q: Did Mr. Paradelo in the course of your interview in my office indicate to you that the entire thing on his application for 1985 tax evasion, which he stated to you for the 1995 conviction, was all a single case? A: It was told to me that it was a run-on. Now, I'm not trying to be evasive, but it was a run-on between the criminal and the civil matters that were in the Landlord/Tenant things that were going, that were happening during that period of time. Respondent described the general chain of events leading up to the 1995 Judgment: in 1985, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a tax lien against Respondent; in 1988 Respondent applied to Empire of America Bank to refinance apartments which he owned; at the closing for the refinancing, the tax lien was revealed to the bank and to Respondent; the closing went forward; Respondent filed for bankruptcy in 1991; the bank failed and was taken over by a trust company; in 1991, the IRS commenced foreclosure proceedings based upon the 1985 tax lien; the matter was ultimately resolved in the criminal case which resulted in the Judgment wherein Respondent was required to pay $59,000 in restitution. Respondent considers the Judgment as a continuation of, and not distinct from, the tax lien matter that initially arose in the 1980's. The undersigned finds Respondent's testimony in this regard to be credible. The details of the events leading up to the 1995 judgment are important to the extent that they lend support to Respondent's position that he did not falsify the license application. Respondent answered "yes" to the question that he had a criminal conviction. He disclosed that he sold property, had to pay tax liens, had to pay restitution, and was placed on probation. While Respondent's description of his criminal conviction was imprecise, it was not false.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57550.105550.2415559.791
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SHANNON M. SPENCE vs OCALA MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A QUALITY INN, 94-006652 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Nov. 30, 1994 Number: 94-006652 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 2000

The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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RITA MOROZ, D/B/A A NEW ADVENTURE OF TAMPA BAY vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 01-000373 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 26, 2001 Number: 01-000373 Latest Update: May 14, 2001

The Issue Whether or not on or about December 8, 2000, Petitioner possessed the appropriate license to operate a body-piercing salon establishment in accordance with Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented, the testimony, and upon the personal inspection of the undersigned, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Respondent, Department of Health, Division of Environmental Health, is the state agency charged with implementation of Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code. At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Rita Moroz, operated a manicure-pedicure, nail-lengthening establishment, "A New Adventure of Tampa Bay," located at 11608 North Dale Mabry Highway, Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida 33618. Section 381.0075(2)(a), Florida Statutes, defines "BodyPiercing" as for commercial purposes the act of penetrating the skin to make, generally permanent in nature, a hole, mark, or scar. "Bodypiercing" does not include the use of a mechanized, presterilized ear-piercing system that penetrates the outer perimeter of lobe of the ear or both. At all times material hereto, Petitioner admitted that she operated a body-piercing establishment salon and provided body-piercing services without first having obtained a body-piercing license as required by law. At all times pertinent hereto, Petitioner possessed a manicure-pedicure license issued by another country and her foreign license also authorized body-piercing services. Petitioner, upon receipt of the Certificate of Violation, discontinued performing body-piercing services. The representative for the Agency stated that the Department would accept, in consideration of Petitioner's admissions and prompt discontinuation of body-piercing services, a reduced fine in an amount not to exceed $500.00.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57381.0075
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JOEANN F. NELSON vs SUNRISE COMMUNITY, INC., 00-002657 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 29, 2000 Number: 00-002657 Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2001

The Issue Did the Respondent engage in a discriminatory employment practice by suspending the Petitioner from work?

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Joeann F. Nelson, is a Black female. In 1997, she was employed as an aide working with developmentally disabled persons at Sunrise Community, Inc. The Respondent, Sunrise Community, Inc. (hereafter “Sunrise”) is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. On or about April 24, 1997, the Petitioner was suspended from her employment for a number of days by Sunrise. The Petitioner filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereafter “the Commission”) on May 8, 1997, alleging that her suspension was racially motivated, and a violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The staff of the Commission investigated the complaint, and issued its Determination of No Cause on May 16, 2000. At the same time, the Commission gave the Petitioner notice of her right to an administrative hearing on the Commission’s findings. The Petitioner, while employed by the Respondent, was asked by her immediate supervisor to participate in taking residents of the facility to their group home. The Petitioner refused to take the residents complaining that another co-worker was scheduled to take the residents on the day in question. The supervisor told the Petitioner that the person who was scheduled to take the residents was too old to handle that job, and the Petitioner got into an argument about this matter. As a result of this refusal to take the residents and the argument, the Petitioner was suspended for a number of days. The refusal to follow the directions of her supervisor regarding her work and the confrontational argument with the supervisor over being asked to do a specific task that was within her job duties generally were sufficient cause for discipline. The Petitioner did not show that she was singled out or treated differently because of her race, either in being asked to perform the task or in being suspended for refusing to do the task. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a second complaint with the Commission on June 30, 1997, and raised additional issues regarding her discharge when she asked for her formal hearing on the Commission’s determination of no cause on the original complaint. However, the only matter properly before the undersigned in these proceedings is her suspension.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint upon a finding that there was no cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: JoeAnne Nelson Post Office Box 76 Crawfordville, Florida 32326 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger, Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, vs POLPO MARIO, INC., D/B/A POLPO MARIO RISTORANTE, 99-003065 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 16, 1999 Number: 99-003065 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether an administrative fine should be imposed on Respondent for unlawfully selling "spirituous beverages" on its licensed premises, as alleged in the Administrative Action served by Petitioner on March 17, 1999.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this disciplinary action, Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division), seeks to impose penal sanctions on the license of Respondent, Polpo Mario, Inc., doing business as Polpo Mario Ristorante, on the ground that on February 24, 1999, an employee of the establishment served a Division special agent a shot of vodka and a shot glass containing a mixture of vodka and amaretto, none of which could be lawfully sold under Respondent's license. After this proceeding began, the restaurant was voluntarily closed by the owner. Respondent has denied the charge and requested a formal hearing to contest this allegation. In his request for a hearing, Respondent contended that the employee who served the drinks was actually a bus boy and had no authority to wait on customers; that the bus boy was pressured into making the sale; that the employee was "slightly retarded"; and that the chef occasionally used amaretto in preparing a special dessert. Except for the latter assertion, none of these defenses was established at the final hearing. Respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Division, having been issued license no. 68-01763, Series 2COP. That license allows Respondent to make sales of beer and wine for consumption on the premises of its restaurant located at 3131 Clark Road, Sarasota, Florida. The license does not, however, authorize the sale of "spirituous beverages," such as vodka, whiskey, and liquors, which contain more than six percent of alcohol by volume. Besides the above license, Respondent also holds licenses from the Division for three other restaurants, including a Series 4COP, SRX license, which authorizes the sale of all types of alcoholic beverages in conjunction with food sales. This type of license has an annual fee of $1,820.00. On November 6, 1998, a Division auditor, Eileen O'Shea (O'Shea), performed a routine audit of Respondent's corporate offices. Such audits are required to be performed at least once every three years. During the course of the audit, O'Shea examined various invoices from liquor dealers, including one which suggested that liquor may have been transferred from one of the restaurants holding a Series 4COP, SRX license to Polpo Mario Ristorante. O'Shea cautioned Respondent's president, Joseph Casadio (Casadio), and his wife, that under a Series 2COP license, they were not authorized to sell or have alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises. She also gave them a copy of the state statutes which contained this restriction, and O'Shea suggested that if any liquor was kept in the kitchen for food prepration purposes, that the bottle be marked with a "K." She further advised them that if they intended to use alcoholic beverages for preparing certain special dishes, they must obtain written approval from the Division to do so. There is, however, no statutory or rule authority for this requirement. Finally, she referred her findings to a Division special agent. Both Casadio and his wife acknowledged to O'Shea that they now understood the requirements and that no laws were being violated. Casadio also told her that he had once served customers an after dinner expresso with Sambuca (a liquor) without charge, but he no longer did so. Around 6:15 p.m. on February 24, 1999, and presumably in response to O'Shea's referral, Division special agent Samuel J. Funaro (Funaro) visited the licensed premises of Respondent for the purpose of attempting to purchase spirituous beverages. Funaro was greeted by Gerard Woel (Woel), an employee who seated Funaro at a table near the bar and handed him a menu. Besides Woel, there were two other female waitresses on duty that evening, including Kim Mitchell (Mitchell). None of these former employees, or any others, testified at the final hearing; however, their out-of-court statements have been treated as admissions by employees of a party and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. Although there were several special entrees shown on a display board at the entrance to the restaurant, none were desserts. Funaro ordered an Eggplant Parmigiana as his entree and a bottle of Budweiser beer to drink. He also asked Woel for a whiskey chaser to go with his beer. Woel departed and returned from the kitchen a few minutes later with a shot glass containing a clear liquid. The parties have stipulated that the liquid was vodka. Woel remarked that the vodka came from a bottle kept by the chef in the kitchen. By serving that drink, Respondent exceeded the authority under its license. At a later point in his meal, Funaro ordered a second bottle of beer and another whiskey chaser. A few minutes later, Woel returned with a shot glass containing a brownish colored liquid and explained that it represented the last vodka in the chef's bottle along with a small amount of amaretto, which was the only other alcoholic beverage in the kitchen. Although Funaro did not retain a sample of the drink, based on his experience, he concluded that the shot glass did in fact contain vodka and amaretto. By serving the drink, Respondent exceeded the authority under its license. Shortly before 8:00 p.m., Funaro completed his meal. Woel was busy with other customers, so the bill was presented by Mitchell, another waitress on duty. The bill totaled $17.91, including tax, and besides the food charge, contained a charge for one beer (even though two had been ordered) and an item for $5.50 entitled "2-Open Food Lunch." As to the latter item, Mitchell explained that this was the way liquor sales were rung up on the cash register because the cash register did not have a specific key for liquor sales. On March 10, 1999, O'Shea and Funaro returned to Respondent's restaurant for the purpose of conducting an inspection of the premises. They found a bottle of Bols Amaretto in the kitchen used for preparing desserts. At that time, the chef on duty told them that after dinner drinks were served at one time but the practice was discontinued. He also stated that the previous chef had kept a bottle of vodka on the premises for preparing a pasta sauce. On March 16, 1999, Funaro met with Casadio and explained the violations he had noted during his previous visit and inspection. Casadio explained again that he had once given a complimentary after dinner drink to patrons but discontinued that practice after O'Shea had given him a verbal warning during her audit. He also explained that the amaretto found in the kitchen on the March 10 inspection was used to prepare desserts for patrons. In mitigation, Casadio established that he had been in the restaurant business for some 20 years, and there is no evidence that he has ever been charged with, or convicted of, violating any Division regulations or state law. He pointed out that he would never risk his license for the price of two drinks ($5.50), that he has always attempted to comply with all relevant requirements, and that he immediately fired Woel after learning of his actions. Given the extremely small amount of liquor involved, the minimal amounts kept on hand in the kitchen for cooking purposes, and the fact that Respondent was obviously not engaged in this conduct on a widespread, continuing basis, a reduction in the fine is appropriate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order determining that Respondent has violated Section 562.12(1), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Action, and that an administrative fine in the amount of $750.00 be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Martelli, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Charles D. Peters, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Joseph Casadio 3131 Clark Road, Suite 103 Sarasota, Florida 34231 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57562.12 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61A-2.022
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