Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Barry Stephen Yanks (Yanks), has applied to respondent, Department of Insurance (Department), for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. By letter dated February 7, 1989, the Department denied Yanks' application. The gravamen of the Department's denial was its contention that on December 9, 1987, Yanks had accepted jewelry as collateral for a bail bond, and that such jewelry had not been timely returned to its owner. As a consequence, the Department concluded that Yanks had acted as a bail bondsman without being licensed as such, and that he lacked the fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business. Yanks filed a timely petition for formal hearing to contest the Department's action. At hearing, the proof failed to demonstrate that Yanks had acted inappropriately as contended by the Department. Rather, the proof demonstrated that when Yanks accepted jewelry from Corrine Hough on December 9, 1987, as collateral for a bail bond to be written on her son, that he was acting on behalf of the attorney for American Bankers Insurance Company (American), the proposed surety. Under the arrangements made with Ms. Hough, the collateral was to be held by the attorney for American because she did not have confidence in the bondsman who was to write the bond, one Nestor Tabares, to safeguard her property. Accordingly, at the request of American's attorney, Yanks secured the collateral from Ms. Hough, gave her a receipt, and delivered the jewelry back to the attorney. After delivery of the jewelry to the attorney, Yanks had no further contact with or control over it. While there was a delay of some 10 months following the termination of the bond that was ultimately written on Ms. Hough's son before her jewelry was returned, such delay was not occasioned by or within the control of Yanks. In sum, Yanks did not act as a bail bondsman on December 9, 1987, and did not exert any control over Ms. Hough's jewelry such that he might be held accountable for any delay in its return.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting the application of Petitioner, Barry Stephen Yanks, for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of October 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Yanks have been adopted in substance in paragraphs 1-5. The purposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Department are addressed as follows: Subordinate or not necessary to the result reached. To the extent supported by the proof, adopted in paragraph 3, otherwise rejected. Adopted in paragraph 3. Not relevant. 5 & 6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Elias, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ana Hernandez-Yanks, Esquire 1481 N.W. 7th Street Miami, Florida 33125 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact James L. Sponheim is licensed as a Limited Surety Agent to represent Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc., and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. His office is located in Dade City, Florida. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, petitioner's Exhibit 2) Respondent Bonnie L. Sponheim is qualified, but not currently licensed, as a bail bond runner. She was previously licensed as a runner, but her license was cancelled on April 3, 1980. Thereafter, she has served as a secretary in her husband's Dade City office. (Testimony of B. Sponheim, Petitioner's Exhibit l) On August 6, 1980, Stephen W. Sissitka, of Zephyrhills, Florida, made application to the Cotton Belt Insurance Company for appearance bonds B6A095951- 52 to effect his release from the custody of the Pasco County Sheriff's office. The application contained provisions as to events which would constitute a breach of the obligations under the bond, including the applicant's change from one address to another without notifying the Cotton Belt Insurance Company or its agent in writing prior to any such move. On the reverse of the application, Glenna Lilly and Spurgeon Phillips executed an indemnity agreement whereby they agreed to bind themselves to produce Sissitka in court at the required time. The application further identified Glenna Lilly as Sissitka's mother. Phillips executed a separate indemnity agreement on August 30, 1980. He is the father- in-law of Sissitka and resides in Dade City. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, S. Sissitka, Respondent's Exhibits 1,2) On August 6, 1980, Mr. Sponheim, as agent for Cotton Belt Insurance Company, issued the requested bonds in the total amount `of $2,500.00. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 4) Although Sissitka had listed his address as Zephyrhills, Florida, he was living at the home of his father-in-law Spurgeon Phillips, in Dade City at the time he was released on bond. However, he was having difficulties with his wife and did not remain in Dade City on a continuous basis. On several occasions, he went over night to his mother's house in Zephyrhills, and another time he visited his wife's mother for several days in Pasco County. He did not tell Mr. Sponheim about the latter visit, nor did Phillips know where he was. In fact, he stayed only sporadically with Phillips during the period August to October, 1980, and sometimes would be gone for a week or two. Phillips complained to Mr. Sponheim about his inability to keep up with Sissitka's whereabouts, and wanted to have him returned to custody. As a result, Mr. Sponheim and Phillips had a meeting with Sissitka on October 7, 1980, at which time Mr. Sponheim reminded Sissitka of his obligations to report any changes of address or employment and imposed the requirement that Sissitka "check in" with Sponheim's office once a week. Sissitka was also told to stay at Phillips' house in the future. Sissitka agreed to follow the conditions imposed and keep Mr. Sponheim and Phillips notified of his whereabouts. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, B. Sponheim, Phillips, Harrelson, S. Sissitka, M. Sissitka, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Stipulation) On October 15, 1980, Mrs. Sponheim discovered Sissitka was no longer employed at a restaurant in Dade City. Mr. Sponheim was out of the state at the time. Mrs. Sponheim was under the impression that Sissitka was living at Zephyrhills, and so she drove out to Phillips' house to talk to his wife in an attempt to ascertain his current situation. When she knocked on the door, Sissitka answered and told her that he had been living there. Mrs. Sponheim told him that they needed to talk. She waited in her car while he put on a shirt and some shoes, and joined her in the car. They then drove to Mr. Sponheim's office. On the way, she asked him about his job and where he was living, but Sissitka indicated that it was none of her business, that Mr. Sponheim had no control over him, and that as long as he showed up in court that was all that mattered. He asked her if he was going to jail, and she told him that was between him and Mr. Sponheim. When they arrived at the office they discussed the conditions of the bond and the arrangements which had been made at the previous meeting with Phillips and Mr. Sponheim on October 7. Sissitka told her that he was tired of being harrassed not only by her husband, but by Phillips, and that everyone was giving him a hard time, and he wanted it stopped. Mrs. Sponheim inferred from this statement that Sissitka wished to terminate the bond relationship and told him that if he wanted to "end it" he was free to go to the jail and surrender himself at any time. At that point, Sissitka said "fine, let's go" but Mrs. Sponheim told him that they needed to talk to Mr. Sponheim about it first. She went into the adjoining private office, telephoned her husband and informed him of the situation. He told her that Sissitka could either go ahead and surrender himself, or otherwise they would have to wait until he returned to the city to settle the matter. He further told her that if Sissitka wanted to turn himself in that she should make sure to get the surrender documents to the jail so that he couldn't walk out again. Mr. Sponheim made a practice of pre-signing the appropriate surrender forms for each person he bonded out at the time the bond was written; therefore, a signed surrender form had been previously prepared for Sissitka. The Pasco County Sheriff's Department requires that the surrender document be filed with that office prior to permitting an individual to surrender himself. Otherwise, the individual would be free to leave the jail because the bond would still be valid. After talking to her husband, Mrs. Sponheim informed Sissitka of the conversation and he asked to use the phone to call his mother. After he completed the call, he said "o.k. let's go." Mrs. Sponheim then filled in the date on the "off bond" form and they walked across the street to the jail. Sissitka went up to the jail door and said "here I am again" and opened the metal door and went on in. Mrs. Sponheim handed the surrender forms to the official at the booking office and said that she was coming off the bond. She then returned to her office and later that day Sissitka called her and inquired about the possibility of being bonded out again because he did not have enough money to post a cash bond. Mrs. Sponheim told him that her husband was not there and he asked if she could bond him out. She replied that she didn't have a license, but gave him the name of another bondsman. (Testimony of J. Sponheim, B. Sponheim, Kelly, Brown, Shytle, Petitioner's Exhibits 5,6)
The Issue At issue is whether respondent committed the offense alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact The Department excepts to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 15, asserting that the hearing officer mischaracterized the persuasive weight of the evidence regarding Mr. Rubino's ownership of the bail funds. At hearing, Mr. Rubino testified that the money he supplied was half of the bond amount necessary to obtain the release of his client's codefendant, Mr. Sergio Gonzalez (Transcript pages 36, 42- 44). He further testified that the source of the bond funds originated from his office account (Transcript page 47) and were not drawn from a check (Transcript page 49). Mr. Rubino's only proof that he owned the bail funds was the following statement: possessed it as "I possessed the money in my pocket" (Transcript page 45). The hearing officer's findings that it was incredulous for Mr. Rubino to advance his own money for a codefendant's bail; that the money advanced by Rubino was street money; and that Mr. Rubino was equivocal in his responses were supported by competent substantial evidence. It is for the hearing officer to consider all the evidence presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based upon competent substantial evidence. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Therefore, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 15 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 16, asserting that the hearing officer ignored the Respondent's implicit admission that he mistakenly released the bail money to Ms. Maria Diaz. At hearing, Respondent presented a letter (Respondent's Exhibit 6) in which he advised Mr. Fernandez of his intent to file a complaint with the Miami Police Department against Ms. Maria Diaz for theft of the bail funds. The Respondent also presented a police report receipt from the Miami Police Department (Respondent's Exhibit 4) demonstrating that he filed a police report against Ms. Diaz (Case Incident Number 346-1561T) in connection with the alleged theft of the above-referenced money. Both exhibits were received into evidence and demonstrated that the Respondent concluded that Ms. Diaz was not entitled to the bail money after the fact. Notwithstanding this evidence, the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 16 addressed Mr. Rubino's ownership interest in the bail funds, not whether Respondent wrongfully returned the bail funds. The Department's arguments regarding this exception are misplaced because the Department fails to demonstrate how the hearing officer's finding of fact that Mr. Rubino did not have any lawful entitlement to the bail funds was not supported by competent substantial evidence. See Heifetz, supra. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 16 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 17, alleging that Mr. Joaquin Fernandez's testimony regarding his disavowment of the bail money was taken out of context. However, Mr. Fernandez's testimony on transcript page 177 is consistent with his testimony contained on transcript pages 163 and 165. Thus, the Department has failed to prove that the hearing officer's finding of fact was not supported by competent substantial evidence. As a result, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 17 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to Finding of Fact number 20, alleging that said finding is inconsistent with the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 16. The Department confuses the hearing officer's observations regarding Mr. Fernandez's credibility concerning the Respondent's good character with the elements necessary to prove the violations cited in the administrative complaint. Mr. Fernandez testified at hearing that he continued to do business with the Respondent following his written request for the return of the bail money; that he was a very good friend of the Respondent; and that the Respondent was deceived by Ms. Diaz to release the bail money to her (Transcript pages 173- 174,182). The Department has failed to prove that the hearing officer's finding of fact regarding Mr. Fernandez's credibility was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Consequently, the Department's Exception to Finding of Fact number 20 is REJECTED. The Department excepts to Finding of Fact number 21, asserting that the hearing officer drew improper inferences from the evidence presented regarding Respondent's deposit of $10,000 into his attorney's trust account. It appears that the Department has interpreted the hearing officer's finding of fact as dispositive of Respondent's guilt. However, the hearing officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence through the testimony of Mr. Rubino, Petitioner's Exhibits 5D, 5E, and 5F and Respondent's Exhibit 10. Moreover, the hearing officer is permitted to draw permissible inferences based upon the evidence presented. Heifetz, supra. Therefore, the Department's Exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact number 21 is REJECTED. RULINGS ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARING OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The hearing officer was entirely correct in finding that Respondent was justified in his belief that Mr. Rubino was not entitled to the return of the bond premium payment. However, the hearing officer erred as a matter of law by concluding that Ms. Diaz was entitled to the return of the bail money. Respondent did not receive the funds from Ms. Diaz, as evidenced by the pre- numbered receipt given to Mr. Fernandez. Respondent had not received any purported written or oral permission from Mr. Fernandez authorizing the release of the funds to Ms. Diaz. There is no evidence noted in the recommended order or the exceptions, that Mr. Fernandez ever indicated to the Respondent that Ms. Diaz was the source of the funds, or had any right to the funds. Respondent had no basis, other than Ms. Diaz's bald oral assertions, that she had any right to receive the refund of the premium deposits. It is uncontested that Respondent received the bail bond premium deposit from Mr. Fernandez's office, and gave Mr. Fernandez a written receipt. In the usual course of business, bail bondsmen return bail moneys to the receipted person or persons upon termination of the bond liability. This receipting system is fundamental to bail bondsmen accounting procedures. See Rule 4-221.115, Florida Administrative Code. Certainly, under normal circumstances, Respondent could have and should have returned the funds to Mr. Fernandez, which would have shielded him from any liability, if he had done so. And in normal circumstances, Respondent would be guilty of violating 648.295(1), Florida Statutes and would be subject to discipline by the Department. However, these are not normal circumstance, due to Mr. Fernandez's testimony that he did not know where the bond premium deposit money came from, where it went, and "could care less." In these highly unusual circumstances, in which the apparently wronged and victimized person, Mr. Fernandez, is indifferent to the events that transpired, it would be incongruous and inequitable to find that the Respondent violated section 648.295(1), Florida Statutes, for failing to return the bond funds to a person, who by his own testimony, "could care less" what happened to the funds. Therefore, while rejecting the hearing officer's conclusion that the Respondent was justified in returning the funds to Ms. Diaz, the hearing officer's ultimate recommendation that the case be dismissed is accepted. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 above, the Department has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent is subject to discipline by the Department pursuant to section 648.45(2), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 27 is REJECTED. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above, the Department has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent is subject to discipline by the Department pursuant to section 648.43(3), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 28 is REJECTED. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above, the Department failed to prove that Respondent utilized the bail money to his own use or benefit. As a result, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated section 648.295(3), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 30 is REJECTED. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above, the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated section 648.295(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 32 is REJECTED RULINGS ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARING OFFICER'S ENDNOTES The Department was correct in bring the instant action based upon the allegations, as alleged in the administrative complaint. However, the Department's Exception to Endnote number 1 is REJECTED, to the extent that the allegations were proved by clear and convincing evidence. The Department's Exception to Endnote number 2 is ACCEPTED. The Department's Exception to End note number 3 is REJECTED because the hearing officer clearly stated in this endnote that Finding of Fact number 15 was based upon the record evidence. The Department's Exception to Endnote number 4 is REJECTED. Rule 4- 231.160(e), Florida Administrative Code, permits the Department to consider the timeliness of restitution as a mitigating or aggravating factor. The Department does not have any legal authority, aside from situations involving Consent Orders, thorough its penalty rule or statutory provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, to order restitution or to condition its penalty on the making of restitution. Upon careful consideration of the Record, the submissions of the parties and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The Findings of Fact of the hearing officer, as modified in this Order, are adopted as the Department's Finding of Fact. The Conclusions of Law of the hearing officer, as modified in this Order, are adopted as the Department's Conclusion of Law. The End notes of the hearing officer, as modified in this Order, are adopted as the Department's End notes. The hearing officer's Recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed is ACCEPTED as being the appropriate disposition for this particular case. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 412 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300, an a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of July, 1996. BILL NELSON Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the administrative complaint. 4/ DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April 1996.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulated facts, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Joseph Aloysius Von Waldner has been licensed as a limited surety agent. He has been in the bail bond business for nine years and has had no previous or subsequent complaints issued against him. On five occasions during January and February of 1979, respondent did authorize, hire and remunerate Delbert Leroy Sams to pick up principals or skips and surrender them to the Orange County Jail. Delbert Leroy Sams was not and has not been previously licensed in any capacity by the Department of Insurance. On March 2, 1979, Mr. Sams was denied a license by the Department of Insurance. At the time respondent engaged the services of Mr. Sams, respondent believed that Mr. Sams was working as a bail bond runner for another bail bondsman. Respondent did not inquire of Sams as to whether Sams was or was not licensed by the Department of Insurance. Respondent knew that other bail bondsmen had used Sams as a runner, and Sams showed respondent some business cards and forms which Sams used when picking up principals. Respondent admits that he was negligent for not inquiring into Mr. Sams' licensure. Respondent was called in for an investigation by the petitioner's chief investigator, Melvin R. Thayer, on February 28, 1979. After talking with Mr. Thayer and becoming aware that Mr. Sams was not licensed, respondent no longer used Sams as a runner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding that respondent violated the provisions of Florida Statutes, s648.45(1)(j) and imposing an administrative penalty against respondent in the amount of $100.00, said penalty to be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of the final order. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Room 428-A, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard L. Wilson, Esquire 100 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with violations of several provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. All of the violations charged relate to allegations that the Respondent failed to return certain personal property received by the Respondent as collateral security on a surety bond.
Findings Of Fact Facts admitted by all parties The Respondent, Sergio Roque, Jr., is currently licensed in this state as a limited surety agent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Administrative Complaint in this matter, the Respondent was licensed in this state as a limited surety agency. On or about July 19, 1990, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent, did, as agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company, post a $100,000 general surety appearance bond, power number X00-0-00000331, to obtain the release of defendant Domingo Arrechea from the Dade County Jail. In conjunction with the posting of the aforementioned surety bond, Respondent did on or about July 19, 1990, receive $10,000, which represented the premium payment for said surety bond. Respondent did in conjunction with the posting of said bond receive from indemnitor Lorraine DeVico a diamond engagement ring, a Rolex watch, and the title to a 1979 Mercedes automobile (ID#11602412149348) as partial collateral security for the aforementioned surety bond. On or about April 3, 1991, Respondent did cause to be surrendered back into custody the defendant Domingo Arrechea, thus terminating all liability for said surety bond. Respondent has failed to return to indemnitor Lorraine DeVico the collateral security described above; namely, the diamond engagement ring, the Rolex watch, and the title to the 1979 Mercedes automobile. Additional facts proved at hearing In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from the defendant Arrechea, and from the defendant's wife, a conditional mortgage on a condominium. In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from "Mike Farina" a conditional mortgage on real estate owned by Mike Farina. Mike Farina was a friend of the defendant Arrechea. "Mike Farina" later turned out to be a fictitious name. Lorraine DeVico was a very close friend of the defendant Arrechea. The Rolex watch Ms. DeVico put up as part of the collateral for Arrechea's bond was a watch that had been given to her by her father. Shortly after Ms. DeVico put the watch up for collateral, her father began to inquire as to the whereabouts of the watch. Because she felt that her father would disapprove of what she had done, and because her father was the source of most of her wealth, Ms. DeVico told several lies to her father about the whereabouts of the watch. As a result of continuing inquiries by her father, Ms. DeVico wanted her watch back and no longer wanted to be responsible under the indemnity agreement she had signed. Towards the beginning of February 1991, Ms. DeVico began to call the Respondent to advise that she was frightened that the defendant Arrechea was considering jumping bond. The Respondent received numerous calls from Ms. DeVico requesting return of her collateral and requesting to be off the indemnity agreement. Consequently, the Respondent hired MV Investigations on February 16, 1991, to locate the defendant Arrechea. On March 27, 1991, Ms. DeVico advised the Respondent that the defendant Arrechea was not answering his digital pager and that his telephone had been disconnected. She advised the Respondent that she sent her employee to look for Arrechea but could not find him. She asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and get her off the bond, agreeing to pay all the expenses. On April 1, 1991, Ms. DeVico again asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and again agreed that she would pay the costs associated with the pick-up. On April 3, 1991, the investigators hired by the Respondent located and picked up defendant Arrechea and surrendered him back to the Dade County Jail. The Respondent returned the collateral deposited by Mr. Farina and by the defendant Arrechea and his wife. After having the defendant Arrechea picked up and surrendered, the Respondent called Ms. DeVico to give her the information and advise her of the pick-up costs. Ms. DeVico verbally refused to pay any pick-up costs. On April 14, 1991, the Respondent sent by certified mail to Ms. DeVico a notice under Section 648.442, Florida Statutes, notifying her that he would be selling her collateral in ten days against his pick-up expenses. The Respondent sold the Rolex watch and diamond ring pledged as collateral by Ms. DeVico after expiration of the ten days. The indemnity agreement signed by Ms. DeVico in conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea included the following language: 2. The indemnitor(s) will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the Company and save harmless the Company from and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities, costs, charges, legal fees, disbursements and expenses of every kind and nature, which the Company shall at any time sustain or incur, and as well from all orders, decrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by reason or in consequence of having executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the indemnitor(s) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good to the Company, its successors and assigns, all sums and amounts of money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, costs, expense, suit, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason of the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitor(s) and before the Company shall be required to pay thereunder. The liability for legal fees and disbursements includes all legal fees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assert or defend its right to collect or to charge for any legal fees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings. * * * 7. The Indemnitor(s) agree(s) that the Company may at any time take such steps as it may deem necessary to obtain its release from any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings, and it shall not be necessary for the Company to give the Indemnitor(s) notice of any fact or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any such bond or undertaking, notice of all such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and further indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such bond or undertaking in any manner it may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses which the Company may sustain or incur or be put to in obtaining such release or in further securing itself against loss, shall be borne and paid by the Indemnitor(s). In conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea, Ms. DeVico also signed a Bail Bond Information Sheet which advised her in bold print that: When all agreements have been fulfilled and bond is discharged, in writing or by the court, and without loss expense on the bond, your full collateral will be returned to you.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4378 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected for two reasons; first, the proposed finding is irrelevant because it is not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, second, the proposed finding was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: First sentence accepted. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 6 through 13: Accepted in substance with some details clarified. Paragraph 14: First sentence accepted. Remainder rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting procedural details or conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: Rejected as constituting statement of position or legal argument, rather than proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 17: First sentence accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting conclusions of law or legal argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20: Accepted COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Martin L. Roth, Esquire Haber & Roth 1370 Northwest 16th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed violations as alleged in the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case the Respondent has been licensed as a limited surety agent. On April 10, 1995, Elsa De La Cruz went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who represented himself to be Respondent approached Ms. De La Cruz and asked her if he could help her. He specifically wanted to know if she was there to bail someone out and identified himself as a bail bondsman. The male also gave Ms. De La Cruz a business card bearing Respondent's name and business location. Ms. De La Cruz left the fifth floor of the courthouse and walked to the east wing which is commonly referred to as "the jail wing." The same male was also there and again approached Ms. De La Cruz. At this time he advised her that if the bond was set at $10,000, he would need $1,000 and collateral to help her. Ms. De La Cruz left the property and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit 2. Ms. De La Cruz did not initiate any of the contact between herself and the male who represented himself as Respondent. On April 11, 1995, Maggie Porto went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who later identified himself as Respondent initiated contact with Ms. Porto and advised her that he was in business if she needed him. After a short while, Ms. Porto left the fifth floor and walked over to the east wing of the criminal center. Upon her arrival there, the same male handed Ms. Porto a business card. When Ms. Porto asked the male if he was the man identified on the card, the subject answered "yes." The business card represented Respondent's name. Later, Ms. Porto left the criminal center and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit number 3. All contact between Ms. Porto and Respondent was initiated by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3032 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 2, the allegation as to the time of the incident is rejected as not supported by the record or hearsay. With regard to paragraph 3, the allegation as to when the business card was delivered to Ms. De La Cruz is rejected as contrary to the weight of the record. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 Northwest 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166 Noel A. Rivera 2200 Northwest 11th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Anthony Alvarez 350 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 201 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
