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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs WILLIAM RICHARD ROSSMEYER, 90-003568 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 07, 1990 Number: 90-003568 Latest Update: Sep. 13, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 00390879. The last license issued to Respondent was in 1988 as a salesman with Atlantic Marketing Realty, Inc., 224 Commercial Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308. On July 26, 1984, a Grand Jury indictment was filed against Respondent in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and was assigned case number 84-67-CR-ORL-18. By Count Two of the indictment Respondent was charged with having sold, transferred, or delivered approximately 1,000 counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes in the denomination of $100 in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 473. On September 28, 1984, Respondent entered into a "Plea Agreement" in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment filed in case number 84-67-CR-ORL-18. By this Plea Agreement, Respondent acknowledged that he entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily. Respondent acknowledged his understanding of the nature of the offense to which he agreed to plead guilty and the penalties therefor. The factual basis for his plea includes an admission that he knowingly delivered 1000 counterfeit $100 bills to two individuals at a motel in Daytona Beach, Florida, for which he received approximately $15,000. On November 19, 1984, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to Count Two of the indictment, a felony. He was adjudicated guilty of this felony offense and sentenced to three years in prison. Respondent served approximately ten months of the three year sentence at the Federal Correctional Institute in Lexington, Kentucky. Upon his release from federal prison, Respondent spent four months at a halfway house in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Respondent was not incarcerated at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed or at the time of the formal hearing. Respondent contends that he thought that he was working for the federal government when he committed the acts which resulted in his incarceration. This contention is rejected as lacking credibility and as being contrary to the Respondent's Plea Agreement. There is a dispute in the record as to whether Respondent notified Petitioner in writing as to his criminal conviction or his subsequent incarceration within thirty days of those events. Respondent contends that he notified Petitioner verbally and in writing of these events, but he was unable to identify the person he contends he notified verbally, nor did he produce a copy of his alleged written notification. Petitioner's records reflect no written notification from Respondent or from anyone on his behalf. This dispute is resolved by finding that Respondent did not notify Petitioner in writing as to his criminal conviction or his subsequent incarceration.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b),(f), and (p), Florida Statutes, and which revokes all real estate licenses previously issued Respondent. It is further recommended that no administrative fines be entered against Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-3568 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioners. The proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 2 are rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Respondent's licensure is as a real estate salesman, not as a real estate broker. Whether Respondent was licensed as a broker or as a salesman would make no difference in the recommendation made as to the penalty to be imposed. All other proposed findings of fact are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William Richard Rossmeyer 180 Isle of Venice, #125 Post Office Box 7412 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

USC (1) 18 U. S. C. 473 Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. STARLA K. ROSE, 86-000090 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000090 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1986

Findings Of Fact Respondent Starla K. Rose, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0046404. On February 25, 1985, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Respondent with one count of grand theft, Sections 512.014(1)a and b and 512.014(2)b, Florida Statutes, two counts of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claims Section 517.234(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes; and, one count of false report of the commission of a crime, Section 817.49, Florida Statutes. Respondent pled not guilty to the Information. On June 6, 1985, a verdict was rendered which found Respondent guilty of one count of grand theft, one count of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claims and one count of false report of the commission of a crime. The court adjudged Respondent guilty of issuing a false report of the commission of a crime, withheld adjudication of guilt on the remaining counts, placed Respondent on probation for 3 years, and ordered her to pay costs. Respondent filed a timely motion for new trial following rendition of the verdict. At the time of final hearing in this case, no disposition had been made of Respondent's motion for new trial.

Florida Laws (4) 475.25812.014817.234817.49
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs LOUIS CASANOVA, 98-002436 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida May 29, 1998 Number: 98-002436 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1997), by obtaining a license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate sales person pursuant to license number 0640934. The last license issued to Respondent was c/o Raizor Realty, Inc., 12007 Cypress Run Road, Orlando, Florida 32836. On July 3, 1996, Respondent applied for a license as a real estate salesperson. On the application, Respondent signed a sworn affidavit that all of his answers were true and correct and: . . . are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever. . . . Question nine on the application asked Respondent whether he had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, even if adjudication was withheld. Respondent answered "no." Petitioner relied on the accuracy of the application and issued a license to Respondent. Respondent is active in the practice of real estate and depends on his license to earn a living. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history and has been licensed for approximately two years. On February 20, 1985, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor theft. The court suspended the sentence. Petitioner had changed the price stickers on a pair of shoes valued at $20 and on a jar of vitamins. The court found Respondent guilty of misdemeanor theft, fined him $100, and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The jail sentence was suspended pending completion of six-months' probation. Respondent completed probation in a satisfactory and timely manner. Respondent did not willfully misstate a material fact. He conferred with friends. They advised Respondent that the matter was immaterial and more than seven years old. Respondent answered no to question nine on his application in the good faith belief that the crime was immaterial and not the type of offense addressed in the question. When Petitioner's investigator inquired of Respondent, Respondent answered all questions fully and truthfully and cooperated in the investigation.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), and dismissing the charges against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire 1999 West Colonial Drive, Suite 211 Orlando, Florida 32804 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION vs ETHAN GORDON, 97-004049 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 02, 1997 Number: 97-004049 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 1999

The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offense alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty and responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120.455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Ethan Gordon, is not now, nor has he ever been, licensed as a real estate broker or salesperson in the State of Florida. At some time prior to, and extending at least into November 1994, Respondent was employed by Mark Sclar, a licensed real estate broker, as a salesperson.1 During that period, Respondent, on one or more occasions, the frequency of which is not of record, offered the real property (apartments) of others for lease; procured lease agreements on such real property; and collected monies incidental to those lease agreements. When successful in renting a property, Respondent was accorded a commission by Mr. Sclar.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and, therefore, Section 455.228(1), Florida Statutes, and which imposes an administrative penalty of $500 for such violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1998.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.6020.165455.2273455.228475.01475.42
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs MARIA ANTONIA CABALLERO GUEITS, 00-004685PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 15, 2000 Number: 00-004685PL Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2001

The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued August 25, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating insurance licenses and appointments pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in this case, the Respondent has been licensed as a Life Health and Annuity Agent, Life Health and Variable Annuity Agent, and a Health Insurance Agent in this state. On March 7, 1982, the Respondent was celebrating her birthday, she turned 22 that day, and was returning home with her husband when the vehicle they were in was stopped for a minor traffic infraction (expired tag). Believing he had to perform a "pat down" for his safety, the officer felt the Respondent's purse and noticed a bulge in the shape of a small weapon. The small hand gun had been a birthday present to the Respondent. Upon discovering the weapon, the officer charged the Respondent with carrying a concealed firearm. Initially the Respondent entered a written plea of not guilty but subsequently changed the plea in open court to one of nolo contendere. In connection with the plea change, the court entered an Order Granting Probation and Fixing Terms Thereof. The fact that the Respondent was placed on probation is not disputed. Further, as the Court determined the Respondent was not likely to again engage in a criminal course of conduct, adjudication was withheld and probation set for a period of one year. The Respondent successfully completed that year of probation and has had no further incidents of criminal misconduct. The Respondent erroneously believed that the successful completion of the probationary period, and the fact that adjudication had been withheld, resulted in the expungement of the criminal record. As the Respondent later found out, criminal records are not automatically sealed or expunged. On November 2, 1999, the Respondent filed an application for licensure as a life health and variable annuity agent with the Petitioner. That application contained two questions dealing with the applicant's past criminal history. As to both questions, the Respondent erroneously entered "no" responses. Had the Respondent entered accurate answers, both responses would have been "yes" based upon the status of the Respondent's criminal record at the time the application was submitted to the Petitioner. The Respondent has a medical condition that she claims has damaged her long term-memory. According to the Respondent, she answered the questions as she did because she did not remember all the facts surrounding the criminal history at the time the application was completed but that, even if she had, she would have assumed the matter was sealed and fully resolved since adjudication was withheld. The Respondent's account in this regard has been deemed credible. The Respondent did not intend to mislead the Petitioner and acted more in ignorance of the law as to the prior arrest and probation than in willful disregard of her responsibility to disclose it. At the time Respondent completed her application for licensure she read the paragraph that appears at the bottom of the third page of said application in bold typeface that states: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU HAVE READ ALL OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND HAVE ANSWERED THEM FULLY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AS IT RELATES TO AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS. THE DEPARTMENT DEEMS ALL MATTERS THAT ARE PART OF AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT AND MATERIAL ELEMENT OF THE APPLICATION, THE OMISSION OF ANY PART OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD IS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT IN AND OF ITSELF. YOUR FAILURE TO DIVULGE YOUR COMPLETE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD ON THIS APPLICATION CAN RESULT IN YOUR APPLICATION BEING DENIED. In addition to the foregoing, the application submitted by the Respondent provided the following statement: Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). The answers provided by the Respondent to the two questions (application questions numbered 18 and 19) were incorrect, misleading, and were presumably used to support the issuance of the Respondent's licenses. Although the Respondent is eligible to have her criminal record sealed or expunged, as of the date of the hearing she had not completed that process. During the investigation of this matter, the Respondent fully cooperated with the Petitioner and obtained copies of documents as requested.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance impose an administrative fine against the Respondent in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of prosecuting this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Santurri, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph H. Fernandez, Esquire The Law Offices of Brand & Fernandez, P.A. 2 Northeast 40th Street Suite 403 Miami, Florida 33137 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (3) 624.501626.611626.621
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RICHARD ELMER BACKUS, 81-002558 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002558 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1982

Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate brokers and holds license No. 0002997. On May 7, 1979, Respondent acted in the capacity of a real estate broker in the transaction of the sale of a parcel of real property located in Polk County, Florida. The purchaser in that transaction was Margaret Rhoden, and the seller was June Davis, who was represented in the transaction by a relative, Henry Goodwin. On May 7, 1979, Margaret Rhoden entered into a Contract for Sale of Rea1 Estate for the purchase of a piece of property Frostproof, Florida, from June Davis. The full purchase price of the property was $3,500, which Ms. Rhoden paid to Respondent in cash on May 7, 1979, and obtained a receipt from Respondent for that amount. At the time the contract was entered into, Ms. Rhoden was advised that a deed should be forthcoming from the seller within two to four weeks. A date of June 20, 1979, was established to close the transaction, subject to a 120-day curative period should any cloud on the title be discovered. The contract between the parties provided that should any such cloud appear of record, the seller would have a period of 120 days after receipt of written notice prior to the date set for closing in which to attempt to cure the defect. The contract further provided that if title defects were not cleared within the l20-day period, the deposit would be returned to the buyer, or, at the buyer's option, the transaction should be closed in the same manner as if no defect had been found. A warranty deed purporting to transfer the property from the seller to the buyer was executed on June 7, 1979, and a title binder was issued on that same date. The title binder indicated an outstanding mortgage on a larger piece of property of which the parcel purchased by Ms. Rhoden was only a part. When efforts to clear this cloud on the title took longer than expected, Ms. Rhoden asked, and was granted, permission by the seller's agent to commence construction on the improvements on the property notwithstanding the fact that she knew that a cloud remained on the title to the lot, and the transaction had not been closed. Construction was not completed on the improvements because Ms. Rhoden ran out of cash during the course of construction. She moved into the dwelling while it was still in a partially completed condition and, on September 8, 1979, with the permission of the seller's agent, received a loan of $3,000 from the $3,500 deposit she had placed with Respondent, Ms. Rhoden executed a promissory note dated September 8, 1979, in which she agreed to repay the $3,000 loan when clear title to the property was issued. Ms. Rhoden used the proceeds of this loan to make additional improvements on the property. On October 26, 1979, Respondent received both the warranty deed dated June 7, 1979, and the title binder issued on that date from the attorney for the seller. When approached by Ms. Rhoden, Respondent agreed to lend her the deed and title binder to attempt to obtain additional financing to complete construction on her home. The clear inference from the record in this proceeding is that there was never any understanding between Respondent and Ms. Rhoden that this deed could be recorded at this or any other juncture in this transaction. In fact, the contract entered into between the buyer and seller clearly called for the payment of the full purchase price of the property at closing, and the note subsequently executed by Ms. Rhoden conditioned the issuance of a warranty deed to her on the payment of the $3,000 face value of the note. Ms. Rhoden was unsuccessful in obtaining additional financing to complete construction on her home, probably due to the fact that when she sought that financing the outstanding mortgage on the property had still not been satisfied. When Respondent advised the seller's attorney that he had loaned the warranty deed to Ms. Rhoden for the purposes outlined above, he was advised that there was nothing to keep Ms. Rhoden from recording the deed, at which point Respondent apparently determined that it would be prudent for him to retrieve the deed from Ms. Rhoden's possession. Ms. Rhoden had her mother return the deed to Respondent in February of 1980. According to the testimony of both Ms. Rhoden and her mother, they felt the purpose for the returning of the deed was to have it recorded. Respondent denies any such understanding. In resolving this conflict in testimony, the clear inference from the circumstances involved in this transaction, including the wording of the contract of sale and the note executed by Ms. Rhoden, supports a finding that all of the parties to this transaction either knew, or should have known, that the recording of the deed at this juncture in the transaction would have been improper. Although the outstanding mortgage had been satisfied in January of 1980, Ms. Rhoden had not Performed her obligation under the contract of sale by paying the full purchase price. When Respondent had recovered the deed from Ms. Rhoden, he was advised by the attorney for the seller not to record the deed until he had received payment from Ms. Rhoden in accordance with the contract and the promissory note. As indicated above, the outstanding mortgage on the property was satisfied in January of 1980. On February 6, 1980, Respondent Prepared a closing statement reflecting the purchase price of the property as $3,500. From this amount he deducted a total of $478 for state documentary stamps, title insurance, Preparing the deed, and amount of real estate commission leaving a the apparently forwarded the note from Ms. Rhoden for $3,000, together with the $22.00 cash balance remaining from her initial $3,500 deposit to the seller along with the deed which the seller had earlier executed. Ms. Rhoden apparently never made or tendered payment of the $3,000 note, the transaction never closed, and at the time of final hearing in this cause an eviction action was apparently pending between the seller and Ms. Rhoden. Paragraph seven of the contract of sale executed between the seller and Ms. Rhoden Provides as follows: If Buyer fails to perform this contract, the deposit this day paid by Buyer as aforesaid shall be retained by or for the account of Seller as consideration for the execution of this agreement and in full settlement of any claims for damages.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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JOENATHAN HARRIS, JR. vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 84-004096 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004096 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact On October 12, 1981, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for one year (Exhibit 2). The probation was terminated by Order Dismissing Warrant entered October 27, 1982 (Exhibit 3). The unemployment compensation fraud resulted from Petitioner's continuing to receive unemployment compensation following his discharge from the armed services after he had obtained full-time employment. The Information charged Petitioner with failure to disclose a material fact, to wit: he reported that he was unemployed while he was in fact working and receiving wages from Pacific Packing Company (Exhibit 2). In Application For Filing for Examination as an Ordinary Life, Including Health, agent dated March 16, 1984, Petitioner, in response to question 11(a) on this application asking if he had ever been charged with a felony, answered, "no." He gave the same answer to question 11(b) which asked if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Petitioner testified that he discussed the completion of this application with a fellow employee of an insurance agency at which he was working; and, since he had, on a earlier application for temporary employment, furnished the information regarding his unemployment compensation fraud conviction to the Department of Insurance, he did not deem it necessary to again report this offense. The fellow employee confirmed that he had discussed this answer with Petitioner and had suggested Petitioner answer the question as he did. Neither petitioner nor this witness satisfactorily answered the Hearing Officer's question how Petitioner could answer no to question 11 and then swear that all answers given on the application are true and correct. Petitioner's minister testified that Petitioner is a deacon in his church and he has found Petitioner to be truthful, honest, and capable of making mistakes and admitting them. As a temporary employee of A. L. Williams Company, a distributor of insurance products, Petitioner was deemed to be truthful, honest, and upright.

Florida Laws (1) 626.621
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. RICHARD B. WATSON, A/K/A DICK WATSON, 87-002105 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002105 Latest Update: Dec. 02, 1987

The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Richard B. Watson holds a license issued by petitioner and has since 1976. He holds license No. 0163723, and has, at all pertinent times, worked as a broker-salesman for Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., 126- 128 Eglin Parkway Southeast in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On June 13, 1983, Lloyd H. Waldorff executed an employment contract under which Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. was to have the exclusive right to sell the 25 units Waldorff Properties of Ft. Walton proposed to build as "phase two" of its La Mar West Townhouse Project in Mary Ester, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Nobody signed the written agreement on behalf of the broker, but Mr. Waldorff's testimony that Ms. Caldwell or somebody in the agency "accepted" it was uncontradicted, and fully consonant with the other evidence adduced. Mr. Waldorff or his organization needed agreements from prospective buyers to purchase units when built, in order to induce a lender to lend money for construction of phase two. One Saturday, probably in mid-July of 1983, Ms. Caldwell presented him with 18 such agreements. It seemed peculiar to Mr. Waldorff, getting 18 purchase agreements at once; and he was also struck by the number of Californians and other non- Floridians among the putative purchasers. But he had nevertheless signed the agreements himself before Ms. Caldwell gave them to Mr. Watson for attestation; and he later furnished all of the purchase agreements to Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Panama City in support of an eventually successful application for a $1,100,000.00 construction loan. (T.90) Mr. Waldorff signed the purchase agreements in a back room within the Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. offices. At hearing he remembered that a woman was present. He did not recall respondent's being there. Seventeen of the 18 agreements furnished the lender were purportedly signed by persons to whose signatures, except in one instance, respondent Watson attested. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On 16 of the 17 purchase agreements on which he signed as a witness to putative purchasers' signatures, respondent also signed as a witness to Mr. Waldorff's signature in a blank provided under the heading "signed in the presence of:". Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Respondent was aware at the time that Mr. Waldorff, whom he considers a friend, needed such agreements in order to obtain financing. As time for closing on the purchase agreements approached, Mr. Waldorff testified, he became suspicious, and asked Ms. Caldwell to see her escrow account statements, but she put him off. Eventually he asked her if the purchase agreements were "bogus," and she answered by nodding affirmatively. It was at this point, Mr. Waldorff said, that he notified the lending institution of their falsity, and asked for an extension of time in which to repay the construction loan. But the weight of the evidence established that the purchase agreements were shams from their inception and that Mr. Waldorff knew it before he obtained the loans. On September 9, 1985, Paul R. Bratton, III, an investigator for DPR, asked Mr. Watson about the purchase, agreements on which he had witnessed purported parties' signatures. In this interview, Mr. Watson said, with respect to some of the contracts which he had signed as a witness, "that he did not see the buyers or the sellers sign the contract." (T.63) In a deposition he gave in the course of related civil litigation, respondent Watson testified that it was "(p)retty much," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, p.10, "standard procedure" for him to witness signatures which he had not seen being affixed. In response to the question, "Does that mean also you wouldn't know whether these people exist in real life or not?", Mr. Watson answered, "It could be. ..." Id. as 15. Mr. Waldorff told Mr. Watson he was going to use the 18 purchase agreements, all but one of which respondent had signed as a witness, to secure a construction loan even though they were "bogus." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This conversation antedated the loan closing. Id.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MICHAEL PAUL VALENTINE, 98-002435 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida May 29, 1998 Number: 98-002435 Latest Update: Dec. 14, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent provided the Florida Real Estate Commission with false information in his application to take the broker's examination, in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(b)and (l), Florida Statutes, or whether he is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, or dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device in any business transaction, in violation of Section 457.25(1)(b), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson on September 27, 1993. On this date, he placed his license with Brokers Realty of Naples, Inc. Respondent has not pursued the real estate profession as his primary business. He has not bought or sold any real estate under his license and has not put any time into it. Respondent's profession is the ministry. He as been a minister for 20 years and has been the senior pastor of Gulf Shore Community Church for five years. Respondent is a member of the Christian Missionary Alliance. In June 1993, Respondent was assigned the responsibility of forming a church in Naples. Respondent's wife was more interested than Respondent in pursuing a real estate career, and Respondent took the course with her more for moral support. While in class, they met a broker with whom they agreed they would place their salesperson's licenses. After receiving their salesperson's licenses, Respondent and his wife placed their licenses under the broker, as they had agreed. However, the broker closed her office after a couple of months. In the meantime, Respondent's wife had met David Bayer of Century 21 Old Naples Realty, Inc. (Century 21). In November 1993, she decided to place her license with Century Respondent agreed that he would do the same. Busy with starting a church, Respondent did not attend to the details of transferring his license. He believed that someone else was doing this for him, but no one did. Respondent's inattention allowed his licensing status to lapse. Unknown to Respondent at the time, his salesperson's license became invalid on November 16, 1993, for lack of an employing broker, according to Petitioner's records. Respondent's license remained invalid until March 31, 1995, when it became inactive, according to Petitioner's records. Respondent's wife later decided to pursue her broker's license. Again for moral support and to help her with preparing for the examination, Respondent agreed that he would also apply for his broker's license. In attempting to obtain the necessary paperwork to take the broker's examination, Respondent discovered in late August 1995 that Petitioner's records had not been updated to reflect the transfer of his license to Century 21. It appears that Respondent was not yet aware of the other above-described impediments to licensure. Trying to update Petitioner's records, Respondent submitted the two forms that are the subject of the present disciplinary proceeding. The first form was a Request for License or Change of Status, which Respondent faxed to Petitioner. Respondent completed the top section of this form, which is to be completed by the licensee. He signed it beside a typed-in date of December 30, 1993, which was the effective date of the transfer of his license to Century 21. Petitioner has not objected to anything in this section. The next section is to be completed by the broker/employer or nonlicensed owner/employer. At the bottom of this section are the words, "Broker or Non-Licensed Owner Sign Here:". Respondent hand-wrote Mr. Bayer's name in what he described as printing, but, on a blurry fax, could be mistaken for a signature for someone unfamiliar with Mr. Bayer's signature. Beside Mr. Bayer's name "December 30, 1993" was typed in. Petitioner has objected to Respondent's undisclosed signing of Mr. Bayer's name on this form. On September 11, 1995, Petitioner received another Request for License or Change of Status form. The bottom section of this form was signed by Mr. Bayer at the bottom in script considerably different from that of the earlier form. The top section of this form is filled out exactly as the earlier form, with Respondent's signature beside the typed-in date of "December 30, 1993." Petitioner objected to the typed-in date because it was nearly two years prior to the date that the form was filed. As to the second objection, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Respondent was trying to file paperwork with Petitioner in 1995 that was misdated so as to suggest that it was filed two years earlier. The 1993 date was the effective date of the license transfer. The form does not state "Date Signed"--only "Date." There is no place on the form to show an earlier effective date. Not only was Respondent not trying to mislead Petitioner with the date on the form, but it is almost impossible to find that the date was misleading. There is no way to conceal that the forms were filed in September 1995, not December 1993. Respondent even sent the second form certified, return receipt requested, so as to document further that the form was sent in 1995. In the absence of another place on the form to show the effective date of the transfer, Respondent's use of the date line to show the effective date was reasonable and not misleading. Thus, Respondent did not intend to mislead with this date entry, and no one could reasonably have claimed to have been misled by this date entry. Interestingly, Petitioner did not claim that Respondent's first form, which had a similar date entry, was misleading as to the date. As to the first form, Petitioner's objection is more substantial: Respondent signed Mr. Bayer's name without disclosing that he was doing so. Mr. Bayer testified that he would have signed the form in December 1993 or September 1995 because Respondent in fact had transferred his license to Century 21 in December 1993. The record does not establish that Mr. Bayer authorized Respondent to sign the form before he did so, but the record clearly established that he ratified the signature. A few days after the first form was faxed, Mr. Bayer signed a form and sent it to Petitioner. Clearly, Respondent's handling of the signature of Mr. Bayer does not rise to misrepresentation, false promises, or dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. There was not fraudulent intent. The question is closer as to whether Respondent's handling of the signature rises to the level of making or filing a false report or record which the licensee knows to be false. Given the standard of evidence imposed upon Petitioner, there is considerable doubt whether the factual basis supporting a finding that Respondent signed as the agent of Mr. Bayer, who immediately ratified the act to eliminate any doubt as to its authorization, is sufficient to find that Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made or filed a false report or record. However, the parties stipulated to a violation of at least one count, and the administrative law judge accepted the stipulation.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order either dismissing the Administrative Complaint or finding Respondent guilty of knowingly making or filing a false record or report and issuing a notice of noncompliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven D. Fieldman, Chief Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jeanette Martinez Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur 4501 Tamiami Trail North, Suite 400 Naples, Florida 34103 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GENARO O. DIDIEGO, 79-001843 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001843 Latest Update: Feb. 13, 1981

Findings Of Fact During all times material to the Complaint Respondent Genaro O. DiDiego was licensed as a real estate broker under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. From May 1, 1976 until February 7, 1977, Mr. DiDiego did business under the trade name "Lauderdale Realty" in the Miami Beach Area. In the spring of 1976 Ms. Arlene Channing through a salesman, Anita Kandel, employed by Lauderdale Realty met the Respondent. Ms. Channing was naive about the real estate business and any related transactions. After their initial meeting the Respondent attempted to interest Ms. Channing in a variety of business ventures. Eventually she became involved in two. One was the Choice Chemical Company loan and the other was the Qualk Building purchase. On May 10, 1976, Ms. Channing loaned Mr. DiDiego $30,000.00 for his purchase of stock in the Choice Chemical Company. This loan was to be secured by a note and mortgage from Mr. DiDiego to Ms. Channing in the principal sum of $30,000.00 with interest at 10 percent until the principal was paid. The note and mortgage were due and payable within 18 months. Specifically, the security was 50 percent of the outstanding stock of Choice Chemical Corporation and also Lauderdale Realty's lots and telephone land operation. The security was to be held in escrow by Gerald S. Berkell, who at that time was counsel to Mr. DiDiego. In fact no such security was ever delivered into escrow. From the facts and circumstances of the transactions between Ms. Channing and Mr. DiDiego, it is found that Mr. DiDiego never intended to secure the $30,000.00 loan. That security was a material inducement to Ms. Channing for the loan. The principal sum of the loan, $30,000.00, was deposited into the account of Lauderdale Realty, account number 60-943-7 at County National Bank of North Miami Beach. Subsequently on April 18, 1978, Ms. Channing filed an action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, against Mr. DiDiego for the unlawful conversion of her $30,000.00. On June 19, 1978, a final judgement by default was entered against Mr. DiDiego in the amount of $30,000.00 plus legal interest. The Qualk Building purchase concerned a building represented to Ms. Channing to cost $700,000.00. Mr. DiDiego induced her to invest $150,000.00 in the purchase of the Qualk Building. To effect the purchase, Mr. DiDiego and Ms. Channing entered into a limited partnership agreement in which Mr. DiDiego would be the general partner, investing $1,000.00 and Ms. Channing would be a limited partner, investing $150,000.00. Subsequently Ms. Channing deposited $150,000.00 into the Lauderdale Realty escrow account. Her check dated June 18, 1976, in the amount of $150,000.00 was deposited in Account number 60-944-8 for Lauderdale Realty. In fact, the total purchase price for the Qualk building was $585,000.00. The building was however encumbered by first and second mortgages totaling $535,855.90. The total amount therefore required to close was less than $33,000.00. These facts were known to Respondent but were not disclosed to Ms. Channing. From the facts and circumstances of this transaction, it is found that the facts were misrepresented to Ms. Channing for the purpose of inducing her to part with her $150,000.00. Ms. Channing never received any accounting for her investment and she subsequently brought an action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. On July 8, 1977, final judgment was entered against Respondent, Genaro O. DiDiego in the amount of $150,000.00 less $32,662.84, which were actually applied to the purchase price of the Qualk building, and less $9,780.00 which represents a portion of the income of the Qualk Building paid by Respondent to Ms. Channing. In entering its final judgment, the Court found that Respondent breached His fiduciary duty to Ms. Channing. This judgment has never been satisfied.

Recommendation In light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the license of Genaro O. DiDiego as a real estate broker be revoked by the Board of Real Estate, Department of Professional Regulation. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford Board Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Genaro O. DiDiego 3745 N.E. 171st Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.65475.25
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