Findings Of Fact Respondent is a state certified general appraiser, holding license number RI 0000912. In late 1993 First Sarasota Mortgage Company hired the appraisal company for which Respondent worked to prepare a "small income property report." This was a short form appraisal report used for multifamily housing, up to seven attached units. Respondent visited the subject duplex to meet the borrower and inspect the property. He found the duplex in bad disrepair. The building was constructed in 1928. Forty or fifty years ago a prior owner removed a second story from the building, leaving it a single-story building. The interior walls are the original walls of the building, which is a legal nonconforming use in an area without other duplexes or similar properties. The building also suffered from a serious termite inspection. Respondent reported what he had seen to the loan officer at First Sarasota. He told her that the property had considerable deferred maintenance and was not as represented by the borrower to the bank. Contrary to the borrower's assurances, the building was infested with termites, either uninsured or underinsured, and not owner-occupied. The loan officer instructed Respondent to continue the appraisal and try to find comparables. After about two and one- half days of research over a five day period, during which time he kept the loan officer informed of his lack of progress, Respondent contacted the loan officer and told her what he had found. After searching in a 15 mile-radius Respondent had still been unable to find properties that did not require large adjustments due to the age or condition of the property. The loan officer agreed that the comparables were useless. Respondent asked her whether he should continue the project or stop. She said that she would talk to the borrower and get back to Respondent. The loan officer called Respondent the next day and said stop working on the project. The loan officer denied the loan application, evidently due to the inadequacy of the property to be mortgaged. Although the lender ordered the appraisal, the borrower had paid the lender in advance for the appraisal. Respondent went to his supervisor and explained that the borrower had already paid $450, and Respondent felt uncomfortable not giving him anything. Respondent suggested that they provide the lender with a letter of opinion based on their opinion of the worth of the property using a cost approach, omitting the market and income approaches due to the absence of comparables. The supervisor approved the issuance of a letter of opinion. A copy of the letter went to the borrower. Respondent did not hear from the borrower for some time after issuing the letter of opinion. Then the borrower asked for a formal appraisal report. Respondent offered a partial refund or the letter of opinion, but the borrower insisted on a formal appraisal report. which Respondent could not provide. The letter of opinion is on the letterhead of Respondent's employer and is dated October 4, 1993. Addressed to First Sarasota, the letter, which is signed by Respondent, describes the property and states: After a thorough inspection of the property, an intensive search of the Lee County Property appraisers tax records, the last three years of recorded sales taken from the Lee County REDI records, sales from the past two years taken from the Ft. Myers MLS and telephone interviews with local realtors and appraisers, it is our opinion that if an appraisal were to be per- formed on this property, the estimated fair market value of the subject property as of the date of inspection, 09/02/93, would be $65,000 to $75,000. The one-page letter explains in detail the calculations under the cost approach for the property, leading to a total value of $92,000 for land and building. A note adds that the cost approach was given little weight due to the magnitude of needed repairs, including repairs for termite damage. The final sentence of the letter states: "This is a letter of opinion only and is not meant to be misinterpreted or utilized as an appraisal." Twice, the letter disclaims being an appraisal report. The letter is accurate, reasonably detailed, and carefully conditioned. The main issue in the case is whether the letter of opinion is a permissible alternative to a formal appraisal report under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) that are incorporated into the disciplinary statutes. Statement of Appraisal Standards No. 7 was adopted on March 22, 1994, and is included in the 1995 USPAP. Statement No. 7 addresses the situations under which an appraiser may perform an assignment that calls for something less than, or different from, a formal appraisal, as required by USPAP standards. The commentary identifies the issue as follows: Throughout the history of real property appraisal practice, a perception has existed that certain types of transactions in the real estate market require something less than or different from a Complete Appraisal. The phrase something less than or different from in this context has meant a Limited Appraisal and a condensed report. To distinguish this type of assignment from a Complete Appraisal, different names have been created for this activity, including Letter Opinion of Value, Update of an Appraisal, Recertification of Value, and, more recently, Evaluation of Real Property Collateral. 1995 USPAP, page 73. Statement No. 7 proceeds to describe a "complete appraisal" and "limited appraisal" and a "self-contained appraisal report," "summary appraisal report," and "restricted appraisal report." Mentioning a provision that permits an appraiser to enter into an agreement that "calls for something less than, or different from, the work that would otherwise be required by the specific guidelines," Statement No. 7 explains: This provision goes on to permit limited departures from specific guidelines provided the appraiser determines the appraisal process is not so limited as to mislead the client and intended users of the report, the appraiser advises the client of the limitations and discloses the limitations in the report, and the client agrees that the limited service would be appropriate. 1995 USPAP, page 73. After an extended discussion of the types of appraisal reports and appraisals, Statement No. 7 concludes in part: Clarification of Nomenclature Various nomenclature has been developed by clients and client groups for certain appraisal assignments. The development of this Statement on Appraisal Standards is a response to inquiries about several types of appraisal assignments, and it is appropriate to clarify the meaning of these terms for future reference. The term Letter Opinion of Value has been used to describe a one-page letter sent to a client that stated a value estimate and referenced the file information and experience of the appraiser as the basis for the estimate. This type of service does not comply with USPAP, and should be eliminated from appraisal practice. . . . The Restricted Report is the minimum report format and replaces the concept of the Letter Opinion of Value. 1995 USPAP, page 75. The 1993 Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, which was in effect at the time of the subject transaction, does not contain Statement No. 7 because the statement was not in effect at the time, nor at the time of the subject transaction. Appraisers have historically used letters of opinion and not been disciplined. Statement No. 7 represents an attempt, in 1994, to provide and clarification "for future reference." Nothing in Statement No. 7 nor the 1993 USPAP supplies Petitioner with any basis for disciplining Respondent for the use of the letter of opinion in 1993. The client in this case was First Sarasota, to which the borrower paid the appraisal fee. Respondent's letter is directed to the client, not the borrower. Nothing in the letter could possibly mislead the client or the borrower. The limitations of the letter are largely apparent in the letter itself. Perhaps most important, Respondent consistently kept the client informed about the project and disclosed for his client the abject condition of the property and misrepresentations of the borrower. Respondent's diligence in fact engendered the complaint from the borrower that resulted in this case. After the subject transaction the restricted appraisal report replaced the letter of opinion. Respondent discontinued use of letters of opinion since the October 4, 1993 letter. In October 1993, however, Petitioner could not discipline an appraiser for the use of a letter of opinion, at least under the facts of this case. The October 4, 1993 letter was not an appraisal report under either then-existing USPAP standards, but was a widely recognized alternative to a formal appraisal report. In October 1993, as is clear from the language of Statement No. 7, USPAP had not created the alternative of the restricted appraisal report and had not limited all communications from appraisers to one of three types of reports. There is absolutely no evidence that Respondent failed to use reasonable diligence in the preparation of an appraisal report.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. ENTERED on December 21, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Gary A. Berleue, pro se 13604 Wainwright Ave. Port Charlotte, FL 33953 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Cindy Realty of Hernando, Inc., and William Colello as real estate brokers. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Stephen C. Booth, Esquire 1604 U.S. Highway 19, North New Port Richey, Florida 33552
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ezell Realty, Inc., was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0231943 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Winfield Ezell, Sr., held real estate broker's license number 0309739 issued by petitioner and was the sole qualifying broker and officer of Ezell Realty, Inc. The firm is located at 1512 West Gore Street, Orlando, Florida. Grover Crawford was an acquaintance of Ezell who was interested in purchasing certain rental property on Coretta Way in Orlando, Florida. When he was unable to purchase the property Crawford told Ezell to let him know if anything else became available in that area. Ezell happened to own a rental house at 1121 Coretta Way which he had just purchased several months earlier in a foreclosure proceeding, and the two eventually began discussions concerning a possible sale. At all times relevant thereto, the house was rented to tenants, and Crawford intended the property to remain as investor-owned property rather than owner-occupied property. Ezell initially agreed to sell the property for $70,000 and the two entered into a contract on January 8, 1983, using this sales price. However, the lender's appraisal of the residence came in far below this figure, and the parties eventually agreed on a sales price of $55,450. A second contract for sale and purchaser was executed on June 22, 1983. Although the contract provided that Crawford would pay a cash deposit of $2,300 to be held in escrow by Ezell Realty, none was paid since Ezell was given $2,300 by the tenants of the house to make needed repairs to the property prior to the sale. This arrangement was agreeable with Crawford. The contract also required the seller (Ezell) to pay all closing coats. Therefore, Crawford was not required to pay any "up front" costs in order to buy the property. Under the terms of the second contract, Crawford was to obtain FHA financing on the property in the amount of $53,150. This type of financing is the most desirable from an investor standpoint since the mortgage can be easily transferred to another buyer for a small transfer fee without lender approval. After executing the first contract on January 8, 1983, Ezell and Crawford executed an "Addendum to Contract For Sale and Purchase" on the same date which provided in pertinent part: This contract is for the sole purpose of having the buyer obtain an assumable FHA mortgage for the seller and reconveying title to the seller. The seller hereby irrevocably assumes the said FHA mortgage from the buyer immediately after closing and the buyers hereby agree to that assumption. For this, Crawford was to receive $1,000. The parties agreed that this addendum would apply to the second contract executed on June 22, 1983. At the suggestion of Ezell, Crawford made application for a $53.150 FHA loan with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC) in Maitland, Florida, a lending institution which Ezell had done business with on a number of prior occasions. However, Ezell was not present at any meetings between Crawford and RFC. When Crawford applied for the mortgage, he indicated the property would be used for investment purposes and would not be owner-occupied. For some reason, RFC assumed the property would be owner-occupied and structured the-loan in that manner. Because of this, Crawford's down payment was slightly less than 5% of the value of the property with the remainder being financed by the institution. Had RFC treated the loan as an investor-loan, the down payment would have been increased to around 15%. Neither Crawford or Ezell advised RFC of the Addendum to the contract which required Crawford to reconvey the property to Ezell for $1,000 once the FHA mortgage was obtained. Had RFC known of this it would not have approved the loan. There was no competent evidence that such an agreement was illegal or violated any federal laws or contravened any real estate industry standard or ethical consideration. The loan was eventually approved, and a closing held on September 22, 1983. After closing, Crawford retained the property in his name with Ezell making all payments from the rent proceeds. This was consistent with an oral agreement between the two that such an arrangement would last for an indefinite period as long as the payments were current. When Crawford later received several notices from the lender stating that mortgage payments were in arrears, he hired an attorney and demanded that Ezell fulfill the terms of the Addendum. He also filed a complaint against Ezell with petitioner which precipitated the instant proceeding. After the closing, Ezell had intended for the tenants to assume the mortgage since they had expressed an interest in buying the property. However, such a sale never materialized. In July, 1984, the property was reconveyed to Ezell, and Ezell paid Crawford $1,000 as required by the Addendum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be dismissed, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Julius L. Williams, Esq. P. O. Box 2629 Orlando, FL 32802 ================================================================ =
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Riverwoods, Illinois. He has four children, and is married to Sharon Wheat-Hester. Petitioner received his undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University in North Carolina. Petitioner also received a master’s degree and doctorate degree in theology from Share-A- Prayer and Word Theological School in Whitewater, Wisconsin. Petitioner is currently employed as the director of a ministry called Marketplace Movement Network. The ministry provides advice to businesses on Chritian business ethics. In that regard, Petitioner has published one book on the subject of Christian ethics in business. Petitioner is also the President and shareholder of Hester International, Inc., a Florida Corporation that since 1995, provides mortgage brokerage services in the State of Illinois and several other states. The corporation’s principal office is located in Illinois. The business has an established client list and referral list. Additionally, Petitioner is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the Illinois, California, North Carolina and Hawaii. He has not had any disciplinary action taken against him in those states. On January 25, 1996, prior to the present license application at issue here, Petitioner sought licensure as a mortgage broker in Florida with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Respondent’s predecessor agency. On the 1996 application Petitioner answered “no” to a question that asked whether he had ever had a license revoked. Petitioner’s 1996 application was denied for a material misrepresentation or omission. Petitioner did not challenge the 1996 denial. On February 16, 2004, also prior to the present application, Petitioner again applied for a mortgage broker license. On this application, question number six asked: Have you had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude? Yes No A “Yes” answer to question six required the applicant to attach details, provide a copy of allegations, and also supply documentation of the final disposition of the case. In response to question number six, Petitioner appeared to have marked both the answers “yes” and “no”, but then circled “yes.” On the second page of the application, Petitioner explained his answer to question number six, stating that he had had a real estate license ten years ago and that he had been involved with a dispute for $2,500 and lost the case. The explanation further stated that Petitioner was moving to Illinois at the time, so he voluntarily surrendered his license. On April 1, 2004, without investigating the facts to refresh his memory, Petitioner provided the requested signed letter of explanation. Subsequently, he withdrew his February application because he did not have time to deal with the ongoing questions the agency had regarding his application. Around July 13, 2004, after discussing the February 2004 application with Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker in the State of Florida. In response to question six, Petitioner marked “no” based on his memory that his real estate agent’s license had been “voluntarily surrendered.” Petitioner also submitted character reference letters. Additionally, Petitioner discussed with Respondent any proof of rehabilitation since the “voluntary surrender” of his real estate license. On page two of the July application, Petitioner wrote that his “only blemish” was a voluntary surrender of a real estate license in 1992. Petitioner stated, “[t]his was ‘not’ an act of moral turpitude or fraud.” In a deficiency letter dated July 28, 2004, the Office requested additional information from the Petitioner, including a signed statement explaining his side of the occurrence. On September 30, 2004, the Office received the same statement the Petitioner had previously forwarded to the Office for his February 2004 application. Petitioner again did not avail himself of the opportunity to discover the true facts surrounding the claimed surrender of his license. In the second paragraph of this explanatory letter Petitioner stated that the disciplinary action that led to surrender of his real estate license arose out of a transaction involving one of his customers who rented property to a third- party renter. Petitioner stated that the rental transaction between his customer and the third-party renter occurred in the lobby of Petitioner’s office without his knowledge or help. According to Petitioner’s, somewhat confusing, explanatory letter, the customer did not have the right to rent the house, but collected $2,500 from the renter and then left the state. Later, Petitioner discovered that the customer had closed in escrow and gained temporary occupancy of the home, thereby enabling the customer to ostensibly rent the home. Petitioner further explained that the renter sued him for the $2,500 and prevailed because the transaction took place in Petitioner’s lobby. Petitioner stated he lost the case because his attorney, Scott Hester (also his brother), was unavailable to make the closing argument and Petitioner had to do his own summation. In fact, Petitioner’s brother never represented Petitioner in the renter’s case because he did not have time to undertake the case. Petitioner did not supply the names of the people referenced in the letter because he did not remember them. As will be seen, at the time of the explanatory letter, Petitioner’s memory of the facts surrounding his license surrender is, at best, faulty. On April 19, 2005, the Office issued its Denial Letter, denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. As grounds for denial under Section 494.041(2)(c), (g), (i) and (q), Florida Statutes, the letter stated in relevant part: The Office’s background investigation and information you provided revealed the following: You answered Question #6 on your application as “no”, when it asks if you have had a license, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against which involved fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude. On or about May 7, 1996, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, denied your application for a license as a mortgage broker for making a material misstatement of fact on their application. On or about December 8, 1992, after the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate conducted an investigation, you surrendered your license with that agency and entered into a written agreement stating that you agreed to have your license revoked. Accordingly, the Real Estate Commission did revoke your license in their meeting of January 19, 1993 effective December 8, 1992. The Investigative Report attached to the Final Order to revoke reveals that you were sued for dishonest conduct and subsequently, on March 25, 1992, ordered to pay Johannes Fruhwirt $7,800 plus post- judgment interest. This order was by the County Court of Broward County as a result of a Final Judgment, Case #9103333 CC53 and a Writ of Execution. The investigation revealed that Hester left the State of Florida without leaving word of his whereabouts. Apparently, that judgment was never satisfied. On May 14, 1991 you promised to pay $3000 to Leonard Schoenfeld when closing occurred on a home Mr. Schoenfeld was purchasing. Closing occurred shortly afterward, and you have never made that payment. On or about July 17, 1995, the State of Illinois received an Application Form to Operate as a Residential Mortgage Licensee in the name of Hester International, Inc. on which you were listed as 50% owner. You signed the “Verification” portion of that form and your signature was notarized on June 20, 1995 indicating that you verified as being true all data entered onto that form. However, you responded “N/A” to Part III, Question #10 which asks that you list all licenses which you or your firm have applied for and been denied and/or any and all licenses issued to you or your firm which were subsequently suspended or revoked. You therefore failed to disclose the revocation of your license with the Florida Division of Real Estate that occurred in 1992. On the same application filed with the State of Illinois, in response to Part III, question 19(m), you did not disclose that a judgment had been entered against you on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The renewal for Hester International Inc., with the State of Illinois, states under the section labeled, “Averment of License” in item “s” that the licensee will advise the Commissioner in writing of any changes to the information submitted on the most recent application for license within 30 days of said change. The State of Illinois reports that you never disclosed the denial of a mortgage broker license in 1996 with the State of Florida . (i) On November 18, 2004 in an electronic filing for corporation reinstatement for Hester International, Inc., you certified that as Registered Agent you maintained an office at 6278 N. Federal Highway, Suite #305 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In fact, that address is a mail drop leased to one Carl Thames, CPA. The signage required by Section 48.091(2), Florida Statutes, does not appear, and you and Hester International, Inc. are unknown at this location. In pre-hearing interrogatories, the Office asked Petitioner to provide more information about the transaction involving the transaction that had led to the revocation of his real estate license, including the identity of those individuals. Even though the importance of accuracy was apparent since Petitioner was now in litigation, Petitioner, again, without investigating the facts and relying solely on his improving memory answered the interrogatories posed to him. In his answers, Petitioner identified the “customer” who had collected the money as Leonard Schoenfeld and the “renter” as Johannes Fruhwirt. Petitioner went on, in his answers, to describe the transaction with Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Fruhwirt. This description is similar to the explanation offered in the explanatory letters supplied for his earlier applications. In his response to Requests for Admissions, Petitioner denied that in May of 1991 he acted as a real estate broker in the auction of a home located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Palm Beach County, Florida, and that he had been unable to deliver a mortgage at an agreed interest rate. Petitioner also denied that he had agreed to pay $3,000 for closing costs as deferred interest payments. Despite these denials, Petitioner admitted that he had signed an agreement to pay $3,000 to Mr. Schoenfeld. Petitioner explained these denials by claiming that these funds were never due because the agreement to pay $3,000 was contingent on closing. Since the real estate deal never closed, the $3,000 was never due. At his July 15, 2005, deposition, Petitioner essentially reaffirmed the inaccurate account of events in his interrogatory answers. At the deposition, Petitioner was asked to review documents related to the Schoenfeld transaction. Those documents included: (1) a copy of the May 14, 1991, agreement wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000, (2) a handwritten letter wherein he agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that he owed him, and (3) a warranty deed on property purchased by Mr. Schoenfeld. When he was shown the May 14, 1991, agreement, Respondent testified that he did not know why he would have agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000. Even when he was shown the deed on the property and even though he had notarized the signatures on that deed, Petitioner maintained that the deal never closed and he never owed the $3000. At hearing, Petitioner’s various and growing explanations during discovery significantly differ from his testimony. Petitioner testified that throughout his various explanations he had confused and combined several individuals into one transaction. Even though he knew that the true facts of these transactions were important to consideration of his application and in answering discovery in this case, Petitioner did not make any real attempt to refresh his memory of these transactions until shortly before the hearing. In fact, the Schoenfeld and Fruhwirt transactions involved different real estate deals and had nothing to do with each other. The Schoenfeld transaction occurred in 1991 and involved the sale of real property located at 14884 Equestrian Way in Wellington, Florida. Mr. Schoenfeld was Petitioner’s customer. As part of the transaction, Petitioner guaranteed he could get a mortgage at a certain rate. After failing to get Mr. Schoenfeld a mortgage at a certain rate, Petitioner agreed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld $3,000 upon closing. When Petitioner failed to pay Mr. Schoenfeld the $3,000 on closing, he asked Mr. Schoenfeld if he could make payments of $200 a month. In a letter to Mr.Schoenfeld, Petitioner confirmed that he would pay Mr. Schoenfeld the amount that was owed. Petitioner made two payments and then stopped making payments. In a letter dated July 1, 1991, Mr. Schoenfeld complained about his dealings with Petitioner to the Division of Real Estate. A few days before Mr. Schoenfeld’s deposition on July 25, 2005, Petitioner paid Mr. Schoenfeld $2,600. Mr. Schoenfeld accepted the payment since the money was still owed to him. However, the payment had been delayed for 14 years and did not include interest for those years. Petitioner testified that he made the payment because, once he remembered the details of the transaction, he felt morally obligated to pay Mr. Schoenfeld what he had promised. However, fulfillment of this obligation also occurred with this litigation pending and after denials that any money was due Mr. Schoenfeld. In short, Petitioner did not pay Mr. Schoenfeld the money that was due him for 14 years until Petitioner was forced to acknowledge the true facts of the Schoenfeld transaction in this litigation. The Fruhwirt transaction involved a man named Mark Ritter who was a client of Petitioner. Mr. Fruhwirt met with Mark Ritter at a house he wanted to rent. Eventually, Mr. Ritter sent him to Petitioner to complete a lease agreement. Mr. Ritter did not know about leases and said Petitioner was a friend whose real estate office could set up the lease contract. Mr. Fruhwirt met Petitioner at his real estate office. Since it was lunchtime, they went to a nearby Burger King to finalize the lease. While at Burger King, Mr. Fruhwirt paid Petitioner $2,850 on the lease. Petitioner’s testified that he did not receive any money from Mr. Fruhwirt and did not accompany Mr. Fruhwirt to Burger King. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ritter and Mr. Fruhwirt met in his lobby and both went to Burger King to finalize the lease arrangement. However, given Petitioner’s past faulty memory, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. At some point, Mr. Fruhwirt moved into the house. Subsequently, Mr. Fruhwirt received a letter from an attorney representing the real owner demanding that he vacate the premises. Mr. Fruhwirt then discovered that Mr. Ritter was not the owner and had to hire an attorney to sort out his continued occupancy of the property. Eventually Mr. Fruwhirt bought this property. Mr. Fruhwirt sued Petitioner and the real estate office for the recovery of the $2,850 he had paid to rent the house. Petitioner was found liable, but the real estate office was found not liable because the transaction happened off its premises at Burger King. On March 25, 1992, the Broward County Court entered a judgment of $7,800 against Petitioner, finding that Petitioner had “breached his duty to disclose that Mark Ritter was not the owner of the involved property.” After Mr. Fruhwirt obtained the judgment, Petitioner declared bankruptcy. Mr. Fruhwirt pursued an adversary action in Petitioner’s bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequently, the Bankruptcy Court cited “11 U.S.C. 523 A(2) and 11 U.S.C. 523 A(4)” and refused to discharge the judgment debt. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order refusing to discharge the debt clearly conflicts with Dr. Hester’s repeated implications and statements that this debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Unable to collect from Petitioner, Mr. Fruhwirt filed with the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. The fund paid $2,850 to Mr. Fruhwirt and suspended Petitioner’s license. Mr. Fruhwirt used the money to defray some of his legal expenses. To date, Petitioner has not paid Mr. Fruhwirt any money on the judgment. The Fruwhirt transaction led to the revocation of Petitioner’s real estate license and, on January 19, 1993, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order revoking Petitioner’s real estate license. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that he never received a copy of the documents, the certificate of service for the final order indicates it was sent to Petitioner at 1101 Hidden Cove, Salem, SC 29676, which was the address where Petitioner was living at that time. Again, Petitioner’s testimony is not credible. The Final Order referenced a December 8, 1992, agreement in which Petitioner agreed that his license would be revoked. In the December 8, 1992 agreement, entitled “Affidavit for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration, Certificate/Permit for Revocation,” signed by Petitioner, he agreed to the revocation of his license and to not apply for a new real estate license for ten years from the effective date of revocation. In particular, the December 8, 1992 agreement stated, “[t]he effective date of the revocation shall be upon signing this document.” Notwithstanding the clear language revoking the license, at the hearing, Petitioner maintained that because he had voluntarily surrendered his license, he did not believe his license had been revoked. In referring to the agreement he had signed, he testified that the agreement said, “that my license will be inactive, not revoked” and denied ever seeing the other documents revoking his license. This testimony is simply not credible and demonstrates Petitioner’s propensity to see or remember things in a way that is more flattering to him, irrespective of reality. The affidavit signed by Petitioner clearly stated that Petitioner’s license would be and was revoked upon signing. In 1995, Hester International applied to operate as a residential mortgage licensee in Illinois. The application identified Petitioner as the vice president and Sharon Hester as the president. Page one of the application indicated the application had to be executed “by two officers or all directors if the applicant/licensee is a corporation.” The application was signed by Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner did not disclose to Illinois that a judgment had been entered against him in Florida or that his real estate license had been revoked or suspended. Question 10 in Part III of the Application asked: “LIST ALL LICENSES WHICH YOU OR YOUR FIRM HAVE APPLIED FOR AND BEEN DENIED AND/OR ANY AND ALL LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU OR YOUR FIRM WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.” Petitioner responded “N/A.” (Id.). Question 19(m) in Part III of the Application asked: UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, I(WE) STATE THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY (OUR) KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER STATE THAT AS THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE: . . . (m) Has not committed a crime against the law of this State, any other state or the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, and that no final judgment has been entered against it in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit which has not previously been reported to the Commissioner. The evidence did not demonstrate that the emphasized clauses in question 10 or the “I(WE)” in 19(m) direct such questions to individuals signing the application. One reasonable interpretation of the language is that the questions are directed to the business entity applying for the license. In short, the I(WE) language is simply language in a form meant to cover multiple types of business entities ranging from sale proprietorships to corporations. Therefore, Petitioner was not required by Illinois to disclose matters which involved him personally. To date, Illinois has not filed any disciplinary action against Petitioner or Hester International. Thus, the failure to disclose personal judgments or license actions to Illinois in a corporate application for licensure does not support a finding of dishonesty or denial of Respondent’s application at issue here. At some point, Hester International’s corporate status had to be reinstated in Florida. Petitioner reinstated the company’s corporate status in November of 2004. Petitioner filed as registered agent at 6278 North Federal Highway #305, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner had not lived at this address for some 15 years, but had lived there for seven years with his girlfriend. The evidence showed that Petitioner simply forgot to change the registered agent’s address and was not acting dishonestly. Once he discovered his mistake, Petitioner amended his filing to reflect the appropriate address. Again, these facts do not form a basis to deny Petitioner’s license application. Finally, Petitioner testified that until Spring 2005, he and his wife were 50/50 owners of Hester International, Inc., as reflected on the application and license renewals in Illinois. In September 2004, Ms. Hester submitted Hester International, Inc.’s application for Florida licensure as a mortgage broker business. The Hester International business application was submitted after the Office had denied Petitioner’s license application in 1996 and was scrutinizing his July 2004 application. In the application, Ms. Hester identified herself as 100 percent owner of the Hester International. Petitioner did review this application, but he intentionally did not take part in its filing. The purported change in ownership was not adequately explained at hearing and appears to have been done in order to forestall any problems with licensure of the corporation due to Petitioner’s participation in the corporation. While the change of ownership is troubling, given Petitioner’s history, and also adds to the evidence that Petitioner is less than forthright in his memory and past business dealings, the change of ownership for the corporation’s licensure application does not, by itself, support a denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, too many inconsistencies exist between Petitioner’s hearing testimony and his earlier accounts to conclude that Respondent can be trusted to hold a mortgage brokerage license. At worst, the evidence shows that Petitioner is not truthful or acts with integrity. At best, the evidence shows that Respondent has the ability to convince himself of facts that do not quite fit the truth, but are more flattering to him. Under either scenario, Petitioner’s appreciation of honesty, truthfulness and integrity are suspect. Neither Petitioner’s letters supporting his good character, nor his success in his ministry demonstrates sufficient rehabilitation to overcome what appears to be long-time evasive behavior. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Scott Hester, Esquire 13843 Longs Landing Road East Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Robert H. Schott, Esquire Gregg Morton, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0376 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Jon A. McVety was registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a salesman affiliated with Lee County Realty, Inc., a corporate broker. Frederick C. Huth was the qualifying broker for Lee County Realty, Inc. On March 26, 1986, Frederick C. Huth entered into a contract to purchase a residence in Fort Myers Beach from Larry and June Hildreth, the owners of the residence. The contract provided for a deposit of $500 to be held in escrow by Lee County Realty, Inc., and was contingent upon the buyer, Huth, obtaining a firm commitment for a first mortgage loan within 30 days for $37,000 with interest at 11 percent and payments amortized over a 30-year period. (Exhibit 5) For his $500 down payment, Huth, unbeknownst to the sellers, signed a promissory note for $500. Huth had formerly owned and operated a motel on Fort Myers Beach which went bankrupt. Huth called several lending institutions to obtain financing pursuant to the contract, but when he disclosed his bankruptcy, he was disapproved. He never submitted a formal application for a loan. By letter dated April 23, 1986, Huth advised the Hildreths that he was unable to obtain financing pursuant to the contract and would be unable to close the deal. At this time, Huth made no reference to his deposit. Between March 26 and Huth's resignation, Huth showed McVety the promissory note he had signed. In response to the question asking if he knew what McVety did with the note, Huth answered (TR p. 12): Well, we couldn't put a note in an escrow account so we really didn't know what to do with it, to tell you the truth. So we put it in his desk drawer, as I remember. With regard to disposition of the promissory note, Huth later testified at TR p. 26, "I think I--my words were something to the effect, I don't know what to do with this. Would you like to stick it in your drawer?" By letter to McVety dated April 22, 1986, which was not received by McVety until April 30, Huth resigned as broker for Lee County Realty, Inc., and the company ceased doing business until a new qualifying broker was obtained. At Huth's request and upon receipt of Huth's resignation, McVety returned the promissory note to Buth. Huth advised McVety that he had been unable to obtain financing for the purchase and, before any other demand was made, McVety returned the promissory note to Huth. Prior to his resignation, Huth had given McVety no other instructions regarding the promissory note, nor had he made McVety aware of the contract between him and Hildreth. Subsequent to Huth's departure, a certified letter addressed to Huth at Lee County Realty from Hildreth, dated May 3, 1986, was received and opened by McVety (Exhibit 7). This letter demanded the $500 down payment on the contract be forfeited and paid to the sellers. At this time the promissory note was no longer in the possession of McVety or Lee County Realty. By letter dated May 7, 1986 (Exhibit 8), McVety, as registered owner of Lee County Realty, Inc., responded to Hildreth that the $500 deposit had been returned to Huth when the transaction did not close, that Huth was no longer associated with Lee County Realty, and that further inquiry should be addressed to Huth at the latter's residence. When the $500 deposit was not forwarded, June Hildreth apparently filed a formal complaint with the Real Estate Commission as she had threatened to do in her letter of May 3, 1986 (Exhibit 7). Following an investigation, Huth voluntarily surrendered his license for revocation and on August 25, 1986, a final order was entered revoking Huth's license as a broker (Exhibit 10). This action did not result in Hildreth receiving the $500 deposit she had demanded and no evidence was presented regarding any action taken to have this $500 given to her. However, on September 23, 1986, these charges against McVety were signed, they were filed on October 1, 1986, and these proceedings commenced. McVety's only connection with the controversy between Huth and Hildreth is that at the time the contract was signed, he owned all of the stock in Lee County Realty and he wrote the Hildreths one letter advising them Huth was no longer associated with Lee County Realty. The evidence is uncontradicted that McVety was unaware of the transaction until Huth resigned as broker and the real estate business was forced to close until a new qualifying broker was obtained. That this business was closed is confirmed by Hildreth's testimony that when she called the realty office after Huth's departure, only an answering machine responded with a recorded message. While he was active broker for Lee County Realty, Inc., Huth was also president and secretary of the company (Exhibit 2). No evidence was submitted suggesting that Huth was other than the chief operating officer of the company while he served as active broker, that McVety had knowledge of the contract (Exhibit 5) before Huth's resignation, or even saw a copy of this contract before receiving a copy attached to the Administrative Complaint in October 1986.
Findings Of Fact The testimony revealed that during late December, 1975, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., a Florida Corporation, filed application with the Florida Real Estate Commission seeking registration as a corporate real estate broker. The application revealed that Defendant Frank Viruet (FREC Progress Docket 2856) was to become the Active Firm Member Broker, and Vice President of the company; that Carol Bauman was to become Secretary-Treasurer and Director of the company; that Lee Klein was to become President and Director of the company. Testimony shows that Carol Bauman is the wife of Defendant Bernard Bauman (Progress Docket 2857); that Lee Klein is the sister of Carol Bauman and that Jeffrey Bauman (FREC Progress Docket 2858) is the son of Bernard Bauman. Subsequent to filing said corporate application For registration with the Commission, evidence reveals that the name was changed to Noble Realty Corporation and shortly thereafter to Deed Realty, Inc. and that along with each change, a new application For corporate registration was later filed with the commission. It was noted that the stated officers and active firm members broker remain as stated in the initial corporate application For registration. Thus, it can be concluded For all legal purposes that the above corporate entities are one and the same. Count I of the Administrative Complaint filed herein, reveals that according to the certificate filed with the Commission's chairman dated December 3, which was offered into evidence by Plaintiff and admitted, during the period November 1, 1975 to the date of said certificate, i.e., December 3, 1976, which covers all dates material to the complaint herein, no registration was issued to or held by either of said corporations, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc., Noble Realty Corporation or Deed Realty, Inc. This was further confirmed by the testimony of Bernard Bauman who was to have become a salesman associated with the above entities and by Frank Viruet, who was to have become the active firm member broker For the above entities. Approximately December 2, 1975, Land Re-Sale Service, Inc. entered into a written lease For office premises known as Room 212, Nankin Building, 16499 N.E. 19th Avenue, North Miami Beach, Florida For the period January 1 through December 31, 1976 (A copy of the lease was entered into evidence by stipulation.) The unrebutted testimony of Plaintiff Reagan reveals that he observed during his investigation of this cause a building directory on the ground entrance floor to the Nankin Building displaying the name Noble Realty, Inc., Room 212 and a similar display on the building directory which was located on the second floor. Plaintiff's witness Peter King, a representative of and For Southern Bell Telephone Company testified that on December 27, 1975, three phones were installed in Room 212 of the Nankin Building in the name of Land Re-Sale Service, Inc. and that from January 2 to January 16, approximately 575 calls were made from the stated phones all during evening hours to out-of-state numbers. Jeffrey Bauman admitted to having made phone calls to out-of-state numbers For purposes of soliciting real estate sales listings, but failed to recall specifically the number of calls nor did he have records to substantiate this fact. Bernard Bauman testified that from such solicitations, approximately 4 listings were obtained accompanied by an advance fee of $375.00 For each listing. When he was advised by the Commission's Investigator that the operation they were conducting was in violation of the licensing law by reason that no registration had been issued to the company and that all who are engaged in real estate activities therein were in violation of the license law (Chapter 475, F.S.) the premises were closed and all real estate activities ceased. This was further confirmed and unrebutted by plaintiff Reagan. As to Count II, the evidence established that, as stated above, the Defendants Bernard and Jeffrey Bauman had solicited real estate sales listings with representations to out-of-state property owners that listings would in fact be published and disseminated to brokers nationwide. Both Jeffrey and Bernard Bauman admitted that their listings were never published or otherwise disseminated to brokers. Bernard Bauman's testimony reveals that no monies received were returned to senders. There is no evidence introduced to show that Defendant Jeffrey Bauman knew, at the time of soliciting, that no bona fide efFort would be made to sell the property so listed with Noble Realty Corporation. As to Count III, plaintiff alleges that the above acts as set Forth above established a course of conduct by defendant upon which his revocation or registration should issue.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Donald E. Swagler is now and was at all times material a licensed real estate broker or broker/salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0139756, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint, respondent Donald Swagler was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker for and an officer of respondent Swagler Realty, Inc., which is now and was at all times material a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0169035, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material, Fern Z. Taylor was a licensed real estate broker with an office in Bonita Springs, approximately a twenty-minute drive south from the offices of Swagler Realty Company in Ft. Myers. On April 10, 1980, Andrew W. Kuchmaner was working part-time as a licensed real estate salesman in the employ (as that term is defined in Section 475.01(2), Florida Statutes) of Swagler Realty Company. Kuchmaner was a new salesman and had not yet had occasion to present a buyer's purchase offer to a client seller. During the early months of 1980, Kuchmaner was also working in the employ of, and receiving a salary from, Jim Walter Homes Company. Philip R. and Susan B. Workman first met Kuchmaner in January or February 1980 while visiting a Jim Walter's Homes sales office in Ft. Myers where he was working in his capacity as a Jim Walter Homes salesman. Kuchmaner advised the Workmans to find and purchase a lot for the Jim Walter home they had selected, and then they could purchase the Jim Walter home. Jim Walter Homes Company requires lot ownership prior to building one of their homes. Prior to selecting a lot, the Workmans had already decided on the Jim Walter home they were going to purchase, and Kuchmaner was going to do the paperwork for Jim Walter. Throughout the first quarter of 1980, the Workmans searched for a lot on which to construct their home in the Bonita Springs area of southern Lee County. During their search, the Workmans came upon a vacant lot with a sign saying it was for sale by Fern Z. Taylor. Upon seeing her real estate for sale sign, the Workmans went to Fern Taylor's office to inquire about the property and seek her assistance in their purchase of a lot in the Bonita Springs area. Fern Taylor advised the Workmans that, in addition to the lot they had already seen bearing her sign, she had Dust that morning listed and had for sale another lot in the Bonita Springs area which they would be interested in seeing. Earlier that same morning, Taylor took a long distance telephone call from a Charles A. Bennett, a resident of Arizona. Bennett said he had a lot he wanted to sell and gave Taylor the price ($7,000) and a description--Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park No. 2, in Bonita Springs. Bennett had not seen the property in some time and gave no landmarks or street address for Taylor's guidance. Back in 1925, Rosemary Park No. 2 was subdivided into eight blocks of 24 140' x 50' lots each and two larger blocks containing 16 larger 162' x 300' lots each. One of the smaller lots bore the legal description: "Lot 20, Block E of Rosemary Park No. 2 according to the Plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 6 at Page 30, of the Public Records of Lee County. This is the lot Bennett owned and was trying to sell. It is located on First Street. In 1926, Rosemary Park No. 2 was re-subdivided. The two larger blocks of the prior subdivision were re-subdivided into eight blocks of 24 140' x 50' lots each. Unfortunately, in a stroke of singular lack of vision, the new blocks and lots were designated with the same letters and numbers already assigned to the smaller blocks and lots in the original 1925 subdivision. As a result, there is another lot in Rosemary Park No. 2 designated as Lot 20, Block E: Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park, resubdivision of the East 1/2 of No. 2, according to the plat thereof, as recorded in Plat Book 8, Page 32, in the Public Records of Lee County, Florida. This other Lot 20, Block E, is owned by the Fyfes of Maine and is on Fifth Street. Taylor, who was quite busy, quickly checked a plat book in her office to locate the lot and the tax rolls to attempt far to verify Bennett's ownership and left to put her sign on the lot she thought Bennett owned and was trying to sell. Through a combination of the confusing legal description, the incomplete description and paucity of information Bennett gave Taylor, and Taylor's admitted negligence, Taylor put her for sale sign on the Fyfes' lot on Fifth Street instead of on Bennett's lot on First Street. Taylor had no listing agreement with the Fyfes, and the Fyfes' property was not for sale. Fern Taylor drew a map for the Workmans providing them with directions to this purportedly newly listed lot on which she had placed her "For Sale" sign. In reliance on Fern Taylor's map and representations as to her listing agreement, the Workmans drove to the Fifth Street lot and viewed the property as well as Fern Taylor's "For Sale" sign. Approximately one week after seeing the Fifth Street lot, the Workmans summoned Andrew Kuchmaner to Bonita Springs to view the lot and give them his opinion as to how the Jim Walter home they had previously selected would sit on the lot. The Workmans had their minds pretty well made up that they wanted to purchase the Fifth Street lot before summoning Kuchmaner. Kuchmaner never took the Workmans to any property but, upon their request, traveled to Bonita Springs to meet them and was thereupon shown the Fifth Street lot. While viewing the Fifth Street lot, Kuchmaner advised the Workmans that the Jim Walter's home they had selected would sit nicely on that lot. He also told the Workmans for the first time that he had a real estate license and would be glad to help them out with placing an offer for the lot on their behalf. The Workmans used Kuchmaner to make their $6,000 offer on the lot to save time because it was late in the afternoon and they lived in North Ft. Myers. When Fern Taylor first met Kuchmaner, he had been represented to her by the Workmans as a Jim Walter salesman. Kuchmaner went to Taylor's office and requested she prepare the contract because he would have to go all the way back to Ft. Myers to write it up. Taylor provided Kuchmaner with the legal description "Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park #2" and advised him he would have to write his own contract. Kuchmaner also proposed to Taylor that they not tell Swagler or Swagler Realty about the sale so they could divide Swagler's quarter of the 10 percent commission ($150 of the total $600 commission). Taylor refused and told Swagler what had happened. Swagler had an angry confrontation with Kuchmaner and was about to fire him, but Kuchmaner begged for a second chance and promised not to try to cut Swagler out of a commission again. Swagler relented and kept Kuchmaner on as a salesman. Kuchmaner filled out a contract on a Swagler Realty form and brought it to Donald Swagler for his review. He advised Swagler that he had gotten the legal description from Fern Taylor and had been to see the property. Swagler generally does not sell property in the Bonita Springs area and is not familiar with the area. He relied on Taylor to provide an accurate legal description of the property being sold. Kuchmaner hand delivered the contract offering to purchase the Bennett parcel to Taylor. Taylor checked the contract before she sent it to Bennett to see that the legal was the same that she had, and it was. She also checked it again when it was sent back from Bennett. Fern Taylor had received and checked the contract, title insurance binder, seller's closing statement and a copy of the warranty deed from Bennett to Workman prior to the closing The Workmans had the property they thought they were purchasing surveyed by William R. Allen, a registered and licensed land surveyor. He received the request to survey the property from Susan Workman. Over the phone, she advised Mr. Allen she had purchased a lot in Rosemary Park, Specifically lot far 20, block E. Mr. Allen informed Mrs. Workman that there are two Block E's in Rosemary Park and that they should be careful. He inquired as to which street she had purchased property on and was told, "We're on Fifth Street." Allen surveyed the Fifth Street lot and certified his survery, using the actual legal description of the Fifth Street (Fyfes') lot. Allen never saw any document with the legal description of the Bennett lot. Fern Taylor did not know that the Workmans had ordered a survey and did not see a copy of the survey until well after the closing. Although she attended the closing, she saw no discrepancies among the documents cursorily reviewed at the closing. Neither did the Workmans or the closing agent. The evidence was not clear whether there was a copy of the survey among the documents at the closing. The lender (Jim Walter Homes) and the title insurance company got a copy of the survey before closing. Neither of their professionals noticed that the legal description on the survey (the Fyfe lot) did not match the legal description on the deed and other documents (the Bennett lot). When a real estate broker has placed his sign ("For Sale") on a parcel of property, it is a reasonable conclusion that he is authorized to sell that parcel. It is customary for a broker to rely on the listing broker to provide a correct legal description for the property they have listed. At no time before the closing did Swagler or Kuchmaner have reason to suspect that the Workmans were purchasing a parcel of property different from the parcel they believed they were purchasing. Neither Swagler nor Kuchmaner were at the closing of the Workmans' purchase. But their presence would not have made any difference. It is not the real estate broker's or salesman's lob to scrutinize the documents being signed to make sure the legal descriptions on all the documents match (unless he has reason to believe the legal descriptions might be wrong.) He has the right to rely on the other professionals--the listing broker (especially since Fern Taylor was familiar with the Bonita Springs area and Swagler was not), the lender's attorney, the title company, the closing agent and, if any, the surveyor and the buyer's attorney. Fern Taylor and perhaps others were culpably negligent. Swagler and Kuchmaner were not. What happened to the Workmans is not their fault.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against respondents, Donald E. Swagler and Swagler Realty Company, in this case. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of February, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3502 These rulings on proposed findings of fact are made in compliance with Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5. Rejected as contrary to facts found. (Kuchmaner did not "solicit" or "obtain" them.) 6.-14. Accepted and incorporated. 15. Rejected as contrary to facts found. (Taylor's "investigation" or "attempt" to ascertain the legal description was deficiently and negligently performed.) 16.-17. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as incomplete ("compare the deed" with what?); second sentence, rejected because it was not proved Taylor had access to a copy of the survey before the closing. Rejected as unnecessary and potentially misleading. (A Final Judgment was entered; Taylor paid the portion against her; the other defendants have not paid the portions against them.) Rejected. Swagler Realty Company was a defendant in the case; Donald E. Swagler was not. 21.-24. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proved whether they "failed," "refused" or "neglected." (The fact is that neither has paid the Workmans any money in satisfaction of the portion of the Final Judgment against Swagler Realty Company.) Accepted but unnecessary. B. Respondents' Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1. Accepted but unnecessary. 2.-10. Accepted and incorporated. 11. Accepted but unnecessary. 12.-23. Accepted and incorporated. 24.-28. Accepted and incorporated. 29. Accepted but unnecessary. 30.-36. Accepted but cumulative. 37.-42. Accepted and incorporated, along with additional findings. 43. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Fl 32802 J. Michael Hussey, Esquire 3443 Hancock Bridge Parkway Suite 501 North Ft. Myers, Fl 33903 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301 Wings S. Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Fl 32802
