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CONCETTINA PETRELLA vs ARLEN HOUSE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, 16-002034 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Apr. 13, 2016 Number: 16-002034 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2016

The Issue Did the action of Respondent, in denying Petitioner the use of an emotional support dog in her condominium unit for her son, violate a legal duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of her son, A.C.?

Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material facts: Facts From Pre-hearing Stipulation Filed June 20, 2016 Petitioner was aware that the Association had a "no pet" policy and signed a document acknowledging same. Petitioner was sent a letter on February 24, 2014, from the Association's then property manager advising Petitioner that the Association had been advised that a dog was being kept in their unit, and reminding Petitioner of the Association's no pet policy. A Fines Committee hearing was scheduled for March 10, 2014, in regard to Petitioner's violation of the no pet policy. Petitioner was not issued a fine for violating the pet policy. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first claim that her son had a disability and required an emotional support animal. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first request to the Association for a reasonable accommodation. The Association's Board of Directors scheduled an interview with Petitioner on April 30, 2014, wherein Petitioner would be able to explain her request for a reasonable accommodation, the need for the emotional support animal, and her son's disability. The Association advised Petitioner, prior to the scheduled interview, that Petitioner may provide the Association with any documents Petitioner believes support her position. An interview and/or meeting occurred on April 30, 2014, between Petitioner, her husband, Yovani Cabreriza, Petitioner's attorney, and certain members of the Board of Directors, along with the Association's attorney, to discuss Petitioner's request for an accommodation. The Association determined that Petitioner was not in need of a reasonable accommodation and requested that the dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 19, 2014. The Association again requested that the subject dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 22, 2015, and advised Petitioner that an arbitration action would follow if the dog was not removed. A Petition for Arbitration was filed on June 4, 2015. Petitioner's response to the arbitration petition was filed on September 14, 2015. The arbitrator issued an order striking the complainants' defense and requiring proof of filing a Fair Housing Complaint. Petitioner filed her housing complaint with FCHR and Housing and Urban Development on November 2, 2015. On March 8, 2016, the FCHR housing investigator issued a "Notice of Determination of No Cause," concluding that reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. On April 8, 2016, FCHR received a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Housing Practice from Petitioner. Findings of Fact From the Hearing This case involves a family who lives at Respondent's condominium complex, Arlen House Condominium, located at 300 Bayview Drive, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160. Petitioner owns condominium unit PH05. Petitioner resides at this location with her husband and minor son, A.C. Petitioner's son was 11 years old in 2014. Her son has suffered from an anxiety disorder since he was a young boy. A.C.'s anxiety disorder problem became worse in 2012. He cried every morning and did not want to go to school. Apparently, he had difficulty breathing during anxiety or panic attacks. His mother described him as being "completely withdrawn" at school.1/ To help her son cope with his anxiety problem, Petitioner bought him a small dog, Jake, in the latter part of 2012. When she bought the dog, she knew that the condominium had a "no pet policy," but failed to alert the condominium or request permission to keep the dog.2/ In early 2014, the Association discovered that the dog was being kept in violation of the Association's rules and regulations. It notified Petitioner in writing on February 24, 2014, and told her to remove the animal. Resp. Ex. 2(e). March 10, 2014, Meeting Petitioner met with the Association's Fine Committee on March 10, 2014. During the meeting, Petitioner presented, for the first time, a letter or letters from the child's doctor, Rasciel Socarras, M.D.3/ Resp. Ex. 2(f). After the meeting before the Fine Committee, counsel for the Association sent Petitioner's counsel a letter dated March 21, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2(g). Essentially, the letter reiterated the "no pet policy" and concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the Fine Committee that her son had a disability that substantially limited a major life activity or that an accommodation was necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their condominium unit. The letter also requested a meeting to help the Association "conduct a meaningful review of your client's request for an accommodation."4/ Prior to the next meeting between the parties on April 30, 2014, counsel for the Association sent a letter to Petitioner's counsel dated April 18, 2014. In that letter, counsel requested copies of any and all documents that may support the boy's disability and need for an accommodation, including but not limited to the medical records that demonstrate his disability.5/ April 30, 2014, Meeting As arranged, Petitioner and her husband, along with their legal counsel, met with the Board of Directors on April 30, 2014. At the meeting, Petitioner explained her son's anxiety problem.6/ Although the record was not clear on this point, based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the undersigned concludes that the two (2) letters (dated and undated) from Dr. Socarras were reviewed and discussed during the April 30, 2014, meeting with Petitioner.7/ The board members asked Petitioner several questions about her son's condition. Petitioner informed the Board of Directors that her son was not on any medication to treat his anxiety, nor was he receiving any mental health counseling or therapy. Petitioner told the Board of Directors that she had diagnosed the child as having problems with anxiety. The Board of Directors also asked her how her son was performing in school and learned that he was enrolled in the gifted learning program at his school.8/ As a result of the meeting, the Board of Directors concluded: (1) that it did not have enough information to determine whether the child was limited in his ability to live in the unit; (2) that he had a disability; or (3) that the pet was medically necessary for him. As a follow-up to that meeting, on May 19, 2014, the Association's counsel sent a letter to Petitioner. The letter outlined the Board of Directors' position and speaks for itself. See Resp. Ex. 2(i). The letter stated in relevant part: At this time, the Board of Directors can neither approve your request for an accommodation nor can it provide an exception to its "no pet" policy. You have been unable to provide information that supports that your son suffers from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his daily activities. There has been no documentation to support that your son has been diagnosed or treated for a disability. More importantly, you have not provided relevant information that your son has a disability or that the dog helps alleviate any identified symptoms. The letter concluded by demanding that the dog, Jake, be removed from the condominium unit no later than Monday, June 2, 2014.9/ Nearly a year of "radio silence" passed with no activity by either party. The Association did not check on the removal of the pet, and Petitioner did not remove the dog despite the demand by the Association. A year later, on May 15, 2015, the Association acted and sent another letter to Petitioner demanding that she remove the pet. Again, Petitioner did not remove the pet. On June 4, 2015, the Association filed a petition for mandatory non-binding arbitration with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Ultimately, the arbitrator entered an order on November 19, 2015, staying the arbitration case until the resolution of the discrimination complaint filed by Petitioner with FCHR. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that during the meeting on April 30, 2014, with the Board of Directors, that other than the letter(s) from Dr. Socarras, and an identification certificate for their pet dog Jake, there was no other medical information or documentation provided by Petitioner to assist Respondent in reviewing and evaluating her request for the accommodation to keep Jake in the unit.10/ As a related topic, the Board of Directors had previously approved service animals for at least two (2) other residents.11/ One resident had suffered a stroke and needed assistance to walk. Another resident had a serious medical condition and was allowed to keep a service animal which was trained to detect the onset of the person's medical condition. In both instances, the Board of Directors followed the same process followed in Petitioner's case. Letters were sent and meetings were held. However, in the cases where a service animal was approved, the Board of Directors requested and was provided medical records which it relied upon to conclude that a service animal was needed as a reasonable accommodation. Prior to this hearing before DOAH, the Board of Directors had not been informed, and no claim was made, that "learning" was a major life activity that was substantially impaired by A.C.'s anxiety.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2016.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.11760.20760.23760.35760.37
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CAROLYN HENKE vs AMERON HOMES, INC., 18-003532 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebastian, Florida Jul. 09, 2018 Number: 18-003532 Latest Update: Feb. 06, 2019

The Issue Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.

Findings Of Fact On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work. The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was $198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552. Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015. Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges. Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include: Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract. Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost (above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately $2,000). Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel. Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway. Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately $1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation. General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away. Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.) Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a man. Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/ Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/ Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf. Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs. Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons. Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way. Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of $170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract. In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following: Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost. Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore, Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.) Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner $2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased. Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material. Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality. Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost. Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost. General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found. Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.) Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower. Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.

USC (3) 2 U.S.C 360142 U.S.C 360242 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.34760.35760.37
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. LOUIS E. SMITH, 87-001377 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001377 Latest Update: Feb. 01, 1988

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On November 20, 1985, License Number B03139 was issued to Swan Care Homes II to operate as an adult congregate living facility. This license was issued to Wayne Veccitto, who was a tenant of respondent and his wife. The expiration date of the license was May 19, 1986. Due to the facts that Mr. Veccitto had not made his rental payments in several months and the property was falling into disrepair, respondent evicted Mr. Veccitto on or about May 1, 1986. Respondent and his wife operated the facility during the month of May, 1986, and advertised for someone else to live in the facility and operate it. Neither the respondent nor his wife desired to personally operate the facility. According to the respondent, the Millers responded to his advertisement and began operating the facility around June 1, 1986. On June 9, 1986, the petitioner received an application dated June 6, 1986, from respondent's wife to operate the subject property as an adult congregate living facility. By letter dated June 16, 1986, respondent's wife was advised that her application for initial license was incomplete and that no further action on the application would be taken until the requested information was received. This letter further advised that it was unlawful to offer adult congregate living facility services or to advertise such services without having obtained a valid license. Respondent was aware of this correspondence but was not concerned because he knew the Millers were assuming the operation of the facility. On June 27, 1986, a representative of the petitioner conducted a complaint investigative visit to the facility. At that time, there were residents at the facility and a couple in charge of the facility who stated that they were working for the respondent. There was no valid license for the facility on June 27, 1986. By letter dated July 2, 1986, and received by the petitioner on July 7, 1986, respondent requested petitioner to rescind or void his application for licensure and to accept an enclosed application from Dorothy V. Miller for the same facility. The respondent and his wife have owned and/or operated approximately 12 adult congregate living facilities in Michigan and 5 or 6 in Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent Louis E. Smith be found guilty of violating Section 400.407(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and that an administrative fine of $1,000.00 be imposed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 1st day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1988. APPENDIX (Case No. 87-1377) The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: 2. Last sentence rejected as immaterial. 5. Reference to Exhibit 2 is rejected. The proper Exhibit Number is 6. Also, no competent evidence to support the statement that Exhibit 6 was rejected by HRS. COPIES FURNISHED: Gaye Reese, Esquire Office of Licensure and Certification 7827 N. Dale Mabry Hwy. Tampa, Florida 33614 Louis E. Smith 6060 Shore Blvd. South Gulfport, FL 33707 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

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PARENT SUPPORT, LLC, D/B/A CARES TREATMENT vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 18-000234 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 11, 2018 Number: 18-000234 Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's applications to renew licenses for two Residential Level II facilities in Davenport, Florida, should be denied and a $2,500.00 fine imposed for the reasons given in the Department of Children and Families' (Department) Amended Denial of Applications & Imposition of Fines issued on February 8, 2018.

Findings Of Fact Background The Department is charged with the responsibility of regulating the licensing and operation of residential treatment facilities pursuant to chapter 397, Florida Statutes (2017). Petitioner is a Delaware limited liability corporation authorized to conduct business in the State of Florida. Subject to the outcome of this proceeding, Petitioner is licensed to operate two Residential Level II facilities in Davenport under the name Cares Treatment. One facility is located at 146 Sunset View Drive (Case No. 18-0230), the other at 389 Sand Ridge Drive (Case No. 18-0234). The licenses were issued on December 15, 2016, and were to expire on December 14, 2017. Each license authorizes Petitioner to "provide substance abuse services for Adults and/or Children/Adolescents for the following component: Residential Level 2 (6 beds)."4/ Resp. Ex. 2. The Torres family home is not a licensed facility and services cannot be provided to residents who reside at that location. Petitioner is not licensed to provide services under the Partial Hospitalization Program (PHP), the Outpatient Program (OP), or the Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP).5/ These services require a separate license from the Department. In December 2017, Petitioner filed with the Department new applications to provide those services. However, the applications were denied and no appeal was taken. According to the renewal applications, Petitioner provides a "residential treatment facility for children and adolescents." Resp. Ex. 3. Each facility "is a free-standing residential facility which provides a structured living environment within a system of care approach for children, adolescents and adult[s] who have a primary diagnosis of mental illness or emotional disturbance and who may also have other disabilities." Id. Petitioner's facilities are a family-run business. Roberto Torres, Jr. (Mr. Torres), is the Chief Executive Officer and manager of the limited liability corporation; Cecilia Torres, his wife, is the Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer; Karla Torres, a daughter, is the Vice President/Chief Administrative Officer; Roberto Torres, III (the son), is the Secretary/Chief Information Officer; and Kristina Torres, a daughter, is the Ambassador/Chief Relationship Officer. Resp. Ex. 4. On November 27, 2017, Petitioner filed its applications for renewal of the two licenses. On December 1, 2017, the Department issued separate, but identical, letters denying both applications on the grounds they were not timely filed and they were incomplete. Resp. Ex. 5. On February 16, 2018, the Department was authorized to amend its letters of denial with a single amended denial document, which combined the original charges in the two letters into Counts I and II and added new Counts III, IV, and V. Resp. Ex. 1. The amended denial letter also seeks to impose a $2,500.00 administrative fine for violating various Class II rules. The specific rules are not identified in the original or amended charging documents, but the Department's PRO cites Florida Administrative Code Rule 65D- 30.003(1)(a) and "rules set forth in 65D-30" as the rules on which it relies. Because proper notice of the specific rules was not given, the rule violations have not been considered. The charges in the amended denial letter can be summarized as follows: Count I - The application for the facility at 146 Sunset View Drive was not timely filed and was incomplete in violation of sections 397.403 and 397.407(8). Count II - The application for the facility at 389 Sand Ridge Drive was not timely filed and was incomplete in violation of sections 397.403 and 397.407(8). Count III - In November 2016, O.G., a 16-year-old female who had been recently discharged from a Baker Act facility, was admitted for treatment of substance abuse and mental health issues. After residing a few months at the Sunset View location, she was moved to the Torres family home, an unlicensed facility, where she remained for one or two months. By providing services at that unlicensed location, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1). She was then moved to the Sand Ridge location for two or three months before being returned to the Torres family home. She continued to receive substance abuse treatment at the family home until her discharge two or three months later. This constitutes a second violation of the same statute. While under the care of Petitioner, O.G. was subjected to actions which resulted in verified abuse reports against Mr. Torres and his son and contributed to the delinquency and exploitation of a child. Such conduct constitutes a threat to the health or safety of O.G. in violation of section 397.415(1)(d). Count IV - On October 19, 2017, J.W., who transferred from a Baker Act facility, was accepted by Petitioner for care and to receive "partial hospitalization program" services, which Petitioner is not licensed to provide. This constitutes a violation of sections 397.401(1) and 397.415(1)(a)2.c. J.W. was later discharged in contravention of his wishes and desires, which resulted in him relapsing and again being Baker Acted. This conduct constitutes a threat to J.W.'s health or safety in violation of section 397.415(1)(d). Count V - On January 23, 2018, the Department attempted to conduct an onsite inspection at both licensed facilities to review J.W.'s files, but was denied access to the premises. Petitioner later failed to respond to a written request by the Department for records relating to J.W. and O.G. This conduct constitutes a violation of section 397.411. The charging document asserts the conduct in Count III violates four Class II rules (not otherwise identified), for which a $500.00 fine should be imposed for each violation; and the conduct described in Count IV violates "applicable" Class II rules (not otherwise identified), for which a single $500.00 penalty should be imposed. Rule 65D-30.003(1)(a), the only rule cited in the Department's PRO, requires in relevant part that "all substance abuse components" be provided "by persons or entities that are licensed by the department pursuant to Section 397.401, F. S." The Charges Counts I and II Section 397.407(8) provides that "the Department may deny a renewal application submitted fewer than 30 days before the license expires." For Petitioner to meet this deadline, license renewal applications were due on or before November 15, 2017. An application is not considered filed until an application with the signature of the chief executive officer is submitted by the applicant. Around 3:30 p.m. on November 27, 2017, Mr. Torres spoke by telephone with Ms. Harmon, the Department System of Care Coordinator, regarding three new licensure applications he was filing. During the conversation, he was reminded that renewal applications for his two existing licenses had not been filed. Mr. Torres responded that he "would have to get on that." Properly signed renewal applications were submitted electronically at 5:00 p.m. and 5:42 p.m. that afternoon. In his cross-examination, Mr. Torres attempted to establish that the Department's website, the Provider Licensing and Designation System (PLADS), was periodically inoperative, and this prevented him from filing his on-line applications in a timely manner. However, there is no credible evidence to support this claim. In fact, after Mr. Torres raised this issue early on in the case, Ms. Harmon reviewed the activity log of Mr. Torres' two on-line applications and found that he began the application process in late August or early September 2017, but did nothing further until he hit the submit button after speaking with her on November 27, 2017. Also, during this same period of time, the PLADS program (to which all applicants have access) indicated that the applications were in "Waiting Approval" status, which meant the applications were "in process" but had never been submitted. Therefore, the applications were not timely filed.6/ Section 397.403(1)(f) requires license applications to include, among other things, "proof of satisfactory fire, safety, and health inspections." Neither application filed on November 27, 2017, included an updated Treatment Resource Affidavit, a current Fire and Safety Inspection form, and a complete and current Health Facility and Food Inspection form. Therefore, the applications filed on November 27, 2017, were incomplete. Count III On November 17, 2016, O.G., then a 16-year-old female, was admitted for treatment at the facility. O.G. had a history of bi-polar episodes, depression, and drug abuse. Before seeking treatment at Petitioner's facility, she had been Baker Acted twice. After learning about Petitioner's facility through another provider, O.G.'s family placed her in the facility to address her substance abuse and behavior problems. Upon admission, a treatment plan was devised by a licensed mental health counselor (LMHC), with a target completion date of May 17, 2017. Resp. Ex. 10. The treatment plan listed four staff members overseeing her case: Karla Torres (case manager); the LMHC; and S.F. and K.V., two "caregivers" or interns. Id. O.G. was discharged from the facility nine months later on August 14, 2017. Petitioner was paid approximately $166,000.00 by O.G.'s parents for her nine-month stay. O.G. was initially placed in the facility located at 146 Sunset Drive, where she remained for approximately three months. She was then moved to the Torres family home at 2347 Victoria Drive in Davenport for two or three months. The Torres home is not a licensed facility. By housing her at an unlicensed location and providing services during that period of time, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1), which makes it unlawful to provide substance abuse services at an unlicensed location. O.G.'s parents were unaware that their daughter was residing in the unlicensed family home. After Mr. Torres and O.G. "got into an argument," she was moved to the facility at 389 Sands Drive for several months. She then returned to the Torres home, where she remained for two or three months until she was discharged. By housing her at an unlicensed location and providing substance abuse services, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1) a second time. During her stay at the Torres home, Mr. Torres discussed "sex" with O.G.; he told her that he cheated on his wife; and he complimented her "quite a few times" for having "a nice body." He also told her that "18" was a special age and if she were 18 years old, things would be different. He added that her parents were "too strict." These highly inappropriate comments were especially egregious in nature, given the fact that O.G. was a minor with mental health and substance abuse issues, and she was living in the licensee's family home. One photograph of O.G. taken in the home shows Mr. Torres standing in the background donned in his pajamas. Resp. Ex. 16. These actions constitute a violation of section 397.415(1)(d)2., which makes it unlawful to commit an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of an individual receiving services from the provider. Mr. Torres occasionally escorted O.G. to two local bars (Miller's Ale House and Marrakesh Hooka Lounge) in Champions Gate. On one visit to Miller's Ale House in April or May 2017, he purchased her a Blue Moon beer, even though she was a minor and in a substance abuse program. She consumed the beer in his presence while the two sat at the bar. Although Mr. Torres attempted (through argument) to deny the incident, O.G. filmed the event on her cell phone. Resp. Ex. 13. This action by him also constitutes a violation of section 397.415(1)(d)2. Petitioner argues in its PRO that the whole incident was a fabrication and the result of a conspiracy by O.G.'s father, the Tampa Police Department, and Department counsel. The contention is rejected. When O.G. was discharged from the residential treatment facility in August 2017, Petitioner enrolled her in another program, IOP, which required her to periodically return to the facility on weekends for further treatment. Her first return visit was the weekend of August 26, 2017. During the weekend visit, the son gave her a cell phone. O.G.'s admission document for the IOP program indicated she would be given IOP services for 60 to 90 days, with a goal of her being substance free at the end of that period. Resp. Ex. 24. There is no record of her being discharged from the program. The Department argues in its PRO that by providing IOP services to O.G., Petitioner was providing a service beyond the scope of its license. However, this allegation was not included in the amended charging document and has not been considered. See, e.g., Trevisani v. Dep't of Health, 908 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)(a licensee may not be disciplined for an offense not charged in the complaint). After being discharged from her original treatment plan on August 14, 2017, O.G. returned to her mother's home. Except for one weekend visit to Petitioner's facility for IOP services, she remained at home until September 16, 2017. That day, O.G. ran away from home with Preston, a resident she had met at Petitioner's facility. After leaving home, she went to Melbourne, and then to West Palm Beach. A Missing/Endangered Runaway Juvenile bulletin was posted by law enforcement on October 5, 2017. Resp. Ex. 11. During this period of time, Petitioner’s records show that O.G. was still enrolled in the unlicensed IOP program. Resp. Ex. 24. While in the West Palm Beach area, O.G. contacted the son on the cell phone he had given her and told him she had run away from home. She asked him to send her some money so that she could go to Tampa to work in a strip club. Because O.G. was not old enough to accept a wire money transfer, the son wired $600.00 to a friend of O.G., who gave her the money. Using the money provided by the son, O.G. traveled to Tampa and met the son on September 30, 2017. The two went to Todd Couples Superstore, where he purchased several adult entertainment outfits she could wear to audition for a job in a strip club. Resp. Ex. 12. He also purchased her various personal items at a Walgreens. The son then drove her to several clubs to audition for a job. After several auditions, she was hired by Scores Tampa, a local strip joint where "people take off their clothes for money." O.G., who was only 17 years old at the time, signed an employment contract on September 30, 2017, using a borrowed driver's license of S.F., a 21-year-old female. Resp. Ex. 15. S.F. was a former intern at Petitioner's facility and is listed as a member of the team staff on O.G.'s initial treatment plan. By that time, S.F. had left Petitioner's facility and moved back to Tampa. That same evening, O.G. began working in Scores Tampa. O.G. says she took off her clothes while performing. The son remained in the club while she worked. After she got off work at 2:00 a.m., he drove her to S.F.'s house. O.G. continued working at the club for the next few days. With the assistance of local law enforcement, O.G. returned to her mother's home on October 7, 2017. After she ran away from home, and even while working in the club, O.G. maintained contact with Mr. Torres through texts and Facetime and asked him not to report her whereabouts to anyone. Although O.G.'s mother spoke to Mr. Torres on several occasions after O.G. went missing in September 2017, neither Mr. Torres nor the son informed her of the daughter's whereabouts. On November 30, 2017, the Department received a report of alleged human trafficking and sexual exploitation of a child. The alleged perpetrator was the son, while the victim was identified as O.G. Because the son was an employee of Petitioner, an institutional investigation was conducted. The investigation was closed on December 26, 2017, with a confirmed report of Human Trafficking-Commercial Exploitation of a Child against the son. Resp. Ex. 17. During the investigation, Mr. Torres and members of his family declined to be interviewed or answer any questions. Instead, they referred all questions to their attorney. On February 6, 2018, the Department received another report of abuse involving Mr. Torres. The report alleged that in April or May 2017, Mr. Torres transported O.G. to a bar at Miller's Ale House in "Davenport" [sic] and purchased her a beer. After an institutional investigation, the file was closed on March 1, 2018, as verified for Substance Misuse – Alcohol against Mr. Torres. Resp. Ex. 18. See also Finding of Fact 18. Mr. Torres declined to participate in the investigation. By clear and convincing evidence, the Department established that the actions of Mr. Torres and his son presented a threat to the health or safety of O.G. in contravention of section 397.415(1)(d)2. Count IV J.W., who did not testify, is a 42-year-old male who was discharged from a hospital on October 9, 2017 (after being Baker Acted), and admitted to Petitioner's facility the same day to receive PHP services. He was diagnosed as having mental health and substance abuse issues and a history of suicidality. He voluntarily left the facility on November 9, 2017. In its PRO, Petitioner characterizes J.W. as "a disgruntled addict." While a resident at the facility, J.W. received a few video sessions with a Miami Springs psychiatrist, who was identified on the renewal applications as the facility medical director, and he was given online counseling sessions for two weeks by an LMHC, who resided in Palm Bay and worked as an independent contractor with the facility. Neither professional was told by Mr. Torres that Petitioner was not licensed to provide PHP services. By providing PHP services to J.W., Petitioner violated sections 397.401(1) and 397.415(1)(a)2.c. According to the LMHC, on October 24, 2017, she was directed by Mr. Torres, who is not a licensed clinician, to "discharge" J.W. from the PHP program and place him in a lower level of care, Sober Living. Resp. Ex. 25. This would still allow J.W. to remain a resident at the facility but not receive the PHP services. Although the charging document alleges that J.W. did not wish to be discharged from the PHP program, and this caused him to have a relapse in his condition and later Baker Acted again, there is no competent evidence to establish this string of events. Count V Section 397.411 requires all licensees to provide Department representatives access to their facilities and to allow the inspection of pertinent records. Based upon information from a provider in Jacksonville that Mr. Torres had requested its assistance in providing PHP services to J.W., the Department instituted an investigation of Petitioner. In January 2018, the Department attempted to conduct an onsite inspection of Petitioner's facilities and to review the files relating to J.W. The inspectors were denied entry. Thereafter, the Department sent a written request to Petitioner for the records of J.W. and O.G. No records were provided and Petitioner failed to respond to the request. These actions constituted a violation of section 397.411. At hearing, Mr. Torres contended (through argument) that because the Department had already taken preliminary action on December 1, 2017, to deny his applications, there was no requirement that he provide access to the facility or respond to written requests for records. This assertion has been rejected. See § 397.411(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (an application for licensure as a service provider constitutes full permission for an authorized agent of the department to enter and inspect at any time).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the applications for renewal of Petitioner's two licenses. An administrative fine should not be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2018.

Florida Laws (5) 397.401397.403397.407397.411397.415
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DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs. LANA STEPHENS, F/K/A GREGORY H. STEPHENS, 87-005594 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-005594 Latest Update: Mar. 29, 1988

Findings Of Fact During the 1985-86 school year Respondent Gregory Hunter Stephens was a student in the tenth grade at Miami Sunset Senior High School. On April 18, 1986, during the lunch period Respondent drove into the faculty parking lot in his Corvette with the police following closely behind. It was determined that during his lunch break Respondent had been driving his Corvette in a nearby condominium development threatening residents and throwing beer cans on the lawns. The residents had summoned the police. An Assistant Principal held a conference with Respondent's father whose response was that the police should have better things to do than to bother his son for drinking beer and driving around during his lunch break. Respondent was given a three-day suspension. On May 22, 1986, Respondent got into a fight in class, a Group III violation of the Code of Student Conduct. A conference was held with Respondent's father, and Respondent was given a ten-day suspension. Although other informal discussions were held with Respondent's father during that school year, by the end of the third grading period Respondent's grades were one "C," one "D," and 4 "Fs." His absences from his classes during the third grading period alone ranged between 2 and 13. He received only a "3" for his effort in each and every class. During the 1985-86 school year, Respondent was absent 95 days out of the 180-day school year. On March 3, 1987, an Assistant Principal observed Respondent leaving the campus during Respondent's second-period class. He stopped Respondent and gave him a warning. A few minutes later he caught Respondent again attempting to leave. Respondent's mother was contacted, and Respondent was given a "work detail detention." On April 2, 1987, a fight broke out off campus between a group of Latin students and a group of Anglo students. On the following day Respondent admitted to an Assistant Principal that he was one of the participants. All of the students involved (including Respondent) were suspended for three days for that Group III Code violation. On October 19, 1987, Respondent was nearly involved in a collision in the parking lot. Respondent got out of his car and started pushing the other driver. A fight ensued. Respondent's parents were contacted, and he was given a ten-day suspension. By the time of the October 19th incident, Respondent had already been absent 6 days that school year. Further, although the Assistant Principal had two conferences with Respondent's father during the month of October, Respondent was receiving one "C," one "D," and five "Fs" in his classes. A Child Study Team was convened, and a meeting was held on November 3, 1987. Respondent and his parents refused to attend. The Team recommended that Respondent be transferred to Douglas MacArthur Senior High School-South, based upon the October 19, 1987, incident, his failing grades during the most-recent two years, and Respondent's chronic aggressive behavior which constituted a threat to the welfare of the other students. It was determined that Respondent required assistance a normal school could not provide and that a structured environment would be more appropriate since the educators at Miami Sunset Senior High School had unsuccessfully attempted to modify Respondent's behavior by conferences between Respondent and a counselor, meetings between Respondent's parents and assistant principals, indoor suspensions, outdoor suspensions, and work detail suspensions

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assigning Respondent Gregory Hunter Stephens to the opportunity school program at Douglas MacArthur Senior High School-South until such time as his performance reveals that he can be returned to the regular school program. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of March, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675, Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: JOSEPH A. FERNANDEZ, SUPERINTENDENT SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY 1410 NORTHEAST SECOND AVENUE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132 FRANK R. HARDER, ESQUIRE 175 FONTAINEBLEAU BOULEVARD SUITE 2A-3 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33172 LANA STEPHENS 15490 S.W. 85TH LANE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33183 MADELYN P. SCHERE, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT BOARD ATTORNEY DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1410 NORTHEAST SECOND AVENUE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132 PHYLLIS O. DOUGLAS, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT BOARD ATTORNEY DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1410 NORTHEAST SECOND AVENUE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs. LILLIAN MCKAHAND, 82-000129 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000129 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1982

Findings Of Fact Respondent has for twelve years been an instructional employee of the School Board of Broward County, Florida. She currently holds a continuing contract as a classroom teacher, and is assigned to Perry Elementary School in Miramar, Florida. During the same time period, Harold McKahand, Respondent's husband, and Peggy Freeman were instructional employees of the Broward County School Board assigned to Perry Middle School, adjacent to Perry Elementary where Respondent taught. From as early as 1979, Respondent had suspected that her husband and Mrs. Freeman were having a love affair. These suspicions were a frequent topic of conversation between Respondent and her husband. In fact, Respondent had indicated to her husband her intention to seek a divorce. Notwithstanding Mr. McKahand's assurances that he did not want a divorce and would no longer see Mrs. Freeman, he continued to do so, and Mrs. Freeman on many occasions made telephone calls to the McKahand residence, which Respondent apparently considered harassing in nature. All of this culminated in a discussion between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman in August of 1981 in which Respondent requested that Mrs. Freeman cease making telephone calls to her home because they disturbed her and her two children. After this discussion between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman, there was little or no personal contact between them until the act which gave rise to this proceeding. On December 12, 1981, Respondent, her husband and two children attended a racquetball tournament. After the tournament, they returned to their home and Respondent busied herself with work around the home. Respondent's husband, unbeknownst to Respondent, took the family car and proceeded to Perry Middle School to obtain some work folders from his office. Upon arriving at Perry Middle School, Mr. McKahand discovered Mrs. Freeman conducting a Saturday afternoon basketball practice with the school's girls basketball team, which she served as coach. Mr. McKahand and Mrs. Freeman conversed briefly, and Mr. McKahand departed the school and returned home. Meanwhile, Respondent's oldest son had left the family home without performing certain chores which had been assigned to him by Respondent. Upon discovering her son's absence, Respondent took her bicycle and began to search the neighborhood for him. Her search carried her ultimately to the gymnasium at Perry Middle School. Respondent had no knowledge that her husband had gone to his office at Perry Middle School, nor did she know that Mrs. Freeman was conducting a basketball practice at the school. When Respondent arrived at the school, she walked into the gymnasium to see if her son was there. Upon entering the gym, she saw the basketball practice in session, and noticed Mrs. Freeman. When she did not see her son, Respondent started walking from the gym. A member of the girls basketball team advised Mrs. Freeman that Mrs. McKahand was at the door. Although there is some conflict in the testimony on this point, it appears that Mrs. McKahand did not beckon to Mrs. Freeman to follow her outside the gym, but that one of the team players told Mrs. Freeman of Respondent's presence, and indicated to Mrs. Freeman that Respondent wanted to talk to her. Upon being advised of this, Mrs. Freeman walked across the basketball court, picked up her purse from a table, and proceeded to the gym door through which Respondent had exited. By this time Respondent was outside the gym. Mrs. Freeman forcefully opened the gymnasium door behind which Respondent was standing, striking Respondent on the arm. As Mrs. Freeman exited the door, she and Respondent grabbed one another and a fight ensued. The girls basketball team members were at various positions inside the gymnasium at the time the scuffle between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman started. It is clear from the record, however, that each of the students were located behind Mrs. Freeman and, therefore, were not in the best of positions to observe the precise manner in which the conflict started. It is also equally clear that the physical confrontation between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman occurred quickly and spontaneously, and, as a result, the various eye-witness accounts contained in this record predictably contain varying and conflicting versions of the events leading up to and culminating in the scuffle between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman. During the course of their physical confrontation, Mrs. Freeman placed one of her hands on Respondent's throat and the other in Respondent's hair, and Respondent reciprocated, pushing Mrs. Freeman against the gymnasium wall. Several blows were exchanged between the two women. Although the gymnasium door had closed behind Mrs. Freeman, several of the basketball team members followed the two teachers out the door and attempted to separate them. After the fight began, there is no evidence that Respondent acted other than in defense of the actions of Mrs. Freeman. When the students were finally successful in separating the two combatants, Respondent began looking for her sunglasses, which had fallen off, and Mrs. Freeman retrieved her purse, which she had dropped during the altercation. Upon finding her purse, Mrs. Freeman called to several of the students to stand back, whereupon she removed a .22 calibre pistol from her purse, and fired at least two shots. Respondent, upon observing Mrs. Freeman to be armed, began to run from the school premises, retrieved her bicycle, and retreated to her home. Apparently unsatisfied with these results, Mrs. Freeman incredibly loaded several of the team members, including some of the students who testified in this proceeding, into her car, where she reloaded her weapon. Mrs. Freeman then proceeded to drive in a reckless manner, including running several stop signs, to Respondent's home. Upon arriving at Respondent's home, Mrs. Freeman pulled her car into the driveway, took her pistol, got out of her car, and again confronted the Respondent who was standing in her driveway with her two children. Respondent picked up a broom in her garage and got her two children to stand behind her in an attempt to shield them from Mrs. Freeman. Mr. McKahand, who was inside the home during this time, came outside, and ultimately was able to get Respondent inside their home. Mrs. Freeman then departed the McKahand residence, but shortly thereafter began making harassing telephone calls to the McKahand home. Later that afternoon, Mr. McKahand attempted to take Respondent to her part-time job in a local department store, but was prevented from doing so when Mrs. Freeman attempted to run the McKahand car off the street with her vehicle, and further fired upon the McKahands with her pistol. As previously indicated, Petitioner has charged Respondent with referring to Mrs. Freeman as a "bitch" during the course of their fight. Respondent denies making such a statement, and the only testimony in the record which would establish a finding that such a statement was made is contained in the conflicting testimony of Mrs. Freeman and Rachel Geathers, one of the student basketball players. Mrs. Freeman's testimony in this regard, which the Hearing Officer hereby finds unworthy of belief, was that Respondent referred to her as a "filthy bitch" as Mrs. Freeman exited the gymnasium door. Ms. Geathers' testimony was that Respondent referred to Mrs. Freeman as a "bitch" after the two combatants had exited the gym and enough time had passed to allow all of the basketball players to run through the door and outside the gym. Ms. Geathers' testimony in this regard is also rejected, in that several of the other students who were in a better position to observe and hear Respondent and Mrs. Freeman testified that they heard no such statement made. Accordingly, it is specifically concluded that the evidence in this case fails to establish Respondent's use of profanity in the presence of students as alleged in the Petition. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding to indicate the Respondent's effectiveness as an employee of the Broward County School System has in any way been adversely affected by the above-described events. In fact, Respondent's principal and grade chairman both testified that Respondent is a good teacher, and they would welcome her back on the faculty of Perry Elementary School should she be absolved of the allegations involved in this proceeding. Even a cursory review of the record in this case will reveal sharp divergencies and conflicts in the testimony of several witnesses. In attempting to resolve these conflicts, the Hearing officer has observed the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, their interest, if any, in the outcome of this proceeding, together with any motive, bias or prejudice which might affect their credibility. Further, the Hearing Officer has also taken into account the conditions existing at the time of the incident observed by the witnesses in weighing the credibility to be attached to the various accounts contained in this record. In so doing, the Hearing Officer has concluded that Respondent did not go to the Perry Middle School gymnasium seeking a confrontation with Mrs. Freeman. Indeed, the record clearly establishes that Respondent did not know Mrs. Freeman was even at the gymnasium on the date in question. Further, it is concluded, despite some evidence to the contrary, that Respondent did not summon Mrs. Freeman to follow her outside the gymnasium, but that Mrs. Freeman was induced to do so as a result of a student telling her that someone was outside the gym to see her. Finally, the quality as opposed to the quantity of the evidence in this case does not support a factual conclusion that Respondent, in fact, initiated the physical confrontation with Mrs. Freeman. Because of her conduct at the time of the incident, and further because of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in Mrs. Freeman's testimony at the final hearing in this cause, her testimony, in its entirety, is worthy of little credibility. Because of this, her testimony that Respondent initiated the fight has been found unworthy of belief. The testimony of Mrs. Freeman's students, several of whom testified that the first aggressive gesture they saw was made by Respondent, is tainted both by their admitted allegiance to their teacher, Mrs. Freeman, and by their physical positioning which would not admit a particularly clear view of the incident. Conversely, the factual version of this incident given by Respondent in her testimony was, in every particular, more plausible than that contained in the testimony of either the students or Mrs. Freeman. At the time of the above- described incident, almost three and one-half months had passed since Respondent had last spoken in person with Mrs. Freeman. The Respondent did not know that Mrs. Freeman was at the gymnasium when she arrived there looking for her son. As a result, there could not have been any premeditated design on the part of Respondent to assault Mrs. Freeman and, due to the passage of time since her last contact with Mrs. Freeman, there is no apparent motive of record to explain a spontaneous assault. As a result, the only way to resolve the conflict in the testimony concerning how this altercation originated is to weigh the credibility of the various participants. Making such a choice is perhaps the most difficult task a finder of fact must face in a proceeding such as this, but by applying the aforementioned factors, the Hearing Officer has determined that in the areas of conflict, the testimony of the Respondent is more credible than that of either Mrs. Freeman or her students.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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GABRIEL SAUERS vs LIANG JIAN AND DOINGHUI LEE, OWNERS, 14-000047 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jan. 08, 2014 Number: 14-000047 Latest Update: Jul. 30, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, Liang Jian and Doinghui Lee (Owners), discriminated against Petitioner, Gabriel Sauers (Sauers), through actions of the Owners’ representative, Joseph Palmer (Palmer), on the basis of Sauers' purported handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Sauers is a young Caucasian male with purported disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder, ADHD, Oppositional Defiance Disorder, and others. He is a high school graduate, having received his education in an exceptional student education class. Sauers did not testify as to whether he is currently employed. He receives food stamps and Supplemental Security Income from the Social Security Administration. That income appears to be his sole means of support. The Owners (who did not appear at the final hearing) are Asians. The property at issue (referred to herein as the Apartments) is a multi-family residential building located at 419 North Wild Olive Avenue. At all times relevant hereto, Sauers was residing in Apartment #7, an efficiency apartment. In October 2012, Sauers rented a one-bedroom apartment from the Owners. Palmer was the manager of the Apartments and handled the negotiations with Sauers for the apartment. After a short time living in the apartment, Sauers asked to rent the efficiency apartment instead of the apartment he had originally leased. There was a difference of about $100 per month in rent between the two apartments. On or about November 1, 2012, Sauers moved into the efficiency apartment, i.e., Apartment #7. Sauers had inspected the apartment and did not list any concerns on his written lease agreement. After living for a short time in the efficiency, Sauers asked for a different refrigerator because the one in the efficiency was too small. He asked that the refrigerator from his prior apartment be moved down to the efficiency or that one be purchased for the efficiency as a replacement. Palmer told Sauers that he (Sauers) could purchase a refrigerator and Palmer would give him a $100 credit on his rent. Sauers never purchased a refrigerator and Palmer did not take any further action on Sauers’ request. While living in the efficiency, Sauers heard loud music being played in one of the other apartments on a regular basis. Sauers’ efficiency was in a building other than where the other apartments were located, but it was in close proximity. Sauers also reported seeing drug transactions taking place around the Apartments. He reported his findings to Palmer, but Palmer just told him to call the police. Sauers called the police on multiple occasions. Sauers had arguments and disagreements with other residents residing in the apartment complex. He admitted that his psychological conditions caused him to argue with other residents from time to time, but said he was singled out by some residents. Sauers raised complaints about the presence of palmetto bugs and roaches in his efficiency. However, the entire complex was under an extermination contract and Ryan’s Pest Control came out regularly to spray for insects. Some invoices and statements from Ryan’s were offered into evidence, but Sauers maintains they only address a few days of his residence at the Apartments. It is likely there were bugs in the efficiency; it is also true that Palmer and the Owners attempted to minimize the problem by having regular pest control service. The stove/oven in the efficiency was improperly grounded when Sauers moved in. He received several electrical shocks when touching the stove. Palmer was made aware of the problem and contracted with Parks Electric Company to remedy the situation. On April 25, 2013, the stove was rewired to alleviate the electrical problem. The Owners had a policy in place that tenants would pay their rent by way of a certified check or money order. Sauers often requested and was allowed to pay in cash. Sauers complained frequently to Palmer about the condition of the efficiency, the dangerous environment around the apartment complex, and other real or imagined problems. Sauers’ father, who helped Sauers move into the apartment complex and notified Palmer about some of Sauers’ disabilities, agreed that the area around the Apartments seemed unsafe. The father, a large man, was accosted on one of his visits to the Apartment, by some unknown person. Sometimes Sauers’ mother would call Palmer to ask questions or raise concerns. She was never able to reach him via telephone, but Palmer returned her calls--to Sauers’ father’s phone--on many occasions. It is abundantly clear that Sauers and Palmer do not get along well. When Sauers was absent from his apartment for several weeks in the summer of 2013, Palmer assumed that the efficiency had been abandoned. He placed a three-day notice on the door of the efficiency, telling Sauers he had to pay the rent which was due or that eviction proceedings would be commenced. When notified that Sauers did not plan to return to the apartment, Palmer went in--only to find that the efficiency was filthy and required significant cleaning. Sauers claims discrimination on the part of the Owners because Palmer had asked him to vacate the apartment at one point in time. The suggestion, made by Palmer, was based on Palmer’s perception that Sauers was extremely unhappy living at the apartment complex. Sauers failed to show that any other residents at the complex were treated differently or that Sauers was denied any reasonable accommodations for his needs.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gabriel Sauers in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Paul Kelton, Esquire Paul, Elkind and Branz 142 East New York Avenue Deland, Florida 32724 Gabriel P. Sauers Unit 1 1111 Ocean Shore Boulevard Ormond Beach, Florida 32176 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.34760.37
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THE HENRY AND RILLA WHITE YOUTH FOUNDATION, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 08-003969BID (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 15, 2008 Number: 08-003969BID Latest Update: Nov. 26, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's decision to reject all bids in DJJ Solicitation Number: RFP# P2043 was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent.

Findings Of Fact Parties DJJ is a state agency whose mission is to reduce juvenile delinquency. One of the methods used to attempt to attain this goal is through the provision of community-based intervention services programs for boys and girls. EYA and the White Foundation, both of whom are not-for- profit foundations, are contractors who are in the business of providing community-based intervention services for boys and girls. There are about 320 to 360 contracts between DJJ and private contractors. Both EYA and the White Foundation, at all times pertinent, had contracts with DJJ. The White Foundation operates only non-residential programs. EYA operates both non- residential and residential programs. Background In RFP#R2043 dated April 30, 2008, DJJ solicited requests for proposals for a contract to provide, "A 120-slot community based intervention program for boys and girls in Circuit 5 (Marion, Citrus, Hernando, Sumter, and Lake Counties, as described in the Scope of Services (Exhibit 1)." EYA is the current operator of the program and continues to operate the program pursuant to an extension of their current contract. That extension is set to expire December 31, 2008. The program sought can be further described as a nonresidential, service-oriented intervention program with comprehensive case management services for department-served youth through the development of a provider designed, developed, implemented, and operated intervention program for youth. The program is to serve youth on probation, conditional release, or post-commitment probation, and is to include supervision of youth transitioning from a residential commitment program, released from residential commitment program for post-commitment services, or placed on probation. The RFP provided that "The Department reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, . . . if the Department determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests." EYA and the White Foundation submitted timely, responsive proposals. Proposals were also submitted by Gulf Coast Treatment Center, Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Silver River Mentoring & Instruction, Community Action Foundation of Citrus County, and Taylor Human Services. No responder availed themselves of the opportunity to ask questions about the RFP. On June 20, 2008, DJJ published its notice of intent to award the contract to EYA. On June 25, 2008, DJJ published a notice of its withdrawal of its previous decision on the RFP and its intended decision to re-issue the solicitation for the program. On June 26, 2008, the White Foundation timely filed a notice of intent to protest DJJ's intended decision. On July 9, 2008, the White Foundation timely filed a formal bid protest challenging DJJ's intended decision. Evaluation generally The language contained in the RFP is boilerplate language that is repeated with little change in all solicitations for both non-residential and residential programs, with the exception of the scope of services portion. Attachment D of the RFP is entitled, "Evaluation Criteria." It provides that the proposals are to be evaluated and scored in three categories: technical proposal (referred to as "Volume 1"), financial proposal (referred to as "Volume 2"), and past performance (referred to as "Volume 3"). Generally, at DJJ, an evaluation panel of three to five evaluators reviews Volume 1, the programmatic elements, or the technical proposal. In this case, three evaluators scored Volume I. The financial proposal, or Volume 2, was a mathematical formula that essentially required no subjective analysis. A single evaluator simply determined the lowest price that was under the maximum amount the RFP permitted. The evaluation of the third part or Volume 3, past performance, was accomplished by Senior Management Analyst II, Paul Hatcher, acting alone. Mr. Hatcher has been an employee of DJJ for 23 years and has been an evaluator of RFPs for seven years. His role in evaluating the RFP was intended to be objective. In other words, he was tasked with reviewing the information provided and ensuring that it met the requirements of the RFP. His evaluation was not supposed to be subjective or judgmental. Typically, and in this case, subsequent to the evaluation of the parts, the DJJ Contract Administrator enters the various scores into a bid tabulation sheet to determine the high scorer. It is DJJ's intention in all cases to award the contact to the prospective provider whose proposal receives the most points. In this case, on June 19, 2008, the contract administrator determined that EYA received 817.22 points and the White Foundation received 785 points. Other responders scored lower. To the extent the controversy is concerned with which party should have been awarded the most points, the focus is on the past performance evaluation. The past performance category addresses the prospective provider's knowledge and experience in operating non-residential juvenile justice programs. The criteria related to the past performance category, Volume 3, are contained in Attachment C to the RFP. Attachment C consists of three parts: Part I - Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs; Part II - Evaluation for Past Performance in the United States Outside of Florida; and part III - Evaluation for Professional Accreditation in the United States. Attachment C further states that if the prospective provider has received DJJ Quality Assurance (QA) reviews and recidivism rate results for its non-residential programs, the provider should complete only Parts I and III. Both the White Foundation and EYA had QA reviews and thus were required to address only Parts I and III. This information was available to all parties through access to DJJ databases. Part I of Attachment C - Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs Part I of Attachment C permitted the assignment of 100 points for "Average QA." For programs receiving a quality assurance review prior to 2007, responders could receive up to 75 points for performance scores and up to 25 points for compliance scores. Part I provided a grid entitled, "Attachment C-1 Part I, Data Sheet: Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs." (past performance data sheet). The past performance data sheet has columns labeled "Contract Number," "Program Type," "Contract Begin Date," "Contract End Date," "Most Recent QA Performance Percentage Score," "Most Recent QA Compliance Percentage Score (if evaluated prior to 2007)," and "Failure to Report." There is also a column entitled "Number of Completions during FY 2005-2006" in which is recorded the number of youths who complete the programs. A final column is labeled, "2005- 2006 Recidivism Rate." The "Most Recent QA Performance Percentage Score," "Most Recent QA Compliance Percentage Score (if evaluated prior to 2007)," "Failure to Report," "Number of Completions during FY 2005-2006," and "2005-2006 Recidivism Rate," are found in databases available from DJJ. This form is quite similar to the forms in RFPs for the residential programs. Ashley Nevels, an accountant, and vice-president of administration for the White Foundation, reviewed all of the records pertaining to the responses to the RFP. Mr. Nevels found Volumes 1 and 2 to be essentially correct. He found errors in Volume 3. Though not qualified or considered as an expert witness, his testimony was helpful in illuminating the forms and procedures used in evaluating the responses. Mr. Nevels carefully reviewed responses in Volume 3 submitted by the White Foundation and EYA. With regard to the past performance data sheet, he found that there was information provided by EYA that was erroneous and information that was omitted. He found that Mr. Hatcher had corrected the erroneous information supplied by EYA, but did not consider whether or not it was complete. Mr. Nevels concluded that the White Foundation was correct in its report as presented on the past performance data sheet. Laura Moneyham, an employee of DJJ, working in its purchasing section, also reviewed the past performance data sheet. She found that EYA should have been awarded only 813.04 total points instead of the 817.22 that Mr. Hatcher awarded. In other words, EYA received 4.18 more points than it should have received. Her findings generally comported with Mr. Nevels, except he believed EYA received slightly more underserved points than reported by Ms. Moneyham. Based on the testimony of Mr. Nevels, the figures derived by Ms. Moneyham, and a review of the data contained in the exhibit, it is found as a fact that EYA should have received at least 4.18 fewer points on the Attachment C-1 Part I, Data Sheet, than was awarded by Mr. Hatcher. It is further found that the White Foundation's data was correct. The errors found on the past performance data sheet would have not affected the outcome of the award. After corrections, EYA would still have enough points to prevail. However, there was also an error in scoring the Part III accreditation portion of Attachment C. As Ms. Moneyham found on her re-scoring, and as Mr. Nevels had found, the White Foundation was entitled to 30 more points than it received in that category. Part III of Attachment C - Evaluation for Accreditation It was DJJ's policy, through the accreditation section that was denominated in Part III, to reward providers with points in the procurement process for achieving accreditation status. This was DJJ's policy because accreditation is a qualified endorsement by an outside, objective party that confirms that an organization conforms to recognized service standards. Ten points were to be awarded for each accredited program submitted in the response to the RFP. Both EYA and the White Foundation submitted information on three accreditations. Both responders were eligible to receive 30 points in this category. Attachment C provides, with regard to Part III - Evaluation for Professional Accreditation in the United States, found at page 16 of 63 of the RFP, as follows: All documentation provided . . . must include the start and end dates, be current dated and valid at least through the start date of the Contract that results from this RFP. The documentation shall also state that the program cited is a non-residential juvenile program and that it is run by the prospective Provider. The Department will verify all information received but is not responsible for research to provide information not submitted and documented by the prospective Provider. Failure to provide the required supporting information for Parts II or III of the attachment shall result in a score of zero (0) for that section. EYA responded to Part III by providing a copy of page 24 of the RFP and providing copies of three certificates from the Council on Accreditation (COA) indicating that EYA was accredited in Circuits 6, 7, and 11; a letter from the copies of Bureau of Quality Assurance Performance Rating Profiles; and an explanation that the three programs are operated in the United States under DJJ contract, are non-residential programs, and are operated under the CBIS program model. The EYA certificates did not indicate start dates. Nevertheless, Mr. Hatcher awarded 30 points to EYA. The White Foundation responded to this section by providing copies of pages 20-23 of the RFP and three certificates from the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) that indicated that the White Foundation was accredited. Mr. Hatcher awarded no points to the White Foundation in the accreditation category. Mr. Hatcher arrived at the White Foundation's score, or non-score, by referring to Part III of Attachment C of the RFP. In that section there appears a list of four accreditation organizations. Accreditation by one or more of these organizations can result in a responder receiving points for the section. Following the list of acceptable accreditation organizations, the form inquires, "Does the prospective provider currently operate or perform a non-residential juvenile justice organization/program/facility/service ('accredited entity') in the United States which is being offered as a part of its RFP proposal, and is that accredited entity in good standing and without restrictions by: . . . " and lists four accreditation agencies. The evaluator is to check "yes" or "no." Immediately following this language, the form recites 12 standards to be addressed if the responder answers "yes." These standards serve as the base requirements for a responder to have an acceptable "yes." Mr. Hatcher found that the White Foundation had not complied with standard eight of the 12 standards, which states, "Must provide documentation that establishes the accredited entity is offered as part of the prospective provider's proposal (i.e. RFP) proposal page and/or section reference)." Mr. Hatcher believed standard eight required documentation of the specific page and section of the RFP to which the accreditation would apply, and that was not provided by the White Foundation in Part III. He believed the White Foundation was required to provide a reference to a specific portion of Volume 1. Because the accreditations supplied did not provide a reference to a proposal page or section, Mr. Hatcher, using a strict interpretation of the requirement, found it to be noncompliant. Mr. Hatcher could have looked at Volume 1 of the White Foundation's response and found the information that was required. He did not look at Volume 1 because he believed that would be "research" of the type prohibited by the guidance found at page 16 of 63 of the RFP. Subsequent to the announcement of the agency decision revealing that EYA had prevailed, as noted, Mr. Nevels and Ms. Moneyham reviewed the evaluations for past performance. Lisa J. Eaton, a Senior Management Analyst II, who is employed by DJJ, also reviewed the evaluations for past performance. Interpreting the same language Mr. Hatcher used for guidance, they all arrived at the opposite conclusion with regard to accreditation and determined that the White Foundation should have been awarded 30 points. It is found as a fact that standard eight of the 12 standards, when read in conjunction with the guidance provided in the first paragraph of Attachment C, Evaluation of Past Performance for Non-Residential Programs, at page 16 of 63, provided guidance that could confuse an evaluator and could result in a decision with regard to accreditation that was contrary to DJJ policy that DJJ attempted to express in the RFP. Agency deliberations with regard to the decision to reject all bids It was brought to the attention of DJJ in December of 2007, by the Recommended Order in Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc. v. Department of Juvenile Justice, Case No. 07-4610BID (DOAH December 14, 2007), that the past performance portion of their RFP was infused with ambiguity. As a result, an attempt was made to clarify the type of information that was desired to satisfy the accreditation portion of the past performance part of the RFP. After the responses to RFP# P2043 were received and scored, the contract section of DJJ determined that Mr. Hatcher's scoring was inconsistent with the scoring that had been done on residential RFPs even though the two were 99 percent congruent. The evaluators of the residential programs would provide information omitted by a response, and correct information that was incorrect when submitted. Then they would score the response. Unlike the residential scorers, Mr. Hatcher did not count QA programs that were missing, but did correct information that was incorrect when submitted, if the contract numbers were correct. This meant that a potential vendor could choose to include their well-performing programs and not report programs that were performing poorly, and thereby gain an advantage. This did not comport with the desires of DJJ. DJJ staff also determined that Mr. Hatcher failed to score the accreditation portion in accordance with their policy objectives. Amy Johnson, Chief of the Bureau of Contracts, believed that Mr. Hatcher was confused by the language of the RFP and that accounted for his incorrect scoring. Upon reviewing the situation, Deputy Secretary Rod Love and Assistant Secretary Darryl Olson determined that all bids should be rejected and the process begun anew. It cannot be determined from the evidence whether that decision was made before the White Foundation protested, or after. As a result of the difficulties experienced in RFP# P2043, DJJ staff have attempted to further clarify that information that is omitted or inaccurate will be corrected and used. They have removed standard eight of the 12 standards that referred to the need to cross-reference. It was DJJ's intent to have consistent interpretations and scoring of proposals throughout the Department, and in particular, between bids for residential and non-residential programs. In order to carry out that intent, DJJ decided to reject the bids and initiate a new RFP for the desired project. There was no evidence that the actions of DJJ were illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent. For reasons that will be addressed below, the decision to reject all bids also was not arbitrary.

Recommendation it is Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice issue a final order dismissing the Petition and Formal Protest filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna Holshouser Stinson, Esquire M. Stephen Turner, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1300 Tonja V. White, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Room 312L 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Martha Harrell Chumbler, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57337.11817.22
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