The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to an equivalency-of-training exemption from law enforcement officer basic recruit training.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is presently employed as a transit security officer on the Miami Metro-Rail. Respondent certified Petitioner as a law enforcement officer on August 23, 1981. However, his last day of certified employment, which was with the Dania Police Department, was July 27, 1987. Petitioner has taken no law enforcement classes since 1987. As part of the process by which he could obtain re- certification as a law enforcement officer, Petitioner tried to enroll in a 92-hour class in May 2003 at the Institute of Public Safety at Broward Community College. The 92-hour classes offered at Broward Community College fill up almost immediately after they are announced. Petitioner eventually was able to enroll for a 92-hour class at Broward Community College that started November 9, 2003. Enrollment in the 92-hour class requires Petitioner to complete basic-recruit training or obtain an exemption from such a requirement due to the completion of comparable training in another jurisdiction. Petitioner thus submitted an equivalency- of-training form (Form CJSTC 76), by which he sought an exemption from the requirement of basic-recruit training. By letter dated October 28, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was not eligible for the equivalency-of- training exemption because of a break of more than eight years in relevant employment. The letter advises that recent legislation, which had been signed into law on July 11, 2003, prohibited the recognition of an exemption after an eight-year break in employment. Petitioner has failed to establish any basis for estoppel. No one ever provided him with any misinformation whatsoever, nor, of course, did Petitioner rely on any such misinformation. Nothing precluded Petitioner from taking the 92-hour course at a location other than Broward Community College; evidently, for personal convenience, Petitioner tried to enroll for the course offered only at Broward Community College. Nothing in the record indicates if the 92-hour courses offered at other locations were as difficult to obtain. And, of course, nothing prevented Petitioner from trying to enroll in the 92-hour course more than a couple of months before the new legislation became effective.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Law Enforcement enter a final order rejecting Petitioner's request for an equivalency- of-training exemption from basic-recruit training due to the break in relevant employment of more than eight years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S _____ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Bo 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Debi George-Alten Post Office Box 771105 Coral Springs, Florida 33071 Brian Hirsch 5156 Northeast 6th Avenue #216 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334 Grace A. Jaye Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service with the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from February 1, 1997 through November 30, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Hendry County is governed by the Hendry County Board of County Commissioners (Board). The period in dispute is February 1, 1997, through November 30, 1999. During this 32- month period, Petitioner served as legal counsel for the Port LaBelle Utility System (PLUS), a division of Hendry County, under the direction of the County Administrator. (Stipulation e.2.b., modified. See also Finding of Fact 11.)1/ Both immediately prior to and immediately following the period in dispute, Petitioner was employed full-time by Hendry County in the regularly established position of "County Attorney." (Stipulation e.1.a. modified) Regularly established positions in Hendry County, such as "County Attorney," are created by the Board and supervised by the County Administrator. When Petitioner resigned the County Attorney position in 1997, he was approached by a Board member to work on two specific PLUS projects for $500.00 per month minimum, at the rate of $100.00 per hour. The Board and Petitioner initially called the $500.00 a "retainer fee" and anticipated that Petitioner would only work on two specific PLUS projects. Petitioner is only claiming that this guaranteed $500.00 per month, which was paid for 32 months, should have been covered by FRS. The new County Attorney had no experience in water and sewer utilities, so Hendry County and Petitioner later struck a deal for Petitioner to take up the additional role of counsel of record for all routine PLUS matters, including special projects, and to act (as he had when he was County Attorney) as PLUS contact person between PLUS and all governmental regulatory agencies at the rate of $100.00 per hour for every hour he worked above the guaranteed minimum of $500.00 per month. Petitioner was hired in this capacity due to his legal expertise in the area of utilities. Both Petitioner and the Board contemplated that he would personally render his legal services, and it was never anticipated by either party that Petitioner would sub-contract out those legal services. All of his services were rendered personally by Petitioner during the disputed period of time. At the commencement of the agreement, both parties anticipated their arrangement would continue indefinitely. No formal written contract was executed between Petitioner and the County for the period at issue. Either Petitioner or the Board could terminate the oral contract at any time without financial liability, but Petitioner would have had a professional duty to assist in the transition of cases to a replacement attorney. (Stipulation e.l.k. expanded.) The County Administrator could terminate the County Attorney, but only the Board could terminate Petitioner. During the disputed period of time, Petitioner's responsibilities and services as counsel for PLUS became essentially the same as the responsibilities and services he had provided to PLUS in his regularly-established position as County Attorney prior to the disputed period and which he subsequently provided to PLUS as County Attorney after the disputed period. However, during the period at issue, Petitioner did not perform all the other non-PLUS duties of the County Attorney. The oral agreement between Petitioner and the Board provided for Petitioner to be paid $500.00 per month by the County on behalf of PLUS. (Stipulation e.2.b., modified. See also Finding of Fact 1.)2/ Originally, Petitioner understood that the agreement guaranteed him $500.00 minimum per month even if he did no routine or special project work for PLUS. Ultimately, the oral agreement also contemplated that Petitioner could charge the County at an hourly rate of $100.00 per hour for any time he spent working on PLUS projects. This was substantially more money per hour than the full-time regular employee salary Petitioner had previously received from the County as its County Attorney. Petitioner is not claiming FRS coverage for any additional amounts of money above $500.00 per month that he charged Hendry County for PLUS work during the 32 months at issue. Petitioner is only claiming that the $500.00 per month constitutes his part time employee "salary" for this period of time. The parties stipulated that the $500.00 fee was paid to Petitioner by the County on a monthly basis, and Petitioner was not required to submit a time card to his supervisor setting forth his time worked each month in order to be entitled to the $500.00 payment. (Stipulation e.1.d. expanded.) Petitioner was not required to submit a timesheet or to similarly account for his time. However, Petitioner, in fact, billed the County for his services. The testimony is that he billed monthly, but his invoices appear to have been rendered every two or three months. Petitioner referred to the $500.00 as a "retainer" on each invoice he prepared. Each of his invoices included a vendor number, recognizable by the County Finance Department. Regularly established positions in Hendry County have no numbers. He sent his invoices from a law office in his home. Most, if not all, of the months during the disputed period, Petitioner billed more than $500.00, including time for projects and legal work not originally anticipated. Most of his services were frequent and sometimes recurring; other were not. Despite his testimony that his agreement with the County guaranteed him a retainer of $500.00 per month, regardless of how few or how many hours he worked on PLUS projects, Petitioner conceded that from the first invoice, he always credited the guaranteed $500.00 to the County and deducted it from the total hours of legal work he billed the County. Petitioner's invoices itemized all services for PLUS and any other projects he performed for the County in tenths of hours worked at the rate of pay of $100.00 per hour, and the $500.00 was always applied each month against the total PLUS hours worked. The County's Finance Department's policies were directed by the Board. Testimony shows that during the period at issue, Petitioner's monthly $500.00 was paid by the County's Finance Department, out of funds exclusive to PLUS, in response to Petitioner's invoices. However, the invoices which are in evidence show that the $500.00 and all additional charges were paid by a single County check for a lump sum in response to the total on each invoice, whenever the invoice was received. The accompanying check stub differentiated between specific projects and general charges, but the $500.00 was not isolated on the check stub. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that during the period at issue, the County Administrator's Office, Human Resources Office, and Clerk of Court did not handle Petitioner's situation as if he were an employee filling a regularly established part-time position. Rather, they treated the whole of his services, invoices, and remuneration as if he were a vendor or independent contractor. Payments to him were designated by the Finance Department as paid out of "professional services." However, the County's current Finance Director, an accountant who was not hired by the County until later, testified that the County should have separated out the $500.00 retainer and the cost of Petitioner's monthly services above that amount into separate amounts because Petitioner was performing non-vendor services for the $500.00 base amount. The County reported Petitioner's pay by Form 1099 for an independent contractor, rather than by Form W-2 for an employee. The Hendry County Personnel Manual requires that one work 7.5 hours per day in order to qualify as a full-time County employee. By law, the County is required to withhold income tax, social security, and medicare deductions for its employees, even the part-time ones. The County withheld no taxes, social security, or medicare deductions from the amounts it paid to Petitioner during the period at issue. The County did not make matching contributions for social security or medicare from the amounts it paid to Petitioner in this period. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.) The County did not include any fees paid to Petitioner in its wage computations for its workers' compensation insurance premiums, but had Petitioner claimed to have been injured on the job, and coverage denied by the company, only litigation would have determined if he were "covered" by workers' compensation. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.) Petitioner did not accrue, and was not paid, sick pay or vacation time during this period. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.) According to the County Personnel Manual, a County employee who works less than 22 hours per bi-weekly pay period does not earn sick or vacation leave, but would still be eligible for FRS. No FRS payments are linked to Petitioner's employment during this period. All County employees in regularly established positions, both part-time and full-time, are paid bi-weekly. Petitioner billed every two or three months. In response, the Finance Department paid Petitioner's invoices in lump sums, as if Petitioner were a vendor or independent contractor. Petitioner did not consider himself a County employee during the disputed time period, and, in fact, considered his arrangement with the County to be a classic retainer agreement. Petitioner treated his income from the County as "other income" by paying both the employer's and employee's share of social security during this period. During the period at issue, Petitioner did not list himself in the business section of the phone book or the yellow pages or otherwise offer his services to the general public, although he could have done so without violating his arrangement with the County. Petitioner had a separate and independent law office in his home during this period and charged individuals for occasional deeds and wills. Petitioner did not have to account to the County for any of his time not on the clock for County business. During this period, Petitioner also acted and was paid as counsel for the Central County Water Control District. Prior to accepting the District as his client, Petitioner sought from the Hendry County Board of County Commissioners permission to represent the Central County Water Control District, because of the Florida Bar Rules on attorneys' conflicts of interest and, presumably, rules on full disclosure to clients, but not because Hendry County was his employer. During the period at issue, Petitioner advised the Hendry County Attorney of what work he was performing, but the County Attorney could not instruct Petitioner how to do his job and did not assign him tasks or direct him. (See Findings of Facts 40 and 42.) During the period at issue, Petitioner received no training from the County. Most of the knowledge Petitioner had regarding County procedures and PLUS issues had been acquired prior to the period in question while he had been serving as the County Attorney. Some of the additional issues Petitioner represented Hendry County on during the disputed time period were assigned by the County Administrator or the Board, but Petitioner could prioritize issues and had discretion as to when he would work on them. The Board, as Petitioner's client, could direct certain of Petitioner's actions as its utilities counsel and had to agree or disagree to certain proposals. On most of these matters, votes of the Board were necessary. A major part of Petitioner's duties as counsel for PLUS during the disputed period involved attendance and providing advice to the Board and other County personnel at meetings or appointments scheduled unilaterally by the County Administrator. Petitioner was required to make reports at these events. No one in the County's administrative hierarchy could instruct Petitioner how to do his job as an attorney but the Board, County Administrator, and Utility Director could assign him tasks and instruct him on projects. In the main, however, the Board and its County Administrator had to rely on Petitioner's expert legal capabilities and professionalism as would any client in an attorney-client situation. During the disputed period, almost all of Petitioner's work for PLUS was done at a County office facility or at meeting sites designated by the County. The County made available office materials, books, and other equipment to Petitioner. All of the clerical and other staff assisting Petitioner in the performance of his duties for the County were employees of the County in regularly established County positions. Petitioner reimbursed the County for its paralegal's services at the rate of $15.00 for each hour she worked on PLUS projects. Petitioner's reimbursement to the County was in the form of a deduction from his invoices. The County paid Petitioner's cell phone and travel expenses or provided reimbursement of these expenses during this period, as billed on his invoices. Petitioner submitted his travel expenses as starting from the County courthouse, not from his home with its private law office. During this period, the services provided by Petitioner were critical and essential to the continued operation of PLUS. Petitioner did not use any of his personal capital in performing the services as counsel for PLUS during the disputed period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order ratifying its denial of FRS creditable service for February 1, 1997 through November 30, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's position was properly reclassified from Career Service status to Selected Exempt status.
Findings Of Fact Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner, Jolly was employed in the Comprehensive Health Planning Section of the Programs, Regulation and Health Facilities Division of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in a Career Service employment position classified and titled Administrative Assistant II Career Service. At the time, Petitioner held permanent Career Service status. The Administrative Assistant II position was certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) as within the Career Service Administrative-Clerical collective bargaining unit, represented by the Florida Public Employees Council 79, AFSCME. In her position, Petitioner performed clerical functions. She did not supervise other employees, perform any managerial functions, or perform any confidential duties. She had no role in labor relations, collective bargaining, the adjustment of grievances filed by employees, or the imposition of discipline upon other employees for breaches of conduct. Similarly, Petitioner had no role in the preparation of agency budgets for collective bargaining, or for other purposes. Sometime around June 15, 2001, Petitioner was notified by DCFS that her position as an Administrative Assistant II would be reclassified as a position within the Selected Exempt Service (SES). The reclassification was effective July 1, 2001. No input from the Petitioner regarding the duties of her position was sought by the Department in its decision to reclassify Petitioner's position. Indeed, the Department reclassified the position based on the fact that Petitioner assisted or aided managerial employees and allegedly had access to confidential material. However, there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner's position involved any confidential matters. Petitioner was terminated from employment with DCFS, without explanation, on June 28, 2002. In terminating her employment as an Administrative Assistant II, DCFS represented that Petitioner had no appeal rights either to PERC or under the bargaining agreement between AFSCME and the State of Florida because her position had been reclassified. However, the evidence does not demonstrate that Petitioner's position was managerial, confidential or supervisory. Therefore, Petitioner's position should not have been reclassified to SES and she is entitled to her rights as a Career Service employee.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners' layoffs from employment by the Respondent were lawful and if not, what remedies should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 2, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that their positions were recommended for transfer from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. On July 1, 2001, the Petitioners' positions were transferred from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. Prior to Special Legislative Session C of 2001, the Department's Office of Prevention and Victim Services consisted of 94 positions, organized into four bureaus: the Office of Victim Services; the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services; the Prevention Office; and the Intensive Learning Alternative Program. During Special Legislative Session C, the Florida Legislature passed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2-C, which reduced appropriations for state government for fiscal year 2001-2002. This special appropriations bill was approved by the Governor on December 13, 2001, and was published as Chapter 2001- 367, Laws of Florida. As a result of Chapter 2001-367, 77 positions were cut from the Office of Prevention and Victim Services budget entity. The appropriations detail for the reduction from the legislative appropriations system database showed that the reduction of positions was to be accomplished by eliminating the Intensive Learning Alternative Program, which consisted of 19 positions; eliminating the Office of Victim Services, which consisted of 15 positions; eliminating the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services, which consisted of 23 positions; and by cutting 20 positions from the Office of Prevention. Seventeen positions remained. Immediately after conclusion of the Special Session, the Department began the process of identifying which positions would be cut. A workforce transition team was named and a workforce transition plan developed to implement the workforce reduction. The workforce reduction plan included a communications plan for dealing with employees; an assessment of the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the residual program; a plan for assessment of employees, in terms of comparative merit; and a placement strategy for affected employees. Gloria Preston, Stephen Reid and Carol Wells were Operations and Management Consultant II's and worked in the Partnership and Volunteer Services Division. According to the budget detail from Special Session C, all of the positions in this unit were eliminated. Titus Tillman was an Operations and Management Consultant II and worked in the Prevention and Monitoring division. According to the budget detail provided from Special Session C, 20 of the positions in this unit were eliminated. On December 7, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that effective January 4, 2002, each of their positions were eliminated due to the Florida Legislature's reduction of staffing in a number of Department program areas during the special session. Petitioners were provided with information regarding what type of assistance the Department would provide. Specifically, the notices stated that the employees would be entitled to the right of a first interview with any state agency for a vacancy to which they may apply, provided they are qualified for the position; and that they could seek placement through the Agency for Workforce Innovation. The notice also provided information regarding leave and insurance benefits, and identified resources for affected employees to seek more clarification or assistance. At the time Petitioners were notified that their positions were being eliminated, Florida Administrative Code Rules 60K-17.001 through 60K-17.004 remained in effect. These rules required agencies to determine the order of layoff by calculating retention points, based upon the number of months of continuous employment in a career service position, with some identified modifications. However, by the express terms of the "Service First" Legislation passed in the regular session of 2001, the career service rules identified above were to be repealed January 1, 2002, unless otherwise readopted. § 42, Ch. 2001-43, Laws of Fla. Consistent with the legislative directive new rules had been noticed and were in the adoption process. On January 4, 2002, each of the Petitioners were laid off due to the elimination of their positions. At the time the layoff became effective, new rules regarding workforce reductions had been adopted. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60K-33, effective January 2, 2002, did not allow for the "bumping" procedure outlined in Rule 60K-17.004. Instead, it required the Department to appoint a workforce transition team for overseeing and administering the workforce reduction; assess the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the remaining program after the deletion of positions; identify the employees and programs or services that would be affected by the workforce reduction and identify the knowledge, skills and abilities that employees would need to carry out the remaining program. The workforce transition team was required under one of the new rules to consider the comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience of each employee, and consider which employees would best enable the agency to advance its mission. Although the Department created a workforce reduction plan and Career Service Comparative Merit Checklist, it did not complete a checklist for any of the Petitioners because it had previously reclassified their positions as Selected Exempt Service. No checklist is expressly required under Rule 60L-33. While no checklist was completed on the Selected Exempt Service employees, each employee in the Office of Prevention and Victim Services was assessed based on the positions remaining and the mission of the Department in order to determine which employees to keep and which to lay off. Of the 17 remaining positions, the Department considered the legislative intent with respect to the elimination of programs and the individuals currently performing the job duties that were left. It also evaluated the responsibilities remaining, which included overseeing the funding of statewide contracts and grants. The Department also considered which employees should be retained based upon their ability to absorb the workload, their geographic location, and their skill set. The Department determined that the employees selected for the remaining positions were the strongest in their field, had fiscal management and programmatic experience, and were best equipped to undertake the workload. At the time of the layoff, Petitioners were each long- serving, well-qualified and highly rated employees of the State of Florida. Each was prepared to move in order to retain employment. In April 2002, AFSCME Florida Public Employees 79, AFL- CIO (AFSCME), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) against the Departments of Management Services and Juvenile Justice. AFSCME alleged that the Department failed to bargain in good faith over the layoff of Department employees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, effective June 28, 2002. The settlement agreement required the Department to provide timely notice to AFSCME of impending layoffs, bargain over the impact of workforce reductions, and provide assistance for employees who were laid off between December 31, 2001, and January 4, 2002, but who had not attained other full-time Career Service employment. There is no evidence the Petitioners in this case were members of AFSCME. Nor is there any evidence that the Department failed to assist Petitioners in seeking new employment. In July of 2003, the First District Court of Appeal decided the case of Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), wherein the court held that employees whose employee classifications were changed from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service must be afforded a clear point of entry to challenge the reclassification of their positions. The Department notified those persons, including Petitioners, whose Career Service positions had been reclassified to Selected Exempt Service, that they had a right to challenge the reclassification. Each of the Petitioners filed a request for hearing regarding their reclassifications, which was filed with the Agency Clerk in August of 2003. However, the petitions were not forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings until May 2007. All four cases were settled with an agreement that their positions were reclassified as Selected Exempt Service positions in error, and that they should have been considered Career Service employees at the time their positions were eliminated. Petitioners and the Department also agreed that any challenge by Petitioners to the layoffs would be forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Gloria Preston began work for the State of Florida in 1975. Her evaluations showed that she continuously exceeded performance standards, and she had training and experience in managing and monitoring grants and contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, and it is unclear whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Stephen Reid began work for the State of Florida in 1977. He left state government for a short time and returned in 1984. With the exception of his initial evaluation with the Department of Corrections, he has received "outstanding" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Reid has experience in contract creation and management. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Carol Wells began employment with the State of Florida in 1975. Similar to Mr. Reid, all of her evaluations save her first one were at the "exceeds" performance level, and she has experience in writing and managing contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Titus Tillman began employment with the State of Florida in 1993. He was subject to a Corrective Action Plan in May 2000, but received "above average" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Like the other Petitioners, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Likewise, no evidence was presented regarding the retention points that were earned by any of the people who were retained by the Department to fill the remaining positions. No evidence was presented regarding the qualifications of those retained employees, in terms of their comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience in the program areas the Department would continue to implement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the petitions for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-100 Lezlie A. Griffin, Esquire Melissa Ann Horwitz, Esquire AFSCME Council 79 3064 Highland Oaks Terrace Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Manny Anon, Jr., Esquire AFSCME Council 79 99 Northwest 183rd Street, Suite 224 North Miami, Florida 33169 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent unlawfully determined that the proper way to return Petitioner to suitable gainful employment is through direct job placement, rather than job retraining.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on October 3, 1958. She has been a licensed practical nurse in Florida since 1983. On April 7, 1998, while working as a licensed practical nurse, Petitioner slipped on a wet floor at work and sustained injuries to her right elbow, leg, and back. On August 27, 1998, while in transit to a workers' compensation clinic, Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in which she sustained a cervical strain and sprain. On October 28, 1998, Petitioner was sitting at work, where she had been assigned light duty, when her chair rolled out from under her, causing her to fall and sustain injuries to her back and neck. Petitioner has not worked since sustaining these last injuries. A physician determined that Petitioner reached maximum medical improvement on April 10, 2000, at which time she had a 23 percent permanent impairment to the body as a whole. Among the physician's diagnoses were concussion with memory disturbances and cognitive difficulties. The physician determined that nearly 60 percent of Petitioner's permanent disability was attributable to "cerebral dysfunction." Among the physician's restrictions were avoiding lifting more than 20 pounds and pushing or pulling and limiting walking, standing, bending, and kneeling. Petitioner first contacted Respondent for job retraining services on January 10, 2001. At the conclusion of an orientation sponsored by Respondent on January 24, 2001, Petitioner signed a request for screening. After examining the file, the Respondent's Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant determined that Petitioner could find suitable gainful employment through direct job placement, rather than job retraining. In particular, the consultant relied on Petitioner's transferable skills and work history. After factoring in her restrictions, the consultant determined that Petitioner could still earn over half of what she had been earning as a licensed practical nurse prior to her first accident. Petitioner complains of delays in Respondent's processing of her request for job retraining services. However, no such delays existed in this case. Nor can Petitioner legitimately seek reimbursement for accounting courses that she began a mere five days after signing the request for screening. Obviously, she did not pursue this alternative after exhausting her options with Respondent and the services that it offers. A transferable skills analysis reveals that Petitioner could obtain suitable gainful employment by direct job placement in various nursing fields, and possibly also certain accounting fields. Clearly, the better approach to the vocational rehabilitation of Petitioner is direct job placement. If Petitioner is able to find and keep suitable gainful employment, she will have obviated the necessity of considering the extent to which her cognitive difficulties may restrict effective job retraining.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers' Compensation enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's request for job retraining services. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Hooks, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security The Hartman Building, Suite 303 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Elizabeth Teegen, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security The Hartman Building, Suite 303 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Silvia Valdes 4336 Southwest 48th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 Elana J. Jones, Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Suite 307, Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's employment contract with Petitioner should be terminated for violation of School Board policies.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the local school board responsible for hiring, firing and overseeing all employees working for the School Board and/or within the Lee County Public School system (also called the "School District" herein). Respondent is an employee of the School Board, serving as an electronics field technician in the School Board's maintenance department. Respondent has worked for the School Board off and on since 1996, when he was a school bus driver. He has been an electronics technician since 2000. In that position, Respondent oversees the maintenance and repair of clocks, alarms, intercoms, scoreboards, sound and lighting systems, burglary systems, and the like for all schools within the School District. Respondent has never received any form of discipline from the School Board. His record is clear, and he has been commended for his work. His work ethic was viewed by others as consistent with that of similarly-situated employees (although Respondent may take more breaks than others). School District maintenance workers work an eight-hour work day, commencing at 7:00 a.m. (per provisions of the SPALC Contract and Collective Bargaining Agreement). Each worker is expected to arrive at the maintenance area on Canal Street (hereinafter "Canal Street") and be ready to commence work by 7:00 a.m., each morning. The work day generally starts with a briefing of sorts to make sure each worker is aware of his/her tasks for the day. After the briefing, workers pick up tools and supplies from various locations around the Canal Street area and then proceed to the first school site requiring performance of an assigned task. A work day for Respondent could involve driving to any one of the numerous school campuses within the School Board's jurisdiction. Workers are given 30 minutes for lunch each day, including the time it takes to drive to and from the lunch site. In addition, workers are allowed two 15-minute breaks, one in the morning and another in the afternoon. Again, the break time includes the time taken to drive to a break site, if the employee decides to take a break at other than the place he/she is working at that time. Employees are not permitted to do personal business or make unauthorized stops during the work day without prior permission from a supervisor. Respondent is a member of the U.S. Naval Reserve and currently holds the rank/level of E5. He attends regular weekend drills each month and also spends two weeks each year on temporary active duty. Respondent has been in the reserves throughout his tenure with the School Board. There has never been an issue between Petitioner and Respondent concerning Respondent's military status or his taking two weeks each summer to attend to his military duties. Respondent is proud of his military service, as evidenced by the fact that he wore his military uniform during both days of the final hearing.1 In May 2008, Respondent spent 17 days on active duty, serving in Bahrain. This was Respondent's active duty requirement for calendar year 2008. However, he then volunteered for an additional period of active duty in July 2008. This second active duty stint was done in furtherance of his military career and at the suggestion of a superior officer. It was strictly voluntary, but Respondent felt somewhat compelled to "volunteer" based on his superior's comments. Respondent then did his second active duty stint beginning June 28, 2008, and ending July 27, 2008. This period of time coincided with the maintenance department's busiest time for its electronics technicians. The maintenance department annually used the time in between school terms to get various maintenance items completed while it would be the least disruptive to students in the classrooms. The summer period is used to "clean up" things that remain pending from the school year. It is clear that Respondent's supervisors were not happy that Respondent had volunteered to be absent during this busy time, but Respondent was allowed to go on active duty anyway. This left the School Board short-handed as to its needed electronics technicians for that period of time. Respondent's supervisor expressed concern to Respondent about this second period of active duty, specifically that it was occurring during the summer break. Respondent recognized the strain this additional leave put on his co-workers and apologized for that fact. Respondent assured his supervisor it would not happen again. Upon his return from the voluntary active duty, Respondent was told that he was being placed on "suspension of driving privileges," meaning that he could not drive School Board vehicles until further notice. This suspension was based on information gleaned from review of data generated by a new tracking system being used in School Board maintenance vehicles (which will be discussed below). Respondent is of the opinion that the suspension was some sort of retaliation for his having gone on the second active duty tour during June and July. The Global Positioning System--Background Beginning in May 2008, the School Board decided to install global positioning system (GPS) devices in all of its maintenance vehicles. The installation began with 50 randomly selected vehicles of the 150-vehicle fleet. The purpose of the GPS devices was to track School Board vehicles and assure that all vehicles were being utilized properly and in accordance with School Board policies. This measure was prompted by repeated complaints from the public about maintenance vehicles being seen involved in non-school activities or at non-school locations. The GPS system in Respondent's maintenance vehicle was installed on May 22, 2008. The signal from the GPS was instantaneous, but required calibration and installation of certain software before it could be effectively utilized. The GPS became fully functional on June 20, 2008, at 10:07 a.m. The GPS system tracked the location, speed, and duration of stops for the vehicle. This data was maintained on a computer server which could print maps showing a vehicle's movements on any given day or time. The maps could be annotated with the vehicle's speed, length of stay at any one location, and actual driving route. On or about June 27, 2008, William G. Moore, director of School Support for the School Board, was being given a course on the use of the new GPS system and how it worked. During his training, Moore randomly selected some vehicles to review, solely for the purpose of ascertaining how the system tracked and recorded information. One of the vehicles Moore randomly selected was vehicle No. 423, which turned out to be Respondent's work van. Moore did not know Respondent personally and did not know to which of the 150 or so School Board vehicles any one person was assigned. Moore then selected June 26, 2008, randomly as a record to review as part of his training. The June 26, 2008, record for vehicle No. 423 immediately raised red flags in Moore's mind. He observed that the vehicle was at a non-school site for over three hours (although it was later determined to be a training site and a legitimate stop). The vehicle was also shown entering a residential community (although again it was later determined that the driver had permission for that trip). However, based on his initial determination that something was amiss and not having any explanation for those instances, Moore decided to more fully examine the route history for vehicle No. 423. First, he determined that this vehicle was assigned to Respondent. (The vehicle will hereinafter be referred to as the work van.) Moore's further investigation turned up a number of questionable stops and trips by the work van during the period June 20 through June 27, 2008. The findings of his investigation will be set forth in pertinent part below on a day-by-day basis, coupled with explanations from Respondent as to each day's activities. Friday, June 20, 2008 At 10:07 a.m. (when the GPS first started working), the work van was departing from Ft. Myers High School ("Ft. Myers High") en route to Estero High School ("Estero"). Upon arrival at Estero, the van remained parked for five minutes, then left the parking lot and drove around the building to the front entrance of Estero for a period of one minute. Leaving Estero, the work van headed to a residential neighborhood known as the Bimini Circle Subdivision, where it stayed for 11 minutes. The work van then proceeded to a 7-11 Store where it remained for 35 minutes. The next stop was back at Estero where the work van remained for one hour and 46 minutes. At 2:00 p.m., the work van left Estero, stopped briefly at the 7-11 Store, then returned to Canal Street at 2:59 p.m. The School Board perceived several violations of policy gleaned from the information on the GPS for the work van during the June 20, 2008, work day: First, the work van was at Estero for a total of two hours and 13 minutes on this date. The total time at Ft. Myers High for this date is not detailed by the GPS, but would presumably be approximately two and a half hours, i.e., allotting time for driving from Canal Street up until the GPS turned on at 10:07 a.m. Respondent's daily activity log indicates five hours at Estero and three hours at Ft. Myers High. Respondent took two unauthorized stops at a store, presumably for personal reasons, and then spent 11 minutes at a residence during work hours. Respondent took in excess of 30 minutes for his lunch hour (35 minutes at a location, plus an undisclosed amount of time driving to and from that location). Respondent took a longer route back to Canal Street than necessary, presumably wasting time. (Employees were expected to work the entire day, then return to Canal Street precisely at 3:00 p.m. A 30-minute debriefing session, return of tools, etc., would occur and then employees would be released from duty at 3:30 p.m. Employees were told repeatedly NOT to return to Canal Street until 3:00 p.m.) Respondent explained his actions and refuted the School Board's concerns as follows: Upon leaving Canal Street that morning, Respondent went directly to Ft. Myers High and remained there until 10:07 a.m. The rest of his day, approximately five hours, was dedicated to work at Estero, but included travel time, breaks, and lunch. The two hours and 13 minutes actually at Estero should be supplemented by driving time to the school from Ft. Myers, driving time to his breaks and lunch, driving time to and from his personal errand, and driving time back to Canal Street. Respondent remembers asking for and receiving permission to stop by his wife's house (the residence in the Bimini Circle Subdivision) to retrieve his wallet. The stops at 7-11 Stores were for lunch and two allowable breaks. The longer route back to Canal Street was taken in order to avoid an accident on the shorter route. During June of 2008, technicians would fill out their daily work logs using rounded estimates of time. They made no attempt to precisely state exact periods of time spent at any one job site. Rather, the daily logs were a very general statement of which job sites had been involved in the employee's work that day. (This procedure has subsequently changed, but was extant at all times relevant hereto.) It is clear Respondent took a longer than allowable lunch break on this date. Further, the time taken for breaks, if drive time was included, was in excess of the allotted amounts. It is clear Respondent was actually at Estero for only about half the time recorded on the daily work log. However, under the procedures in place at that time, the work log time entry was not dispositive of his actual time at the site. Monday, June 23, 2008 On this date, the School Board gleaned the following violations of policies from its review of the GPS log: Respondent was at Estero for two hours and nine minutes, but his daily work log indicates six hours at Estero and two hours at Gateway Elementary. The work van made stops at McDonalds and Bank of America on the way to Estero, then at the Bimini Circle address for eight and a half minutes after leaving Estero. Petitioner says any stops for personal business are strictly prohibited while in a School Board vehicle. After a 47-minute stop at Dairy Queen, the work van then proceeded to Gateway where it stayed for approximately two hours. Upon leaving Gateway, the work van stopped at Home Depot--an unauthorized stop--for about 18 minutes. Respondent provides the following explanation and rebuttal concerning the School Board's concerns for that day: Again, his work sheet indicates the correct amount of time actually at Gateway. The remainder of his day, including all travel, breaks, and lunch, was allocated on this time sheet to Estero no matter how long he was actually there. The stops at McDonalds and Bank of America were simply to allow his co-worker (Sheryl Reed) to get an iced tea and to get money for lunch. Respondent maintains that these types of stops were not specifically prohibited and were common practice. Respondent maintains the stop at his wife's house was his break time (although a stop at McDonalds and Bank of America had already occurred that morning). The 47-minute lunch hour was caused by Respondent simply losing track of time. That is, he admits that it was a longer lunch break than allowed, but it was not done intentionally. The stop at Home Depot was to obtain a coaxial wire needed for the Estero job, but the wire was not available. Employees are allowed to shop at local retail stores to acquire equipment or supplies not available through the School Board. However, all such purchases must be made by way of a purchase card (P-Card) so that purchases can be tracked. There is no P-Card receipt for the Home Depot visit on this date, but Respondent maintains that is because no purchase was made. That is, the coaxial wire he was looking for was not available. Reed said that Respondent made personal purchases from Home Depot and Lowe's on occasion during the summer of 2008 (because he was in the process of remodeling his house). He had purchased floor tiles and other items a couple of times a week that summer. However, she cannot remember whether he purchased anything on that particular date. Respondent admits that he did make purchases of home improvement products during work hours and transported the products in the work van to his house. He does not remember making any such stops for purposes during the week of June 20 through 27, 2008. Tuesday, June 24, 2008 On this date, Respondent's daily work log indicates three hours spent at Gateway and five hours spent at Island Coast.2 The GPS indicates the work van was at Gateway for three hours and at Island Coast for one hour and 40 minutes. The School Board also found the following other policy violations: A stop at Weaver's Corner for 36 minutes and 40 seconds, presumably a long lunch made longer by travel time to and from the lunch venue. An unauthorized visit for eight minutes and 40 seconds at a bank. A visit to a gas station for eight minutes, then a short drive to another gas station for five minutes. Respondent provides the following explanation and rebuttal to the School Board's findings: As before, the extended period of time for the Island Coast job site includes travel, breaks, and lunch. However, it would have been more accurate on this day to have split the two job sites equally. The stops at the gas stations were intentionally made so as not to return to Canal Street before the allotted 3:00 p.m., return time. Respondent does not provide any explanation for the longer than allowable lunch break. Wednesday, June 25, 2008 There were three stops on this date listed on Respondent's daily work log: Island Coast (4 hours), Dunbar Community (2 hours), and Ft. Myers High (2 hours). The GPS indicates the work van was at Island Coast for two hours and 11 minutes; at Dunbar Community for 11 minutes and 20 seconds; at Villas Elementary for one hour and 14 minutes; then at Ft. Myers High for four minutes and 40 seconds. Other perceived policy violations included: A short stop at a bank in the Wal-Mart parking lot upon leaving Canal Street. A lunch stop of 42 minutes and 30 seconds, not counting driving time to and from the restaurant. Another stop at Bank of America for in excess of ten minutes. A short, seven and a half-minute stop at a shopping center. Respondent provided the following in rebuttal and response to the School Board's perceived violations of policy: The quick stops at the banks were not prohibited and were common practice. They may have been part of Respondent's break time on that date. The lunch hour ran over, but was not excessive or intentional. It may have also included part of a break he never took that day. Thursday, June 26, 2008 This is the date that Moore initially reviewed in his training session that raised red flags concerning Respondent's time issues. On this date, the daily work log indicates seven hours in training and one hour at Villas Elementary. The School Board's concerns about this date are set forth above, but would also include: An authorized trip during the lunch hour for Respondent to retrieve a lap top which was being delivered by overnight delivery (so the computer would not be left sitting on the front porch). This trip which took approximately 18 minutes, of which 30 seconds was spent stopped at his house. Respondent also took time for lunch before returning to the training site. A circuitous, out-of-the-way route between the training site and the next job site (Villas Elementary). A short stop at a 7-11 Store and then a longer-than- usual route back to Canal Street. Respondent's explanation and rebuttal to the School Board's concerns were as follows: Respondent had permission to make a quick visit to his home during the lunch hour to see why his home alarm had activated. (He does not remember anything about a lap top or a need to retrieve it.) Respondent says that in the 30 seconds his work van was at the house, he exited the vehicle, walked to the house, unlocked the door and entered, turned off the alarm (which had been activated by his dog, who had escaped from his kennel), put his dog back in its kennel, re-set the alarm and left. Respondent was able to do his personal errand and get to the restaurant and eat lunch with his co-workers within the time (one hour) allotted for lunch that day by the trainer. The circuitous route was for the purpose of delivering some money to his daughter at her school. She was waiting for him outside, and he didn't even have to stop the work van to hand off the money. Rather, his daughter reached out and grabbed the money as he rolled past. The stop at the 7-11 Store was to use the rest room. Respondent's testimony concerning the stop at his house is not entirely believable. It would seem to take more than 30 seconds to accomplish the things that he did. However, inasmuch as he made the stop and was still able to join his co-workers in time for lunch, the reason for his home visit is immaterial. Also, the rolling delivery of money to his daughter is very unusual, but there is no evidence that the exchange did not take place in that fashion. Friday, June 27, 2008 This day's daily work log indicates three work sites: Dunbar Middle School (4 hours), Ft. Myers High (2 hours), and Cypress High School (Cypress High)(2 hours). The GPS indicates 33 minutes and 50 seconds at Dunbar; one hour and 47 minutes at Ft. Myers High; and five minutes and 50 seconds at Cypress High. The work van then went back to Dunbar for one hour, 51 minutes and 30 seconds. The School Board's other concerns about time and travel on this date are as follows: After leaving Canal Street that morning, the work van made stops at McDonalds for three minutes and at Lowe's for 15 minutes. There is a stop of one hour and eight minutes at a shopping plaza, presumably a long lunch hour. Respondent's response to the allegations of policy violations for this day are as follows: The McDonalds visit was again an allowable stop (as he understood the policies) for his assistant to get an iced tea. The Lowe's stop was for the purpose of getting concrete anchors needed for a School Board job, but none were available and so no purchase was made on the P-Card. The long lunch hour was just that; he was not thinking clearly because this was just one day prior to going on active duty and he was preoccupied with those thoughts. The extra driving time was due to the fact that after leaving Dunbar, Respondent was called on the radio to go back there for an emergency job. The daily work logs do not correspond exactly with Respondent's work day because that was not the purpose of the logs. The logs were, at that time, simply an indicator of which schools had been visited on any given day. There was no effort by anyone to be exact or precise with the times recorded on the daily logs. The daily logs are essentially of no value in determining where an employee might have been at any point in time on any given day. There is no way to reconcile the GPS times with the daily work logs. Each employee is expected to work a full day. If the number of tasks assigned during the morning meetings at Canal Street did not fill a technician's day, he/she was expected to locate additional work or do work on an on-going project to fill the day.3 Nonetheless, it is often difficult to coordinate a day's activities to make the assignments equate to the exact hours and minutes in a work day. A large part of an employee's time during the work day is spent driving his/her vehicle. The driving time is supposed to be factored into the time spent on a particular work site. Thus, if it took 30 minutes to get to a work site, that time would be added to the time spent actually at the site. Then, when driving to a subsequent work site, the drive time would be assigned to that next site, etc. Employees are on their honor to take breaks and lunch only when allowed and for the time allotted. There is no time clock, so each person must attempt to keep time themselves so as to honor the allotted times. This is often difficult due to slow service at a restaurant, inability to take breaks at a particular time, or other factors. The GPS system has provided the School Board with an effective tool for monitoring its employees' movements and location. However, at all times relevant hereto, the GPS system was in its infancy and the School Board was still learning how to assimilate and read the data generated by the system. Thus, Respondent's activities from June 20 through June 27, 2008, were examined in a way no other employee's had been looked at heretofore. It is, therefore, hard to make a comparative determination of Respondent's actions versus an established norm. Nonetheless, the School Board's findings are supported by the GPS data. That is, the daily work logs are not consistent with time actually spent at particular job sites. Respondent's lunch breaks exceed the allotted 30-minute time period almost every day that was examined. There are stops at local establishments that are not part of the employee's work duties. Some of the routes taken by an employee are not the shortest routes, although it is impossible to ascertain whether they are the best routes based on other extraneous factors. The time spent on breaks, versus travel time, is hard to ascertain with any degree of certainty.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Lee County School Board, rescinding the notice of termination and imposing a less stringent penalty, e.g., a period of probation, a letter of reprimand and/or some remedial training, against Respondent, Christopher Rasmussen. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his disability by refusing to renew Petitioner’s contract for employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a private university located in Pasco County, Florida (Saint Leo or the university). Respondent employed Petitioner as an assistant professor from sometime in January 2000 until the end of the 2005-2006 school year in May 2006. Petitioner initially taught sports management courses in the Business Department of Saint Leo and, following the university reorganization, taught sports management courses in the Sports Management Department of the School of Business (the Department). The Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief allege, in relevant part, that Respondent violated Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004), when Respondent allegedly discriminated against Petitioner because of Petitioner's handicap. Neither the Charge of Discrimination nor the Petition for Relief expressly allege that Respondent violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Sections 12101-12213 (2000). However, judicial decisions discussed in the conclusions of law instruct the trier of fact to make findings in a manner that is consistent with the ADA.1 Petitioner is a person with a handicap within the meaning of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). Petitioner was paralyzed in an automobile accident on December 19, 2001, and is a disabled person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 12112 (2004). Petitioner is a qualified person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 12111(8) (2004). Petitioner is a person with a disability who can perform the essential functions of a tenured employee. Petitioner was qualified for the position for which Respondent employed Petitioner in January 2000. Petitioner received his doctorate of education in sports management from the United States Sports Academy in 1990. Although Petitioner had no prior experience teaching at the college level, Petitioner was the only doctorate teaching sports management courses in the Business Department of the university when Respondent employed Petitioner in January 2000. At the time, Respondent needed a doctorate to teach sports management courses in order to satisfy the accreditation requirements of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). Respondent does not allege that Petitioner is not qualified to perform the requirements of a tenured employee. Respondent argues, and submitted evidence intended to prove, that Petitioner either lacked the motivation to perform the required job duties or simply refused to perform those duties. On November 12, 2004, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent would not renew Petitioner’s teaching contract at the end of the 2005/06 school year. The refusal to renew Petitioner's teaching contract was an adverse employment action. There is no direct evidence that the adverse employment action was motivated by discrimination. However, the circumstantial evidence, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable inference by the trier of fact that the adverse employment action was motivated by both legitimate non-discriminatory and discriminatory reasons. Legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, in part, motivated the adverse employment action against Petitioner. When a third-year review of Petitioner's job performance began on August 26, 2004, Petitioner had not prepared sufficient papers for conferences, had not demonstrated consistency in presenting papers at conferences, and had not served on any conference panels. Petitioner had not published a sufficient number of articles or books and had not engaged in sufficient scholarly research. Petitioner did not submit any paper or abstract to present at a conference until June 2004. The first paper was accepted for publication in November 2004. In September 2004, Petitioner had his first test bank accepted for inclusion in a textbook published by another author. Petitioner utilized at least one course syllabus that was below grade level. The syllabus included some grammatical errors and inaccurate information. Petitioner episodically cited incorrect facts during class. Petitioner was occasionally late to class for up to five minutes. Petitioner frequently read from the textbook when lecturing students. Petitioner sometimes did not give prior notice to his supervisor of his unavailability for a class. The supervisor was unable to arrange for a substitute. Petitioner sometimes cancelled classes without providing class notes for the substitute. Petitioner failed to maintain consistent office hours for academic advice of students. One faculty member in an adjacent office provided academic advice to Petitioner's students in Petitioner's absence. Petitioner failed to attend a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, as a reviewer on a national council chaired by Petitioner's supervisor. Petitioner did not ascertain the correct starting time or location of the meeting. The failure to attend the meeting in Atlanta caused the council to be short a reviewer for one year. The inclusion of Petitioner as a reviewer on the council would have provided Petitioner with an opportunity to improve his national reputation and meet many influential people in his field of employment. Record evidence supports a reasonable inference that discriminatory reasons, in part, motivated the adverse employment action against Petitioner. Two of four evaluators in the third-year review of Petitioner's job performance that began on August 26, 2004, referred to Petitioner's disability in their formal evaluations. The two evaluators testified at the hearing that Petitioner's disability did not influence their evaluations. Their testimony is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The testimony of the two evaluators, among other considerations, is not plausible. The testimony does not adequately explain why the evaluations address Petitioner's disability if the evaluators disregarded the disability in evaluating Petitioner.2 The immediate supervisor of Petitioner commented on Petitioner's disability in her third-year evaluation of Petitioner. The supervisor stated she was "extremely disappointed" during the previous academic year when Petitioner declined her request to "be a role model and show our students what individuals with handicaps could achieve." The supervisor further explained in her evaluation that "disability sport has - become a major segment of - our sport business industry - and there are many career opportunities for students in this area." The supervisor further stated in her third-year evaluation of Petitioner that she could not "fully understand what it is like to have [Petitioner's] disability." However, the supervisor stated that she had "worked with physically challenged individuals for approximately 16 years, and they never ceased to amaze [her] at what they could do." One of three outside evaluators also included references to Petitioner's handicap in the third-year evaluation of Petitioner. The evaluator devoted approximately one-third of the evaluation to a discussion of his experience working with one disabled colleague who had been seriously injured in a motorcycle accident and was, like Petitioner, wheelchair bound. After recounting the many laudable accomplishments of the evaluator's disabled colleague after becoming disabled approximately 12 years ago, the evaluator stated that his disabled colleague did not consider himself disabled. The evaluator explained that his disabled colleague "never makes excuses for his special challenge nor does he ask or demand special considerations due to his situation." The evaluator went on to compare Petitioner's paralysis with the evaluator's self-proclaimed "disability" following open heart surgery. The evaluator stated that he had undergone open heart by-pass surgery and did not let his "disability" prevent him from achieving performance standards. After recounting numerous professional accomplishments after his surgery, the evaluator explained: The reason I have provided this information is not to brag but rather to illustrate that if one has a positive attitude about life he/she can do anything he/she wishes whether or not they are disabled. A disability is an extra challenge in life not a sentence to do less. I have not let my disability negatively affect my career. Respondent's Exhibit 44 at 4. When prima facie evidence shows that an adverse employment action is motivated by both non-discriminatory and discriminatory considerations, an employer does not escape liability under the ADA on the ground that the adverse employment action was not motivated "solely" by prohibited discrimination. Rather, judicial decisions discussed in the conclusions of law require the trier of fact to apply a so- called motivating-factor standard, or mixed-motive standard.3 The motivating-factor standard requires the trier of fact to determine whether the prohibited discriminatory motive made the difference in the decision to take the adverse employment action.4 The motivating factor standard has been judicially explained as a "but-for" standard.5 Liability for prohibited discrimination requires the trier of fact to find that Respondent would not have taken the adverse employment action but-for the prohibited discrimination. The but-for standard requires the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Petitioner's failure to comply with performance standards for tenure was caused by his handicap.6 If the evidence supports such an inference, the adverse employment action would not have been taken but-for the prohibited discrimination. The record evidence supports a reasonable inference that Petitioner's failure to comply with performance standards for tenure by the beginning of the third-year review on August 26, 2004, was caused by his handicap. The inference is supported, in relevant part, by comparing the record evidence of Petitioner's performance during his employment before his disabling accident on December 19, 2001, with Petitioner's performance from the date of the accident until the beginning of the third-year review on August 26, 2004. Prior to the accident on December 19, 2001, Petitioner taught classes at Saint Leo for four semesters.7 Petitioner received four evaluations by three different evaluators. Even though it was Petitioner's first teaching experience at the college level, all but one of those evaluations rated Petitioner's job performance as "outstanding." The one exception rated Petitioner's job performance in his first year as "satisfactory." In the second year, however, the same evaluator rated Petitioner's job performance as "outstanding." The supervisor for Petitioner during the first and second academic years of employment was the acting chair of the Business Department at Saint Leo. The supervisor rated Petitioner's job performance during the first year as "satisfactory." However, a second-line evaluator who was also a dean at Saint Leo rated Petitioner's job performance during the first year as "outstanding." In the second academic year, the supervisor rated Petitioner's job performance as "outstanding." The supervisor found that Petitioner was "developing into a highly competent and effective classroom teacher." An outside evaluator retained to evaluate Petitioner during the second academic year found that Petitioner had made "positive contributions to [the] sport management program." The evaluator recommended that Respondent retain Petitioner based on Petitioner's academic background, sport management experience, and teaching performance. Prior to the accident, Petitioner was selected to serve on the Panel of Reviewers for the Sport Management Program Review Council (SMPRC) to review institutional portfolios. The selection provided Petitioner with an opportunity for professional development, an improved national reputation, and enhanced professional relationships. However, the opportunity was postponed due to the accident that paralyzed Petitioner. On January 29, 2002, Petitioner received a fifth evaluation by a fourth evaluator. The dean of the School of Business (the Dean) evaluated Petitioner's job performance for the four academic semesters that Petitioner worked before the accident. The Dean found that Petitioner was: cademically competent and very committed to Saint Leo University and the well being of his students. Stewart is relatively new to university level teaching and the expectations associated with this level of performance. His classroom manner is casual yet he holds the students to high performance standards. Stewart will need to identify an area of research interest and begin to prepare papers for the conferences in his discipline. I approached him with an idea and a willingness to co-author a paper. Unfortunately, due to his accident, Stewart will be involved full-time for the next six months in rehabilitation and relearning. Stewart has excellent potential to develop into an effective senior faculty member. Respondent's Exhibit 10. After the accident on December 19, 2001, Petitioner taught three academic semesters before his third-year review that began on August 24, 2004, and led to the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004. During the semester that began in January 2002, Petitioner was on medical leave to undergo surgery and recover. Petitioner worked during the semester that began in August 2002, but returned to medical leave during the semester that began in January 2003 in order to undergo additional surgery. Petitioner worked the two semesters that began in August 2003 and January 2004. On August 24, 2004, at the start of the fourth semester of work after the accident, Respondent began the third-year review that led to the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004. During the three semesters that Petitioner worked between the accident and the start of the third-year review, the Dean, who evaluated Petitioner on January 29, 2002, did not pursue the idea he had described for co-authoring a paper with Petitioner. Petitioner was learning to adjust to life in a wheel chair. Petitioner experienced, and continues to experience, a great deal of pain unless Petitioner takes pain medication. Petitioner has also had to learn new toileting skills and has expressed embarrassment over his condition. Petitioner did not attend the council meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, because he became confused over the correct time and location of the meeting. Petitioner did not make a volitional choice not to attend the meeting. On December 5, 2003, Dr. Michael Moorman was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Dr. Moorman found that the quality of Petitioner's classroom teaching was "outstanding." After December 5, 2003, Respondent changed the job performance standards for employees teaching sports management courses at Saint Leo.8 While Petitioner was on medical leave, each school at Saint Leo designated a program as a "flagship" program. Each flagship program would be funded and supported in an effort to enable the program to grow into a nationally recognized program that would serve as a paragon for other Saint Leo programs to emulate. The job performance requirements in each flagship program were also intended to establish a standard for emulation by other programs. The School of Business designated the Sport Management Program as its flagship program and reorganized the program into the Sport Management Department. In February 2003, Respondent commissioned an outside study of the Department. The study concluded that the Department lacked academic rigor, failed to challenge students, and was poorly organized for the purpose of becoming a flagship program for Saint Leo. Respondent searched for a nationally known professor to chair the Department. Respondent wanted someone who could make the necessary curriculum changes, improve the Department's national recognition, increase the academic rigor of the Department, and enhance the national reputation of its professors, including Petitioner. In August 2003, Respondent selected a person to chair the Department. After December 5, 2003, the new chair succeeded Dr. Moorman as Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The new chair found, during the academic semester that began in January 2004, Petitioner did not meet the job performance requirements of the new flagship Department of Sport Management. One deficiency the chair described in her third- year evaluation of Petitioner pertained to errors in a syllabus used by Petitioner. For example, the syllabus continued to use the title "Saint Leo College" instead of "Saint Leo University." The new chair confided to an associate in the Department that the vice president of Academic Affairs (Vice President) had told the new chair in so many words that Petitioner would have been fired long ago if Petitioner had not been in a car accident. The associate testified to the statement she attributed to the new chair, and the associate's testimony is found to be credible and persuasive. The Vice President denied making the statement to the new chair during his testimony, and that portion of his testimony is found to be credible and persuasive. The statement attributed to the Vice President that he would have fired Petitioner but-for the accident conflicts with the predominantly "outstanding" job performance of Petitioner prior to his accident. The testimony of the new chair also conflicts with two evaluations of Petitioner's job performance by different deans on January 29, 2002, and December 5, 2003. Both of those evaluations occurred after the accident, but before the new chair became the immediate supervisor of Petitioner sometime after December 5, 2003. It is more likely that the new chair expressed her own view that the university was holding Petitioner to a lower standard of job performance because of his disability. When the third-year review process began on August 26, 2004, Petitioner was no longer the only doctorate employed in the Department. However, he was the only disabled doctorate employed in the Department. The record evidence supports a reasonable inference that Respondent required Petitioner to comply with standards exemplified by unidentified disabled persons described in two of the four third-year evaluations of Petitioner.9 Respondent did not require non-disabled employees to comply with similar standards. The Vice President testified that the references in the evaluations to standards exemplified by other disabled persons did not influence his decision to take the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004. That portion of the testimony of the Vice President is neither credible nor persuasive. The Vice President, in relevant part, relied on the third-year evaluations. His denials of influence conflict with other relevant evidence. Before the Vice President began the third-year review process on August 26, 2004, he conferred with the new chair and reviewed Petitioner's record, including Petitioner's record of "outstanding" performance on or before December 5, 2003. In a letter to Petitioner dated August 26, 2004, the Vice President told Petitioner, in relevant part, that he had "serious concerns regarding your performance." The Vice President instructed the Dean and the new chair to "carefully monitor" Petitioner's "teaching and professional development activities in the fall semester of 2004." However, neither the Dean nor the chair monitored Petitioner's activities, and the Vice President initiated the adverse employment action on November 12, 2004, prior to the conclusion of the fall semester. Respondent applied a different timeline to Petitioner's tenure track than the timeline that Respondent generally applied to the tenure track of other employees. Tenure track employees may apply for tenure after their fifth year of employment, but may apply no later than their seventh year of employment. Most tenure track employees apply for tenure during their sixth year of employment. Employees on tenure track at Saint Leo receive annual contracts for their first, second, and third years of employment. Tenure track employees that receive a favorable third-year review are given a two-year employment contract after the third and fifth years of employment. Petitioner began his tenure track in January 2000. The seventh year of his tenure track would have expired at the end of the academic semester in December 2006.10 The third year of Petitioner's tenure track would have expired at the end of the academic semester in December 2002. Due to the accident on December 19, 2001, however, Respondent extended the time for the third-year review until August 26, 2004. The extension provided Petitioner with seven academic semesters, rather than six, before the third-year review began.11 Although Respondent extended the time for beginning the third-year evaluation, Respondent did not extend the seven- year limit for tenure. Respondent thereby reduced the time after the third-year evaluation in which Petitioner had to correct his deficient job performance to a period less than that enjoyed by non-disabled employees. Other tenure track employees normally have 14 academic semesters in which to complete their seven-year tenure track. Upon the expiration of six academic semesters, Respondent conducts a third-year evaluation. A tenure track employee then has eight more academic semesters, or four academic years, in his or her tenure track. Respondent reduced Petitioner's tenure track by a semester when Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment at the end of the academic semester in May 2006, rather than at the end of the academic semester in December 2006. By extending the third-year evaluation by a semester and reducing the remaining tenure track by an additional semester, Respondent reduced by one year the period that non-disabled tenure track employees have after their third-year review to complete their tenure track requirements. The Vice President has conducted third-year reviews on approximately 20 tenure track employees at Saint Leo since 1997. He has terminated the employment of two of those candidates. Petitioner is one of the two terminated from employment. The Vice President acknowledged in his testimony that he may have given Petitioner more time if the adverse employment decision were based solely on research and acceptable publication levels. Petitioner's teaching performance on and before December 5, 2003, was predominantly "outstanding." Moreover, one of the outside evaluators found that syllabi deficiencies were nothing that could not be easily corrected. Another evaluator found the syllabi "are consistent with guidelines established by NASSM/NASPE." It is unlikely, therefore, that the adverse employment action was motivated by job performance deficiencies in teaching, research, and syllabi. The Vice President relied on findings of evaluators that evaluated Petitioner, in relevant part, on Petitioner's inability to comply with standards exemplified by other disabled persons. The Vice President articulated no intelligible standards he used for discerning whether, or to what degree, the disability of Petitioner influenced the negative opinion of the evaluator. Moreover, the Vice President did not undertake an independent determination of whether Petitioner's handicap prevented Petitioner from complying with applicable job performance requirements by August 26, 2004. The job performance requirements for tenure are prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and a Faculty Handbook (FHB). The CBA provides, in relevant part: Promotion and tenure decisions at Saint Leo University are made on the basis of documented and evaluated performance in three areas: (1) teaching; (2) scholarly growth [sic] (3) institutional and community service. (a) Tenure and Promotion: The primary criteria for decisions regarding reappointment, tenure and promotion are excellence in classroom teaching and in facilitating student learning. Teaching Faculty must demonstrate excellence in teaching, a part of which is academic advising. Teaching faculty must demonstrate excellence in either (1) scholarly growth or (2) institutional and community service. Scholarly growth may be demonstrated through professional development and/or research. The definition of professional development and scholarly research will be determined by the relevant School. The University will recognize both traditional and non- traditional means of demonstrating professional development and/or research. Respondent's Exhibit 1 at 44. The FHB describes guidelines for promotion and tenure applications in terms similar to those in the CBA. The FHB provides, in relevant part: Promotion and tenure decisions at Saint Leo University are made on the basis of documented and evaluated performance in three areas: teaching; professional development, research, and scholarly growth; and institutional and community service. For teaching faculty excellence in teaching and demonstrated student learning are essential to tenure and promotion. Either professional development, research and scholarly growth or institutional and community service must be judged excellent for tenure. Respondent's Exhibit 2 at 73. The School of Business does not provide written job performance requirements that determine the tenure requirements for scholarly research and professional development. Testimony at the hearing suggested tenure requires at least two publications or presentations each year. However, that testimony is belied by predominantly "outstanding" job performance evaluations of Petitioner during his first two academic years in which Petitioner published no articles and made no presentations. In the three complete academic semesters that Petitioner had available to him after the accident to pursue his scholarly research, one article authored by Petitioner was accepted for publication and a test bank authored by Petitioner was included for publication in a text book. Petitioner also attended three conferences.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief for the reasons stated herein, and reinstating Petitioner to his position of employment with back pay and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th of December, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Since 1968 the Petitioner, Donald W. Hulmes has been attorney for the Broward Community College. Previously he was attorney for the Broward County Board of Public Instruction (School Board), having held this position since 1955. During the Petitioner's employment with the School Board he was a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). In 1968 the college was separated from the School Board by the legislature, and became autonomous under its own Board of Trustees, which appointed the Petitioner as its college attorney. For four more years in this capacity, until 1972, the Petitioner continued to be enrolled as a member of SCOERS. The college's finances were examined on an annual basis by legislative auditors. As a result of these audits performed for fiscal years 1969-1970 and 1971-1972, the auditor commented adversely on the college's practice of processing the Petitioner's annual retainer as salary payments with applicable payroll deductions taken. When the Petitioner was employed by the college there was no change in his contract status relative to duties and responsibilities, and the college had continued to make retirement deductions for him the same as was done during his School Board employment. As a result of the adverse comments from the legislative auditor the college fiscal personnel considered whether the Petitioner's position was as an employee, or was contracted services. If the position of college attorney was to be on an employee basis, time reports would have to be maintained and other policies affecting employees would have to be adhered to. If the position was contracted services, compensation would have to be in a form other than salary payments. Based on these considerations, the college provided the Petitioner with a contract for one year with a stipulated retainer, and in 1972 the Petitioner was disenrolled from SCOERS. Alternatively, the college could have determined that the Petitioner's position was as an employee. Although the Petitioner was not formally notified of the action taken by the college, he and the college comptroller discussed the matter, and the Petitioner assumed he was going to have some problems. Subsequently, he noticed that his checks were a different color, and had different slots and blocks, but his secretary handled the deposit of the checks into his account, so little attention was paid to these changes, including the absence of a deduction for retirement. Sometime thereafter the Petitioner began to make inquiries of the college fiscal personnel relative to reentering the retirement system. However, no formal or written inquiry was made until 1978 when the Petitioner had been out of SCOERS for six years. During these years, and until 1979, the Petitioner's compensation arrangement with the college was by annual retainer for specified services, plus an hourly rate for special services. He has been and remains the senior partner of a law firm consisting of himself and four other attorneys. He is free to provide legal advice to and represent members of the public. This law firm maintains two offices, one in Hollywood and one in Fort Lauderdale, and the Petitioner has a private listing in the telephone directory. He has a $1,000 per month draw with his law firm, although he does not pay into the firm or contribute to its income substantially. When the Petitioner applied to get back into the retirement system, the college was given an Employment Relationship Questionnaire to complete, for the purpose of determining the facts relative to his eligibility. Among other information submitted by the college, it indicated that the Petitioner was engaged by the college on a part-time basis. In addition, in June of 1978, the president of the college analyzed the nature of the services rendered by the Petitioner as college attorney, and estimated that on a monthly basis he spent approximately 30 hours on routine and special issue work. Further, the Petitioner provides his own office space, library, secretarial assistance, and in his absence his law partner was available to advise the college, if necessary. Faculty members at the college have a 30 hour work week, and administrative staff personnel and other classified employees are required to work 37 1/2 hours per week. The Petitioner's relationship with the college does not require him to maintain any special working hours as other college employees are required to do. He is not subject to a pre-employment physical examination. He does not receive annual leave or sick leave. No written performance evaluations are prepared for the Petitioner, as is done for other college employees except the president. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not been a full-time employee of Broward Community College. In 1979 the college began making deductions from the Petitioner's payments as contributions to the Florida Retirement System, and these contributions were reported. As a result the Division of Retirement advised the Petitioner that he is not eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System, and denied him reinstatement in SCOERS. Previously, in 1970, the Petitioner had rejected an opportunity to become a member of the Florida Retirement System. He has left his contributions of SCOERS on deposit. His contributions to the Florida Retirement System since 1979 are in the process of being refunded. Essentially, the Petitioner contends that he was disenrolled from membership in SCOERS by the college wrongfully, as a result of administrative error; the Respondent claims that there was no error because the Petitioner was not eligible for membership in the SCOERS retirement system, and does not meet the criteria for membership in the Florida Retirement System.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED, that the Petitioner, Donald W. Hulmes, be denied reinstatement in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, and that he be denied membership in the Florida Retirement System. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 24th day of June, 1981. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Terry McNab, Esquire Post Office Box 12 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North ionroo Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
