The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked because of inadequate supervision of foster children, as alleged in Petitioner's letter dated December 22, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), seeks to revoke the foster home license of Respondents, Wendy and David Palmer. In a letter dated December 22, 1998, DCFS alleged that Respondents allowed "foster children to be taken overnight over one hundred miles from [their] home with no supervision from [Respondents] as the licensed foster parents." The charging document went on to allege that their "neglect materially affected the safety and welfare of the children because they were given alcoholic beverages and were allowed to sleep with men." Respondents denied the allegations and requested a formal hearing to contest the proposed action. Their license has remained inoperative pending the outcome of this proceeding. Respondents have operated a foster home around six miles north of Altoona, Florida, since May 1994, caring mainly for teenage females who had "a lot of behavior problems" and had failed in prior placements. The home is licensed by DCFS under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. Children were placed in their home by the Lake County Boys Ranch, a private organization which had a contract with DCFS to provide that service. On an undisclosed date, but prior to August 1998, three females, M. G., G. M., and D. W., were placed in Respondents' home. At that time, each of the girls was around fifteen years of age. G. M. had almost fifty prior placements, while D. W. had failed in "several" other placements. M. G. had also been in a number of "non-relative" placements, but the exact number is unknown. All three had a reputation of being difficult to handle and were considered "high-risk." None testified at the final hearing and thus any comments they may have made to a DCFS investigator are hearsay in nature. Respondents' daughter, Jamie, who was 21 years old when the events herein occurred, had been approved to serve as a respite provider at the foster home. This meant she could assist her parents by transporting the children to medical or visitation appointments and provide supervision in the home for a limited period of time. Examples of her duties included transporting the three girls to doctor's appointments, to lunch, or to the beach for recreational purposes. She considered her relationship with the girls to be "like sisters." On August 3, 1998, Jamie decided to travel to Hampton in Bradford County, Florida, in an extended cab pick-up truck to retrieve the remainder of her personal belongings from the residence of her former boyfriend, Scott, a 22-year-old male. Hampton is approximately 83 miles from Altoona, but the distance between the foster home and Scott's residence was no more than 75 miles or so. The one-way trip less took less than an hour and a half. Jamie spoke with her mother around 10:30 or 11:00 a.m. that day and received permission for the three girls to accompany her on the trip. The trip was perceived by Wendy Palmer as a recreational trip, and one that would enable the girls to build trust in the family since it allowed them to take a short trip away from their home and to return later that same day. Contrary to the charging document, this was not an illegitimate purpose, and Respondents' authorization of the trip at that point in time could not reasonably be forseen as an act which would materially affect the girls' health or welfare. Jamie was told to go straight to Hampton, pack her belongings, and then return. Jamie eventually departed the foster home between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. and arrived at Scott's residence shortly before 4:00 p.m. Although Scott was not at home when the group first arrived, he returned shortly thereafter with "two buddies," both adult males. A verbal argument between Scott and Jamie ensued, and Scott remained at the residence for several hours while the two discussed why their relationship had gone sour. Scott's two friends, however, remained outside the residence by his truck. Just before 6:00 p.m. Jamie telephoned her mother to advise that she had safely arrived in Hampton, that she was packing, that Scott was on the premises attempting to change her mind about leaving him, and that it looked like it was going to rain. Scott and his friends left a few minutes later, and even though Scott had a key to the residence, he and his friends did not return that evening. Before 9:00 p.m., Jamie again telephoned her mother to advise that it was storming, that she was upset after arguing with Scott, and that she was afraid to drive home in rainy weather at that hour with the girls. Accordingly, she asked permission to remain at Scott's residence that evening and drive home the first thing in the morning. Although Scott's residence was not a licensed, inspected, and approved foster home, Wendy Palmer agreed that under those extenuating circumstances, it was appropriate to remain in Hampton overnight. Wendy Palmer added that she would have driven to Hampton herself to retrieve the girls, but she did not wish to drive on two-lane roads in the rain at that late hour. Wendy Palmer's decision that evening technically violated her duty as a foster parent to provide round-the-clock supervision for the girls in a licensed foster home. Indeed, without the order of a court, foster children are not allowed to stay in an unlicensed home. After talking with her mother, Jamie drove to a local convenience store and purchased two Bud Lights in a can. She returned to the residence and consumed them herself. Contrary to the allegations in DCFS's letter dated December 22, 1998, the girls were not given alcoholic beverages. Also, Jamie did not allow adult males to enter the premises that evening. Further, they did not engage in sexual relations with other men. Indeed, except for the girls and Jamie, there was no one else present, and all four slept in the living room of the residence. Although Jamie allowed the three girls to smoke that evening, this conduct is not cited as a ground for revocation in the charging document. The next morning, Jamie telephoned her mother a third time and advised that they were getting ready to drive back to Altoona. The group returned a short time later. On October 9, 1998, or some two months later, the three girls ran away from the foster home and were eventually picked up by law enforcement authorities in Wildwood, Florida. At that time, D. W. made allegations for the first time that while in Hampton on the evening of August 3, 1998, the group had been given alcoholic beverages by Jamie, that they had engaged in sexual intercourse with friends of Scott, and that Jamie had become intoxicated. These allegations led to an investigation by DCFS and its decision to revoke Respondents' foster home license. They also resulted in a verified report of institutional neglect on November 2, 1998, which is found in abuse report 98-113392. DCFS takes the position that the trip had no legitimate purpose because the girls would receive no discernible benefit from the trip. This assertion has been rejected above. It further contends that the teenagers were placed at risk when Respondents allowed the girls to stay overnight with a respite worker in an unlicensed home. According to DCFS, the appropriate action would have been for the Palmers to advise Jamie to transport the girls to a "public shelter" in the area, or alternatively, for the Palmers to drive to Hampton that evening and pick them up. Because these latter steps were not followed, Respondents violated DCFS protocol, and they committed a negligent act within the meaning of the statute. During the four-year period in which Respondents served as foster parents, they provided outstanding care for foster children who were most at-risk, and all of whom had failed in prior placements. Other than this one incident, there are no blemishes on their record. Moreover, they have the continuing support and confidence of the private agency which makes local placements of foster children pursuant to a contract with DCFS. These considerations, as well as the extenuating circumstances which occurred on the evening of August 3, 1998, should be taken into account in determining whether Respondents' license should be disciplined.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order determining that Respondents violated Section 409.175(8)(a)1., Florida Statutes, and that their foster home license be suspended for one year effective December 22, 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John N. Spivey, Esquire 14550 U. S. Highway 441 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158
The Issue Whether Respondents Adams Group Home, Inc., and Joyce Adams' ("Respondents") group home licensure renewal applications should be denied.
Findings Of Fact Parties and Background APD is the state agency charged with regulating the licensing and operation of foster care facilities, group home facilities, and residential centers, pursuant to sections 20.197 and 393.067, Florida Statutes. Under section 393.063(19), a group home facility means a residential facility "which provides a family living environment including supervision and care necessary to meet the physical, emotional, and social needs of its residents." The capacity of such a facility must be at least four but not more than 15 residents. Respondents are licensees of two group home facilities, known as Adams Group Home #1, located at 2400 Oleander Drive, Miramar, Florida 33023, and Adams Group Home #2, located at 7131 Southwest 16th Street, Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023. Respondents' group homes provide a family living environment within a residential, single-family structure with a combined total of not more than 12 adult residents with developmental disabilities. Joyce Adams is Adams Group Homes' corporate officer. Ms. Adams has been licensed through APD to provide group home services for 18 years. Group homes licensed by APD are required to apply for a renewal license every year. The renewal process involves a review of the applications to make sure they are accurate and complete and an observation by a licensing specialist at the facilities to ensure the facilities are in compliance with the applicable statutes and administrative rules. Every year prior to 2018, including 2014 through 2017, Respondents' group home licensure renewal applications for Adams Group Home #1 and Adams Group Home #2 were approved by APD. No evidence was presented at hearing demonstrating that Respondents have ever been the subject of any corrective action plan or proposed disciplinary agency action in the form of an administrative fine, suspension or revocation of a license, or moratorium on admissions, prior to APD's March 13, 2018, denial letter. The March 13, 2018, Denial Letter Against this backdrop, on December 20, 2017, Respondents submitted applications to APD for renewal of the licenses of Adams Group Home #1 and Adams Group Home #2, which were set to expire in March 2018. By letter dated March 13, 2018, APD notified Respondents of the denial of their group home licensure renewal applications. APD's grounds for the denial of the license applications are set forth in the denial letter in four counts. In Counts I and II, APD alleges the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") commenced investigations which resulted in DCF's verified findings of abuse, neglect or exploitation against Ms. Adams in February 2014 and December 2015, respectively. APD further alleges that based on section 393.0673(2), it "may" deny an application for licensure based solely on DCF's verified findings. In Count III, APD alleges Respondents used video cameras in the common areas in 2016 and 2017 without written consents for the common areas in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.009(7), which constitutes a Class II violation. In "Count IIII," APD alleges that after Hurricane Irma struck south Florida on September 10, 2017, Respondents had "no power at the group home," Respondents utilized a "makeshift grill" less than ten feet from the structure, and failed to care for its residents. APD specifically alleges that on September 19, 2017, a resident of Adams Group Home #2 "was taken to the emergency room at Memorial Regional Hospital for confusion and fever." APD further alleges that Respondents' conduct described in "Count IIII" constitutes Class I violations, and that the conduct violates rule 65G-2.009(1)(d) with regard to the minimum standards of facilities to ensure the health and safety of the residents and address the provision of appropriate physical care and supervision; adhering to and protecting resident rights and freedoms in accordance with the Bill of Rights of Persons with Developmental Disabilities, as provided in section 393.13; and section 393.13(3)(a) and (g), relating to humane care, abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Count I The parties stipulated that on December 29, 2013, DCF commenced an investigation of Respondents' group homes, and that on February 25, 2014, DCF closed its investigation with verified findings of abuse, neglect, or exploitation on the part of Ms. Adams. APD was aware of DCF's verified findings upon completion of DCF's investigation. At hearing, APD provided no witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the specific facts involved in the violation. Instead, APD presented unsigned DCF investigative reports and a DCF supervisor's testimony regarding the general investigative process. At hearing, Ms. Adams explained the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation. Ms. Adams testified the incident involved M.K., a 41-year-old female resident of Respondents' group home since 2006, who is developmentally disabled. According to Ms. Adams, on Sunday, December 29, 2013, M.K. was taken by personal car to the emergency room at Memorial Hospital, Pembroke Pines, where she was admitted. Ms. Adams testified that M.K. had been coughing for a few days, and she had consulted with a nurse practitioner about M.K.'s condition on Thursday, December 26, 2013. However, M.K.'s condition had not improved by Sunday, she looked weak, and Ms. Adams did not want to wait until Monday for M.K. to be seen by a doctor. M.K. was transported to the hospital on Sunday, December 29, 2013, by a facility employee. Emergency (911) had been called for M.K. on approximately eight occasions prior to December 29, 2013. Ms. Adams persuasively and credibly testified she would not have hesitated to call 911 for M.K. if she felt it was necessary. On Monday, December 30, 2013, the next business day, Ms. Adams provided an incident report to APD. Ms. Adams also immediately notified M.K.'s waiver support coordinator. M.K. returned to Respondents' group home after her release from the hospital where she has continued to reside since then. Count II The parties stipulated that on November 4, 2015, DCF commenced an investigation of Respondents' group homes, and that on December 12, 2015, DCF closed its investigation with verified findings of abuse, neglect, or exploitation on the part of Ms. Adams. APD was aware of DCF's verified findings upon completion of DCF's investigation. At hearing, Ashley Cole, regional program supervisor for the southeast region of APD, testified about the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation. The violation involved the use of residents' funds to request a new support coordinator.1/ Specifically, in November 2015, Ms. Cole conducted a review of client files at one of Respondents' group homes, including a review of financial ledgers, and saw disbursements of money from three residents to an attorney, totaling $1,300.00. When asked about this by Ms. Cole, Ms. Adams explained that the funds were used to pay an attorney to write letters on behalf of the three residents requesting new support coordinators. The funds were used to benefit the three residents and the letters were written by Respondents' attorney on behalf of the three residents. At hearing, Ms. Cole testified that it is typical for an APD client or the client's guardian to request a new support coordinator, not the group home owner, and that it is not required that a request for a new support coordinator be in writing. Although it may not be typical for the group home owner to request a new support coordinator in writing on behalf of the residents, it is not prohibited by law. None of the three residents had guardians or family members to assist in the handling of their affairs. Ms. Adams testified that she had attempted to obtain assistance from the current support coordinator to act on the residents' behalf, but to no avail. Two of the residents still resided at Respondents' group home as of the beginning of 2018; the other resident died about a year after the incident for reasons unrelated to the written requests for a new support coordinator. Count III Delmarva Foundation, n/k/a Qlarant, has contracted with the State of Florida to evaluate the performance of group home providers such as those operated by Respondents. On May 31, 2016, Delmarva Foundation Quality Assurance Reviewer Martina Pocaterra performed an unannounced observation visit at one of Respondents' group homes. Ms. Pocaterra observed video cameras in the common areas of the group home. The next morning, Respondents provided consent forms from residents for use of cameras in the bedrooms, but not for use in the common areas of the group home. Because there were no consent forms signed by residents allowing the use of video cameras in the common areas, an alert notification form was submitted to APD. On October 3, 2017, Delmarva Foundation Quality Assurance Reviewer Michelle Ceville performed a provider discovery review at one of Respondents' group homes. On this occasion, Ms. Ceville observed video cameras in the common areas of the group home. Respondents again provided consent forms from residents for use of cameras in the bedrooms, but not for use in the common areas. Because there were no consent forms signed by residents allowing the use of video cameras in the common areas, an alert notification form was submitted to APD. The clear and convincing evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Respondents violated rule 65G-2.009(7)(a) and (b) by failing to obtain written consent of residents for the use of video monitoring equipment in the common areas. "Count IIII" On September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma struck Florida. After the hurricane, APD contacted group homes to ensure that the homes had electricity, lights, and air conditioning, and that the homes were safe. On September 15, 2017, Adams Group Home, Inc., informed APD that Adams Group Home #2 had electricity and running water, and that Adams Group Home #2 residents had not been evacuated. On September 19, 2017, Kimberly Robinson, an APD human services program analyst, conducted a wellness check at one of Respondents' group homes. It is unclear from Ms. Robinson's testimony which group home she actually visited. However, Ms. Robinson observed that the home had air conditioning, and that "everything in the home was fine." On September 19, 2017, Pembroke Pines Assistant Fire Marshal Shawn Hallich visited Adams Group Home #2 and conducted an inspection. He testified that he "did a walk around real quick," and that on the enclosed outdoor patio on the back porch of the home, he noticed "a pot on two blocks with two pieces of wood and an open flame with charcoal, and something . . . being cooked on it." According to Mr. Hallich, the cooking device was located on the back patio "approximately, probably 10 feet from the sliding glass door, maybe a little bit less than that." Mr. Hallich did not use any device to measure the distance of the cooking device from the structure of the home. Mr. Hallich testified that the cooking device was a safety hazard because there was an open flame and there was nothing to prevent the cooking device from being tipped over or falling over on its own. During his inspection, Mr. Hallich also observed that there was no air conditioning inside the home. There was some electricity inside the home, but not enough voltage necessary for the air conditioning system to operate. However, there were fans located and operating in every room of the home, and the windows were open. Mr. Hallich testified it was hot, but he did not use any device to measure the temperature inside the home. Mr. Hallich also acknowledged that if the fans were on inside the home, the circulation would have made it feel cooler inside the home. On September 19, 2017, Mr. Hallich issued a Notice of Violation, stating the nature of the violation as: "No air conditioning and unsafe cooking practices being conducted." Mr. Hallich recommended the following action be taken: (1) "Must relocate all residence [sic] until all power has been restored[; (2)] All cooking must be conducted at least 10 feet away from the structure using a commercial cooking appliance." As to the violation found by Mr. Hallich with respect to the outside cooking device, Ms. Adams asked Mr. Hallich whether she could use it outside, and he told her that "it had to be 10 feet away from the structure for cooking." In issuing the Notice of Violation with respect to the cooking device, Mr. Hallich specifically relied on section 10.10.6.1 of the Florida Fire Prevention Code which provides as follows: For other than one- and two-family dwellings, no hibachi, grill, or other similar devices used for cooking, heating, or any other purpose shall be used or kindled on any Balcony, under any overhanging portion, or within 10 ft (3 m) of any structure. Mr. Hallich's reliance on section 10.10.6.1 of the Florida Fire Prevention Code is misplaced because Adams Group Home #2 is a single-family dwelling. As a single- family dwelling, Respondents' group home is exempt from section 10.10.6.1. In any event, APD failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the cooking device was located within ten feet of the single-family dwelling. In addition, APD failed to present clear and convincing evidence that any residents of the group home were taken to the hospital or were not properly cared for by Respondents because of the lack of air conditioning. In sum, APD failed to present clear and convincing evidence at hearing to demonstrate a violation of rule 65G- 2.009(1)(d) and section 393.13.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Agency for Persons with Disability enter a final order granting Respondents' applications for licensure renewal.3/ DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether discipline should be imposed against Respondent for operating on an expired public lodging establishment license, an offense which is deemed by rule to constitute operation without a license.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Blackwood is an apartment building with five units located at 4115 Riverside Drive, Coral Springs, Florida 33065- 5929. The Division issued Blackwood a license, numbered 16-16900-H, to operate as a public lodging establishment. According to information in the Division's official database, as reproduced in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 1/ the "current license expiration date [for Blackwood's license] is December 1, 2000." On June 5, 2000, and again on October 6, 2000, Division employee Cynthia Pieri conducted routine inspections of Blackwood. Each time, she found the apartments to be open and operating. Additionally, on both occasions Ms. Pieri took note that Blackwood's 1999-2000 license was not on display or available at the premises. On a Lodging Inspection Report that she prepared on June 5, 2000, 2/ Ms. Pieri checked box number 38 indicating a violation in connection with the following item: "Current license, displayed, available upon request." In the comments section of the form she wrote: "#38 1999-2000 DBPR license is not posted." Ms. Pieri left blank the spaces provided for informing the establishment of the date when its license would expire in a line that read: "REMINDER: Your license expires / / ." Petitioner's Exhibit 2. 3/ Kenneth Charles Buck, a Division employee, explained that ordinarily licensees such as Blackwood are sent a renewal notice. Regardless whether a licensee receives a notice, however, it is responsible for paying the required fee, which may be remitted either to the local office or to the Division's headquarters in Tallahassee. Transcript of Final Hearing ("T-") Sometimes, a licensee will pay the field inspector; field inspectors are authorized to accept license fees and issue receipts. T-14. Mr. Buck testified that the documents he could access on his computer indicated that Blackwood had failed to pay a license fee for the 1999-2000 period. T-13. Mr. Buck stated further that he had spoken with Blackwood's owner "on occasion" and had informed her that the license fee was due. T-14.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Blackwood Rentals. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2001.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent operated two contiguous four-unit buildings as an unlicensed public lodging establishment in violation of Subsection 509.241(1), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to most of the facts in this case. The disputed issues of fact involve issues of whether the two four-unit buildings comprise a single complex of buildings that Respondent operates as a single entity. With this exception, the parties submitted the case to the ALJ as an issue of law. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating public lodging establishments defined in Subsection 509.013(4), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent owns and operates two four-unit buildings located, respectively, at 11220 and 11240 Third Street East, Treasure Island, Florida 33706. Petitioner inspected each building on July 2 and October 16, 2003, and found that Respondent had not licensed either building as a public lodging establishment. Respondent has never licensed either building as a public lodging establishment. The two four-unit buildings are located on contiguous lots that are not separated by a highway. However, the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the two buildings comprise a single complex of buildings within the meaning of Subsection 509.013(7), Florida Statutes (2003). The buildings are not situated on the same tract or plot of land. Each parcel of land on which a building is located is a separate lot bearing a separate street address, a separate legal description, and a separate survey. Each lot is separately titled to Respondent and his wife under a separate warranty deed acquired in separate transactions. Respondent is legally entitled to transfer each lot independently without first severing or subdividing one lot from the other. Each lot secures a separate mortgage for which the lender, in the event of default, may foreclose without foreclosing against the other lot otherwise encumbering the other lot. Respondent does not operate the two buildings under one business name within the meaning of Subsection 509.013(7), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent does not operate the two buildings under any business name. Neither building bears a name, and Respondent does not manage the two buildings from a single rental management office. Respondent operates each building pursuant to a separate occupational license for each building. The two buildings do not comprise a public lodging establishment within the meaning of Subsection 509.013(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). For reasons previously stated, the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the two buildings comprise a single complex of buildings. In addition, Petitioner failed to submit any evidence that Respondent either rents to any guest for a period that is less than 30 days or advertises to the public that the eight units are regularly rented to guests. Rather, the only relevant evidence shows that Respondent rents to guests for one year or more and does not advertise the rental units in any manner. The two four-unit buildings satisfy the requirements of an express exclusion in Subsection 509.013(4)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2003). Each building is an establishment that rents four units or less. Petitioner submitted no evidence that Respondent either advertises the units for rent to guests or that Respondent regularly rents the units to transients defined in Subsections 509.013(10) and (11), Florida Statutes (2003). The only relevant evidence shows that Respondent does not advertise the units and does not rent to transients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the two four-unit buildings do not comprise a public lodging establishment and dismissing the Administrative Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ted J. Starr, Esquire 8181 U.S. 19 North Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Geoff Luebkemann, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact From on or about December 13, 1976, up to and including the date of the hearing, Robert C. Duff was the holder of license no. 13-87, series 1-COP, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. This license was held for purposes of trading as Bob's Bait and Tackle and the business was located at 2211 Hwy 231, N/O Panama City, Bay County, Florida. Mr. Duff wanted to transfer the license and the Division of Beverage was in the process of investigating this request for license transfer in December, 1976. In the course of this investigation it was revealed that Robert C. Duff did not own the premises upon which his business was located. Mr. Duff did not try to conceal the fact that he did not own the licensed premises. Moreover, Mr. Duff and a Mr. Charles Hoskins, President of Better Brands, Inc., told of a discussion between them and the investigating agent of the Division of Beverage at the time Duff received his license, in which the agent was told that Duff did not actually own the property. This licensing was in 1968. In fact, Hoskins has been leasing the licensed premises to Duff since 1968 for a lease rental amount ranging from $200.00 to $250.00. That lease agreement was still in effect at the time of the hearing. One final comment on the statement of ownership pertains to Petitioner's Exhibit #2 admitted into evidence at the hearing. This is an affidavit signed by Robert Duff showing him to be the owner of the licensed premises. This affidavit was executed at the time of the license application in November, 1968. Duff claims he was unaware that he signed such an affidavit and points to the fact that the reviewing agent, with the knowledge of his lack of ownership in 1968, recommended the approval of the license application and the license was issued. Charles Hoskins owns the premises upon which the license is operated in his personal name, and there was no showing that any other principals were involved in the ownership of the property, either directly or indirectly. Charles Hoskins was from 1968, through and including the date of the hearing, the President of Better Brands, Inc., which holds license no. 13-233, J-DBW with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. This license is a license for a distributor. In addition, Hoskins from the beginning date and up to and including the date of the hearing has held between 10 percent and 20 percent of the stock owned by Better Brands, Inc. Both Robert C. Duff and Better Brands, Inc., have been charged with violations of s. 561.42(1), F.S. which states in pertinent part: "No licensed manufacturer or distributor of any of the beverages herein referred to shall have any financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or business of any vendor licensed under the Beverage Law." The facts of this case do not reveal that Better Brands, Inc., as a licensed distributor has any financial interest, directly or indirectly in the establishment or business of Robert C. Duff, a vendor licensed under the Beverage Law. Robert C. Duff and Better Brands, Inc., have also been charged with a violation of Rule 7A-4.18, F.A.C., which states: "Rental between vendor and distributor prohibited. It shall be considered a violation of section 561.42, Florida Statutes, for any distributor to rent any property to a licensed vendor or from a licensed vendor if said property is used, in whole or part as a part of the licensed premises of said vendor or if said property is used in any manner with said vendor's place of business." The facts in this matter do not show that Better Brands, Inc., rented any property to Robert C. Duff, the licensed vendor.
Recommendation It is recommended that the charge against Robert C. Duff, Respondent, be dismissed this 15th day of July, 1977. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Collett, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Franklin R. Harrison, Esquire 406 Magnolia Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Nancy Boles owns and has operated Happy Days Guest Ranch for some 14 years. This facility is licensed as an ACLF and has no record of complaints other than those contested at this proceeding. On or about March 4, 1987, DHRS received a report from an undisclosed source that a resident at the Happy Days Guest Ranch ACLF had been abused by the proprietor, Nancy Boles, and an investigator was sent to the ACLF. Apparently the allegation was that Respondent had slapped a resident. At this time there were approximately 6 residents at the ACLF. After talking to these residents and with Respondent, the investigator, Katherine Massaro, concluded that a substantiated report of abuse had occurred. The HRS Division of License and Certification was notified and a decision was made to relocate the six residents and place a moratorium on further admissions to the ACLF. Additionally, Respondent's application to renew her ACLF license was denied. No evidence was presented that the HRS Division of Adult Services, filed a notification of a confirmed report of abuse against Respondent and placed her on the abuse register. Accordingly, this is not a proceeding challenging a confirmed report of abuse of the aged but is a license revocation proceeding. It is apparent that HRS notified the State Attorney's Office of the alleged abuse and the charges disposed of in Exhibit 1 were preferred. No adjudication of guilt was made in that case. Petitioner's eye witnesses to the alleged abuse were two elderly women. The younger, Mardell Surrency, whose deposition is Exhibit 2, was 75, and the other, Alice Beasley, whose deposition is Exhibit 3, was 86. Both of these women testified that they saw Respondent slap Fowler Simmons, another resident of the ACLF who is senile or has other mental impairment that led these witnesses to conclude that mentally Simmons was "real bad" with the mind of a child who had to be told everything to do. Both witnesses gave an indication (pantomined) of how Respondent slapped Simmons. Unfortunately, a verbal description of this act is not contained in their deposition. Surrency testified that Beasley "was 86 years old so she didn't pay much attention to anything." Beasley, on the other hand, testified that she and "Modelle" were sitting alongside each other when the incident occurred and she and "Modelle" had often talked about how mean Respondent talked to Simmons. Neither ever saw any bruise on Simmons' face or body or ever saw Respondent strike Simmons other than this one time. Both testified Respondent told Simmons to not sit there "like a damn fool." Respondent's version of the incident was that she did indeed slap Simmons, but gently on the mouth, to get him to eat the meal she had prepared. She demonstrated a very light slap with the palm of her hand on the lips. This evidence is deemed more credible than the often rambling and disjointed testimony of the two female residents of the ACLF.
The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether Respondent, a licensed group home operator, violated several statutes and rules governing such homes and their staffs, with most of the alleged offenses occurring, Petitioner charges, in connection with the accidental death of a resident. If Respondent is found guilty of any disciplinable offenses, then it will be necessary to determine the appropriate penalties for such violation(s).
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this action, Respondent Daniel Madistin LLC #1 ("DM1") held a Certificate of License, numbered 091867, which authorized DM1 to operate a group home for the developmentally disabled in West Palm Beach, Florida, for the one-year period from April 1, 2014, through March 31, 2015. DM1 had been licensed as a group home since 2009. DM1's facility (the "Home") could house up to six residents at a time. As a group home licensee, DM1 falls under the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"), which issued DM1's initial and annual renewal licenses and periodically inspected the Home. One of the Home's longtime residents was a young man named V.H.-D. This wheelchair-bound, nonverbal resident suffered from a number of medical conditions, including severe cerebral palsy, as a result of which he was unable to care for himself. The Home's staff, therefore, were required, among other things, to feed V.H.-D., whose difficulty swallowing solid foods had caused him to be placed, on doctor's orders, on a diet of puree as a precaution against choking. (V.H.-D.'s family had refused to consent to the placement of a feeding tube.) On the morning of Sunday, October 19, 2014, an employee of DM1, Pharah Murat, fed V.H.-D. his breakfast, as she had done many times since starting to work in the Home in June of 2014. Because V.H.-D. could not talk, he generally manifested satiety by regurgitating food and expelling it from his mouth, at which point the caregiver would clean him up. So, this day, when V.H.-D. began expelling food, Ms. Murat stopped feeding him and wiped his mouth, per the routine. The situation was not routine, however, as Ms. Murat soon realized. V.H.-D. became pale and nonresponsive and looked unwell. Concerned, Ms. Murat immediately called her supervisor, Daniel Madistin, the eponymous principal of DM1. Upon hearing Ms. Murat's description of V.H.-D.'s condition, Mr. Madistin, who was at church with his wife, ended the call and promptly dialed 911. Having thus summoned emergency medical services and law enforcement, Mr. Madistin rushed to the Home. Meantime, Ms. Murat and a fellow employee, Marie Cadet, attended to V.H.-D. as they awaited the arrival of the paramedics. The evidence, which is in conflict, persuades the undersigned to find that, more likely than not, Ms. Murat placed V.H.-D. on the floor and performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation, or tried to, although to what avail cannot be determined. Afterwards, she and Ms. Cadet returned V.H.-D. to his wheelchair and moved him from the dining room to the front door, so that the paramedics would be able to work on him without delay once they appeared, which they did within a matter of minutes. V.H.-D. was removed from the Home and taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he died from asphyxiation due to pulmonary aspiration of food secondary to cerebral palsy. APD contends that V.H.-D. was the victim of "neglect" because (a) Ms. Murat called Mr. Madistin, instead of 911, and (b) the staff failed to (i) recognize that V.H.-D was choking and (ii) handle an emergency situation promptly and intelligently. While there is no dispute that Ms. Murat called Mr. Madistin, there is no debate that she did so immediately upon realizing that V.H.-D. might be in distress, which she observed very quickly. The evidence does not establish whether or not Ms. Murat realized that V.H.-D. was choking, but it does clearly prove that she not only realized something was wrong, but also acted upon that recognition without delay. APD insinuates that by not calling 911 first, Ms. Murat increased the response time of the EMTs, to the detriment of V.H.-D. There is, however, no persuasive evidence that Ms. Murat's actions decreased the likelihood of V.H.-D.'s survival, nor is that a reasonable inference. To the contrary, it is more reasonable to infer, although not necessary to find, that Ms. Murat expedited the delivery of emergency medical services because she could converse in her primary language with Mr. Madistin, whose first language, too, is Creole, enabling the latter, who is fluent in English, to relay the relevant information efficiently to the 911 dispatcher. In addition, it should be mentioned that DM1's policy directed employees to call 911 in an emergency. So, even if Ms. Murat's failure to call 911 first amounted to neglect in this instance, which it did not, there is no basis in the evidence for holding the licensee responsible, for there is no evidence suggesting that DM1 knew or should have known that Ms. Murat would act as she did in a crisis. In any event, the evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet acted with reasonable skill and efficiency in this emergency. In making this finding, the undersigned is mindful that direct care staff are not medical providers. Indeed, at the time DM1 hired Ms. Murat, a caregiver needed only an eighth-grade education to meet the minimum academic requirements,1/ and even under the current rule a high school diploma or its equivalent suffices.2/ The point is that it is unreasonable to expect a direct service provider in a group home, when responding to a medical emergency, to meet the standard of care applicable to a doctor, nurse, or EMT. No persuasive evidence in the instant record establishes the appropriate standard of care for direct service providers, but the undersigned is nevertheless able to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the performance of DM1's staff, while probably falling short of heroic, was at least reasonable, and certainly not neglectful. After the EMTs had left for the hospital, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office ("PBSO") deputies stayed behind at the Home to investigate. One of the officers tried to interview Ms. Murat, but she was reluctant to speak. Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet are Haitian immigrants whose native tongue is Creole, and once the officers realized this, they called for the assistance of Deputy Vessage, a bilingual PBSO deputy who often serves as a translator in such instances. Deputy Vassage responded to this request and questioned the women in Creole, without incident. APD has alleged that Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet were not fluent speakers of English and thus were incapable of communicating effectively in the official language of the state of Florida.3/ This allegation was not proved. That Ms. Murat insisted upon using her primary language when speaking with law enforcement officers, who were investigating a fatal event that had just recently occurred in her presence, shows good judgment, not a lack of communication skills. At any rate, the evidence persuades the undersigned to find that both women likely were able to speak English with sufficient proficiency to make themselves understood in ordinary circumstances. More important, however, as will be discussed below, the law does not require that direct service providers such as Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet be capable of communicating effectively in English, but rather that they be capable of communicating effectively. Needless to say, speaking in English is not the only way to communicate effectively; nor, for that matter, is talking necessary for effective communication. APD investigated the circumstances surrounding the death of V.H.-D., and in so doing reviewed DM1's business records, including the personnel file for Ms. Murat. APD claims that DM1 failed to maintain written evidence of Ms. Murat's qualifications as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.012(5)(b)(1978). This rule was substantially amended in 2014, however, and the recordkeeping requirement was repealed, effective July 1, 2014. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65G- 2.012 (2014). There is no persuasive evidence in this record to support a finding that DM1 failed to comply with the former version of rule 65G-2.012 while it was in effect.4/ It is undisputed that DM1 did not terminate Ms. Murat's employment, or otherwise discipline her, as a result of V.H.-D.'s death. On January 16, 2015, an APD employee named Sabah Bissainthe made an unscheduled visit to the Home to conduct an inspection. Upon her arrival, she encountered Sinclair Concin, who worked for DM1. Mr. Concin, who was not expecting visitors, called Mrs. Naomi Madistin for guidance when he realized that Ms. Bissainthe was a state employee performing official business. Mr. Concin put Ms. Bissainthe on the phone with Mrs. Madistin, and the two made arrangements for Mrs. Madistin to meet Ms. Bissainthe at the Home as soon as Mrs. Madistin could get there, which she did within an hour. Mrs. Madistin cooperated fully with Ms. Bissainthe. Ms. Bissainthe was not refused entry to the Home or forbidden from inspecting any part of the facility, contrary to APD's allegations. Mr. Concin's primary language is Creole, which Ms. Bissainthe does not speak. APD alleged that Mr. Concin does not speak English, but the evidence fails to prove that charge, which would not, at any rate, be a disciplinable offense, without more. APD further asserted that Mr. Concin is unable to communicate effectively because he did not converse in English with Ms. Bissainthe. The evidence shows, however, that Mr. Concin and Ms. Bissainthe did communicate effectively, notwithstanding that each spoke a different primary language, because Mr. Concin proved capable, in fact, of accomplishing the task when the circumstances required that he accommodate an APD investigator who had appeared unannounced at the doorstep of the Home. On February 18, 2015, an investigator from the Attorney General's office, Paul Valerio, paid an unannounced visit to the Home in connection with a matter unrelated to V.H.-D.'s death. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Madistin was on-site at the time, so Mr. Valerio called Mr. Madistin to let him know that an official investigation was under way. The two men agreed that Mr. Valerio would meet with Mrs. Madistin at the Home the next day, and that meeting took place as planned. Mrs. Madistin fully cooperated with Mr. Valerio, who completed his investigation without difficulty. The evidence does not establish that Mr. or Mrs. Madistin was unavailable or uncooperative, as APD charged. Ultimate Factual Determinations Neither Ms. Murat nor Ms. Cadet abused, neglected, exploited, or harmed V.H.-D., who received prompt and appropriate medical treatment on the day he died. Moreover, Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet were mentally competent to perform their duties as direct service providers. The evidence, therefore, does not establish the violations of sections 393.13(3)(a), 393.13(3)(g), and 393.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes; and Florida Administrative Code Rules 65G-2.008(1)(h) and 65G-2.009(1)(d) set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint. The evidence failed to establish that Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet, or either of them, were (i) incapable of demonstrating effective communication or (ii) not mentally competent to perform their jobs as direct service providers. Thus, the violations of rules 65G-2.008(1)(g) and 65G- 2.008(1)(h) alleged in Count II were not proved. The charges brought in Count III of the Administrative Complaint are duplicative of the charges set forth in Count I and fail for the same reasons of fact. The charges in Count IV are based on allegations that DM1 failed to maintain adequate personnel records for Ms. Murat, in violation of outdated provisions Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.012(5)(1978), which expired on July 1, 2014, when a new version of the rule took effect. The evidence failed to show that DM1 violated the former rule at any time during its existence. The charges brought in Count V of the Administrative Complaint are duplicative of the charges set forth in Count II and fail for the same reasons of fact. The allegations of Count VI largely overlap those of Counts I and III, with the additional allegation that DM1 failed to fire Ms. Murat or suspend her employment. While it is true that Ms. Murat was not punished as a result of V.H.-D.'s death, DM1's decision not to take such action does not constitute a disciplinable offense, and the remaining allegations of Count VI fail for the same reasons of fact that doom the charges set forth in Count I. The charges in Count VII are based on allegations that Sinclair Concin (i) was unable to communicate effectively with Sabah Bissainthe and (ii) refused to allow Ms. Bissainthe to enter the Home to conduct an investigation, thereby putting DM1 in violation of rules 65G-2.008(1)(g), 65G-2.008(1)(h), and 65G- 2.0032(3). The evidence showed, however, that Mr. Concin did communicate effectively with Ms. Bissainthe, and that he let her into the Home. Therefore, the charges were not proved. In Count VIII, APD charged DM1 with failure to have a facility operator (manager) on-site or on call at all times, in violation of rule 65G-2.012(1)(a). This charge was based on the allegation that when investigator Paul Valerio arrived at the Home for an unscheduled visit, neither Mr. Madistin nor his wife was in the residence. Mr. Valerio was able immediately to reach Mr. Madistin by phone, however, and make plans to meet with Mrs. Madistin the following day. Thus, the charge set forth in Count VIII was not proved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding that Daniel Madistin LLC #1 is not guilty of the offenses charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2015.
