The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses, their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: Respondent, Ernest L. Howey ("Howey"), was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission") on June 4, 1970 having been issued Certificate No. 763. At all times material to the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent maintained that certification. Respondent was employed as police officer with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department from January 9, 1984 to February 8, 1989. Respondent was terminated from the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department on February 8, 1989 for conduct prejudicial to the good order of the Department. The grounds for his termination were essentially the same as those alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint in this proceeding. Prior to beginning work with the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, Respondent was employed by the Sunrise Police Department. While he was with the Sunrise Police Department, Respondent helped build that Department's shooting range and served as an assistant range officer. While serving in this capacity, Respondent held a NRA instructor's certificate and a Class "K" License from the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. While he was employed with the Sunrise Police Department, Respondent started a private security company called Arm Security and Investigations, Inc. (the "Company"). The Company was and is licensed by the Department of State as a private security company. At all pertinent times, Respondent was the president of the Company and he and his wife were the sole shareholders. In order for the security guards employed by the Company to carry a gun while they were on duty, they were required to have a Class "G" statewide firearm license issued by the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing. To qualify for a Class "G" license, an applicant was required to meet the requirements of Section 493.306(7)(a), Florida Statutes which provides that an applicant must . . .satisfy minimum training criteria for firearms established by rule of the Department [of State], which training criteria may include, but are not limited to, sixteen hours of range and classroom training taught and administered by a firearms instructor who has been licensed by the Department. Prior to October 1, 1986, the statutory training criteria called for eight hours of classroom and range training. See, Chapter 86-193, Laws of Florida (increasing the training requirements to sixteen hours.) At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the administrative criteria implemented by the Department of State required at least six hours of classroom instruction and three hours of firing range instruction under a licensed instructor. To qualify as a firearms instructor for Class "G" license applicants, an instructor had to obtain a Class "K" license. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent possessed a Class "K" license. On or about March 17, 1987, after receiving a complaint from a former employee of Respondent's corporation, the Department of State, Division of Licensing began an investigation into charges of various violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, by Respondent and his corporation. The investigation revealed that during 1985, 1986, and 1987, Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed firearms instructor, certified on the Class "G" license applications for seven of his employees that the employees had received the requisite classroom and firing range training necessary for the license. Each of the certifications executed by Respondent contained the following statement: III certify that the above- named person has satisfactorily completed the prescribed training as set forth in Section 1C-3.27, Rules of the Department of State." In actuality, none of those employees received the training required under the applicable statutes and rules. All seven of the employees admitted that they had not received the full amount of classroom instruction shown on the license application and that they had not received firing range instruction under Respondent's supervision as reflected in the applications. Six of the employees indicated in affidavits that they had never received training on a firing range under Respondent's supervision. The seventh employee indicated that all of his training was conducted in the office of Arm Security. None of the seven employees certified by Respondent received a waiver or exemption from the prescribed training requirements. Respondent contends that he did not certify any applicant whom he did not believe was qualified. Respondent administered a written NRA test to all applicants and each of them passed. Respondent admits that many of the applicants were not trained on the firing range. However, he contends that he did train them in his office using "non-live" ammunition at reduced, close range targets. The ammunition used included a primer, a cartridge and a casing or head made out of wood with a hole in the back of it. There was no powder in the cartridge. Respondent contends that this training procedure enabled him to adequately assess the capabilities of the applicants. However, Respondent never inquired of the Department of State whether this indoor method could serve as a substitute for training on the firing range. In fact, it appears that Respondent was aware or at least strongly suspected that the applicable statute and rules required the shooting of live ammunition by the applicant on a firing range. Moreover, at least two of the applicants denied ever shooting a firearm in the presence of the Respondent. Thus, it is clear that some of the applicants did not even receive this indoor training. As a result of the Department of State's investigation, Respondent was fined $7,000 and his Class "K" Firearm Instructor License was revoked. At least part of the motivation for Respondent's certification of the seven applicants was to enable them to begin functioning immediately as armed security guards for Respondent's company. After the Department of State discovered the falsified applications, the Class "G" licenses issued to the employees were revoked. At least six of the employees filed new applications and were able to satisfactorily complete the prescribed training under a new instructor on the first attempt.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of October, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX The Petitioner has submitted a Proposed Recommended Order. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or in the Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5-9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. Booth, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ernest L. Howey 5016 South Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33405 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether or not on March 16, 1977, the Respondent, Verna A. Robinson, entered the home of Edward Johnson at 1100 Little River Drive, Miami, Florida, and fired several shots at Edward Johnson; who suffered gun shot wounds in the wrist, upper arm and hip. Whether or not this alleged conduct described is in violation of Section 231.36(6), and 231.09, Florida Statutes; together with Rules 6A-4.37, 6H-1 and 6H-5, Florida Administrative Code, in that it is conduct that is grossly immoral and a poor example for students. Further, whether or not such alleged conduct raises serious questions as to the Respondent's emotional preparedness to properly deal with the normal stresses which arise in classroom teaching.
Findings Of Fact This cause is brought upon the notice of charges by the Petitioner, dated September 22, 1977, as amended November 1, 1977. This action is placed against the Respondent, Verna A. Robinson, who is the holder of Florida Teaching Certificate no. 176010, Graduate, Rank II, valid through June 30, 1979; which covers the areas of Elementary Education and Junior College. The charging document prays for the dismissal of the Respondent as an employee of the Dade County School Board. The facts in this case show that the Respondent was acquainted with one Edward Johnson, to the extent that they had been intimate over a period of seven years. By .arch 16, 1977, the relationship between Mrs. Robinson and Mr. Johnson had diminished to some degree. On that date, in the late afternoon, a telephone conversation was held between the Respondent and Johnson. The discussion concerned getting together to attend a movie. Johnson declined to go with Robinson and this was the cause of some consideration on the part of the Respondent. The depth of that consternation was demonstrated when the Respondent went to the home of Johnson, later that afternoon and carried a pistol with her. When she arrived at the Johnson hone she was admitted by Mr. Johnson's son and there ensued a short conversation. It should be indicated that the Johnson and Robinson families were social friends, and Mrs. Johnson worked as a teacher in the same school where the Respondent was employed. After Mrs. Robinson entered the home the son indicated that his father was changing clothes, to which Mrs. Robinson replied "ice doesn't need any clothes". She then approached Johnson, who was in the bedroom area of his home and stated to him "I'll teach you to fuck with me". She then fired several shots, five or six in number, at Johnson, striking him with three-of the bullets in the area of his wrist, shoulder and hip. The wounds were not fatal. The Respondent then turned around and left the house and was followed by the Johnson's teenaged son who threw an object through her windshield as she was departing the scene of the confrontation. During the course of this exchange at the Johnson home, the Johnsons to include the victim, Edward Johnson, his wife and son, did not find the Respondent to be overly excited. The Respondent then went to the home of a fellow teacher one Linda Panapas. When she arrived, Mrs. Panapas described the Respondent as being agitated, disoriented, illogical and incoherent. She said the Respondent stormed about the house speaking in incompleted sentences and Mrs. Panapas found it very difficult to understand what had transpired. She did however discern that something had happened involving a shooting. The Respondent did not indicate who had been shot. Something in the conversation lead Mrs. Panapas to call the Johnson home where she was told that there had been a shooting. One other factor in the shooting which was described by the Respondent, was the fact that she had thrown the gun away afterwards. Early the next morning the Respondent voluntarily surrendered herself to the Dade County Public Safety department. She spoke with a police officer of that organization whose name is John Little. At that time the Respondent was given an opportunity to make a statement. After being advised of her constitutional rights she indicated that she remembered throwing out a gun while driving on Interstate 95 near Northwest 103 Street in Dade County, Florida. At the time of this interview, there was no sign of lack of control of her faculties, that could be detected by the officer. The principal of the elementary school where the Respondent was working at the time of the shooting was contacted on the day after the incident. The school is the Norwood Elementary School, in Dade County, Florida. The principal in that school is Betty Angell. Ms. Angell stated that at the time of the incident she was unaware of the involvement between the Respondent and Johnson. When Robinson contacted the principal she stated that she would be taking some days off, but did not indicate for what reason. Later, on the Sunday following the shooting, Robinson spoke to Ms. Angell at Ms. Angell's residence. Mrs. Robinson explained to Ms. Angell that Robinson and Johnson had, "got to liking each other too much and she had more than she could take." The Respondent was interested in knowing what would happen to her career in view of the incident. It was explained to Mrs. Robinson, by's. Angell, that she might be recommended for suspension or placed in some other school. Mrs. Robinson was not opposed to being placed in another school. During the conversation at the Angell home, the Respondent remained calm and appeared to be sorry for what had happened. The Respondent has not returned to the school where she teaches. According to Ms. Angell, prior to this event, the Respondent had been a teacher of high caliber, even though she recalled a few deficiencies in Mrs. Robinson's teaching effectiveness. Ms. Angell now holds the opinion that Mrs. Robinson's effectiveness as a teacher has been impaired because she has demonstrated an inability to manage conflict and in the mind of Ms. Angell this would translate itself into an ineffectiveness in dealing with the conflicts between the various students in Mrs. Robinson's class. Ms. Angell holds this view, notwithstanding the fact that the children and other people within the community and school are unaware of the incident itself. Moreover, Ms. Angell indicated that steps had been taken to keep the incident from becoming a matter of common knowledge within the community and within the Norwood Elementary School. She has made these efforts because she feels that if the incident became a matter of community knowledge it would create problems on the issue of the effectiveness of Mrs. Robinson. The Respondent was charged with the shooting of Edward Johnson under the terms of Chapters 782.04(1) ad 777.04(1), Florida Statutes. She was tried for those offenses of attempted murder in the first degree, and possession and display of a firearm. The outcome of that trial was a finding that the Respondent was not guilty because she was insane at the time of the commission of the offenses. This decision was reached in view of the opinion of several experts in the field of psychiatry and psychology. The same experts testified in the course of the hearing at bar. The experts testified about their observations of Mrs. Robinson shortly after the shooting and immediately prior to the hearing before the undersigned. The observations of the experts could be summarized; however, they are sufficiently critical to warrant examination separately. One of the specialists who saw the Respondent at the request of the Circuit Court, was Jeffrey J. Elenewski. Mr. Elenewski has a doctorate in clinical psychology. Elenewski saw the Respondent in May, 1977. From his observation he concluded that the Respondent was suffering an accute disassociative reaction at the time of the shooting incident involving Mr. Johnson. This reaction rendered the Respondent out of contact with reality. Elenewski arrived at this opinion after doing psychological testing on the Respondent and through clinical observation of the Respondent. Beginning on June 7, 1977, the Respondent was treated by Dr. Elenewski through individual psychotherapy. He saw her weekly for approximately one hour through the end of September, 1977. She has called and discussed her situation with Dr. Elenewski subsequent to September, 1977, as occasion demanded. On January 30, 1978, Dr. Elenewski saw the Respondent for purposes of examining her mental state in the context of the present time. Again he conducted clinical interviews and gave her a battery of tests. The clinical interview took approximately one hour and the testing a period of two to three hours. His overall opinion of the Respondent based upon his January 30, 1978 observations and prior history, was to the effect that she has made an adequate psychological adjustment after the incident. At the January 30, 1978 session he found her to be relatively free of anxiety, to be energetic and innovative and someone who is extremely conscientious and dedicated to her profession. Dr. Elenewski currently believes the Respondent does not present a danger to herself or to other people, and would not pose any specific danger to children of the age group which she teaches. Moreover, Dr. Elenewski feels that the Respondent possesses attributes that make her an excellent role model for children. In his view, the Respondent has strong self-confidence and through the recent past has developed a high tolerance for frustration. Dr. Elenewski believes that the shooting incident was an isolated incident and is extremely encapsulated and he does not feel that those stresses and pressures which lead to the incident would exist in the future. Because the incident itself was one that the Respondent was not conscious of, it was therefore an act without premeditation, according to Elenewski. The Respondent was also seen by Dr. Syvil Marquit. Dr. Marquit is a clinical psychologist who had examined Mrs. Robinson at the request of Mrs. Robinson's defense attorney. He saw her for a period of six or seven hours in the latter part of April, 1977, this interview sequence followed some initial testing in the beginning of April, 1977. His conclusions about the Respondent were that at the time of the offense, that she did not know right from wrong and was suffering from a frenzied disoriented state, to the extent that another personality emerged. By April, 1977, Dr. Marquis felt that the Respondent was no longer a danger to herself or to others but still might become a danger if not treated. Dr. Marquit saw Mrs. Robinson again on February 3, 1978. At that time the interview phase and psychological testing that was done took place over a period of two hours. He found Mrs. Robinson to be much improved and not as depressed as of the time of the interview in April, 1977. Based upon the February, 1978 observation, Dr. Marquit feels that the Respondent could handle herself well in a classroom setting in times of stress. In summary, Dr. Marquit felt that the Respondent was unaware of the events that took place during the course of the incident, but has sufficiently recovered to be able to continue in her role as a teacher. At the time of the criminal offense, the Circuit Court also ordered the Respondent to be examined by Dr. Arthur D. Stillman. Dr. Stillman is a psychiatrist. Dr. Stillman saw the Respondent in April, 1977. His initial observations of the Respondent was to the effect that she was serious minded and cooperative in a studied way. She was able to respond to the questions readily and had no fragmentation of thinking, looseness, or dysphoria or euphoria. She denied any delusions or hallucinations. Her memory, to his observation, was generally good except for the events in which she was found to be amnesiac. Those events pertained to the incident in question. At best she had vage screen memories of those parts of the incident. From his observations and the testing that was done, Dr. Stillman concluded that the Respondent showed evidence of a psychotic episode. He felt that she needed therapy for her condition, and that she presented potential for acting out. Specifically concerning the events that occurred in the shooting, Dr. Stillman felt that she was suffering from a temporary, transitory episode and was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. Dr. Stillman saw Mrs. Robinson again in February, 1978, in his mind there had been some improvement and although the Respondent was not totally aware of her situation in terms of an emotional perception of the incident, she was improving. In Dr. Stillman's opinion, the patient would benefit from further attention in the area of the difficulty involved in the shooting incident. Dr. Stillman felt like Mrs. Robinson had not achieved enough insight about the why of the events of the shooting incident. The type of treatment that she needs is not a structured treatment plan. However, in his view, the chances of such an event reoccurring are remote. He did not find her to be a danger to herself or others or in particular, children. In Dr. Stillman's mind the Respondent is a good role model because she is stable after having suffered through a rather traumatic experience, and additionally because she got sick and recovered. The incident in itself in Dr. Stillman's opinion is an isolated event, and now he feels that she is sufficiently recovered to deal with stress. In Dr. Stillman's analysis, the sickness caused her to commit the act, not a lack of morality. Finally, Dr. Stillman feels that Mrs. Robinson would be more effective in helping children deal with their problems of stress, because of the experience she has suffered through. One of the other witnesses that testified in the course of the hearing was Samuel Hudson Latimore. Mr. Latimore is the Detention Superintendent of the Dade Detention Facility. This facility deals with juvenile delinquents, and has as one of its functions the education of those children. Beginning in August, 1877, the Respondent volunteered to work in this facility. This voluntary service was not a condition imposed by any court. According to Latimore, the Respondent works at the facility twice a week, two or three hours a day and teaches 10 through 18 year old boys and girls. In his mind, the Respondent has demonstrated herself to he competent and effective in dealing with this type of young person. Latimore stated that she teaches survival skills, and aspects of getting jobs and helped to develop programs for these young people. In Latimore's opinion, its. Robinson would be capable of working with any children in an education setting. He feels that she is very qualified to fulfill this function and believes this even after being made aware of the shooting incident. Mrs. Robinson's husband, her minister and fellow employees at the school where she taught, also gave testimony. Those individuals stated that she has done well in the school setting in the past and has attempted to face up to the problem that lead to the incident with Mr. Johnson. Mr. Robinson, her husband, has stood by his wife during the pendency of the present charges and the criminal prosecution that was brought against her. His testimony demonstrated that he intends to continue living with his wife and to assist her in whatever fashion necessary to deal with the remnants of the problem which she has had. The Petitioner has charged the Respondent with a number of violations. Specifically, a violation of Sections 231.36(6) and 231.09, Florida Statutes; together with Rules 6A-4.37, 6B-1, and 65-5, Florida Administrative Code. The facts when considered in light of the language of those provisions of the Florida Statutes, and the Florida Administrative Code, demonstrate to the Petitioner that the Respondent is guilty of conduct which is grossly immoral and a poor example for students. The Petitioner further feels that those facts show that the Respondent is guilty of conduct which raises serious questions as to whether or not Verna A. Robinson is emotionally prepared to properly deal with the normal stresses which arise in classroom teaching. In examining the basis of the charges, the provisions of Section 231.36(6), reads as follows: Any member of the district administrative or supervisory staff and any member of the instructional staff, including any principal, may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year; provided that no such employee may be discharged or removed during the school year without opportunity to be heard at a public hearing after at least ten days' written notice of the charges against him and of the time and place of hearing; and, provided further that the charges must be based on immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness, or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude. An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, with due regard to the fact that the testimony of the experts in the fields of psychiatry and psychology is unrefuted, leads to the conclusion that the Respondent is not guilty of immorality or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude, as alleged. At the time the offense was committed, the Respondent was found to he insane by the jury, and therefore was not convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. The same opinion which was expressed by the experts, to the effect that the Respondent did not appreciate the nature of her act, leads to the conclusion that she was not capable of committing an immoral act, because such acts of immorality prosuppose intent and knowledge. The Respondent being insane at the time of the commission of the act was incapable of such intent and knowledge. An examination of the provisions of Section 231.09, D-f Florida Statutes, leads to the conclusion that none of the provisions found in the charges have been violated by the act which the Respondent committed, for the reasons discussed in examining Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes, to include the fact that the pupils in her school are unaware of the events for which Mrs. Robinson has been charged. Therefore, it can not be said that what she did is a poor example for pupils in their deportment and morals and in the future the accurate impression which has been offered by the psychiatrist and psychologist shows that she will be an example for people in their deportment and morals. The provision concerning deportment and morals comes directly from the Section 231.09(2), Florida Statutes. It should also be stated that that particular provision has been held unconstitutional in the case of Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, etc., et al., 548 F.2d 559 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals). However, on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, which is reported at 553 F.2d 1008, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing with the right for oral argument and the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, with the date of the oral argument to be announced. That rehearing has been held but no decision has been rendered. Consequently, the remarks about the provision, Section 231.09(2), Florida Statutes, have boon offered with the caution that the section may be ultimately held unconstitutional. In the charging document, the Petitioner makes further reference to certain rules of the Florida Administrative Code. The first reference is to Rule 6A-4.37, Florida Administrative Code. That provision pertains to the procedures to be utilized in cases of this sort, and does not set forth substantive requirements, which if violated would constitute grounds for disciplinary action. Again, Rule 6B-1, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the Code of Ethics of the education profession in the State of Florida; however, it does not delineate substantive requirements which would he cause for consideration under the factual allegations in these charges. Rule 6B-5.07, Florida Administrative Code, reads as follows: Management Techniques. In exercising management techniques, the competent educator shall: Resolve discipline problems in accordance with law, state board regulations, school board policy, administrative regulations and accepted school policies, Maintain consistency in the application of policy and practice, Use management techniques which are appropriate to the particular setting such as group work, seat work, lecture, discussion, individual projects and others, and Develop and maintain standards of conduct. These provisions should be read in conjunction with the provisions of 6B-5.10 and 5.11, Florida Administrative Code, which state: 65-5.10 Human and Interpersonal Relationships. Competent educators are held to possess effective human and interpersonal relations skills and therefore: Shall encourage others to hold and express differing opinions or ideas, Shall not knowingly misinterpret the statements of others, Shall not show disrespect for or lack of acceptance of others, Shall provide leadership and direction for others by appropriate example, Shall offer constructive criticism when necessary, Shall comply with reasonable requests and orders given by and with proper authority, Shall not assign unreasonable tasks, and Shall demonstrate self-confidence and self- sufficiency in exercising authority. 6D-5.11 Personal Requirements. In assessing the mental or physical health of educators, no decision adverse to the educator shall be made except on the advice or testimony of personnel competent to make such judgment by reason of training, licensure and experience. However, certain behaviors are held to be probable cause to examine, and each competent educator within the scope of delegated authority shall: Be able to engage in physical activity appropriate to the designated task except for temporary disability, Be able to communicate so effectively as to accomplish the designated task, Appropriately control his emotions, and Possess and demonstrate sufficient intellectual ability to perform designated tasks. When these requirements are examined in view of the facts that were offered in the course of the hearing, it is clear that the Respondent is able to resolve those problems of discipline in a proper manner and to deal with the interpersonal relationships between the students, to include students who are having conflict. Moreover, it is clear that the Respondent would be able to control her emotions in the classroom setting and is emotionally prepared to deal with the normal stresses in classroom teaching. In conclusion, the facts do not warrant the dismissal of Verna Armstrong Robinson as an employee of the Dade County School Board.
Recommendation It is recommended that the action for dismissal of the employee Verna Armstrong Robinson, he withdrawn and that Verna Armstrong Robinson be allowed to continue as a teacher employed by the Dade County School Board. It is further recommended that that employment he at some school other than the Norwood Elementary School. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jesse J McCrary, Jr., Esquire 300 Executive Building Suite 300 3050 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137 Elizabeth J. du Fresne, P.A. Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Michael S. Hacker, Esquire Hacker, Phelps & Matters Suite 1400 - Ainsley Building 14 Northeast First Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-660 VERNA ARMSTRONG ROBINSON, Respondent. / ORDER OF THE SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA THIS CAUSE came on for hearing before The School Board of Dade County, Florida, at its regular meeting on June 28, 1978, upon the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order, recommending that the action for dismissal of Verna Robinson be withdrawn and that Verna Robinson be allowed to continue as a teacher employed by the School Board of Dade County, The attorneys for Robinson and the School Board have waived the 90-day requirement for rendition of orders under the provisions of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. IT IS THEREUPON ORDERED by The School Board of Dade County, Florida that: The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact; attached hereto, are adopted by the School Board of Dade County, Florida. The Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law are modified to the following extent and effect: Paragraph one of the Conclusions of Law is accepted. Paragraph two of the Conclusions of Law is rejected in that the action of the respondent, Verna Robinson, was immoral and cause for dismissal under the provisions of Florida Statutes section 231.36(6), and not in keeping with the duties of instructional personnel set forth in Florida Statutes section 331.09, and the Florida Administrative Code Chapter 6B-1 or Chapter 6B-5. Verna Robinson be and is hereby dismissed from her employment with The School Board of Dade County, Florida and that Verna Robinson shall receive no compensation from The School Board of Dade County, Florida from March 23, 1977 at 5:00 p.m. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th Day of July, 1978. THE SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA Phyllis Miller, Chairman
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue for consideration in these cases is whether the licenses held by Respondents should be disciplined in some manner because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaints filed herein by the Department of State's Division of Licensing.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Unlimited Crime Prevention, Inc., was licensed in Florida as a "Class B" Security Agency holding license number B98-00127. Respondent William Larue Scott, was the President/Manager of UCP and held a "Class D' security officer license number D93- 19846, a "Class G" statewide firearms license number G94- 03199, and a "Class ZB" organizational officer position license number ZB98-00179. William Shane Scott, son of William Larue Scott and an employee of UCP, held a "Class D" security officer license number D96-07113, a "Class ZB" organizational officer position license number ZB98-00180, and a "Class G" statewide firearms license number G97-01150. The Department of State, Division of Licensing, was then and is the state agency responsible for the licensing of non- certified security personnel and agencies and for the regulation of the non-governmental security industry in Florida. On June 7, 2000, Garry Floyd, an investigator with the Division since 1981, received a complaint that two security officers from UCP had been observed by security officers from another security firm working at a site while carrying unauthorized weapons. Security officers are authorized to carry certain weapons but not nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistols. Upon receipt of the complaint, Mr. Floyd sent a telefax message to UCP's President/Manager, Mr. William L. Scott, asking for an explanation. The following day, an individual who identified himself as Mr. William L. Scott, called and said he had received Mr. Floyd's message and was looking into the matter. At this point, Mr. Scott said he was one of the two security officers involved but that he and his associate were carrying revolvers, not semi-automatic weapons. Thereafter, on June 11, 2000, Mr. Scott sent Mr. Floyd a telefaxed memorandum in which he reiterated his denial of the allegations as to the weapons carried, explained that the allegations occurred because of animosity toward his firm, and requested the investigation be terminated because of a lack of evidence. On June 27, 2000, Mr. Floyd met with Robert Shank, the other security officer alleged to have been carrying the unauthorized weapon and questioned him about the allegations. Shank vehemently denied the allegations and continued to do so even after Floyd said he did not believe him. On July 3, 2000, Mr. Floyd went to Mr. Scott's home where Scott maintained UCP's home office. Though Floyd went there with the intention of speaking with Mr. Scott, he was unable to do so and spoke, instead, with Mrs. Scott, whom he asked to have Mr. Scott call him. Mr. Scott did not call as requested, however. Thereafter, on July 17, 2000, Mr. Floyd went to UCP's new office, but because so many other people were there, so as not to embarrass Mr. Scott, he made an appointment to come back on August 2, 2000. When Mr. Floyd spoke with Mr. Scott on August 2, 2000, he gave Mr. Scott a list of questions he had written down. Scott said he was not ready to admit anything and would not answer any questions, orally or in writing. As of the hearing, Mr. Scott had not answered any of the questions posed by Mr. Floyd. The questions are simple. They ask, primarily, about the ownership of the company and the positions held therein by both Scott and his son, as well as whether he has ever allowed any employee to carry semi-automatic weapons. Mr. Floyd also met with Eric Hege, an employee of UCP, and provided him with a list of eight questions, two of which concerned the type of firearms carried by Mr. Scott. However, Mr. Hege refused to answer the questionnaire. This stymied Mr. Floyd's investigation, and he could proceed no further with it. However, sometime during the first week of July, 2000, Mr. Floyd received a complaint from a local police department that UCP was using an unlawful scheme of colored lights on its vehicles. When he went to various places where ICP's vehicles were located, he saw that they did have unlawfully colored lights which could give the impression they were official police vehicles. One vehicle had a green light on the seat, and another had a blue light. Blue lights are not allowed on civilian vehicles. Only amber-colored emergency lights are allowed on civilian vehicles. Mr. Shank previously held a license to carry a semi- automatic weapon, but not during the period he was employed performing security duties for Respondent. He surrendered that license after he, too, was charged with carrying an unauthorized weapon. Though he was not licensed to do so, while he was on duty with UCP, he carried a semi-automatic weapon or, in the alternative, a revolver. He started carrying the revolver so that he would not violate the law. Mr. Shank is certain that William L. Scott knew he was carrying an unauthorized weapon because Scott purchased revolvers for himself and the others in July 2000, so they would not be in violation of the law. When Shank had pointed out that the semi-automatic weapons were against state law, William L. Scott replied, "Fuck the State. The statutes don't mean anything." On June 2, 2000, Mr. Shank, with William L. Scott's son and several other employees of UCP, was working as a security officer at The Harbor Club in Pinellas County. At that time he was carrying a semi-automatic weapon, as was Mr. Scott's son. He was of the opinion at the time that William L. Scott's approach was to violate the law regarding weapons and deny it if caught. In late July or early August 2000, William L. Scott held a meeting of his employees at which time he instructed them, among other things, that if Mr. Floyd were to contact them about the incident at The Harbor Club, they were not to give him any information. He also provided each security officer with a letter which instructed them, in the event they were contacted by any personnel from the Division of Licensing, to immediately notify their supervisor and to advise the state personnel that they could not be distracted from their duties. Employees were not to speak with a state employee until a supervisor had relieved him, nor were they ever to hand over their firearms to an inspector unless properly relieved. Investigators were to be referred to the company's attorney, and if the investigator refused to leave, the police were to be called. Mr. Shank has also performed services for UCP using a vehicle with green and red flashing lights on the roof. So have both Scotts and Mr. Hege. Mr. Shank was subsequently charged with driving a vehicle with improper lights as well as carrying a semi-automatic weapon. William L. Scott and Mr. Shank had a falling out over money in early September 2000. Shank then called Mr. Floyd to tell him what he knew of the allegations because he felt it was the right thing to do. When Boin Upton, at the time an employee of Excelsior Defense, also a security firm, came to work at The Harbor Club on June 2, 2000, he found representatives of UCP already were there. He thought this was unusual because he understood that his company had the contract to provide security for the club. He called his supervisor who came to the club and resolved the issue. A the time, however, he noticed that both Mr. Shank and William L. Scott, the two representatives of UCP, were carrying nine-millimeter semi- automatic weapons. When Mr. Upton asked about this, he was told by Mr. Shank that he had a "CC" waiver. A "CC" license is one which is issued to an apprentice private investigator and does not authorize the carrying of a semi-automatic weapon. Joshua Wilson also was a security guard who worked for UCP from July 7 through the end of August 2000, and whose duty stations were at the Lutz Apartment complex and at The Harbor Club. His job was to observe and report and to keep the peace, and he was not armed. However, he observed William S. Scott, William L. Scott's son carrying a nine- millimeter semi-automatic weapon at The Harbor Club during this period. Mr. Wilson recalls a staff meeting held by Mr. Scott during this period at which Mr. Scott discussed the investigation being conducted by the Division. At this meeting, he gave each employee a copy of the memorandum which advised employees not to talk with anyone from the Division but to refer them to a UCP supervisor. Scott indicated his opinion that Mr. Floyd had declared war on UCP and him, and he would not help him. Another former employee of UCP, Mr. Phelps, also recalls being told directly by Mr. Scott that if an investigator from the Division contacted him with questions about the company, he was not to answer them. In mid-June 2000, Officer Jim Routzahn of the Indian Shore Police Department conducted a routine traffic stop of William L. Scott. Mr. Scott got out of his vehicle wearing a uniform and badge and carrying a semi-automatic weapon. Scott's badge was in the form of a shield and not a star. Mr. Scott advised Officer Routzhan that he was the owner of a security company and was on official duty dropping off and picking up security officers. At the time, because Officer Routzahn received a high-priority call to go elsewhere, he gave Mr. Scott a warning and let him go. According to Mr. Floyd, a search of the records of the Division of Licensing fails to show any prior complaints against either UCP or either Mr. Scott. However, the records reflect William L. Scott was previously denied a license based on a conviction in Indiana. Mr. Floyd has known William L. Scott from when he, Mr. Floyd, was an investigator for another agency. During that former investigation, he found Mr. Scott to be very personable, helpful, and cooperative. Mr. Floyd, a retired Captain of Police from Tampa, considers this case to be serious because it involves the impersonation of a policeman. Based on his experience, "wanna-be's" constitute one of the biggest problems facing law enforcement, and even if the only issue here were related to the inappropriate use of colored lights on UCP's vehicles, he would still have filed an Administrative Complaint in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order revoking the Class "B" Security Agency License number B98-00127, the Class "D" Security Officer License number D93-19846, the Class "G" Statewide Firearms License number G94-03199, and the Class "ZB" Organization Officer Position, number ZB98-00179, all licenses held by William Larue Scott as President/Manager of Unlimited Crime Prevention, Inc., be revoked. It is further recommended that the Class "G" Statewide Firearms License number G97-01150, held by William Shane Scott be placed on probation for a period of one year under such terms and conditions as the Department may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Bensko, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Louis Kwall, Esquire Kwall, Showers & Coleman, P.A. 133 North Fort Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33755 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact The Department of State hereby adopts and incorporates herein by reference- the Findings of Fact in the Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department Of State, Division Of Licensing, enter a Final Order imposing a fine of $1,000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of August, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6780 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected. The evidence fails to establish that the certificate was signed by Moore, who did not testify at the hearing. Rejected. Not supported by the evidence. Neither Meyer nor Wiese testified at the hearing. (This ruling is related to the second proposed finding identified as "4".) Rejected. Not supported by the evidence. Neither Meyer nor Wiese testified at the hearing. Respondent The Respondent filed a letter containing unnumbered paragraphs which is treated herein as a proposed recommended order. The paragraph beginning "I TAKE EXCEPTION" is regarded as paragraph #1. The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 1, 2. Rejected. The proposed finding is applicable to the weight of the testimony which clearly established that the witness received an inadequate level of instruction. 3. Rejected. The Respondent stipulated to the fact that Dale and Moore were in the same class. The stipulation was placed on the record. The Petitioner released Moore from testifying based on the stipulation. 4, 6-12. Rejected, irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 DV's Security Guard School Stephen Paul DeVillo 10871 Ruden Road Fort Myers, Florida 33917-5513
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed an act of violence against, or wrongfully detained, Beatrix Shadwell and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "D" Security Officer license, Number D93- 16229, and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license, Number G93- 03349. On March 2, 1996, Respondent's wife telephoned the Collier County Sheriff Office from a convenience store and asked for assistance. A deputy was dispatched to the convenience store to talk to her. Respondent's wife was distraught when the deputy arrived. She said that she was afraid that something was wrong with her husband. She told the deputy that he had shot a gun when she had left the house and she was afraid that he had shot himself. In response to questioning, Respondent's wife, who had redness around her throat and small cuts on her hands, admitted that she and her husband had had an argument. The deputy accompanied Respondent's wife to her home. He searched the house without finding Respondent, although he found several guns, including some loaded. He then questioned Respondent's wife more closely. According to the deputy, Respondent's wife admitted that her husband had physically abused her by grabbing her by the throat, handcuffing her, taping her mouth closed, and putting a gun to her head and threatening to kill her. The deputy took a sworn statement to this effect by writing down what Respondent's wife said and having her sign it. Respondent's wife testified that nothing happened except that she and her husband had an argument. She claimed that her written statement is inaccurate due to her exaggerations and difficulties with English. Respondent's wife is Panamanian and has not resided in the United States for long. She speaks and understands English reasonably well, but not perfectly. While the deputy was speaking with Respondent's wife, Respondent telephoned the house. The deputy ordered him to come home and talk to the deputy. When Respondent returned home, the deputy gave him his Miranda rights and asked him about the incident. Respondent admitted pointing an unloaded weapon at his wife. Petitioner has not proved by clear and convincing evidence all of the facts contained in the statement of Respondent's wife. Her language problems raise some doubt as to the accuracy of the now-repudiated statement. However, Respondent admitted to the deputy that he pointed an empty gun at his wife. This evidence is unrebutted by other evidence because Respondent elected not to testify, and his wife did not discredit this portion of the deputy's testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Licensing, Department of State, enter a final order revoking Respondent's Class "D" and Class "G" licenses. ENTERED on October 19, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Kristi Reid Bronson Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. Number 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Steve Edmund Shadwell, pro se 1880 51st St. SW Naples, FL 33999
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent Agency is a Florida-licensed (Class "A" license number A88- 00297 private investigative agency. Respondent Foreman is the owner of the Agency. He is a Florida-licensed (Class "C" license number C00-02486) private investigator. He has been licensed for approximately the past 20 years. At no time during the period of his licensure has the Department taken any disciplinary action against him. At around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of September 30, 1994, Foreman interrupted his work schedule to drive a male tenant living in an apartment that he owned (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenant") to the Henderson Mental Health Clinic, an outpatient mental health facility located in Broward County, Florida. The Tenant needed to receive treatment at the clinic. After parking his vehicle, Foreman escorted the Tenant to the reception area of the facility. Foreman was wearing a gun belt and a holster. A loaded firearm was encased in the holster. It was a warm day and Foreman did not have on a jacket. 2/ Consequently, the holstered firearm was in plain view. At the time, Foreman had a Department-issued Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License, but he did not have a Class "G" Statewide Firearm Permit. 3/ Detective Joel Maney of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department was working a uniformed off-duty security detail at Henderson Mental Health Clinic that morning. From his position behind the reception counter, Detective Maney observed Foreman enter the reception area with the Tenant and noticed that Foreman was carrying a firearm. Not wanting to cause a disturbance inside the facility, Detective Maney did not immediately confront Foreman. He did, however, monitor Foreman's activity. After informing the receptionist that the Tenant had arrived and was waiting to be seen, Foreman left the facility. Detective Maney followed Foreman outside. As Foreman was walking on the sidewalk toward his vehicle, Detective Maney approached him and asked for identification. Foreman responded to the request by stating that he was a detective/investigator and that he did not have time to talk inasmuch as he was in the middle of an investigation. Eventually, Foreman produced his Florida driver license, his Class "C" Private Investigator License, and his Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License for Detective Maney. He also showed Detective Maney a five-pointed, star-shaped badge. In the center of the badge was a replica of the Great Seal of the State of Florida. The words, "Special Investigator Foreman Investigative," were inscribed around the seal. When Detective Maney first saw the badge, he thought it was a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge because of its shape and because it bore the Great Seal of the State of Florida. Unlike a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge, however, Foreman's badge did not have a map of Florida superimposed on the seal. Moreover, the written inscription on the badge was different than that found on a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge. Throughout the period that he has been licensed, Foreman has used this badge as a means of identifying himself in connection with the performance of his duties as a private investigator.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to establish that Respondent Foreman committed the violations alleged in Counts II and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, disciplining Respondent Foreman him for having committed these violations by imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00, and (3) dismissing the remaining counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1995.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether just cause exists to impose sanctions against Respondent, Winston Northern (“Northern” or the “Teacher”), up to and including revocation of his Educator’s Certificate.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to Florida Educator Certificates, as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796(6), Florida Statutes (2016). The Commissioner of Education is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida Educator Certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. (2016) At all times relevant hereto, Northern held a Florida Educator Certificate and was employed as a teacher in the Duval County School System, teaching at A. Philip Randolph Academy of Technology, a charter school within the Duval County school system (and referred to herein as the “School”). On October 30, 2013, L.E. was a ninth-grade male student in the Teacher’s fourth period class, Introduction to Information Technology. L.E., who had a history of misbehaving in class, was one of 25 students in class on that day. The facts of this case read like A Tale of Two Cities; “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” Although the duration of the incident in question was very short, and the location where it occurred was limited in size, the disparity in the testimony of eye witnesses could not be greater. For some, there was clearly an egregious event precipitated by the Teacher’s actions. For others, there was only a minor disruption of class with little significance. Few of the witnesses seemed to have a clear memory of the events that transpired that day, as evidenced by the contradictory and imprecise testimony evoked at final hearing. The Commissioner’s View Mrs. Byrd (formerly Ms. King) was the School’s “computer technology coordinator.” She would often come into Mr. Northern’s classroom because most of the School’s computer- related supplies were kept in a closet in that classroom. Mrs. Byrd came into Mr. Northern’s room on October 30, 2013, to get some IT supplies out of the closet. As she exited the classroom, Mrs. Byrd saw a woman walking quickly towards the classroom door; the woman appeared to be very agitated. Mrs. Byrd asked the woman (later identified as T.E., L.E.’s mother, and also referred to herein as the “Mom”) if she needed assistance. Mrs. Byrd noticed that the woman was not wearing a Visitor’s badge, as required by school rules. The woman said she did not need any help and that Mr. Northern had called her to come and deal with her son’s behavior issues. At that point, Mr. Northern opened the door and ushered T.E. into the classroom, indicating to Mrs. Byrd that it was “okay.” Mrs. Byrd followed them back into the classroom. T.E. immediately made a beeline to where her son, L.E., was sitting. Mrs. Byrd remembered T.E. physically attacking her son as she yelled profanities at him. The beating, with fists and open hands to L.E.’s face, lasted “a long time.” Mrs. Byrd initially estimated it to be about a minute and a half in length, but later agreed that it was probably about 15 seconds in duration. During the time that L.E. was being physically attacked by his mother, Mr. Northern did not intervene. Mrs. Byrd was in shock at what she was witnessing. At some point, Mrs. Byrd recovered from her shock and began to shout Mr. Northern’s name over and over to get his attention. Mr. Northern then directed the Mom and L.E. out into the open area outside the classroom. A student told Mrs. Byrd she “needed to do something” after L.E., his mom and Mr. Northern left the room. She obtained L.E.’s name from a student so that she could report the incident. Once outside the classroom, T.E. continued to berate both L.E. and Mr. Northern. At that point, Mrs. Byrd (who had walked out of the classroom sometime after the others) walked towards the elevator which was located just across from the classroom. As she neared the elevator, she met Mr. Lewis, the principal at the school. She indicated to Principal Lewis that she needed to talk to him about something important, i.e., the incident she witnessed in Mr. Northern’s classroom. However, Principal Lewis heard the Mom cursing loudly at T.E. and instead of talking to Mrs. Byrd, he went to speak to the Mom. Mrs. Byrd entered the stairwell next to the elevator and went downstairs. Principal Lewis explained to the Mom that the language she was using was not allowed on campus and that she needed to calm down. She did so. T.E. then took her son downstairs and presumably signed him out of school for the remainder of the day. Mr. Northern did not indicate to Principal Lewis that there had been a problem of any kind in the classroom. Principal Lewis’ testimony overall was not persuasive. He seemed very unclear as to how the events unfolded and seemed to contradict other, more believable witness testimony. Mrs. Byrd was upset by the incident and immediately called the abuse hotline at the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) to report the incident. DCF advised Mrs. Byrd to notify administration at the School about the incident. Mrs. Byrd contacted the assistant principal, Mrs. Peeples, but not until the next day. Mrs. Peeples asked Mrs. Byrd to provide a written statement about the incident and Mrs. Byrd prepared the statement. At about 4:15 p.m. on the day of the incident, Mrs. Peeples allegedly received a telephone call from the parent of one of the other students in Mr. Northern’s class. The student had purportedly told his/her parent a fellow student, L.E., had been severely beaten by his mother in the presence of the entire classroom. Based on that call, Mrs. Peeples contacted Principal Lewis to tell him what she had heard from the parent. Principal Lewis remembered that he, not Mrs. Peeples, received the parent’s phone call on that day. He also remembered talking with Mrs. Peeples about the incident and that she recounted her conversation with Mrs. Byrd. Mrs. Byrd, however, said she did not talk to Mrs. Peeples about the incident until the following day. Therefore, who talked to whom and when the conversations occurred are not completely clear from the testimony provided. Principal Lewis contacted Mr. Northern and told him they needed to talk, so Mr. Northern later stopped by Mr. Lewis’ office. A short conversation was held, but Mr. Northern did not say that the Mom had physically attacked her son in the classroom. Mr. Northern did not remember being summoned to Principal Lewis’ office, but remembered talking briefly to him in the breezeway on the first floor of the School. The School gathered statements from six of the 25 children in Mr. Northern’s classroom that day. Three of the statements were not signed and did not clearly indicate who had written them. Mrs. Peeples, who decided which students to ask for statements and was present as each child wrote his or her statement, could not--on the day of final hearing--identify the authors of the unsigned statements. Mrs. Peeples’s testimony was credible, but not substantively helpful. Some of the students’ hearsay statements seem to confirm what Mrs. Byrd reported; some do not. From the affirming statements came these remarks: “His mom came up there and kept punching [L.E.] in the face.” (K.B.) “His mom had just started beating on him.” (W.W.) “[His] mother just started hitting him in the face.” (J.W.) “A mom . . . came in and was very angry, very verbal about her anger and started hitting her son and yelling.” (Unsigned) “[L.E.’s] mom started hitting him.” (Unsigned) None of the hearsay statements were particularly credible as they are all unverified and without information as to the author. The Teacher’s View On October 30, 2016, L.E. was engaged in playing a very violent video game on a classroom computer in Mr. Northern’s classroom. L.E. had accessed the game by way of a “modified” thumb drive which made his actions undetectable by school administration, which may have been monitoring the computer. Mr. Northern told L.E. to put the game away, because it was prohibited by school policy. Further, a school assembly had been held recently wherein the consequences for playing such video games were announced, i.e., five days suspension from school and 45 days restriction from use of school computers--at least that was Mr. Northern’s description of the events at final hearing. In his deposition (taken on July 18, 2016), Mr. Northern said the issue with L.E. was that L.E. was “playing video games” instead of logging on to the appropriate website. He made no mention of the nature of the video games or that they were violent or prohibited by school policy, only that L.E. was told three times to stop playing videos and log on to the website as directed. After the third warning, Mr. Northern decided to call in reinforcements, to wit: L.E.’s mom. It was customary for Mr. Northern to call L.E.’s mom or Dean Lapkin, a school administrator, when L.E. would act out in class or fail to stay focused on his work. Mr. Northern said L.E. was a bright student, very versed in computer skills. He had a lot of potential, but was very often off-track and off-task. When L.E. refused to comply with instructions, Mr. Northern would call T.E. and have her talk with her son. That was usually enough to get L.E. back on track. Principal Lewis confirmed that calling a student’s parent was an acceptable method for dealing with recalcitrant students. On the day in question, Mr. Northern finally pulled L.E. off the computer (whether for playing video games despite being warned three times or for playing forbidden violent video games) and telephoned L.E.’s mother. Mr. Northern said at final hearing that he had first contacted Dean Lapkin to see if L.E. might be released from the prescribed discipline for watching violent video games on campus. Dean Lapkin said the discipline was to be imposed, that Mr. Northern should write a referral and he, Lapkin, would make the call to L.E.’s mom. But somehow Mr. Northern determined that the dean was too busy to call T.E., so Mr. Northern called the Mom himself. Mr. Northern said he received the Mom’s telephone number from Dean Lapkin that very day, but that statement flies in the face of his prior testimony that he had called the Mom several times in the past about L.E.’s behavior. (This sort of discrepant testimony severely clouds the facts in this case.) As Mr. Northern was talking to the Mom, she put him on hold to take another call, reputedly from Dean Lapkin. When she returned to the phone call with Mr. Northern, the Mom said she was already at the School. In his deposition, Mr. Northern said that he called T.E. immediately, i.e., there was no mention of calling the dean first, and that she arrived at the School as they talked. Mr. Northern anticipated receiving a call from downstairs for him to send L.E. down to the Guidance Office to check out, or, possibly, that the Mom would be escorted to his classroom to get L.E. Instead, a few minutes after Mr. Northern completed his call to T.E., she appeared in his classroom. Mrs. Byrd had just left the room, so Mr. Northern assumed she had let T.E. into the room (as the door is generally locked). However she gained entrance, Mr. Northern heard L.E. say to someone, “Bitch, what you gonna do now?” and turned around to see T.E. racing toward L.E., cursing loudly. Mr. Northern testified that he “tried to rush over” to intercept the Mom before she got to L.E. He stated that he was able to get between the two and fend off the Mom’s attempts to hit her son. As far as he knew, the Mom never landed any blows on L.E. Mr. Northern did not remember anyone in the classroom saying anything to him during the confrontation. After some unspecified amount of time, Mr. Northern escorted T.E. and L.E. outside the classroom into the hallway area. The Mom continued haranguing her son in that area until Principal Lewis intervened. One student’s statement seems to confirm Mr. Northern’s comments: The student wrote, “Mr. Northern call [L.E.] to his desk then his mom came and took him out of the classroom.” At final hearing, Ms. Williams, a former student who was present on the day in question, remembered the Mom slapping at L.E. but could not remember if the Mom ever made contact. Hearsay evidence at final hearing presented by Mrs. Byrd, uncorroborated but not objected to, indicates that during the DCF investigation L.E. had reported that his mom never hit him, but neither L.E. nor T.E. testified at final hearing to verify what actually happened. According to Mr. Northern and at least two of the students, Mrs. Byrd was not in the classroom during the confrontation between L.E. and his Mom. Mr. Northern did speak to Principal Lewis at some point after the incident. According to Mr. Northern, they met in the breezeway on the first floor for a few moments. Principal Lewis maintained that he called Mr. Northern to his office to talk about the incident later on the day it happened. Mr. Northern’s testimony was not persuasive as to the specifics of his meeting with Principal Lewis. Other Factors in the Dispute The Mom’s physical size was discussed by three witnesses. Mrs. Byrd described her as being “bigger than me.” (Mrs. Byrd is approximately five feet, two inches tall and stout in stature.) Ms. Williams said the Mom was about five feet, four inches tall and “not that big.” Mr. Northern said she was about five feet, one inch tall and weighed about 102 pounds. L.E. was a ninth-grade student and was sort of slight in stature. Mrs. Byrd said the Mom did not have a Visitor’s badge on her person. She could not remember what the Mom was wearing on that day, but did not see a badge. Mr. Northern said the Mom was wearing a halter top and tight jeans that day, totally inappropriate clothing under the student dress code (as he initially thought T.E. was a student). She did have a Visitor’s badge but, with no place to put it on her clothes, she had it in her purse. Neither party presented the Visitor’s log for that day to substantiate whether T.E. had registered or not, so we shall never know. It is interesting that Principal Lewis never asked T.E. about a Visitor’s badge. There were allegedly three investigations done concerning the alleged incident: One by the school; one by DCF; and one by law enforcement. None of the investigative reports (or their ultimate findings) was introduced into evidence in order to substantiate either party’s position. It was not mentioned whether photographs were taken of L.E. to ascertain bruising or other injuries from the alleged beating. So, again, we shall never know. After the investigations were concluded, Principal Lewis did not “trespass” the Mom from coming on campus in the future, even though he had authority to do so if warranted.1/ Neither the Mom nor L.E. was called to testify or bring some clarity to the matter at hand. Presumably they would have confirmed the position of one side or another in this matter, but again we shall never know. Nor was Dean Lapkin called to verify his involvement in the situation. Mr. Northern served as a teachers’ union representative at the School. He has brought complaints to Principal Lewis on numerous occasions as part of his duties in that role. Mr. Northern has also brought direct complaints to Principal Lewis regarding computer equipment issues in his own classroom. The two men have a “history” outside the present dispute. In fact, just about two weeks prior to the alleged incident, Mrs. Byrd wrongfully removed ten computers from Mr. Northern’s classroom, forcing him to have Principal Lewis intervene to have the equipment returned. The Amended Administrative Complaint in this matter contains four counts: Count I is a general count alleging that Mr. Northern violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession; Count II alleges Mr. Northern’s failure to protect a student from conditions harmful to learning or to the student’s mental health and/or physical health and safety; Count III alleges intentional distortion of facts concerning an event; and Count IV alleges failure to maintain honesty. What the unrefuted evidence at final hearing proved is this: Mr. Northern was teaching his class on October 30, 2013. L.E. was a student in that class. L.E.’s mother came to the classroom cursing loudly and took L.E. away. Mrs. Byrd had been in the classroom in close proximity to L.E. as he was being removed from the classroom by his mom and/or Mr. Northern. Mrs. Byrd reported an incident to DCF and to the School administration. Mr. Northern discussed the matter with Principal Lewis. “Tis a far harder decision I make in this case than I have ever made . . .,” at least as to what actually transpired that fateful day in Mr. Northern’s classroom. The conflicting and unclear stories delivered by the key players in this incident (minus the two primary protagonists), does little to explain what actually happened on that day. Based on the totality of the conflicting testimony, it is likely that T.E. came into the classroom and accosted her son. The finer details of what she did, however, seem to be forever lost.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education, dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Winston Northern. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2016.
