The Issue Whether the vessel ("Imagine") owned by Petitioner, William Hackett ("Petitioner"), is a "derelict vessel" within the meaning of section 823.11, Florida Statutes (2019); and, therefore, subject to the provisions of sections 376.15(3), 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 2020, Officer Glen Way, a sworn FWC law enforcement officer, was on water patrol in an FWC patrol vessel within the public waters of Key West Harbor in Monroe County, Florida, when he observed a vessel (a 32-foot 1967 Hatteras known as "Imagine") sunken and nearly 90% submerged. There were no persons on board and the vessel looked abandoned. The electrical, propulsion, steering systems, and engines were well under sea water and inoperable. Based on his investigation, Officer Way concluded that the vessel suffered a severe marine casualty, had been discarded as sunk with no intrinsic value, and was derelict. His investigation further revealed that the vessel was owned by Petitioner. On January 8, 2020, Officer Way spoke with Petitioner and explained to him the derelict vessel process. That same day, Officer Way emailed Petitioner an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Documentation Related to A Derelict Vessel Determination. Subsequently, Petitioner had the vessel raised from being sunken and tied to a commercial salvage barge with a crane. Although the vessel was no longer sunk, it had been sunk for over two months and Officer Way observed that no corrective action had been taken by Petitioner to correct the systems. Significantly, Officer Way observed that the vessel’s propulsion and steering systems were still inoperable, the onboard engine was substantially corroded, and marine growth was visible along the waterline of the entire vessel. In addition, windows were boarded up with plywood, blocking the ability to safely navigate or operate the vessel upon the water. Officer Way also observed a 25-horsepower outboard motor affixed to the transom of the vessel. However, Officer Way persuasively and credibly testified that a 25-horsepower outboard motor is insufficient to propel the vessel safely upon the public waters of the State of Florida. In sum, the vessel was still wrecked, junked, substantially dismantled, and derelict. Subsequently, on July 28, 2020, and at 8:30 a.m. on August 13, 2020, Officer Way observed that the vessel was again sunk, inoperable, abandoned, left, wrecked, junked upon the public waters of the State, and derelict. The vessel has no intrinsic value. At the hearing on August 13, 2020, Petitioner candidly acknowledged that the vessel was again sunk and not operational.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner’s vessel, "Imagine," derelict under section 823.11, abandoned under chapter 705, and subject to the provisions of sections 376.15(3), 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Brandy Elaine Elliott, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) William Hackett 419 Southard Street Key West, Florida 33040 Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Reinecke Insurance Agents, Incorporated, doing business as Dealers Association Plan. Respondent is also known as the Reinecke Agency, Inc., doing business as Dealers Association Plan. Respondent began business on March 1, 1978. At all times material hereto, Respondent has held a certificate of authority, issued by Petitioner, authorizing Respondent to engage in business as an administrator. Alarm Association of Florida, Inc. The Alarm Association of Florida, Inc. (Alarm) is a trade association that was incorporated on July 12, 1976, as a Florida not-for-profit corporation. Alarm was organized to provide an opportunity for its members to exchange ideas and share information concerning trade practices, business conditions, technical developments, and related subjects concerning the electrical protection industry. Alarm has two primary types of membership. Regular Membership is open to any individual, partnership, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of installing or providing alarm service in the electrical protection field for one year preceding the application. Associate Membership is open to any individual, partnership, firm, or corporation that is not engaged directly in the electrical protection business, but may supply goods or services to Regular Members. Officers and directors of Alarm are selected by the voting members, which are limited to Regular Members. About 25% of Alarm's membership consists of nonvoting members. Sometime prior to November 1, 1985, a representative or representatives of Alarm requested Respondent to make a presentation concerning an employee benefit plan that Alarm was considering establishing. Alarm had previously formed a committee to investigate the feasibility of sponsoring such a plan, which its members could join. Alarm thereafter decided to sponsor an employee benefit plan and use Respondent as the plan administrator. Respondent prepared or caused to be prepared the necessary documents. These documents included a trust agreement between various persons, as trustees (Alarm Trustees), and Alarm (Alarm Trust or Alarm Trust Agreement); the Alarm Association of Florida Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (Alarm Plan); and the Administrator Agreement between Alarm and Respondent. Each document was executed and delivered on November 1, 1985. The Alarm Trust Agreement states that the Alarm Trust is to be funded by the contributions made by the members of the Alarm Plan and the Alarm Trust funds are to be maintained as a reserve against claims by Alarm Plan participants. The Alarm Trust Agreement provides that Alarm may remove an Alarm Trustee at anytime and replace an Alarm Trustee who has resigned or been removed. The Alarm Trust Agreement states that the Alarm Plan Administrator, which was designated as Respondent, shall administer the day-to-day operations of the Alarm Trust, inter alia, to pay claims, provide "consulting and actuarial services necessary for the continuing successful operation of the [Alarm] Plan," and establish procedures for "Employee Contributions." "Employees" are "all qualified members of [Alarm] and their employees. The Administrator Agreement, which is authorized by the Alarm Trust Agreement, authorizes Respondent to use the Alarm Trust funds to review and pay claims and pay premiums on policies purchased by the Alarm Plan or Alarm Trustees. Among its various "powers and duties," Respondent is to demand monthly from the Alarm Trustees such funds "prudently required" for the payment of claims; do all things prudent for the daily administration activity of the Alarm Trust; make or cause to be made such reports, and file such information with appropriate public authorities, as may be required by the Trust by applicable laws; and negotiate and purchase such excess insurance or reinsurance as Respondent and the Alarm Trustees deem appropriate to compensate the Alarm Plan participants if claims exceed Alarm Trust assets. The Administrator Agreement states that Respondent is to receive 20% of the monthly contributions as its administrative fee. The Alarm Plan provides a detailed statement of the available benefits and various administrative matters, including claim procedures. In general, the Alarm Plan covers a wide range of medical, accident, and dental expenses. In capital letters on the first page, the Alarm Plan states: This is a self-funded, trade association member employee benefit plan established under Public Law 93-406 [Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")], available only to qualified participating employers and their qualified employee participants. It is not available for individual coverage . . . The Alarm Trust Agreement likewise states that it "shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with its being . . . a welfare Benefit Plan pursuant to . . . ERISA . . ." Each Alarm member enrolled in the Alarm Plan makes a monthly contribution, which is paid to Respondent. The contribution is equal to the number of employees of the enrollee who have elected to participate in the Alarm Plan multiplied by the contribution rate. The Alarm Trustees set the contribution rate based upon the advice of Respondent. On at least one occasion, the Alarm Trustees increased the rate upon the advice of Respondent. At all times, the Alarm Trustees and Respondent have intended to keep the Alarm Plan and Alarm Trust actuarially sound. When Respondent first began business, it employed an actuarial service to set contribution rates. After a few years, Respondent terminated the service and thereafter recommended rate increases or initial rates for the various plans that it administered only as the need became apparent. Respondent uses the contributions to pay claims that it has received. As long as Respondent has determined that the claims are valid, the Alarm Trustees do not review the claims. The Alarm Trustees consider a claim only when a participant appeals a rejected claim. Respondent also uses the contributions to pay itself its 20% administrative fee and any reinsurance premiums due third-party insurers. Respondent pays any remaining funds to the Alarm Trustees, who hold such fund in the Alarm Trust as reserves against future claims. The Alarm Trust is liable for all claims. If the valid claims presented to Respondent exceed the contributions received for that month, the Alarm Trust provides the difference. However, the Alarm Trustees have reinsurance under which third- party insurers are liable to pay any claim in excess of $25,000, but not more than $1,000,000. Since the Alarm Plan has been adopted, Respondent and Alarm have solicited enrollees, such as by direct mail. In the case of new enrollees that are not already members of Alarm, Respondent may take an Alarm Plan application and Alarm membership application at the same time. In April, 1988, Alarm comprised 425-450 members. A couple of years ago, Alarm had only about 65 members. About 85 members have enrolled in the Alarm Plan. These enrollees are all employers. About 300 employees participate in the Alarm Plan. All of these employees are employed by enrolled employers. The record fails to disclose whether all of the enrollees are voting members of Alarm. Petitioner's Exhibit Number 11 lists the names of the enrollees. It appears from the names of the businesses that all, or nearly all, of them qualify for voting membership in Alarm. On advice of counsel, the Alarm Plan has never obtained a certificate of authority pursuant to the Act. Neither Respondent, Alarm, the Alarm Trustees, or the Alarm Plan has ever attempted to comply with any provision of the Act, based on the position that ERISA preempts the Act. The Alarm Plan is not fully insured and has no exemption from the Secretary of Labor. Professional Wrecker Operators of Florida, Inc. The Professional Wrecker Operators of Florida, Inc. (Wrecker) is a trade association that was incorporated on May 18, 1977, as a Florida not-for- profit corporation. Wrecker was organized to serve as a clearinghouse of trade information for its members, inform its members of applicable laws and legislative bodies of its members' views, and provide its members with an opportunity to learn about and assist each other. Wrecker has two classes of membership: active, which is limited to professional wrecker operators, and associate, which extends to "affiliated industry persons and companies in sympathy with [Wrecker's] precepts." Only active members may vote. Sometime prior to November 26, 1984, a representative or representatives of Wrecker requested Respondent to make a presentation concerning the possibility of Wrecker sponsoring an employee benefit plan. Wrecker thereafter decided to sponsor a plan and use Respondent as the plan administrator. Respondent prepared or caused to be prepared the necessary documents. These documents included a trust agreement between various persons, as trustees (Wrecker Trustees), and Wrecker (Wrecker Trust or Wrecker Trust Agreement); the Professional Wrecker Operators of Florida Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (Wrecker Plan); and the Administrator Agreement between Wrecker and Respondent. Each document was executed and delivered on November 26, 1984. Except for the deletion of Paragraph 8.2 in the Alarm Trust Agreement, the Wrecker Trust Agreement and Alarm Trust Agreement are identical in all material respects. The provisions of the Wrecker Administrator Agreement and Alarm Administrator Agreement are identical in all material respects. The Wrecker Plan and Alarm Plan are identical in all material respects. The facts set forth in paragraphs 12-16 above with respect to Alarm were identical with respect to Wrecker and are incorporated by reference herein. As of October 30, 1987, the Wrecker Plan had 89 enrollees. About 400 employees participated in the Wrecker Plan. At least five of the enrollees in the Wrecker Plan were not members of Wrecker. The Wrecker Plan never obtained a certificate of authority pursuant to the Act. The Wrecker Plan was not fully insured and had no exemption from the Secretary of Labor. Because the organizational documents of Wrecker offered membership to entities outside of the wrecking trade, Respondent believed that the Wrecker Plan was required to obtain a certificate of authority under the Act because the Wrecker Plan, unlike the Alarm Plan, did not qualify for an ERISA exemption from the Act. On May 22, 1986, Respondent filed with Petitioner an application for a certificate of approval under the Act for the Wrecker Plan. A representative of Petitioner informed Respondent that the approval would be denied unless a certified audit and actuarial report on the plan and trust were submitted. When this information was not thereafter provided, Petitioner's representative advised Respondent that a withdrawal of the application would look better than a denial, which was imminent. Respondent consequently withdrew the application by letter dated February 24, 1987, and never resubmitted the application. Respondent provided the Wrecker Trustees with monthly reports of contributions, claims, and other information pertaining to the current financial condition of the Wrecker Plan and Wrecker Trust. This report contained a category labeled "claims overpaid," which reflected the amount of claims for which no funds were available. At least one of the Wrecker Trustees misunderstood the category as monies that had been paid erroneously in excess of the amount of claims. On or about January 10, 1988, the Wrecker Trustees met with Respondent and were informed that the deficit in the Wrecker Plan and Wrecker Trust approximated $47,000. On January 22, 1988, Wrecker and the Wrecker Trustees received a letter from Respondent containing a one-page statement on Respondent's letterhead styled, "Estimated [Wrecker] Losses." Containing six entries, this statement disclosed $128,153.38 of "[e]stimated claims not paid at closing of the trust by the trustee's [sic]." The statement did not indicate the trust closing date, effective date, or the date through which the unreported claims were projected. Pursuant to a Consent Order dated March 29, 1988, incorporating a Settlement Stipulation For Consent Order entered into by the Wrecker Trustees and Petitioner, the Wrecker Plan ceased operations on February 29, 1988, and, although admitting no violation of the Act, paid an administrative fine of $5,000. A certified audit through that date discloses a deficit in the Wrecker Plan and Wrecker Trust of about $168,000. Florida Automobile Dismantlers and Recyclers Association The Florida Automobile Dismantlers and Recyclers Association (Dismantlers) is a trade association that sponsors the Florida Auto Dismantlers and Recyclers Association Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (Dismantlers Plan). On September 23, 1981, Dismantlers and Respondent entered into an Administrator Agreement and Dismantlers and various trustees, including M. L. Vaughn, the president of Respondent, entered into a trust agreement (Dismantlers Trust Agreement or Dismantlers Trust) with respect to the Dismantlers Plan. The Dismantlers Plan documents, which were provided by Respondent, are substantially identical to the Alarm Plan and Wrecker Plan documents. On or about October 3, 1983, Respondent, as administrator of the Dismantlers Plan, filed with Petitioner an application for a certificate of authority for the Dismantlers Plan under the Act, which became effective on October 1, 1983. Petitioner issued the certificate of authority. Respondent handles contributions and claims for the Dismantlers Plan in the manner described above for the Alarm Plan and Wrecker Plan. As the Dismantlers Plan administrator, Respondent is obligated to file with Petitioner such reports and documents as are required under the Act. Consequently, Respondent has filed with Petitioner annual statements of the Dismantlers Plan for each fiscal year ending from 1983 through 1987. An annual statement consists of three legal-size pages containing 19 questions, of which only three questions require answers that typically change each year. These questions request the number of employers enrolled in the plan, the number of participants participating in the plan, and the amount of funds handled by the plan and trust each year. The annual statement requires a copy of the most recent financial statement for the plan and trust. At the bottom of the annual statement, the person signing swears that he or she is familiar with the Act. At least two of the annual statements filed for the Dismantlers Plan from 1983 through 1987 were signed by Mr. Vaughn, as president of Respondent. The fiscal year of the Dismantlers Plan and Dismantlers Trust ends on January 31. On December 7, 1987, Respondent filed the Dismantlers Plan's annual statement for the fiscal year ending on January 31, 1987. The financial statements attached to the annual statement disclosed less than $10,000 available to pay claims, annual additions of $479,240, and annual deductions of $470,400. Mr. Vaughn testified that the 1987 annual statement of the Dismantlers Plan was filed late due to the presence in Respondent's offices of Petitioner's auditors for five months. Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association The Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association (Independent) is a trade association that sponsors the Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (Independent Plan). On September 20, 1983, Independent and Respondent entered into an Administrator Agreement. On July 18, 1978, Independent and Various trustees entered into a trust agreement (Independent Trust Agreement or Independent Trust), which, although naming a different initial administrator, was witnessed by a principal of Respondent. The Independent Plan documents, which were provided by Respondent, are substantially identical to the Alarm Plan and Wrecker Plan documents. On or about September 29, 1983, Respondent, as administrator of the Independent Plan, filed with Petitioner an application for a certificate of authority for the Independent Plan under the Act. Petitioner issued the certificate of authority. Respondent handles contributions and claims for the Independent Plan in the manner described above for the Alarm Plan and Wrecker Plan. As the Independent Plan administrator, Respondent is obligated to file with Petitioner such reports and documents as are required under the Act. Consequently, Respondent has filed with Petitioner annual statements of the Independent Plan for each fiscal year ending from 1983 through 1987. The fiscal year of the Independent Plan and Independent Trust ends on the last day of February. On December 7, 1987, Respondent filed the Independent Plan annual statement for the fiscal year ending on February 28, 1987. The financial statements attached to the 1987 annual statement disclosed a deficit of $289,552 available to pay claims, annual additions of about 2.8 million, and annual deductions of about $2.62 million. Attached to the 1987 annual statement is a one-page letter, signed by a trustee, stating that a rate increase of 14.3%, effective January, 1987, had produced additional funds of $270,395 and a second rate increase of 14.3%, effective October, 1987, would produce additional funds--over an unstated period of time--of $309,062, which would produce an Independent Trust surplus--at an unstated point in time-- of $118,483. Mr. Vaughn testified that the 1987 annual statement of the Independent Plan was filed late due to the presence in Respondent's offices of Petitioner's auditors for five months. Florida RV Trade Association The Florida RV Trade Association (RV) is a trade association that sponsored the Florida RV Trade Association Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (RV Plan). On September 1, 1983, RV and various trustees (RV Trustees) entered into a trust agreement (RV Trust Agreement or RV Trust). The RV Trust Agreement named Respondent as the administrator of the RV Plan. The RV Trust Agreement and RV Plan, which were provided by Respondent, are substantially identical to the Alarm Plan and Wrecker Plan documents. On or about October 6, 1983, Respondent, as administrator of the RV Plan, filed with Petitioner an application for a certificate of authority for the RV Plan under the Act. Petitioner issued the certificate of authority. Respondent handled contributions and claims for the RV Plan in the manner described above for the Alarm Plan and Wrecker Plan. As the RV Plan administrator, Respondent was obligated to file with Petitioner such reports and documents as are required under the Act. Respondent's obligations extended to ensuring that the security or surety bond required by the Act, if available, was obtained timely and posted with Petitioner. Respondent regularly obtained the surety bonds for plans holding a certificate of authority under the Act, which included the Dismantlers Plan and Independent Plan, through Dealers Insurance Company. Dealers Insurance Company and Respondent share the same telephone number, although they use different post office boxes. Mr. Vaughn is also president of Dealers Insurance Company, of which he is part owner. Glenna Bryan is the office manager of Respondent and office manager and vice president of Dealers Insurance Company. Although operating under a certificate of authority, the RV Plan never posted with Petitioner the security or surety bond required by the Act prior to 1987. By letter dated July 25, 1986, to the RV Trustees, Mr. Vaughn, on behalf of Respondent, stated, as he had at a meeting with the RV Trustees in April, 1986, that the only option available to restore financial soundness to the RV Trust was to merge the RV Plan and RV Trust into another plan and trust. In 1986 or early 1987, Petitioner demanded that the RV Plan post the security or surety bond required by the Act. Respondent obtained from Dealers Insurance Company a surety bond in the required amount of $100,000. The bond was duly signed on February 2, 1987, by Ms. Bryan for Dealers Insurance Company, which served as the surety on the bond. The surety bond was delivered to Respondent. Ms. Bryan, as office manager of Respondent, mailed the bond to the RV Trustees with a cover letter dated February 17, 1987. The letter stated that the bond had been "issued on behalf of the State of Florida [and] is a M.E.W.A. bond that will be posted with the State. . .." The letter requested that, after the RV Trustee had signed the bond as principal, he return it to Respondent. The RV Trustee duly executed the bond, but, instead of returning it to Respondent, he sent it to the RV attorney, who sent it to Petitioner together with a cover letter dated March 9, 1987. On March 9, 1987, RV paid the premium for the bond by check in the amount of $1,000 and payable to Dealers Underwriting Service. RV delivered the check to Mr. Vaughn. Dealers Underwriting Service, of which Mr. Vaughn is secretary and treasurer, promptly deposited the check. The premium has never been refunded to RV. The bond was delivered to Petitioner without the prior specific knowledge of Respondent or Dealers Insurance Company. By letter dated June 3, 1987, Dealers Insurance Company informed Petitioner that the bond was cancelled as of August 5, 1987. Dealers Insurance Company has also taken the position that the bond was never properly delivered and null and void ab initio. Dealers Insurance Company has thus refused to honor any claims or demands under the bond. Dealers Insurance Company had completed its underwriting prior to signing the bond and delivering it to Respondent. The only purposes of having the original bond returned to Respondent were to obtain a copy of a fully executed bond and ensure that it was properly filled in and filed. Dealers Insurance Company cancelled the bond because of the RV Trust's insolvency and imminent dissolution, which Dealers Insurance Company discovered due to the knowledge gained by Mr. Vaughn and Ms. Bryan in their capacity as employees of Respondent and in the course of their administration of the RV Plan. By order of Leon County Circuit Court entered July 20, 1987, the RV Plan and RV Trust were voluntarily transferred by the RV Trustees to Petitioner for liquidation on the grounds of financial insolvency. Petitioner has unsuccessfully demanded payment under the bond from Dealers Insurance Company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a final order: Dismissing the first count of the Administrative Complaint; As to the second count, dismissing the portion thereof alleging thatRespondent violated Section 624.437, Florida Statutes; As to the second count, finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.891(1)(b) and 626.891(2)(e), Florida Statutes, as to the latter, by virtue of a violation of Section 626.8805(4) Florida Statutes; As to the third count, dismissing the portion thereof alleging that Respondent violated Section 626.891(1)(b), Florida Statutes; As to the third count, finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 626.891(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by virtue of a violation of Section 626.8805(4), Florida Statutes; As to the fourth count, finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.891(1)(b) and 626.891(2)(b), Florida Statutes, as to the latter, by virtue of a violation of Section 626.8805(4), Florida Statutes. As to the fifth count, dismissing the portion thereof alleging that Respondent violated Section 626.891(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and As to the fifth count, finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 626.891(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by virtue of a violation of Section 626.8805(4), Florida Statutes. Based on the foregoing, it is further recommended that the Final Order suspend the certificate of authority of Respondent, pursuant to Section 626.893, Florida Statutes, for a period of three months from the effective date of the Final Order, for violation of Section 626.891(1)(b), Florida Statutes, proven as to the second count; impose an administrative fine against Respondent in the total amount of $9000, representing $5000 for the willful violation of Section 626.891(1)(b), Florida Statutes, proven as to the fourth count, and $1000 for each of the four violations of Section 626.891(2)(e), Florida Statutes, proven as to the second, third, fourth, and fifth counts. Each of these violations is based on demonstrated incompetence, which, at least in this case, implies an ignorance that is inconsistent with a finding of willfulness. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings Count One 1-4. Adopted. 5-6. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 7. Adopted. 8-9. Rejected as unnecessary. 10-11. Adopted, except that Respondent did not solicit Alarm; it only furnished the documents. 12-13. Adopted in substance. 14-18. Adopted. 19-21. Rejected as unnecessary. 20. Adopted. 22. First two sentences adopted. Last sentence rejected as unnecessary. Third sentence rejected as unsupported by any evidence. 23-25. Adopted in substance, except that the certificate of authority issued to the other plans is irrelevant to whether the Alarm Plan required one. 26. Rejected as legal argument. While it is evident that Respondent recognized the legal significance of admitting that plans were MEWA's, it is likely that it did not weigh the legal significance of "operation and maintenance" in its Answer. Count Two 1-4,6. Adopted. 5. Adopted in substance. 7. Rejected as legal argument and contrary to greater weight of the evidence. 8-11. Adopted. Adopted in substance. Rejected as unnecessary. 14-16. Adopted, except that Respondent did not solicit Wrecker; it only furnished the documents. 17-18. Adopted in substance. 19-23. Adopted. 24. Rejected as unnecessary. 25-26. Adopted. 27-28. Adopted in substance, except that the certificate of authority issued to the other plans is irrelevant to whether the Wrecker Plan required one. 29. Rejected as legal argument. Counts Three and Four All proposed findings adopted or adopted in substance. Count Five All proposed findings adopted or adopted in substance, except that 9,11, and 19 are rejected as unnecessary. Adopted. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence and unnecessary. 3-4. Rejected as unnecessary. 5-9,11. Rejected as legal argument. 10 and 13. Adopted. 12. Adopted in substance. 14 and 15. Rejected as argument and, in the case of 15, unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, except that M. L. Vaughn is President of the surety. Rejected as legal argument and against the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Terry Butler, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-8300 Geoffrey B. Dobson, Esquire Meredith & Dobson, P.A. 77 Bridge Street St. Augustine, Florida 32804-1957 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue By this action Petitioner seeks to recover costs, expenses and damages associated with state response to an oil spill incident occurring February 26, 1987, within three miles of the Florida shoreline. Respondent's vessel was responsible for that spill. In particular the costs, expenses and damages claimed are related to salaries, per diem allowances, Federal Express charges, beach sand replacement, equipment, use of a cellular phone, and consulting work at the shore and off site. Petitioner also seeks damages for bird mortality resulting from the spill. See Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N- 16, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 26, 1987, the motor vessel Fernpassat struck the south jetty at the entrance to the St. Johns River at a location within three miles of the Florida shoreline. In doing so it ruptured the hull and spilled a substantial amount of heavy fuel oil. The type of the oil was No. 5 or 6 Bunker C. A preliminary estimate placed the amount of oil in excess of 100,000 gallons. While the true amount may have been somewhat less, it was a significant spill in that it substantially threatened the public's welfare and the environment and generated wide public interest. Petitioner's exhibit 3 is a map which depicts the basic location where the vessel collided with the jetty with an "X" mark. The area impacted by the discharge ran from roughly Atlantic Beach, Florida, to Guana State Park in St. Augustine, Florida. This is approximately 25 miles of beach front. Beach property over which Petitioner has regulatory and proprietary responsibility had oil deposited upon it. The oil spill killed or injured a number of birds. The event was responded to by the "Federal Region IV Regional Response Team" (RRT). The federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) was Captain Matthew Woods, U.S. Coast Guard. The RRT, through management and control provided by the OSC, took necessary steps to combat the effects of the spill. Respondent immediately accepted responsibility for the cleanup through the use of a consultant and cleanup contractor. Under this arrangement the OSC monitored the contractor's cleanup efforts to make certain that the job was done satisfactorily. Florida officials were part of the RRT. Rule 16N-16.009(21), Florida Administrative Code, calls for personnel from Petitioner; the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER); and the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs (DCA) to represent state interests as members of the RRT. Each of these agencies participated as members of the RRT. This furthered the legislative intent expressed at Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, to support the RRT through implementation of the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act," which is also known as the "Clean Water Act," 33 U.S.C. ss. 1251-1376. By its efforts the RRT promoted the removal of the oil in accordance with a national contingency plan. Pursuant to Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, the state is expected to complement applicable provisions within the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act" as well as render the support previously described. Both the support and complementary functions of the state are part of Florida's "Pollutant Spill and Prevention Control Act," Sections 376.011-376.17, 376.19-376.21, Florida Statutes. Chapters 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, more completely identifies the role played by the state agencies in this instance. This chapter was adopted pursuant to authority set out in Section 376.07, Florida Statutes, which, among other things, empowered Petitioner to make rules which developed and implemented criteria and plans to respond to spills such as the one at issue. In its complementary role the state has established a "State Response Team" (SRT). This organization in defined at Rule 16N-16.009(13), Florida Administrative Code. It is constituted of predesignated state agencies available continually to respond to a major spill. This incident was a major spill or discharge as defined in Rule 16N-16.009(18), Florida Administrative Code. The predesignated state agencies, pursuant to the rule defining the SRT and Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes, act independently of the federal authorities, although they are expected to cooperate with the federal authorities in the efforts at cleanup. What that meant here is that notwithstanding the concerns which Captain Woods had and the state participation in the RRT through Petitioner, DER and DCA, there was a parallel function by the SRT which had its own mandate. This allowed the SRT to pursue an independent agenda in the spirit of cooperation with the OSC in an attempt to protect the resources over which the state has jurisdiction, including the beach front and birds. Both Captain Woods and the consultant to the spiller, James L. O'Brien, who is a man of considerable credentials in giving advice about oil spill problems, expressed their understanding of the interests which the state might have in carrying out its functions and did not find that reality a hindrance in performing their duties. As a result, even though state employees and equipment and consultants to the state had limited utility for the OSC and the consultant to the spiller in carrying out their duties, it does not follow that claims by the state for reimbursement in categories set out in the statement of issues must fail unless found to support the OSC or spiller's choice in attempts at cleanup. The question is whether the costs, expenses and damages are reasonably related to support for the RRT or complementary of that function through the SRT and owed or expended from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund (Fund) for recoverable items. See Section 376.11, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's exhibit 15 is a copy of the state contingency plan. See Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes. It identifies the membership of Petitioner, DER and DCA. Other claimants for costs, expenses, and damages who were involved in the response to this incident as predesignated agencies are the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (Commission), the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Attorney General. The state contingency plan explains the operational responsibilities of state agencies when responding to the incident. This is a more specific reference to those responsibilities as envisioned by the general guidelines announced in the "Pollution Spill Prevention and Control Act." Having considered the testimony and exhibits in the context of the state support and complementary role in responding to the spill contemplated by the aforementioned laws, regulations and contingency plans, the costs, expenses and damages sought by the Petitioner are reasonably related to those purposes. Those costs, expenses and damages are detailed in Petitioner's exhibit 16 and summarized in Petitioner's exhibits 8 and 9. With the exception of $15,654.37 in costs and expenses for Petitioner's Executive Office and Division of Law Enforcement and $3,336.16 for salaries for the Commission, DOT and DCA, all claims for expenses and costs have been paid from the Fund. Petitioner wishes to impose the costs, expenses and damages in the state response whether or not claims were disbursed from the Fund. The damage claim associated with future beach re-nourishment by replacement of sand that had been befouled by oil and needed to be removed is a reasonable claim in the amount of $10,222.50. It has been paid from the Fund and is held in the Erosion Control Trust Fund until needed. The on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00 and the oil spill assessment study fee of $9,880.00 commissioned by Petitioner through Jacksonville University are reasonably related to the Department's role in response to the spill. As Petitioner's exhibit 8 depicts, $30,312.53 has been disbursed from the Fund in costs, expenses and damages reasonably related to the response to the spill. There remains unpaid from the Fund the aforementioned costs and expenses in the amount of $18,990.53 which are reasonably related to the response to the spill. Those latter amounts, although presented for payment from the Fund by the agencies in question, were not paid, based upon some fiscal anomaly. By inference, it does not appear from this record that the Fund owes the agencies for these claims. According to Section 376.13, Florida Statutes, on February 27, 1987, Governor Martinez declared a state of emergency in response to the oil spill. That proclamation was withdrawn on March 25, 1987. The activities for which claims for costs and expenses are advanced transpired in the time frame of the state of emergency declaration. The amount which Respondent has expended in the cleanup effort is $700,000 plus or minus $200,000. None of this money has been paid to satisfy claims for costs, expenses and damages previously described. While it has been found that costs, expenses, and damages are reasonably related to the state's purposes in responding to the spill, not all items are recoverable. They are only recoverable if recognized for recovery by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, and owed or expended from the Fund. Petitioner's claims in its exhibit 8 in the amount of $12,901.30 and DOT claims for $675.19 in that exhibit qualify for recovery as well as the on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00. Other claims do not qualify with the exception of a limited recovery for bird mortality. Reasons for this fact finding are set forth in the conclusions of law. Petitioner has disbursed $176,058.00 to the Commission for damages related to alleged bird mortality. This money was disbursed from the Fund. Petitioner now concedes that the amount should be reduced by half. This recognizes that the cost estimate for damages dealt with pairs of birds not single birds. Petitioner now asks for $88,075.00. Two hundred fourteen (214) birds are said to have died as a result of the spill, according to Petitioner. Petitioner seeks damages for each of these birds. The number proven to have been killed by the event and the theory upon which the damage claim is predicated leads to a result which diminishes the claim for reasons to be explained. As with other claims, Section 376.021.(4)(c), Florida Statutes, anticipates the payment of damages from the Fund. Section 376.11(1), Florida Statutes, is in aid of recovery of damages, as is Section 376.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes. However, these claims must be susceptible to proof that readily identifies and explains valuation methods of the birds and recognizes the predicate of establishing the actual number lost in this episode. For the most part, Petitioner has failed in the endeavor. Mark Damian Duda is a wildlife biologist with the Commission. He earned a bachelor of science degree from West Virginia University and received his master's degree in natural resource policy and planning from Yale University, both with honors. He was assigned the task of trying to arrive at an acceptable method for valuing birds that had been killed. His assessment is generally set forth in a report, a copy of which is Respondent's exhibit 3. Having considered a number of options, he reached the decision to employ what he describes as the replacement value method. Quoting from his report concerning this method, he has this to say: Replacement Value Method We believe the replacement value method is the most useful and logical method to determine the value of wildlife lost in the February 27 Jacksonville oil spill. A replacement cost approach can avoid many of the problems involved in attempting to estimate the use of value of biological resources. Under the replacement cost approach, the resource is valued at what it would cost to replace it. If the resource is replaced, the problems of identifying all its uses, the monetary value of these uses, and the users affected by the resource loss are eliminated, except for the period between the initial loss and the replacement. Four Florida institutions were asked to estimate the cost of obtaining specimens of the birds killed in the Jacksonville oil spill, or the price at which they would be willing to sell members of each species. Their estimates are shown in Table 4. One problem with most of these estimates is that they are not true replacements costs; but rather the cost of collecting already existing specimens from the wild and redistributing them to the Jacksonville Area. This does not represent true replacement, since true replacement requires a complete recovery of the species population. This can be most clearly assured by using only captive breeding programs for replacement. However, many of the species in this list probably cannot be bred in captivity. Therefore, true replacement of these species through captive breeding is probably impossible. It is absurd to value them at zero since they cannot be replaced. Therefore, this section presents some calculations on the assumption that they could be redistributed or replaced. Table 1 presents the replacement costs for the birds. The numbers were derived by multiplying the number of dead birds times the average replacement costs given in Table 4. Using this approach, the total replacement costs for the birds estimated to have been killed in the Jacksonville oil spill is $176,058.00. It should be noted that we use a deliberately conservative approach, using body counts only, and thereby underestimating the total mortality. There is an increasing amount of scientific literature indicating that actual body counts appear to significantly underestimate the total mortality resulting from a spill. For example, there have been a variety of experiments that show only 5 percent to 25 percent of the birds that die at sea, wash in or beach themselves on shore. The percent of loons found is probably even lower because of their low buoyancy and wide-ranging distribution. An alternative approach to estimating replacement costs is to estimate the cost of creating new habitat or enhancing existing habitat to support enough nesting pairs of each species to replenish the population. Again, to represent true replacement costs, this should be new or enhances habitat, not just the cost of acquiring already existing habitat. Tables 1 and 4 within Respondent's exhibit 3 are replicated here for convenience as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, respectively. The numbers of birds shown in Duda's table are not numbers about which he has direct knowledge. They are numbers purportedly obtained from Tim O'Meara and Peter Southall, biologists who work for the Commission who got their information from the Central Region and Northeast Region, respectively. In particular, they allegedly received their information from rehabilitators working in the two regions. Neither biologist testified at hearing, and the exhibits do not satisfactorily establish what involvement the biologists had in a direct inventory of birds, if any, or the other sources of their information which was then given to Duda in preparing his report. The rehabilitators in the Central Region did not testify nor were any exhibits presented which spoke to records kept by those individuals that set out bird deaths in that area. The only person who presented any reliable information concerning bird mortality was Cindy Mosling, rehabilitator in the Northeast Region. Any records which she maintained were not produced at hearing. Nonetheless, she did remember some details concerning bird mortality, and from this testimony 56 common loons, 3 gannets, 1 black skimmer and 2 hooded mergansers are found to have died as a result of the oil spill. The replacement value method by Duda speaks to the fact that his method does not constitute a complete recovery of the species population. Instead, what is shown in Respondent's exhibit 3 is averaging of estimates from Table 4 on costs for collecting existing specimens from the wild and releasing them back to the Jacksonville area after a period as opposed to a captive breeding program. That explanation is not correct, either, because there is no intention to release birds to the wild after raising them or rehabilitating them in captivity in one of the Florida institutions mentioned in Table 4. Moreover, only one of those programs has been relied upon by Petitioner in arriving at a cost estimate. That program is Sea World. As a consequence, the cost analysis in Table 1 related to hooded mergansers is incorrect in that it reflects an average of $150 and not the $200 quoted by Sea world. Again, the prices reflect pairs and not single birds. Robin Friday is the curator from Sea World who supplied cost estimates for pairs in Table 4 to Respondent's exhibit 3. He arrived at his price estimates in a 15 to 20 minute telephone conversation with Duda. To the extent he had no actual experience with price lists reflecting cost of a specie, he assumed that theoretical permits would be issued to collect live birds or eggs in the wild and that he would keep them in a captive environment, hoping they would breed while in captivity. In the latter category, the costs to promote the outcome of breeding in captivity formed his estimate. It can be seen that this departs from Duda's method for valuation. Notwithstanding this fact, Duda relied upon the price quotation by Friday. The main species of birds which Friday has had experience with are waterfowl. Of the species which have been verified as lost in this incident, he had had experience with common loons and hooded mergansers. The hooded merganser is a waterfowl with which he has close experience in breeding, acquisition and disposition. The common loon is a shore bird. In his career he has worked to rehabilitate two or three of those birds. He has had no experience with gannets and black skimmers, which are shore birds. As Friday identified, waterfowl may be sold, shore birds may not. Sale of the shore birds is prohibited by law. His price quotes for the hooded mergansers are from actual experience in sales. His quotations on the other species are matters of conjecture in collecting, housing, feeding and establishing a breeding program for them based upon limited experience in rehabilitating common loons and no experience with gannets and the black skimmer. The price estimate on the hooded merganser of $100 per bird is accepted. The price estimates for common loons, gannets and black skimmers are not. They are too speculative. Jean Benchinol is a curator in Gulf Breeze, Florida, who works for Animal Park, Inc. She testified at hearing. She was presented as a witness who could corroborate the Friday opinion on bird valuation. Her cost estimates may be found as Petitioner's exhibit 14, quotes for single birds. She has had direct involvement with hooded mergansers. She has sold those birds and quoted the price at hearing as being $100. This coincides with the price per bird quoted by Friday. For other birds in her price estimates that cannot be bought and sold and that remain at issue here, that is, common loons, gannets and the black skimmer, she categorized them as capable of surviving in captivity or not. The black skimmers can live in captivity and the common loon and gannet cannot, according to the witness. She had had a common loon in captivity before and noted that it did not do well, being more receptive to northern climes. At hearing her opinion about birds that could not survive in the Florida environment was rejected. In this final analysis, that refers to the common loons and gannets. Likewise, having considered her explanation concerning her valuation for the black skimmer, that opinion is rejected. In rejecting this method, the cross examination at hearing concerning valuation for the royal tern was significant in that it pointed out the inexact and unreliable nature of the method. This method contemplated receiving a live bird in her facility and the costs for medication, housing, feeding and staff time for approximately 60 days. In summary, on the subject of bird mortality, there is no inherent prohibition against valuation; birds do have a value that can be measured in monetary terms. Here the effort to arrive at that understanding fails in the inventory of casualties and method of valuation, with a limited exception. It is also observed that the Respondent had paid the rehabilitators to house, feed and nurse birds back to health that were injured, a similar activity to the theoretical exercise envisioned by Duda, Friday and Benchinol.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which requires the Respondent to reimburse the Fund in the amount of $17,301.58 and dismisses all other charges against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX 1 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences of Paragraph 6 are subordinate to facts found. The last two sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 7 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences of Paragraph 9 are subordinate to facts found. While it is agreed that the correspondence from Petitioner to Respondent did not indicate that claims for costs and expenses were only subject to collection if paid from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund, in the administrative forum recoupment of costs, expenses and damages may only be permitted for monies owed or expended from the fund. Paragraphs 10-13 are subordinate to facts found. It is acknowledged as set forth in Paragraph 14 that money was transferred from Coastal Protection Trust Fund to the Erosion Control Trust Fund for future beach renourishment. The more relevant fact is whether the claim for damages of value under the renourishment is legitimate and that determination has been made favoring the Petitioner. The concept of using the funds that are being held for purposes of future renourishment is in keeping with a reasonable disposition of the damage claim. Paragraphs 15-24 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 25 is contrary to facts found. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. The third sentence is an accurate statement of what Table 1 contributes but the findings in that table are rejected in part. The first sentence to Paragraph 26 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is accepted in the sense of recognizing that a list was maintained; however, that list was not produced at hearing as an aide in determining the number of birds that were killed. The third sentence is rejected. The fourth and fifth sentences are knowledged and those underlying facts were taken into account in accepting the representations by the witness Mosling concerning the number of birds that died as a result of the oil spill which she could recall. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 29 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The first sentence to Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The first sentence to Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is accepted with the exception that certain categories of water fowl are bought and sold in the free market. Concerning the third sentence, while it is acknowledged that curators are the better persons to attempt valuation, they must have sufficient understanding of the varieties on which they are commenting to have their opinions accepted and their methods of analysis of costs must stand scrutiny. This was not achieved in this instance. The last sentence in Paragraph 31 is not accepted in that the replacement value method was not adequately explained and does not allow a ranking of whether it is inexpensive, or cheaper or some where in the middle. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found as it references hooded mergansers. The other references are to species which have not been found to have been lost to the spill. The last sentence is accepted in the sense that the remaining species have limitations placed upon their use by state and federal law which prohibits the buying and selling. Paragraph 34 in its reference to the cost of hooded mergansers is accepted. The balance of the information was not utilized in that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that other species had been lost to the spill. In Paragraph 35 of the species that testimony was presented about, only the common loon, gannets and black skimmer pertain. While it is acknowledged that the method that the witness Friday used to estimate the value of those species is an accurate portrayal of his efforts, those efforts were rejected as were those of Ms. Benchinol described in Paragraph 36. In Paragraph 36 the explanation of her methods is correct. The methods were not accepted either in support of the testimony by Friday or in her own right. There is no significance to the discussion concerning the brown pelican and inadequate proof was made that the brown pelicans were lost. Respondent's Facts The first sentence to Paragraphs 1 is subordinate to facts found. The last two sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. As to Paragraph 2, it is acknowledged that Mr. Healey served as the liaison to the RRT and OSC. In the second sentence to that paragraph it is accepted that the state supports the RRT. It also has the function to compliment the RRT and to act independent of the federal response. The first sentence to Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second and third sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The fourth and fifth sentences are subordinate to facts found. While Paragraph 4 accurately describes the circumstance, this did not deter the state from pursuing its independent function in responding to the spill event. Paragraph 5 accurately portrays the OCS's idea of who was necessary to support the federal response. It does not preclude the activities of other state employees in carrying out their functions. Paragraph 6 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 7 is a correct statement but does not preclude the state's efforts in its own right at responding to the spill. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 while an accurate portrayal does not preclude the state in its efforts. The same pertains to Paragraph 10. Paragraph 11 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is contrary to facts found as is Paragraph 14. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 16 is not relevant. Paragraph 17 is an accurate portrayal of the federal use of the state helicopter but does not preclude request for reimbursement for uses which the state had of that helicopter. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences within Paragraph 19 are subordinate to facts found. The third and fourth sentences are not relevant to the issue of whether the state was entitled to seek the assistance or Jacksonville University for its own purposes distinct from those of the federal response. The latter sentence is a correct portrayal of the outcome but for reasons different than contemplated by the Respondent. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to facts found in its first two sentences. The third sentence is not accepted beyond the fact that the Department of Interior using a nonconsumptive use technique, whether other federal agencies use that method was not subject to determination from the record. The first three sentences to Paragraph 23 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The fourth sentence is not accepted. The fifth and sixth sentences are subordinate to facts found. As to the seventh sentence, it is not clear that there was the intention of redistributing to the Jacksonville area. The eighth sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found as are Paragraphs 25 and 26. The suggestion of the price for hooded mergansers as set out in Paragraph 27 is not accepted. The lesser scaup was not found to have been lost to the spill. The state price of $100.00 per bird for hooded mergansers is accepted. Paragraphs 28-31 are subordinate to facts found as it pertains to the species that were proven to have been lost. Paragraph 32 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 33 and 34 are subordinate to facts found, with the exception that it has been determined that the number of dead birds which Ms. Mosling can recall involvement with is accepted. Paragraphs 35 through 37 are subordinate to facts found in the species determined to have been lost, with the exception that the actual price for hooded mergansers was $100. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Kenneth J. Plante, General Counsel Lynn M. Finnegan, Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Robert B. Parrish, Esquire James F. Moody, Jr., Esquire Taylor, Moseley & Joyner 501 West Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (“the Commission”) correctly determined that a sailboat owned by Jeffrey Sundwall was a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2017),1 and thus subject to sections 376.15(3)(a) and 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Commission is empowered to remove, or cause to be removed, derelict vessels from Florida’s public waters. §§ 376.15(3)(a) and 823.11(3), Fla. Stat. A vessel is considered to be “derelict” if it is left, stored, or abandoned “[i]n a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition upon any public waters of this state.” § 823.11(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. Mr. Sundwall was the registered owner of a 28-foot sailboat named the Sea Joy. Facts Specific to the Instant Case Lieutenant Andy Cox of the Commission found the Sea Joy anchored off Wisteria Island in the Florida Keys on March 27, 2017. The Sea Joy had an expired registration decal, and a large amount of seaweed on the outboard motor, which probably rendered the motor inoperative. The Sea Joy had been left open and exposed to the elements, and Lieutenant Cox observed one-inch deep, green water inside the vessel. Lieutenant Cox also determined that the Sea Joy had no working bilge pumps or battery power. Lieutenant Cox initiated a derelict vessel investigation. While the Commission did not take custody of the Sea Joy at that time, Lieutenant Cox affixed a large, red sticker to the Sea Joy announcing that the vessel’s owner had 5 days before the Commission disposed of it pursuant to its authority under chapter 705. Lieutenant Cox met with Mr. Sundwall on approximately March 28, 2017, in a Florida Keys jail and served him with three infraction citations. Lieutenant Cox also provided Mr. Sundwall with a written notice indicating the Commission considered the Sea Joy to be a derelict vessel. On July 24, 2017, the County Court for Monroe County issued an Order requiring the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office and the Commission to preserve the Sea Joy as essential evidence in a criminal case against Mr. Sundwall. Thus, the Sea Joy could not be “destroyed, removed, altered, moved, or otherwise disposed of.” After Hurricane Irma struck Florida in September of 2017 and wrecked several hundred vessels, the Commission partnered with the Coast Guard in an effort to identify and remove derelict vessels. If an owner of a derelict vessel waived his or her ownership interest, then the State of Florida would not charge for a vessel’s removal and disposal.2 Wisteria Island is owned by the FEB Corporation. In November of 2017, the Commission found the Sea Joy hard aground on the shore of Wisteria Island, and the Sea Joy could not be moved without mechanical assistance. The Sea Joy had no mast or sail, and the vessel was still left open and exposed to the elements. In sum, the Sea Joy was nothing more than a hull at that point. Contemporaneous photographs and video of the Sea Joy indicate that it was resting on “wrack lines” left by the tide. Those wrack lines demonstrated that the Sea Joy was on public waters at high tide.3 In response to a request for reconsideration from the State of Florida, the Monroe County Court issued an Order on December 12, 2017, allowing the State to remove the Sea Joy from Wisteria Island. On December 17, 2017, the Commission transported the Sea Joy to a marina in Marathon, Florida. 2 The Commission’s attorney announced during the final hearing that the Commission would not seek to recover the costs of removing and disposing of the Sea Joy from Mr. Sundwall. Ordinarily, the owner of a derelict vessel is responsible for all costs associated with its removal and destruction. See §§ 376.15(3)(a), 705.103(4), and 823.11(3)(b), Fla. Stat. However, in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, the State of Florida assumed all of those costs. 3 This finding is based on the testimony of Major Robert Rowe of the Commission, and the undersigned found him to be a credible and persuasive witness. Officer David Bellville of the Commission met with Mr. Sundwall on January 4, 2018, at the Stock Island Detention Center in Key West. Officer Bellville served Mr. Sundwall with a notice stating that he had 30 days to take possession of the Sea Joy or it would be destroyed pursuant to the Commission’s authority under chapter 705. Officer Bellville also served Mr. Sundwall with an election of rights form stating he had 21 days to protest the Commission’s proposed action. Mr. Sundwall declined to waive his property interest in the Sea Joy and ultimately executed the election of rights form and a request for an administrative hearing on January 20, 2018. Mr. Sundwall’s hearing request was postmarked on January 23, 2018, and received by the Commission on January 29, 2018. Because Mr. Sundwall’s documents were received after the 21-day deadline, the Commission had the Sea Joy destroyed on February 21, 2018, and issued an Order on March 6, 2018, dismissing Mr. Sundwall’s hearing request with prejudice. Mr. Sundwall appealed the Commission’s Order to the First District Court of Appeal, and the appellate court issued an opinion in Sundwall v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission, 271 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), on May 16, 2019, reversing and remanding the Commission’s dismissal: After Hurricane Irma struck Florida in 2017, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) identified Mr. Sundwall as the owner of a boat declared derelict upon the waters of Florida. See § 823.11, Fla. Stat. (2017) (defining derelict vessels and empowering FWC to deal with them). Mr. Sundwall was incarcerated at the time. FWC sent Mr. Sundwall notice of the declaration, an explanation of his rights, an Election of Rights form, and a form for a Petition for Administrative Proceeding. The notice stated that a failure to make any election within twenty-one days from receipt of the notice would constitute a waiver of the right to a hearing. Mr. Sundwall signed a receipt for these documents on January 4, 2018. The twenty-first day after that fell on January 25, 2018. He signed the Election of Rights form, requesting a hearing; and also completed the Petition for Administrative Proceeding, dating both of his signatures January 20, 2018. There was no certificate of service or institutional date stamp on any of the papers, nor any institutional mail log indicating when he gave the papers to prison officials. The envelope was postmarked January 23, 2018. FWC stamped it as received on January 29, 2018. FWC dismissed the petition with prejudice because FWC did not receive it within twenty-one days and Mr. Sundwall did not request an extension within that period. FWC's order of dismissal acknowledged that the envelope from Mr. Sundwall was postmarked January 23, 2018. However, FWC relied on Florida Administrative Code Rule 28- 106.104(1), which defines filing as receipt by the agency clerk during normal business hours. In his pro-se brief, Mr. Sundwall relies on the January 20 date of his signatures and the January 23 postmark date, arguing that he is entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule under Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992). FWC does not dispute that argument, but argues that Mr. Sundwall provided no proof that he placed his papers in the hands of prison officials before expiration of the deadline; i.e., no institutional mail stamp or log and no certificate of service. The record does not reflect whether Mr. Sundwall’s institution utilizes dated mail stamps or logs, but one reason there were no certificates of service is because none of the forms that FWC supplied to him contained a certificate of service. In a literal sense, however, Mr. Sundwall "provided" FWC a postmarked envelope that evidences timeliness. He argues on appeal that FWC calculated the time erroneously, and he points out that the envelope was postmarked on January 23. The postmark date was before expiration of the twenty-one-day period for requesting a hearing, and therefore the petition necessarily was submitted to prison officials before the deadline. FWC acknowledged the postmark date in its order of dismissal, and the postmarked envelope is in the record. We therefore reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings on Mr. Sundwall's petition.[4] Ultimate Findings There is no dispute that the Sea Joy was a “vessel” within the meaning of section 327.02(46), Florida Statutes. When it was beached on Wisteria Island, the Sea Joy was a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1. It was left or abandoned in a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition upon the public waters of this state. While the Sea Joy no longer exists, the photographic evidence and the witness testimony conclusively demonstrate that it was wrecked or substantially dismantled by the time it ran aground on Wisteria Island. The photographic evidence also demonstrated that the Sea Joy was upon the State of Florida’s public waters at high tide. Mr. Sundwall made several factual arguments during the final hearing. For instance, section 823.11(1)(b)3. defines a “derelict vessel” as one that is “[d]ocked, grounded, or beached upon the property of another without the consent of the owner of the property.” Mr. Sundwall testified that he had permission for the Sea Joy to be on Wisteria Island. Mr. Sundwall’s argument is not persuasive because the Commission determined the Sea Joy to be a 4 To whatever extent that Mr. Sundwall is seeking damages from the Commission for the Sea Joy’s destruction, he must pursue that claim before a different tribunal. DOAH’s role in this matter is limited to making findings as to whether the Sea Joy was a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1. and thus subject to sections 376.15(3)(a) and 705.103. derelict vessel pursuant to section 823.11(1)(b)1., not section 823.11(1)(b)3. However, even if the Commission had deemed the Sea Joy to be derelict pursuant to section 823.11(1)(b)3., Mr. Sundwall’s testimony that he had permission to keep the Sea Joy on the shore of Wisteria Island was uncorroborated and unpersuasive. In preparation to take control of the Sea Joy, Mr. Sundwall asserted that a friend of his had attempted to inspect the Sea Joy while it was beached on Wisteria Island. He claimed that the Commission forced Mr. Sundwall’s friend away from the wrecked vessel. Because the Commission was dealing with several hundred displaced vessels in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, it is very unlikely that the Commission would have been in a position (or to have been inclined) to prevent any willing person from removing the derelict Sea Joy from Wisteria Island or inspecting it. Moreover, the undersigned generally found Mr. Sundwall’s testimony on this point to be unpersuasive and self-serving. Mr. Sundwall’s witnesses did not present any persuasive testimony to corroborate his assertions. Mr. Sundwall also argued that the instant case is part of the Commission’s ongoing effort to retaliate against him for undermining a criminal investigation. Even if that were the case, there is no evidence that the Commission left the Sea Joy anchored off Wisteria Island or caused it to become a derelict vessel. Mr. Sundwall asserts that he has been denied due process. However, the facts refute that assertion because: (a) he was given notice of the Commission’s proposed action to dispose of the Sea Joy; (b) he had an opportunity to request a hearing; (c) his case was referred to DOAH; and (d) a formal administrative hearing was conducted on February 7, 2020, at which he fully participated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission issue a Final Order deeming the Sea Joy to have been a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1. and that the Commission was authorized under section 376.15(3)(a) to relocate or remove the Sea Joy. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Brandy Elaine Elliott, Esquire Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Jeffrey Ray Sundwall, 829113 Jackson Correctional Institution 5563 10th Street Malone, Florida 32445 Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Christian E. Behrens, is a certified firefighter and is currently employed by the City of Miami Beach Fire Department as a firefighter II. As such, Petitioner is a "firefighter" as defined by Section 633.382(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has been employed by the City of Miami Beach Fire Department for approximately six and one-half years. He has an outstanding record with his employer and is highly rated in job performance. Petitioner received an associate in arts degree from Miami-Dade Community College in December, 1983. Petitioner received a bachelor of science degree from Florida International University with a major in computer science in April, 1987. Petitioner has completed in excess of the 18 semester credit hours of fire-related courses required for entry into the supplemental compensation program; however, such courses were completed after the Petitioner received the degrees described above and such courses were not included in the credits needed for the described degrees. The Department's position in this case is that the Petitioner would qualify for supplemental compensation at the associate degree level if he applies for, and receives, a second associate in arts degree from Miami-Dade Community College in either fire science or EMT technology. This would then qualify Petitioner under the associate level of compensation. Computer science is a valuable fire-related technology utilized by fire departments across this state. As a part of his regular duties, Petitioner has been required to learn, and teach to others, the statewide fire management information system. This system is mandated by the Department and is a computer program utilizing computers in the work place. Additionally, Petitioner has assisted in the design and implementation of his fire department's USC pen pad system. Again, this is a computer program mandated by his employer which utilizes computers in the work place. Additionally, Petitioner spends countless hours working with computers to assist in the daily function of his fire department. These hours are a part of, or are in addition to, other duties he performs for the fire department. Computers have become an indispensable portion of the operations of the Coral Gables Fire Department and, indeed assist all aspects of the fire department operation: from personnel to administration to actual fire fighting. As such Petitioner's skills and training make him a highly desirable employment prospect. Petitioner's expertise is considered by Operations Chief Cook to be invaluable and fire-related.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Division of State Fire Marshal, enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for supplemental compensation at the bachelor degree level. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4319 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 3, 8, 9, and 10 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is rejected as a restatement of law. Paragraph 5 is rejected as a restatement of the statute and rule. Paragraph 6 is rejected as restatement of the rule. Paragraph 7 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 11 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 12 is rejected as conclusion of law or argument. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 through 24, 31 through 33, 38 and 39 are accepted. Paragraphs 3 and 6 are accepted but are irrelevant. 3 Paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, and 37 are rejected as argument, irrelevant, or not supported by credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 William Lance Gerlin 330 Alhambra Circle Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Daniel T. Gross Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners are, and at all times material hereto were, owners of residential real property adjoining the site of the proposed construction to the northwest. The City of Cape Coral is, and at all times material hereto was, the applicant for the permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation for the construction of the proposed project, which is a public boat ramp. This boat ramp is located within the corporate limits of the City of Cape Coral. The Department of Environmental Regulation is, and at all times material hereto was, the agency of the State of Florida which has the authority to issue permits for dredging, filling or other activities of a similar nature to include construction of boat ramps on the shores or banks of navigable waterways of the state. The Caloosahatchee River is a navigable, Class III waterway of the State of Florida. Lands covered by the waters of the Caloosahatchee River at the location of the proposed project are submerged lands of the State of Florida. The City applied to the Department on March 27, 1980, for a permit to construct a boat ramp on the Caloosahatchee River at the Cape Coral Yacht Club. A boat ramp currently is located at the site of the proposed project. The existing ramp was initially partially constructed in 1964, and subsequently a seawall was removed and the two existing seawalls projecting into the water were constructed in 1969. The City's application was initially incomplete, lacking evidence of approval by the City Council. At the request of the Department, the City submitted additional information. The application as originally proposed contemplated dredging waterward of the mean high water line at the proposed project site. The dredged material was to be placed along a beach area adjacent to the proposed boat ramp, and the spoil would have projected waterward of the mean high water line. The proposed project was revised in September, 1980, to delete placing the dredged material on the adjacent beach. The revised project would retain the dredged material landward on the mean high water line until it had dried, at which time it would be removed from the site. After the dredging described above has been completed, the revised project calls for the construction of a concrete boat ramp 42 feet wide and 58 feet long extending approximately 28 feet waterward of the mean high water line of the Caloosahatchee River. In addition, three timber poling walkways at the sides of and in the middle of the boat ramp will be constructed extending waterward of the mean high water line. On May 10, 1980, Dan Garlick, an employee of the Department, conducted a Permit Application Appraisal and concluded the project would have an insignificant impact on biological resources or water quality, and would comply with Chapters 17-3 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. Garlick recommended approval of the project. David Key, another employee of the Department, conducted an on-site investigation and expressed concurrence with the findings contained in Garlick's report. Key also noted that no adverse impact on navigation was anticipated as a result of the project. On July 1, 1980, the National Marine Fisheries Service and US Fish and Wildlife Service investigated the proposed project. These federal agencies had no objection to the proposed boat ramp or the dredging aspects of the proposed project. These agencies had no objection to the proposed spoil basis located in the upland area of the site required to dry the dredged material. These agencies objected only to placement of the dredged material on the adjoining beach, which proposal was deleted in the City's revised plan. Petitioners introduced no expert testimony relating to the effects of the proposed project on water quality, marine resources or navigation. Lay testimony was received regarding conditions around the site of the existing boat ramp. Garbage, dead fish and flotsam accumulate at or near the site in the water and on the land. The existing seawalls extending perpendicular from the shore prevent matter in the water from being flushed by the current and tides. In the proposed project the seawall to the right of the existing boat ramp would not be removed. Prior to January, 1981, the existing ramp site was not regularly cleaned by the City. Since that date the area has been cleaned regularly; however, after weekends when the facility is most heavily used there are large quantities of refuse and garbage around the site. The City has requested and received permission from and payment has been made to the Department of Natural Resources for use of sovereignty submerged lands and the removal of 215 cubic yards of fill. After a review of the revised application, the Department gave notice of its intent to issue a permit for the proposed project by letter dated November 10, 1980. The Department based its intent to issue on a determination that the project would not adversely affect navigation, marine resources or water quality, provided the conditions set in the letter were met. The Department's Exhibit 2 is the only documentation presented by the City reflecting the City Council's action on the application. Exhibit 2 contains no findings by the local government that the proposed project would not violate any statute, zoning or ordinances; makes no findings that the project would present no harmful or increased erosion, shoaling of channels or stagnation of waters; and contains no findings that no material injury or monetary damage will result to adjoining land. The Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Minutes of the City Council for the City of Cape Coral Meeting of June 18, 1980, does not reflect that the final reports on the ecological effects of the proposed project were read into the record, and does not reflect that those reports were duly considered by the Council. It was at this meeting that final action on the application for permitting of the proposed project was presumably taken. However, the motion approved at that meeting did not authorize approval of the proposed project nor issuance of the permit. The motion empowered the Mayor to write a letter expressing approval. This motion presumable resulted in the letter of June 17, 1980, the Department's Exhibit 2, which was signed by the City Manager and not the Mayor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the agency head withhold final action on the application for a reasonable period of time to permit the applicant to cure the procedural defects. Upon curing the procedural defects, the Hearing Officer would recommend issuance of the permits originally requested. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Sasso, Esquire Post Office Box 1422 1413 Cape Coral Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Richard Roosa, Esquire 1714 Cape Coral Parkway Post Office Box 535 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Paul R. Ezatoff, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ERICH SCHLACHTA and ESTER SCHLACHTA, husband and wife, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 80-2258 CITY OF CAPE CORAL, PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT and STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FWC," "Respondent," or "Commission") properly determined that two (2) vessels owned by Jeffrey Sundwall ("Petitioner" or "Sundwall") were derelict or abandoned upon the waters of the state of Florida ("State") in violation of section 823.11, Florida Statutes (2018),1/ and, therefore, subject to the provisions of sections 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Following the aftermath of Hurricane Irma in September 2017, law enforcement officers from FWC investigated what were categorized as "displaced vessels" found around the State that had been impacted and dislocated by the hurricane. Many had been ripped from their moorings, slips, or docks and floated away, driven by the winds and tides. Vessels displaced by Hurricane Irma included those that were either wrecked or sunken in waters of the State. Vessels that were left on the waters of the State in a wrecked or sunken state by Hurricane Irma were considered "derelict vessels" by FWC under section 823.11(1)(b). Following Hurricane Irma, derelict and displaced vessels were dealt with differently by FWC than derelict vessels would ordinarily be handled. For instance, ordinarily, derelict vessels would be left on the waters of the State while the owner was determined, located, and notified and the investigation process was completed. In the wake of Hurricane Irma, however, since there were so many derelict vessels that littered the waters of the State, particularly in South Florida and the Florida Keys, the State authorities chose to be more proactive and remove the derelict vessels from the State waters and store them for 30 days. After the hurricane in September 2017, FWC attempted to locate and notify owners that their derelict vessel had been located, removed from the waters of the State, and stored. The owner could either (1) retrieve the vessel during a 30-day window following notification, (2) waive their interests in the vessel and allow the State to destroy the vessel sooner than 30 days, or (3) do nothing. If the owner had not recovered the vessel or challenged the derelict determination after 30 days, Respondent would proceed with destruction of the derelict vessel. Ordinarily, the private owner of a derelict vessel is responsible for all costs associated with its removal and destruction. Despite this, after Hurricane Irma, the State assumed those costs. The law enforcement officers who testified at the hearing received training at the law enforcement academy to identify derelict vessels as defined by State law. Facts Relating to the Vessel, Cuki Following Hurricane Irma, FWC personnel determined that a vessel named Cuki was displaced following Hurricane Irma. It was found grounded and partially imbedded on the beach just south of Spessard Holland Beach Park in the unincorporated area of Melbourne Beach in Brevard County. The Cuki, is a 1974 Columbia 45-foot, two-masted sailboat. Depending on the level of the ocean tide, this area of the beach was rather wide and flat, and frequented by members of the public and other beachgoers.3/ An Incident Summary Report was prepared by Kelsey Grenz on November 21, 2017. The Cuki was first reported to FWC as grounded on the beach in Brevard County on September 19, 2017. Resp. Ex. 1. The facts, and reasonable inferences from the facts, indicate that when it was first reported to FWC on September 19, 2017, the Cuki was in reasonably decent condition.4/ See Pet. Exs. N and X. Respondent investigated ownership of the Cuki and identified Petitioner as the last documented owner of the Cuki.5/ Resp. Ex. 2, pp. 1-2. On November 15, 2017, Grenz and her supervisor provided written notice to Petitioner that his vessel, the Cuki (documented vessel DO564929), was wrecked and grounded off the coast of Brevard County, Florida, following Hurricane Irma. Resp. Exs. 1 and 2. The notice was hand-delivered to Petitioner by Grenz while he was in custody and incarcerated at the Monroe County Detention Center on several unrelated criminal charges.6/ Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2. In addition to the written notice informing Petitioner that the Cuki had been displaced following Hurricane Irma, Grenz also provided Petitioner with a waiver document that would have allowed Petitioner to waive his interests in the Cuki, and allowed the State to remove and destroy the vessel at no cost to him. Resp. Ex. 1, p. 2. Petitioner was unwilling to sign the waiver.7/ By November 15, 2017, the vessel, although derelict and grounded on the beach in Brevard County, was still considered physically in the waters of the State. Resp. Exs. 5a and 5b. More specifically, it was below the high-tide watermark on the beach, and, at times, the normal tidal flows of the Atlantic Ocean washed up against and around it. Resp. Ex. 5. On January 16, 2018, Respondent, Law Enforcement Officer Bob Wehner, went to the location of the Cuki and recorded the vessel’s condition as he personally observed it then. In a short report, Wehner described the Cuki as follows: Vessel "CUKI" is a 1974 45’ Columbia Fiberglass sailboat that is beached on the Atlantic coast in the unincorporated area of Brevard County (N28.0454 W80.5462). The portside of the vessel is partially imbedded in the sand below the high-water tidemark on the beach. The vessel is equipped with an inboard motor, however, there is no shaft or propeller present. The vessel has no rudder, or steering wheel at the helm and no other means of steerage. The vessel is equipped with two masts. The mast at the stern of the vessel is broken at the base and suspended only by a single cable. There are no sails and the sail rigging is either missing or in disarray. The hatches at the topside of the cabin and windows on the portside have no covers leaving the interior open to the rain and wave activity. Resp. Ex. 3, p. 2. A detailed series of daylight pictures of the Cuki were taken by Wehner on January 16, 2018. The pictures generally reveal and show that the vessel: Was grounded on the beach in waters of the State. Resp. Ex. 4(a). The Cuki had cables attached to the sail that were tangled up, or in disarray. Resp. Exs. 4(a) and 4(h). Some of these cables and other riggings were supposed to be attached to the masts and were broken off. Resp. Ex. 4(d). The Cuki had seven (7) or eight (8) open hatches or doors on the top side of the vessel that were subject to wind, rain, ocean spray, and other natural elements. Resp. Exs. 4(c), 4(d), and 4(g). The Cuki was lying on its port side, pointing generally north with the bottom/keel area facing out towards the Atlantic Ocean. It was partially imbedded in the beach sand all the way up to the gunwale on the port side of the vessel. Resp. Exs. 4(d) and 4(e). Its rear mast was broken at the base, making the mast unusable. Resp. Exs. 4(f) and 4(g). It had no rudder or steering wheel to navigate the vessel when it was under power. The drive shaft and propeller were missing and were not connected to the inboard motor used to power the vessel when it was not under sail. Resp. Exs. 4(i), 4(j), and 4(k). The Cuki’s keel, necessary for stabilizing the vessel, was imbedded in the sand and was cracking and rusting where it was affixed to the hull. Resp. Exs. 4(l), 4(m), and 4(n). The vessel had no skeg to protect the rudder. Resp. Exs. 4(i) and 4(j). FWC hand-delivered a supplementary written notice to Petitioner on January 17, 2018. The notice provided Petitioner with additional details of the specific condition of the Cuki, as detailed above on January 17, 2018. Resp. Ex. 6. At present, the Cuki is still located on the beach in Brevard County, Florida. At some point in time when Respondent was prepared to remove the Cuki from the Brevard County beach as a derelict vessel, it determined that an order had been entered by the Monroe County Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. It ordered FWC, and other state entities, not to destroy, remove, alter, move, or otherwise dispose of the Cuki until certain that misdemeanor criminal charges filed against Petitioner were resolved.8/ Resp. Ex. 10. Apparently, this July 24, 2017, order was lifted when an Amended Order Granting State’s Motion to Reconsider was entered on January 8, 2018. Resp. Ex. 12. This second order specifically stated that FWC "may remove the [vessel] or the vessel may be removed by the post-Irma federal grant program." Resp. Ex. 12. It further stated that Petitioner, as the defendant in that criminal case, could "make arrangements, prior to the local, State, and/or Federal government removing the vessel, to have the vessel removed and stored on private property with the consent of the property owner." Resp. Ex. 12. Neither party did so.9/ Petitioner does not contest that the Cuki is "destroyed" or "abandoned." Sundwall also characterized the Cuki as a "carcass at this point." Rather he argues, in part, that FWC had a duty to maintain or protect the Cuki after it grounded in Brevard County. Facts Relating to the Vessel, Sea Myst Following Hurricane Irma, FWC personnel determined that another vessel, named the Sea Myst (documented vessel FL6220JX), registered to Petitioner, was displaced following Hurricane Irma. The Sea Myst is a 15-foot, fiber-glassed open motorboat. The Sea Myst was wrecked and substantially dismantled in the waters of the State in Monroe County. Resp. Ex. 8. When it was found, a visible water line stain and barnacle growth on the outside of the hull indicated that the vessel had been partially submerged or sunken in the sea water. The barnacles attached to the hull indicated to the officers that it had been submerged in sea water for an extended period of time.10/ Resp. Exs. 9(a), 9(b), 9(c), and 9(d). When it was first discovered, it appeared that approximately 75 percent of the Sea Myst vessel was underwater at the bow. Resp. Ex. 9(a). There was no outboard motor or other means of propulsion on the vessel. There was also no steering linkage with which to steer the vessel. Resp. Ex. 9(d). When it was first found, the Sea Myst was lodged alongside other derelict vessels, which were lying "stacked up" against the shore. Pet. Ex. W. To determine if a vessel is substantially dismantled, FWC commonly looks to three categories: propulsion, steerage, and hull integrity. Since the Sea Myst was missing both propulsion and steerage, it was substantially dismantled, given the conditions under which it was recovered following Hurricane Irma.11/ Post-Hurricane Irma Investigation and Collection of Derelict Vessels Following Hurricane Irma, the U.S. Coast Guard removed displaced and derelict vessels from the waters of the State that were not able to be retrieved by their owners, including the Sea Myst. Neither FWC nor the U.S. Coast Guard removed any vessels from the waters of the State following Hurricane Irma, unless they were left on the waters of the State in a wrecked or derelict condition. This included vessels that were submerged, partially submerged, beached, or grounded in a position where they could not be moved under their own power without mechanical assistance. All the vessels removed by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Commission were on waters of the State. Removal of these vessels was also necessary to prevent hazards to navigation. Following removal from the waters of the State, the Sea Myst, like other vessels, was put in a storage location that was monitored by FWC. This was to allow Sundwall, identified as the registered owner, an opportunity to receive notice of the vessel’s condition and to retrieve the vessel from the storage location, without incurring the costs of removal from the waters of the State. Resp. Ex. 8, pp. 1-2. On January 19, 2018, David Bellville hand-delivered written notice to Petitioner that his vessel, the Sea Myst, was damaged and displaced by Hurricane Irma. Resp. Ex. 7. In addition to this notice, Bellville also provided Petitioner with a waiver document that would have allowed Petitioner to waive his interests in the Sea Myst, and allowed the State to remove and destroy the vessel at no cost to him. Petitioner did not agree to sign the vessel over to the State. Petitioner testified that he is not the owner of the Sea Myst and that the Sea Myst had been bought and paid for by an un-named person and never collected. Petitioner further stated that he filed a Petition for an Administrative Hearing regarding the Sea Myst in error and that he felt the vessel should be destroyed with federal disaster/FEMA funds. Nonetheless, the more credible evidence indicates that Petitioner is still the titled owner of the Sea Myst, which is a derelict vessel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner’s vessels, the Cuki and the Sea Myst, derelict vessels under section 823.11, Florida Statutes, and abandoned property pursuant to chapter 705, Florida Statutes; that Petitioner was obligated to remove his derelict vessels from the waters of the State and has not done so; that Respondent did not violate any responsibility or duty to protect, maintain, or preserve the vessels; that appropriate costs be recovered upon proper application and proof; and that Respondent may dispose of both vessels as authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether proposed regulations for Brevard County manatee protection areas by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC), which are amendments to Rule 68C- 22.006, Florida Administrative Code, noticed in the April 20, 2001, Florida Administrative Weekly (F.A.W.)("Proposed Rule"), with a Notice of Change published in the F.A.W. on June 15, 2001, are an invalid exercise of legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, the following material and relevant facts are found. Effective July 1, 1999, Respondent, FWCC became primarily responsible for implementation of the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act, Section 370.12(2), Florida Statutes (2000) instead of the Department of Environmental Protection, by operation of Section 45, Chapter 99-245, Laws of Florida. FWCC is the State agency responsible for promulgating rules pursuant to Section 370.12, Florida Statutes. Respondent noticed proposed rules, and is a mandatory party to a challenge thereto. Section 120.56(1)(e), Florida Statutes. STANDING OF THE PARTIES McGill, Pritchard, Dovark, Gentile, Akins, Mason, Jaren, Robertson, Standing Watch, Inc., Save the Manatee Club, Inc., Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc., and Sea Ray Boats, Inc.1, are substantially affected by one or more of the Proposed Rules in that they operate motorboats in one or more of the areas proposed for regulation, or in that they represent the interests of members who operate motorboats in one or more of the areas proposed for regulations, or who desire to protect manatees and manatee habitats on behalf of members who derive aesthetic or other benefits from manatees, and who observe or otherwise enjoy manatees in Brevard County and elsewhere. Intervenor, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL), is a Florida corporation that owns and operates the Cape Canaveral Power Plant located in Cocoa, Brevard County, Florida. FPL's operations are specifically addressed in the proposed rule in that the proposed rule creates a no-entry zone along an area bordering the FPL Cape Canaveral Power Plant property boundary including easements and right-of-way where electrical generation operating equipment and electrical distribution and transmission equipment are located. Intervenor, Cocoa Beach is a Florida Municipal Corporation located in Brevard County. The Cocoa Beach Sports Area located with the Banana River Lagoon has been designated since 1988 as an area for water-related recreational activities for the residents of the City of Cocoa Beach and for the general public. The Proposed Rule seeks to impose speed restrictions for boats operating within this area and, if promulgated, will directly regulate and restrict the boating, fishing and other water-related recreational activities of the public within the area. Intervenor, Titusville is a Florida Municipal Corporation located in Brevard County, whose elected body has determined that a substantial number of its residents are substantially affected in the Proposed Rule. The parties alleged facts supported their standing in individual petitions, and the parties stipulated to standing. Therefore, none of the Petitioners presented any evidence regarding their standing. Petitioners and Intervenors are substantially affected by one or more sections of the proposed rule in that they operate motorboats in one or more of the areas proposed for regulation, or they represent the interests of members who operate motorboats in one or more of the areas proposed for regulation or who desire to protect the manatees and manatee habitat on behalf of members who derive aesthetic or other benefits from manatees and who observe or otherwise enjoy manatees in Brevard County. ADOPTION PROCESS FOR THE 2001 RULE PROPOSAL On September 6, 2000, the Commission authorized staff to initiate amendments to the Brevard County rules at a public meeting in Deland, Florida. On October 6, 2000, the Commission published a Notice of Rule Development in the Florida Administrative Weekly and announced a rule development workshop. On October 26, 2000, the Commission staff conducted a rule development workshop in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. On January 24, 2001, the Commission directed staff to conduct a second rule development workshop in Brevard County, Florida. On February 16, 2000, the Commission published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of the rule development workshop scheduled for March 7, 2000. On March 7, 2000, the Commission staff conducted a second rule development workshop in Viera, Brevard County, Florida. On March 30, 2000, the Commission conducted a public meeting in Tallahassee, Florida, and authorized publication of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On April 20, 2001, the Commission published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Florida Administrative Weekly and advertised public hearings to be held on May 3 and May 23, 2001. On May 3, 2001, the Commission staff conducted a public hearing on the Proposed Rule in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. On May 23, 2001, the Commission staff conducted a public hearing on the Proposed Rule in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. On June 15, 2001, a Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. There are no algorithms, formulae, protocols, matrices, math models, or metrics used by the Commission to combine the individual data sources into findings that idle-speed, slow-speed, or no-entry zones were required for any specific zone in question. Aerial surveys have been conducted by the Florida Marine Research Institute (FMRI) and others. One type of aerial survey technique is a statewide survey. These surveys are typically flown in the winter, after the passage of a cold front. Typical winter aggregation areas are included in these surveys. The synoptic surveys are used for monitoring winter aggregations of manatees. Population biologists working on manatee recovery view synoptic survey results as the best available information about the minimum estimated size of the manatee population in Florida at this time. The statewide synoptic survey data from the past several years is as follows: 1991 1,268 manatees 1991 1,465 manatees 1992 1,856 manatees 1995 1,443 manatees 1995 1,822 manatees 1996 2,274 manatees 1996 2,639 manatees 1997 2,229 manatees 1997 1,709 manatees 1998 2,022 manatees 1999 2,034 manatees 1999 2,354 manatees 2000 1,629 manatees 2000 2,222 manatees 2001 3,276 manatees During the most recent statewide synoptic survey, portions of Brevard County were observed in five counts made during January 5, 6, and 7, 2001. Of the 591 manatees observed in Brevard County on January 6, 2001, 457 manatees were adjacent to Florida Power and Light Company's thermal discharge, 38 manatees were in Sebastian River, 16 manatees were in Berkley Canal System, and 8 manatees were along the east Banana River shoreline on the southeastern extension of Merritt Island. In addition to statewide surveys, targeted aerial surveys in specific areas are used to establish manatee distribution and relative manatee abundance. These types of surveys are used by the FWCC in assessing manatee use of an area and then establishing manatee protection regulations. The most recent, comprehensive FMRI aerial survey in Brevard County consisted of 45 flights between September 1997 and September 1999. A standardized flight path designed to cover most probable manatee habitats was flown over Brevard County at least once per month during the two-year period at an altitude of approximately 500 feet (except for June 1999, where excessive smoke covered the area); the only area of the county not covered at all was restricted airspace associated with the Kennedy Space Center Complex. The highest number of manatees counted during this survey was 790 manatees in March 1999. General Description of Brevard County. Located in east central Florida, Brevard County is approximately 72 miles north-south and approximately 20 miles east-west. The west boundary of the county is the St. Johns River; the east boundary is the Atlantic Ocean. The Indian River Lagoon in Brevard County extends north of the Kennedy Space Center, at the north end of the county, to Sebastian Inlet, at the south end of the county. Brevard County consists of two major landforms and two major surface waters. From east to west, the geographical features are the Atlantic Ocean, a barrier island running the length of the county, the Indian River Lagoon, and the mainland. Northern Brevard County contains two other major geographical features. The barrier widens to form the Canaveral Peninsula on the east and Merritt Island on the west. Merritt Island is bordered by the Indian River on the west; the Banana River on the east; and the Mosquito Lagoon on the north. At the southern end of Merritt Island, the Banana River joins the Indian River. Besides Sebastian Inlet at the southern boundary of the county, the only navigable connection between the Indian River Lagoon and the Atlantic Ocean is at Port Canaveral. Port Canaveral cuts across the Canaveral Peninsula; along the west shoreline, the Canaveral Locks permit vessels to pass from the Port into the Banana River. The Mosquito Lagoon, Indian River and Banana River are located in a transitional zone between the temperate and tropical zones and form one of the most diverse estuaries in North America. The Indian River Lagoon varies from 0.5 to 5 miles in width and has an average depth of one meter (39.4 inches). The Indian River Lagoon system is not subject to significant periodic lunar tides. The water depths are depicted as mean lower low water, while the shorelines are represented in terms of approximate mean high water. In the lagoon system in Brevard County, the relative water levels rise and fall as influenced by wind, rainfall, storms, and tides. Expert witnesses with local knowledge of the waters acknowledged the variation in water level or relative depth and testified that the water level fluctuates in the Indian River Lagoon by more than three feet and fluctuates by two or two and one-half feet or greater annually. The Indian River Lagoon contains extensive sea grass beds, which are the preferred food for manatees. A bathymetric survey commissioned by the St. Johns River Water Management District determined the acreage of submerged land within the lagoon that can be potentially vegetated with submerged aquatic vegetation at a depth of six feet below mean sea level. Brevard County is the hub of the Atlantic Coast manatee population with a large year-round and a large migratory transient manatee population present throughout the year. THE MANATEE The West Indian manatee (Trichechus manatus) is one of endangered marine mammals in coastal waters of the United States. The West Indian manatee is presently classified as an "endangered species" by the federal Endangered Species Act and has protected status under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The West Indian Manatee is one of the four living species of the mammalian Order Sirenia, the other three are the West African manatee, the Amazonian manatee and the dugong; the fifth species, Stellar's sea cow, was hunted into extinction. In the southeastern United States, manatees are limited primarily to Florida and Georgia and this group forms a separate subspecies called the Florida manatee (T. manatus latirostris). The Florida manatee (hereinafter "manatee") is a migratory species with a large range of movement along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States. During the winter, cold temperatures keep the population concentrated in peninsular Florida, but during the late spring and summer they expand their range and are seen infrequently as far north as Rhode Island, and as far west as Texas. Manatees demonstrate "site fidelity" with some individual mammals adjusting their behavior to take advantage of changes in the availability of resources. Manatees often return to the same winter thermal refuges and the same summer habitats year after year. Manatees prefer water temperatures above 68 degrees F and when ambient water temperatures drop below 68 degrees, they seek warm water refuges, such as spring-fed rivers and power plans discharge outs. Florida Power and Light Company and Reliant Energy Power Plants and the Sebastian River are the primary warm water refuges sought by manatees in Brevard County. For feeding, resting, cavorting, mating and calving, manatees prefer shallow sea grass beds in coastal and riverline habitats with ready access to deep channels, particularly near the mouths of creeks, embayments and lagoons. Manatees sometimes prefer vegetation growing along the banks of waterways, instead of submerged or floating aquatic vegetation. Manatees seek and find sources of fresh water for drinking. In brackish or estuarine environment, they locate fresh water sources, either natural or artificial. They have been observed drinking fresh water at marinas, from air conditioning condensate discharge, from pockets of fresh water floating on the surface of the saltier water, from storm water outfalls and from springs. Typically, six-to-eight hours per day are spent on feeding, usually at one-hour intervals. Intermittently, between two and 12 hours per day are spent resting or sleeping either at the surface of the water or on the bottom. Time not devoted to feeding or sleeping is spent in traveling, socializing or exploring during both day and nighttime hours. The basic social unit consists of a female manatee and her dependent calf. Manatees, apart from winter aggregations at warm water resources and transient mating herds, are semi-social or mildly social mammals. Manatees usually prefer to swim below the surface at one to three meters (3.28 to 9.84 feet) depth, surfacing every few minutes to breathe. They typically have a swimming cruising speed between four and ten KM/HR (2-6 MPH), but can swim in short bursts at up to 25 KM/HR (15 MPH). Manatees have been seen in shallow waters with their backs and heads out of the water and on occasion have been observed fully or partially out of the water to feed or escape pursuing male manatees. Female manatees reach sexual maturity by age five years and males at the age of three to four years. Mating occurs when estrous females are successfully approached by dynamic epherimal mating herds of between five and 20 males (lasting up to four weeks). Female manatees will swim to very shallow water when pursued by mating herds of males as a preventive measure from mating. Manatees have a low reproductive rate and a long life expectancy. Manatee's gestation period is 11 to 14 months with usual birthing of one calf. Dependent calves remain near their mother's side from one to two years, swimming parallel to its mother, directly behind her flipper. Life expectancy for a manatee is in excess of 50 years. A significant decrease in adult survivorship due to, among other things, watercraft collisions could contribute to a long-term population decline. The manatee population in Florida has shown yearly increases resulting in more manatees now than there were in 1976 in the areas of Brevard County that are subject to the Proposed Rules. MANATEE PROTECTION PLANS The United States Fish and Wildlife Service developed an initial recovery plan for West Indian manatees in 1980, primarily for manatees in Florida. The plan was revised in 1989 and 1996. A third revision to the Recovery Plan was noticed for public comment in November 2000, and in July 2001. The recovery plans hereinabove recognized the major human-related cause of manatee mortality is collisions with watercraft. The existing and draft recovery plans state: Because watercraft operators cannot reliably detect and avoid hitting manatees, federal and state managers have sought to limit watercraft speed in areas manatees are most likely to occur to afford boaters and manatees time to avoid collisions. Avoidance technology research is ongoing for deterrent devices designed to "avoid collisions"; however, no device or combination of devices has gained acceptance and approval by the Marine Biological Scientific Community. The Florida Legislature has designated the entire State a refuge and sanctuary for the manatee--the Florida State marine mammal. Section 370.12(2)(b), Florida Statutes. HISTORY OF MANATEE PROTECTION IN BREVARD COUNTY The Florida Legislature initially authorized the adoption of manatee protection rules for Brevard County effective July 1, 1978, when it required the (former) Florida Department of Natural Resources to adopt rules regulating the speed and operation of motorboats between November 15 and March 31, 1978, in those portions of the Indian River within 3/4 mile of the then Orlando Utilities Commission (now Reliant) and Florida Power and Light Company power plant effluents. These rules became effective on March 19, 1997 (former Rule 16N-22.06, Florida Administrative Code ("Brevard County Manatee Protection Rules" or "BCMPR"). In 1989, a strategy to improve manatee protection in 13 key counties was approved by the Governor and Cabinet. The strategy called for development of manatee protection plans, for boat facility siting criteria, for priority land acquisition of critical manatee use areas, and improved aquatic preserve management for sea grass protection. Guidelines for implementation included new or expanded speed zones, refuges or sanctuaries for the regulation of boat speeds in critical manatee areas. Financial assistance was given Brevard County for its manatee protection plan in 1993. After creation of the FWCC, effective July 1, 1999, the BCMPR and other manatee protection rules were transferred from Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) to the FWCC, and the Secretary of State renumbered the prior rules to Chapter 68C-22, Florida Administrative Code. In 1994, FDEP amended BCMPR to establish manatee protection zones in the Canaveral Barge Canal and portions of adjacent areas of the Indian and Banana Rivers; to expand the existing "slow speed" zone in Sykes Creek (north of "S Curve") to include the channel; to establish a maximum 25 MPH zone in the Sykes Creek channel between Sykes Creek Parkway and the "S Curve"; and to renumber and correct map inconsistencies. This site- specific rule-making action was taken in response to proposed additional threats to manatees resulting from development of Abby Marina (now Harbortown Marina), pending completion of Brevard County comprehensive countywide manatee protection plan. In 1998, FDEP amended the BCMPR to establish seasonal "motorboats prohibited" and "no-entry" zones at the then Orlando Utilities Commission's (now Reliant) power plant and a seasonal "no-entry" zone at Florida Power and Light Company's power plant. THE PROPOSED MANATEE PROTECTION RULE AMENDMENTS FOR BREVARD COUNTY 1906 Section II - Proposed Rules THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED RULES IS: (Substantial rewording of Rule 68C-22.006 follows. See Florida Administrative Code for present text.) 68C-22.006 Brevard County Zones. The Commission hereby designates the waters within Brevard County, as described below, as areas where manatee sightings are frequent and where it can be assumed that manatees inhabit on a regular, periodic or continuous basis. The Commission has further determined that a likelihood of threat to manatees exists in these waters as a result of manatees and motorboats using the same areas. The primary purpose of this rule is to protect manatees from harmful collisions with motorboats and from harassment by regulating the speed and operation of motorboats within these designated areas. A secondary purpose is to protect manatee habitat. In balancing the rights of fishers, boaters, and water skiers to use these waterways for recreational and commercial purposes (as applicable under 370.12(2)(j), F.S.) with the need to provide manatee protection, the Commission has examined the need for unregulated areas or higher speed travel corridors through regulated areas. Such areas or corridors are provided in those locations where the Commission determined, on the basis of all available information, (1) there is a need for the area or corridor and (2) the area or corridor will not result in serious threats to manatees or their habitat. Unregulated areas or higher speed corridors are not provided in locations where both of the above findings were not made. The following year-round and seasonal zones are established, which shall include all associated and navigable tributaries, lakes, creeks, coves, bends, backwaters, canals, and boat basins unless otherwise designated or excluded. As used in this rule, ICW means the Intracoastal Waterway. Access to the NO ENTRY and MOTORBOATS PROHIBITED zones designated in paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) will be provided in accordance with procedures set forth in subsection (4), hereunder, and applicable provisions of Rule 68C-22.003. NO ENTRY (November 15 – March 31) Indian River, Reliant Corporation Delespine Power Plant Area: All waters within the discharge canal of the Reliant Corporation Delespine power plant, and; All waters southerly of a line extending eastward from and following the same bearing as the southernmost seawall of the power plant discharge canal, with said line bearing approximately 70º, westerly of a line 250 feet east of and parallel to the western shoreline of the Indian River, and northerly of the jetty on the north side of the power plant intake canal. Indian River, FPL Frontenac Power Plant Area: All waters in the vicinity of the Florida Power and Light (FPL) Frontenac power plant southerly of a line connecting the northern guy wires of the power poles immediately north of the FPL Unit 2 discharge area from the western shoreline of the Indian River to the third power pole east of the western shoreline (approximately 1,650 feet east of the shoreline), and westerly of a line running from said third power pole to the easternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 28' 07" North, approximate longitude 80º 45' 19" West) of the jetty on the north side of the FPL intake canal. MOTORBOATS PROHIBITED (All Year, except as noted) Indian River, Reliant Corporation Delespine Power Plant Area: All waters in the vicinity of the Reliant Corporation Delespine power plant southerly of a line bearing 90º from a point (approximate latitude 28º 29' 41" North, approximate longitude 80º 46' 35" West) on the western shoreline of the Indian River 95 feet north of the northernmost seawall of the power plant discharge canal, westerly of a line 250 feet east of and parallel to the western shoreline of the Indian River, and northerly of a line extending eastward from and following the same bearing as the southernmost seawall of the power plant discharge canal, with said line bearing approximately 70º. This zone is in effect from November 15 through March 31. C-54 Canal: All waters of the C-54 Canal (South Florida Water Management District Canal 54) east of the spillway (approximate latitude 27º 49' 50" North, approximate longitude 80º 32' 24" West) and west of a line drawn perpendicular to the northern shoreline of the C-54 Canal at a point (approximate latitude 27º 49' 55" North, approximate longitude 80º 32' 00" West) on the northern shoreline 2,500 feet east of the spillway. IDLE SPEED (All Year, except as noted) Indian River, Power Plant Area: All waters west of the western boundary of the ICW channel, south of a line bearing 90° from a point (approximate latitude 28º 30' 13" North, approximate longitude 80º 46' 48" West) on the western shoreline of the Indian River approximately three-fourths of a mile north of the Delespine power plant discharge canal, and north of a line bearing 90° from a point (approximate latitude 28º 27' 27" North, approximate longitude 80º 45' 43" West) on the western shoreline of the Indian River approximately three-fourths of a mile south of the Frontenac power plant discharge canal, except as otherwise designated under (2)(a) and (b)1. This zone is in effect from November 15 through March 31. Banana River, Cape Canaveral Area: All waters north of a line bearing 270° from the southwesternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 23' 29" North, approximate longitude 80º 37' 10" West) of Long Point in Cape Canaveral to a point (approximate latitude 28º 23' 29" North, approximate longitude 80º 37' 49" West) in the Banana River approximately 3,500 feet west of Long Point, and east of a line bearing 331° from said point in the Banana River to a point (approximate latitude 28º 24' 16" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 19" West) on the State Road 528 Causeway (west of State Road 401). Section II - Proposed Rules 1907 Banana River, Manatee Cove Area: All waters of Manatee Cove (on the east side of the Banana River, just south of State Road 520) east of a line at the mouth of the cove running between a point (approximate latitude 28º 21' 21" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 52" West) on the northern shoreline and a point (approximate latitude 28º 21' 09" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 51" West) on the southern shoreline. Turkey Creek: All waters of Turkey Creek north and east (downstream) of Melbourne- Tillman Drainage District structure MS-1 and south and west of a line at the mouth of Turkey Creek that runs from the southeasternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 02' 21" North, approximate longitude 80º 34' 48" West) of Castaway Point to the northeasternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 02' 14" North, approximate longitude 80º 34' 43" West) of Palm Bay Point. Sebastian Inlet Area: All waters of the cove on the northern side of Sebastian Inlet (commonly known as Campbell Cove) northwest of a line running between the two rock jetties at the entrance to the cove. Sebastian River Area: All waters of the North Prong of Sebastian River, and; All waters of the North Fork Sebastian River (also known as Sebastian Creek) and the C-54 Canal west of a north-south line from a point (approximate latitude 27º 50' 08" North, approximate longitude 80º 31' 02" West) on the northern shoreline of the North Fork Sebastian River at the intersection of the river and the North Prong and east of a line drawn perpendicular to the northern shoreline of the C-54 Canal at a point (approximate latitude 27º 49' 55" North, approximate longitude 80º 32' 00" West) on the northern shoreline 2,500 feet east of the spillway. SLOW SPEED (All Year) Mosquito Lagoon: All waters west of the ICW channel, south of the Volusia County/Brevard County line, and north of ICW channel marker “43,” and; All waters of Mosquito Lagoon (including the ICW channel) south of ICW channel marker “43,” southwest of a line commencing at ICW channel marker “43” and then running to ICW channel marker “45” and then on a bearing of 132° for a distance of 1,000 feet to the line’s terminus at a point in Mosquito Lagoon (approximate latitude 28º 44' 35" North, approximate longitude 80º 44' 35" West), and north of a line running from said point in Mosquito Lagoon on a bearing of 221° to the western shoreline of Mosquito Lagoon. Indian River, Turnbull Basin Area: All waters south and east of a line commencing at a point (approximate latitude 28º 44' 36" North, approximate longitude 80º 46' 19" West) on the eastern shoreline of Turnbull Basin (about one mile north of Haulover Canal) and then bearing 193° to a point 1,500 feet northwest of the ICW channel, then running in a southwesterly direction 1,500 feet northwest of and parallel with the ICW channel to a point (approximate latitude 28º 41' 22" North, approximate longitude 80º 49' 05" West) 1,500 feet northwest of ICW channel marker “12,” and then running in a southerly direction 1,500 feet west of and parallel with the ICW channel to the Florida East Coast Railroad Bridge, including all waters west of the ICW channel and south of an east-west line 1,500 feet north of the point where the Florida East Coast Railroad Bridge crosses over the ICW, but excluding the ICW channel as designated under (2)(e)2. Indian River, Titusville Area: All waters south of the Florida East Coast Railroad Bridge, east of the ICW channel, and north of an east-west line 1,200 feet south of the point where the Florida East Coast Railroad Bridge crosses over the ICW, and; All waters west of the ICW channel south of the Florida East Coast Railroad Bridge and north of the State Road 402 Bridge and Causeway. Indian River, State Road 402 (Max Brewer Causeway) to State Road 405 (NASA Parkway): All waters within 2,000 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Indian River, excluding the ICW channel where the channel is less than 2,000 feet from the western shore; All waters within one mile of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River south and east of a point (approximate latitude 28º 36' 04" North, approximate longitude 80º 44' 44" West) on the western shoreline of Peacock’s Pocket (northwest of Banana Creek), and; All waters south of an east-west line 3,400 feet north of the point where the State Road 405 Bridge crosses over the ICW, excluding the ICW channel as designated under (2)(e)3. Indian River, State Road 405 (NASA Parkway) to State Road 528 (Bennett Causeway): All waters north of an east-west line 3,000 feet south of the point where the State Road 405 Bridge crosses over the ICW, excluding the ICW channel as designated under (2)(e)3.; All waters west of the ICW channel and north of the overhead power transmission line that crosses the western shoreline of the Indian River approximately 1,200 feet north of State Road 528, excepting those areas otherwise designated for seasonal regulation under (2)(a), (b)1., and (c)1. when said seasonal zones are in effect; All waters south of said overhead power transmission line and west of a north-south line running through the second power pole east of the western shoreline; All waters within one-half mile of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River north of a point (approximate latitude 28º 25' 47" North, approximate longitude 80º 43' 24" West) on the eastern shoreline of the Indian River 1,500 feet south of the canal on the southern side of Meadow Lark Lane, including all waters of Rinkers Canal, and; All waters east of the ICW channel and south of the overhead power transmission line that crosses the eastern shoreline of the Indian River approximately 3,900 feet north of State Road 528. Indian River, State Road 528 (Bennett Causeway) to State Road 518 (Eau Gallie Causeway): All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Indian River; All waters south of State Road 528 and within 1908 Section II - Proposed Rules 500 feet of the State Road 528 Causeway, within 500 feet of the State Road 520 Causeway, within 500 feet of the State Road 404 Causeway, and north of State Road 518 and within 500 feet of the State Road 518 Causeway; All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River between State Road 528 and State Road 520; All waters east of the ICW channel from State Road 520 to an east-west line 300 feet south of the southernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 19' 22" North, approximate longitude 80º 42' 00" West) of the spoil island east of ICW channel marker “80,” and; All waters within 500 feet of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River south of the aforementioned east-west line and north of State Road 404 (Pineda Causeway). Indian River, State Road 518 (Eau Gallie Causeway) to Cape Malabar: All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River; All waters south of State Road 518 and within 500 feet of the State Road 518 Causeway and within 500 feet of the State Road 192 Causeway; All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Indian River south of State Road 518 and north of the easternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 02' 24" North, approximate longitude 80º 34' 48" West) of Castaway Point (including all waters of the Eau Gallie River and Crane Creek), and; All waters south of said easternmost point of Castaway Point, north of Cape Malabar, and west of a line commencing at a point (approximate latitude 28º 02' 29" North, approximate longitude 80º 34' 38" West) in the Indian River 1,000 feet northeast of said easternmost point of Castaway point, then bearing 130° to the westernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 02' 15" North, approximate longitude 80º 34' 19" West) of the spoil site west of ICW channel marker “14,” then bearing 153° to the westernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 01' 32" North, approximate longitude 80º 33' 55" West) of the spoil site southwest of ICW channel marker “15,” then bearing 138° to the line’s terminus at a point (approximate latitude 28º 01' 12" North, approximate longitude 80º 33' 35" West) in the Indian River approximately 2,400 feet northeast of Cape Malabar. Indian River, Cape Malabar to Grant: All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River south of Cape Malabar and north of a point (approximate latitude 27º 55' 59" North, approximate longitude 80º 30' 30" West) on the eastern shoreline of the Indian River (north of Mullet Creek); All waters south of Cape Malabar, north of the spoil island between ICW channel markers “25” and “27,” and west of a line commencing at a point approximate latitude 28º 01' 12" North, approximate longitude 80º 33' 35" West) in the Indian River approximately 2,400 feet northeast of Cape Malabar, then bearing 157° to the easternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 00' 26" North, approximate longitude 80º 33' 13" West) of the spoil site between ICW channel markers “16” and “17,” then bearing 152° to the easternmost point (approximate latitude 27º 59' 21" North, approximate longitude 80º 32' 35" West) of the spoil island west of ICW channel marker “22,” then bearing 166° to the line’s terminus at the easternmost point (approximate latitude 27º 57' 50" North, approximate longitude 80º 32' 10" West) of the spoil island between ICW channel markers “25” and “27;” All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Indian River south of said spoil island between ICW channel markers “25” and “27,” and north of ICW channel marker “35,” and; All waters west of the ICW channel between ICW channel markers "35" and “38.” Indian River, Grant to the Indian River County Line: All waters west of the ICW channel between ICW channel marker "38" and the Brevard County/Indian River County line, including those waters east of the centerline of the U.S. 1 Bridge over the Sebastian River, and: All waters within 1,500 feet of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River, south of a point (approximate latitude 27º 55' 59" North, approximate longitude 80º 30' 30" West) on the eastern shoreline of the Indian River (north of Mullet Creek) and north of an east-west line running through ICW channel marker “59” (approximate latitude 27º 51' 38" North, approximate longitude 80º 28' 57" West), including those waters within 1,500 feet west of the westernmost edge of the Mullet Creek Islands, within 1,500 feet west of the westernmost edge of the islands south of Mathers Cove, within 1,500 feet west of the westernmost edge of Long Point, and within 1,500 feet west of the westernmost extensions of Campbell Pocket south to said east-west line running through ICW channel marker “59,” and; All waters of the Indian River and Sebastian Inlet east of the ICW channel, south of said east-west line running through ICW channel marker “59,” north of the Brevard County/Indian River County line, and west of a line 200 feet southwest of and parallel with the centerline of the State Road A1A Bridge, except as otherwise designated under (2)(c)5. and excluding the marked Sebastian Inlet channel. Sebastian River Area: All waters of the Sebastian River (including waters also known as San Sebastian Bay), the South Fork San Sebastian River (also known as St. Sebastian River, Sebastian River and Sebastian Creek), and the North Fork Sebastian River (also known as Sebastian Creek) within Brevard County west of the centerline of the U.S. 1 Bridge and east of a north-south line from a point (approximate latitude 27º 50' 08" North, approximate longitude 80º 31' 02" West) on the northern shoreline of the North Fork Sebastian River at the intersection of the river and the North Prong of Sebastian River. Canaveral Barge Canal: All waters of the Canaveral Barge Canal east of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of the Indian River and west of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Banana River. Sykes Creek and Kiwanis Basin: All waters of Sykes Creek and Kiwanis Basin south of the Canaveral Barge Canal and north of the centerline of State Road 520. Section II - Proposed Rules 1909 Newfound Harbor: All waters south of State Road 520 and within 1,000 feet of the State Road 520 Bridge and Causeway; All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of Newfound Harbor north of the runway for the Merritt Island Airport (approximately one mile south of State Road 520), and; All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the eastern shoreline of Newfound Harbor and an extension of said shoreline to a point 1,000 feet south of Buck Point. Banana River, North of State Road 528: All waters within 1,500 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Banana River south of a point (approximate latitude 28º 26' 10" North, approximate longitude 80º 39' 35" West) on the shoreline near Kars Park on the boundary of the federal No Motor zone; All waters south of an east-west line running through the westernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 24' 42" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 34" West) of the first spoil island north of the Canaveral Locks (commonly known as Ski Island), including those waters in Port Canaveral west of State Road 401, and; All waters east and south of a line commencing at the northernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 24' 44" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 32" West) of Ski Island, then running to the southernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 24' 55" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 31" West) of the second spoil island north of the Canaveral Locks, then following the eastern shoreline of said spoil island to its northernmost point, then bearing 6° to a point (approximate latitude 28º 25' 09" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 29" West) in the Banana River underneath the overhead power transmission line south of the third spoil island north of Canaveral Locks, then following said transmission line (which is the boundary of the federal No Motor zone) in an easterly direction to the line’s terminus at a point (approximate latitude 28º 25' 16" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 13" West) on the eastern shoreline of the Banana River. Banana River, State Road 528 to State Road 520: All waters south of State Road 528 and north of an east-west line 1,000 feet south of the point where the State Road 528 Bridge crosses over the main Banana River channel, except as otherwise designated under (2)(c)2.; All waters west of a line running from a point (approximate latitude 28º 24' 16" North, approximate longitude 80º 39' 30" West) on the State Road 528 Causeway east of the western State Road 528 Relief Bridge to a point (approximate latitude 28º 21' 26" North, approximate longitude 80º 39' 32" West) on the State Road 520 Causeway approximately 1,200 feet west of the water storage tanks, and; All waters south of a line bearing 270° from the southwesternmost point (approximate latitude 28º 23' 29" North, approximate longitude 80º 37' 10" West) of Long Point in Cape Canaveral to a point (approximate latitude 28º 23' 29" North, approximate longitude 80º 37' 49" West) in the Banana River approximately 3,500 feet west of Long Point, and east of a line bearing 174° from said point in the Banana River to a point (approximate latitude 28º 21' 28" North, approximate longitude 80º 37' 35" West) on the State Road 520 Causeway approximately 1,000 feet west of Cape Canaveral Hospital Complex. Banana River, Cocoa Beach Area: All waters south of State Road 520 and within 1,000 feet of the State Road 520 Causeway, excluding the main Banana River channel; All waters within 1,000 feet of the general contour of the western shoreline of the Banana River, south of State Road 520 and north of Buck Point and an extension of said shoreline to a point 1,000 feet south of Buck Point, excluding the main Banana River channel where the channel is less than 1,000 feet from the western shoreline, and; All waters east of a line commencing at a point (approximate latitude 28º 21' 25" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 30" West) on the State Road 520 Causeway (approximately 2,000 feet east of the State Road 520 Bridge over the main Banana River channel), then bearing 190° to a point (approximate latitude 28º 19' 15" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 55" West) in the Banana River approximately 1,900 feet west of the northwesternmost point of the Cocoa Beach Municipal Park, then bearing 270° to a point (approximate latitude 28º 18' 38" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 55" West) in the Banana River approximately 1,700 feet west of the southwesternmost point of the Cocoa Beach Municipal Park, then bearing 171° for approximately 3,000 feet to a point (approximate latitude 28º 18' 07" North, approximate longitude 80º 38' 50" West) in the Banana River east of channel marker “15,” then bearing 124° to a point (approximate latitude 28º 16' 52" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 45" West) in the Banana River 1,000 feet west of the eastern shoreline of the Banana River, then heading in a southerly direction 1,000 west of and parallel with the eastern shoreline of the Banana River to the line’s terminus at a point (approximate latitude 28º 15' 51" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 38" West) in the Banana River near the northern boundary of Patrick Air Force Base. Banana River, South of Cocoa Beach to State Road 404 (Pineda Causeway): All waters south of an east-west line running through the southernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 16' 19" North, approximate longitude 80º 39' 25" West) of the more southerly of the two islands east of Macaw Way (on Merritt Island) and west of a line bearing 162° from said southernmost point to State Road 404; All waters south and east of the overhead power transmission line in the Banana River adjacent to Patrick Air Force Base, and; All waters north of the centerline of State Road 404 and within 2,000 feet of the State Road 404 Bridges and Causeway, excluding the main Banana River channel as designated under (2)(e)5. Banana River, South of State Road 404 (Pineda Causeway): All waters south of the centerline of State Road 404, including those waters east of a line bearing 270° from the southernmost point (approximate latitude 28º 08' 32" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 15" West) of Merritt Island 1910 Section II - Proposed Rules (commonly known as Dragon Point) to the Eau Gallie Causeway, excluding the main Banana River channel as designated under (2)(e)5. 25 MPH (All Year) Mosquito Lagoon: All waters in the ICW channel south of the Volusia County/Brevard County line and north of ICW channel marker “43” (north of Haulover Canal). Indian River, Turnbull Basin and Titusville Area: All waters in the ICW channel southwest of ICW channel marker “1” (southwest of Haulover Canal) and north of an east-west line 1,200 feet south of the point where the Florida East Coast Railroad Bridge crosses over the ICW. Indian River, State Road 405 (NASA Parkway) Area: All waters in the ICW channel south of an east-west line 3,400 feet north of the point where the State Road 405 Bridge crosses over the ICW and north of an east-west line 3,000 feet south of the point where the State Road 405 Bridge crosses over the ICW. South Indian River Area: All waters in the ICW channel south of ICW channel marker “59” and north of the Brevard County/Indian River County line. South Banana River Area: All waters in the main Banana River channel south of a point in the channel 2,000 feet north of the State Road 404 Bridge, and north of a point (approximate latitude 28º 09' 15" North, approximate longitude 80º 36' 32" West) in the channel on the northern boundary of the local Idle Speed zone approximately 1,900 feet north of the Mathers Bridge. Commercial Fishing and Professional Fishing Guide Permits: The following provisions pertain to the issuance of permits to allow individuals engaged in commercial fishing and professional fishing guide activities to operate their vessels in specified areas at speeds greater than the speed limits established under subsection (2) above. Procedures related to the application for and the review and issuance of these permits are as set forth in 68C-22.003, Florida Administrative Code. Permits shall be limited as follows: Permits shall only be available for the zones or portions of zones described under (2)(d)1. through (2)(d)9., and (2)(d)13. through (2)(d)18. Permits shall not apply on weekends or on the holidays identified in s. 110.117, F.S. Permit applications may be obtained at the Commission’s Law Enforcement office at 1-A Max Brewer Memorial Parkway in Titusville or by contacting the Commission at Mail Station OES-BPS, 620 South Meridian Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (850-922-4330). Access to the NO ENTRY and MOTORBOATS PROHIBITED zones is allowed for Reliant Corporation employees or their authorized agents (for the zones designated under (2)(a)1. and (b)1.) and for Florida Power and Light Company employees or their authorized agents (for the zone designated under (2)(a)2.) provided that entry into the zones is necessary to conduct activities associated with power plant maintenance, emergency operations or environmental monitoring. The Commission must receive notification of the activity prior to its commencement. In the event of an emergency activity, the Commission shall be notified no more than one week after the activity has been commenced. All vessels used in the operation or associated with the activity shall be operated at no greater than Idle Speed while within the zones and must have an observer on board to look for manatees. The zones described in 68C-22.006(2) are depicted on the following maps, labeled “Brevard County Manatee Protection Zones.” The maps are intended as depictions of the above-described zones. In the event of conflict between the maps and descriptions, the descriptions shall prevail. DATA SOURCES CONSIDERED BY FWCC IN PROMULGATING THE PROPOSED RULE FWCC's staff who were primarily responsible for the development of the recommended revisions to the BCMPR to the FWCC included: Scott Calleson, who holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Science and a Masters of Science degree with emphasis on Environmental Planning and Natural Resource Management, and has worked with manatee protection rules since 1992; David Arnold, who holds both a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology and a Master of Science degree in Biological Oceanography, and who supervised the Department of Environmental Protection's marine turtle protection program prior to becoming Chief of the Bureau of Protected Species Management in 1995; and Dr. Charles Deutsch, who has both a Bachelor of Science and a Doctorate degree in Biology with specialization in biology of marine mammals and behavior, animal behavior and behavioral ecology, and worked for the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in a number of analyses of manatee radio tracking along the Atlantic Coast. The verbal, narrative and graphical presentations of the experts were relied upon in making recommendations to the FWCC for the proposed rule revisions. FWCC's staff gave good faith consideration to the experts' opinions, publications, articles, data analysis, and reasonable inferences and predictions. MANATEE MORTALITY DATA FWCC relied upon manatee mortality data in evaluating manatee inhabitation (Brevard County Mortality Information and Brevard County Misc. Information), including FMRI manatee salvage database for Brevard County from January 1974 to December 2000 (including carcass recovery location and cause of death). AERIAL SURVEY DATA In evaluating manatee inhabitation, FWCC relied upon manatee aerial survey data in existing manatee inhabitations. Included in this process were: information on aerial surveys performed for Kennedy Space Center by Dynamic Corporation; Geographic Information System information for FMRI's 1997-1999 Brevard County aerial survey along with data in "Seasonal Manatee Distribution and Relative Abundance in Brevard County, Florida, 1997-1999"; Geographic Information System data from earlier Brevard County aerial surveys; and aerial surveys conducted by the Florida Marine Research Institute and others. Aerial Surveys Aerial surveys have been conducted by the Florida Marine Research Institute and others using various techniques. One type of aerial survey technique is a statewide survey. These surveys are typically flown in the winter, after the passage of a cold front. Typical winter aggregation areas are included in these surveys. The synoptic surveys are used for monitoring winter aggregations of manatees. Population biologists working on manatee recovery view synoptic survey results as the best available information about the minimum estimated size of the manatee population in Florida at this time. The statewide synoptic survey data from the past several years is as stated in Finding of Fact 23 herein above. In addition to statewide surveys, targeted aerial surveys in specific areas are used to establish manatee distribution and relative manatee abundance. The commission in assessing manatee use of an area and then establishing manatee protection regulations uses these types of surveys. SYNOPTIC AERIAL SURVEYS Considered by FWCC was the statewide synoptic survey for the period 1991 to 2001. These surveys are used for monitoring winter aggregation of manatees and provide a minimum estimate of the number of manatees observed. Population biologists view synoptic survey results as the best available information source to estimate the minimum size of the manatee population in Florida at the present time. The statewide synoptic survey data for the years 1991-2001 are detailed in paragraph 22 herein above. The Berkeley Canal system location, where manatees were observed on January 6, 2001, has four connecting canals to the eastern shoreline of the Banana River; the northernmost connection is just south of the Pineda Causeway and the southernmost connecting canal is located about three and three-fourths miles to the south between Carter's Cut and the Mathers Bridge. The West Banana River shoreline locations where manatees were observed on January 6, 2001, is the Banana River Marina. MANATEE DISTRIBUTION AND RELATIVE ABUNDANCE Targeted aerial surveys in specific areas are used to establish manatee distribution and relative manatee abundance. They are used in assessing manatee use of an area and then in establishing manatee protection regulations in those areas. Forty-five flights between September 1997 and September 1999 are the most comprehensive and recent FMRI aerial surveys in Brevard County. Aerial surveys possess an inherent bias because the location of animals can only be seen during daylight hours and do not account for nighttime locations. FWCC's aerial survey data were presented in various forms: raw data entry sheets completed by the surveyors; a composite, GSI plot of the data points for Brevard County; small- format GIS plots of data points that depicted manatees seen by month; and small-format GIS plots of data points that depicted manatees seen during each flight, along a flight path. Before the 1997-1999 Bervard survey, relative abundance and distribution surveys for portions of Brevard County were conducted in late-1985 through early-1987. The 1985-87 Banana River surveys included only the area between Launch Complex 39B and Eau Gallie, but included portions of Canaveral Barge Canal, Sykes Creek and Newfound Harbor. Flights were flown over the Cocoa Beach area during morning hours for a nine-month period (March 3, 1990- November 27, 1990), and showed more than one manatee during each flight, with one exception on March 3, 1990. SATELLITE TELEMETRY DATA AND VHF RADIO TELEMETRY DATA The FWCC relied upon manatee telemetry data in evaluating manatee inhabitation for Brevard County. Included in the satellite and VHF radio telemetry data relative to inhabitation was a GIS database obtained from the "United States Geological Survey (USGS) Biological Resources Division, Florida Carribean Science Center, Sirenia Project, Gainesville, Florida," and reports authored by Dr. Charles Deutsch who analyzed the USGS data. The USGS Sirenia Project data analyzed by Dr. Deutsch were collected from May 1986 to May 1998, and included both VHF radio and telemetry and satellite telemetry data for the 78 manatees that were tagged for varying amounts of time during that period along the lower East Coast of the United States, excluding data for manatees that were born and raised in captivity. This data was considered by Dr. Deutsch as the best telemetry data available. Of the full USGS Sirenia Project data evaluated by Dr. Deutsch, 61 manatees were tracked at some time during the study period in Brevard County, including 16 manatees that were only tracked using VHF radio tracking and not satellite telemetry. The maximum number of tagged manatees observed in Brevard County during the study period was 12 manatees at one time. Dr. Deutsch opined that about one or two percent of the documented East Coast manatee sub-population was tracked each year. The radio telemetry data subsets from the Sirenia Project covered a ten-year period from May 1986, and included over 6,000 manatee observations for 54 individual tagged manatees. Of those 6,000 observation points, three-quarters (almost 5,000) were actual visual sighting of manatees made by persons on shore or in vessels. Of those visual sightings, approximately ten percent were made by non-government employees. The satellite telemetry data evaluated by Dr. Deutsch included data for 45-tagged manatees that was collected from April 1987 to May 1998, with over 34,000 location records of Class 1, 2, or 3 accuracy. Of the 61-tagged manatees that were observed in Brevard County during the 12-year study period, the median tracking period was 135 days, with some animals tracked for several years while others were tracked for shorter periods of time. Of the 61 manatees tracked in Brevard County, approximately one-half were fitted with radio or satellite telemetry transmitters (tags) while in Brevard County, the other half were tagged in different areas of northeast Florida, in southeast Georgia, or in southeast Florida. A majority of the animals tagged outside of Brevard County were observed in Brevard County, and Dr. Deutsch opined that this data demonstrated Brevard County to be the hub of manatee activity along the Atlantic Coast. MIGRATORY RANGE OF TAGGED MANATEES The size of the migratory ranges of tracked manatees varied with considerable variation of movement by individual manatees in Brevard County. Some manatees would spend eight months of the year near Canaveral Sewer Plant (Banana River) and spend each winter near Port Everglades (Ft. Lauderdale). Many tagged manatees displayed strong site-fidelity, returning to the same seasonal locations yearly while others did not. Telemetry data points are not precisely a depiction of the actual and true location of the manatee at the time of data transmission from the tag to the satellite. Services Argos, the company that administers the hardware, assigned 68 percent of the data points within 150 meters of the true location in class three locations. In 1994, USGS performed accuracy experiments in Brevard County of satellite telemetry and found location class 3 data points to be within 225 meters of the true location, and 95 percent within 500 meters of the true location. In addition to Dr. Deutsch's reports, FWCC considered various telemetry papers and publications pertaining to Brevard County: "Tagged Manatee Use of the Cocoa Beach/Thousand Island Area;" "Winter Movements and Use of Warm-water Refugia by Radio- tagged West Indian Manatees Along the Atlantic Coast of the United States;" and "Easton, Tagged Manatee Movement through the Canaveral Barge Canal, Brevard County Florida" (February 14, 1997). MANATEE SIGHTING DATA FWCC relied upon manatee sighting data in its evaluation of manatee inhabitation. Included in the sighting data was the Brevard County 2001 Rule Development and Trip Notes of February 6- 7, 2001; Sea Ray Boats, Inc. Water Test Re-Run Manatee Sighting Records for 2000-2001; Canaveral Barge Canal Boater Activity and Compliance Study; Sharon Tyson's Sykes Creek Observation Records; and cold-seasons sighting logs for the C-54 canal structure. STUDIES AND REPORTS PERTAINING TO MANATEE DISTRIBUTION, RELATIVE ABUNDANCE, HABITAT, BEHAVIOR, OR OTHER MANATEE INFORMATION. FWCC considered and relied upon the Brevard County Manatee Protection Plan that included an inventory and analysis section about manatees, analysis of manatee mortality data, manatee legislation and protection, law enforcement, habitat issues, existing boat facilities, Brevard County boating activity patterns, and an inventory of present manatee education programs. The existing Federal Manatee Recovery Plan, to which members of the Bureau of Protected Species and Florida Marine Research Institute contributed, was relied upon. SCAR CATALOG DATA FWCC considered and relied upon scar catalog data in evaluating manatee protection needs with Brevard County Misc. Information as the source provider. EXPERT OPINIONS FWCC relied upon expert opinions in evaluating manatee inhabitation. A staff meeting with manatee experts, as part of the process, included, but was not limited to, meetings with Jane Provancha and Sharon Tyson in December 2000, meetings and discussions with Dr. Charles Deutsch between November 2000 and May 2001, and various discussions with members of the federal Recovery Plan Team. OTHER AVAILABLE SITE-SPECIFIC INFORMATION FWCC considered site-specific information that was available, principally drafts of the Brevard County Manatee Protection Plan. FWCC also considered site-specific information about water skiing areas and prospective additional travel times in various waters proposed for new, or changed, regulations. DATA ANALYSIS Threat Analysis Rule 68C-22.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, contemplates a qualitative assessment and exercise of discretion by taking into consideration a balancing of manatee protection needs, including an assessment of relative threats to manatees, with the right of boaters, fishers and water skiers. In assessing where threats to manatees may exist from motorboats, the manatee death database provides information on confirmed interactions, such as locations where manatee carcasses have been recovered. Manatee deaths, carcass recovery and confirmed interactions locations are maintained in FMRI's database. From January 1974 to December 2000, 728 manatees died in Brevard County and 184 of those deaths were because of interactions with watercrafts. Watercraft related deaths account for 23.5 percent of all manatee deaths recorded in Brevard County between 1974 and 2000. Approximately 19 percent of all watercraft related deaths of manatees in Florida have occurred in Brevard County. FWCC has determined that manatee death from watercraft interaction is due to blunt trauma more than 50 percent of the time. Deaths from propeller cuts account for less than 50 percent. Often injury instead of immediate death from motorboat strikes is the case. Many manatees have scars from previous sub- lethal motorboat strikes, and manatees have been observed with more than 30 different strike patterns. Where the cause of death is classified as watercraft related, carcass recovery may or may not be where the collision occurred depending upon the acuteness of the injury at the time of collision. Acuteness of the injury, wind, current, tide, and decomposition all affect the location of the carcass at the time of salvage. Additionally, operation of motorboats can disrupt essential manatee behaviors such as warm water sheltering, feeding, sleeping, mating, and nursing. This harassment can lead to cold-related illnesses and increase mortality risk by driving manatees from warm water refuges. The increase in the Atlantic Coast manatee population and the increase of the number of boat registrations result in an increase in the threat of harmful collisions between boats and manatees. Geographic Scope of Threat Analysis Section 370.12(2)(m), Florida Statutes, does not specifically describe the geographic scope of the FWCC's evaluation of "other portions of state waters" for manatee sightings and assumed inhabitation on a periodic or continuous basis. Subsection 370.12(2)(g), Florida Statutes, suggests that the evaluation of manatee sightings is appropriate for large portions of navigable waterways, such as the Indian River between St. Lucie Inlet and Jupiter Inlet. A "waterway" is generally defined as "a navigable body of water." (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1333.) Rule 68C-22.001(3)(a)2.f., Florida Administrative Code, contemplates a qualitative assessment of the "likelihood of threat" to manatees. The only reference is to the "characteristics of the waterway in question." The rule does not mandate the geographic scope of a "threat evaluation." The FWCC analyzed various data on different scales depending upon the nature of the inquiry - the evaluation of sighting "frequency" generally considered a large geographical area such as a section of a river. Conversely, the regulatory alternatives to protect manatees were evaluated at a smaller or finer scale. The Commission also considered segments of waterways divided by causeways or natural barriers. The Commission considered research that divided Brevard County (north of Eau Gallie) into 12 zones for purposes of analysis. In the Brevard County Manatee Protection Plan, the waterways were analyzed in terms of seven "planning zones," to include review of physical characteristics such as bathymetry and sedimentological conditions, shoreline conditions, and water quality; Manatee Habitat Features, including sea grass, mangrove/salt marsh, freshwater sources, warm water refugia, calving and resting areas, feeding areas, travel corridors, and habitat protection; Manatee Data including manatee abundance and distribution and manatee mortality; boat facilities; boating activity patterns; waterspouts areas; and manatee zones. The Commission's consideration of waterway characteristics and manatee behavior during the Brevard County rule-making process, including the geographic scope of manatee inhabitation and threat from watercraft, was reasonable and consistent with the approach taken by other resource management agencies and researchers as contemplated by the statutory purpose. Proximity and Degree of Known Boating Activities FWCC evaluated available boating activity information in assessing threat. Staff considered the general analysis of boating activity and detailed analysis of boating activity in specific portions of Brevard County as provided in the County's MPP; included therein were maps that show locations of the County's 72 marinas and 65 boat ramps, of which 27 are public ramps. Also considered was the study of Brevard County-Wide Boating Activity by Dr. J. Morris, of the Morris of Florida Institute of Technology. Dr. Morris' inquiry resulted in the following specific finding. First, Brevard County residents are the primary ones who launch at boat ramps, followed by residents of Orange, Osecola, Seminole, Indian River and Volusia counties. Second, the Inter Costal Waterways experiences increases in transient traffic during late fall and winter months, including out-of-state boats. Third, Class One boats (16 to 25 feet) are the most observed type, followed by Class A (less than 16 feet) vessels. Fourth, most boating activity occurs during weekends. Fifth, the greatest concentrations of boats were in specific areas such as NASA causeway (SR 405, Indian River), East Canaveral Barge Canal, SR 520 and the Banana River (the Merritt Island Causeway), the Pineda Causeway (SR 404, Banana River), the Melbourne Causeway (Indian River), near Grant Island Farm, the Sebastian River and the Sebastian Inlet. Dr. Morris concluded that the boating public preferred to cruise the waters of the lagoons with the marked channels and use Indian and Banana Rivers as highways for recreational boating purposes. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) closed a portion of the northern Banana River within the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge to public boat entry, limiting public entry to wading or by non-motorized vessels. The closed area has one of the largest concentrations of manatees in the United States, and recently has been the most important springtime habitat for the east coast manatee population. As a result of the March 1990 closing to motorized boats, an average increase of manatee use observed during the summer months in the area increased by 60 percent. The increased use is attributed to improved habitat quality aided by the lack of human disturbance and reduced propeller scarring of sea grass. In December of 1994, Dr. Morris submitted a report, "An Investigation of Compliance to Boat Speed Regulations in Manatee Protection Zones in Brevard County, Florida." This report contained an analysis from on-water and aerial observations in both "slow speed" and "idle speed" zones in various areas of Brevard County for a one-year period of April 1993 to April 1994. At Mosquito Lagoon, of 1,214 boats observed, speeds were clocked for 98 percent of the boats and 11 percent of those exceeded the posted Inter Costal Waterways 30 MPH speed limit, all of which were recreational boats. At the Indian River site between Grant and Sebastian, 2,511 boats were observed, speeds were clocked for 97 percent of the boats and 16 percent of those exceeded the posted ICW 30 MPH speed limit. In posted "slow speed" zones outside the ICW channel, 25 percent of boats observed underway were deemed non- compliant with the speed zone limitation. Of those non-compliant Class A powerboats, the violators were typically personal watercrafts ("Jet Ski" type vessels.) A detailed boater activity study was made of the Canaveral Barge Canal and Sykes Creek Area. The study found, in part, that: highest boating use occurred during holidays, except during bad weather; most use occurred on weekends; and in Canaveral Barge Canal and Sykes Creek 63 percent of the vessels were Class 1 boats and 74.3 percent of the vessels were Class 2 or Class 3 boats. INCREASED LEVEL OF BOATING ACTIVITY IN BREVARD COUNTY In general, the level of boating activity in Brevard County continues to increase with the increasing population, launching facilities, and boat registrations in Brevard County and nearby counties, including Orange and Seminole counties. In 2000, 34,316 vessels were registered in Brevard County. In the preceding year there were 31,842 vessels registered. In 1995, 28,147 boats were registered and in 1987, 23,352 boats were registered in Brevard County. In 2000, Florida registered 840,684 recreational vessels, an increase over the 695,722 vessels registered in 1994. Boating accidents increased with the increased registration of vessels with Brevard County ranking 10th out of the state's 67 counties with the number of boating accidents. Brevard County, since mid-1990's, has registered an increased number of "flats skiffs" which are shallow draft, low profile motorboats capable of speeds up to 50-60 MPH while operating in shallow (about 1 foot) water and often used for sight-fishing in shallow sea grass flats. SEASONAL AND/OR YEAR-ROUND PATTERNS OF MANATEE USE AND THE NUMBER OF MANATEES KNOWN OR ASSUMED TO OCCUR IN, OR SEASONALLY USE THE AREA FWCC staff evaluated whether seasonal restrictions could or would be effective. Staff concluded that the only seasonal regulation of motorboats justifiable by the data was at the power plant discharges in the Indian River. At those locations, extreme concentrations of manatees are regular during the cold season. Year-round manatee protections were proposed for this area, but they would have to be more restrictive during the winter months. During the coldest periods of winter, following a strong cold front, manatees have been observed in large concentrations in: the power plant discharges at Florida Power and Light Company's Indian River plant and at the adjacent Reliant Energy Plant and the Sebastian River Canal. The congregation of manatees at thermal refuges on cold winter days was not for the duration of the winter season. They have been known to leave the thermal refuge for a part of a day, a day, or for many days at a time. Sharon Tyson, observer, performed a detailed Brevard County Manatee Photo-Identification Project during late 1999 and early 2000 at the Brevard County power plants, and documented a number of manatees in the FPL discharge zone between December 24, 1999, and March 4, 2000. During that period the number of manatees in the zone varied greatly, through late-December to mid-January (from 7 to 57 manatees). On January 16, 2000, no manatees were present. On January 17, 2000, 10 manatees were present. On January 23, 2000, 29 manatees were counted. Two weeks later, February 6, 2000, 111 manatees were present. Similar sightings made at the C-54 Canal Structure (near Sebastian Creek), during the same time-period, found as few as 11 manatees to as many as 90 manatees. Apart from the extreme concentration of manatees during extremely cold periods, manatees are distributed through the county waterways during each season of the year. The 1997-1999 Brevard County Aerial Survey GIS Plots gave a clear representation of year-round manatee distribution patterns varying greatly. MANATEE MORTALITY TRENDS WITHIN THE AREA Only in rare cases is the approximate or actual location of a manatee and motorboat collision known. The FWCC considered and relied upon a review of the general trend of watercraft-related (and other) mortality County-wide to assess a generalized increased mortality trend. In doing so as part of the rule-making process, FWCC reviewed total manatee mortality for Brevard County for the period for which records existed from 1974 to 2000. That data base source indicated increasing watercraft mortality in recent years. FWCC evaluated manatee salvage data for January-March 2001 and preliminary information for April-May 2001. Staff employee, Scott Calleson's working file mortality information was reviewed and considered as was Dr. Ackerman's "Mortality Rates White Paper," which concluded that human-caused manatee mortality levels were at an unsustainable rate in the Atlantic, Brevard County, Tampa Bay, and Southwest Florida Regions. The Florida Inland Navigation District provided documentation that was considered in the FWCC rule making that included a regional evaluation of "Watercraft Related Manatee Deaths in the Nine Critical Counties of FIND" from 1990-1999. Of these nine critical east coast counties, Brevard County had the highest mortality trend. During the last two-to-three years, there has not been a clear trend of increased manatee mortality in Brevard County, but the number of watercraft-related mortalities is capable of being reduced, in part, through improved regulations. Historical manatee mortality data for Brevard County from 1977 through 2000 demonstrates a clearly increasing trend in watercraft-related manatee mortality. For each five-year increment, water-related manatee mortality has increased as follows: from 1977-1979 there were an average of 1.9 water-related mortalities/year; 1980-1985 there were 4.6 mortalities/year; 1986-1990 there were 7 mortalities/year; 1991-1995 there were 8.8 mortalities/year; and 1996-2000 there were 11.8 mortalities/year. EXISTENCE OF FEATURES WITHIN THE AREA THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF, OR KNOWN TO ATTRACT, MANATEES SUCH AS SEAGRASSES, FAVORABLE WATER DEPTHS, AND FRESH OR WARM WATER SOURCES Dr. Deutsch stated that his telemetry analysis indicated that the most important habitat correlation for Brevard County manatees was with sea grass, and in particular, often with outer edge of sea grass beds. Manatees prefer feeding on submerged, emergent and floating vegetation, generally in that order. Manatees extensively use Brevard County sea grass beds for feeding. Sea grass coverage is depicted on the Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Boater's Guide to Brevard County, which has no date, but was prepared by the DEP. Sea grass coverage in 1989 is depicted in the 2000 maps prepared by the STMC, using the Atlas of Marine Resources, Versions 1.2 and 1.3b. The most recent St. Johns River Water Management District sea grass coverage data for the Indian River Lagoon indicates a strong correlation between sea grass coverage in waters with an average depth of 66.93 inches (1.7 meters) or less. As of 1992, of the estimated 46.190 acres of sea grass in Brevard County, nine percent of the sea grass suffered light scarring from boat activity; 4.2 percent of the sea grass suffered moderate scarring; and 13.4 percent of the sea grass suffered severe scarring. Areas with boat scarring of sea grass included a number of areas that are included within proposed "slow speed" zones: the eastern portion of Turnbill Basin; the eastern shoreline of the Indian River between the NASA railroad bridge and Rinkers Canal; the Banana River around Manatee Cove and south of the City Golf Course; the northwest part of Newfound Harbor; and the western shoreline of the Banana River, between Newfound Harbor and Pineda Causeway. The location of the proposed manatee protection zones corresponds well to the location of sea grass beds, deeper waters and channels adjacent to sea grass beds or established migratory routes, and fresh warm water sources. FAVORABLE WATER DEPTHS Dr. Deutsch stated that his telemetry analysis indicated that bathymetry is an important habitat correlate for Brevard County. Generally, tagged manatees were observed in the area from a two-meter (6.65 feet) depth contour to the shoreline. FWCC consideration of "favorable water depths" took into account the fact that water levels fluctuate in the Indian River Lagoon. However, unlike many coastal areas of Florida, the Indian River Lagoon does not experience significant daily tidal fluctuation. On an annual basis, however, the water level fluctuates about 2.5 to 3 feet in response to environmental conditions. It was determined to be impractical to amend manatee protection rules (and to move regulatory signs implementing the rules) in response to changing water levels. Manatees usually swim between one to three meters (3.28 to 9.84 feet) below the surface, surfacing every few minutes to breathe, and typically feed at just below the surface to a depth of three meters. Manatee experts, including persons with extensive experience observing manatee behavior in Brevard County, all testified that manatees used areas where the water level at the time was less than three feet for mating, feeding, fleeing a pack of male manatees, and resting. The FWCC used a bathymetric survey prepared on behalf of the St. Johns River Water Management District for purposes of establishing preferred sea grass habitats during the rule-making and considered the bathymetry in conjunction with other data to predict areas where manatees are likely to inhabit. The St. Johns District advised the FWCC staff that the 1.7-meter depth on its bathymetric survey was the rough depth limit for sea grass, and provided the FWCC staff with a GIS file on the bathymetric survey at 0.3-meter depth intervals for most areas, although the approximate sea grass contour was shown as 1.5 to 1.7 meters. Surveys are tied to a horizontal datum and a vertical datum. A survey depicts the three-dimensional lagoon basin, part of the spheroid planet Earth, on a two-dimensional map. The hydrographic survey data used by the FWCC in the rule-making was based upon a survey tied to a horizontal datum - North American Datum (NAD) 83/90; and a vertical datum - North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD-88). The horizontal and vertical accuracy of the survey differs. Positional accuracy of horizontal (e.g. shorelines) points is within 1 to 5 meters (3.28 to 16.4 feet). Vertical accuracy of depth data points averages within .03 feet. The hydrographic survey states that it is not to be used for navigation - - "The use of NAVD-88 for the bathymetric survey gives the impression of deeper water than is actually present within the lagoon since the "0" contour of NAVD-88 is located on dry land approximately 1 foot above the ordinary water line." Manatee distribution from aerial surveys and 1992 bathymetry data was graphically depicted by the STMC and confirms manatee use of areas proposed for regulation in the proposed rules. FRESH WATER SOURCES FWCC considered and relied upon major fresh water sources that have been historically used by manatees such as: Turnbull Creek; Titusville Marina/POTW; Addison Canal; the two Indian River power plants; two wells along the eastern shoreline of the Indian River approximately two miles south of Rinkers Canal; the intersection of Bacardi and Dakar Drive in Sykes Creek; the Cape Canaveral POTW (sewer plant); the Banana River Marina; the outfall into the Indian River from the east shore of Merritt Island westerly of the south end of Newfound Harbor; the Indian River Isles; the Eau Gallie River; Crane Creek; Turkey Creek; and the Sebastian River. Also considered were less significant sources of fresh water found at many marina basins, at the Sear Ray Boats, Inc. facilities and in residential canals. WARM WATER SOURCES FWCC considered major warm water sources in the two Indian River power plants and the Sebastian River Canal. Minor sources of warm water include deeper water and areas with artesian springs such as: Port Canaveral; a basin off Wynar Street in Sykes Creek; the Banana River Marina; and the Berkeley Canals. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATERWAY IN QUESTION IN RELATION TO KNOWN BOATING ACTIVITY PATTERNS FWCC considered, as its basic source document, Morris' Final Report for Brevard County Boating Activity Study. Boating activity patterns in Brevard County are dependent upon weather, economic conditions, and other factors. Larger motorboats (including tug/barge combinations) are constrained in movement to deeper water--in some areas, primarily within marked or maintained navigation channels including the Canaveral Locks, Canaveral Barge Canal, ICW, and Banana River main channel. In the Indian River, south of the NASA railroad bridge, the deeper area outside of the marked channel widens to between half-a-mile to a mile with depths ranging from seven to 12 feet MLLW, all the way to Rock Point, just north of Grant. For most of the length of the County, larger boats have sufficient water depth to travel adjacent to the ICW channel. Waters outside the main channel in the Banana River are relatively shallow. The Canaveral Barge Canal is dredged to maintain a depth of approximately 15 feet. Barges and escorting tugs navigate through the Canaveral Locks and into the ICW. Some barges proceed northward from the Canaveral Locks into the Banana River channel to make deliveries to the Space Center, according to the Lockmaster, Mr. Querry. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.'s, design and production facilities located along the Canaveral Barge Canal use the Canal to access testing areas to the west in the Indian River ICW, to the east in the Banana River channel, and in the Atlantic Ocean. Limited retests are permitted in an area adjacent to the Canaveral Barge Canal facilities. Recreational motorboats and personal watercrafts can be operated outside of marked channels. Some of these recreational motorboats can navigate "on plane" and up to 60 MPH in water about one-foot deep. Motorboat users engage in a variety of activities having differing operational patterns. Fishers might prefer to travel at relatively high speed enroute to preferred fishing areas, and then operate with a push pole, trolling motor or adrift, in order to hunt certain species of fish. If no fish are located, then high-speed operation to another spot is used, repeating the pattern of locating fish by sight. Water-skiers usually operate at high speed in a relatively small area, usually protected from the wind, and often located near an island or park. BOAT-MANATEE INTERACTIONS FWCC considered that manatees display varying reactions to motorboats. Higher speed motorboat operation in relatively shallow water presents a greater threat to manatees than operation at slow speed or idle speed or than operation in relatively deeper waters, since manatees have fewer opportunities to avoid the collision. Manatees can swim or rest at the surface or underwater and must come to the surface to breathe air every two to three minutes for smaller, active manatees and up to 20 minutes for large, resting manatees. Their general cruising speed is two to six miles per hour, but they can travel at short bursts up to 15 MPH. Boats operated at "slow speed" vary in miles-per-hour over the bottom within a range of about seven to eight miles-per- hour. At "slow speed," the manatee and vessel operator have more time to avoid collision, or the manatee can avoid serious blunt trauma injury from collisions with most vessels. The ability of manatees to avoid being hit by motorboats has diminished in Brevard County as a result of an increase in the manatee population, increase of motorboats, increase in boating access points, and development and use of faster boats that operate in less-predicable (non-linear) patterns in relatively shallow waters where manatees often feed on submerged vegetation. TESTIMONY REGARDING MOTORBOAT-MANATEE INTERACTION Officer Dennis Harrah, qualified as expert in boating safety, marine law enforcement, and local knowledge of the waterways of Brevard County, testified that "slow speed" zones provide greater reaction time for the vessel operator to avoid collision than unrestricted speed areas and than the "25 MPH maximum speed" areas. He further testified that "idle speed" zones provide greater reaction time for vessel operators to avoid collision than "slow speed" areas. Dr. John Reynolds, qualified as expert in marine mammal conservation and policy, manatee biology and behavioral ecology of marine mammals, opined, based on frequent observation of motorboat-manatee interactions, review of videotapes of such interactions, and review of studies on the subject, that there is an increased threat to manatees associated with boats that operate in planing speeds as opposed to slow speeds. His opinion is based, in part, on "common sense" that objects moving faster have greater momentum and therefore greater magnitude of impact, and on the reduced reaction time of both vessel operators and manatees to avoid collision. Dr. Reynolds was not aware of any evidence to suggest that the majority of watercraft strikes to manatees are from vessels operating at "slow speed," and it is his belief that "a good percentage of manatee mortality was from fast-moving vessels." Ms. Spellman, qualified as expert in marine biology and in manatee rescue and salvage, testified that she had observed considerable variability in manatees' reactions to kayaks, canoes and windsurfers, including manatees approaching the vessel, manatees not reacting at all, and manatees swimming away. She has observed manatee reactions to small motorboats as highly variant, depending upon the animal, including: swimming under a slow-moving motorboat, moving just as a motorboat approaches at idle speed, or diving and leaving the area as soon as a motorboat got anywhere near. Ms. Spellman testified, based upon her presence in the waters of the Canaveral Barge Canal or in the Port east of the Locks, that she has been in the water with manatees on five occasions when a barge/tug combination came by and in all cases the manatees reacted to the barge well in advance of the barge coming near her and the manatee, and that in each instance the manatee swam to within 15 to 20 feet of the shoreline. Of the thousands of times that she has seen manatees, she estimated that 95 percent of the time the manatees had scars from boat propellers or skegs. Dr. Powell testified, based upon over 30 years of observation of boat-manatee interactions, that the typical reaction is a flight or startle response, often to dive to deeper water. The diving response may take the manatee under the boat, away from the boat, or across the path of the boat. Based on his observations, including manatees reacting to motorboats moving at "idle-speed," "slow-speed" and at "faster-speeds," Dr. Powell opined that the manatees' reactions resulted from acoustical cues, visual cues, and perhaps pressure cues. Captain Singley, tugboat operator in Brevard County for over 30 years, observed a group of manatees react to a fast moving planing hull; some animals broke the surface, others scattered to the right or left, and others dove to the bottom. Mr. Walden, Sea Ray's Boat, Inc.'s, performance and water test specialist, testified that he had observed manatees in the Barge Canal, and sometimes the manatees would react to the motorboat. The majority of time when the boat was operating at planing speed or faster the manatee would dive and go deeper, and would began evasive action, upon hearing and noticing the motorboat a couple of hundred feet away. Dr. Gerstein testified that fast moving boats can hit manatees and that he was not aware of any physical evidence, eye- witness account, or law enforcement report of a slow-moving boat hitting a manatee. STUDIES ABOUT MOTORBOAT-MANATEE INTERACTION KNOWN BOAT STRIKES FWCC considered that watercraft collisions with manatees are rarely reported to authorities, and, as a result, it is difficult to directly assess the circumstances of such collisions, such as boat size, type and speed at the time of collision. A summary entitled "Watercraft-related Manatee Deaths Where the Responsible Vessel is Known," indicates that barges, displacement hull vessels, and planing hull vessels are known to have been in fatal collisions with manatees. In those planing- hull incidents where the vessels and estimated speed are known, the speed of the vessel ranged from getting-up-on-plane (45-foot boat with twin 425 HP outboard motors) to 35 MPH (18-foot boat with 150 outboard motor). Two other incidents were a 46-foot boat with twin inboard motors operating at 18 knots and a 20- foot boat with 200 HP outboard operating at 20 MPH. The only indication that a slow-moving planing-hull vessel struck a manatee is a report from an individual who was operating at estimated five MPH in a flat hull vessel and reported to have "felt a bump on aft hull, saw two animals (manatees) swam off." PROTECTION OF MANATEE-SEA GRASS HABITAT FWCC considered protection of sea grass habitat a secondary purpose in the Proposed Rule for areas subject to Section 370.12(2)(m), Florida Statutes. The Florida Guide To Recreational Boating notes that: Sea grass beds have been severely scarred (torn up) by boats operated in extremely shallow water. This is due, in part, to the "flats fishing craze" and the rising popularity of vessels designed to operate in shallow water. The Guide recommends that operators set the boat's drive unit at the highest possible setting and that the operator "proceed at idle speed when moving through shallow grass beds." Dr. Reynolds testified that "idle speed" or "slow speed" shoreline buffer zones provide greater sea grass protection (and manatee conservation) than higher motorboat speeds. The Executive Director of the Indian River Guides Association testified that the group is promoting "pole and troll" areas within the Merritt Island National Wildlife refuge portions of the Indian River Lagoon. He stated that many people from Orlando and elsewhere bring their boats by trailers to Brevard County, or move to Brevard County, and operate their boats so as to tear up seagrass beds. FWCC correctly concluded that "slow speed" and "idle speed" zones provide a greater measure of protection to shallow seagrass beds than do higher speeds for motorboats. DATA SOURCES CONSIDERED BY FWCC IN PROMULGATING THE PROPOSED RULE Differing Opinions About Manatee Protection Areas FWCC's Opinion The FWCC, based on the following, took the position that the proposed rules are more likely to protect manatees from motorboat impacts than the existing rules, and that the proposed rules take advantage of the available science of manatee biology and conservation, using the same basic approach used in manatee conservation by officials in Australia to protect dugongs (another Sirenian) from motorboats. The FWCC postulates that "idle speed" and "slow speed" zones provide greater protection to manatees than do higher motorboat speeds. "Maximum 25 MPH" speed zones in deeper water areas provide greater manatee protection than do unregulated waters. Most motorboats observed operating in unregulated areas (outside "slow speed" or "idle speed" zones) in Brevard County, during Dr. Morris' boating compliance study, were operating at or below 25 MPH. The FWCC correctly concludes that "maximum 25 MPH" speed was reasonable in light of research into the minimum planing speed of most recreational motorboat models, the observations of typical motorboat speed and operation in unregulated waters of Brevard County. The FWCC considered 1997 DEP-solicited information from motorboat manufacturers to determine minimum planing speeds and maximum planing speeds, and draft on- and off-plane for various sizes and types of motorboats. Considered also by the FWCC was boating test literature to determine that most boat models could reach planing speed at or slightly below 25 MPH. The FWCC considered information that was submitted showing that many production boats reached planing speed between 20-25 MPH. For example, Scout Boats' 11 models planed between 20- 25 MPH, and Shamrock's 13 models planed between 20-25 MPH. The Florida Marine Research Institute's 1992 information on this topic found a range of minimum planing speed between 14 and 24 MPH. Motorboats operating at speeds higher than 25 MPH are many. Ranger Boats offered several models with maximum speed in the "upper 60's" to "low 70's"; Scout Boats' models had top speeds of 35-60 MPH; Shamrock's models ran at the top end between 36-41 MPH; Donzi Boats operate at speeds in the 70 MPH range; and Bayliner's Capri 1700LS had a top speed of 46 MPH, as did Stingray's 180RS. Since the FWCC's creation, speed zone rules adopted for Lee County included maximum 25 MPH zones. Rule 68C-22.005, Florida Administrative Code for Brevard County has regulated motorboats with a "maximum 25 MPH" speed in channels. Commission staff applied their professional judgment in developing recommendations on manatee protection areas, and presented those recommendations to the FWCC, who considered staff recommendation, in context with public comment, to determine what manatee protections were warranted. PETITIONERS' OPINIONS The various Petitioners advocate manatee protection zones that, in many cases, are similar to the FWCC's proposed rules, including "slow speed" shoreline buffer zones and "maximum 25 MPH channels." Petitioners' challenge to many of the protection zones alleges that FWCC's basic regulatory mechanisms are flawed. FEDERAL LAWSUIT-SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT On or about January 13, 2000, STMC and other related environmental groups filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court against Alan Egbert as Executive Director of the FWCC. The suit alleged, inter alia, that the FWCC is in violation of the Endangered Species Act by permitting the unauthorized taking of manatees in the State of Florida. During the pendency of the litigation, FWCC engaged in a series of mediations resulting in a settlement agreement approved by FWCC and executed by the parties in April 2001. The agreement contained a series of maps with draft manatee (speed) zones for Brevard County. Petitioners alleged that "the genesis of the Proposed Rule is this settlement agreement reached in the Egbert case, and there is a definite connection between the language of the Proposed Rule being challenged and the settlement agreement." Petitioners' speculative conclusion regarding this suit was tendered without one iota of evidence. Mr. Calleson, FWCC's staff employee, acknowledged that portions of existing speed zones and proposed speed zones in maps resulting from the federal mediation process contained a "lot of similarities" with speed zones in maps of the proposed rule. Mr. Calleson acknowledged that the FWCC did not direct staff to conduct negotiated rule-making on the proposed rule, and staff participation in the federal mediation process was not a negotiated rule-making process pursuant to Section 120.54(2), Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part: (d)1. An agency may use negotiated rulemaking in developing and adopting rules. The agency should consider the use of negotiated rulemaking when complex rules are being drafted or strong opposition to the rules is anticipated. The agency should consider, but is not limited to considering, whether a balanced committee of interested persons who will negotiate in good faith can be assembled, whether the agency is willing to support the work of the negotiating committee, and whether the agency can use the group consensus as the basis for its proposed rule. Negotiated rulemaking uses a committee of designated representatives to draft a mutually acceptable proposed rule. * * * 3. The agency's decision to use negotiated rulemaking, its selection of the representative groups, and approval or denial of an application to participate in the negotiated rulemaking process are not agency action. Nothing in this subparagraph is intended to affect the rights of an affected person to challenge a proposed rule developed under this paragraph in accordance with s. 120.56(2). THOMAS MCGILL PETITIONERS Most of the McGill Petitioners support the adoption of rules that are consistent with the Citizens for Florida Waterway, Inc. (CFW), proposal submitted on December 29, 2000. The CFW proposal endorsed the use of "slow speed" zones, the use of "maximum 25 MPH zones," existing power plants "idle speed" and "motorboat prohibited" zones, and the use of shoreline buffers. The CFW proposal differed from the proposed rules primarily in scope of the proposed zones, rather than the nature of the proposed zones. The CFW proposal recommended numerous 25 MPH channels (in marked channels) through protected areas: from the Canaveral Locks through the Canaveral Barge Canal to the Indian River (except for three slow-speed boating safety zones); in North Sykes Creek; in the Banana River north of State Road 528 and between Bicentennial Park to the State Road 520 Relief Bridge. STANDING WATCH, INC. Stowell Robertson, one co-Petitioner of Standing Watch, Inc., is Executive Director of the Indian River Guides Association, Inc. (Guides). Mr. Robertson wrote the Guides' Recommendations, but his personal recommendation differed in two respects: in the North Indian River between NASA railroad bridge and the State Road 405 bridge, he would establish a "slow speed" zone from the western shoreline out to 500 feet (instead of 300); and he would impose a maximum 25 MPH speed in the Canaveral Barge Canal instead of 20 MPH. The Guides recommended that motorboat speed and operation be limited as follow: Mosquito Lagoon-make no changes to existing rule Turnbull Basin, North Indian River Create two "slow speed" zones in Turnbull - one in the Mimms Scottsmoor Canal, another from Jones Road boat ramp to Little Flounder Creek from the shore to 100 feet into the Basin; Set a new "slow speed" zone on the north side of the NASA railroad causeway and bridge out to 250 feet; Set a maximum 25 MPH in the ICW from Haulover Canal to the NASA railroad bridge; Take no further action [to change regulations]. Indian River, NASA railroad bridge to S.R. 402 Place "slow speed" zones on the south side of the NASA railroad bridge and causeway out to 250 feet; Reduce the [existing] west shoreline "slow speed" zone so that the western boundary is 350 feet from the ICW between markers R2 and G1; Set a maximum 25 MPH in the ICW; Take no further action [to change regulations] Indian River, State Road 406 to State Road 402 (1) and (2) Replace eastern "slow speed" zone with reduced "slow speed" zone extending from Peacock's Pocket to the existing "slow speed zone north of the State Road 405 Causeway, extending from shore to 250 feet west of the sand bar/drop off or three feet of water; Reduce the size of the "slow speed" zone north of State Road 405 Causeway to 300 feet; Reduce the size of the existing western shoreline "slow speed" zone to 500 feet from shoreline; Take no further action [to change regulations]. Indian River, State Road 405 to State Road 528 Bridge Close the warm water refuge sites at the power plants to manatees, not to boats; Deliver fuel to the power plants by land; Reduce the existing "slow speed" zone on the western shoreline to 1,000 feet from the shore; Take no further action [to change regulations]. Canaveral Barge (and Banana River to Locks) Maximum 20 MPH channel from Indian River to entrance to Canaveral Locks with "slow speed" zones at 100 feet either side of State Road 3 bridge, Sea Ray docks, Harbor Square Marina; Take no further action (to change regulations). Banana River (1) (2) All waters of Banana River, including channels, not otherwise regulated at "slow speed" should have 25 MPH limit; Reduce all existing "slow speed" zones along east and west shorelines, causeways, and bridges to 500 feet of shore; Retain existing "slow speed" zones in the two channels into "Long Point"[north and south ends of Canaveral Sewer Plant area]; Take no further actions [to change regulations]. Newfound Harbor (1) (2) All waters of Newfound Harbor, including channels, not otherwise regulated at "slow speed" should have a 25 PMH daytime limit and 20 MPH nighttime limit; Establish a "slow speed" zone along western shoreline from State Road 520 south to Two Islands; Establish a "slow speed" zone along eastern shoreline from State Road 520 south to the inside point north of Buck Point; The east and west "slow speed" zones be 500 feet from shorelines, and 200 feet[along northern shore] from S.R. 520; Take no further action. Sykes Creek North State Road 520 Set speed limit in marked channel at 20 MPH; All residential canals should be "slow speed"; Take no further action. Indian River State Road 528 to State Road 520 Establish 500 foot "slow speed" zones along western and eastern shorelines and 200 feet from causeways and bridges; Take no further action. Indian River State Road 520 to State Road 404 Establish 500 foot "slow speed" zones along western and eastern shorelines and 200 feet from causeway bridges; Take no further action. Indian River State Road 404 to State Road 518 Establish 500 foot "slow speed" zones along western and eastern shorelines and 200 feet from causeways and bridges; Take no further action. Indian River State Road 518 to State Road 192 Establish 500 foot "slow speed" zones along western and eastern shorelines and 200 feet from causeways and bridges; Establish Eau Gallie River "slow speed" zone with 20 MPH speed limit in marked channel daytime only, "slow speed" at night; Take no further action. Indian River (1) Establish 500 foot "slow speed" zones along western and eastern shorelines and 200 feet from causeways and bridges; (2)-(5) Crane Creek, Turkey Creek, St. Sebastian River, C-54 canal should be "slow speed"; Take no further action. Mr. James Kalvin, Standing Watch co-Petitioner and also President of Standing Watch, Inc., testified at deposition that neither he, nor the corporation, had any objection to the existing Brevard County manatee protection rules. SPECIFIC PROPOSED ZONES CHALLENGED The Petitioners' Challenge All Petitioners challenged the validity of Proposed Rule 68C-22.006, as "an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" as that phrase is defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes. MCGILL PETITIONERS The McGill Petitioners challenged the proposed rule amendment for Brevard County manatee protection areas, Proposed Rule 68C-22.006 (2)(d)2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. They allege that additional slow speed zones in Brevard County are invalid because the FWCC exceeded the authority granted in Section 370.12(2), Florida Statutes. McGill Petitioners based their allegations on the FWCC's lack of definable principles or data and an erroneously assumed cause-effect relationship for boat-manatee collisions, failure by the FWCC to consider the hearing limitations and capabilities of manatees in their environment, and a failure by the FWCC to employ standards and definitions for critical terms in its rule promulgation. At the final hearing, McGill Petitioners agreed that they do not object to that portion of Proposed Rule 68C- 22.006(2)(d)15 that reduces the width of the slow-speed zone in the Banana River between State Road 528 and State Road 520 causeways. Petitioners do, in fact, object to removal of the 25 MPH exemption for residential channels. The McGill Petitioners' position as set forth in their Prehearing Stipulation states: The Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission has exercised unbridled discretion and acted beyond the authority delegated in 370.12(2)(m), Florida Statutes, and has developed the proposed rule in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The proposed rule exceeds the delegated legislative authority because it is not based on scientifically definable principles or data. By failing to understand the root cause of watercraft mortality such as the manatee's inability to hear slow moving vessels, the Commission cannot deem their actions "necessary" to justify imposing speed restrictions as required by Section 370.12(2)(m), Florida Statutes. The Commission continues to impose speed motorboat restrictions even after finding that such restrictions are ineffective at preventing manatee mortality. The Commission relies on a flawed mortality database, a poor understanding of the limitations and applicability of satellite telemetry data, and lack of standards and definitions for critical terms. [emphasis added] The McGill Petitioners' Amended Petition alleged in paragraph 6: The Commission has not employed the best available science or even reasonable science. . . . aerial survey and telemetry data were misapplied. . . . in that areas that did not reflect frequent usage . . . were designated . . . slow speed zones. Also, the use of inaccurate telemetry tracking information was used as the basis for justifying areas where aerial survey data showed no manatee activity. . . . In support of their alleged inaccuracy of the satellite telemetry data, Petitioners presented the testimony of Mr. Dvorak and his Power-point Presentation of Aerial Survey Mortality, Telemetry and Bathymetry Assessment, and other technical papers. Mr. Dvorak did not include in his presentation/analysis survey data available on the Atlas or Marine Resources and did not include all telemetry data available from the United States Geological Survey, which was included in Dr. Deutsch's analysis presented for Respondent, FWCC. The Amended McGill Petition, paragraphs 10 and 12, stated: The McGill Petitioners advised the FWCC that creation of new "slow speed" zones was based upon incorrect assumption "that such slow speed zones alleviate collisions between vessels and manatee" and they suggested that "slow moving vessels are responsible for the majority of documented manatee collisions." McGill Petitioners' evidence proffered to demonstrate that "slow moving vessels are responsible for the majority of documented manatee collisions," consisted of inclusive studies and undocumented theories to demonstrate that slow speed zones do not alleviate collisions between vessels and manatees. FWCC considered an abundance of the best evidence of known or suspected collisions between vessels and manatees that demonstrated that "fast moving motorboats" are a known major source of manatee- vessel collisions. The McGill Petitioners further stated in paragraph 11 that: The rule does not consider the acoustic realities of the manatee's hearing limitations and its environment. McGill Petitioners presented the testimony of Dr. Edmund Gerstein regarding his measurements of the manatees' ability to hear noises. Dr. Gerstein concluded from his research that manatees have difficulty hearing and locating low-frequency sounds (below 400Hz), and they have difficulty detecting sounds of any frequency when it is not sufficiently louder than the ambient noise level. The testimony of Dr. Joseph Blue was given in support of the McGill Petitioners' position that low-frequency sounds are quickly attenuated in shallow water because of the Lloyd Mirror effect. Upon this foundation, Dr. Blue testified that since sound is shadowed ahead of the barge(s), the tugs that push the fuel oil barges between Prot Canaveral and the power plants on the Indian River emit low-frequency sound that is shadowed in the forward direction by the barge(s) and it would be undetectable to animals. Thus, the McGill Petitioners' witnesses concluded that there are acoustic consequences associated with slowing down boats. According to Dr. Gerstein, requiring motor boats to travel a slow speed deprives manatees of acoustic information they can use to detect, localize, and avoid boats. It is this "science of acoustics" Petitioners alleged that the FWCC gave no weight in promulgating the proposed rule. The FWCC considered the issues raised by acoustic studies. The FWCC's Executive Director was advised on the subject by the Manatee Technical Advisory Committee (MATC) whose recommendation resulted from a workshop on acoustic research and technology with presentations of the work of Drs. Gerstein and Blue. No reliable scientific sources, professional literature, expert opinions, and direct observations of manatee reactions to motorboats, supports the proposition of Drs. Gerstein and Blue that manatees cannot hear slow-moving motorboats. The FWCC rejected the studies of Drs. Gerstein and Blue. McGill Petitioners' alleged in paragraphs 3, 4, 13, and 14, of their Amended Petition that the FWCC did not provide a reasonable opportunity for and ignored much of the public's input. In their Prehearing Stipulation, the McGill Petitioners' acknowledgement of public hearings held by FWCC and the opportunity for pubic input during those hearings. There is an abundance of evidence in the record that demonstrates that the FWCC staff held non-mandatory pre-rule development meetings with interested persons, including some of the McGill Petitioners. The Staff held two rule development workshops in Brevard County. Staff held a public hearing specifically on the Proposed Rules in Brevard County. Staff considered the rule adoption at many hours of public hearings on three different dates and locations. Staff mailed special notices regarding the Proposed Rules to all identified waterfront property owners of whom many are the McGill Petitioners, and Staff mailed a series of survey documents to identified boaters and businesses in conjunction with the preparation of a statement of estimated regulatory cost. (CSERC) In paragraphs 7 and 9 of their Amended Petition, the McGill Petitioners alleged that the FWCC entered into a Negotiated Rule-Making Process with litigants to the exclusion of a balanced committee in violation of 120.54(2)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Section 120.54(2)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes an agency to engage in development of a "preliminary text" or "preliminary draft" of proposed rules prior to the publication of a notice of rule development. Preliminary maps of amendments to the BCMPR were similar to maps being discussed as part of the federal mediation. This fact alone is not a basis to conclude violation of the above-cited statutes. A second rule development workshop was noticed to discuss a preliminary copy of the Staff's "zone configuration" being considered. Subsequent to the second workshop, the FWCC authorized publication of Notice of Proposed Rule-making that incorporated changes to the preliminary draft maps that were discussed at the workshop. The McGill Petitioners, during the hearing, agreed that they do not object to that portion of Proposed Rule 68C-22.006(2)(d)15 that reduces the width of the slow-speed zone in the Banana River between State Road 528 and State Road 520 causeways. Petitioners do, in fact, object to removal of the 25 MPH exemption for residential channels. Petitioners offered no testimony in support of this allegation, choosing rather to adopt the evidence and position proffered by Standing Watch, Inc., herein below addressed. In paragraphs 5 and 15 of their Amended Petition, the McGill Petitioners alleged that the Commission did not properly address the consideration of lower cost regulatory alternatives. The "lower cost regulatory alternatives" submitted by McGill, Pritchard and Dvorak were considered and were discussed in the draft SERC. The draft SERC gave reasons for the rejection of each of the proposed "lower cost regulator alternatives," primarily because none would substantially accomplish the objectives of the law being implemented. The SERC was finalized, as required by Sections 120.541(1)(a) and (c); and 120.56(2)(b), Florida Statutes, before filing for adoption with the Secretary of State. In paragraph 17 of their Amended Petition, the McGill Petitioners alleged that the FWCC failed to employ metrics or standards that could be used to validate the effectiveness of both proposed and existing rules, in rule promulgation, and that without the use of metrics, the FWCC had no way to determine and verify that speed zones they propose are necessary to protect harmful collisions with motorboats. The McGill Petitioners proffered no evidence of specific "metrics or standards" that would validate the effectiveness of the existing and or the proposed rule they contend the FWCC could have or should have used in the Proposed Rule development. The FWCC relied upon the best available and reliable information in its rule-making, including opinions of experts. To the information available to it, the FWCC applied its professional judgment, gave consideration to public comments/concerns provided during public meetings, and considered the estimated regulatory costs and other applicable rule-making requirements. In paragraph 18 of their Amended Petition, the McGill Petitioners alleged that the FWCC repeatedly ignored requests to sub classify watercraft-related mortalities in order to properly identify appropriate corrective action. The FWCC considered all available data regarding manatee injury and death resulting from the speed of motor boats and rejected Petitioner's contention that boat size, large boats such as tugs and barges, were more dangerous to manatees than smaller and faster motorboats. Sea Ray Boat, Inc. Petitioner, Sea Ray Boats, Inc., challenged only Proposed Rule 68C-22.006(2)(d)(11) that modifies the existing manatee protection speed zones in the Canaveral Barge Canal (that is 200 feet wide with a 125-foot navigation channel maintained at a depth of 12.5 feet) such that the entire Canal will now be designated a "slow speed" zone. Sea Ray does not argue that the FWCC did not consider all available information or that FWCC's consideration of the information was not complete. Sea Ray's position is, were one to consider the information presented to the FWCC, as balanced against the federal lawsuit filed by Save the Manatee Club, Inc., the challenged Proposed Rule is the result of the latter not the former and, therefore, is an invalid delegation of legislative authority. Sea Ray alleges that the FWCC did not analyze nor address the adequacy of the existing rule and speed zones in effect in the Canaveral Barge Canal. Sea Ray alleged that the FWCC did not consider the alternative (with weekend boating increases over weekdays) whether the risk to manatees would be reduced by "restricting slow speed zones in the channel to weekend and holidays." Sea Ray alleged that the FWCC failed to apply "properly" the mandatory balancing test of the impact of the proposed rule on the rights of commercial and recreational boaters. Section 370.12(2)(j), Florida Statutes. Sea Ray argues that the FWCC's consideration of information in formulating the Proposed Rule was devoid of "ascertainable quantitative criteria, standards or analytical processes," that Sea Ray maintains is required by Section 370.12, Florida Statutes. Standing Watch, Inc. Standing Watch, Inc.'s, Second Amended Petition challenged and alleged that the proposed speed in proposed Rule 68C-22.006(2)(e) 1-5 is not based upon "competent, substantial evidence" and does not comport with Section 370.12(2), Florida Statutes. Paragraphs 38 and 39 alleged that the proposed speeds in the Proposed Rule 68C-22.006(2)(c) 1-6 and (2)(d) 1-18 are not based upon "competent, substantial evidence" and do not comport with Section 370.12(2), Florida Statutes. Standing Watch, in essence, challenges all "idle," "slow" and "25 MPH" maximum speed zones proposed. Standing Watch argues that the FWCC failed to "quantify" by rule or working definition such terms such as "frequent" and "seasonal" and failed to define the term "periodic." Therefore, without working definitions the FWCC had no "threshold" from which to determine whether manatees were "frequently sighted," and the proposed rule is, accordingly, invalid in its entirety. Thus, it is alleged that the FWCC made no independent findings based upon the data reviewed that manatees were "frequently sighted" in any specific area of Brevard County. Standing Watch alleged, "The genesis of the Proposed Rule is this settlement agreement reached in the Egbert case, and there is a definite connection between the language of the Proposed Rule being challenged and the settlement agreement." Mr. Calleson acknowledged that portions of existing speed zones and proposed speed zones in maps resulting from the federal mediation process contained a "lot of similarities" with the speed zones in maps of the Proposed Rule. The FWCC declined to direct staff to conduct negotiated rule-making on the Proposed Rule. Accordingly, staff's participation in the federal mediation process was not a negotiated rule-making process pursuant to Section 120.54(2), Florida Statutes. Continuing their argument, Standing Watch alleged that the FWCC without algorithms, formulae, protocols, matrices, mathematical models, or metrics made no separate determination for each zone and/or area (of the proposed rule) and had no factual basis for the identification of separate speed zones, rendering all determinations made by the Commission as arbitrary and capricious. Based upon the foregone foundation, Standing Watch challenged Proposed Rule 68C-22.006 in its entirety as arbitrary and capricious. City of Cocoa Beach Watersports Area Cocoa Beach intervened to challenge that portion of Proposed Rule 68C-22.006(2)(d)16, that "reduces allowable speeds in the area known as Banana River, Cocoa Beach Waterspouts Area." In support of its challenge, Cocoa Beach adopted the Proposed Final Order submitted on behalf of Petitioners, Standing Watch, Inc., Jim, Kavin, Thomas Mason, Dougals P. Jaren and Stowell Robertson. Additionally, Cocoa Beach relied upon "facts" particularly applicable to the Cocoa Beach (Waterspouts Area). Cocoa Beach alleged that prior to the Proposed Rule and subsequent to 1988 the FWCC had no evidence of manatee deaths attributed to watercrafts having occurred in the Watersports Area; that two years prior to the proposed rule only one or two manatees were sighted in that area; that the sea grass preferred by manatees is not found in the area, and that the Watersports Area does not have the depth [bathymetry] preferred by manatees. Petitioners contend that a "sub-classification" would corroborate Mr. James Wood's view "a majority of watercraft collisions are caused by large, slow-moving vessels, not by small, recreational motorboats." Mr. Wood's analysis was inconclusive as to the characteristics of watercraft that caused manatee injury. The reliable and available evidence, including documentation on known or suspected boat strikes, scar catalog data, and affidavits of persons who perform manatee necropsies, does not support the view held by Mr. Wood. To the contrary, evidence and testimony of experts herein presented, established that small, fast moving motorboats kill and injure manatees and their habitat. The sub-classification of watercraft-related mortalities is not required for rule adoption. The proposition set forth by McGill Petitioners, and adopted by other Petitioners, that larger vessels and barge/tugs were responsible for Brevard County manatee mortalities was raised in an earlier rule challenge filed by McGill, and was rejected, as it is herein rejected. DOAH Case No. 99-5366, page 18 (officially recognized); Final Order, McGill v. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 23 F.A.L.R. (DOAH 2000). All data, 1997-1999 Brevard County relative abundance and distribution aerial survey, 2000 synoptic aerial survey, telemetry analyses, other data considered, and professional literature indicated that Brevard County is an important year- round habitat for manatees.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Pinellas Count Water and Navigation Control Authority Regulations (PCWNCAR) as more specifically alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated September 12, 1990.
Findings Of Fact John C. Lombardi, Respondent, is a certified marine specialty contractor and was so licensed at all times here relevant. He holds license C- 4097. Respondent at all times relevant hereto was the qualifying contractor for Myron Gibson Marine Construction Corporation. He also is the owner of Myron Gibson Marine Construction Corporation. Respondent entered into an oral contract with Larry Mickelson to install two tie poles off the dock at 809 Bay Point Drive and into a written contract with the property owner of this property to install two tie poles. Under the terms of the written contract, Respondent contracted to install these tie poles 25 feet off the dock with a minimum penetration of 10 feet. Due to an error on the part of the contractor, the initial tie poles were installed too close to the dock and had to be relocated. Respondent contracted with Mickelson to jet the poles to the required penetration. However, at the location 25 feet off the dock, the construction crew encountered a hard clay and shell mixture some four feet below the water bottom sand and silt and could get less than 8 feet penetration. When Mickelson attempted to tie up his boat to these tie poles, he noted they moved and called Gibbon Marine to correct the situation. In resetting the piles, Gibson Marine cut one of the piles in a point to facilitate driving the pile to a greater penetration. A drop hammer was used to drive the piles further into the clay and shell mixture. Respondent's crews made four visits to the site to correct the problem, and final payment was made on March 13, 1990 (Exhibit 8). Mickelson still was not satisfied, and Respondent advised him of the difficulty encountered in attempting to get 10 feet penetration and offered Mickelson three options, all at extra costs. These were (1) install sister piles, (2) relocate piles in hopes of finding less dense material in which to drive the piles, and (3) call in another contractor with equipment to drill the holes for the piles. Mickelson had another marine contractor come out to reset the piles to a greater depth, but this contractor was also unsuccessful. Mickelson then employed Ress Marine Construction who had drilling equipment with which to drill holes in which to set the tie poles. Ress Marine removed the piles installed by Respondent and drilled holes into which two tie poles were installed to a minimum depth of 10 feet. The removed piles which had been installed by Gibson Marine showed discoloration on the bottom three feet of these piles. One of Petitioner's witnesses (Ress) testified that he told Mickelson the piles appeared to have obtained only 3 to 3 1/2 feet penetration. Two of Respondent's witnesses who were on the scene doing the work when the piles were initially installed both testified the piles were driven to a penetration depth of not less than 7 to 8 feet. Respondent has owned Gibson Marine for the past 5 years, and this is the first customer complaint he had received, and these are the only charges ever filed against his certificate by Petitioner or any other regulatory authority.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent, Thomas A. Baggett has been licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot in Tampa Bay for fifteen (15) years and at all times pertinent to this proceeding was licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot. On February 5, 1984, at about 0620 hours, while Captain Baggett was piloting M/V Triton C outbound from the Gardinier Wharf in Hillsborough County, Florida, the M/V Triton C ran aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on the east side. The M/V Triton C is a Liberian bulk carrier with an approximate length and width of 576.7 feet and 81 feet, respectively, with a gross tonnage of 17,823 tons. At the time of grounding, the M/V Triton C had a forward draft of 29 feet, 11 inches and an aft draft of 30 feet and 1 inch. The M/V Triton C was experiencing no engine or navigational equipment problem before it ran aground. All aids to navigation, including ranges and buoys, were in place and working properly at the time of the grounding. The M/V Triton was travelling at a speed of 11.7 knots. Range lights, when properly aligned, provide a way for the pilot or anyone navigating a vessel to know the vessel is in the center of the channel. On the morning of February 5, 1985, shortly before the grounding of the M/V Triton C, Captain Baggett gave orders for the turn from CUT E into CUT D, or from a heading of 198 degrees to a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett ordered the wheel 20 degrees to starboard and then eased to 10 degrees. Captain Baggett then ordered the quartermaster to midship the wheel and steady the vessel on 213 degrees. He gave no instructions to the quartermaster concerning the use of the range lights for navigating the center of the channel. At this point the confusion begins. Captain Baggett testified that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees, an appropriate course for the transit of CUT D, while he was present and he observed the M/V Triton C as being on the ranges for about 2 minutes before going into the chart room. As he stepped back into the chart room, he glanced at the compass and observed that the vessel was on a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett gave no further instructions or orders other than "hard to starboard" when he came out of the chart room 15-20 seconds later and noticed the bow swinging to port, the rudder indicator showing 20 degrees rudder and the ranges being already opened. Captain Baggett testified that upon giving the order "hard to starboard" the quartermaster pulled the wheel and went "hard to port" and the vessel almost immediately went aground. The mate and quartermaster tell a different story. The master was below and not present on the bridge at the time of grounding. The mate testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees, and that Captain Baggett remained in the chart room for 40 seconds to 1 minute and came out as the vessel went aground. The quartermaster testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room immediately upon the vessel steadying up on 213 degrees, and did not stay to watch the course or range for 2 minutes. He further testified that Captain Baggett was in the chart room for 5-6 minutes; that he came out of the chart room as the vessel went aground; and, Captain Baggett gave no order of "hard to starboard". The quartermaster at the time of the grounding was Maheswaran Gnanasundran and the mate was Siburs Ioannas. As evidenced by the depositions, both were foreign; neither spoke English and each required an interpreter at the deposition. The master of the M/V Triton C on the day of grounding was Stamatios Stanou, a citizen of Greece, and required an interpreter for his deposition. Captain Baggett experienced a communication problem with quartermaster Gnanasundran in the beginning of the turn out of CUT E to CUT D, and earlier with another quartermaster at the beginning of the turn out of Hilisborough A CUT into Hillsborougn C CUT who was on duty just prior to quartermaster Gnanasundran. The M/V Triton C was at a heading of 206 degrees immediately after grounding and did not move significantly from that heading while grounded. Both the mate and the quartermaster testified that the M/V Triton C, after steadying up, stayed on the course heading of 213 degrees during the entire time and was on the same course heading when the vessel went aground. The mate testified that as the M/V Triton C began to run aground it began to list to the right, and its heading as it finally came to rest aground was 206 degrees. The master of the M/V Triton C testified that the wind was out of the northwest at 15 knots, with full tide, and the current being with M/V Triton C at about 2 knots. Captain John C. Hanson, an investigator for petitioner, testified that at the time of grounding, based on tidal information and weather reports, the wind was out of the northwest and there was an ebb tide running in a southerly direction which would tend to set the M/V Triton C in a southerly direction to the east of CUT D. Captain Hanson further testified that these conditions would have an effect on navigation. Captain Baggett testified that there was an ebb tide in a southwest direction and that it would tend to set to the southwest but at that point in time, it would have had very little effect on the M/V Triton C. Therefore, he did not make any allowances for the tide, wind, or a combination of them. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 shows the mean lower low water depth outside of the confines of the channel in the area of grounding to be 24 feet to 25 feet. Captain Hanson testified that the chart was current but that the depth of the water in a Particular area could be deeper, depending upon tides and winds. Captain Baggett testified that soundings taken on February 5, 1985, during the morning of grounding, put the depth of the water at the bow (point of grounding) and stern to be 25 feet and 37 feet, respectively and, that he visually observed, after daylight the stern of the vessel as being located in the ship channel of CUT D. The ship channel in CUT D has an approximate width of 400 feet with shoaling on both sides. Captain Hanson boarded the M/V Triton C 3 days after the grounding and testified that he plotted the position where the vessel went aground by taking "crossbearings of fixed structures, (no floating aids) and one radar range to one of the radar structures." Captain Hanson plotted the position of the M/V Triton C to be on the east side of CUT D, at a point 450 feet from the centerline of the CUT D approximately 1325 yards from a midpoint between buoys 1E and 2E. For an exact position see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The crossbearings used to locate the exact position of the M/V Triton C are shown on the chart on the right side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The left side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 is an enlargement of CUT D prepared by Captain Hanson showing the various courses the M/V Triton C could have taken from a point abeam of buoys 1E and 2E to the position of grounding based on the speed of the M/V Triton C at 11.7 knots. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates that if the point of grounding was 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, as Captain Hanson testified, and, the M/V Triton C grounded on the heading of 206 degrees, then, at that heading, the stern of a vessel 576.7 feet long could not have reached the channel. Captain Hanson's testimony concerning his method of locating the position of the M/V Triton C, the crossbearing used and the calculations went unrebutted. With a vessel drafting 29 feet 11 inches forward and the point of grounding being 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, the depth of the water outside the confines of the channel along the heading taken by the M/V Triton C was deeper than 25 feet or the grounding would have occurred sooner and at a point closer to the east bank of CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the quartermaster that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees after making the turn from CUT E to CUT D and steered that course for five to six minutes while Captain Baggett was in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room, because the vessel would have travelled beyond the point of grounding in 5 to 6 minutes. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the mate that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees and that the vessel went aground within 40 seconds to 1 minute while Captain Baggett was still in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room because the vessel could not have travelled to the point of grounding in 40 seconds to 1 minute from the time it made the turn out of CUT E into CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of Captain Baggett that the vessel steadied up on a heading of 213 degrees in the center of CUT D and that he viewed the ranges in line for 2 minutes before going to the chart room and that "almost immediately" upon coming out of the chart room 15 to 20 seconds later the vessel went aground was incorrect as to how long he stayed after the vessel steadied up before going into the chart room because in that time frame the turn, causing the vessel to go aground would have been so sharp the vessel would have gone aground at a heading significantly less than 206 degrees. The most believable evidence demonstrates that Captain Baggett was in the chart room 2-3 minutes prior to grounding. Captain Baggett went into the chart room to make his time and distance calculations because light was more readily available. Captain Baggett could have made the time and distance calculations without going into the chart room. While Captain Baggett was in the chart room, he was facing away from the chart room entrance and did not look at the rudder indicator, the ranges, or otherwise determine if his orders were being properly carried out. Captain Baggett's expertise as a pilot was available to the mate and quartermaster while he was in the chart room had either of them been aware of a problem and requested his assistance. But, his expertise as a pilot was not totally available to the vessel due to his position in the chart room. Where the crew is unfamiliar with the harbor and its lights and there is a language problem, courses are usually given on compass rather than instructions on the range lights.
