The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a yacht and ship broker's license.
Findings Of Fact Applicants for yacht and ship salesman licenses and for broker's licenses are furnished with copies of Chapter 326 F.S. and applicable agency rules with the application forms. Petitioner originally applied and was licensed as a yacht and ship salesman in June, 1992. To be a salesman, one must be associated with a licensed broker who prominently displays the salesman's license. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner contacted Respondent agency by telephone to discuss renewal of his salesman's license issued June 3, 1992 and due to expire under its own terms on June 3, 1994. At that time, Kathy Forrester told Petitioner that his file reflected that his license had been "cancelled" effective March 10, 1993 due to a letter received on or about March 1, 1993 from Petitioner's employing broker, Frank Stanzel. Mr. Stanzel's letter showed that he was relocating his business from Miami to Ft. Lauderdale and that he wanted his two salesmen's licenses transferred to the new location. He enclosed with his letter the two salesmen's licenses for agency action, as required by agency rules. Mr. Stanzel further reported that Petitioner had left his employ on October 19, 1992, taking his license with him, so Mr. Stanzel could not return Petitioner's license to the agency. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted he had left Mr. Stanzel's firm on October 19, 1992 to pursue a construction job due to the vigorous insurgence of the construction industry following Hurricane Andrew. He took the original of his salesman's license with him and left only copies with Mr. Stanzel in Stanzel's Miami office. Petitioner asserted, however, that since "all it takes to sell yachts is a computer and a telephone," he continuously attempted to sell yachts from his own home after October 19, 1992. After October 19, 1992, Petitioner worked at least 40 hours a week in construction, did not sell any yachts or ships, and had no contact with Mr. Stanzel as his employing broker. Mr. Stanzel did not supervise Petitioner's sales activities after October 19, 1992. Petitioner never returned to Mr. Stanzel's Miami office after that date. Petitioner has never been in Mr. Stanzel's new office in Ft. Lauderdale. Mr. Stanzel paid Petitioner a commission in December 1992 for prior sales work on a yacht sale to Petitioner's father, which sale ultimately closed in December 1992, but since October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel has not considered Petitioner his employee. Petitioner received no IRS 1099 form (commission salesman's equivalent of employee's W-2 form) from Mr. Stanzel after 1992. After October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel did not display Petitioner's license, as required by agency rules for salesmen in a broker's employ. Nothing precludes a licensed salesman from selling yachts and ships out of his home if he is overseen by an employing broker. Petitioner had done so while employed by Mr. Stanzel prior to October 19, 1992. However, by law, all yacht and ship sale closings must be done through the employing broker's trust account. Petitioner has closed no sales on his own through Mr. Stanzel's trust account since October 19, 1992. The two have never discussed a return to work by Petitioner. They did not communicate on any subject between October 19, 1992 and April 15, 1994. Even if Mr. Stanzel had not written his March 1, 1993 letter, Petitioner still would not have been able to show that he has attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. On March 22, 1993, five months after Mr. Stanzel heard the last of Petitioner and approximately three weeks after he notified the agency of Petitioner's leaving his employ, Mr. Stanzel's broker's license expired. Under the terms of the agency rules, Mr. Stanzel was required to apply for a new license. He applied. His broker's license was not renewed retroactively, and his new license became effective August 30, 1993. For approximately five months, from March 22, 1993 to August 30, 1993, Mr. Stanzel was not a licensed Florida broker. Neither Mr. Stanzel nor the Respondent agency notified Petitioner of this fact nor did anyone notify Petitioner at that time that his salesman's license was deemed "cancelled" during the broker's lapse. After finding out for the first time on April 15, 1994 that the agency presumed his salesman's license "cancelled" by Mr. Stanzel's notification that Petitioner had taken his salesman's license and left Mr. Stanzel's employ, Petitioner and his father prevailed upon Mr. Stanzel to execute an affidavit dated May 19, 1994 to the effect that Mr. Stanzel had misunderstood, now believed Petitioner had been diligently working at yacht sales after October 19, 1992, and wanted Petitioner's salesman's license reinstated. The affidavit was submitted to the agency. Although Ms. Forrester had misgivings about the affidavit, the agency reinstated Petitioner's salesman's license, effective April 29, 1994, after receiving the affidavit (TR 25-28). The reinstated license still had the original expiration date of June 3, 1994. The agency did not reinstate Petitioner's salesman's license retroactive to October 19, 1992 when Petitioner went into construction work fulltime, to the date of Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expiration, or to the date of Mr. Stanzel's new broker's license. Petitioner accepted his salesman's license as reinstated. Petitioner did not renew his salesman's license on June 3, 1994, so it expired by its own terms. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner filed an application to be licensed as a yacht and ship broker, together with the required bond, fee, and fingerprints. On August 2, 1994, Peter Butler, Head of the Section of Yacht and Ship Brokers, wrote Petitioner a deficiency notice, explaining that the agency regarded Petitioner's salesman's license "cancelled" during the lapse of his employing broker's license. The agency has no rule which specifically states that when an employing broker's license expires, his salesmen's licenses are automatically cancelled. The language employed in the deficiency notice was, "any salesman licenses held by [the employing broker] were considered cancelled (sic) for that period of time [the period while the employing broker's license was expired/lapsed] because they did not have an actively licensed broker holding their license." [Bracketed material added for clarity.] This language became the focus of the concurrent Section 120.535 F.S. proceeding. The deficiency notice did not refer to the prior "cancellation" of Petitioner's salesman's license based on Mr. Stanzel's March 1, 1993 notice that Petitioner had left his employ effective October 19, 1992. The deficiency notice cited Section 326.004(8) F.S. [1993] which provides: Licensing.- (8) A person may not be licensed as a broker unless he has been a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years, and may not be licensed as a broker after October 1, 1990, unless he has been licensed as a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years. The deficiency notice also specified that if Petitioner paid another dollar for a fingerprinting fee and provided an explanation of his 1992 yacht sales, the agency would issue a new salesman's license. There was no way Petitioner could alter the past lapse of the broker's license. Petitioner did not pursue relicensure as a salesman. Bob Badger, an agency investigator, submitted a report to Mr. Butler dated September 1, 1994 expressing his opinion that even with Mr. Stanzel's after-the-fact affidavit, Petitioner's salesman's license would have been interrupted by the fact that he had no licensed broker holding his salesman's license during Mr. Stanzel's broker's license lapse of five months. He further concluded that Petitioner's salesman's license was "suspended" for a short period for not renewing his salesman's license bond. After review of the investigation report, on September 19, 1994, the agency issued its Intent to Reject Petitioner's broker's application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. alluding to the deficiency notice and citing Section 326.004(8) F.S., for Petitioner's failure to complete two consecutive years as a salesman. Even if Mr. Stanzel's broker's license had been reinstated without lapse, thereby by implication reinstating Petitioner's salesman's license without lapse, it would not retroactively change the fact that Petitioner has not attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. Petitioner claimed that he was "cancelled by ambush," because the agency did not timely notify him of Mr. Stanzel's lapsed broker's license, and further asserted that the agency's failure to timely notify him constituted a violation of Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. At the present time, the agency writes a letter to salesmen advising them when their employing broker's license is cancelled. However, such a letter would not have been written to Petitioner, even if it were being used by the agency on March 22, 1993 when Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expired, because Petitioner's license had already been effectively cancelled by his own removal of his license from Mr. Stanzel's office, by his assuming other full time employment in construction, and by his removing his yacht-selling activities, if any, from Mr. Stanzel's immediate oversight. Section 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and rules enacted thereunder clearly place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesmen's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of a salesman's license when a broker is no longer associated with the selling entity. Typically, salesmen turn in their licenses through the original broker for cancellation by the agency and receive new ones when they move from one broker's oversight to another's. Salesmen who are employed by one broker also switch their salesman's licenses to another active broker whenever the first broker disassociates from a yacht sales company and moves to another company, quits, retires, or lets his broker's license lapse. Due to the common dynamics of the employment situation whereby salesmen are under the active supervision of their employing broker in the company office, they usually know immediately when a broker's license is in jeopardy or the broker is not on the scene and supervising them. This knowledge is facilitated by the statutes and rules requiring that all licenses be prominently displayed in the business location. Anybody can look at anybody else's license on the office wall and tell when it is due to expire. If licensees are in compliance with the statute and rules, no active salesman has to rely on notification from the agency with regard to the status of his own or his broker's license. In the present case, Petitioner removed himself from all contact with Mr. Stanzel as of October 19, 1992. Therefore, he did not know what was occurring in the office or with any licenses. All agency witnesses testified substantially to the effect that since they have been employed with the agency and so far as they could determine since its inception, agency personnel have relied on Sections 326.002(3), 326.004(8), 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and Rules 61B-60.005 and 61B-60.008(1)(b) and (c) F.A.C. to preclude licensing someone who has not been actively supervised by a Florida licensed employing broker for two consecutive years. More specifically, agency personnel have always applied Sections 326.004(14)(a) and (b) to place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesman's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of the salesman's license when his broker is no longer associated with the sales entity. The agency has always interpreted the word "broker" as used in Chapter 326 F.S. and Chapter 61B-60 F.A.C. to mean "Florida licensed broker." See also, Section 326.002(1) and 326.004(1) F.S. and Rule 61B-60.001(1)(g) F.A.C. These interpretations are in accord with the clear language of the applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner asserted that he had been treated differently than others similarly situated because other salesmen were notified by the agency when their employing broker's license lapsed and because the agency cancelled their salesman's licenses for other reasons but did not cancel their salesman's licenses because of their broker's license's lapse. The facts adduced did not closely parallel his own situation so as to demonstrate disparate treatment. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the agency affirmatively set out to notify any other salesman that his salesman's license was cancelled due to a lapse of his employing broker's license. Rather, the agency was tipped off by a complaint that Bryan Long's salesman's license had expired February 27, 1993. The agency investigated and determined that the license of Mr. Long's broker had expired on February 14, 1993, before Long's own salesman's license had expired. The broker's name was Herbert Postma. Upon discovering that Long and Postma were selling yachts without licenses, the agency investigated the broker's transactions and commissions paid. As a result of its investigation, the agency discovered that two more salesmen, Villalon and Grzeszczak, held salesman's licenses which, like Long's license, had expired during the time Postma's license was lapsed. As with Petitioner, the agency did not attempt to notify any of the salesmen when their broker's license lapsed. The disciplinary investigation of Long's sales and of Postma's transactions and commissions peripherally notified the other salesmen of their lapsed salesman's licenses and of the broker's lapsed license. Petitioner is correct that none of the four licensees were listed as "cancelled" in the agency's records, and Brian Long entered into a Consent Order with the agency which did not mention he was "cancelled" because of the broker's license's lapse. However, the duration dates of each type of license were shown in the agency records. Like the current situation, the new licenses were not issued retroactive to the date of each salesman's prior license's expiration or retroactive to the date of the broker's prior license expiration. Also like Petitioner's reinstatement, none of these licenses showed a reinstatement without a lapse. The agency printout for yet another salesman, Preston, showed that like Petitioner, he was "cancelled" when he had no broker and was reinstated 21 days later. The printout also shows that like Petitioner, Preston was not reinstated retroactively. None of the named salesmen were shown to have been granted a broker's license as having been employed by a broker for two consecutive years.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship broker. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6033 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted except that legal argumentation pejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as not credible. Covered in substance in FOF 5, 6, and 8. Accepted that this is what the letter stated. However, not dispositive due to the facts as presented. See FOF 11. Rejected as mere legal argument. 9-10 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 11 Rejected as mere legal argument. 12-19 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 20 Rejected as mere legal argument. 21-25 Rejected in FOF 32-37 upon the greater weight of the evidence as a whole and in part as mere legal argument. 26-42 These proposals are mixed legal argument and some fact proposals, largely without any citation to the record. The legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts. The facts not accepted are either rejected as covered specifically within the recommended order or are rejected as not dispositive. Ms. Forrester's testimony is mischaracterized in proposed fact 24, and it is rejected for that reason. The legal arguments are addressed in the conclusions of law. Respondent's PFOF: 1-19 The proposed facts have been accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. The interspersed legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts, but has been addressed in the conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire GUSTAFSON & TILTON, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. Harper Field, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner owes sales and use tax (plus penalties and interest) to the Department of Revenue (Department), as alleged in the Department's November 1, 1999, Notice of Decision.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the Stipulations of Fact set forth in the parties' Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation: 1/ Mr. Wiviott is a very successful, "hands-on" entrepreneur who presently owns approximately five or six businesses. Since 1958, when he and his brother opened a carpet store in Milwaukee, Mr. Wiviott has owned approximately 30 different businesses (including nine restaurants and a yacht service business), many of which he has sold "for literally millions of dollars of profit." Approximately two-thirds of the businesses that he has owned he has "started from scratch." There have been instances where Mr. Wiviott has invested in businesses that were in industries in which, at the time of his investment, he had no prior experience. In these instances, he overcame his lack of experience by being "extremely industrious" and doing "research." When Mr. Wiviott has needed to consider a "feminine viewpoint" in making a business decision, he has used Mrs. Wiviott, his wife of 43 years, as a "sounding board." For the past 35 years, William Becker has been Mr. Wiviott's accountant. In 1991 or 1992, Mr. Wiviott purchased two "brand new" boats as business investments. The boats were sold to Mr. Wiviott together as a package. Mr. Wiviott paid a total of $1.1 million for the two boats. The larger of the boats was a 63-foot sport fisherman. Although unfinished, it was seaworthy. Mr. Wiviott named this boat the "Choice One." Mr. Wiviott named the other boat, a 56-foot sport fisherman, the "Choice Too." Mr. Wiviott accepted delivery of the Choice One and Choice Too in the Bahamas. He did not pay any sales tax on his purchase of the boats. After accepting delivery, Mr. Wiviott brought the boats to Fort Lauderdale. In 1993, Mr. Wiviott explored the possibility of entering (for the first time) the yacht charter business. He spoke to various people involved in the industry, including two charter brokers (Bob Offer and Bob Saxon) and a charter yacht owner (Bernie Little). He also had discussions with Mr. Becker. Together, he and Mr. Becker made cost and revenue projections. He ultimately made a "value judgment" to go into the business. Mr. Wiviott retained the services of Mr. Offer to help him find a suitable yacht for the business. One of the yachts that Mr. Offer showed Mr. Wiviott was the Fifty-One, a Washington State-built, Fort Lauderdale- based "mega" yacht owned by an Italian national, Dr. Moretti. The Fifty-One's interior design made it particularly well suited for chartering. It had four levels, including a sky deck/lounge equipped with a complete kitchen (to complement the galley located on the bottom level). There were five staterooms that could comfortably accommodate ten charter guests. Each of the regular staterooms had its own head. The master stateroom had "his and her" heads. There was also a stateroom for the captain, as well as quarters for six other crew members (the number needed to properly service a charter party). The Fifty-One had not been well maintained during the time it had been owned by Dr. Moretti. Although Dr. Moretti had made the Fifty-One available for charter, the yacht had a poor reputation among charter brokers and, as a result, it just "sat at the dock," unchartered, while under Dr. Moretti's ownership. In October of 1993, Mr. Wiviott offered to purchase the Fifty-One from Dr. Moretti for $5.1 million, subject to a satisfactory marine survey and sea trial. Dr. Moretti initially rejected the offer, but subsequently agreed to sell the Fifty- One at Mr. Wiviott's offering price (which was considerably less than the $9 million that Dr. Moretti had paid for the Fifty-One a year and a half earlier). Before the deal was consummated, Mr. Wiviott contracted with a marine survey company, Patton Marine, Inc. (Patton), to perform a thorough inspection of the Fifty-One. Patton performed an extensive pre-purchase survey of the Fifty-One, which included various sea trials and other tests (conducted in Fort Lauderdale and off the Fort Lauderdale coast). The survey revealed that the Fifty-One had various "deficiencies." Most of these "deficiencies" were "small items" and were remedied before the sale was finalized. The most serious of the remaining "deficiencies" was the excessive amount of interior vibration. Notwithstanding the known "deficiencies" that remained, Mr. Wiviott thought that, at $5.1 million, the Fifty- One was a good buy. At worst, he believed, he "could make a pretty good profit" by reselling the Fifty-One. Mr. Wiviott retained Robb Maass, whom Mr. Wiviott was told was the "top marine attorney in the [Fort Lauderdale] area," to assist him in forming a Florida corporation which would purchase the Fifty-One and operate a yacht charter business. With Mr. Maass' assistance, B. W. Marine, Inc. (Petitioner) was organized under the laws of the State of Florida, effective January 20, 1994, with Mr. Wiviott as its sole officer, director, and shareholder. Petitioner's principal corporate address was, at the time of incorporation, and has remained, 757 Southeast 17th Street, #389, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316. On January 28, 1994, shortly after Petitioner's incorporation, Petitioner closed on the purchase of the Fifty- One. No Florida or other state sales tax was paid on the purchase. The newly purchased yacht (which had been registered in the Cayman Islands by the previous owner, Dr. Moretti) was immediately registered with the United States Coast Guard, and it thereafter began to fly an American flag. Based upon on Mr. Maass’ advice, Petitioner also took steps to obtain a "certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade" for the Fifty-One. It was not until the following year, however, that the United States Congress (passing a bill introduced by Florida Congressman E. Clay Shaw, Jr.) authorized the Secretary of Transportation to issue such a "certificate of documentation." 2/ After taking delivery of the yacht in the Bahamas, Petitioner imported the Fifty-One into Florida. It did so because Mr. Wiviott wanted the Fifty-One to be marketed in the south Florida area and to have access to the exceptional yacht repair and maintenance facilities that were available there. The South Florida area is where the "mega" yacht charter brokers (who, in most instances, effectively "make[] the decision [as to] which boat a charter client is going to use") are concentrated and where the reputation (or, as Mr. Wiviott put it in his hearing testimony, the "aura" or illusion") of a "mega" yacht is established (in part, by the owner, captain, and crew "pander[ing]" to the broker community during showings of the yacht). It is therefore important for a "mega" yacht available for charter to have a presence in the south Florida area so that it can seen by, and shown to, the "mega" charter brokers who are concentrated there. Although most "mega" yachts are marketed in Florida, "the chartering experience [generally occurs] elsewhere," in such places as New England (in the summer) and the Caribbean and Mediterranean (in the winter). Aware of this, Mr. Wiviott, at the time that the Fifty-One was imported into Florida, had no expectation that that the Fifty-One would be used exclusively for charters in Florida waters. Mr. Wiviott wanted the Fifty-One to be imported into Florida without Petitioner having to pay any use tax. Mr. Maass advised Mr. Wiviott that Petitioner would not have to pay Florida use tax if it registered with the Department as a "dealer" and used the Fifty-One "only . . . for bare boat charter[s]." Mr. Maass cautioned Mr. Wiviott that "[t]here could be no personal recreational use, no personal use aboard the boat whatsoever." Before importing the Fifty-One into Florida, Petitioner registered with the Department as a "dealer" that would be engaging in "bare boat" charter operations in Florida. Mark Newcomer was the first captain of the Fifty-One under Petitioner's ownership. Mr. Wiviott considered Captain Newcomer to be, not a "charter captain," but a "yard captain," that is, a captain "who specializes in repairs, maintenance and upgrades of yachts." Captain Newcomer was hired by Petitioner "to take delivery [of the Fifty-One] and to oversee the renovation and retrofit[ting] of the yacht." He was responsible for ensuring that the Fifty-One was brought up to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) standards. Obtaining certification that the Fifty-One met ABS standards was an "essential part" of any campaign to effectively "market[] the boat" for charter. Mr. Wiviott did not have any intention of continuing Captain Newcomer's employment with Petitioner following completion of "the renovation and retrofit[ting] of the yacht." Captain Newcomer brought the Fifty-One into Florida on or about February 1 or 2, 1994, and docked it at a Fort Lauderdale marina (either Pier 66 Marina or the Bahia Mar Marina). On February 3, 1994, Captain Newcomer moved the Fifty- One to the Bradford Marine Shipyard (Bradford Marine), a Department-registered Fort Lauderdale repair facility able to service boats up to 150 feet in length. The Fifty-One underwent repairs and improvements at Bradford Marine until February 12, 1994, by which time the work that had to be done with it out of the water had been completed. At Bradford Marine, Petitioner had to pay a 20 to 30 percent "surcharge on all outside vendors that c[a]me in." On February 13, 1994, Captain Newcomer moved the Fifty-One to the Bahia Mar Marina (Bahia Mar), a more cost- effective location, to do (with the help of others) the remaining repair and improvement work on the yacht (which could be done with the yacht in the water). Because Captain Newcomer was "very good friends" with the dockmaster at the Bahia Mar, he and those he supervised were allowed to perform work on the Fifty-One (involving the use of noise-generating power tools) that would have otherwise been prohibited. The Fifty-One remained at the Bahia Mar until March 14, 1994, undergoing repairs and improvements. On March 15, 1994, Captain Newcomer, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott (and with less than a full crew), took the Fifty-One on a cruise to the Jockey Club, a "private club" that was part of a "condominium complex resort" located in Miami. He did so pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Wiviott, with whom he spoke to on a daily basis regarding the repair and improvement work that was being done on the Fifty-One under his (Captain Newcomer's) supervision. Mr. Wiviott wanted "to take the boat out to stretch it out [and to] see the progress that Captain Newcomer was making." Furthermore, Mr. Wiviott thought that it was important for Petitioner's charter business for the Fifty- One "to be seen." Near the Jockey Club, the Fifty-One ran aground "in the mud," where it "sat . . . for about eight hours until the tide came back in." After the Fifty-One arrived at the Jockey Club, divers "g[o]t under the boat and clean[ed] the prop[eller]s [and] clean[ed] the drivetrain." The Fifty-One remained docked at the Jockey Club for three days. On March 17, 1994, the Fifty-One returned to the Bahia Mar to undergo further repairs and improvements. By mid-April of 1994, the work necessary to bring the Fifty-One up to ABS standards had been completed. Petitioner therefore applied for, and on April 19, 1994, was issued, an ABS "Class Certificate." The Fort Lauderdale Charter Broker's Boat Show (1994 Boat Show) was held at Pier 66 Marina (Pier 66) from April 14, 1994 to April 20, 1994. The Fifty-One was one of the boats entered in the 1994 Boat Show, and it remained at Pier 66 for the entire show. Mr. Wiviott was aboard throughout the event to show the boat to charter brokers and others. Captain Newcomer helped Mr. Wiviott show the boat. Food and drinks were served. Fresh flowers adorned the boat. The crew wore their dress uniforms. After the end of each day's session, Mr. Wiviott stayed aboard the Fifty-One overnight in lieu of spending company money to rent a hotel room. Following the 1994 Boat Show, from April 20, 1994 until April 28, 1994, the Fifty-one was taken on a "shakedown" cruise to Key West and back to Fort Lauderdale, during which it was run at various speeds and systems were "overloaded" to determine whether they worked properly. At the time of the cruise, the Fifty-One was not equipped with all of the staff and other accoutrements necessary to provide the "five star service" that those who charter "mega" yachts pay to receive. During the cruise, the boat docked at the Ocean Reef Club, an exclusive private resort community in Key Largo; the Galleon Marina, a public facility in Key West; Fisher Island; and the Jockey Club. There were a "few breakdowns" during the cruise, including a "crane breakdown" at the Ocean Reef Club. With the help of vendors, the necessary repairs were made. Aboard during the cruise, in addition to Captain Newcomer and a partial crew, was Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott; Mr. Wiviott's brother, Howard Wiviott; Howard's wife; Mr. Becker, whose firm provided Petitioner with accounting services (primarily through the efforts of Stacey Torchon, one of its accountants); and Mr. Becker's wife. There was no marine surveyor, no representative of a registered repair facility, and no "mega" yacht charter broker aboard during the cruise. 3/ Mr. Becker and his wife did not remain aboard for the entire cruise. They disembarked in Key Largo on April 23, 1994. During the time that he was aboard, Mr. Becker spoke to Captain Newcomer and the crew about the financial and accounting procedures that needed to be followed in conducting Petitioner's charter operations, information that Mr. Becker could have provided by telephone from his California office. (Stacey Torchon, who was "more involved [than Mr. Becker] in the day-to-day operations" of Petitioner, never met personally with any Fifty-One crew member; rather, she communicated with the crew by telephone.) While they were aboard, Mr. Becker and the other guests Mr. Wiviott had invited to take part in the cruise (referred to, collectively, hereinafter as the "Invited Guests") ate, relaxed, and enjoyed the hospitality and ambiance. The Invited Guests' presence on the Fifty-One during the "shakedown" cruise was not solely for the purpose of furthering Petitioner's charter business. Mr. Wiviott was motivated by personal reasons in inviting them aboard. The assertion (made by Petitioner in its Proposed Recommended Order) that one of the purposes of the "shakedown" cruise was to determine, through the feedback given by the Invited Guests, "whether the Petitioner was delivering the chartering experience in terms of comfort, ambiance and service that people willing to spen[d] $50,000 per week would expect" simply does not ring true. Mr. Wiviott knew full well that the Fifty-One, with a "yard captain" at the helm and less than a full crew, was not equipped to provide such service. He did not need to take the "Fifty-One" on a lengthy cruise with family and friends to find this out. Had Mr. Wiviott really wanted to learn if the Fifty-One offered a "chartering experience" for which someone would be willing to pay $50,000.00, he would have asked "mega" yacht charter brokers, not family and friends, to come aboard the Fifty-One for a cruise and give him their feedback. On April 28, 1994, following the "shakedown" cruise, the Fifty-One returned to the Bahia Mar, where, in the ensuing days, defects discovered during the "shakedown" cruise were remedied. By May 7, 1994, the Fifty-One was ready for charter. The Fifty-One, at that time, was not the only vessel in Petitioner's fleet. Shortly after acquiring the Fifty-One, Petitioner had purchased (in Florida) the Choice One and Choice Too 4/ from Mr. Wiviott. Petitioner paid Mr. Wiviott $1,138,804.28 for the Choice One. Inasmuch as the purchase was made under Petitioner's sales tax exemption certificate (that Petitioner had obtained from the Department based upon its representation that it intended to use the Fifty-One exclusively for "bare boat" charter operations in Florida), no Florida sales tax was paid. At the time of the purchase, Mr. Wiviott envisioned that Petitioner would use the Choice One as a "chase boat" for the Fifty-One (from which charterers and guests could fish). The Choice One, however, was never used by Petitioner for this purpose because it turned out that it was not feasible to do so. The Choice One wound up sitting at the dock in Fort Lauderdale, leaving only "to be stretched" or moved to another docking facility by its captain (initially Steven Ernst and then later Carl Roberts). Before its sale by Petitioner in 1995, the Choice One was chartered on only one occasion, during which time it remained at the dock in Fort Lauderdale (positioned so that those aboard could view a passing "boat parade"). The Fifty-One was chartered on a more frequent basis. Of the 15 charters of the Fifty-One during the Audit Period, however, only two (the Gerardo Cabrera and Jean Foss charters) were in Florida waters. The Gerardo Cabrera charter was the first charter of the Fifty-One following the completion of the "renovation and retrofit[ting] of the yacht." It started in Fort Lauderdale on May 18, 1994, and ended in Fort Lauderdale on May 21, 1994. The captain of the Fifty-One for the Gerardo Cabrera charter was Jon Cheney, who had replaced Captain Newcomer on May 7, 1994. The charter agreement between Petitioner (as the "Owner") and Mr. Cabrera (as the "Charterer") was dated May 13, 1994, and read, in pertinent part, as follows: In consideration of the covenants hereinafter contained, the Owner agrees to let and the Charter[er] agrees to hire the Yacht from noon on the 18th of May 1994 to noon on the 21st of May 1994 for the total sum of $18,000.00 + expenses + 6% FSST ($1,080 Dollars) of which amount $18,000 + $1,080 + $5,000 (ADVANCE toward expenses) for a total of $24,080 shall be paid on the signing of this Agreement . . . . The Owner agrees to deliver the Yacht at Bahia Mar Yachting Centre, Ft. Laud. on the 18th day of May 1994 in full commission and working order, outfitted as a yacht of her size, type and accommodations, with full equipment, inclusive of that required by law, and fully furnished, including galley and dining utensils and blankets; staunch, clean and in good condition throughout and ready for service; and agrees to allow demurrage pro rata to the Charterer for any delay in delivery. . . . The owner's insurance policy does not cover Charterer's protection and indemnity during the term of the Charter. . . . * * * The Charterer agrees to accept the yacht delivered as hereinbefore provided and to pay all running expenses during the term of the charter. The Charterer, his agents and employees have no right or power to permit or suffer the creation of any maritime liens against the yacht, except the crew's wages and salvage. The Charterer agrees to indemnify the Owner for any charges or losses in connection therewith, including reasonable attorney's fees. * * * The Charter[er] agrees to redeliver the yacht . . . to the Owner at Bahia Mar Yachting Centre, Ft. Lauderdale, FL . . . . The Charter[er] agrees that the yacht shall be employed exclusively as a pleasure vessel for the sole and proper use of himself, his family, guests and servants during the term of this charter and shall not transport merchandise or carry passengers for pay, or engage in any trade nor in any way violate the Revenue Laws of the United States, or any other Government within the jurisdiction of which the yacht may be at any time, and shall comply with law in all other respects. * * * 11. It is mutually agreed that full authority regarding the operation and management of the yacht is hereby transferred to the Charter[er] for the term thereof. In the event, however, that the Charterer wishes to utilize the services of a Captain and/or crew members in connection with the operation and management of the yacht, whether said Captain and/or crew members are furnished by the Owner or by the Charterer, it is agreed that said Captain and/or Crew members are agents and employees of the Charterer and not of the Owner. In the further event that local United States Coast Guard or other regulations require the Owner exclusively to provide a Captain and/or crew, or the Owner wishes to provide his own Captain and/or crew, the Owner agrees to provide a Captain who is competent not only in coastwise piloting but in deep sea navigation, and to provide a proper crew. The Captain shall in no way be the agent of the Owner, except that he shall handle clearance and the normal running of the yacht subject to the limitations of this charter party. The Captain shall receive orders from the Charterer as to ports to be called at and the general course of the voyage, but the Captain shall be responsible for the safe navigation of the yacht, and the Charterer shall abide by his judgment as to sailing, weather, anchorages, and pertinent matters. The Charterer assumes total control and liability as if the Charterer were the owner of the yacht during the term of the charter. . . . This agreement, by "industry standard," is "considered a 'bare boat' charter agreement." On May 13, 1994, Mr. Cabrera (as "Employer") also entered into a separate "Yacht Employment Agreement" with Captain Cheney (as "Yacht Captain"). It provided as follows: WHEREAS, Charterer has under charter the yacht FIFTY ONE pursuant to his bare boat charter party agreement wherein it is Employer's obligation to furnish the said yacht with a competent master and crew; and WHEREAS, Yacht Captain is a competent master, having over two years' experience in the coastal and inland waters of FLORIDA and THE BAHAMAS and is able to furnish a crew for the management and navigation of the said yacht; and WHEREAS, the parties desire to reduce their agreement to written term; NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the premises and of the agreements hereinafter contained, it is agreed as follows: Employer hereby hires yacht Captain as the Master of the said yacht to act as such Master as long as the yacht is under charter to Employer. Yacht Captain agrees to furnish 6 crew men to assist in operating and navigating the said yacht. The Captain and crew, if any, shall be properly uniformed. The crew to comprise the following: [left blank] Yacht Captain shall be paid for his services and the services of his crew a total sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION and Employer shall furnish the Yacht Captain and his crew, quarters and food, during the term of this Agreement. The term of this Agreement shall commence on the 18th day of MAY 1994, or at such time that the yacht shall be ready to sail pursuant to the bare boat charter party agreement with the Owner and shall terminate on the 21st day of MAY, 1994, unless sooner terminated by the termination of the yacht party agreement for any reason whatsoever. In the event that the yacht charter party agreement is sooner terminated, the Master and crew will receive a pro-rated share of the agreed compensation for their services. After collecting from Mr. Cabrera all the monies Mr. Cabrera owed under both the charter agreement and the "Yacht Employment Agreement," Rikki Davis (the broker representing Mr. Cabrera) handed these monies over to Mr. Offer (the broker representing Petitioner). (It is commonplace in the "mega" yacht chartering industry "to have the amount paid for the use of the vessel under [a] bare boat charter agreement and amount for the captain and crew paid together by the charterer as a lump sum."). Mr. Offer, in turn, forwarded the monies he was given by Ms. Davis to Petitioner. The Gerardo Cabrera charter was the only charter that took place before the captain and crew of the Fifty-One became employees of Papa's Yacht Services, Inc. (Papa's), Petitioner's sister corporation, which, like Petitioner, was incorporated in Florida and has maintained a Florida corporate address from its inception. Papa's was formed solely for the purpose of enabling Petitioner to be in "compliance [with] the bare boat charter concept." Papa's dealings with Petitioner was Papa's sole source of revenue. Petitioner paid Papa's a "management fee" for providing a captain and crew for the Fifty-One. Although the Fifty-One's captain and crew had become Papa's employees, Petitioner continued to pay for their health insurance and provide them with free room and board on the Fifty-One at all times during the Audit Period, except when the Fifty-One was under charter and the charterers provided the captain and crew with room and board. Having a full-time captain and crew aboard a "mega" yacht available for charter, even when the yacht is not under charter, is essential to conduct successful charter operations. The captain and crew must be available, on the vessel, to host the "mega" yacht charter brokers who come aboard between charters (sometimes with little or no advance notice) and to perform those everyday tasks necessary to maintain the vessel. To attract and keep qualified onboard personnel, it is necessary to provide them with, as part of their compensation package, free room and board on the "mega" yacht. Doing so is the "standard in the industry." The Fifty-One was chartered by Jean Foss from December 27, 1995 to January 3, 1996, approximately a year and a half after Papa's had become the employer of the Fifty-One's captain and crew. Ms. Foss cruised to the Bahamas during the charter. The charter originated and concluded in Fort Lauderdale. "[T]he only reason [the Fifty-One] was in Florida [for the charter was] because [Ms. Foss] wouldn't fly to the Bahamas." The charter agreement between Petitioner (as the "Owner") and Mr. Foss (as the "Charterer") was similar to the charter agreement into which Mr. Cabrera and Petitioner had entered. It was dated August 15, 1995, and read, in pertinent part, as follows: TERM, HIRE & PAYMENTS: In consideration of the covenants hereinafter contained, the OWNER agrees to let and the CHARTERER agrees to hire the Yacht for the term from 12 noon . . . on the 27th day of December, 1995 to 12 noon . . . on the 3rd day January, 1996 for the total sum of $44,800 + All Expenses of which amount $22,400.00 shall be paid on the signing of this AGREEMENT and the balance thereof as follows: remaining 50% deposit (US$22,400.00) and Florida State Sales Tax of 6% US$2,668 for a total sum of $25,088.00 due by 24 November, 1995. DELIVERY. The OWNER agrees to deliver the yacht to CHARTERER at Fort Lauderdale, Florida at 12 noon . . . on the 27th day of December, 1995, in full commission and in proper working order, outfitted as a yacht of her size, type, and accommodations, with safety equipment required by law, and fully furnished, including gallery and dining utensils and blankets; staunch, clean and in good condition throughout and ready for service, and agrees to allow demurrage pro rata to the CHARTERER for any delay in delivery. . . . * * * 5. RUNNING EXPENSES. The Charterer agrees to accept the yacht as delivered as hereinbefore provided and to pay all shipboard expenses during the term of the charter period. * * * 8. RE-DELIVERY and INDEMNIFICATION. The CHARTERER agrees to redeliver the yacht, her equipment, and furnishings, free and clear and of any indebtedness for CHARTERER's account at the expiration of this charter, to the OWNER at Fort Lauderdale, Florida at 12:00 noon on the 3rd day of January, 1996 in as good condition as when delivery was taken, ordinary wear and tear and any loss or damage for which the OWNER is covered by his own insurance, and CHARTERER's insurance (if any) set forth in Paragraph 3 of this AGREEMENT, excepted. . . . * * * 10. RESTRICTED USE. The CHARTERER agrees that the yacht shall be employed exclusively as a pleasure vessel for the sole and proper use of himself, his family, passengers and servants, during the term of this charter, and shall not transport merchandise, or carry passengers for hire, or engage in any trade, nor any way violate the Revenue Laws of the United States, or any other Government within the jurisdiction of which the yacht may be at any time, and shall comply with the laws in all other respects. * * * 12. CHARTERER'S AUTHORITY OVER CREW. It is mutually agreed that full authority regarding the operation and management of the yacht is hereby transferred to the CHARTERER for the term thereof. In the event, however, that the CHARTERER wished to utilize the services of a captain and/or crew members in connection with the operation and management of the yacht, whether said captain and/or crew members are furnished by the OWNER or by the CHARTERER, it is agreed that said captain and/or crew members are agents and employees of the CHARTERER and not of the OWNER. In the further event that local United States Coast Guard or other regulations require the OWNER exclusively to provide a captain and/or crew, or the OWNER agrees to provide a proper captain who is competent not only to coastwise piloting, but in deep sea navigation, and to provide crew, the captain shall in no way be the agent of the OWNER, except that he shall handle clearance and the normal running of the yacht subject to ports to be called at, and the general course of the voyage. The captain shall be responsible for the safe navigation of the yacht, and the CHARTERER shall abide by his judgment as to sailing, weather, anchorages, and pertinent matters. The captain and crew shall be selected by the CHARTERER with the approval of the OWNER or the OWNER's Agent. CHARTERER is aware that he has a choice of captains. CHARTERER has full right to terminate the captain and/or crew; however, replacements shall be hired as under Paragraph 12 of this AGREEMENT. . . . Ms. Foss also entered into a "Yacht Services Agreement." The agreement, dated August 16, 1995, was with Papa's, which agreed to provide a seven person crew for the Fifty-One for the charter period (December 27, 1995, through January 3, 1996). Ms. Foss, in turn, agreed to pay Papa's $11,200.00 for such crew services and, in addition, to provide the captain (Arthur "Butch" Vogelsang) and crew with food and quarters aboard the Fifty-One during the charter period. Petitioner collected and remitted to the Department the sales tax owed by Mr. Cabrera and Ms. Foss on their rentals of the Fifty-One. No Florida sales tax was due on any of the other 13 charters of the Fifty-One during the Audit Period because they all took place outside Florida. In the case of 11 of these 13 other charters, like in the Jean Foss charter, the charterer entered into a charter agreement with Petitioner for the rental of the Fifty-One, as well as a separate agreement with Papa's for employment of a captain and crew for a fee (that "represent[ed] the actual cost [to Papa's] of the crew"). Typically, the total amount due under both agreements was sent to Petitioner, and Mr. Becker's firm (which also provided accounting services to Papa's) "moved the [portion of the] funds" due Papa's to Papa's bank account. Two charterers during the Audit Period (Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Faisal Aziz of Saudi Arabia) refused Mr. Wiviott's request that they enter into two separate agreements, one (with Petitioner) for the rental of the Fifty- One and another (with Papa's) for employment of a captain and crew. Instead, they insisted on signing a single document, a Mediterranean Yacht Brokers Agreement (or MYBA Agreement), wherein Petitioner agreed to provide both the Fifty-One and a captain and crew. Not wanting to lose the business, Mr. Wiviott, on behalf of Petitioner, entered into these MYBA Agreements, notwithstanding that he had been instructed by Mr. Maass "not [to] take MYBA contracts." The MYBA Agreement between Petitioner (as "Owner") and Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company (as "Charterer") was dated December 16, 1995, and provided that: the "charter period" would begin 12:00 noon on March 3, 1996, and end 12:00 noon on March 17, 1996; the "cruising area" would be the Caribbean; the "port of delivery" would be Guadeloupe; the "port of re- delivery" would be Grenada; the crew would consist of a captain and six other crew members; the charter fee would be $48,000.00 per week for a total (for 2 weeks) of $96,000.00; the "Advance Provisioning Allowance" would be $48,000.00; and the "delivery/re-delivery fee" would be $6,857.00. In addition, it contained the following "clauses," among others: CLAUSE 1 AGREEMENT TO LET AND HIRE The OWNER agrees to let the Yacht to the Charterer and not to enter into any other Agreement . . . for the Charter of the Yacht for the [s]ame period. The CHARTERER agrees to hire the Yacht and shall pay the Charter Fee, the Security Deposit, the Advance Provisioning Allowance and any other agreed charges in cleared funds, on or before the dates and to the Account specified in this Agreement. * * * CLAUSE 6 CREW The OWNER shall provide a suitably qualified Captain acceptable to the insurers of the Yacht and a suitably experienced Crew, properly uniformed, fed and insured. The OWNER shall ensure that no member of the Crew shall carry or use any illegal drugs on board the Yacht or keep any firearms on board (other than those declared on the manifest) and shall ensure that the Captain and Crew comply with the laws and regulations of any country into whose waters the yacht shall enter during the course of this Agreement. The MYBA Agreement between Petitioner (as "Owner") and Prince Aziz (as "Charterer") was dated March 19, 1996, and provided that: the "charter period" would begin 12:00 noon on April 2, 1996, and end 12:00 noon on April 9, 1996; the "cruising area" would be the Caribbean; St. Maarten would be the "port of delivery" and "the port of re-delivery"; the crew would consist of a captain and six other crew members; the charter fee would be $50,000.00; and the "Advance Provisioning Allowance" would be $10,000.00. It contained the following additional provisions, among others: 30. AGREEMENT TO LET The OWNER shall let the yacht for the charter period and agrees not to enter into any other agreement for the charter of the yacht for the same period, and agrees not to sell the yacht before completion of the charter period, unless otherwise agreed by the Charterer. * * * 32. CREW The Owner shall provide a properly qualified Captain approved by the insurers of the yacht and a properly qualified crew, uniformed and insured. . . . Upon the advice of Mr. Maass, Petitioner assigned to Papa's its MYBA Agreements with Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Aziz. It also entered into "Bareboat Charter Agreements" with Papa's for the rental of the Fifty-One for the same periods covered by the MYBA Agreements (notwithstanding that the MYBA Agreements expressly prohibited Petitioner from doing so). According to what Mr. Maass told Mr. Wiviott, by Petitioner taking such action, "the MYBA contract[s] could be accepted without violating the requirement that [Petitioner] engage only in bare boat chartering." The written assignment of the MYBA Agreement with Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company was dated December 16, 1995, the same date as the MYBA Agreement, and read, in pertinent part, as follows: BW Marine owns the vessel "Fifty-One," a 125 foot motoryacht, bearing official number 1020419 (the "Vessel"); BW Marine entered into a Yacht Charter Party Agreement dated December 16, 199[5] (the "Charter") between BW Marine and Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company (Charterer"); BW Marine desires to assign to Papa's Yacht Services, and Papa's Yacht Services agrees to accept, all BW Marine's right, title, and interest in and to the Charter; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants contained herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: Assignment BW Marine assigns to Papa's Yacht Services all its right, title, and interest in and to the Charter. Papa's Yacht Services accepts the assignment and assumes all obligations of BW Marine under the Charter. Payment For administrative convenience, Charterer shall pay BW Marine the charter hire under the Charter. BW Marine, in turn, shall remit the surplus of these funds over the lease amount due from Papa's Yacht Services to BW Marine under that certain Bare Boat Charter Agreement between the parties of even date herewith. . . . Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company was not a signatory to this written assignment (and no other document offered into evidence reflects that Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company consented to the assignment). 5/ The written assignment of the MYBA Agreement with Prince Aziz was dated March 19, 1996, the same date as the MYBA Agreement. It was identical to the December 16, 1995, written assignment of the MYBA Agreement with Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company (with the exception of the dates contained therein). Prince Aziz was not a signatory to this written assignment (and no other document offered into evidence reflects that Prince Aziz consented to the assignment). The first "Bareboat Charter Agreement" between Petitioner (as "Owner") and Papa's (as "Charterer") was dated December 16, 1995, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Owner owns the vessel "Fifty-One," a 125 foot motorcoach bearing official number 1020419 (the "Vessel"); and Charterer desires to charter the Vessel from Owner and Owner is willing to make the Vessel available to Charterer for such purpose, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: Term Owner agrees to let and Charterer to hire, the Vessel for a term commencing March 3, 1996, and ending March 17, 1996. Payment Charterer shall pay Owner charter hire of One Hundred Two Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars ($102,857.00), plus state sales tax, if applicable. Control The Vessel is chartered on a bare boat or demise basis. Owner hereby transfers to Charterer full authority regarding the operation and management of the Vessel for the charter term. Charterer is solely responsible for retaining a master and crew. Guest Limitation When the Vessel is underway, the number of persons on board the Vessel, other than the master and crew, shall be limited to the Charterer (or the Charterer's representative, if Charterer is a corporation) and twelve (12) guests. * * * Delivery Owner agrees to deliver the Vessel at Guadeloupe. Redelivery Charterer shall redeliver the Vessel to Owner at Granada at the end of the charter term, in as good condition as when delivery was taken, ordinary wear and tear excepted. . . . * * * 9. Expenses Charterer shall pay all running expenses during the term of the charter. Charterer shall pay for routine maintenance and repair of the Vessel during the charter term. * * * 12. Non-Assignment Charterer agrees not to assign this Agreement or subcharter the Vessel without the consent of the Owner in writing, which Owner may withhold in Owner's sole discretion. . . . The second "Bareboat Charter Agreement" between Petitioner and Papa's was dated March 19, 1996, and was identical to the first "Bareboat Charter Agreement" between them (with the exception of the charter period, charter cost, and delivery/redelivery locations). The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Papa's ever entered into a sub-charter agreement with either Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company or Prince Aziz. Both Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Aziz paid Petitioner the entire charter fee prescribed under their respective MYBA Agreements. They did not make any payments to Papa's. Petitioner paid Papa’s a “management fee” for providing the captain and crew during these charters. On one of the 15 charters during the Audit Period, Mr. Wiviott was aboard the Fifty-One as a guest of the charterer, the Choice Meat Co., Inc., a company that he and his son, Greg Wiviott, owned. Choice Meat Co., Inc., paid the "going charter rate" for the rental, but no broker's commission because "there was no broker to pay." There were occasions during the Audit Period, when the Fifty-One was not under charter, that Mr. Wiviott, members of his family (including his wife; children; grandchildren; his bother, Howard; and Howard's wife), and his friends used the Fifty-One outside Florida for non-business-related, personal purposes, sometimes for "one or two weeks at a time." For instance, in June of 1994 (after the Gerardo Cabrera charter and before the next charter, which began on July 21, 1994), when the Fifty-One was in New England, the Wiviott family was aboard for approximately "a couple of weeks." At the end of that summer, just before the Fifty-One returned from New England to Fort Lauderdale, the family again used the Fifty-One, this time "for a week or so." In November of 1994, around the Thanksgiving holiday, the Fifty-One traveled to the Caribbean so that the family could use it there for recreational purposes. The Fifty-One remained in the Caribbean for ten to 14 days with the family aboard. After the Wiviott children and grandchildren got off, the Fifty- One went on to the Virgin Islands, where Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott's friends came aboard and were entertained by the Wiviotts. In January of 1995, some time "shortly after the 1st," when the Fifty-One was in St. Maarten (where it was based for the winter), the Wiviott family once again spent time aboard the Fifty-One. The foregoing instances of out-of-state, non-charter, non-business-related use of the Fifty-One by the Wiviott family occurred when Captain Cheney was in command of the vessel. The Wiviott family continued to make such use of the Fifty-One during the time Captain Elario was captain. When Captain Elario took over the Fifty-One in St. Lucia (from Paul Canvaghn, who had been captain for only a day or two), Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott were aboard the vessel. They remained on board for approximately a week as the Fifty-One cruised the Caribbean. During that week, Mrs. Wiviott swam, laid in the sun, relaxed, and ate meals prepared by the Fifty- One's chef. She did not perform any tasks designed to further Petitioner's charter business. Subsequently, while Captain Elario was still captain, Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott took a non-charter, non-business-related trip on the Fifty-One to the Bahamas. Also during the time Captain Elario was captain, when the Fifty-One was in Hilton Head, South Carolina, Mr. Wiviott's brother, Howard, and Howard's wife, came aboard, and they remained on the yacht as it traveled to Norfolk, Virginia. Howard and his wife did not perform any tasks designed to further Petitioner's charter business while aboard the Fifty- One. Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott's daughter, along with her two young children, stayed overnight on the Fifty-One when, while under Captain Elario's supervision, it was docked at the Capital Marina in Washington, D.C. During the daughter's and children's stay, there was a party celebrating the youngest child's birthday. Indicative of the amount of time that Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott spent aboard the Fifty-One were the clothing and other personal items that (as a convenience) they stored (in a locker) on the Fifty-One (so that they would not have to bring these items with them each time they boarded the vessel). (These items were moved from the locker to another area on the Fifty- One, when necessary, to accommodate charterers using the stateroom in which the locker was located). Whenever the Fifty-One returned to Florida, it underwent needed repairs and maintenance. It also cruised the waters of the south Florida area, docking at various facilities. It did so not only "to be stretched," but to gain additional exposure among "mega" yacht charter brokers. In addition, while in Florida, the Fifty-One was stocked with supplies and provisions (including rack of lamb, veal, lobster tails, baked goods, gourmet foods, specialty items, wines, bath and beauty products, and party supplies) to be available for use by those on board when the Fifty-One was outside Florida, including not only charterers (such as Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Aziz) and their guests, but also Mr. Wiviott, his family, and friends (when they were on board the Fifty-One for non-business-related, personal purposes). The Fifty-One, while in Florida, was also provided with fuel for charter, as well as non-charter, non-business related, trips outside Florida. Petitioner's charter business proved to be unprofitable. Expenses far exceeded revenues. (Petitioner, however, was able to sell the Fifty-One for more than the purchase price it had paid, receiving approximately $5.7 million, excluding commissions, for the Fifty-One in February of 2000.) By letter dated October 11, 1996, the Department informed Petitioner that it was going to audit Petitioner's "books and records" for the Audit Period. Petitioner was selected for audit because it had reported only a relatively small amount of taxable charter revenue on the Florida sales and use tax returns it filed during the Audit Period. The Department's "audit findings" were that the Fifty-One "was purchased for [a] dual purpose, for leasing and to be used by the shareholder" and therefore "the vessel and other purchases [made by Petitioner during the Audit Period under its sales tax exemption certificate, including its purchase of the Choice One] are taxable at the cost price." Based upon these audit findings, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, in which it advised Petitioner that Petitioner owed $430,047.95 in sales and use taxes, $215,023.97 in penalties, and $169,672.70 in interest through July 18, 1997, for a total of $814,744.62, "plus additional interest of $141.39 per day . . . from 07/18/97 through the date [of] payment." By letter dated April 22, 1998, Petitioner protested the Department's proposed assessment. On November 1, 1999, the Department issued its Notice of Decision sustaining the proposed assessment and announcing that, as of October 6, 1999, Petitioner owed the Department $929,270.52, with "interest continu[ing] to accrue at $141.39 per day until the postmarked date of payment." Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Chapter 120 Administrative Hearing on the Department's proposed action.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order sustaining its assessment against Petitioner in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined, for alleged violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Administrative Complaint, dated December 4, 1981. This proceeding involves allegations by the Florida Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission) that Respondent, James R. Siebert, violated Subsection 475.25(1)(h) Florida Statutes, by sharing a commission with a person not properly licensed under the real estate law, and that he employed a person as a salesman who is not the holder of a valid license, in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(c) , Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The incident which prompted the Administrative Complaint involved an auction sale of a restaurant in Brooksville, Florida which was conducted by an auctioneer who did not have a license to practice real estate in Florida. Respondent requested an administrative hearing and filed an answer to the Administrative Complaint admitting the occurrence of the auction, but denying that it involved the sale of real estate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James L. Siebert, is a licensed real estate broker at Orange Lake, Florida, and was so licensed at all times relevant in this proceeding. (Stipulation) On several occasions prior to February 21, 1981, Respondent had gratuitously assisted Albert W. (Billy) Mitchell, an auctioneer, in conducting auctions by serving as a "ring man" and clerk. A "ring man" normally is one of several such individuals at an auction who assists the auctioneer by encouraging bidding and identifying bidders. Mitchell is not licensed under real estate laws of Florida, but operates under a local occupation license. None of the prior auctions in which Respondent assisted Mitchell involved the sale of real estate. (Testimony of Respondent, Mitchell) On January 28, 1981, Mitchell entered into an "auction sale contract" with Welberta Pruitt whereby Mitchell agreed to sell at auction to the highest and best bidder: . . . the following described business and personal property owned by the Party of the First Part: Pruitts Golden Wagon Steak House Restaurant and Contents on attached inventory list and located 1702 Howell Avenue, Brooksville, in Hernando County, State of Florida. The terms of this sale shall be 10 percent of the amount of the purchase price to be paid on day of sale and the balance to be paid as follows: On delivery of title - There is a mortgage on the business of $67,838.20 with interest at 8 3/4 percent on the unpaid balance. The attachment to the contract listed various items of food supplies and restaurant furniture and equipment, plus decorative items of personal property. Pruitt and her husband had purchased the real property on which the restaurant building was located under an agreement for deed in 1979 which provided that the Pruitts would make the payments on a mortgage of about $67,000 from the sellers to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Citrus County and, when such mortgage was paid in full, the sellers would convey title to the property by warranty deed. The contract reflected that the total purchase price of the property was $75,000, and that a down payment had been made in the sum of $7,000. Mrs. Pruitt owned furniture, fixtures and equipment which she transported from Tennessee to operate a restaurant on the premises. (Testimony of W. Pruit Kelly, Mitchell, Johnston, Respondent's Exhibits 1,2) It was the understanding of the parties to the auction agreement that only the personal property in and around the restaurant building would be sold to the highest bidder, and it was anticipated that the successful bidder would take up the mortgage payments on the real property. The equity which the Pruitts had acquired by prior mortgage payments was to be "given" to whoever purchased the "business" at the auction. Accordingly, on February 20, 1981, the day preceding the auction, Mrs. Pruitt issued a "notice" that she would sell her "entire Restaurant, business, furnishings, equipment, and Inventory at Public Auction". The notice further stated that she would give her equity in the real estate to the purchaser on which there was an existing mortgage of $67,821.36 "that you may assume". The noticewas placed on the door of the restaurant. In addition, Mitchell issued a brochure advertising the auction wherein it was stated that the "entire business, furnishings, equipment, and stock" would he sold at absolute auction and that the purchaser would have the "privilege of assuming the payments on the existing mortgage." Mitchell had Respondent's name placed at the bottom of the brochure without Respondent's knowledge because he thought it would be a good advertisement for him. (Testimony of Mitchell, W. Pruitt, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent's Exhibit 3) Mitchell asked Respondent to assist at the Pruitt auction and told him that since Mrs. Pruitt and her attorney were having a disagreement, it might be necessary for Respondent to write the contract resulting from the auction. No fee for Respondent's services was discussed prior to the auction. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent) On February 21, 1981, the auction was conducted at the restaurant in Brooksville, and Respondent was present to act as a "ring man". There were only about 3 individuals who entered bids at the auction. Prior to receiving bids, Mitchell announced that he was auctioning the contents of the business and that whoever bought the property would take over the payments on the mortgage. The successful bidder was Robert Shrader, who bid $9,600. He made a 20 percent down payment at the time in the amount of $1,920 which Mitchell retained as a commission on the sale. Mitchell had not described the real estate at the auction, but merely stated that he was auctioning the business and that Mrs. Pruitt would give the successful bidder her equity in the property. After accepting Schrader's bid, Mitchell gave the figures on the sale to Respondent who prepared a standard contract for sale and purchase of the real estate in the total amount of $77,421.36. The contract reflected a deposit of $1,920 to be held in escrow by Billy Mitchell and Associates, that the contract was subject to assumption of a mortgage of $67,821.36, and that there would be a balance of $7,680. Shrader and Mrs. Pruitt signed the agreement on February 21, 1981, which was witnessed by Mitchell and Respondent. Although no brokerage fee was listed, Respondent signed as broker on the contract. He testified at the hearing that he had done this out of habit. A real estate contract was prepared rather than merely a bill of sale of the personal property in order that the parties would have the figures they needed to close which they could take to the closing attorneys. After the auction, Mitchell gave Respondent $200 as a gift for his gasoline and other expenses on the Pruitt and prior auctions. Respondent testified, and Mitchell confirmed, that the latter insisted that he accept that amount as reimbursement for expenses. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On April 6, 1981, Joseph P. Johnston, an attorney in Brooksville, closed the transaction by means of a bill of sale for the furnishings and equipment in Pruitts restaurant, and assignment of the Pruitt interest in the mortgaged real property. The closing statement reflected that a "broker's commission" in the amount of $1,920 was held by the "broker" to apply on commission, In actuality, the sum retained by Mitchell as a commission was based solely upon a percentage of the personal property sold at auction. (Testimony of Johnston, Mitchell, Petitioner's Exhibit 2)
Recommendation That the Florida Real Estate Commission dismiss the charges against Respondent, James R. Siebert. DONE and ENTERED this 3d day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3d day of June, 1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire Klein & Klein 333 North West 3rd Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact On May 29, 1977, petitioner Artur Zoelfel entered into a written agreement to buy the yacht Superior Queen from H-E-R Leasing Corporation "for the total sum of $125,000.00 (one hundred, twenty-five thousand dollars)." Petitioners' exhibit No. 1. H-E-R Leasing Corporation is not a licensed or registered dealer in Florida. An addendum to the contract, dated May 30, 1977, was signed by Artur Zoelfel but was not signed by anybody on behalf of H-E-R Leasing Corporation. Petitioners' exhibit No. 2. On June 16, 1977, an assistant secretary for maritime affairs in the United States Department of Commerce entered an order, No. MA-15079, approving the sale of the Superior Queen to "Artur Zolfel, a West German citizen, and the transfer of said vessel to Federal Republic of Germany registry and flag . . . upon the condition that there shall be no liens or encumbrances recorded against such vessel . . . at the time of its transfer . . ." Petitioners' exhibit No. 2. On June 27, 1977, an anonymous telephone caller told Bernard Frank Fox, respondent DOR's area supervisor in Broward County, that petitioner had bought the Superior Queen. As the result of investigation by other employees of respondent DOR, Mr. Fox concluded that this information was correct and set in motion events that culminated, on June 30, 1977, in a levy on the Superior Queen by the Broward County sheriff's office. At that time, respondent DOR claimed that fifty-two hundred dollars ($5,200.00) in tax was owed, on the assumption that the Zoelfels had paid the asking price for the Superior Queen, which had purportedly been one hundred thirty thousand dollars ($130,000.00). After the levy, one Paul C. Mueller approached Mr. Fox on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Zoelfel and represented to Mr. Fox that petitioners had purchased the Superior Queen for one hundred twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($112,500.00). On that basis respondent DOR accepted forty-five hundred dollars ($4,500.00) in satisfaction of its claim for tax, and the sheriff released the Superior Queen. As reflected by the bill of lading, petitioners exhibit No. 4, on August 2, 1977, petitioner Artur Zoelfel caused the Superior Queen to be loaded onto a freighter, M/S Finn Enso, in Tampa, Florida, bound for Hamburg, West Germany. Neither of the petitioners is a licensed exporter.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the notice of assessment be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Thomas E. Hunt, Esquire Suite 302, Building 2 3020 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Mr. Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the application of Ronald J. Palamara (“Palamara”) for licensure as a yacht and ship broker under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was previously a licensed yacht and ship broker in Florida, holding Yacht Broker License No.324. On April 28, 1999, the Petitioner’s prior license expired. The Petitioner reapplied for a Yacht Broker license on February 24, 2000. Robert Badger (Badger), at that time an investigator with the Division, investigated the application for form pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that there were no problems with the form of the application. Badger also reviewed the application for moral character of the applicant pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3), Florida Administrative Code. On the application, the Petitioner indicated that he had a criminal background, but failed to disclose the nature of the criminal background on the application. In a letter from the Division addressed to the Petitioner, additional information was requested regarding his criminal background. The Petitioner replied in a letter that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor for resisting an officer without violence. The Petitioner also disclosed on the application that he had a civil Final Judgment against him in the matter of Chinnock Marine, Inc. v. Barthelemy & Palamara, Case No. 98- 19512 (Fla. 17th Cir. 1999). He did not fully disclose the details relating to events that led to the judgment. Instead, he stated on the application that the claims were “unfounded” and that Chinnock Marine “misled the court.” The subject application is dated February 22, 2000. On that application, the Petitioner was specifically required to disclose any “pending” civil suits involving a yacht. At the time of his application, another civil matter was pending against the Petitioner in World Class Yachts v. Palamara, Case No. 99-12923 (Fla. 17th Cir. 2001), which was filed on July 22, 1999. The Petitioner failed to disclose the pending World Class Yachts civil suit.2 Subsequent to the filing of the subject application, a non-final order was entered against the Petitioner finding that he was in default and rendering judgment for World Class Yachts in the amount of $157,500. The Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s non-final order of default to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of default. Palamara v. World Class Yachts, Case No. 4D01-3260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The Petitioner admits that the World Class Yachts case relates to a yacht. Although the circuit court had not entered a Final Judgment against the Petitioner in the amount of $157,500.00 at the time of the hearing in this case, the World Class Yachts civil litigation involving a yacht should have been disclosed on the application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3)(a)6, Florida Administrative Code. In both Chinnock Marine and World Class Yachts, the Petitioner has moved to vacate the default judgments, alleging that he was not properly served. The Petitioner has worked in the yacht brokerage business in South Florida for many years. He has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license. In the community in which he lives and works he enjoys a reputation for being a person of integrity, honesty, and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this case granting the license sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2002.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed five violations of the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, including the following counts: 1) failing to have the license of each salesperson in his employ prominently displayed in his principal place of business; 2) failing to place deposits received from clients pursuant to transactions involving yachts into a broker's trust account; 3) allowing a person licensed only as a salesperson to act as a broker and to use the broker's name to evade the provisions of the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act; 4) failing to deposit funds into the broker's trust account within three working days of receipt of funds pursuant to a purchase contract by a salesperson licensed under him; 5) allowing a salesperson licensed under him to carry out acts which if committed by the broker would place him in violation of the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act and the rules thereunder, such as violating the Notary Public Law, failing to exercise due professional care in the performance of brokerage services, and making substantial and intentional misrepresentations with respect to transactions involving yachts, as alleged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause, in violation of the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The purpose of the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act is to protect the consumer. A yacht broker is an individual who, in expectation of compensation, sells used boats in excess of 32-feet in length for other persons. In order to obtain a license to act as a yacht broker, an individual must submit an application, undergo a background check for moral character, submit a surety bond, and demonstrate to the Division that he has a trust account to place funds received in pending yacht transactions. Before being able to independently perform yacht brokering services as a yacht broker, an individual must spend two consecutive years as a yacht salesperson in a mentorship working under a broker. At all times relevant to this action, Respondent held a license with Petitioner to operate as a yacht broker. Respondent continues to be licensed as a yacht broker. In late 1995 and early 1996, Respondent operated his yacht brokerage business, Greg and Associates, from two locations. His main office was located in Rockledge, Florida, and a branch office was located in Sarasota, Florida. No brokers were present at the Sarasota location. Respondent operated the Sarasota branch office from his main office in Rockledge, Florida. He never visited the Sarasota branch office. Respondent viewed his relationship to the Sarasota branch office as an "escrow agent." Bullock, a salesman, had complete autonomy to run the Sarasota branch office. Respondent met Bullock only once, and he never met any of the other salesmen who operated out of the branch office. Respondent had only a commission arrangement with Bullock. Respondent sent checks for all commissions to Bullock, who deposited them in Bullock's company, Friar Tuck, Inc's., Barnett Bank business account. Respondent allowed Bullock to hire the other salesmen, to determine a commission arrangement with the other salesmen, and to disburse commissions to the other salesmen. Respondent did not know the commission arrangement with most of the salesmen in the branch office. On April 16, 1996, Respondent was interviewed in his office about some complaints that had been received concerning the operation of his Sarasota branch office. Among the salesmen working under Respondent's broker's license in his Rockledge office at that time were Darrell Lawson and Mark Salmuller. Respondent did not have the licenses of either of these two salesmen displayed. Both men were listed as active employees by Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent maintained a broker's trust account, entitled Greg and Associates, d/b/a Yacht Brokerage USA, in the Rockledge branch of the Barnett Bank. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Chester Bullock, a yacht salesperson working for Respondent in Respondent's Sarasota branch office, maintained a business checking account entitled Friar Tuck, Inc., d/b/a Yachtmasters, in a Sarasota branch of the Barnett Bank. Bullock was listed as president of the company and was identified as a signatory on the account. This was not a proper broker's trust account, as Bullock, being a yacht salesman, could not have established such an account. In July 1995, Chester Bullock and Jeff Webb, salesmen in the Sarasota branch office, took an offer and received a $1,000.00 deposit from David and Cynthia Cislo, on a 1979 34-foot Marine Trade Trawler. Respondent's salesmen did not deliver the deposit to Respondent's trust account within three days of its receipt. The funds were deposited in Bullock's business checking account at the Sarasota branch of the Barnett Bank. Sometime later, the money was redeposited in Respondent's trust account. Bullock notarized the vessel bill of sale at the time of the closing, and received a commission on the sale. In November 1995, Bullock took an offer and received a $5,350.00 deposit from a Louisiana client, Charles Cosgrove, on a 1964 38-foot Chris-Craft Commander yacht. Respondent's salesman did not deliver the deposit to Respondent's trust account within three days of its receipt. On November 27, 1995, Bullock and Jeff Webber, Respondent's salespeople, acted as listing broker and salesperson, respectively, on the lease-purchase of the 1964 38-foot Christ Craft Commander by Cosgrove. Respondent never signed the brokerage sales record, which is the closing statement given to the lease-purchaser, Cosgrove, and was never identified as broker of record on any of the sales documents. Instead, the purchase-sale agreement lists Bullock as the broker, and the closing statement lists Bullock as the broker. Bullock acted as the notary public for the lease-purchase agreement. In January 1996, Bullock and Harold Raines, yacht salesmen in the Sarasota branch office, took an offer and received a $1,700.00 deposit from a client, Michael Hill, on a 1973, 53-foot Huckins yacht. The letterhead of the draft purchase and sales agreement, which stated "Yachtmasters" and a phone number for the Sarasota area, further indicated that Hill's offer was made through yacht salesmen at the Sarasota branch office. Respondent's salesmen did not deliver the $1,700.00 deposit to Respondent's trust account within three days of its receipt. Instead of delivering the $1,700.00 deposit to Respondent for deposit in Respondent's Rockledge broker's trust account, the check was delivered to Friar Tuck, Inc's., Sarasota account. Hill's deposit, which was supposed to be held in a trust account, intermingled with the other business funds of Bullock's account. Hill requested and received an oral extension from Bullock on his closing date to purchase the yacht. About a month later, Bullock notified Hill that the yacht was sold to another party. It was only after Hill threatened to sue Respondent, the responsible broker, and after Hill filed a complaint with Petitioner that Respondent refunded Hill his deposit. The Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act does not permit licensed salespeople to perform certain acts. It requires the employing broker to do them. An employing broker, a broker who holds the license of his salesperson, must make all trust account deposits and withdrawals of monies involved in a transaction brokered by the salesman. An employing broker is required to supervise the yacht transactions brokered by his salespeople and to sign closing statements, which itemize all charges and credits of the transaction for the client. Respondent minimized his own involvement in his Sarasota branch office and permitted his salesman, Bullock, to operate it. This enabled Bullock to sign as the broker a closing statement of the sale of a yacht, which is an action that should have been performed only by a broker. During the same time period that Respondent granted Bullock autonomy to supervise the Sarasota branch office, Bullock operated another business from the same location, Sarasota Marine and Maintenance Services, which did boat surveys and cleaned boats. Bullock was the president of Sarasota Marine and Maintenance Services. In early 1996, Wittman, a Colorado resident at that time, telephoned Bullock about the 1988, 34-foot Wellcraft Grandsport in the magazine advertisement placed by Bullock. Bullock sent Wittman a videotape of the yacht. After reviewing the videotape, Wittman did not think that it was the same yacht advertised in the magazine. Bullock admitted that the yacht in the videotape was not the same yacht advertised in the magazine, but claimed that it was a sister ship. Based upon Bullock's assurances that the sister yacht was in good condition and the results of a survey done by Bullock's company stating that the yacht was in good condition, Wittman purchased the yacht. Bullock acted as both the listing broker and the selling broker in the sale of the 1988, 34-foot Wellcraft Grandsport yacht to Boyd Wittman, the purchaser. Notwithstandng the fact that he was representing the seller, Bullock did not obtain the written consent of Wittman, the purchaser. Wittman wanted a registered surveyor to do a survey of the condition of the yacht, because Wittman lived out-of-state and wanted to avoid spending money to fly to Florida to inspect it. Bullock arranged for his own company, Sarasota Marine and Maintenance Services, to perform the survey. The survey was signed by Ernest Shaffer, who was identified as a Certified Marine Surveyor and Consultant with the Society of Accredited Marine Surveyors, the National Association of Marine Surveyors, and the National Marine Investigators. Ernest Shaffer was someone that Bullock hired to wash boats. He was not a certified surveyor, as he was held to be. When the yacht was delivered to Wittman in Colorado, he was shocked by the poor condition of the yacht. The interior, the cockpit, the exterior, the bilge, and the mufflers were all in poor condition. Wittman was expecting a yacht that he could take someone out on a lake with, and it was not in good enough condition. Wittman had to pay another $15,000 to $20,000 to repair the yacht to improve it to good condition. Repairs included replacing all of the interior of the cabin, replacing the port windshield, putting new mufflers in, fixing a transmission leak, fixing the air-conditioning, rebuilding the water pumps so that the engines cooled properly, and replacing the dry-rot wood on the main deck on the cockpit. In sum, Wittman purchased the yacht for $38,000, spent another $15,000 to $20,000 in repairs, and eventually sold it for $37,000. Bullock also quoted to Wittman a fee for shipping the yacht from Florida to Colorado for $1,500. Wittman thought the price was reasonable. When the yacht was finally shipped, it cost Wittman approximately $3,800, which he paid, because he had already bought the yacht and had to finish the transaction. Bullock acted as both the listing broker and the selling broker in the sale of a 1973, 34-foot Nautiline yacht to Ernest C. Shaffer, the purchaser. Bullock arranged for his company, Sarasota Marine and Maintenance Services, to perform the survey. The survey was signed by Ted Williams, who was identified as a Certified Marine Surveyor and Consultant with the Society of Accredited Marine Surveyors (SAMS), the National Association of Marine Surveyors (NAMS), and the National Marine Investigators. Neither Bullock, Ernest Shaffer, nor Ted Williams, his employees who signed the surveys of the yachts described above, was certified with NAMS or SAMS, two marine surveys accreditation associations. In the case of a 1973, 53-foot Huckins yacht, Bullock tried to sell the boat three times and took three simultaneous contacts on the same vessel. He took a contract from Michael Hill, a prospective purchaser, extended the closing date for Hill to March 6, 1996, and simultaneously had contracts for the same boat with the prospective purchasers Sam Bankester and Steven Kenneally, with the closing dates of February 29, 1996, and March 2, 1996, respectively. Ultimately, Steven Kenneally purchased the yacht. The terms of the contracts did not provide for simultaneous contracts on the same vessel. The prospective purchaser who did not come up with the money first lost out on the opportunity to purchase the yacht. In addition, the Hills, the prospective purchasers, had a difficult time obtaining their earnest money back from Bullock. In January of 1996, Raines, Respondent's salesman, showed Chris June, a North Carolina resident, a 1970, 42-foot Trojan Sea Voyager yacht named "Fantasia." June liked the 42- foot Trojan Sea Voyager and entered into a contract to purchase it through Raines and Bullock. Bullock recommended a surveyor, John Pomeroy, in St. Petersburg, Florida, to complete the survey. Pomeroy was, in fact, not certified with NAMS or SAMS. Bullock told June that the boat was in very good condition and that it was a great value. During the survey, June noticed that wood on the yacht was separating in the bow, and asked Bullock and Pomeroy about it. They explained that this was "wet/dry expansion" which occurs in yachts that sit for a long time and can easily be fixed with some screws and caulking. "Wet/dry expansion" causes wood in wooden yachts to start separating, according to Bullock and Pomeroy, due to the wet wood below the waterline and the dry wood above the waterline. The survey disclosed no substantial problems with the yacht. Relying on the statements of Bullock and Pomeroy, June purchased the "Fantasia" for $22,000, with money loaned to him by a relative. A month after purchasing his yacht, June was informed that his boat was sinking while moored at the dock. June had to hire a marine recovery company to recover the yacht, just before it was about to go completely under water. The yacht took on water in an area near the stern that was not well checked-out, where a basketball-sized wad of putty holding the corner together came loose. As the estimate to repair the boat was more than three times what the boat was worth, June sold it to a salvage yard for $2,500. However, the salvage yard defaulted on that payment. June has been making accelerated payments on his loan, and has the loan down to approximately $19,000. He made a claim against Respondent's surety bond and settled the action for a small amount from the bonding company. Respondent attended two all-day workshops hosted by the Petitioner's Section of General Regulation, which cover in detail how to display a license, to display trust accounts, to display broker's duties and responsibilities, and to display branch offices. Respondent was exposed to the statutes and rules which were violated. Respondent took a cavalier attitude towards following the requirements of the Act. On February 15, 1996, Petitioner entered a Final Order against Respondent in Docket No. YS95397, imposing a fine of $1,500 for Respondent's violation of the Act. Respondent used the name "Yachtmasters" for his Sarasota branch office without having a license issued in that name in violation of Florida law. In the case DBPR v. Chester C. Bullock, Docket No. YS97172 (December 11, 1998), the Petitioner charged Chester Bullock, a registered salesman, with five violations: Charge 1 - The Respondent acted as a broker when he was licensed only as a salesman. Charge 2 - The Respondent made substantial and intentional misrepresentations with respect to transactions involving yachts upon which people have relied. Charge 3 - The Respondent violated other laws governing transactions involving yachts, specifically, he violated Chapter 117, Florida Statutes, by notarizing signatures on documents in which he had a financial interest. Charge 4 - The Respondent failed to immediately deliver deposits received from clients for the purchase of yachts to the broker under whom he was licensed as a salesman. Charge 5 - The Respondent failed to exercise due professional care in the performance of brokerage services, such as recommending his own company as a surveyor to a client and representing it as being an accredited surveyor company, when it was not. Bullock was found guilty on all charges and assessed a civil penalty of $45,000 in that case and had his yacht salesperson's license revoked. The Petitioner has proven each of the violations by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent's explanations for his conduct is not credible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes enter a final order which: Finds Respondent guilty of the charges set forth in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause. Respondent's broker's license is hereby revoked. The Division impose a civil penalty of $40,500, which is $500 for Count 1 and $10,000 each for Count 2, 3, 4, and 5. The Respondent shall immediately cease and desist from any violations of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, and the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: William Oglo, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Gregory Linnemeyer 613 Rockledge Drive Rockledge, Florida 32955 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action and, if so, whether Respondent Stuart Yacht Corporation is entitled to the General Permit which the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) intends to issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 4 in St. Lucie Settlement, a subdivision in Stuart, Florida. The subdivision has one border along the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. The subdivision has a finger fill that extends to the South Fork with canals on both sides. There are four lots on the finger fill, Lots 1 through 4 of the subdivision. Lot 4 is farthest from the river. On the north side of Petitioner’s property he has a dock where he keeps a boat. The dispute in this case involves the canal on the south side of Petitioner’s property. All references to “the canal” hereafter, unless otherwise noted, will be to the canal on the south side of Lot 4. Between Lots 2, 3, and 4 and the canal is a road which provides access to the lots on the finger fill. Between the road and the canal is a narrow strip of land. Petitioner owns this narrow strip of land where it corresponds with his lot lines. In other words, the southern boundary of his Lot 4 abuts the canal. However, because the canal is artificial, having been created by dredging, Petitioner has no riparian rights associated with the canal. That was the holding of the circuit court for Martin County in the litigation between Stuart Yacht Corporation and Petitioner. It was also established in the circuit court litigation that St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., which is the homeowner's association for the subdivision, owns the northern half of the canal and Stuart Yacht Corporation owns the southern half of the canal. No subdivision documents were presented to show the extent of rights granted to homeowners within St. Lucie Settlement related to the construction of docks or other uses of water bottoms that are included within the subdivision. Petitioner testified that he terminated his membership in the homeowners association three-and-a-half years ago. Stuart Yacht Corporation owns and operates a marina on the south side of the canal which includes docks over the water. At some point in the past, but before Petitioner purchased Lot 4 in 1995, Stuart Yacht Corporation constructed a dock along the north side of the canal, over the water bottom owned by St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. The dock along the north side of the canal has been used for mooring large yachts. The portion of the dock that ran along the boundary of Lot 4 was recently removed by Stuart Yacht Corporation following the rulings in the circuit court. The balance of the dock along the north side of the canal would be removed as a part of the proposed permit that Petitioner has challenged. In addition to removing the dock along the north side of the canal, the proposed permit authorizes Stuart Yacht Corporation to construct a new dock that is four feet wide and runs 150 feet along the property boundary in the center of the canal. No part of the proposed new dock would be on the property of St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., did not challenge the proposed permit. In his petition for hearing, Petitioner alleged that the proposed new dock would cause the following injuries to his interests: interference with ingress and egress to Petitioner’s shoreline; interference with Petitioner’s desire to obtain a permit in the future to construct a dock or to “harden” the southern shoreline; and interference with Petitioner’s riparian rights. Petitioner’s testimony about his past use of the canal was inconsistent. He said he moored his boat in the canal once in 1995. He said he boated into the canal to fish on several occasions. He said that (at least twice) when he attempted to enter the canal by boat, he was denied access by representatives of Stuart Yacht Corporation. However, in a deposition taken before the hearing, Petitioner said he had never attempted to use the canal. The only testimony presented by Petitioner to support his claim that the proposed permit would interfere with his navigation, fishing, and desire to obtain a dock permit in the canal was the following: I couldn’t get a boat in there with that proposed dock in the center line of the canal right on their side of the canal. It would be 150 feet long. It would be a huge Wall of China. My neighbor and I couldn’t get to our shoreline. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to navigate into the canal in a small boat or to fish in the canal if the proposed dock is constructed. The evidence was also insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to construct any kind of dock for any kind of watercraft if the proposed dock is constructed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department dismiss the petition for hearing based on Petitioner's failure to prove standing, and issue the proposed permit to Stuart Yacht Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul B. Erickson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Amanda Gayle Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Office of the General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Stop 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Guy Bennett Rubin, Esquire Rubin & Rubin Post Office Box 395 Stuart, Florida 34995
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not the names Miami Yacht Sales, Inc. and Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc. are deceptively similar.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and his demeanor while testifing, documentary evidence received, pleadings and responses, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. On 0ctober 7, 1977, Respondent, Division of Corporations, issued Charter number F40099 permitting the use of the corporate name Miami Yacht Sales, Inc. to the Petitioner in reliance on Chapter 607, Florida Statutes. On January 3, 1984, Respondent, Division of Corporations, issued Charter number 087231 permitting, the `use of the corporate name Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc. to the Respondent in reliance on Chapter 607, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is engaged in the business of selling new and used boats and yachts. Petitioner conducts its business at 2122 N. River Drive, Miami, Florida. Petitioner, through its president, Larry Stevens, related one incidence of a telephone communique from Merrill Stevens Brokerage, a competitor which was seeking information respecting one of Respondent, Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc., salesmen. Mr. Stevens also related at least one instance wherein a supplier misdelivered a package which was destined for the Respondent's business, end Petitioner rerouted that package to Respondent. Petitioner, through Mr. Stevens, generally alluded to "confusion, client-wise" which he believed would continue as soon as Respondent, Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc., was able to get an advertisement in the Yellow Pages of the Miami telephone directory. Petitioner pointed to no specific acts of confusion or other deceptive practices by Respondent, Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc.. example, Petitioner did not substantiate that any of its customers went to the Respondent's business and had to ultimately be directed to Petitioner's business. Likewise, Petitioner did not allege or otherwise claim that the name Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc. was selected by Respondent based on an attempt to deceive or otherwise defraud the consuming public. As stated herein, Respondent, Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc., did not appear at the hearing herein although it was properly noticed by copy of a notice of hearing filed May 28, 1984 scheduling this matter for hearing on June 28, 1984. However, the evidence reveals that Respondent, Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc., is also engaged in the business of selling new and used boats and yachts and its business is situated approximately four miles from Petitioner's business site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is therefore recommended that the petition of Miami Yacht Sales, Inc., seeking to forbid the use by the Respondent of the name Miami Yacht Brokerage, Inc., be DENIED. Recommencded this 13th day of November, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent acted as a broker or sales associate without being the holder of a valid and current broker or sales associate license, in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004),1 and, therefore, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes; and Whether Respondent published or caused to be published an advertisement for the sale of real properties, advertising himself to be a broker, at the time Respondent's license was in inactive status for failure to renew, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-10.025.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. From April 18, 2002, through September 30, 2003, Respondent was an active sales associate in association with Caldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., a brokerage corporation located at 5981 Catheridge Avenue, Sarasota, Florida 34232. Respondent's Florida real estate sales associate license, number 95480, was involuntarily placed on inactive status due to non-renewal during the period October 1, 2003, through August 15, 2004. On or about February 22, 2004, Respondent published or caused to be published an advertisement for the sale of real properties with the South Florida Sun Sentinel, and in that advertisement, Respondent held himself out to be a realtor in the State of Florida, associated with Caldwell Banker. From August 16, 2004, through the present, upon the late renewal of his license, Respondent is listed as an inactive sales associate.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.42(1)(a), 475.25(1)(a), and 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-10.025 and, therefore, Subsection 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; suspending Respondent's license for a period of one year; fining Respondent the sum of $1,000; and requiring that Respondent pay fees pursuant to Subsection 455.227(3), Florida Statutes, for investigative costs, in the amount of $841.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th of December, 2006.
