The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa), as a successor motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line-makes (vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes (2009),1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers. Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ferman sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 24314 State Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years. Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson), Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler dealers in the Tampa metro market. In April 2008, Petitioner had four dealers in the Tampa metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida (the Bankruptcy Court). At or about the same time, Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The filing of Wilson’s bankruptcy petition precipitated an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson’s franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for Wilson’s bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilson a notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased dealership operations. Wilson’s cessation of business adversely impacted Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the economic loss. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and, therefore, was still a dealer. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer, would have undermined Wilson’s efforts to sell the dealerships and maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and Wilson’s largest creditor, Chrysler Financial. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner did anything to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or manipulate the timing of a sale. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also sought the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly as possible in the event that a sale was not consummated. The Bankruptcy Court did not initially grant Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009, Wilson continued to negotiate with potential buyers for the dealership. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale of Wilson’s assets would be unlikely. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of intent to terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. Wilson received the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner attempted to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement dealership as soon as Wilson’s dealer agreements were terminated. Establishing a replacement dealership is a lengthy process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to start and maintain the dealership. Petitioner talked to several potential candidates to replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the principal of one of the complaining dealers in these cases. By letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else but wanted the successor dealership for himself should Petitioner decide to proceed. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson facility. Petitioner considered several potential alternative locations for the successor dealership, including property offered by Ferman. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa, Florida, which Ferman leased from a third party unrelated to this proceeding. Ferman offered to sublease the property to Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealership. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. It is undisputed that this location is less than two miles from the former Wilson location. Before establishing the successor dealership, however, Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010 (the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm that the establishment of the successor dealership would be exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1. from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3). The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor dealership. The letter also provided the relevant dates of the bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within two miles of Wilson’s former location. The letter asked the Department to confirm that the establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it was established within one year of March 10, 2009, when Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate e-mails dated February 9 and 12, 2010, the Department twice confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner relied on this confirmation by the Department before proceeding with the appointment of a successor dealership. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter to the Department, stating Petitioner's intention to appoint North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson (the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa was exempt from the relevant statutory requirements for notice and protest. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business. North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners’ application to establish a new dealership for the sale of motorcycles manufactured by Herchee Industrial Co., Ltd. (HERH), at 203 Northeast Avenue, Gainesville, Florida 32609, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact While the dealership agreement between Petitioner Adly Moto (Adly) and Respondent is not in evidence, the weight of the evidence established that Respondent is an existing franchised dealer for Petitioner Adly. According to DHSMV's published notice, Petitioner Adly intended to establish a new motorcycle dealership, Scooter Superstore, at 203 Northeast 39th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, on or after July 16, 2008. There is no real dispute that this location is only 3 to 4 miles from Respondent's place of business. Therefore, Respondent has standing to protest Petitioner’s application pursuant to Section 320.642(3)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2008). Respondent’s license number is not in evidence. According to DHSMV’s published notice, Adly intended to establish Scooter Superstore as a dealer for the sale of HERH motorcycles. Currently, Respondent sells Adly motorcycles. The only evidence of record that HERH manufactures Adly products is an announcement dated April 2008 which states that “Her Chee Industrial/ADLY Moto LLC (USA) is proudly introducing Hammerhead Off-Road as our scooter distribution partner in the US.” It is therefore presumed that HERH manufactures Adly products. According to the evidence presented, Respondent has sold primarily scooters of 50 cubic centimeters or less. Respondent insists that he has ordered vehicles over 50 cubic centimeters from the distributor, but that the distributor has refused to ship these vehicles to him. There is evidence that at least three such vehicles were ordered by Solano Cycle, Inc., but the evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not these vehicles were to be offered for sale at the Gainesville location which is the subject of this controversy, or at another Solano Cycle location in another city. However, the evidence is insufficient to establish conclusively as to whether or not Adly vehicles larger than 50 cubic centimeters have been sold by Respondent.1 The market in Gainesville, Florida, comprises primarily college students and professors. According to Martin Solano, president of Respondent, the market in Gainesville is primarily scooters of 50 cubic centimeters or less. Other than anecdotal observations, no competent substantial evidence was presented as to the Gainesville market. There is no evidence establishing an objective, reasonable standard against which to compare the actual market penetration achieved by the existing dealer. Respondent moved to a larger location because the earlier location was very small and, therefore, could not hold a lot of stock. There is no evidence as to Respondent’s profits, capitalization, or financial resources to compete with the proposed new dealership. No market penetration data, whether inter-brand or intra-brand, is in evidence. Since an objective reasonable standard was not established, the actual penetration achieved against the expected standard cannot be established.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying Petitioners’ application. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and licensure status of motor vehicle dealers and enforcing the statutory and regulatory authority related to standards of business practice by such dealers. D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. (Respondent) holds recreational vehicle dealer license no. 5RV-1222 issued by the Petitioner. The Respondent's licensed place of business is located at 3635 Fowler Street, Fort Myers, Florida 33901. The Respondent is engaged in the business of buying, selling and trading recreational vehicles. It operates under the name D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. That name alone is depicted on the only exterior sign on the Respondent's place of business at the above address. For approximately a two-year period, one George Pieropan, with Respondent's permission, occupied an office in the building occupied by Respondent and bought and sold recreational vehicles at that same location as Respondent. Pieropan purported to be operating a separate recreational vehicle consignment dealer business named "Suncoast RV," a proprietorship. There was, however, no sign on the exterior of the Respondent's dealership building advertising Suncoast RV. Both businesses operated from the same location. There was no segregation of the recreational vehicle inventory of Suncoast RV and D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. The vehicles were intermingled on the display lot. George Pieropan was not a licensed motor vehicle dealer. George Pieropan and Suncoast RV had a separate checking account, but recreational vehicles purportedly being offered for sale by Suncoast RV were advertised in the newspaper as being offered for sale by D.J.M. RV Center, Inc., the Respondent. When individuals came to the sales lot to shop for are creational vehicle, they were shown vehicles by employees of both Suncoast RV and the Respondent, regardless of which entity the vehicle was being sold by or consigned to. Keys for the recreational vehicles purportedly being sold by Suncoast RV or Pieropan, were intermingled with the keys for vehicles being sold by the Respondent on a keyboard in the Respondent's office. Mr. Don Meyer, the President of the Respondent corporation, established that the Respondent purchased a 1978 "Honey" recreational vehicle from George Pieropan which George Pieropan had taken in trade from Mr. and Mrs. Leroy Kehrer. The Respondent sold that vehicle to one James Killem. The bill of sale to Killem for the vehicle was signed by George Pieropan on behalf of the Respondent corporation, D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. In approximately October of 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Kehrer had gone to the Respondent's location to shop for a recreational vehicle. While they were at the Respondent's dealership, Mr. and Mrs. Kehrer were shown a Yellowstone recreational vehicle by Howard Turner. Howard Turner was a salesman for the Respondent and also sold vehicles for Suncoast RV (Pieropan). During their initial visit, Salesman Turner advised the Kehrers that they would have to bring in their current recreational vehicle to have its trade-in value appraised. The Kehrers thus brought in their "Honey" recreational vehicle the next day and Mr. Turner discussed a price with them, with D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. ultimately purchasing the 1978 Honey vehicle. After Mr. Turner and the Kehrers agreed upon an appraised value for their Honey vehicle, which was to be a trade-in, they traded it in on a Yellowstone recreational vehicle which Mr. Turner showed them. The Yellowstone vehicle had been placed on consignment with George Pieropan by its owner, Marcus Heck. During this visit Mr. Turner introduced the Kehrers to George Pieropan, referring to him as "one of the owners of the business" or "his boss." The next day, Pieropan called Mr. Kehrer and shortly thereafter came to the Kehrer's home where a sales agreement was executed for purchase of the new Yellowstone recreational vehicle which had been shown them by Howard Turner, the Respondent and Pieropan's sales employee. As a result of the purchase agreement, the Kehrers issued a check and, at Pieropan's behest, made out the check to "Suncoast RV." At this same time, however, Pieropan told them that Suncoast RV was the branch of the Respondent's dealership that handled used recreational vehicles on consignment such as the subject Yellowstone vehicle. In any event, the Kehrer's paid George Pieropan $17,200 in cash and traded in their "Honey" recreational vehicle with an accompanying trade-in allowance of $13,542 to make up the purchase price for the Yellowstone recreational vehicle. Ultimately, D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. sold that Yellowstone vehicle to one James Killem and George Pieropan executed the bill of sale to Killem on behalf of the Respondent corporation, D.J.M. RV Center, Inc., after D.J.M. purportedly purchased that vehicle from Pieropan. The Kehrers have never received a title for the Yellowstone recreational vehicle they purchased through George Pieropan. Marcus Heck, the previous owner of that vehicle was contacted by Don Meyer, co-owner of the Respondent corporation and had been quoted a sales price for the Yellowstone vehicle by Meyer. Mr. Heck received a check for $15,200 from Pieropan, but that check was dishonored for insufficient funds. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Heck received another check for partial payment of the amount due him in the amount of $9,000. That check was drawn on the Respondent's account and signed by Richard E. Tessier, who was the Respondent corporation's sales manager at the time. Thus, although the Yellowstone vehicle was purportedly consigned by Marcus Heck its original owner to George Pieropan, George Pieropan was acting on behalf of the Respondent corporation in selling the vehicle to the Kehrers' with the assistance of Howard Turner, who was clearly the Respondent's salesman, as evidenced in part by the Respondent corporation's attempt to partially honor the check issued on insufficient funds by George Pieropan who had since left the state. Thus, although Pieropan purported to be operating a separate recreational vehicle dealer business named "Suncoast RV," his business and the Respondent's were so intermingled as to constitute one business entity for all practical purposes. This is borne out by testimony of Marcus Heck, who established that on one occasion when Don Meyer (owner of the Respondent) was on an extended vacation, the Respondent's entire business operation was run by Pieropan in his absence. The businesses were not segregated as to office space, office entrances, driveways, or fences and inventories were co-mingled. Marcus Heck had been contacted by Don Meyer, the co-owner of the Respondent corporation, and quoted the sales price for the Yellowstone vehicle which was to be sold to the Kehrers through Suncoast RV. Suncoast RV was described by Pieropan to Heck as being part of D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. Both Suncoast RV Center, Inc. and Pieropan paid office rent to the brother of Don Meyer, one of the co-owners of D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. Finally, it was established by Howard Turner, the salesman for both D.J.M. and Suncoast and Respondent's witness, that both entities used one common telephone line and that he, Turner, sold recreational vehicles for both Pieropan and Suncoast and D.J.M. RV Center and signed sales orders for both.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the licensure of D.J.M. RV Center, Inc. be suspended for a period of one year and that Respondent pay to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles a fine of $1,000, and it is further RECOMMENDED that the suspension may be abated at such time as the Respondent provides good and sufficient proof to the Department that the seller of the motor home in question has been reimbursed in full for the sale price of the subject recreational vehicle and that, concomitantly, title to the same has been effectively transferred to the purchasers, Mr. and Mrs. Kehrer. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of October, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. _ P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1985. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted. 10. Accepted. 19. Accepted. 2. Accepted. 11. Accepted. 20. Accepted. 3. Accepted. 12. Accepted. 21. Accepted. 4. Accepted. 13. Accepted. 22. Accepted. 5. Accepted. 14. Accepted. 23. Accepted. 6. Accepted. 15. Accepted. 24. Accepted. 7. Accepted. 16. Accepted. 25. Accepted. 8. Accepted. 17. Accepted. 26. Accepted. 9. Accepted. 18. Accepted. 27. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Undisputed and accepted. Undisputed and accepted. Undisputed and accepted. This proposed finding is rejected as not being supported by the competent, substantial and credible evidence and testimony of record. This proposed finding is rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial and credible evidence and testimony of record. This proposed finding is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial, credible evidence and testimony of record. This proposed finding is accepted, but is not dispositive in itself of any issue at bar. This proposed finding is accepted, but it in turn is not dispositive of any issue at bar. This proposed finding is rejected as not being in accord with the competent, substantial, credible evidence and testimony of record in its entirety. This proposed finding of fact is accepted. This proposed finding of fact is accepted. This proposed finding of fact is accepted. 12 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory E. White, Esq. PAVESE, SHIELDS, GARNER, HAVERFIELD, DALTON & HARRISON Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether Petitioners are entitled to a motor vehicle dealership that is proposed to be located in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On December 3, 2010, a Notice of Hearing setting the date, time and location of final hearing was issued in this case. The Notice of Hearing was mailed to the last known, valid addresses of the Petitioners, which were also the addresses provided in Petitioners' Notice of Publication. Neither Notice of Hearing was returned. This cause came on for hearing as noticed. After waiting more than 15 minutes, Petitioners failed to appear to prosecute their claim. There has been no communication from the Petitioners, before, during, or since the hearing to indicate that they would not be attending the final hearing. Because of Petitioners' failure to appear, there was no evidence to demonstrate that Petitioners are entitled to a franchise motor vehicle dealership in Santa Rosa Beach, Florida. Absent such evidence, the establishment of the proposed dealership should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles denying the establishment of Petitioners' proposed franchise. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Dan Rhoad Ruff and Tuff Electric Vehicles, Inc. 1 Ruff Tuff Drive Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180 Thomas B. Waldrop Electric Cart Company, LLC 5480 US Highway 98 West Santa Rosa Beach, Florida 32459 Rachel Miller Hampton Ruff and Tuff, Inc. 230 South West Hollywood Boulevard Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Steve Hurm, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue in the case is whether an application for a motor vehicle dealer license filed by Lambretta International, LLC, and Retro Unlimited, Inc., should be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying the application for establishment of the motor vehicle dealer franchise at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Caroline Khurana Lambretta International, LLC 14339 Lake City Way Northeast Seattle, Washington 98125 Chris Densmore Scooter Escapes, LLC, d/b/a Scooter Escapes 1450 1st Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Edward G. Dreyer, III Retro Unlimited, Inc. 3200 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Robin Lotane, General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue for disposition in this proceeding is whether Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license should be revoked for his prior conviction of a felony, as proposed in an administrative complaint dated October 26, 1993.
Findings Of Fact It is uncontroverted that Respondent Lorenzo Reddick, Jr. (Reddick) holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). The complaint fails to allege, and there is no evidence of, when the license was issued. The licensed place of business is 3214 Orange Center Boulevard, #C, Orlando, Florida. On April 27, 1993, Reddick pleaded, and was adjudged guilty of a single count offense in a multi-count superseding indictment, in U.S.A. v. Lorenzo Reddick, Case #92-104 Cr-Orl-19, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The offense, as described in the Judgment, was "Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity", on 12/30/91, pursuant to title 18 U.S. Code, section 1957(a), and title 18 U.S. Code, Section 2. (Petitioner's exhibit #1) Reddick was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment, commencing May 21, 1993, with two years supervision after release. According to the court documents comprising Petitioner's exhibit #1, the sentence was less than provided in sentencing guidelines "upon motion of the government, as a result of defendant's substantial assistance." Reddick is currently serving his prison term. At the time of the offense Reddick was not operating nor was he licensed as a motor vehicle dealer. There is no evidence of whether his license was obtained before or after his conviction. There is no evidence whatsoever of the offense other than what is found on the face of the judgment, as reflected above. DHSMV learned of Reddick's conviction in the process of investigating a filed complaint related to failure to transfer title and registration of a vehicle purchased from Reddick's dealership. Neil Chamelin was the manager of DHSMV's dealer license and consumer complaint programs and was responsible for evaluating requests for administrative action and preparing administrative pleadings for the division director. Chamelin received a copy of Reddick's Judgment of Conviction and Sentence and based the administrative complaint on those documents only. Chamelin has no independent knowledge of the offense. DHSMV has a longstanding policy that a single felony conviction may be sufficient for the agency to take action against a dealer's license. That is, the agency has interpreted the language of the relevant statute to mean that a licensee does not automatically get one free felony before his dealer's license is jeopardized, even after the language was amended seven or eight years ago to include a requirement of sufficient frequency of violations as to establish a pattern of wrongdoing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter its Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that is the subject of this proceeding. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 James R. Cunningham, Esquire 200 East Robinson, Suite 1220 Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a motor vehicle dealer license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Global Express, LLC. (Global Express), is a limited liability company which has submitted to Respondent an application for a license as a motor vehicle dealer under the fictitious name of Auto Zone Auto Sales (the subject application). Johnny Romero and Rosangela Romero, who are husband and wife, are the members and managers of Global Express. Mr. Romero is also known as Johnny Guillermo Romero Peguero.1 Both Mr. and Mrs. Romero signed the subject application on behalf of Global Express before a notary public on May 4, 2009. The following language is contained above the signature lines: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct . . . Part 5 of the application form requires that the “applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director” answer yes or no to certain questions (the Certifications). Each dealership officer is required to answer these questions under penalties of perjury. Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever had a surety bond cancelled? Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been denied or had a dealer license suspended or revoked in Florida or any other jurisdiction? In addition to the foregoing, Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the affirmative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been a licensed dealer in Florida or any other jurisdiction? Under their affirmative response Mr. and Mrs. Romero inserted information reflecting that they had previously been licensed dealers under the license numbered VI/1018283. Pursuant to application executed by Mr. and Mrs. Romero on January 11, 2007, Respondent issued motor vehicle dealer license numbered VI/1018283 to Pronto Cars Corp. (Pronto). Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license bond was cancelled by its surety, Nova Casualty Company, by notice dated December 18, 2007. Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license was suspended by Respondent by Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint dated March 20, 2008. That case was assigned the following case number by Respondent: DMV-08-479. The Order suspended Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license because Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Romero ever received a copy of the Emergency Final Order and Administrative Complaint in case DMV-08-479. That conflict is resolved by finding that Ms. Pierre-Lys, acting in her capacity as a compliance officer for Respondent, served a copy of the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on Mr. Romero on April 16, 2008. Mr. Romero, on behalf of Pronto, signed and submitted an election of rights form dated May 5, 2008, which provided, in relevant part, as follows: “I have read the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter [DMV-08-479] and understand my options.” Immediately before Mr. Romero’s signature is a check in a box indicating that Mr. Romero was exercising the following option: “I have not obtained a surety bond and wish to voluntarily relinquish my motor vehicle license. I have completed and am returning the Voluntary Relinquishment of License form within 21 days from the date of my receipt of this administrative complaint.” On May 23, 2008,2 Respondent issued its Final Order in its case number DMV-08-479, thereby canceling Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer’s license. The Final Order directed Pronto to surrender its license and all dealer and temporary tags in its possession. The Final Order also contained the following: It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint filed herein is DISMISSED and this case is hereby CLOSED. Mr. Romero called Respondent’s compliance officer, Luz Irizarry, on March 6, 2009, told her that he wanted to obtain a motor vehicle dealer license, and asked whether he would have to go to a school for new dealers. Ms. Irizarry referred the inquiry to Ms. Buck, who determined that Mr. Romero would have to attend the school because Pronto had received consumer complaints, Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond, and Pronto’s license had been suspended and subsequently revoked. On March 9, 2009, Ms. Irizarry informed Mr. Romero of the reasons he would have to go to dealer school, and specifically discussed with him the fact that Pronto’s operations had been suspended. When he signed the Certifications on May 4, 2009, Mr. Romero had actual knowledge that Pronto’s surety bond had been revoked and that Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license had been suspended. Mr. Romero’s contends that he was confused about his answers because he thought he had bought the surety bond for its full term and because he thought the Final Order entered by Respondent dismissed the suspension of his license. Those contentions are rejected. It is clear from his answer pertaining to the license that had been issued to Pronto that Mr. Romero understood as a principal of Pronto he would have to disclose the revocation of Pronto’s surety bond and the suspension of Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license on the subject application. Mr. and Mr. Romero’s Certifications under section 5 of the subject application pertaining to the revocation of a surety bond and the suspension of a motor vehicle dealer license are willful, material misrepresentations of fact. On February 26, 2008, Respondent discovered that Pronto had moved its business location and was doing business at a location that had not been approved by Respondent. On April 1, 2009, Mrs. Romero drove a motor vehicle displaying a “For Sale” sign. The vehicle had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 27, 2009, Mrs. Romero displayed, or acquiesced in the display of, another car with a “For Sale” sign on it parked in front of Global Express’s proposed, but unlicensed, location. That car had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The temporary tag was filled out to show the name of another dealer. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 2, 2009, Mr. Romero had 13 motor vehicles titled in his name. Although he asserts that some of the motor vehicles were bought in conjunction with a taxi service he operated, he admitted that some of these vehicles had been purchased for resale. Mr. Romero acquired a 1966 Ford motor vehicle on May 9, 209, and sold the vehicle on May 21, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired a 1999 Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 18, 2009, and sold the vehicle on May 25, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired another Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 20, 2008, and sold the vehicle on May 31, 2009. Respondent established that during April and May 2009, Mr. Romero engaged in the business of dealing in motor vehicles without a license. On March 30, 2009, Mr. Romero paid Respondent for the registrations of ten motor vehicles with worthless checks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order deny the subject application. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in business activities requiring a motor vehicle dealer license while its license was suspended.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a motor vehicle dealer that, at all material times, has been located at 5800 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami. Except for the period of suspension discussed below, at all material times, Respondent has been licensed to operate as a motor vehicle dealer, holding license number VI-1005997. In the course of business, Respondent acquired possession of a 2007 Suzuki motor vehicle, bearing VIN KL5JD66Z97K644005. Respondent acquired title to the Suzuki by a state of Maryland Certificate of Salvage issued by Nationwide Insurance on August 13, 2010. The certificate shows "damage greater than 75% and repairable" and Respondent as the buyer. Following an informal hearing on May 2, 2012, Petitioner issued a final order on June 18, 2012, that, among other penalties, suspended Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license for 90 days, effective July 1, 2012, for issuing more than two temporary tags to the same person for the same vehicle, in violation of section 320.27(9)(b)17, Florida Statutes, and for issuing fraudulent temporary tags, in violation of section 320.131, Florida Statutes. On August 12, 2012, Respondent sold the Suzuki to 4A Body Shop, Inc. On August 2, 2012, Respondent executed the documentation necessary to complete this transaction.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Mail Stop 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Herminio Frometa 5800 Northwest 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142 Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Boyd Walden, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-435 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Steve Hurm, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue Whether the Respondent knowingly sold rebuilt vehicles without disclosing in writing to the purchaser, customer, or transferee that the vehicles were previously titled as rebuilt vehicles.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles R. Kuhn, III, is and was at all times relevant to the allegations in the administrative complaint a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida. The Respondent did business in the name A-1 Auto and Truck Center and was located at 12180-1 Phillips Highway, Jacksonville. The Department is the state agency authorized by statutes to regulate licensed independent motor vehicle dealers and to maintain the titles of motor vehicles in the State of Florida. Pam A. Albritton testified about her experiences buying a vehicle from the Respondent. On August 22, 2003, as reflected by the date on the installment sales contract, Albritton purchased a 2000 Volkswagen (VW), VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, for $8,281.80. The Respondent did not at any time provide Albritton with a written statement that the vehicle she purchased, VIN 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, hereafter the Albritton vehicle or car, was a rebuilt vehicle and had been previously titled as a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Albritton that this vehicle was a rebuilt vehicle. Albritton did not see the certificate of title to the vehicle until after the sale of the vehicle. Albritton took the car to an authorized VW dealer in November of 2003 because it was not shifting gears properly. The dealer found that the vehicle had suffered extreme damage from an accident and needed extensive repairs to the engine control system and the airbag in order to make the car safe to drive. The dealer told Albritton what had been found and advised her not to drive the car until it had been repaired. Albritton confronted the Respondent about the problems with the vehicle, and the Respondent gave her a handwritten "warranty" dated November 20, 2003. Pursuant to this agreement, Albritton took the car to the Respondent to have the seatbelts fixed; however, the repairs did not actually make the belts safe because the seatbelt retractor mechanism would not lock. In December of 2003, the wheel bearings on Albritton's car broke, and she contacted the Respondent about getting the car fixed. She was informed that the Respondent was away for two weeks, and nothing could be done until he returned. Needing her car for transportation in her work, she paid $200 to have the wheel bearings repaired. Pursuant to a mediation agreement, Albritton agreed to settle her complaint against the Respondent on the basis that he would get her a comparable vehicle. The Respondent was supposed to contact Albritton within 30 days of the mediation but failed to do so. The records introduced at hearing show that Albritton's vehicle had been re-titled as a rebuilt vehicle. Such a title indicates that the vehicle in question had been written off as an insurance loss and the original title cancelled or destroyed. Thereafter, the vehicle was repaired, and the person making the repair obtained a new title, which when issued, showed that the vehicle was rebuilt. Aylwin S. Bridges testified regarding his purchase of a VW from the Respondent. On or about June 14, 2003, Aylwin S. Bridges, purchased a 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, from the Respondent for $11,555.00. Neither prior to nor at the time of the sale did the Respondent provide Bridges a written statement that the 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, was a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Bridges that the car he was purchasing was rebuilt. The records introduced at hearing show that the Bridges' car had been re-titled as rebuilt. Bridges did not see a certificate of title to the vehicle prior to the sale of the vehicle. The Bridges' vehicle had extensive mechanical problems. For example, the engine control module had been spliced into the car and several codes had been deleted from it; the seat belts would not work; and the horn would not work. When Bridges sought to trade the vehicle, he found that the most he was offered for the car was only $2,500 because it was rebuilt. The Respondent testified in his own behalf. He did not deny having failed to disclose to Albritton and Bridges in writing prior to selling them their cars that the vehicles had previously been titled as rebuilt vehicles. The Respondent introduced a general disclaimer, Respondent's Exhibit 7, which was provided to Albritton and Bridges. This disclaimer states that the purchaser is buying a used car and that used cars may have any one or more of the listed problems. The Respondent testified that he knew the cars were rebuilt, but felt he had complied with the legal requirements of disclosure by providing the buyers with the aforementioned disclaimer. The specifics of the disclaimer are discussed in the Conclusions of Law for purposes of continuity, but are findings of fact.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding that the Respondent violated Section 319.14, Florida Statutes, on two occasions; fine Respondent $1,000 for each violation; and suspend the Respondent's license for six months for each violation, said suspensions to run consecutively, and that payment of the fine be a condition precedent to re-issuance of a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Patrick Kuhn, III A-1 Auto and Truck Center 12180-1 Philips Highway Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite B439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399
