Findings Of Fact Respondent, Otis Brown, is the holder of a Class "K" Firearms Instructor License, a Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License, a Class "D" Security Officer License, and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm License. On September 19, 1989, the Department of State (Department) temporarily approved respondent's application for a Class "DS" Security Officer School/Training Facility to be located at 15966 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. In June 1991 respondent relocated his school to 7900 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida; however, it was not until September 30, 1991, that he applied for a license at such location and not until February 18, 1992, that the Department issued its temporary approval of such application. Each of the schools operated by respondent and approved by the Department were designated, by respondent, as "in-house," or non-fee charging. During the period extending from April 1991 through January 1992 respondent provided training for a Class "D" Unarmed Security Guard License in Monroe County, Florida, without benefit of a Class "DS" Security Guard School License for that location, which failed to conform with the State's minimum requirements. Specifically, in April 1991, respondent offered a course for unarmed security guards at his hotel room in the Econo Lodge, Key West, Florida. Such class included, among others, Brian Whitten and Ronald Shipman, who each paid approximately $100 for the course. The course lasted one day, starting at approximately 9:00 a.m. and concluding around 4:00 p.m. following the administration of the examination, with one hour off for lunch and several short breaks. In all, not more that 6 hours of instruction were given. Both Whitten and Shipman received a certificate of successful completion of unarmed security guard training from respondent. Again, in January 1992, respondent offered a course for unarmed security guards at his hotel room in Key West, Florida. Such class included, among 8 or 9 others, Bruce Clothier, who paid $75 for the course. The course lasted from 8:00 a.m. until noon the first day, and from 8:00 a.m. until approximately 11:30 a.m. the second day. The second day of instruction lasted approximately three hours, most of which was a review of the previous day's material, and then the students were accorded about one-half hour to take an examination. Every student received a certificate of successful completion of the unarmed security guard training from respondent. As with the unarmed security guard training, the firearms trained offered by respondent often failed to conform with the State's minimum requirements. In January 1991, in Miami, Florida, Brian Whitten received training from the respondent for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. His classroom and range training totaled approximately ten hours. Between April and October 1991, Charles Ramsey was employed by respondent at his Miami school, and assisted respondent in conducting training courses for Class "D" and Class "G" licensure. At the time, respondent was disabled, and Ramsey assisted him with various physical activities, as well as teaching first aid instruction to the students. While Ramsey taught the first aid course, respondent was always present. Ramsey did not, however, hold a Class "DI" license. Regarding the firearms training course for Class "K" licensure offered during this period, the proof demonstrates that little formal instruction was given. Rather, the students were given a booklet to take home with them to study for two days and on the third day received a block of instruction on the statutes of the State of Florida and firearm safety and an examination before lunch. Following lunch, the students received their range training. In December 1991, in Miami, Florida, John Ortiz paid respondent $40.00 for the training required for a firearms waiver. Respondent provided Ortiz with four hours of classroom training, which included reading and classroom discussion, and approximately two hours of range training. During range training, Ortiz fired one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition. In January 1992, Ortiz returned to the respondent for requalification with his .38 caliber pistol for his Class "G" license. Respondent asked Ortiz for $35.00, which he paid, and received his recertification without any further training. On January 15, 1992, a Department of State investigator met with respondent to inspect his business records. Such inspection revealed that respondent had not maintained school records for a period of at least two years at his business location, and those that were available failed to disclose the type of training given, the location of the classes, a log of students and their signatures for each class, or the name of the instructor. Nor did respondent have copies of all certificates or diplomas presented to students for successful completion of training courses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered finding respondent guilty of the violations set forth in Courts I-VII of the administrative complaint, dismissing Count VIII of the administrative complaint, and revoking respondent's Class "K" Firearms Instructor License, Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License, and Class "DS" Security Officer School/Training Facility License, reserving to respondent the opportunity to reapply for licensure following one year from the date of revocation. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of April 1993. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April 1993.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Sergio Ramon Garcia (Garcia) was licensed by the State of Florida as a life and variable annuity contracts agent, life agent, life and health agent, general lines agent, health insurance agent, and legal expense insurance agent, having been issued license number 266253905. On the evening of July 20, 1991, while leaving his insurance office in Dade County, Florida, Mr. Garcia was the victim of a violent crime. Two individuals with firearms attempted to rob Mr. Garcia. He was shot five times. As a result of his injuries, Mr. Garcia was in surgery for several hours, in intensive care for two weeks, and in the hospital for approximately two months. He was paralyzed from the waist down. Mr. Garcia received rehabilitation for a considerable amount of time. At first, there was no expectation that he was going to walk again. Mr. Garcia was confined to a wheelchair. Through physical therapy, he progressed from the wheelchair to a walker, to crutches, and to a cane. Now, Mr. Garcia is able to walk without any assistance. During his rehabilitation period, Mr. Garcia used a bicycle for therapy that he had purchased for his personal pleasure years before the shooting. His physical therapist had recommended using the bicycle to exercise his legs. Mr. Garcia rode the bicycle every morning and every evening. He became very sentimental toward the bicycle and referred to the bicycle as his “friend.” The bicycle had distinct features. It was specially modified to accommodate his therapy needs (a specially wide seat for his hip problems) and was white, including the handle bars. Mr. Garcia has undergone 12 operations and more are expected. He has screws in his hips, and the screws will have to be replaced through surgery. Mr. Garcia experiences pain daily and continues to take medication for pain. Furthermore, Mr. Garcia continues to attend physical therapy. After the shooting, Mr. Garcia’s then business partner purchased a handgun, a .22 caliber Derringer, and gave it to Mr. Garcia for protection. The handgun was a small weapon which would fit within the palm of Mr. Garcia's hand. Mr. Garcia obtained a license to carry a concealed weapon. Subsequently, Mr. Garcia and his wife decided to move to Broward County, Florida. Mr. Garcia did not receive the renewal for his concealed weapons license when they moved; notwithstanding, approximately three weeks prior to the incident, Mr. Garcia renewed his concealed weapons license. It is inferred and a finding is made that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Garcia had renewed his concealed weapons license, and the license was valid.2 In January 1996, Mr. Garcia’s bicycle was stolen. The theft was reported to the proper law enforcement agency which requested the bicycle's serial number; however, the Garcias were unable to provide the serial number to the law enforcement agency. On a cold morning on or about February 21, 1996, after driving his children to school, Mr. Garcia observed a male riding, what Mr. Garcia determined to be, his bicycle. He drove alongside the male and tried to get the male to stop, but to no avail. Finally, Mr. Garcia pulled his vehicle in front of the male and stopped, forcing the male to stop. The male got off the bicycle and reached into his jacket. Mr. Garcia had his handgun in the pocket of his pants. He believed that his concealed weapons license was valid.3 Believing that the male was reaching for a handgun, Mr. Garcia became fearful for his life. Mr. Garcia reached into his pocket and pulled out his own handgun. However, the handgun, having a hair-trigger, accidentally discharged while he was pulling it from his pocket. Mr. Garcia did not point the handgun at the male. The projectile from the handgun hit the ground. The male got back on the bicycle and rode away. Not being able to run after the male because of his physical condition, Mr. Garcia returned to his vehicle, placed the handgun under the seat of his vehicle, and drove after the male. Mr. Garcia saw the male talking with a traffic assistance officer and stopped. Mr. Garcia approached them, explained that the bicycle belonged to him and demanded the bicycle from the male. Mr. Garcia put the bicycle in his car and took the bicycle home. An investigation by the local law enforcement agency ensued. As part of the investigation, Mr. Garcia was requested to provide the serial number for the bicycle. He was unable to provide a serial number and had no documents showing a serial number. However, Mr. Garcia did provide photographs of his bicycle and a receipt, identifying the same type of bicycle. On or about February 21, 1996, an information was filed against Mr. Garcia in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, Case No. 96-5453CF. Mr. Garcia was charged with one count of aggravated assault with a firearm, which is a felony, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon, which is also a felony. On or about March 25, 1996, Mr. Garcia was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon. Mr. Garcia obtained counsel who strongly advised him to plead nolo contendere to the charges. His counsel advised him that, even though the prosecution’s case was very weak, a jury was unpredictable,4 and, therefore, an acquittal could not be guaranteed. Further, Mr. Garcia’s counsel advised him that, if he was convicted, he could be sentenced to a mandatory three-year prison sentence. In return for the plea of nolo contendere, the State Attorney's office waived the primary offense which carried a mandatory minimum three-year sentence. Mr. Garcia’s wife agreed with his counsel and recommended and encouraged her husband to plead nolo contendere to the charges. She did not want to face the possibility of her husband being convicted of the charges and going to prison. On or about July 22, 1996, Mr. Garcia entered a plea of nolo contendere to both felonies. The Circuit Judge withheld adjudication and sentenced Mr. Garcia to one year of community service and one year of probation for both felonies. Taking the initiative, Mr. Garcia voluntarily notified the Department of Insurance (Department) of the criminal charges against him, the nolo contendere plea, and the sentence imposed. At the hearing, neither the male who was riding the bicycle nor any alleged eye-witnesses testified. A finding is made that Mr. Garcia was in fear for his life and was defending himself when he pulled his handgun from the pocket of his pants. Since the incident on February 21, 1996, the bicycle has remained in Mr. Garcia’s possession. No claim for the bicycle has been made by the male who was riding it that day. It is inferred and a finding is made that Mr. Garcia is the owner of the bicycle. Mr. Garcia and his wife are partners in the insurance business. Mrs. Garcia is a licensed insurance agent by the Department. They have over 5,000 clients. Mr. Garcia and his wife employ over 30 people. Their workforce includes individuals who are in work release programs, and the Garcias attempt to assist them in getting their lives back together. The Vice President of the Dade County Board of Specialty Agencies testified as a character witness for Mr. Garcia. In the Vice President’s opinion, Mr. Garcia is, among other things, a very dedicated, conscientious, and responsible person. Mr. Garcia has been licensed since 1985. The Department has taken no prior disciplinary action against Mr. Garcia.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer issue a final order suspending the license of Sergio Ramon Garcia for one month. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1997.
The Issue The issue for consideration in these cases is whether the licenses held by Respondents should be disciplined in some manner because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaints filed herein by the Department of State's Division of Licensing.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Unlimited Crime Prevention, Inc., was licensed in Florida as a "Class B" Security Agency holding license number B98-00127. Respondent William Larue Scott, was the President/Manager of UCP and held a "Class D' security officer license number D93- 19846, a "Class G" statewide firearms license number G94- 03199, and a "Class ZB" organizational officer position license number ZB98-00179. William Shane Scott, son of William Larue Scott and an employee of UCP, held a "Class D" security officer license number D96-07113, a "Class ZB" organizational officer position license number ZB98-00180, and a "Class G" statewide firearms license number G97-01150. The Department of State, Division of Licensing, was then and is the state agency responsible for the licensing of non- certified security personnel and agencies and for the regulation of the non-governmental security industry in Florida. On June 7, 2000, Garry Floyd, an investigator with the Division since 1981, received a complaint that two security officers from UCP had been observed by security officers from another security firm working at a site while carrying unauthorized weapons. Security officers are authorized to carry certain weapons but not nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistols. Upon receipt of the complaint, Mr. Floyd sent a telefax message to UCP's President/Manager, Mr. William L. Scott, asking for an explanation. The following day, an individual who identified himself as Mr. William L. Scott, called and said he had received Mr. Floyd's message and was looking into the matter. At this point, Mr. Scott said he was one of the two security officers involved but that he and his associate were carrying revolvers, not semi-automatic weapons. Thereafter, on June 11, 2000, Mr. Scott sent Mr. Floyd a telefaxed memorandum in which he reiterated his denial of the allegations as to the weapons carried, explained that the allegations occurred because of animosity toward his firm, and requested the investigation be terminated because of a lack of evidence. On June 27, 2000, Mr. Floyd met with Robert Shank, the other security officer alleged to have been carrying the unauthorized weapon and questioned him about the allegations. Shank vehemently denied the allegations and continued to do so even after Floyd said he did not believe him. On July 3, 2000, Mr. Floyd went to Mr. Scott's home where Scott maintained UCP's home office. Though Floyd went there with the intention of speaking with Mr. Scott, he was unable to do so and spoke, instead, with Mrs. Scott, whom he asked to have Mr. Scott call him. Mr. Scott did not call as requested, however. Thereafter, on July 17, 2000, Mr. Floyd went to UCP's new office, but because so many other people were there, so as not to embarrass Mr. Scott, he made an appointment to come back on August 2, 2000. When Mr. Floyd spoke with Mr. Scott on August 2, 2000, he gave Mr. Scott a list of questions he had written down. Scott said he was not ready to admit anything and would not answer any questions, orally or in writing. As of the hearing, Mr. Scott had not answered any of the questions posed by Mr. Floyd. The questions are simple. They ask, primarily, about the ownership of the company and the positions held therein by both Scott and his son, as well as whether he has ever allowed any employee to carry semi-automatic weapons. Mr. Floyd also met with Eric Hege, an employee of UCP, and provided him with a list of eight questions, two of which concerned the type of firearms carried by Mr. Scott. However, Mr. Hege refused to answer the questionnaire. This stymied Mr. Floyd's investigation, and he could proceed no further with it. However, sometime during the first week of July, 2000, Mr. Floyd received a complaint from a local police department that UCP was using an unlawful scheme of colored lights on its vehicles. When he went to various places where ICP's vehicles were located, he saw that they did have unlawfully colored lights which could give the impression they were official police vehicles. One vehicle had a green light on the seat, and another had a blue light. Blue lights are not allowed on civilian vehicles. Only amber-colored emergency lights are allowed on civilian vehicles. Mr. Shank previously held a license to carry a semi- automatic weapon, but not during the period he was employed performing security duties for Respondent. He surrendered that license after he, too, was charged with carrying an unauthorized weapon. Though he was not licensed to do so, while he was on duty with UCP, he carried a semi-automatic weapon or, in the alternative, a revolver. He started carrying the revolver so that he would not violate the law. Mr. Shank is certain that William L. Scott knew he was carrying an unauthorized weapon because Scott purchased revolvers for himself and the others in July 2000, so they would not be in violation of the law. When Shank had pointed out that the semi-automatic weapons were against state law, William L. Scott replied, "Fuck the State. The statutes don't mean anything." On June 2, 2000, Mr. Shank, with William L. Scott's son and several other employees of UCP, was working as a security officer at The Harbor Club in Pinellas County. At that time he was carrying a semi-automatic weapon, as was Mr. Scott's son. He was of the opinion at the time that William L. Scott's approach was to violate the law regarding weapons and deny it if caught. In late July or early August 2000, William L. Scott held a meeting of his employees at which time he instructed them, among other things, that if Mr. Floyd were to contact them about the incident at The Harbor Club, they were not to give him any information. He also provided each security officer with a letter which instructed them, in the event they were contacted by any personnel from the Division of Licensing, to immediately notify their supervisor and to advise the state personnel that they could not be distracted from their duties. Employees were not to speak with a state employee until a supervisor had relieved him, nor were they ever to hand over their firearms to an inspector unless properly relieved. Investigators were to be referred to the company's attorney, and if the investigator refused to leave, the police were to be called. Mr. Shank has also performed services for UCP using a vehicle with green and red flashing lights on the roof. So have both Scotts and Mr. Hege. Mr. Shank was subsequently charged with driving a vehicle with improper lights as well as carrying a semi-automatic weapon. William L. Scott and Mr. Shank had a falling out over money in early September 2000. Shank then called Mr. Floyd to tell him what he knew of the allegations because he felt it was the right thing to do. When Boin Upton, at the time an employee of Excelsior Defense, also a security firm, came to work at The Harbor Club on June 2, 2000, he found representatives of UCP already were there. He thought this was unusual because he understood that his company had the contract to provide security for the club. He called his supervisor who came to the club and resolved the issue. A the time, however, he noticed that both Mr. Shank and William L. Scott, the two representatives of UCP, were carrying nine-millimeter semi- automatic weapons. When Mr. Upton asked about this, he was told by Mr. Shank that he had a "CC" waiver. A "CC" license is one which is issued to an apprentice private investigator and does not authorize the carrying of a semi-automatic weapon. Joshua Wilson also was a security guard who worked for UCP from July 7 through the end of August 2000, and whose duty stations were at the Lutz Apartment complex and at The Harbor Club. His job was to observe and report and to keep the peace, and he was not armed. However, he observed William S. Scott, William L. Scott's son carrying a nine- millimeter semi-automatic weapon at The Harbor Club during this period. Mr. Wilson recalls a staff meeting held by Mr. Scott during this period at which Mr. Scott discussed the investigation being conducted by the Division. At this meeting, he gave each employee a copy of the memorandum which advised employees not to talk with anyone from the Division but to refer them to a UCP supervisor. Scott indicated his opinion that Mr. Floyd had declared war on UCP and him, and he would not help him. Another former employee of UCP, Mr. Phelps, also recalls being told directly by Mr. Scott that if an investigator from the Division contacted him with questions about the company, he was not to answer them. In mid-June 2000, Officer Jim Routzahn of the Indian Shore Police Department conducted a routine traffic stop of William L. Scott. Mr. Scott got out of his vehicle wearing a uniform and badge and carrying a semi-automatic weapon. Scott's badge was in the form of a shield and not a star. Mr. Scott advised Officer Routzhan that he was the owner of a security company and was on official duty dropping off and picking up security officers. At the time, because Officer Routzahn received a high-priority call to go elsewhere, he gave Mr. Scott a warning and let him go. According to Mr. Floyd, a search of the records of the Division of Licensing fails to show any prior complaints against either UCP or either Mr. Scott. However, the records reflect William L. Scott was previously denied a license based on a conviction in Indiana. Mr. Floyd has known William L. Scott from when he, Mr. Floyd, was an investigator for another agency. During that former investigation, he found Mr. Scott to be very personable, helpful, and cooperative. Mr. Floyd, a retired Captain of Police from Tampa, considers this case to be serious because it involves the impersonation of a policeman. Based on his experience, "wanna-be's" constitute one of the biggest problems facing law enforcement, and even if the only issue here were related to the inappropriate use of colored lights on UCP's vehicles, he would still have filed an Administrative Complaint in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order revoking the Class "B" Security Agency License number B98-00127, the Class "D" Security Officer License number D93-19846, the Class "G" Statewide Firearms License number G94-03199, and the Class "ZB" Organization Officer Position, number ZB98-00179, all licenses held by William Larue Scott as President/Manager of Unlimited Crime Prevention, Inc., be revoked. It is further recommended that the Class "G" Statewide Firearms License number G97-01150, held by William Shane Scott be placed on probation for a period of one year under such terms and conditions as the Department may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Bensko, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Louis Kwall, Esquire Kwall, Showers & Coleman, P.A. 133 North Fort Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33755 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether to impose sanctions against Respondent, Brooke Braly, up to, and including, revocation of her Educator’s Certificate.
Findings Of Fact The Commissioner is responsible for monitoring each person who holds a Florida Educator Certificate and who is working in any school district within the State. Part and parcel of the Commissioner’s duties is the determination of whether any teacher violated any of the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession. At all times relevant hereto, Ms. Braly held Florida Educator Certificate No. 1106771, covering the areas of elementary education and English for speakers of other languages. The certificate is valid through June 30, 2021. Ms. Braly is employed as a teacher in the Volusia County School System, teaching at the School in the area of Modified ESE with Varying Exceptionalities. Her students were those with physical and/or mental disabilities which resulted in learning difficulties. Ms. Braly had served in that position for seven years as of the date of final hearing, including the 2017-2018 school year. An incident occurred at the School on December 5, 2016, i.e., the 2016-2017 school year, involving the Student. Based on that incident, the Commissioner issued an Administrative Complaint on November 21, 2017 (some 10 months later), which contained the following allegations: On or about December 5, 2017, [Ms. Braly] failed to notify school administrators after she confiscated a BB gun from a student at the beginning of the school day. [Ms. Braly] also failed to properly secure the BB gun to prevent the student from regaining possession of it while still on school property. The Salient Facts From the evidence presented, it is clear that on December 5, 2016, the Student approached Ms. Braly at the beginning of the school day. The Student told Ms. Braly that he had inadvertently failed to remove his BB/airsoft pistol from his backpack before leaving for school that morning. He asked her what he should do, and Ms. Braly took the gun from him to secure it for the day. At no time was she worried that the Student had intentions of using the BB gun or that it was a serious problem. In fact, Ms. Braly did not even believe it was a BB gun, but thought it was a plastic toy gun. At the end of the day, the Student took the gun home with him. As the Student was exiting the school bus at his stop that afternoon, another student sitting on the bus saw the BB gun, which the Student had stuck into his waistband under his shirt. The Student’s shirt was lifted for some reason and the other student spotted the gun. That student went home and immediately sent an email to several School administrators to report what he had seen. The administrators reviewed surveillance videos from the bus and identified the Student as the person carrying the gun. An investigation ensued and the Administrative Complaint was filed. The less clear and/or less persuasive “facts” of this case are set forth below. The Gun The Commissioner presented a picture of a BB gun at final hearing which was purported to be the same gun Ms. Braly had confiscated from the Student on December 5, 2016. The black and white picture shows a replica Smith & Wesson handgun of small to average size. Ms. Braly says that the gun depicted in the picture is not the gun she took from the Student. The Student’s father brought a handgun to final hearing that he said was the gun at issue. It was plastic, lightweight, and tan and black in color. There was a clip (presumably for holding BBs) that could slide into the handle of the gun. The father demonstrated how to insert the clip and how to “cock” the gun by sliding back the top portion. That action would engage a spring that would release once the trigger was pulled, i.e., it was a spring-fired pistol, not a recoil action weapon. According to the Student, the gun fired plastic pellets rather than BBs. Ms. Braly, who only saw the gun for a few moments on the morning of December 5, 2016, remembers it to be black with an orange tip, unlike the gun produced at final hearing. At some point, the Student was asked to identify the gun from a picture depicting several different handguns. The Student pointed out to an investigator which of the depicted guns looked most like his BB pistol. The photographic line-up was not offered or admitted into evidence, so no finding is made as to what it may have shown, vis-à-vis what the gun looked like. At the final hearing, the Student’s father acknowledged that he had previously told School administrators he had destroyed his son’s gun back in December when the event occurred. The gun he produced at final hearing was obviously not destroyed; in fact, it looked very new and barely used. The Student said the gun produced at hearing was the same gun he gave to Ms. Braly on December 5, 2016. Mr. Starin, an investigator for the Volusia County School District, was tasked with looking into the incident. He did not speak to the Student’s parents nor did he attempt to locate the gun (other than having the Student identify what the gun looked like from the pictorial lineup). The most persuasive evidence is that the gun given to Ms. Braly on December 5, 2016, was the same as or similar to the one depicted in the Commissioner’s exhibit and proffered at final hearing. It was very light and obviously a toy, but was designed to resemble a real gun. Though it looked somewhat like a real weapon from afar, it is hard to believe anyone who held the gun or saw it up close would think it real or capable of causing serious harm to a person. December 5, 2016 As the Student was walking to his bus stop, he told his sister he had forgotten to remove the BB gun from his backpack after carrying it with him to the park the night before. His sister advised the Student to give the gun to his teacher so as not to get in trouble at school. Upon arrival at the School, the Student immediately approached Ms. Braly, who he trusted and believed would help him do what was most appropriate in this situation. When no other students were nearby, the Student told her about the gun. Ms. Braly took the gun and placed it in her office in a desk drawer. The Student remembers her placing the gun in a cardboard soda can box. Ms. Braly remembers just placing it in a desk drawer. It is patently obvious by his actions that the Student had no intentions of displaying the gun at school for any purpose. He very intentionally tried to diffuse any danger or unease that might have arisen due to his mistake. Ms. Braly took the Student’s actions and demeanor into account when deciding what to do. Ms. Braly thought the toy gun would be safe in her locked office as that was where she kept her purse and car keys during the school day. Normally no one had access to the office during the day, except that construction was going on and some of the workers did have access to the office. Ms. Braly did not consider those workers a threat to steal anything or to rifle through her desk during the day. She also did not consider the toy gun worthy of anyone’s interest. She believed her response to the situation was reasonable, based on all the circumstances and her knowledge of the Student. At the end of the day, the Student retrieved the gun. How that occurred is not entirely clear from the evidence. The Student says that he asked Ms. Braly at the end of the day if he could get his gun. She was very busy at the time and just told him, “yes,” so he went into the office and retrieved it. He remembers Ms. Braly telling him to put it in his backpack so that no one else would see it. He did so, but then transferred it to his waistband later. An ESE co-teacher with Ms. Braly remembers Ms. Braly being completely absorbed in the preparation of an Individual Education Plan for another student that afternoon. The co-teacher had instructed students not to bother Ms. Braly and does not remember the Student or anyone else talking to Ms. Braly that afternoon. Ms. Braly does not remember being asked by the Student whether he could get his gun from the office. She simply did not even think about the gun after acquiring it that morning. To her, the gun was a toy and did not warrant much attention. Sometime the next day, she realized the gun was gone and surmised that the construction workers must have left the door open so that the Student was able to get his gun. She did not explain why she thought the Student – rather than the workers – had taken the gun from her office. At any rate, the Student retrieved his gun before he left for home. As he was exiting the school bus, the other student noticed the gun in his waistband and notified School administrators. That action is very understandable considering the school shootings across the nation in recent times. December 6, 2016 Once the school administrators got word about the gun and identified the Student, they contacted Ms. Braly. The School resource officer, Deputy Abato, went to Ms. Braly’s class and asked to talk to her. They went into her office, away from the students, and she was asked about the gun. The conversation lasted only a few moments. Deputy Abato was only concerned with whether the gun was real or not. Convinced it was not, he did not pursue the matter. Later, Ms. Braly was asked by assistant principal Feltner to write a statement concerning the incident. Her statement reiterated what had happened, i.e., the Student showed her the gun, she identified it as a toy and placed it in her office, and the Student later retrieved it. Again, how she knew that the Student retrieved the gun rather than someone else getting it is not clear. Deputy Abato’s statement from that same day mirrored Ms. Braly’s statement. Deputy Abato said that if a student pulled a gun on him that looked like the one in the picture offered into evidence, he would order the student to put the gun down. If they did not do so, he would likely shoot them. Whether the gun the Student had was like the picture is not clearly established in the record. The best evidence is that the gun could have looked like that, but even that evidence is neither clear nor convincing. The gist of the Commissioner’s argument in this case is that: IF an armed deputy saw the Student with the gun, and IF the deputy ordered him to put it down, BUT the student did not immediately comply, THEN the deputy MIGHT be inclined to fire on the student. Though completely plausible in general terms, that eventuality seems very unlikely under the facts of this case. Later Developments On December 15, 2016, Investigator Starin issued an “Investigative Summary” describing his findings after conducting a brief investigation. The report did little more than recite what other people had said. Mr. Starin concluded that the Student brought the gun to school, gave it to his teacher, and retrieved it at the end of the day. The summary provides little substantive information and makes no recommendation or assertion of wrongdoing by Ms. Braly. The investigator only talked to three people as part of his minimal investigation into the incident on December 5, 2016: Ms. Braly; Deputy Abato, who had only secondhand knowledge; and the Student. It is remarkable that Mr. Starin did not interview Ms. Braly’s co-teacher or her paraprofessional, both of whom were in the classroom that day, or the Student’s parents. The overall level of the investigation is consistent with the degree of seriousness of the events. That is, there was a slight breach of protocol, but no probability of harm to the Student or others at the School. The Board decided that the incident nonetheless warranted some discipline. The School Board notified Ms. Braly that a letter of reprimand would be issued and she would be suspended for three days without pay. Although this was a fairly low level of discipline, Ms. Braly has challenged it; the matter is currently in arbitration. Notwithstanding the discipline imposed, the Board has re-hired Ms. Braly for the 2018-2019 school year in the same position she has held for the past seven years. In fact, she has continued teaching at the School since the December 5, 2016, incident. She is an effective teacher and has not had any other disciplinary actions against her, and the School recognizes her as an effective ESE teacher. The Commissioner also seeks to discipline Ms. Braly, noting that she failed to report the incident and did not adequately secure the toy gun. Both of these allegations are true, whether they violate any particular policy or not. The Commissioner proposes a letter of reprimand, suspension of Ms. Braly’s Educator Certificate for six months, and two years of probation. However, based on the best evidence available, Ms. Braly’s conduct was both reasonable and essentially benign. If any sanction against Ms. Braly was warranted, it should be minimal at worst.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education, dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent, Brooke Braly, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Gretchen Kelley Brantley, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 316 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Branden M. Vicari, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. Suite 110 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North Clearwater, Florida 33761 (eServed) Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 770088 Ocala, Florida 34477-0088 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Marian Lambeth, Bureau Chief Bureau of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George E. Feld, held certified general contractor license number CG C021801 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. Feld has been a licensed contractor in Florida since June 1982. He has qualified George E. Feld and Associates, Inc. under his license and operates the business at 2131 Northeast 205th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. After submitting the low bid, on or about March 1, 1985 George Feld and Associates, Inc. entered into a contract with the City of Tamarac to construct a 5,500 square foot recreation building for the City. The negotiated contract price was $195,950. The contract called for commencement of the project within ten days after the contract was signed and completion by July 27, 1985. Sometime prior to March 20, 1985, Feld met one David P. McCall and Marvin Weiss at a motel in North Miami. McCall was interested in doing work on the Tamarac project. He gave Feld a business card with the name "Arrow Head Development Corporation, Inc." printed on it, and which stated the firm was "state certified" and "licensed" as a general contractor. Feld also noted that Weiss held a general contractor's license, and he assumed that McCall and Weiss were working together. Relying on McCall's card, and later representations by McCall, but without checking with petitioner's office to verify if McCall or Arrow Head were licensed or qualified, Feld agreed to subcontract out the shell and sewer work on the Tamarac project to Arrow Head. To this end, Feld and Arrow Head entered into two contracts on March 20, 1985, for Arrow Head to perform the shell and sewer work. On June 21, 1985 McCall submitted a written "proposal" to Feld for the shell work on the job. The proposal had the following words and numbers typed on its face: "State License Number: #CGC 05961." It was not disclosed whose license number this was. Although McCall denied typing this document (because he does not personally know how to type), he did not deny that it was placed on the document at his direction or with his knowledge. It was not until sometime later that Feld learned that Arrow Head was not qualified by any licensee. Because of his mistaken belief that Arrow Head was qualified, Feld had never qualified that firm. Even so, there was no evidence that Feld intended to allow an unqualified firm to perform the work. Work proceeded on a timely basis as required by the contract. Feld visited the job site daily, and supervised all activities, including those performed by McCall. He routinely inspected the work, verified that it was being done according to specifications, and made corrections where needed. The job specifications called for trusses that were over forty feet in length. Because of this, and pursuant to the South Florida Building Code (Code), it was necessary for the City to hire an engineer to oversee their installation. The City hired one George Fink as engineer to supervise this phase of the project. However, Fink's responsibility was limited to just that, and once the installation was completed, Feld resumed responsibility for the remainder of the job. Trusses are a manufactured roof member and may vary in length, height and pitch. In this case, they were designed in the form of a cathedral roof, and were in excess of forty-seven feet in length. Further, because of the building's design, there were a number of trusses to be installed. The installation of the trusses was begun around 9:00 a.m. on Friday, June 27, 1985 and finished by 2:00 p.m. that same day. As required by the Code, Fink was present and supervised the installation of the trusses on the top of the shell. He confirmed at hearing that they were properly installed. The problem herein arose early that day when Fink had noticed that the building plans did not provide for lateral bracing of the trusses. However, according to Fink, this was not unusual since plans do not normally provide for lateral bracing. Even so, Fink told an unnamed person who "appeared to be the fellow running the erection crew" that lateral bracing should be added to the center and two side core members and that the four trusses on each end needed additional bracing. Fink also suggested to this unnamed individual that sheathing be added "as soon as possible" to the top and outside of the trusses to give added stability and protect them from wind damage and the like. In this regard, at hearing Fink conceded that it was "reasonable" for a contractor to erect trusses one day, and to place sheathing on them the following work day. Fink thought sheathing to be particularly necessary on this job since the trusses were high pitched," "long in length," and there were "no gables or anything in between to ... add any other support." By the end of the work day, the crew had placed the proper bracing on the trusses. However, no sheathing was applied. According to Fink, who was accepted as an expert in this proceeding, a prudent and competent contractor would be aware of the need for sheathing and added bracing because of the potential hazard of high winds caused by late afternoon thunderstorms in South Florida. By failing to place sheathing on the roof, Fink opined that Feld was grossly negligent and incompetent in the practice of construction on the Tamarac project. Sometime on late Sunday night or early Monday morning, most of the trusses on the roof collapsed. Some fell on an electrical wire running to the building. However, no injuries occurred. Only five trusses on the north side of the building remained in place. The City of Tamarac then filed a complaint with petitioner against Feld. The cause of the collapse was not disclosed, and even Fink was unable to state that the lack of sheathing was the cause of the accident. There was no evidence that strong winds or thunderstorms occurred on the night the trusses fell, or that bad weather was predicted when the work day ended on Friday afternoon. Feld acknowledged that no sheathing was placed on the trusses. He attributed this to the fact that the construction crew stopped work at 3:30 on Friday afternoon, and did not return to the job site until the following Monday morning. He intended to install the sheathing the following Monday but by then it was too late. This was in accord with the standard enunciated by Fink that it was not unreasonable for a contractor to erect trusses one day, and to place sheathing on them the following work day. Feld also stated that he was well aware of the need for bracing and sheathing on trusses by virtue of his long experience in the construction business. Feld hinted, but did not prove, that McCall may have been responsible for the accident because of bad blood between the two. In any event, he doubted that wind would have caused the trusses in question to fall. Finally, Feld pointed out that, even though city inspectors were present, no one had come to him on Friday afternoon and said the trusses might collapse over the weekend without sheathing. Feld is a graduate of the University of Buenos Aires with a degree in architecture, and has been engaged in the construction/architecture business for twenty-two years. He presently is an instructor of construction at Miami-Dade Community College. There is no evidence he has ever been the subject of a disciplinary action by the Board on any other occasion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint against George E. Feld be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1987.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses, their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: Respondent, Ernest L. Howey ("Howey"), was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission") on June 4, 1970 having been issued Certificate No. 763. At all times material to the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent maintained that certification. Respondent was employed as police officer with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department from January 9, 1984 to February 8, 1989. Respondent was terminated from the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department on February 8, 1989 for conduct prejudicial to the good order of the Department. The grounds for his termination were essentially the same as those alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint in this proceeding. Prior to beginning work with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, Respondent was employed by the Sunrise Police Department. While he was with the Sunrise Police Department, Respondent helped build that Department's shooting range and served as an assistant range officer. While serving in this capacity, Respondent held a NRA instructor's certificate and a Class "K" License from the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. While he was employed with the Sunrise Police Department, Respondent started a private security company called Arm Security and Investigations, Inc. (the "Company"). The Company was and is licensed by the Department of State as a private security company. At all pertinent times, Respondent was the president of the Company and he and his wife were the sole shareholders. In order for the security guards employed by the Company to carry a gun while they were on duty, they were required to have a Class "G" statewide firearm license issued by the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. To qualify for a Class "G" license, an applicant was required to meet the requirements of Section 493.306(7)(a), Florida Statutes which provides that an applicant must . . .satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by rule of the Department [of State], which training criteria may include, but are not limited to, sixteen hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a firearms instructor who has been licensed by the Department. Prior to October 1, 1986, the statutory training criteria called for eight hours of classroom and range training. See, Chapter 86-193, Laws of Florida (increasing the training requirements to sixteen hours.) At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the administrative criteria implemented by the Department of State required at least six hours of classroom instruction and three hours of firing range instruction under a licensed instructor. To qualify as a firearms instructor for Class "G" license applicants, an instructor had to obtain a Class "K" license. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent possessed a Class "K" license. On or about March 17, 1987, after receiving a complaint from a former employee of Respondent's corporation, the Department of State, Division of Licensing began an investigation into charges of various violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, by Respondent and his corporation. The investigation revealed that during 1985, 1986, and 1987, Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed firearms instructor, certified on the Class "G" license applications for seven of his employees that the employees had received the requisite classroom and firing range training necessary for the license. Each of the certifications executed by Respondent contained the following statement: III certify that the above- named person has satisfactorily completed the prescribed training as set forth in Section 1C-3.27, Rules of the Department of State." In actuality, none of those employees received the training required under the applicable statutes and rules. All seven of the employees admitted that they had not received the full amount of classroom instruction shown on the license application and that they had not received firing range instruction under Respondent's supervision as reflected in the applications. Six of the employees indicated in affidavits that they had never received training on a firing range under Respondent's supervision. The seventh employee indicated that all of his training was conducted in the office of Arm Security. None of the seven employees certified by Respondent received a waiver or exemption from the prescribed training requirements. Respondent contends that he did not certify any applicant whom he did not believe was qualified. Respondent administered a written NRA test to all applicants and each of them passed. Respondent admits that many of the applicants were not trained on the firing range. However, he contends that he did train them in his office using "non-live" ammunition at reduced, close range targets. The ammunition used included a primer, a cartridge and a casing or head made out of wood with a hole in the back of it. There was no powder in the cartridge. Respondent contends that this training procedure enabled him to adequately assess the capabilities of the applicants. However, Respondent never inquired of the Department of State whether this indoor method could serve as a substitute for training on the firing range. In fact, it appears that Respondent was aware or at least strongly suspected that the applicable statute and rules required the shooting of live ammunition by the applicant on a firing range. Moreover, at least two of the applicants denied ever shooting a firearm in the presence of the Respondent. Thus, it is clear that some of the applicants did not even receive this indoor training. As a result of the Department of State's investigation, Respondent was fined $7,000 and his Class "K" Firearm Instructor License was revoked. At least part of the motivation for Respondent's certification of the seven applicants was to enable them to begin functioning immediately as armed security guards for Respondent's company. After the Department of State discovered the falsified applications, the Class "G" licenses issued to the employees were revoked. At least six of the employees filed new applications and were able to satisfactorily complete the prescribed training under a new instructor on the first attempt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of October, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX The Petitioner has submitted a Proposed Recommended Order. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or in the Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5-9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. Booth, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ernest L. Howey 5016 South Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33405 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether or not on March 16, 1977, the Respondent, Verna A. Robinson, entered the home of Edward Johnson at 1100 Little River Drive, Miami, Florida, and fired several shots at Edward Johnson; who suffered gun shot wounds in the wrist, upper arm and hip. Whether or not this alleged conduct described is in violation of Section 231.36(6), and 231.09, Florida Statutes; together with Rules 6A-4.37, 6H-1 and 6H-5, Florida Administrative Code, in that it is conduct that is grossly immoral and a poor example for students. Further, whether or not such alleged conduct raises serious questions as to the Respondent's emotional preparedness to properly deal with the normal stresses which arise in classroom teaching.
Findings Of Fact This cause is brought upon the notice of charges by the Petitioner, dated September 22, 1977, as amended November 1, 1977. This action is placed against the Respondent, Verna A. Robinson, who is the holder of Florida Teaching Certificate no. 176010, Graduate, Rank II, valid through June 30, 1979; which covers the areas of Elementary Education and Junior College. The charging document prays for the dismissal of the Respondent as an employee of the Dade County School Board. The facts in this case show that the Respondent was acquainted with one Edward Johnson, to the extent that they had been intimate over a period of seven years. By .arch 16, 1977, the relationship between Mrs. Robinson and Mr. Johnson had diminished to some degree. On that date, in the late afternoon, a telephone conversation was held between the Respondent and Johnson. The discussion concerned getting together to attend a movie. Johnson declined to go with Robinson and this was the cause of some consideration on the part of the Respondent. The depth of that consternation was demonstrated when the Respondent went to the home of Johnson, later that afternoon and carried a pistol with her. When she arrived at the Johnson hone she was admitted by Mr. Johnson's son and there ensued a short conversation. It should be indicated that the Johnson and Robinson families were social friends, and Mrs. Johnson worked as a teacher in the same school where the Respondent was employed. After Mrs. Robinson entered the home the son indicated that his father was changing clothes, to which Mrs. Robinson replied "ice doesn't need any clothes". She then approached Johnson, who was in the bedroom area of his home and stated to him "I'll teach you to fuck with me". She then fired several shots, five or six in number, at Johnson, striking him with three-of the bullets in the area of his wrist, shoulder and hip. The wounds were not fatal. The Respondent then turned around and left the house and was followed by the Johnson's teenaged son who threw an object through her windshield as she was departing the scene of the confrontation. During the course of this exchange at the Johnson home, the Johnsons to include the victim, Edward Johnson, his wife and son, did not find the Respondent to be overly excited. The Respondent then went to the home of a fellow teacher one Linda Panapas. When she arrived, Mrs. Panapas described the Respondent as being agitated, disoriented, illogical and incoherent. She said the Respondent stormed about the house speaking in incompleted sentences and Mrs. Panapas found it very difficult to understand what had transpired. She did however discern that something had happened involving a shooting. The Respondent did not indicate who had been shot. Something in the conversation lead Mrs. Panapas to call the Johnson home where she was told that there had been a shooting. One other factor in the shooting which was described by the Respondent, was the fact that she had thrown the gun away afterwards. Early the next morning the Respondent voluntarily surrendered herself to the Dade County Public Safety department. She spoke with a police officer of that organization whose name is John Little. At that time the Respondent was given an opportunity to make a statement. After being advised of her constitutional rights she indicated that she remembered throwing out a gun while driving on Interstate 95 near Northwest 103 Street in Dade County, Florida. At the time of this interview, there was no sign of lack of control of her faculties, that could be detected by the officer. The principal of the elementary school where the Respondent was working at the time of the shooting was contacted on the day after the incident. The school is the Norwood Elementary School, in Dade County, Florida. The principal in that school is Betty Angell. Ms. Angell stated that at the time of the incident she was unaware of the involvement between the Respondent and Johnson. When Robinson contacted the principal she stated that she would be taking some days off, but did not indicate for what reason. Later, on the Sunday following the shooting, Robinson spoke to Ms. Angell at Ms. Angell's residence. Mrs. Robinson explained to Ms. Angell that Robinson and Johnson had, "got to liking each other too much and she had more than she could take." The Respondent was interested in knowing what would happen to her career in view of the incident. It was explained to Mrs. Robinson, by's. Angell, that she might be recommended for suspension or placed in some other school. Mrs. Robinson was not opposed to being placed in another school. During the conversation at the Angell home, the Respondent remained calm and appeared to be sorry for what had happened. The Respondent has not returned to the school where she teaches. According to Ms. Angell, prior to this event, the Respondent had been a teacher of high caliber, even though she recalled a few deficiencies in Mrs. Robinson's teaching effectiveness. Ms. Angell now holds the opinion that Mrs. Robinson's effectiveness as a teacher has been impaired because she has demonstrated an inability to manage conflict and in the mind of Ms. Angell this would translate itself into an ineffectiveness in dealing with the conflicts between the various students in Mrs. Robinson's class. Ms. Angell holds this view, notwithstanding the fact that the children and other people within the community and school are unaware of the incident itself. Moreover, Ms. Angell indicated that steps had been taken to keep the incident from becoming a matter of common knowledge within the community and within the Norwood Elementary School. She has made these efforts because she feels that if the incident became a matter of community knowledge it would create problems on the issue of the effectiveness of Mrs. Robinson. The Respondent was charged with the shooting of Edward Johnson under the terms of Chapters 782.04(1) ad 777.04(1), Florida Statutes. She was tried for those offenses of attempted murder in the first degree, and possession and display of a firearm. The outcome of that trial was a finding that the Respondent was not guilty because she was insane at the time of the commission of the offenses. This decision was reached in view of the opinion of several experts in the field of psychiatry and psychology. The same experts testified in the course of the hearing at bar. The experts testified about their observations of Mrs. Robinson shortly after the shooting and immediately prior to the hearing before the undersigned. The observations of the experts could be summarized; however, they are sufficiently critical to warrant examination separately. One of the specialists who saw the Respondent at the request of the Circuit Court, was Jeffrey J. Elenewski. Mr. Elenewski has a doctorate in clinical psychology. Elenewski saw the Respondent in May, 1977. From his observation he concluded that the Respondent was suffering an accute disassociative reaction at the time of the shooting incident involving Mr. Johnson. This reaction rendered the Respondent out of contact with reality. Elenewski arrived at this opinion after doing psychological testing on the Respondent and through clinical observation of the Respondent. Beginning on June 7, 1977, the Respondent was treated by Dr. Elenewski through individual psychotherapy. He saw her weekly for approximately one hour through the end of September, 1977. She has called and discussed her situation with Dr. Elenewski subsequent to September, 1977, as occasion demanded. On January 30, 1978, Dr. Elenewski saw the Respondent for purposes of examining her mental state in the context of the present time. Again he conducted clinical interviews and gave her a battery of tests. The clinical interview took approximately one hour and the testing a period of two to three hours. His overall opinion of the Respondent based upon his January 30, 1978 observations and prior history, was to the effect that she has made an adequate psychological adjustment after the incident. At the January 30, 1978 session he found her to be relatively free of anxiety, to be energetic and innovative and someone who is extremely conscientious and dedicated to her profession. Dr. Elenewski currently believes the Respondent does not present a danger to herself or to other people, and would not pose any specific danger to children of the age group which she teaches. Moreover, Dr. Elenewski feels that the Respondent possesses attributes that make her an excellent role model for children. In his view, the Respondent has strong self-confidence and through the recent past has developed a high tolerance for frustration. Dr. Elenewski believes that the shooting incident was an isolated incident and is extremely encapsulated and he does not feel that those stresses and pressures which lead to the incident would exist in the future. Because the incident itself was one that the Respondent was not conscious of, it was therefore an act without premeditation, according to Elenewski. The Respondent was also seen by Dr. Syvil Marquit. Dr. Marquit is a clinical psychologist who had examined Mrs. Robinson at the request of Mrs. Robinson's defense attorney. He saw her for a period of six or seven hours in the latter part of April, 1977, this interview sequence followed some initial testing in the beginning of April, 1977. His conclusions about the Respondent were that at the time of the offense, that she did not know right from wrong and was suffering from a frenzied disoriented state, to the extent that another personality emerged. By April, 1977, Dr. Marquis felt that the Respondent was no longer a danger to herself or to others but still might become a danger if not treated. Dr. Marquit saw Mrs. Robinson again on February 3, 1978. At that time the interview phase and psychological testing that was done took place over a period of two hours. He found Mrs. Robinson to be much improved and not as depressed as of the time of the interview in April, 1977. Based upon the February, 1978 observation, Dr. Marquit feels that the Respondent could handle herself well in a classroom setting in times of stress. In summary, Dr. Marquit felt that the Respondent was unaware of the events that took place during the course of the incident, but has sufficiently recovered to be able to continue in her role as a teacher. At the time of the criminal offense, the Circuit Court also ordered the Respondent to be examined by Dr. Arthur D. Stillman. Dr. Stillman is a psychiatrist. Dr. Stillman saw the Respondent in April, 1977. His initial observations of the Respondent was to the effect that she was serious minded and cooperative in a studied way. She was able to respond to the questions readily and had no fragmentation of thinking, looseness, or dysphoria or euphoria. She denied any delusions or hallucinations. Her memory, to his observation, was generally good except for the events in which she was found to be amnesiac. Those events pertained to the incident in question. At best she had vage screen memories of those parts of the incident. From his observations and the testing that was done, Dr. Stillman concluded that the Respondent showed evidence of a psychotic episode. He felt that she needed therapy for her condition, and that she presented potential for acting out. Specifically concerning the events that occurred in the shooting, Dr. Stillman felt that she was suffering from a temporary, transitory episode and was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. Dr. Stillman saw Mrs. Robinson again in February, 1978, in his mind there had been some improvement and although the Respondent was not totally aware of her situation in terms of an emotional perception of the incident, she was improving. In Dr. Stillman's opinion, the patient would benefit from further attention in the area of the difficulty involved in the shooting incident. Dr. Stillman felt like Mrs. Robinson had not achieved enough insight about the why of the events of the shooting incident. The type of treatment that she needs is not a structured treatment plan. However, in his view, the chances of such an event reoccurring are remote. He did not find her to be a danger to herself or others or in particular, children. In Dr. Stillman's mind the Respondent is a good role model because she is stable after having suffered through a rather traumatic experience, and additionally because she got sick and recovered. The incident in itself in Dr. Stillman's opinion is an isolated event, and now he feels that she is sufficiently recovered to deal with stress. In Dr. Stillman's analysis, the sickness caused her to commit the act, not a lack of morality. Finally, Dr. Stillman feels that Mrs. Robinson would be more effective in helping children deal with their problems of stress, because of the experience she has suffered through. One of the other witnesses that testified in the course of the hearing was Samuel Hudson Latimore. Mr. Latimore is the Detention Superintendent of the Dade Detention Facility. This facility deals with juvenile delinquents, and has as one of its functions the education of those children. Beginning in August, 1877, the Respondent volunteered to work in this facility. This voluntary service was not a condition imposed by any court. According to Latimore, the Respondent works at the facility twice a week, two or three hours a day and teaches 10 through 18 year old boys and girls. In his mind, the Respondent has demonstrated herself to he competent and effective in dealing with this type of young person. Latimore stated that she teaches survival skills, and aspects of getting jobs and helped to develop programs for these young people. In Latimore's opinion, its. Robinson would be capable of working with any children in an education setting. He feels that she is very qualified to fulfill this function and believes this even after being made aware of the shooting incident. Mrs. Robinson's husband, her minister and fellow employees at the school where she taught, also gave testimony. Those individuals stated that she has done well in the school setting in the past and has attempted to face up to the problem that lead to the incident with Mr. Johnson. Mr. Robinson, her husband, has stood by his wife during the pendency of the present charges and the criminal prosecution that was brought against her. His testimony demonstrated that he intends to continue living with his wife and to assist her in whatever fashion necessary to deal with the remnants of the problem which she has had. The Petitioner has charged the Respondent with a number of violations. Specifically, a violation of Sections 231.36(6) and 231.09, Florida Statutes; together with Rules 6A-4.37, 6B-1, and 65-5, Florida Administrative Code. The facts when considered in light of the language of those provisions of the Florida Statutes, and the Florida Administrative Code, demonstrate to the Petitioner that the Respondent is guilty of conduct which is grossly immoral and a poor example for students. The Petitioner further feels that those facts show that the Respondent is guilty of conduct which raises serious questions as to whether or not Verna A. Robinson is emotionally prepared to properly deal with the normal stresses which arise in classroom teaching. In examining the basis of the charges, the provisions of Section 231.36(6), reads as follows: Any member of the district administrative or supervisory staff and any member of the instructional staff, including any principal, may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year; provided that no such employee may be discharged or removed during the school year without opportunity to be heard at a public hearing after at least ten days' written notice of the charges against him and of the time and place of hearing; and, provided further that the charges must be based on immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness, or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude. An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, with due regard to the fact that the testimony of the experts in the fields of psychiatry and psychology is unrefuted, leads to the conclusion that the Respondent is not guilty of immorality or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude, as alleged. At the time the offense was committed, the Respondent was found to he insane by the jury, and therefore was not convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. The same opinion which was expressed by the experts, to the effect that the Respondent did not appreciate the nature of her act, leads to the conclusion that she was not capable of committing an immoral act, because such acts of immorality prosuppose intent and knowledge. The Respondent being insane at the time of the commission of the act was incapable of such intent and knowledge. An examination of the provisions of Section 231.09, D-f Florida Statutes, leads to the conclusion that none of the provisions found in the charges have been violated by the act which the Respondent committed, for the reasons discussed in examining Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes, to include the fact that the pupils in her school are unaware of the events for which Mrs. Robinson has been charged. Therefore, it can not be said that what she did is a poor example for pupils in their deportment and morals and in the future the accurate impression which has been offered by the psychiatrist and psychologist shows that she will be an example for people in their deportment and morals. The provision concerning deportment and morals comes directly from the Section 231.09(2), Florida Statutes. It should also be stated that that particular provision has been held unconstitutional in the case of Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, etc., et al., 548 F.2d 559 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals). However, on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, which is reported at 553 F.2d 1008, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing with the right for oral argument and the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, with the date of the oral argument to be announced. That rehearing has been held but no decision has been rendered. Consequently, the remarks about the provision, Section 231.09(2), Florida Statutes, have boon offered with the caution that the section may be ultimately held unconstitutional. In the charging document, the Petitioner makes further reference to certain rules of the Florida Administrative Code. The first reference is to Rule 6A-4.37, Florida Administrative Code. That provision pertains to the procedures to be utilized in cases of this sort, and does not set forth substantive requirements, which if violated would constitute grounds for disciplinary action. Again, Rule 6B-1, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the Code of Ethics of the education profession in the State of Florida; however, it does not delineate substantive requirements which would he cause for consideration under the factual allegations in these charges. Rule 6B-5.07, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: Management Techniques. In exercising management techniques, the competent educator shall: Resolve discipline problems in accordance with law, state board regulations, school board policy, administrative regulations and accepted school policies, Maintain consistency in the application of policy and practice, Use management techniques which are appropriate to the particular setting such as group work, seat work, lecture, discussion, individual projects and others, and Develop and maintain standards of conduct. These provisions should be read in conjunction with the provisions of 6B-5.10 and 5.11, Florida Administrative Code, which state: 65-5.10 Human and Interpersonal Relationships. Competent educators are held to possess effective human and interpersonal relations skills and therefore: Shall encourage others to hold and express differing opinions or ideas, Shall not knowingly misinterpret the statements of others, Shall not show disrespect for or lack of acceptance of others, Shall provide leadership and direction for others by appropriate example, Shall offer constructive criticism when necessary, Shall comply with reasonable requests and orders given by and with proper authority, Shall not assign unreasonable tasks, and Shall demonstrate self-confidence and self- sufficiency in exercising authority. 6D-5.11 Personal Requirements. In assessing the mental or physical health of educators, no decision adverse to the educator shall be made except on the advice or testimony of personnel competent to make such judgment by reason of training, licensure and experience. However, certain behaviors are held to be probable cause to examine, and each competent educator within the scope of delegated authority shall: Be able to engage in physical activity appropriate to the designated task except for temporary disability, Be able to communicate so effectively as to accomplish the designated task, Appropriately control his emotions, and Possess and demonstrate sufficient intellectual ability to perform designated tasks. When these requirements are examined in view of the facts that were offered in the course of the hearing, it is clear that the Respondent is able to resolve those problems of discipline in a proper manner and to deal with the interpersonal relationships between the students, to include students who are having conflict. Moreover, it is clear that the Respondent would be able to control her emotions in the classroom setting and is emotionally prepared to deal with the normal stresses in classroom teaching. In conclusion, the facts do not warrant the dismissal of Verna Armstrong Robinson as an employee of the Dade County School Board.
Recommendation It is recommended that the action for dismissal of the employee Verna Armstrong Robinson, he withdrawn and that Verna Armstrong Robinson be allowed to continue as a teacher employed by the Dade County School Board. It is further recommended that that employment he at some school other than the Norwood Elementary School. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jesse J McCrary, Jr., Esquire 300 Executive Building Suite 300 3050 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137 Elizabeth J. du Fresne, P.A. Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Michael S. Hacker, Esquire Hacker, Phelps & Matters Suite 1400 - Ainsley Building 14 Northeast First Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-660 VERNA ARMSTRONG ROBINSON, Respondent. / ORDER OF THE SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA THIS CAUSE came on for hearing before The School Board of Dade County, Florida, at its regular meeting on June 28, 1978, upon the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order, recommending that the action for dismissal of Verna Robinson be withdrawn and that Verna Robinson be allowed to continue as a teacher employed by the School Board of Dade County, The attorneys for Robinson and the School Board have waived the 90-day requirement for rendition of orders under the provisions of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. IT IS THEREUPON ORDERED by The School Board of Dade County, Florida that: The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact; attached hereto, are adopted by the School Board of Dade County, Florida. The Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law are modified to the following extent and effect: Paragraph one of the Conclusions of Law is accepted. Paragraph two of the Conclusions of Law is rejected in that the action of the respondent, Verna Robinson, was immoral and cause for dismissal under the provisions of Florida Statutes section 231.36(6), and not in keeping with the duties of instructional personnel set forth in Florida Statutes section 331.09, and the Florida Administrative Code Chapter 6B-1 or Chapter 6B-5. Verna Robinson be and is hereby dismissed from her employment with The School Board of Dade County, Florida and that Verna Robinson shall receive no compensation from The School Board of Dade County, Florida from March 23, 1977 at 5:00 p.m. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th Day of July, 1978. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA Phyllis Miller, Chairman
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Irving Weissbrod (Weissbrod) held a Class "K" Firearms Instructor Licence Number K87-00026 /1 , which allowed him to provide classroom and range instruction to applicants for a Class "G" license. Weissbrod has been teaching the firearms qualification course since 1987. Weissbrod was required by Rule 1C-3.128, Florida Administrative Code, to use the Department of State, Division of Licensing's Firearms Instructor's Training Manual (Training Manual) in teaching the course for a Class "G" license. In early March, 1995, Richard Thomas Railton (Railton), an investigator for the Respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), was given the assignment to attend a Class "G" training course which was being given by Weissbrod through his business, Florida Firearms Corp. The purpose of the assignment was to determine whether the training being given met the minimum hours required by statute. Railton called Weissbrod to arrange for the class. Weissbrod told Railton that the cost of the course was $144.00. Railton obtained the money from the Department and converted the funds to a money order payable to Florida Firearms for $144.00. Railton identified himself to Weissbrod as Richard Thomas. On March 14, 1995, Railton went to Florida Firearms, where the class was to be conducted. He arrived around 6:45 p.m. There were two other students in the class, Paul Stephenson and an unidentified male. When Railton arrived at the class, he advised Weissbrod that he had extensive experience with firearms, that he had been a policeman for seven or eight years, and that he was currently a private investigator. Stephenson advised Weissbrod that he had been a private investigator for about ten years and that he had a lot of firearm training. The third student had no training in firearms. The Training Manual requires that an instructor provide 13 hours of instruction on the legal aspects of the use of firearms; fours hours of instruction on operational firearms safety; three hours of firearms mechanical training; and eight hours of firearms range qualification. The class started at 7:05 p.m. During the first fifteen minutes of class, Weissbrod processed the students' paperwork, collected fees, and gave receipts. When Railton paid his fees, Weissbrod charged him only $134.00 because Railton did not need to have a photograph taken for his license application. Weissbrod told the class that he taught an accelerated class and that he could teach the required information in less time than the state requirement of 28 hours. From 7:20 to 7:40 p.m., Weissbrod explained the definitions of misdemeanors and felonies and discussed firearm violations in the two categories. He also discussed the meaning of reasonable and deadly force. From 7:40 to 8:10 p.m., Weissbrod passed out copies of an examination and reviewed the questions and answers with the students. While they were reviewing the examination, Weissbrod remarked, "I'll be out of here real early tonight." At 8:10 p.m. Weissbrod passed out an examination for the students to complete. By 8:35, the students had completed the examination. Both Railton and Stephenson passed the written test. Weissbrod told them to meet at Big Al's Gun Range the next evening at 7:30 p.m. for range qualification. Weissbrod told one student that they would be finished with the range qualification by 8:00 p.m. On March 15, 1995, Railton and Stephenson met Weissbrod at the firing range at 7:30 p.m. The third student did not participate in the range qualifications on that evening. Railton and Stephenson fired their guns and their targets were scored. Both men passed the range qualifications. Weissbrod issued certifications to Railton and Stephenson, stating that they had received 28 hours of training. Weissbrod admitted that Railton and Stephenson received less than the 28 hours required by Section 493.6115(8), Florida Statutes; however, he submits that it was an isolated incident, and no evidence was presented to the contrary. Notwithstanding, his violations were flagrant and, whether isolated or not, were knowingly committed. On March 22, 1995, the Department issued an Emergency Suspension Order, alleging that Weissbrod committed fraud, deceit, negligence or misconduct in the practice of regulated activities under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, based on essentially the same facts that are alleged in Counts I through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint. On April 13, 1995, an Order was issued vacating the Emergency Suspension Order. Thus, Weissbrod had been effectively suspended by the Department from March 22, 1995 to April 13, 1995, a period of 22 days.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order finding that Irving Weissbrod violated Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes as set forth in Counts I through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint and imposing an administrative fine of $300 for each Count (a total of $1800) and suspending his license for one month. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Ricardo Cabrera, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services, on March 9, 2005, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the licensure of individuals who wish to install and maintain fire suppression equipment and the investigation and prosecution of complaints against individuals who have been licensed in Florida. See Ch. 633, Fla. Stat. Respondent, Ricardo Cabrera, is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed Fire Equipment Dealer, Class C, in the State of Florida. Mr. Cabrera, who first applied for licensure as a Fire Equipment Dealer, Class C, on or about October 10, 1989, was issued license number 70219300011990 on January 17, 1990. The Department has jurisdiction over Mr. Cabrera’s licenses. Criminal Case. On or about October 20, 1989, after Mr. Cabrera had first applied for licensure by the Department, a criminal Information was filed in case number 89-38498, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, charging that on September 30, 1989, Mr. Cabrera, unlawfully and feloniously had in his actual or constructive possession cocaine, a controlled substance. On or about December 12, 1989, Mr. Cabrera pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. Adjudication was withheld on the charge, and Mr. Cabrera was sentenced to probation for a period of one year and was ordered to successfully complete the T.A.S.C. drug program, a narcotics treatment program. As a result of the fact that the court withheld adjudication of guilt, Mr. Cabrera did not lose any civil rights. Mr. Cabrera's 1998 License Renewal Application; Count I. Mr. Cabrera applied for renewal of his license as a Fire Equipment Dealer, Class C, on or about December 5, 1998. Mr. Cabrera was asked and answered in the negative the following question on the application for renewal he filed with the Department: “Have you ever been convicted or pled nolo contendere to a felony?” The question, "[h]ave you ever been convicted or pled nolo contendere to a felony” is clear and understandable. Given Mr. Cabrera's plea of nolo contendere to the felony of possession of cocaine on December 12, 1989, the only reasonable response to this question Mr. Cabrera should have given was "yes." Mr. Cabrera has given no explanation as to why he failed to answer the question truthfully. Mr. Cabrera's license renewal application was received by the Department on or about December 21, 1998, and the renewal of his Fire Equipment Dealer, Class C, license was granted on June 14, 1999. Mr. Cabrera's 1999 License Renewal Application; Count II. Mr. Cabrera again applied for renewal of his license as a Fire Equipment Dealer, Class C, on or about December 6, 1999. Mr. Cabrera was asked and answered in the negative the following question on the application for renewal he filed with the Department: “Have you ever been convicted or pled nolo contendere to a felony?” The question, "[h]ave you ever been convicted or pled nolo contendere to a felony” is clear and understandable. Given Mr. Cabrera's plea of nolo contendere to the felony of possession of cocaine on December 12, 1989, the only reasonable response to this question Mr. Cabrera should have given was "yes." Mr. Cabrera has given no explanation as to why he failed to answer the question truthfully. Mr. Cabrera's license renewal application was received by the Department on or about December 13, 1999, and the renewal of his Fire Equipment Dealer, Class C, license was granted on December 15, 1999. Mitigating/Aggravating Factors. An Administrative Complaint was filed against Mr. Cabrera on or about December 30, 1994, as Qualifier for BC & ABC Fire Extinguisher Maintenance, alleging that he maintained two places of business without separate Fire Equipment Dealer licenses and qualifiers for each, and that he allowed an unlicensed person to conduct the business of a Fire Equipment Dealer. On or about August 8, 1995, Mr. Cabrera was placed on probation for two years and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00. An Administrative Complaint was filed against Mr. Cabrera on or about June 29, 2004, as Qualifier for BC & ABC Fire Extinguisher Maintenance, alleging that he allowed the insurance required to be carried by Section 633.061, Florida Statutes, for the business to lapse. On or about February 11, 2005, Mr. Cabrera was placed on probation for one year and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department: Finding that Mr. Cabrera, did not violate Section 633.162(4)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I & II of the Administrative Complaint; Finding that Mr. Cabrera, violated Section 633.162(4)(g), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I & II of the Administrative Complaint; and Revoking Mr. Cabrera's license for a period of four years from the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005.
