Findings Of Fact Respondent is a state certified general appraiser, holding license number RI 0000912. In late 1993 First Sarasota Mortgage Company hired the appraisal company for which Respondent worked to prepare a "small income property report." This was a short form appraisal report used for multifamily housing, up to seven attached units. Respondent visited the subject duplex to meet the borrower and inspect the property. He found the duplex in bad disrepair. The building was constructed in 1928. Forty or fifty years ago a prior owner removed a second story from the building, leaving it a single-story building. The interior walls are the original walls of the building, which is a legal nonconforming use in an area without other duplexes or similar properties. The building also suffered from a serious termite inspection. Respondent reported what he had seen to the loan officer at First Sarasota. He told her that the property had considerable deferred maintenance and was not as represented by the borrower to the bank. Contrary to the borrower's assurances, the building was infested with termites, either uninsured or underinsured, and not owner-occupied. The loan officer instructed Respondent to continue the appraisal and try to find comparables. After about two and one- half days of research over a five day period, during which time he kept the loan officer informed of his lack of progress, Respondent contacted the loan officer and told her what he had found. After searching in a 15 mile-radius Respondent had still been unable to find properties that did not require large adjustments due to the age or condition of the property. The loan officer agreed that the comparables were useless. Respondent asked her whether he should continue the project or stop. She said that she would talk to the borrower and get back to Respondent. The loan officer called Respondent the next day and said stop working on the project. The loan officer denied the loan application, evidently due to the inadequacy of the property to be mortgaged. Although the lender ordered the appraisal, the borrower had paid the lender in advance for the appraisal. Respondent went to his supervisor and explained that the borrower had already paid $450, and Respondent felt uncomfortable not giving him anything. Respondent suggested that they provide the lender with a letter of opinion based on their opinion of the worth of the property using a cost approach, omitting the market and income approaches due to the absence of comparables. The supervisor approved the issuance of a letter of opinion. A copy of the letter went to the borrower. Respondent did not hear from the borrower for some time after issuing the letter of opinion. Then the borrower asked for a formal appraisal report. Respondent offered a partial refund or the letter of opinion, but the borrower insisted on a formal appraisal report. which Respondent could not provide. The letter of opinion is on the letterhead of Respondent's employer and is dated October 4, 1993. Addressed to First Sarasota, the letter, which is signed by Respondent, describes the property and states: After a thorough inspection of the property, an intensive search of the Lee County Property appraisers tax records, the last three years of recorded sales taken from the Lee County REDI records, sales from the past two years taken from the Ft. Myers MLS and telephone interviews with local realtors and appraisers, it is our opinion that if an appraisal were to be per- formed on this property, the estimated fair market value of the subject property as of the date of inspection, 09/02/93, would be $65,000 to $75,000. The one-page letter explains in detail the calculations under the cost approach for the property, leading to a total value of $92,000 for land and building. A note adds that the cost approach was given little weight due to the magnitude of needed repairs, including repairs for termite damage. The final sentence of the letter states: "This is a letter of opinion only and is not meant to be misinterpreted or utilized as an appraisal." Twice, the letter disclaims being an appraisal report. The letter is accurate, reasonably detailed, and carefully conditioned. The main issue in the case is whether the letter of opinion is a permissible alternative to a formal appraisal report under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) that are incorporated into the disciplinary statutes. Statement of Appraisal Standards No. 7 was adopted on March 22, 1994, and is included in the 1995 USPAP. Statement No. 7 addresses the situations under which an appraiser may perform an assignment that calls for something less than, or different from, a formal appraisal, as required by USPAP standards. The commentary identifies the issue as follows: Throughout the history of real property appraisal practice, a perception has existed that certain types of transactions in the real estate market require something less than or different from a Complete Appraisal. The phrase something less than or different from in this context has meant a Limited Appraisal and a condensed report. To distinguish this type of assignment from a Complete Appraisal, different names have been created for this activity, including Letter Opinion of Value, Update of an Appraisal, Recertification of Value, and, more recently, Evaluation of Real Property Collateral. 1995 USPAP, page 73. Statement No. 7 proceeds to describe a "complete appraisal" and "limited appraisal" and a "self-contained appraisal report," "summary appraisal report," and "restricted appraisal report." Mentioning a provision that permits an appraiser to enter into an agreement that "calls for something less than, or different from, the work that would otherwise be required by the specific guidelines," Statement No. 7 explains: This provision goes on to permit limited departures from specific guidelines provided the appraiser determines the appraisal process is not so limited as to mislead the client and intended users of the report, the appraiser advises the client of the limitations and discloses the limitations in the report, and the client agrees that the limited service would be appropriate. 1995 USPAP, page 73. After an extended discussion of the types of appraisal reports and appraisals, Statement No. 7 concludes in part: Clarification of Nomenclature Various nomenclature has been developed by clients and client groups for certain appraisal assignments. The development of this Statement on Appraisal Standards is a response to inquiries about several types of appraisal assignments, and it is appropriate to clarify the meaning of these terms for future reference. The term Letter Opinion of Value has been used to describe a one-page letter sent to a client that stated a value estimate and referenced the file information and experience of the appraiser as the basis for the estimate. This type of service does not comply with USPAP, and should be eliminated from appraisal practice. . . . The Restricted Report is the minimum report format and replaces the concept of the Letter Opinion of Value. 1995 USPAP, page 75. The 1993 Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, which was in effect at the time of the subject transaction, does not contain Statement No. 7 because the statement was not in effect at the time, nor at the time of the subject transaction. Appraisers have historically used letters of opinion and not been disciplined. Statement No. 7 represents an attempt, in 1994, to provide and clarification "for future reference." Nothing in Statement No. 7 nor the 1993 USPAP supplies Petitioner with any basis for disciplining Respondent for the use of the letter of opinion in 1993. The client in this case was First Sarasota, to which the borrower paid the appraisal fee. Respondent's letter is directed to the client, not the borrower. Nothing in the letter could possibly mislead the client or the borrower. The limitations of the letter are largely apparent in the letter itself. Perhaps most important, Respondent consistently kept the client informed about the project and disclosed for his client the abject condition of the property and misrepresentations of the borrower. Respondent's diligence in fact engendered the complaint from the borrower that resulted in this case. After the subject transaction the restricted appraisal report replaced the letter of opinion. Respondent discontinued use of letters of opinion since the October 4, 1993 letter. In October 1993, however, Petitioner could not discipline an appraiser for the use of a letter of opinion, at least under the facts of this case. The October 4, 1993 letter was not an appraisal report under either then-existing USPAP standards, but was a widely recognized alternative to a formal appraisal report. In October 1993, as is clear from the language of Statement No. 7, USPAP had not created the alternative of the restricted appraisal report and had not limited all communications from appraisers to one of three types of reports. There is absolutely no evidence that Respondent failed to use reasonable diligence in the preparation of an appraisal report.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. ENTERED on December 21, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Gary A. Berleue, pro se 13604 Wainwright Ave. Port Charlotte, FL 33953 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Evidence reveals that during late December, 1975, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., a Florida Corporation, filed application with the Florida Real Estate Commission seeking registration as a corporate real estate broker. Said application revealed that Defendant, Frank Viruet, was to become the Active Firm Member Broker, and Vice president of the Company; that Carol Bauman was to become Secretary-Treasurer and Director of the company; and that Lee Klien was to become president and Director of the company. The application also revealed that Carol Bauman is the wife of the Defendant Bernard Bauman (Progress Docket #2357); that Lee Klien is the sister of Carol Bauman; and that Defendant Jeffrey Bauman (Progress Docket #2858) is the son of Bernard Bauman. Subsequent to filing the above corporate application For registration, the name was changed to Noble Realty Corporation and shortly thereafter to Deed Realty, Inc. and that at each such change, new application For corporate registration was filed with the Commission. Further, the stated offices and Active Firm Member Broker remained the same. Thus, For all legal purposes, the above corporate entities are one and the same. As to Count One of the complaint, according to the certificate of the Commission's Chairman, dated December 3, 1976, (which was offered and received into evidence without objections), during the period November 1, 1975 through the date of said certificate, no registration was issued to or held by either of the three corporations above referred to. This was confirmed by testimony of Bernard Bauman who was to have become a salesman associated with the above entities and by Frank Viruet the broker, who was to have become the Active Firm Member Broker For the above entities. Approximately December 2, 1975, evidence reveals that Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., entered a written lease For office premises known as Room 212, Nankin Building, which is located at 16499 N.E. 19th Avenue, North Miami Beach, For the period January 1 through December 31, 1976. (A copy of the lease was entered into evidence by stipulation). The unrebutted testimony by Plaintiff Reagan was that he observed during his investigation of this cause, a building directory on the ground floor entrance to the Nankin Building displaying the name Noble Realty, Inc., Room 212 (2nd Floor). A similar display on the building directory appeared on the second floor. Plaintiff's witness, Peter King, a representative of and For Southern Bell Telephone Company, testified that on December 27, 1975, three phones were installed in said room 212 of the Nankin Building in the name of Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., and that from January 1 through January 16, 1976, approximately 575 phone calls were made from such phones during evening hours to out-of-state numbers. Jeffrey Bauman and Bernard Bauman admitted to having made phone calls to out-of-state numbers For purposes of soliciting real estate sales listings, but did not recall nor introduce records as to how many calls were in fact made. Jeffrey Bauman testified that Frank Viruet had also made phone calls from the stated phones but did not state whether they were solicitations. On this point, Frank Viruet denied making solicitation calls although he admitted using the phone For other purposes. Bernard Bauman testified that approximately four listings were obtained with an advance fee of $375.00 For each listing received. He further testified that upon being advised, by the investigator with the Commission, that the operation was in violation of the licensing law by reason that no registration had been issued to the applicant company, and that all who were engaged in real estate activities For said company were in violation of the licensing law, the premises were closed and all real estate activities ceased. This was confirmed by nominal Plaintiff Reagan. Frank Viruet denied having knowledge of real estate activities being conducted by the Baumans. He further denied knowledge that office space in Room 212 of the Nankin Building was occupied by Land Re- Sale Service, Inc. and used by the Bauman's. He admitted to signing the application For registration which was submitted to the Commission as the corporate Active Firm Member Broker to be. As to Count Two, evidence established as stated above, that defendants Jeffrey and Bernard Bauman had solicited real estate sales listings with representations to property owners that the listings would in fact be published and disseminated to brokers nationwide. However, the Baumans, admitted by their own testimony that their listings were never published or otherwise disseminated to brokers either intrastate or nationwide. Bernard Bauman testified that no money was ever returned to senders. There was no evidence received to show that Defendant Frank Viruet knew that no bona fide efFort would be made to sell the property so listed with Noble Realty Corporation; nor that Viruet was aware that solicitations were being made. As to Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that the acts and doings set out in Counts One and Two establish a course of conduct by defendants upon which revocation of their registration should issue.
Findings Of Fact The testimony revealed that during late December, 1975, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., a Florida Corporation, filed application with the Florida Real Estate Commission seeking registration as a corporate real estate broker. The application revealed that Defendant Frank Viruet (FREC Progress Docket 2856) was to become the Active Firm Member Broker, and Vice President of the company; that Carol Bauman was to become Secretary-Treasurer and Director of the company; that Lee Klein was to become President and Director of the company. Testimony shows that Carol Bauman is the wife of Defendant Bernard Bauman (Progress Docket 2857); that Lee Klein is the sister of Carol Bauman and that Jeffrey Bauman (FREC Progress Docket 2858) is the son of Bernard Bauman. Subsequent to filing said corporate application For registration with the Commission, evidence reveals that the name was changed to Noble Realty Corporation and shortly thereafter to Deed Realty, Inc. and that along with each change, a new application For corporate registration was later filed with the commission. It was noted that the stated officers and active firm members broker remain as stated in the initial corporate application For registration. Thus, it can be concluded For all legal purposes that the above corporate entities are one and the same. Count I of the Administrative Complaint filed herein, reveals that according to the certificate filed with the Commission's chairman dated December 3, which was offered into evidence by Plaintiff and admitted, during the period November 1, 1975 to the date of said certificate, i.e., December 3, 1976, which covers all dates material to the complaint herein, no registration was issued to or held by either of said corporations, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., Noble Realty Corporation or Deed Realty, Inc. This was further confirmed by the testimony of Bernard Bauman who was to have become a salesman associated with the above entities and by Frank Viruet, who was to have become the active firm member broker For the above entities. Approximately December 2, 1975, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc. entered into a written lease For office premises known as Room 212, Nankin Building, 16499 N.E. 19th Avenue, North Miami Beach, Florida For the period January 1 through December 31, 1976 (A copy of the lease was entered into evidence by stipulation.) The unrebutted testimony of Plaintiff Reagan reveals that he observed during his investigation of this cause a building directory on the ground entrance floor to the Nankin Building displaying the name Noble Realty, Inc., Room 212 and a similar display on the building directory which was located on the second floor. Plaintiff's witness Peter King, a representative of and For Southern Bell Telephone Company testified that on December 27, 1975, three phones were installed in Room 212 of the Nankin Building in the name of Land Re-Sale Service, Inc. and that from January 2 to January 16, approximately 575 calls were made from the stated phones all during evening hours to out-of-state numbers. Jeffrey Bauman admitted to having made phone calls to out-of-state numbers For purposes of soliciting real estate sales listings, but failed to recall specifically the number of calls nor did he have records to substantiate this fact. Bernard Bauman testified that from such solicitations, approximately 4 listings were obtained accompanied by an advance fee of $375.00 For each listing. When he was advised by the Commission's Investigator that the operation they were conducting was in violation of the licensing law by reason that no registration had been issued to the company and that all who are engaged in real estate activities therein were in violation of the license law (Chapter 475, F.S.) the premises were closed and all real estate activities ceased. This was further confirmed and unrebutted by plaintiff Reagan. As to Count II, the evidence established that, as stated above, the Defendants Bernard and Jeffrey Bauman had solicited real estate sales listings with representations to out-of-state property owners that listings would in fact be published and disseminated to brokers nationwide. Both Jeffrey and Bernard Bauman admitted that their listings were never published or otherwise disseminated to brokers. Bernard Bauman's testimony reveals that no monies received were returned to senders. There is no evidence introduced to show that Defendant Jeffrey Bauman knew, at the time of soliciting, that no bona fide efFort would be made to sell the property so listed with Noble Realty Corporation. As to Count III, plaintiff alleges that the above acts as set Forth above established a course of conduct by defendant upon which his revocation or registration should issue.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, the Respondent Joyce A. Chandler, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0348072. Respondent's license was suspended for a period of one year pursuant to a Final Order of the Florida Real Estate Commission on August 4, 1983, which became effective September 3, 1983. To date, the Respondent has failed to take steps necessary to reactivate her license and she remains in a suspended status. Gerald and Mary Anne Jennings were the owners of a home located at 15413 S.W. 105th Avenue, Miami, Florida. There was a first mortgage on the home held by Stockton, Whatley and Davin. In the early part of 1981, the Jennings were experiencing financial difficulties and in an effort to help pay off debts secured a second mortgage in the amount of $15,000.00 from Davide and Associates, Inc. This mortgage from Davide and Associates, Inc., was a wrap-around mortgage making the total obligation (Stockton, Whatley and Davin plus Davide) approximately $44,000.00. In August of 1981, Davide and Associates, Inc. sold the wrap-around mortgage to Mr. and Mrs. Leon Shiff. In January of 1983, the Jennings made a decision to sell their home as they were having difficulty making payments to Shiff. The Jennings contacted Mr. Shiff and informed them of their decision, and Mr. Shiff attempted to secure prospective purchasers for them. On or about January 30, 1983, the Respondent Chandler made an offer to purchase the Jennings home, which offer was rejected by the Jennings. On or about February 2, 1983, the Respondent made a second offer to purchase the Jennings home which offer was accepted. The terms of this February 2, 1983 contract provided that the Respondent was to give sufficient funds to the Jennings to catch up on all mortgage arrearages, tender to the Jennings approximately $4,000.00 in cash, and the Jennings were to take back a third mortgage in the amount of $4,000.00. Respondent, in turn, was to assume the Stockton, Whatley and Davin mortgage and agreed to pay off the Shiff mortgage within 90 days. The Jennings desired to return to West Virginia immediately. Therefore, the Respondent promised and represented to the Jennings that she would secure tenants to occupy the residence while she attempted to obtain the necessary financing and to close the transaction and would use the proceeds from the rental money to make all mortgage payments. On or about February 22, 1983, the Respondent and the Jennings signed yet a third contract. Said contract has not been produced and the location of it is unknown. On this same date, the Respondent had the Jennings sign, in blank, a Warranty Deed. The Respondent represented to the Jennings that the Warranty Deed was nothing more than a Power of Attorney which enabled the Respondent to rent the house and use the rental money to make the mortgage payments while the Respondent sought the financing per the terms of the contract. Based on the Respondent's representations and promises, the Jennings vacated the residence and stopped making mortgage payments. Thereafter, the Respondent secured a Mr. and Mrs. Hill as tenants for the property. Mr. and Mrs. Hill came to the Respondent as tenants from Prudential Life Insurance Company. Mr. and Mrs. Hill had recently experienced damage to their home due to a fire and the Respondent secured rental property for the Hills on behalf of Prudential. In regards to this matter, Prudential paid via a double party check made payable to Robert Hill and Princess International, Inc. $1,950.00. The Respondent goes by the name of P. J. Chandler, Princess Chandler, Princess international and Princess International, Inc. These tenants remained in the Jennings' home for approximately two months. The Respondent made no mortgage payments to either Stockton, Whatley and Davin or to Mr. Shiff for the period of February 1983 to August 1983. Further, the last mortgage payment made was for the January payment delivered to Mr. Shiff by Mrs. Jennings. In order to keep the first mortgage in good standing with Stockton, Whatley and Davin, Mr. Shiff took it upon himself to make these mortgage payments although he was receiving no mortgage payments on the wrap-around from Mr. & Mrs. Jennings or the Respondent. In June of 1983, Mr. Shiff enlisted the aid of Herman Isis, attorney at law, to begin foreclosure proceedings on the residence. In August of 1983, the residence was sold to Shiff at the foreclosure sale. Thereafter, a certificate of title was received by Mr. Shiff in regards to said foreclosure purchase. The Jennings received only $3,248.00 from the Respondent as opposed to the approximate $8,000.00 contract amount. The transaction never closed as promised by the Respondent. Finally, the Respondent failed to make the necessary mortgage payments as represented and promised by her to the Jennings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent Joyce A. Chandler's license as a real estate broker be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Graves, Esquire 315 S.E. Seventh Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether respondents' real estate licenses should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined on charges of false promises, misrepresentation, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Terry L. Baker is now and was at all times material to the charges a licensed real estate broker holding license no. 204679. (P-1) He also was president, secretary, and treasurer of respondent Terry L. Baker and Associates, Inc., a licensed real estate brokerage corporation (lic. no. 213974) located at 1418 West Edgewood Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida. There are no other officers, directors, or members of this brokerage corporation; respondent owns 100 percent of the capital stock. (P-1) Respondent was, and continues to be, the active broker for this real estate brokerage corporation. (P-1) On July 21, 1982, respondent assisted in the negotiation and closing of a real estate sales transaction between Dolores B. Hawkins, as seller, and James W. and Patricia L. Dobson, as purchasers. The real estate involved was a residential lot and dwelling unit located at 7065 Bishop Hatcher Drive East, Jacksonville, Florida, and was, at the time, the subject of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-2, P-6) The real estate sales contract was signed by the seller and buyers on July 21, 1982. At that time, respondent submitted a written estimate of the seller's closing costs. This estimate, signed by both respondent and the seller, showed that the seller would net $1,598.25 from the transaction. It was specifically noted that this net figure did not include an Atlantic Bank payment. This payment was a recognized obligation of the seller and was required to obtain the release of a record judgment lien held by the bank. Ms. Hawkins, the seller, understood that this payment was her obligation and was not included in the $1,598.25 figure. The written estimate also included seller's cost of approximately $2,000 for attorney's fees and back mortgage payments. The attorney's fees were related to the legal costs associated with the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. An existing mortgage balance, to be assumed by the buyers, was listed as approximately $19,000. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-3) On two separate occasions prior to closing, respondent told seller Hawkins that there had been an increase in the charge for attorney's fees associated with the mortgage foreclosure. (Testimony of Hawkins, respondent) Prior to closing, respondent loaned seller Hawkins $220 to help her pay her apartment rent. They agreed that the loan would be repaid out of the proceeds from the sale of her property. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-4) At closing on August 17, 1982, respondent presented the seller with a Seller's Closing Statement listing various charges to the seller, including the loan repayment of $220, the payment to Atlantic Bank (for release of lien) of $425, attorney's fees of $638.50, and an assumed mortgage of $19,847.51. The net amount due the seller was $675.82. The buyers paid the balance due at closing and the seller delivered the warranty deed to respondent for recording. A couple of days later, respondent, in turn, wrote a check for $675.82 and delivered it to the seller as net proceeds from the sale. Payment of respondent's commission was shared by the seller and buyers at closing. Respondent received the warranty deed at closing and the parties to the transaction expected him to have it recorded. He accepted this duty and undertook to perform it. However, he did not record the warranty deed on the public records until October 4, 1982--almost three months later--after repeated requests by the mortgage service company for a copy of the recorded deed. The delay was caused by respondent's waiting to receive a release of the Atlantic Bank lien so that he could record the two instruments at the same time. But after repeated requests for a copy of the recorded deed, he finally recorded it even though he had not yet received the release of lien. (Testimony of Baker, Hawkins, Dobson) Contrary to the Department's contention, respondent's delay in recording the deed does not constitute culpable negligence, false promises, misrepresentation, or breach of trust in a business transaction. His lack of diligence in recording the deed is, instead, an act of simple negligence. His carelessness exposed the buyers to unnecessary risk. During this delay of almost three months, the seller, while record titleholder, could have reconveyed the property or subjected it to additional encumbrances. Respondent, in delaying recordation almost three months, failed to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable man, in the same situation and with similar experience, would not have omitted. His failure to exercise due care does not, however, demonstrate willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the rights of others. The Department also charges that respondent did not have--at time of closing--the lien of Atlantic Bank satisfied. Prior to closing, the respondent- -on behalf of the seller--negotiated the outstanding debt with attorneys for Atlantic Bank: He was told that the bank would accept fifty cents on the dollar, or $425. Thereafter, respondent collected this amount as a charge to the seller at closing. (Testimony of respondent) Respondent, however, did not have an executed release of lien form, or the judgment lien satisfied, at closing. He asserts--without contradiction-- that the bank's attorney at first offered to prepare the release, but later asked respondent to do so. By the time of closing, respondent had been either unable to obtain the release from the attorney, or he had been unable to obtain and complete the form on his own. When asked why he proceeded to close the transaction although the release had not been obtained, he states that both buyers and seller consented to the closing because the property was facing foreclosure. Respondent's assertion that the parties consented to closing, in the absence of a release of lien, is unrefuted and accepted as fact. No evidence was presented that, in light of the parties' consent, closing of the transaction was improper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint, and all charges contained therein, be dismissed for failure of proof. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Wilbur Lewis Hallock, at all times relevant thereto, was a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0035549 by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, in 1971. He also has the designation of a Graduate of the Realtors Institute (GRI), having successfully completed its requirements. At the time the events herein occurred, Hallock was a salesman for Don Asher and Associates in Orlando, Florida. On or about August 8, 1980, Respondent, through reading the Orlando Sentinel Star, became aware of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding by Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan Association 1/ pending against James A. and Jeanie Lockwood, husband and wife, who owned a home located at 4813 and 4815 Basswood Lane, Orlando, Florida. 2/ Hallock had been told to vacate his apartment, and was in the process of finding a new home. He was "looking for a bargain" and believed he found one when he read of the Lockwoods' plight. The Lockwoods were separated at that time and only James Lockwood lived in the house on Basswood Lane. Hallock telephoned James Lockwood on Friday evening, August 8, 1980, and told him he was aware of the foreclosure proceeding and wished to meet with him to discuss a possible sale or way to avoid foreclosure proceedings. Lockwood, who was in the process of moving to Winter Haven and wished to immediately sell the property, was receptive and invited Respondent to meet with him that evening. Respondent and a lady friend (Mrs. Florence Harrison) then visited James that night. Hallock introduced himself, and showed two cards to prove his identity. Hallock made clear he did not represent his employer, Don Asher and Associates, but was simply representing himself. Although conflicting stories as to what happened during and after this first meeting were given by the various witnesses, the undersigned finds the following to be the more credible version of the sequence of events. Upon meeting Lockwood, Hallock proceeded to discuss the various alternatives available to Lockwood. These included selling the home to Hallock's brother, who lived in Miami, allowing Hallock himself to purchase the house, or simply letting the lending institution foreclose. Because the mortgage payments were in arrears and a foreclosure proceeding in progress, Lockwood offered to give the house to Hallock if he would bring the payments current. Hallock, who knew consideration for a real estate transaction was required, declined the offer and instead offered James "a minimum of $50 equity." No total purchase price was discussed since the balances on the first mortgage, and a second mortgage held by Freedom Federal Savings and Loan of Tampa, were unknown. Neither was the agreement reduced to writing. James also wished to avoid paying a commission on the sale of the house that might be due since another realtor, Area One West, Inc., held a listing. However, Hallock advised James that because Jeanie Lockwood had not signed the agreement, the listing realtor would have "no claim whatsoever." Hallock also told James that his wife needed to concur in their agreement. That same evening, Hallock telephoned Jeanie Lockwood, who resided in an apartment in Orlando. He told her he had just talked with her husband concerning a possible sale of their house, and wished to discuss the matter with her that evening. She agreed, and subsequently met Hallock and Mrs. Harrison later that evening. Also present was Jeanie's neighbor, Carol Gordon, who had been asked by Jeanie to sit in on the discussions. Hallock identified himself to the ladies, told them that he had become aware of the foreclosure proceeding by reading a newspaper, and had discussed a possible sale with the husband. He briefly described the same alternatives available to her as he had with James. When asked by Hallock whether she wished to keep the house or move into it, Jeanie stated she did not. No purchase price or equity payment was discussed that evening. However, Hallock requested Jeanie to call the two lending institutions on the following Monday morning to authorize him to ascertain the balances owed on the mortgages. He also advised her that the listing then held on the property by the other realtor was not valid because Jeanie had failed to sign the listing agreement. Hallock called James early the next morning (Saturday) and asked to meet with him. James was moving his possessions out of the home that day and told Hallock to come over right away. Upon arriving at the home, Hallock told James he had a deed prepared that conveyed the property to him and wished to have James sign it that day before he moved to Winter Haven. However, he indicated he would not record it or pay any consideration until the mortgage balances were ascertained, the chain of title checked, and final confirmation received from the Lockwoods. James agreed to meet Hallock at 10:00 a.m. that morning to sign the deed. Hallock then telephoned Jeanie and asked to meet her that morning. When they met, Hallock explained he wished her to sign the deed that day so he would not have to interrupt her work schedule during the following week. Hallock told her to meet James and himself at Wescott Realty at 10:00 a.m. to sign the papers. He also told her that "the least you will get is $100 for the house." At approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, the Lockwoods and Hallock met at Wescott Realty in Orlando. There they executed a warranty deed conveying the property in question from the Lockwoods to Hallock (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). It was notarized by Barbara Boehmer, an employee of Wescott. Also present was Mary Black, another employee of Wescott. Prior to their signing the document, the Lockwoods were asked by Hallock if they were of legal age, were husband and wife, were under duress or threat to sign, or were subject to the influence of drugs or alcohol. Although the signing was done in a rather hasty fashion, there was no effort by Respondent to cover or conceal any portion of the document. The word "deed" was not mentioned at any time during the transaction, nor were the Lockwoods verbally advised at that time as to the nature of the document being signed. Neither was any money or other consideration exchanged. On Monday, August 11, 1980, Jeanie Lockwood called Margaret M. Norman at Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan to request the balance on the mortgage held by that institution. Mrs. Norman advised Jeanie to make the request in writing; Jeanie then prepared a letter requesting that the institution give Hallock "any information he requires regarding the foreclosure on our house at 4815 Basswood Lane." (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Hallock telephoned Jeanie on Monday evening and told her he would give her $65 equity instead of $50.00. She concurred with this amount. He also told her he was in the process of having the title checked and would not record the deed unless the title was clear. On Tuesday morning, Hallock telephoned Mrs. Norman to ascertain the balance on the mortgage held by Winter Park Federal Savings and Loan. Upon receiving preliminary information concerning the mortgage, Hallock called James in Winter Haven and advised him the wife had accepted the $65 equity offer on Monday night. The husband complained he wanted an amount closer to $100; Respondent said he would "split the difference" and upped the equity payoff to $75. The husband then gave his concurrence. At 11:43 a.m. on August 12, 1980, Hallock recorded the warranty deed signed by the Lockwoods in the Orange County Courthouse and paid $232 for documentary stamps affixed to the deed (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). He later requested and obtained from the Department of Revenue a partial refund of the stamp tax after he determined the stamp tax paid exceeded the amount actually required. After recording the deed he obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $75 and mailed it to James in Winter Haven. However, James never cashed the check and returned it to Hallock. On that same Tuesday, Jeanie called Area One West, Inc., the listing realtor, to let them know she had received foreclosure papers on the second mortgage. A salesperson told Jeanie that she had a prospective buyer for the house, and suggested they view the property that afternoon. Thereafter, two representatives of Area One West, the prospective buyer and Jeanie all met at 4815 Basswood Lane. Upon reaching the premises, they found the realtor's sign and multilock in the carport, the front door unlocked, and Hallock's car in the driveway. Inside was Hallock showing the house to a prospective buyer. Jeanie told Hallock she now had a buyer and would not sell the house for $65. Hallock told her he had bought the home, already recorded the deed she had previously signed on Saturday, and had mailed James a check for $75. Jeanie then accused Hallock of being "in cahoots" with James. On August 14, 1980, Respondent telephoned James Lockwood in Winter Haven to inquire about a lawnmower, edger and books that James had left in his house. James told Hallock to keep his books but stated he wished to keep the lawnmower and edger. During the next day or two, James came and took the lawnmower, drapes and oven racks from the house. Thereafter, Hallock called James and asked if he would swap the edger for the missing oven racks; James agreed. Hallock ultimately changed the locks on the house on Saturday, August 16, 1980. James Lockwood is a 29-year-old stockholder employed by Merrill Lynch in Winter Haven, Florida. Prior to his present employment, he worked for an Orlando automobile dealership. His wife is a secretary with the State of Florida. Although their formal education was not disclosed, James did attend college for an undisclosed period of time. Jeanie described her husband as being as honest and truthful "as the next person" but acknowledged he sometimes lied. The listing agreement with Area One West, Inc., was signed by James Lockwood and Carol Lockwood on July 3, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). 3/ Carol is his second wife. Jeanie did not sign the agreement. The house was originally listed for $56,900 on the agreement but that figure was marked through and replaced with a figure of $49,900. Hallock purchased the house for approximately $39,600.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint against Respondent Wilbur Lewis Hallock be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1981.
