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MARY H. KING vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE GROUP INSURANCE, 11-001901 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Apr. 18, 2011 Number: 11-001901 Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2011

The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Petitioner’s claim of additional life insurance benefits should be paid or denied.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida Group Insurance Program (the Program) is a benefit available to State of Florida officers, employees, and retirees. The Division of State Group Insurance (DSGI) is an administrative unit located within the Department of Management Services. The life insurance policy at issue in these proceedings is part of the Program which is administered by DSGI. At the time of his retirement, March 1, 1998, William King and his wife resided at 4159 Stratford Way, Jacksonville, Florida 32225 (the Stratford address.) Mr. and Mrs. King moved from the Stratford address in May 1999 to 12830 Muirfield Boulevard N., Jacksonville, Florida 32225 (the Muirfield address.) Mr. King died on September 25, 2010. At the time of his death, Mr. King was a retired state employee with life insurance coverage through the Program. At the time of his death, Mr. King resided at the Muirfield address. Mary H. King is the widow of William King, and the named beneficiary to Mr. King's life insurance policy provided through the Program. DMS has contracted with Northgate Arinso (Northgate), formerly Convergys, Inc., to provide human resources management services, including assisting in the administration of employee benefits. Northgate primarily performs these tasks through an on-line system known as "People First." People First became the system of record for DSGI benefits data, including addresses, on January 1, 2005. Prior to that, the system of record for DSGI was the COPES system. However, People First does not administer the State of Florida retirement pension program. Prior to January 1, 2000, life insurance coverage for retirees was $1,500, with a premium of $4.20 per month. Effective January 1, 2000, the coverage for retirees was increased to $10,000, and the premium continued to be $4.20 per month. The Open Enrollment Guide for Plan Year 2000 notified all current life insurance plan participants that they must re- enroll for the life insurance program, and that failure to do so would result in those retirees no longer receiving life insurance benefits. Because the retirees' response to the 1999 Open Enrollment was poor, DSGI developed a letter dated November 10, 1999, to provide the retirees another chance to enroll, as opposed to their losing life insurance coverage as of January 1, 2000, due to lack of response. By letter dated November 10, 1999, DSGI sent a letter to Mr. King notifying him of the above-referenced increase in retiree life insurance coverage from $1,500 to $10,000 effective January 1, 2000. The November 10, 1999 letter informed retirees that they had to complete a new enrollment form in order to continue retiree group life insurance coverage. This November 10, 1999 letter was addressed to the Muirfield address. In this effort to get a better response to the reenrollment requirement, DSGI created a file with names and social security numbers and provided that to the Division of Retirement (DOR). DOR then provided DSGI with a disk containing the addresses for those persons from the DOR database. The November 10, 1999 letter, including the one sent to Mr. King, used the addresses furnished by DOR. Although the DOR address database was used to mail the letter dated November 10, 1999, no change was made to the DSGI database (which, at that time, was COPES), for those retirees whose addresses were different in the DOR database. Later mailings by DSGI were to the addresses of record in the DSGI/COPES system. A change of address notification card dated August 10, 1999, regarding Mr. King's change of address from the Stratford address to the Muirfield address is in evidence. It is not clear from the face of the change of address form as to whether this was sent to DSGI or to DOR. Two months later, DSGI sent another letter to retirees informing them that they were enrolled in the life insurance plan but required them to submit an enclosed form to indicate a decision either to decline the coverage or to provide beneficiary coverage. This letter was dated January 12, 2000, and was mailed to the Stratford address, Mr. King's former address. Several of Mr. King's State of Florida Statements of Retirement Benefit Payments are in evidence and reflect that the payment of $4.20 was regularly deducted from Mr. King's monthly retirement benefit for State life insurance, including the monthly statement dated January 31, 2000. The monthly retirement benefits statements were mailed to the Muirfield address by DOR. Sandi Wade is a benefits administrator for DSGI. According to Ms. Wade, the cost of retiree life insurance was supplemented in the past with funds from a trust account, thereby reducing the premium charged to retirees. In 2006, DSGI determined that the funds used to augment the retirees' benefits from years 2000 through 2007 would be depleted after 2007. DSGI then determined that the current life insurance premium of $4.20 would support a benefit of $2,500, and that the premium to continue $10,000 of life insurance coverage would be $35.79 per month. This resulted in a change in the life insurance options available to retired employees. By letter dated July 31, 2006, DSGI informed retired state employees of this change in a letter which read in pertinent part: Dear Retiree: RE: State of Florida Life Insurance * * * The upcoming annual open enrollment period will provide you with three (3) options regarding your life insurance coverage. You should carefully examine all options and the information provided in your Open Enrollment packet, which will be mailed prior to Open Enrollment, to decide which choice best suits your unique circumstances. Effective January 1, 2007, the three (3) life insurance options available will be: A $2,500 benefit for a monthly premium of $4.20 A $10,000 benefit for a monthly premium of $35.79 Terminate life insurance coverage (precludes participants from re-enrolling for the product in the future.) Consistent with our practice in previous years, should you not participate in the Open Enrollment process, or make no change to your life insurance election, you will continue to be enrolled with retiree life insurance coverage. Your default election will be the $2,500 benefit, with its associated premium. If there is a desire to modify your open enrollment life insurance election, requests for changes to your life insurance coverage enrollment will be accepted through Friday, January 19, 2007. * * * This notice in advance of open enrollment is being provided in order that you will have additional time to consider all options available to you. Life insurance choices are important decisions. Mike Waller, an employee of DSGI, maintains benefits data for People First/DSGI. In July 2006, Mr. Waller was asked to prepare a file containing the names and mailing addresses of all retirees who were covered by life insurance. He created a file used in a mail merge to send all retirees a copy of the July 31, 2006 letter. In preparing the file containing the mailing addresses of retirees covered by life insurance in July 2006, Mr. Waller used the addresses of record from the benefits data he maintained. In July 2006, the address of record in the DSGI database for Mr. King was the Stratford address, and was included in the mailing addresses file. Mr. Waller prepared the file and on July 3, 2006, delivered it to Dick Barnum and Thomas Lockridge. Thomas Lockridge delivered the file to Laura Cutchen, another employee of DSGI. DSGI contracted with Pitney Bowes to mail the July 31, 2006 letter to 29,392 retired state employees. After obtaining copies of the letter from the print shop of DSGI, Ms. Cutchen delivered the letters and the file containing names and addresses of retirees to Pitney Bowes to assemble. Pitney Bowes provided the envelopes, assembled the letters (inserting them in each of the 29,392 envelopes), and addressed the letters by ink jet. The letters were delivered to the U.S. Post Office, accompanied by Ms. Cutchen. The State of Florida first class mailing permit had been applied to each envelope. The July 31, 2006 letter was mailed to Mr. King at the Stratford address. The return address on the envelope containing the July 31, 2006 letter was DSGI, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 215, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0949. Janice Lowe is employed by DSGI and has been for over 32 years. Her duties include assisting retirees with insurance issues. According to Ms. Lowe, DSGI received numerous returned letters as undeliverable. These undeliverable letters were processed by Ms. Lowe. If the returned envelope showed a different address on a yellow sticker applied by the U.S. Postal Service, the letter was re-mailed to that address. However, if the returned envelope did not provide a different address, DSGI accessed the DOR database to determine whether there was another address for the retiree to whom the returned letter was addressed. Each time a name was accessed on the DOR system, DSGI printed that Retirement Benefit Information screen showing the address in the DOR database. If the address in the DOR database was different from the address in the DSGI database, the original envelope and letter were placed in another envelope and mailed to the retiree at the address from the DOR database. A copy of each retirement print screen that was accessed by Ms. Lowe was printed and inserted alphabetically into binders. The presence of a DOR print screen indicates that the initial letter was returned as undeliverable and processed as described above. From each retirement screen that was accessed, Ms. Lowe typed the name of the retiree and DOR address in a format used for address labels. Once she had typed a full page of names and addresses, she printed those onto mailing labels and put the new labels on envelopes. She then placed the July 31, 2006 letter and original envelope that had been returned into the new envelope bearing the newly created address label. There is a DOR print screen for Mr. King, thereby indicating that the letter to him dated July 31, 2006, and mailed to the Stratford address, had been returned to DSGI, and was processed as described above. Ms. Lowe re-mailed the July 31, 2006 letter to Mr. King at the Muirfield address on or about October 13, 2006. A copy of the address label used to mail this to Mr. King is in evidence. This label reflects the Muirfield address. The letters mailed by Ms. Lowe were mailed first class. The return address printed on the envelopes was the State of Florida, Division of State Group Insurance, P.O. Box 5450, Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5450. When one of the letters as prepared and mailed by Ms. Lowe was returned to DSGI, Ms. Lowe stapled the letter to the DOR print screen for that retiree. The retirement print screen that Ms. Lowe printed for Ms. King does not contain a letter that was returned, indicating that the envelope with the Muirfield address, mailed in October 2006, was not returned to DSGI as undeliverable. Although Ms. Lowe re-mailed the letter using the Muirfield address, she did not change Mr. King's address in the DSGI database, and does not have access that would allow her to do so. Prior to Convergys assuming responsibility for the administration of benefits, DSGI maintained benefits information in the COPES system. When Convergys assumed responsibility for the management of benefits on January 1, 2005, the benefits information from COPES was imported into the Convergys/People First system. For reasons that are not entirely clear, People First and DOR do not share databases and each maintains its own database of names and addresses. This results in two divisions (DSGI and DOR) of the same state agency (DMS) using different databases. Each year, DSGI holds an open enrollment period as required by section 110.123(3)(h)5., Florida Statutes. Open enrollment is that period of time once a year, as identified by DSGI, during which participants in the state group insurance programs, including retirees, may change, add, or cancel participation in the insurance plans offered. Prior to open enrollment, DSGI mails to each employee and retiree participating in the state group insurance program a package that explains the benefits and options that are available for the next year. There is a copy of correspondence from DSGI addressed to Mr. King regarding open enrollment for 2001. This correspondence was mailed to Mr. King at the newer Muirfield address. It states in part, "The Annual Enrollment Period begins on September 11, 2000 and ends on October 11, 2000." This correspondence contained a copy of a return postcard addressed to DSGI and also contained the statement "Detach this postcard and mail to DSGI by 9-22-00 to obtain the desired information." It is unclear from the record how the Muirfield address was used at this point in time when the DSGI database still reflected the Stratford address for Mr. King. DSGI maintains that its database reflected that the DSGI address of record for Mr. King was the Stratford address until February 8, 2011, after the death of Mr. King. The 2006 Open Enrollment period for the 2007 plan year ran from September 19, 2006, through October 18, 2006. During Open Enrollment for Plan Year 2007, the People First Service Center was charged with the responsibility of sending open enrollment packages to State of Florida employees and retirees. The Open Enrollment packages for Plan Year 2007 were mailed by People First using the U.S. Postal Service. People First mailed Mr. King's Open Enrollment 2007 package on September 3, 2006, to the older Stratford address. The Open Enrollment package mailed to Mr. King on September 3, 2006, contained Mr. King's 2007 Benefits Statement; a letter from John Mathews, former Director of DSGI; Information of Note; a Privacy Notice; and the 2007 Benefits Guide. The 2006 Open Enrollment package for year 2007 also included a document entitled, "State Group Insurance Program- Information of Note" which reads in pertinent part: RETIREE LIFE INSURANCE For Plan Year 2007, those currently enrolled with retiree life insurance may elect to retain the current $4.20 premium for a benefit of $2,500, retain the current benefit of $10,000 for a premium of $35.79, or cancel coverage. If no change is made during open enrollment, participation will continue at the $4.20 premium level. Prior to the benefits change effective January 1, 2007, Mr. King paid a monthly premium of $4.20 for $10,000 in life insurance coverage. This amount was deducted from his retirement benefit monthly payment. This amount continued to be deducted from his retirement benefits following the change in January 2007 until December 2007 when the amount deducted increased to $7.41. In any event, no election to pay the increased premium of $35.79 was received by DSGI for Mr. King. This is not surprising since Mr. King did not receive the Open Enrollment package informing him of the right to make this election as it was mailed to the Stratford address. For those retirees who did not make a timely election pursuant to the Open Enrollment notice sent in 2006 for Plan Year 2007, the death benefit automatically became $2,500, effective January 1, 2007, for the monthly premium of $4.20. Throughout the years, the Benefits Guides and newsletters sent from DSGI have informed program participants of their responsibility to maintain current addresses with DSGI, including reminders to notify both DOR and DSGI in writing if there was an address change. Neither DGSI nor DOR notifies the other of receipt of address change. A change of address of one division of DMS does not automatically change the address in another as the two divisions have separate databases. While it is beyond the scope of this proceeding to evaluate the fact that these two divisions of the same state agency do not share databases, it is noted that DOR serves a larger population of persons. That is, the database of the DOR consists of all retirees that participate in the Florida Retirement System, including retirees of various local government agencies and educational entities. Deductions were made monthly for state life insurance premiums until Mr. King's death in September 2010. No evidence demonstrated that Mr. King informed DSGI in any way that he desired to maintain his $10,000 life insurance benefit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for an increase in life insurance benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James C. Cumbie, Esquire The Cumbie Law Firm, P.A. Post Office Box 40066 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Jason Dimitris, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (3) 110.123120.5720.22
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WILLIAM R. LEDDEN vs. DIV OF STATE EMPLOYEES INSURANCE, 84-000269 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000269 Latest Update: Feb. 28, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner became employed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Weights, on November 5, 1982. Upon being accepted for employment Petitioner completed and submitted to proper authorities the forms necessary to be covered by the State's group health insurance program and authorized the appropriate deductions from his salary to cover the premiums. On several occasions, he and his wife inquired through the Department of Transportation regarding their failure to receive an insurance card. Each time they were told the insurance card would be forthcoming and only administrative delays in processing the application were causing the delay. During this time no deductions were being taken from Petitioner's pay. In June, 1983 Petitioner incurred two doctor bills for his wife and son (Exhibit 1) in the total amount of $50, of which he paid $10 with the remainder forwarded to Blue Cross and Blue Shield who administers the state's health insurance plan. Blue Cross and Blue Shield had no record of Petitioner's insurance and the claim was denied. Petitioner paid the additional $40 charges. Although evidence was not submitted to show why Petitioner's application was not properly processed or what finally got this application back on track, the proper steps were finally taken and Petitioner was credited with having been covered with health insurance in accordance with his application from December 1982 and billed for premiums due from that date. This resulted in the assessment by the state of $436.14 for back premiums. Since he was not on the Blue Cross register in June 1983, Petitioner contests the assessment as a condition to remaining a participating member in the state health insurance program.

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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs MICHAEL CHARLES PEPPE, 92-002708 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 04, 1992 Number: 92-002708 Latest Update: Feb. 18, 1993

The Issue The issue for consideration is whether Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure as a life agent, a life and health agent, a general lines agent, a health agent and a dental health care contract salesman in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters in issue herein, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and regulation of the insurance industry in this state. Respondent, Michael Charles Peppe was and is currently licensed and eligible for licensure in Florida as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, a general lines agent and a health insurance agent. He was an officer and director of M. Peppe Agency, Inc., a Florida corporation. During the period in issue herein, Respondent's agency had a brokerage agreement with William Sanner and Mary Lou Sanner who were employed as sub- agents. Constance Abraham, an 85 year old widow first met William Sanner when she moved to Ft. Lauderdale, some 20 or so year ago. They were neighbors in the same apartment building. At that time she was insured with Mutual of Omaha and her policy was transferred to him, an agent for that company, for service. Over the years she purchased quite a bit of other insurance from him. They were all different kinds of health insurance policies and over time, she estimates, she purchased somewhere around 50 policies. During the period between 1985 and 1991, Mrs. Abraham purchased numerous health policies for both herself and her son through Mr. and Mrs. Sanner, though she does not recall ever having dealt with Mrs. Sanner. Records disclose that her coverage was placed with nine different companies and provided coverage in such areas as Medicare Supplement, nursing home insurance, cancer insurance, and hospital expense - indemnity insurance. Over the years approximately 60 policies were issued through Respondent's agency to either Mrs. Abraham or her son. The applications were taken by Sanner who would collect the initial premiums and forward both to Respondent's agency for processing to the various insurers. Some policies were signed by Sanner as agent of record and some were signed by Respondent in that capacity. Only a few were signed by Mrs. Sanner. Mrs. Abraham claims she didn't realize how much health insurance she had. Mr. Sanner would come to her apartment and talk to her about a new policy and she would abide by his advice. Her purchases amounted to approximately $20,000.00 per year in premiums which she would pay by check to Mr. Sanner. At no time did she ever deal with or meet the Respondent, Mr. Peppe. She did not question Sanner deeply about why he was selling her so much insurance. Whenever she asked about a new policy, he would usually have what appeared to he to be a good reason for it such as something was lacking in her coverage. Even when she recognized he was selling her duplicate coverage, he told her it was a good idea to have more. At no time did he or anyone else tell her she had too much insurance. Mrs. Abraham claims to know nothing about insurance herself. However, she was cognizant of the nature of the policies she had, utilizing without prompting the terms, "indemnity", "supplemental", and "accident." Mr. Sanner would come to her home at least once a month She trusted him to help her with her health insurance and would talk with him whenever a policy came up for renewal. On some occasions he would recommend she renew and on others would recommend she drop that policy in favor of another. At no time was she aware, however, of the fact that she was duplicating policies. She also claims she never had to tell Mr. Sanner what she wanted from her coverage. He always seemed to know and would handle not only the purchase of her policies but also the filing of her claims. She can recall no instance where she asked for any coverage and he tried to talk her out of it. Mrs. Abraham denies she was the person who complained to the Department. It was her daughter who noticed what was going on and took matters into her own hands. At no time did either Sanner or the Respondent attempt to contact her after the complaint was filed. Mrs. Abraham and her husband had four children. Her son, Lewis, who is somewhat retarded, lives with her and she also purchased some policies for him. Over the years she has had many occasions to file claims under her policies. It is important to her that she have protection to provide full time care if necessary because she has no family locally to provide that care for her. She had coverage that provided nursing care, a private room in the hospital, and some policies which provided for extended or nursing home care. She recognizes that such care is expensive and wanted enough policies to give her total coverage without out of pocket expense if the care was needed. She keeps track of the policies she has on her personal computer and has been doing so for some six or seven years. She apparently is sufficiently computer literate that she knows what she has and what she is doing. Mrs. Abraham owns a condominium at the Galt Ocean Mile apartment in Ft. Lauderdale. The $20,000.00 figure in policy premiums she mentioned were for her policies only. Those for her son were extra. She has sufficient income from stocks and bonds to pay her premiums, pay her mortgage, and still live comfortably. Her son has his own income from a trust fund and his own investments. At one point in time, when Mrs. Abraham had some recurring health problems and was in and out of hospitals regularly, she received in benefits far more than her actual expenses and made a tidy profit. Nonetheless, she adamantly disclaims she purchased the policies she had for that purpose claiming instead that she wanted merely that both she and her son be able to pay for the best medical care possible in the event it is needed. To that end, Lewis Abraham has filed very few claims against his carriers. Most, if not all, of the companies which provided the coverage for Mrs. Abraham and her son have limits on the amount of total coverage any one policy holder can have in any line of insurance. The limit is cumulative and not limited to policies with a specific company. Taken together, the policies in force for Mrs. Abraham in some cases exceeded that limit and had the insurers been made aware of the totality of her coverage, their policies would not have been issued. This information was not furnished to the companies, however, by either Sanner or Respondent. In addition, on many of the policies the mental condition of a policy holder must be disclosed if that person is retarded or not fully competent. Respondent did not know of Lewis' condition though Mr. Sanner was fully aware of it both as it related to his retardation and his drop foot. On none of the policy applications relating to him, however, was either ever mentioned. Some companies indicated that if Lewis's mental and physical condition had been properly disclosed on the application, they either would not have issued the coverage or, at least, would have referred the matter to the underwriter for further evaluation and a determination as to whether to issue the policy and if so, at what premium. Even more, Lewis' physical and mental condition may have caused the company to decline payment of a claim within two years of issuance of any policy actually written. Respondent received monthly statements from the various insurers with whom his agency did business detailing the transactions for that month. Commissions on each sale were paid by the insurers to Respondent's agency and thereafter, pursuant to an agreement between Respondent and Sanner, the commissions were divided. The commissions paid to Respondent's company by the insurers on all these policies amount to in excess of $18,000.00. Respondent asserts that Mrs. Abraham knew exactly what she was doing and was, in effect, conducting if not a scam, at least an improper business activity through the knowing purchase of duplicative policies and redundant coverage. This well may be true, but even if it is, Mr. Sanner was a knowing accomplice and participant. In addition, while it is accepted that Respondent might not know the status of every policy purchased through his agency or the total activity with any particular client, when his name appears as signatory on policy applications forwarded to a company for whom he accepts or solicits business, as here, it is hard to find he did not have at least a working familiarity with the business written by his sub-agents . This finding is supported by the analysis done of Respondent's pertinent activities here by Milton O. Bedingfield, a 39 year insurance agent and broker for 10 companies, a Certified Life Underwriter, and an expert in life and health insurance. Mr. Bedingfield concluded, after a review of all the policies written for the Abrahams through Respondent's agency, there was a gross oversale of policies and repeated omissions of pertinent information on policy applications. He found a duplication of benefits and overlapping coverage, all without legitimate purpose, especially for an 85 year old woman. Since the average hospital stay is less than 2 weeks, she would not likely benefit from her insurance for the stay. He could not see where Mrs. Abraham would get back in benefits what she has paid in premiums. In Mr. Bedingfield's opinion, this is the worst case of oversale he has seen in his 39 years in the insurance business. He contends the agent stands in almost a fiduciary capacity to his clients - especially the aged who rely on their agent to properly advise them on adequate coverage. There is often an element of fear involved that the unscrupulous agent can profit from. Here, he feels, Respondent's practice falls far short of the state's standard of acceptability on the sale of Medicare Supplemental insurance. On balance, however, Mr. Bedingfield does not know if all the policies he saw stayed in force throughout the period of the policy. Many could have lapsed or been cancelled. In all fairness, as well, where insurance is brokered, as here, the ultimate placing agent normally does not meet the client but must rely on what he is told by the offering agent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent in this case, Michael C. Peppe, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2708 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 22. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by evidence or record except for the fact that Respondent sign and processed applications and premium payments and received a financial benefit from the sales. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted so far as it relates Ms. Abraham was well informed and aware of her coverage. Not established, but insufficient evidence of actionable misconduct. Accepted. - 6. Not proper Findings of Fact but more Conclusions of Law. Accepted. Not a proper Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdrey 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68626.611626.621626.691626.8373626.839626.9541
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs GARY LAMAR RICKETTS, 96-001465 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Mar. 26, 1996 Number: 96-001465 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed on his licenses and appointments as a life and variable annuity contracts agent, a life, health and variable annuities contracts agent, health agent, and general lines agent.

Findings Of Fact Respondent received a Bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Florida in 1969. From the time of his graduation until 1985, he worked in the contracting business, both for himself and others. For nine years, including the years of his employment with Prudential, Respondent taught courses designed to prepare candidates for the Florida contractor's examination requirements. Respondent began work for Prudential in April 1985; this was his first employment in the insurance industry. Respondent worked continuously for Prudential until 1994, when he resigned. Respondent's resignation was prompted by Prudential's decision to exit the property and casualty market in Florida after Hurricane Andrew affected the scope of insurance products that could be provided. Currently, Respondent is an independent insurance agent and the major part of his business now involves group health insurance and working with employers and employee groups. Immediately upon his employment with Prudential in 1985, Respondent attended a Department-required 40-hour training course administered by Prudential, after which he took the required examination, and received his Department license to sell life and health insurance. He received other licenses within the next year, including property and casualty, and the federal licenses necessary to sell investment-based insurance products. At all times material and relevant to this matter, Respondent was a duly licensed life and health, life and variable annuity, and property and casualty insurance agent in the State of Florida, having been first licensed by the Department in June 1985. After receiving his initial license, Prudential required that Respondent, as a new agent, to undergo approximately six months of training. During this training period, Respondent was assigned to work with a more experienced agent, Mr. Herb Wagner, whom he accompanied on sales calls. Generally, Respondent and Mr. Wagner split any commissions earned on sales that they made together. Also, Respondent was paid for service calls made to his assigned Prudential clients. The Walter Richards, Ronald Richards, and Ann Munkittrick sales discussed below were made during this time. Although Respondent was the newly assigned servicing agent for each of these three policyholders, Mr. Wagner either made or participated in each of the sale presentations. Respondent's intent with regard to each sale he made, including those at issue in this proceeding, was to benefit the customer. Respondent approached the business of insurance sales as a teacher; he tried to make each person he talked to about insurance aware of the things that he would want to know if he were in the position of the customer, both in servicing and in sales. During sales presentations, Respondent habitually informed customers to whom he offered a financed insurance option that loans were the mechanism by which cash values could be taken from the old policy by a statement to the effect that, "There are only three ways to take values from an insurance policy: the first is to die, which you don't want to do; the second is to cash surrender the policy, which you don't want to do; and the third is to take a loan against the policy, and that is the way we will get the money to pay the premium on the new policy." This statement was made as part of each of the sales at issue here. Respondent's presentation included: (1) a review of existing coverage and an update of existing policies, using the Ordinary Policy Service Record (OPSR) cards; (2) a review of the insured's other assets and policies; (3) a discussion of insurance needs; (4) a discussion of the cost of insurance that would meet their needs; (5) a determination that the older policies were held for their death benefit, not for a lifetime or savings need, if the policyholder expressed an unwillingness or inability to pay the premium cost; (6) a statement of the option to use values from the old policy to pay the premiums on a new policy; and (7) an explanation of how a financed insurance program could work, if the policyholder was interested. The OPSR cards used by Respondent during presentations summarized an insured's policy and was provided by Prudential to the agent responsible for servicing the customer. The OPSR cards contain such information as: the face amount of the policy; the guaranteed cash value of the policy; the dividend option; the amount of accumulated dividends; the cash value of paid-up additional insurance (if the paid-up additional insurance dividend option had been chosen); the most recent dividend; the amount of any paid-up additions; the beneficiary; the amount of the premium; the frequency of premium payment; any outstanding loan balances; and the loan interest rate contained in the insurance contract. When Respondent presented an option for financed insurance, to aid in explaining the proposal, he started with the guaranteed cash value block and the dividend value block on the OPSR card to show the customer the values available in the old policy. In each of the six sales presentations at issue in this proceeding, and in all of Respondent's 1985-1986 presentations, Respondent used Prudential's computer-generated illustrations to show how the proposed policy would perform based on certain assumptions. The illustration included a statement that the illustration was based upon the assumption that the then current dividend scales would remain the same; that dividends were not guaranteed; and that a decline in dividend scales would result in the necessity to pay premiums for a longer period of time before dividends would reach the point where the dividends would fully fund the policy's own premiums. With respect to each sale Mr. Ricketts reviewed orally with the customer the disclosures relating to dividend fluctuations. With respect to each sale in this case, Respondent, using the illustration, would explain the various columns, including an oral review of the fact (a) that dividends can change; (b) that the columns on the illustration marked with an asterisk were affected by dividends; (c) that values in the old policy would support an additional policy in the face amount suggested for a specific number of years, based on current dividends; (d) that if the abbreviated payment option were elected, there is a point at which the past, current and future dividends will take care of remaining premiums; and (e) that because dividends are not guaranteed, the abbreviation point could be a greater or lesser number of years depending on whether dividend scales rose or fell. "Dividend scales" in connection with mutual life insurance policies refer to the entire list of dividends paid on a class or type of policy. The term does not refer to a rate or a formula, but to the dollar results within classes of policies of the division of company profits in a mutual insurance company. The illustrations used by Respondent during his presentations were usually left with the insured and when the policy as issued differed from the illustration, Mr. Ricketts would deliver a new illustration with the policy. If after the presentation described in paragraph 9, the policyholder was interested, the presentation would continue with a description of the mechanics of the financed insurance plan: (a) using the OPSR cards again, the values, both dividends and cash values, would be explained; (b) the recitation of the ways to access the values (to die, to surrender, or to take loans); (c) a statement that the old policies were valuable and should never be surrendered; (d) an explanation that when the annual premium due notice came, the policyholder should call Respondent, who would prepare a loan form or request a loan check; and (e) an offer to re-explain the plan at the anniversary date if requested. In each of the instances involved in this case, Respondent used the same presentation. In those cases where Mr. Wagner made the sales presentations, the substance of the presentations was also the same. When a policy was issued, it was sent to the agent for delivery, and Respondent (or in the case of the sales with Herb Wagner, Respondent and Mr. Wagner) personally delivered the policy, repeated the foregoing explanation, and reviewed the policy itself. Respondent offered the option of financed insurance to each of the complainants only when he determined they met certain criteria: (a) the customer had need for increased death benefits; (b) the customer held his old policy not for any lifetime or "savings" need, but for its death benefit; (c) the customer was unwilling or unable fully to pay the premiums of the new policy out of pocket; and, (d) the ability of the existing policy or policies to carry the new policy for a finite number of years, at which time there was a viable plan to pick up the premium at the end of the financing period. During interviews with clients, if a person otherwise a candidate for financed insurance told Respondent that his or her old policy was intended or held to provide funds for a lifetime or savings need, Respondent did not suggest or offer the financed insurance option. In July 1985, Walter Richards had a life insurance policy with Prudential which was issued in 1965 or 1966, with a face value of $5,000. This policy was purchased by his mother when he was 19 or 20 years old. On or about July 15, 1985, Respondent and Herb Wagner, met with Walter Richards, his wife, his brother and mother. The meeting included the standard presentation by Respondent, resulting in a determination that Walter Richards was an appropriate client who might benefit from financed insurance. Respondent explained how such a policy would work as detailed in paragraph 9 above. After Respondent's standard presentation, Walter Richards believed that he could purchase a $30,000 policy with the premiums on the new policy being paid for by the $5,000 policy. Moreover, Walter Richards believed that at the end of seven years the $5,000 policy would “fade away” or “lapse,” and the $30,000 would make enough to pay its own premiums. At the conclusion of the presentation, and based on Walter Richards' interpretation of Respondent's presentation, Walter Richards signed an application for the $30,000 policy. Respondent received a first-year commission of approximately $146.26 from the sale of the $30,000 policy issued to Walter Richards. At hearing, Walter Richards testified that Respondent did not discuss the fact that loans would be taken from the $5000 policy to pay the premium on the $30,000 policy or that there was the possibility that there would not be enough money in the $5,000 to pay off the $30,000 policy in the projected seven-year period. Also, Walter Richards testified that he never requested loans on either of the insurance policies and was never told that checks he received from Prudential were loans against the old or new policies. Walter Richards' memory is taxed about some details of the transaction. For example, Walter Richards did not remember which of the agents did most of the talking at the meeting. Herb Wagner's name was familiar, but he could not remember whether Mr. Wagner was the other agent at the initial meeting even after being informed that Mr. Wagner had signed his brother's application at that time. While he had in his possession a 1989 illustration of the $30,000 policy, Walter Richards does not know how it came into his possession. He remembers tables and charts from the first meeting with Respondent, but he could not recall what they were or any specifics about them. During the initial year following the purchase of the $30,000 policy, premium payments for the policy were made from loans taken against Mr. Walter Richards' $5,000 policy. In 1990, 1991, and 1992, the funds in the $5,000 policy were insufficient to pay for the $30,000 policy. As a result, values from the $30,000 policy were used to pay the premium during those years. These loans were authorized by the Disbursement Request Forms used by Prudential. The signature of the policyholder on the Disbursement Request Form was not required for a loan check to be disbursed. Agents of Prudential were allowed to request such disbursements. However, all checks disbursed pursuant to these forms were mailed directly to the owner of the policy. Printed on the back each check immediately above the line designated for the endorsee’s signature was the following or similar language: This check is for the net proceeds of the LOAN made under the contract and described on the statement of loan attached to the check. By endorsing this check, YOU, the payee(s) (1) confirm the payee(s) application for the LOAN; (2) agree to pay interest on the LOAN at the contract rate; (3) agree that INTEREST NOT PAID when due will be added to the LOAN amount and the INTEREST charged on it will be the same rate(s) as the LOAN itself; (4) assign to The Prudential the contract and all benefits due or to become due or granted under it in order to secure payment of the LOAN with INTEREST; (5) certify that no proceeding in bankruptcy or on account of insolvency are filed or pending, and that the contract is free and clear of any encumbrance or other assignment. Walter Richards received notices from Prudential documenting the loans as well as checks with notices attached thereto. During the time relevant to this proceeding, Walter Richards endorsed several “loan checks.” Sharon Richards, wife of Walter Richards, acknowledged that checks from Prudential were mailed to her home and that after she or her husband endorsed the checks, she would deposit the checks and write checks to Prudential for the premium payment on the $30,000 policy. Prior to depositing the checks, Ms. Richards did not read the language on the checks nor the language on the notice attached to the checks. The plan submitted to Walter Richards resulting in the sale of the $30,000 policy to him was that his existing $5000 policy's values would support an approximately $500 annual premium on a $30,000 policy for 7 years, after which the dividends on the additional policy would be sufficient to cover its own premiums. Because of the reduced dividend scales beginning in 1990, the plan did not work as contemplated, and two and part of a third premium payment were financed from the values that were building up in the $30,000 policy rather than being fully funded by the old policy. Notwithstanding the reduced dividend scale in 1990, 1991, and 1992, Mr. Walter Richards has continuously achieved at least $36,000 in net death benefits with no additional out-of- pocket payment for ten years, demonstrating that the plan proposed in 1985 was a conservative and reasonable plan. Walter Richards filed a complaint with the Department and instituted legal action against Prudential after he read an article in the Tampa Tribune which stated that Prudential had been sued for "churning." Mr. Walter Richards then concluded that what was described in the article was the plan he was using to fund his $30,000 policy. Notwithstanding his filing a complaint, Walter Richards stated at hearing. "My policy was working the way it was supposed to. But my brother's policy had not come out at all the way it was supposed to." At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ronald Richards had a life insurance policy with the Prudential which was issued in 1966 with a face value of $5,000. On or about July 15, 1985, the Respondent and Herb Wagner visited the home of Ronald Richards in Valrico, Florida, for the purpose of servicing Ronald Richards' existing Prudential life insurance policies. The appointment was set up by an agent for Prudential as Respondent had only recently began working for Prudential. Present at the meeting were Ronald Richards; his brother, Walter Richards; their mother; and Sharon Richards, Walter’s wife. After Respondent reviewed Ronald Richard’s insurance policy and inquired as to Mr. Richard’s needs relative to insurance, Respondent made the standard presentation detailed in paragraph 9, Ronald Richards was offered and expressed an interest in purchasing a $30,000 policy. This appeared to be a reasonable plan to assist Ronald Richards to achieve a recognized need for additional death benefits. Ronald Richard’s understanding of Respondent's presentation was that $500 a year would come out of the old policy for seven years; at the end of the seven years, no additional premiums would be due on the $30,000 policy; and that after the seven years, the $5,000 policy would “disappear.” Both Ronald and Walter Richards' understanding that their $5,000 policies would disappear or lapse as a result of their financed insurance program was erroneous. At the conclusion of the July 15, 1985, meeting and presentation, Ronald Richards decided to purchase the $30,000 policy. The new policy was issued on October 2, 1985. The Respondent received a first-year commission of approximately $254.79 from the sale of the $30,000 policy to Ronald Richards. At the time of the application, there was no indication that there would be any problems with Ronald Richards' policy. However, Prudential's underwriting department refused to issue the policy as applied for at standard rates because of Ronald Richards' health history. Because the policy was rated and issued at Prudential's highest risk category, when Ronald Richards' policy was issued by Prudential, it was offered at an increased premium of about $900 per year, rather than the approximate $500 standard rate. In 1985, when Ronald Richards' policy was returned rated with a higher annual premium, Respondent and Mr. Wagner delivered the policy and, at that time, told Ronald that the proposed program of insurance payments would not work for him. Respondent and Mr. Wagner also informed Ronald Richards that an additional policy with a face amount of $10,000 could be supported by the values in the 1966 policy if he would like to reduce the face value. Ronald refused this alternate plan, insisted that his documented blood pressure problem did not exist, and further insisted on obtaining $30,000 coverage like his brother, Walter. In reaction to the fact that the old policy would not support the $900 premium for more than two or three years, Mr. Ronald Richards responded that he would "cross that bridge when I get there." Ronald Richards claims that he was unaware that loans from the value of the old policy were used to pay the new policy. However, during the time period relevant to this proceeding, Ronald Richards received routine loan notices as well as "loan" checks. These checks, which contained the language clearly indicating that the proceeds were loans, were endorsed by Ronald Richards. In or about December 1985 Prudential mailed a "loan" check to Mr. Ronald Richards from the old policy in the amount of $926.50, representing the first year's premium. Mr. Richards endorsed the "loan" check from Prudential, deposited the check in his bank in Tampa, and wrote a check from his own account to pay the $926 first year's premium on the $30,000 policy. In October 1986, Ronald Richards, unsuccessfully sought a reduction of his rating, on the grounds of a weight loss, addressing one of the reasons for the special rating of his policy. This application was suggested to Mr. Richards by Respondent in an attempt to reduce the premium payment to the $30,000 policy. Respondent and Mr. Wagner, again, suggested at the next two anniversary dates that the policy be reduced to $10,000, but Mr. Richards refused. In the third year of the policy being in force, Ronald Richards was informed by the Respondent that he would have to pay a premium of $900 for the $30,000 policy because the values in the $5,000 policy had been used up. In 1987, Mr. Ronald Richards allowed the $30,000 policy to lapse. As expected, the values in the old policy were insufficient to finance another year's premium. In 1989, two years after the policy lapsed, Respondent prepared for Mr. Richards an application for reinstatement of the policy at a reduced $10,000 face amount. Ronald Richards signed the application for reinstatement at the reduced amount and Respondent was successful in getting Prudential's approval for the reinstatement. However, Mr. Ronald Richards did not pay the necessary premium and the reinstatement was not accomplished. Ronald Richards testified that he did not remember receiving the information that his policy was rated and that the old policy would not support a new policy in the amount of $30,000. He further stated that he only realized his policy required a $900 payment in the third year, when the value in the old policy would not sustain the third $900 premium. These statements conflict with accounts given by Respondent as well as those of Walter Richards who was present when Ronald's policy came back with a higher risk rating because of health problems and when the problems with Ronald's policy were explained to him by Respondent and Mr. Wagner. Also, a letter was mailed to Ronald Richards' home notifying him of the special rating required because of his elevated blood pressure and weight. This letter required the signature of Ronald Richards acknowledging that he was aware that the proposed policy could not be issued as initially presented due to the special rating. Ronald Richards acknowledged that Respondent and Mr. Wagner "probably explained the details" and "how the program would work". Nonetheless, Mr. Ronald Richards testified that he filed a complaint with the Department DOI after seeing television reports in about 1995, involving a lawsuit against Prudential for the "churning." In October 1997, Ronald Richard's $5,000 policy was reinstated and all loans against it were canceled by Prudential. In August 1985, Ann M. Munkittrick had a life insurance policy with Prudential, which was issued November 11, 1964, with a face value of $2,000. On or about August 5, 1985, Respondent and another Prudential agent, Herb Wagner, met with Mrs. Munkittrick. This meeting took place during Respondent's initial training period. Also present at the hour-long meeting was Mrs. Munkittrick's husband. During the hour-long meeting, Respondent made the standard presentation as described in paragraph 9. During the meeting, Respondent or Mr. Wagner explained to Ms. Munkittrick that she could purchase an additional $6,000 policy at no out-of- pocket costs to her. This offer was made based on Mrs. Munkittrick's responses to Respondent's inquiries after which Respondent determined that Mrs. Munkittrick was an appropriate candidate for financed insurance and was interested in such policy. Based on the standard presentation made to her during the August 5, 1985, meeting, Mrs. Munkittrick understood that the new policy was not free but rather would come from values in her old policy's value and dividends. After Respondent's standard presentation, Mrs. Munkittrick signed an application for the $6,000 policy, which was issued on August 24, 1985. Respondent received a first-year commission of approximately $91.26 from the sale of the Mrs. Munkittrick's $6000 policy. The premium payments for Mrs. Munkitrrick's new policy were paid by loans taken against her old policy. To accomplish this, Prudential routinely provided Mrs. Munkittrick with Disbursement Request Forms which she signed, and notices which reported (1) that loan(s) had been taken against her old policy; (2) that the loan(s) paid the premium on her new policy; (3) the rate of interest; (4) the interest accrued; and (5) the total outstanding loan principal. In addition to the Prudential notices concerning loans and interest on such loans, Mrs. Munkittrick received "loan" checks from Prudential which she endorsed, and sent back to Prudential. The acknowledgment on the back of the checks endorsed by Mrs. Munkittrick clearly stated that the funds were the proceeds of a "loan" and also indicated the corresponding conditions. At hearing, Mrs. Munkittrik admitted that she received the notices attached to the checks, but was unsure if she read the notices. According to Mrs. MunKittrick, if she read the notices, she did not "absorb" the fact that the loans were taken against her policy. As to the actual sales presentation, Mrs. Munkittrick acknowledged in her testimony at hearing that the events occurred "a long time ago" and, consequently, she could not recall many of the details of the meeting with Respondent. Specifically, Mrs. Munkittrick could not recall or simply doubted: whether Respondent reviewed her old policy with her during the August 1985 meeting; whether Respondent used an illustration; whether Respondent told her how much value was available from her old policy; whether Disbursement Request Forms were filled out when she signed them; and whether she read the print on the back of Prudential loan checks she endorsed. In September 1986, John Anderson Jr., then a resident of Plant City, Florida, had three life insurance policies with Prudential. These policies were issued November 17, 1961, November 6, 1969, and June 6, 1979, with face values of $5,000, $3,000, and $6,000, respectively. In September 1986, Betty Anderson, wife of John Anderson Jr., then a resident of Plant City, Florida, had a life insurance policy with Prudential. The value of the policy, issued on June 6, 1979, was approximately $6,920.00. On or about September 18, 1986, the Respondent met with John Jr., and Betty Anderson (Andersons), at their home in Plant City, Florida. Respondent was the Anderson's assigned Prudential agent and was meeting with them for the purpose of servicing their existing Prudential life insurance policies. During this meeting, Mr. Anderson, who was 59 years old at that time, advised Respondent that he planned to retire in a few years and did not have any minor children. Mr. Anderson further indicated that Mrs. Anderson had no source of income independent of him. Respondent made the standard presentation described in paragraph 9 and provided the Andersons with illustrations. Mr. Anderson was concerned about providing additional financial resources for Mrs. Anderson in the event he predeceased her; he believed that this could be accomplished by securing additional life insurance. However, the Andersons informed Respondent that they couldn't afford another policy if they had to pay out of pocket. Respondent addressed the Andersons' concerns and, again, explained to them that loans against the old policy would be used to pay the premium payments on the proposed $25,000 policy. Based on the Respondent's standard presentation, on or about September 18, 1996, the Andersons signed an application for the $25,000 Prudential life insurance policy recommended by the Respondent. Respondent received a first-year commission of approximately $630.00 from the sale of the additional $25,000 policy. From 1987 through 1992, Disbursement Request Forms were prepared by the Respondent requesting loans on each of the four old policies held by Mr. Anderson. One Disbursement Request Form had the signature of Mr. Anderson. Consistent with Prudential's procedures, when Disbursement Request Forms were completed by the agent, the checks generated by such requests were sent directly to the insured, Mr. Anderson. The standard language regarding loans was printed on the back of the check. When the annual loan checks came from Prudential, Mr. and Mrs. Anderson endorsed the checks, deposited them in the bank account, and then wrote a check to Prudential for the premium payment. Mr. Anderson also received coupon books annually, which provided information regarding the loan status; the interest on loan; a description of dividends; and current loans and interest rate. This notice, along with the loan checks and the notice attached thereto, plainly shows that loans were used to make the premium payments on the new policy. In 1991 and 1992 loans were taken out against the $25,000 policy due to a reduction in the dividend scales. Because of the reduced dividend scales, the 1986 policy would not abbreviate until after the September 2000 premium payment was made. In 1995, Mr. Anderson received notice that the $25,000 policy was going to lapse. However, when the Andersons contacted Prudential, they agreed to "fix everything back, which they did." Mrs. Anderson stated that, "[Prudential] put everything back the way it was." However, in May 1995, Mr. Anderson authorized Prudential to cancel his $25,000 policy and simply refund all premium payments. In 1995, about the time the Andersons received the lapse notice, Mrs. Anderson heard a news telecast related to Prudential and told her husband. "They're talking about our situation." The television broadcast included a telephone number to call regarding complaints. Thereafter, the Andersons called the Department to file a complaint against Prudential. On or about May of 1986, Harold E. Welch of Hillsborough County, Florida, had three life insurance policies with Prudential including one issued in 1957 with a face value of $5,000, and a second issued in 1976, with a face value of $5,000. Harold Welch first met the Respondent at his office at the Tampa Port Authority after Mr. Welch moved to Tampa. Respondent was Mr. Welch's assigned agent, and Mr. Welch had requested his help in changing beneficiaries on his existing insurance policies. On or about April 22, 1986, Mr. Welch again met with the Respondent at the Tampa Port Authority Office. After making his standard presentation and determining that Mr. Welch might be a person who could benefit from financed insurance, Respondent talked to him about purchasing a $10,000 policy. Using his standard presentation, the Respondent told Mr. Welch that the premiums on the new policy would be paid out of the values of the older policies, and that they would pay the premiums for a period of nine years, after which the new policy would pay for itself. During the presentation, the Respondent used a printed illustration to explain the nine-year payment plan. Copies of the same was given to Mr. Welch. Mr. Welch testified that the Respondent gave him a print-out with a lot of numbers on it. Mr. Welch further stated that the only part he understood was the bracketed part on the first page that showed nine payments and then "zeros after that." Mr. Welch understood the 1986 policy premiums would be paid with the accrued values of his existing policies over nine years, after which time the new policy would pay for itself and values could be returned to the older policies. The following language appeared on the illustration: Dividend amounts are scheduled on basis of current Prudential scale and are not guarantees or estimates for the future. Illustrated dividends on permanent policies assure current rate of investment earnings on funds attributable to policies since January 1, 1989, and will continue each year into the future. Based upon the Respondent's representations, Harold Welch signed an application for the $10,000 Prudential life insurance policy on or about April 20, 1986. The Respondent received a first-year commission of approximately $255.75, from the sale of the $10,000 additional life insurance policy to Mr. Welch. Mr. Welch admitted that he could not recall whether or not Respondent discussed the dividend scale disclaimer and likewise could not remember whether he read the disclaimer. Although Mr. Welch testified that he did not recall Respondent's talking about loans, he admitted he had understood that the "values" would be taken from his policies, and that at the time he did not "particularly care" how the values were obtained. Mr. Welch admitted signing Disbursement Request Forms authorizing loans against his policy, but that he "didn't really pay any attention to those things.” According to Mr. Welch, “All I wanted to do was get the premium paid." In fact, Mr. Welch signed Disbursement Request Forms in 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994, authorizing loans, including one to pay for the very first 1986 premium. On or about April 20, 1989, Mr. Welch received and endorsed a check from Prudential which represented a loan from the value of his older policies to pay the premium for the new policy. Printed on the back of the check just above the line on which the endorser was to sign, was the language quoted in paragraph 27. Mr. Welch acknowledged receipt of various documents between 1986 and 1994 providing information that loans were taken against his policies to pay premiums on the additional policy, admitted that he made no inquires about the loans and raised no objections about the loans. As to the 1986 policy, Mr. Welch stated that the notices caused him no concern. Respondent was taking care of the payment on the new policy and this "was just part of the whole plan." Mr. Welch admits that he has a fundamental understanding of dividend usage and related insurance terminology. This is evidenced on several insurance transactions initiated by Mr. Welch prior to Respondent's 1986 presentation regarding the $10,000 policy. In 1985, Mr. Welch wrote a letter to Prudential requesting that the premium be paid with the policy dividends and that any balance be forwarded to him. Also, prior to meeting Respondent, Mr. Welch took two loans against one of his policies which he knew based on "common sense" would reduce the death benefit if not repaid. Finally, Mr. Welch understood how dividends and loans may work together. In response to a 1994 notice of loan interest payment due, Mr. Welch wrote on the payment coupon "please take care of this interest payment through policy dividend." Mr. and Mrs. Welch qualified much of their testimony with comments concerning their inability to remember. Specifically, when questioned about the details of Respondent's presentation, Mr. Welch testified that "sometimes I forget these things. . ." Nonetheless, and although inconsistent with relevant documentation, Mr. Welch stated that in 1986 he was not aware that loans were being taken against his policies. Moreover, Mrs. Welch acknowledged that she did not attend the meeting and therefore, didn't hear Respondent's presentation of the 1986 policy to Mr. Welch. Due to a decline in the dividend scale, Mr. Welch had to make an out-of-pocket interest payment of $142.40, and a loan was taken out on his $10,000 policy to pay the premium in 1996. This exceeded the nine years that Respondent told Mr. Welch premium payments would have to come from the values in the old policies. However, Mr. Welch had no reason to believe that Respondent "knew at all" at the time of the sale that the abbreviated payment plan would not work. Only after Mr. Welch heard media reports involving Prudential did he question the 1986 transaction in which he purchased the 1986 policy. According to Mr. Welch, "I saw an article in the local newspaper about the 'churning' at Prudential; and when I read it, I thought . . . 'It applies to me perfectly.'" Thereafter, he contacted the a law firm through the newspaper, and filed suit. By the time he read the news account, Mr. Welch had had cancer surgery and considered himself uninsurable, and he was afraid his old policies had been depleted and that he was going to lose all his insurance. However, this was not the case. On or about May 1986, John Evenson, then of Valrico, Florida, had several life insurance policies with Prudential, including a policy issued June 7, 1955, with a face amount of $5,000; a policy issued June 1960, with a face amount of $3,000; a policy issued February 11, 1969, with a face amount of $2,500; a policy issued July 11, 1981, with a face amount of $2,000; and a policy issued February 11, 1983, with a face amount of $6,000. His wife, Doreen Evenson, also had a Prudential policy issued January 24, 1972, with a face amount of $2,000. In late 1985, Respondent contacted Mr. Evenson with respect to the above described policies. Mr. Evenson worked in the same business complex as Respondent, and meetings concerning Mr. Evenson's life insurance matters occurred at Mr. Evenson's office. Mrs. Evenson was not present at these meetings. In 1986, Respondent met with Mr. Evenson at least three times concerning a proposed $10,000 policy. The application for a $10,000 policy was signed at the second meeting, on April 18, 1986, after Respondent made his standard presentation described in paragraph 9. Prior to purchasing the $10,000 policy in 1986, Mr. Evenson possessed at least a fundamental knowledge of dividend and loan concepts in the context of his insurance policies. For example, prior to Mr. Evenson's 1986 purchase, he had taken approximately $3,200 in loans against his policies for his son's tuition and for a down payment on a home. Mr. Evenson knew that dividends from his policies could be used to reduce the loans. Also, Mr. Evenson understood dividends; options; the use of dividends, that dividends are not guaranteed; cash value; accessing cash value through loans; and that loans reduce death benefits. Mr. Evenson participated in the payment plan for the 1986 policy, through receipt, endorsement, and deposit of loan checks to pay premiums, and signed disbursement requests consistent with the safeguards established by Prudential. Also, Mr. Evenson received notices of loan interest due from Prudential which specified the amount and source of the loans. Mr. Evenson endorsed several of the "loan" checks. These Prudential loan checks were accompanied by an attached statement plainly stating that the funds were to be loan proceeds and directed the payee to the conditions on the back of the check which further advised that the checks were loan proceeds, and the effect of the loan on the subject policy. Each of the loan checks contained such language immediately above the Evensons' endorsements. The Evensons knew the checks were to be used to pay of the 1985 policy premium, and thus, they deposited the "loan" checks into their own account and wrote checks in the corresponding amounts to Prudential to pay the annual premium. The Evensons also received dividend checks during the relevant period of time which are distinguishable from loan proceeds checks in that no acknowledgment or conditions are printed on the back of the checks. Consistent with Prudential safeguards to prevent imposition of loans against policies without knowledge and participation of the insured, Respondent and Prudential rejected the Evensons' requests to consolidate or simplify the annual premium payment process by having Prudential automatically apply the funds. During his testimony, Mr. Evenson repeatedly stated that his memory was vague concerning certain details of the purchase because it occurred "so long ago." However, Mr. Evenson understood that the 1986 policy was not "free," but that a premium would need to be paid annually. Second, Mr. Evenson testified that during Respondent's presentation and prior to the sale of the new policy, Respondent had a list of Mr. Evensons's policies which included information concerning outstanding loans against some policies. Third, Mr. Evenson acknowledged his need for death benefits, indicating that if he passed away, his wife would need the money to help pay for the mortgage. Finally, Mr. Evenson understood dividends are not guaranteed. The notices, check statements, and checks reflecting loans against his policies did not cause Mr. Evenson to make inquiries about the loans or about the loan proceeds checks. Other than asking that the process occur automatically, the Evensons did not question the payment plan until learning through newspaper and television about churning allegations against Prudential. The Evensons contacted the author of the Tampa Tribune newspaper article, who referred them to James, Hoyer and Newcomer law firm. The Evensons thereafter hired James, Hoyer and Newcomer to sue Prudential. There was no replacement or intent by Respondent to replace any policy in connection with any of the sales in issue. In fact, there was no replacement on any of these sales. Respondent's intent was only to use values in the old policy to leverage an increase in death benefits for the policy holder by financing the new policy for a period of time. Each year the decision to finance the premium or to pay out-of-pocket is a fresh one, and while the option to use financed insurance for a number of years may be the basis on which the insured decided he could afford the program, there was no commitment to use old policy values for more than one premium at a time. All the sales transactions relevant to this proceeding occurred during Respondent's first year and a-half as a licensed insurance agent. The fist six (6) months of this time period Respondent was being trained by Prudential and was usually accompanied by a more experienced agent. Respondent has worked continuously in the insurance industry since 1985, and except for the instant case, Respondent has not been the subject of disciplinary proceedings related to his licenses issued pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Internal policies and requirements respecting loan disbursements for the purpose of paying premiums on the same or another policy required the insured's signature on the disbursement forms, or a signature below a loan agreement on the reverse of a loan check, and were accompanied by a series of notices, all to the policy holder's home address of record, thus bypassing the agent. These were followed by annual status reports and interest billings. Respondent was fully aware of the foregoing safeguards with respect to policy loans at all times. In each of sales at issue in this case, there was an objective need for more insurance to provide additional death benefits, and in most cases a subjective need as well. In each case, the insured held his old policy for death benefits, and not for lifetime cash or savings need. Also, in each case, with one exception, the values in the preexisting policy were sufficient to finance premiums on the proposed additional policy until the point the dividends on the new policy could pay its own premiums, assuming dividend scales remained constant. The exception is Mr. Anderson's sale, as he agreed that a portion of his pension was to be dedicated to premium payments. In each of the cases, beginning in 1990, dividend scales declined for the first time in many years. The reduction in dividend scales necessitated alteration of any plan to use funds from the old policy as the only source for payment of premiums on the new policy until the abbreviation point which was now extended farther into the future than it would have been had the 1985 or 1986 dividend scales continued. In most instances, where there was an insufficient amount in the old policy to pay for the next annual premium, the policyholders in this case requested Respondent to arrange for payment from other sources, such as the cash values in the new policy itself. By 1990, these values were sufficient to pay or contribute toward payment of annual premiums. In each case herein, the insured understood from the outset that the new policy was not "free" but that there were values in the old policy which could be used as a source of payments for the new policy. Similarly, in each of the six sales in issue, the analysis made and communicated at the time of sale was that, assuming dividend scales remained the same, the dividends on the new policy would reach a point when its dividends would be sufficient to pay its own premiums at a time varying between seven years. Each of the policyholders in this case became convinced they had been wronged after reading or watching newspaper and/or television reports about "churning." In the insurance industry, "churning" is considered an improper insurance sales practice involving financed insurance which requires that the sale or transaction is not in the best interest of the insured; it involves misrepresentation or deception; and is motivated by the salesman's desire for a commission, not the welfare of the insured. The sale of financed insurance without more does not constitute churning. Nonetheless, based on their interpretation of the various news accounts about "churning" by Prudential agents which they saw and/or read, each complainant except Mr. Welch contacted the Department to file complaints. Mr. Welch instead contacted an attorney.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that all counts of the Administrative Complaint filed on April 22, 1996, be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Fredickson, Esquire Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Peter Winders, Esquire Stephanie J. Young, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. One Harbor Place 777 South Harbor Island Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Daniel Y. Sumner General Counsel The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57626.611626.621626.951626.9521626.9541626.9561
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JAMES R. HIRSCHFELD AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN W. HIRSCHFELD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE GROUP INSURANCE, 07-003929 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Aug. 28, 2007 Number: 07-003929 Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2007

The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Petitioner’s claim of $10,000 in life insurance benefits should be paid or denied.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida Group Insurance Program (the Program) is a benefit available to State of Florida officers, employees, and retirees. At the time of his death, John W. Hirschfeld was a retired state employee with life insurance coverage through the Program. Mr. Hirschfeld died on January 6, 2007. James R. Hirschfeld is the Personal Representative of the estate of John W. Hirschfeld, his father. Prior to John Hirschfeld’s death, James Hirschfeld held a Power of Attorney for John Hirschfeld, although he did not notify DSGI of the Power of Attorney until his father’s death. Convergys Corporation (Convergys) is a private entity that administers the State of Florida human resources and personnel system. At all times material to this proceeding, Convergys has been responsible for providing notice to Program participants regarding the availability of benefits and changes. Sandi Wade is the benefits administrator for the Division of State Group Insurance (DSGI). According to Ms. Wade, DSGI supplemented the cost of retiree life insurance in the past, thereby reducing the premium charged to retirees. This supplement was reduced by the Florida Legislature effective January 1, 2007. Accordingly, premiums paid by retirees had to be increased due to that reduction in funds. This resulted in a change in the life insurance options available to retired employees. By letter dated July 31, 2006, DSGI informed retired state employees of this change in a letter which read in pertinent part: Dear Retiree: RE: State of Florida Life Insurance The upcoming annual open enrollment period will provide you with three (3) options regarding your life insurance coverage. You should carefully examine all options and the information provided in your Open Enrollment packet, which will be mailed prior to Open Enrollment, to decide which choice best suits your unique circumstances. Effective January 1, 2007, the three (3) life insurance options available will be: A $2,500 benefit for a monthly premium of $4.20 A $10,000 benefit for a monthly premium of $35.79 Terminate life insurance coverage (precludes participants from re-enrolling for the product in the future.) Consistent with our practice in previous years, should you not participate in the Open Enrollment process, or make no change to your life insurance election, you will continue to be enrolled with retiree life insurance coverage. Your default election will be the $2,500 benefit, with its associated premium. If there is a desire to modify your open enrollment life insurance election, requests for changes to your life insurance coverage enrollment will be accepted through Friday, January 19, 2007. * * * This notice in advance of open enrollment is being provided in order that you will have additional time to consider all options available to you. Life insurance choices are important decisions. DSGI contracted with Pitney Bowes Management Services to mail the July 31, 2006, letter to 29,392 retired state employees. DSGI provided Pitney Bowes with a computer disk containing the names and addresses of the retirees to whom the letter was to be sent. The disk included the name John W. Hirschfeld at 2509 W. Taffy Lane, Leesburg, Florida 34748-6421. Using a software program, the names of retirees were electronically printed on envelopes directly from the disk provided to Pitney Bowes by DSGI. As a means of quality control, Pitney Bowes utilized a procedure which periodically stopped the printing process and counted the number of envelopes printed as compared to the number on the list of the last name printed. Pitney Bowes batched and delivered the envelopes containing the letter dated July 31, 2006, to the post office where the postage was applied using the mailing permit of the Division. The return address on the envelopes was the address of DSGI. The letters were mailed by Pitney Bowes on August 6, 2007. Janice Lowe is employed by DSGI and has been for 28 years. Her duties include assisting retirees with insurance issues. According to Ms. Lowe, DSGI received numerous returned letters from Pitney Bowes. With each returned letter, DSGI accessed the Florida Retirement System (FRS) data base to determine whether there was another address for the retiree to whom the returned letter was addressed. Each time a name was accessed on the FRS system, DSGI printed that Retirement Benefit Information Screen and inserted it into a three-ring binder. The letter was re-mailed to the retiree when the FRS data provided an address which was different from that used by DSGI in the initial mailing. If the FRS data base did not provide a different address, or if the letter was returned a second time, DSGI personnel attempted to make telephone contact with the retiree and so noted in a log and/or on the returned envelope. At hearing, DSGI produced three voluminous binders containing the Retirement Benefit Information Screen for each retiree whose letter had been returned. According to Ms. Lowe, the binders did not contain a Retirement Benefit Information Screen for John W. Hirschfeld indicating that the screen had not been pulled-up because the letter to Mr. Hirschfeld had not been returned. Each year, DSGI holds an open enrollment period as required by Section 110.123(3)(h), Florida Statutes. Open enrollment is that period of time once a year, as identified by DSGI, during which participants in the state group insurance programs may change, add, or cancel participation in the insurance plans offered. Prior to open enrollment, information is mailed to all participants regarding availability of various plans, including description of benefits. Open enrollment is generally held during October for coverage during the next year. In preparation for open enrollment held during October 2006, Convergys mailed a package of materials to participants in the Program. Included in that package was a benefits statement that identifies the types of coverage carried by the participant. On September 3, 2006, Convergys mailed an open enrollment package to John Hirschfeld. Under the heading “Basic Term Life,” the statement showed the coverage of $2,500 at a monthly cost of $2.40 to the participant, and $10,000 coverage at a monthly cost of $35.79 to the participant. Next to the line explaining that coverage for $2,500 has a cost to the participant of $4.20, was the symbol “**”. At the bottom of the page, the following appears: “** Indicates Current Coverage and Default Election effective 01/01/2007.” Immediately below the explanation of premium costs for the two levels of coverage was the following sentence: “If you do not make an election change, your current life insurance premium will change to $2,500.” The 2006 Open Enrollment package for year 2007 also included a document entitled, “State Group Insurance Program- Information of Note” which reads in pertinent part: RETIREE LIFE INSURANCE For Plan Year 2007, those currently enrolled with retiree life insurance may elect to retain the current $4.20 premium for a benefit of $2,500, retain the current benefit of $10,000 for a premium of $35.79, or cancel coverage. If no change is made during open enrollment, participation will continue at the $4.20 premium level. Convergys mailed the 2006 open enrollment package to John W. Hirschfeld at 2509 W. Taffy Lane, Leesburg, Florida 34748-6421. John Hirschfeld became very ill in November 2005. After surgery in April 2006, a nurse was hired to go to John Hirschfeld’s home to assist him. James Hirschfeld took over his father’s affairs, including checking his father’s mail every two days. John Hirschfeld did maintain a key to the mailbox that was located in a bank of mailboxes, although he was in poor physical condition and most likely could not check his mail. It is unknown whether his nurse ever checked his mailbox. James Hirschfeld never saw any documents from the state regarding the change in life insurance options either when he picked up his father’s mail or after his father died when he cleaned out his father’s home to sell it. Prior to the benefits change effective January 1, 2007, John Hirschfeld paid a monthly premium of $4.20 for $10,000 in life insurance coverage. Had James Hirschfeld known, he would have submitted the necessary changes and paid the new higher premium on behalf of his father to maintain the $10,000 life insurance coverage. He is confident that had his father known of the change, he would have elected to pay the increased premium because they had discussed his father’s life insurance coverage of $10,000. At hearing, James Hirschfeld acknowledged that he is not disputing that the state sent the letter to his father. He asserts that the extra $7,500 of life insurance is justified because he or his father would have changed the coverage had either of them known. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that two notices of the change in life insurance options for state retirees, the July 31, 2006, letter and the open enrollment packet, were sent to John Hirschfeld at his actual address, and that the notices were not returned.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for the increase in life insurance benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Hirschfeld, Personal Representative of the Estate of John W. Hirschfeld 9548 Mid Summer Lane Leesburg, Florida 34788 Sonia P. Matthews, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Linda South, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (3) 110.123120.5790.303
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. JULES MAXWELL HANKEN, 82-000296 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000296 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the respondent Jules Maxwell Hanken was licensed as an ordinary life, including disability, agent in Florida, and was the President of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. in St. Petersburg, Florida. Though some administrative and supervisory duties were delegated to other individuals, respondent was the ultimate supervisor of insurance agents and employees at Gulf Health/Life. Respondent assumed the primary and major responsibility for training, directing and instructing employees to work as insurance salesmen within the agency. COUNTS I and VI The American Benevolent Society, Inc. was formed by the respondent and others in mid-1978, and was incorporated on November 22, 1978. The organization was described as "a society devoted to the welfare and benefit of independent Americans." Among its stated purposes was the provision of information and referral services dealing with medical, legal, benevolent, financial and recreational matters. The ABS also provided a newsletter and discounts to its members from numerous area businesses and dining establishments, as well as travel discounts and information. The membership fee was $15.00 for an individual and $25.00 for a family. New members were advised that one of the functions of the ABS was to solve the problem of high medical costs, and that members having difficulties with insurance claims could receive aid from the ABS. The offices of the ABS were located in the same building as Gulf Health/Life, Inc., but a separate telephone number and listing was maintained for the ABS. Employees of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. who answered the ABS telephone were instructed to not let callers know that the ABS office was in the Gulf Health office and to inform ABS callers that their insurance agent was not located at that office. In the sale of accident and health insurance, which was a major portion of the insurance sold at Gulf Health/Life, Inc., efforts were made by the respondent to offer insurance which would provide a discount in premium to members of the ABS. Apparently, respondent attempted to have the ABS endorse various insurance companies in return for members of the ABS receiving a "group" or "association" premium which would be less than the premium for an individual purchasing the same insurance. CNA did provide such a plan on one of its policies for individual members of the ABS, as well as for other associations, whereby the premiums for ABS members were slightly lower (approximately $10.00 per individual) than for members of the general public purchasing the same insurance. Neither Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Co. nor Founders Life Assurance Co. offered any group rate or reduction in insurance premiums to members of the ABS. Insurance salesmen employed at Gulf Health/Life, Inc. were instructed and directed by the respondent to also sell membership in the ABS. They received a commission for each membership sold and most sales were made at the same time as sales of insurance policies were made. It is estimated that approximately ninety-five percent (95 percent) of the ABS members also had insurance with a company represented by Gulf Health/Life, Inc. Respondent's insurance salesmen were directed in writing to always explain to the customer the difference between the ABS and the insurance company, to always collect separate checks and give separate receipts for the ABS membership fee and the insurance premium, and to require new ABS members to sign a form whenever they purchased insurance expressly acknowledging that the ABS was not the insurance company and that the endorsement and recommendation of insurance by the ABS did not imply or guarantee any discount in insurance premium. The respondent's agents were also required to place their signature on this form. In addition, the printed application form for membership in the ABS stated, in relevant part, as follows: I . . . am not joining as a prerequisite to obtaining insurance . . . and I realize that the A.B.A. insurance endorsement in no way implies or guarantees any discount or deviation from the ordinary premium established for the policies included. It is understood that the Society is not the insurance company." Respondent's salesmen were directed to obtain from each new ABS member the names of other persons who might be interested in ABS membership, and the amount of the salesman's commission for each ABS sale was dependent upon the number of referrals contained in each application. For example, an individual application for ABS membership with no referrals earned the salesperson a commission of $4.50, while an application with three referrals merited a commission of $7.50. Membership agents for the ABS, who were also licensed insurance agents, were required to sign a document acknowledging their understanding that monies collected for ABS were to be maintained separately from insurance premiums, that no preferential recommendations were to be made for insurance plans endorsed by the ABS over other plans which the agent was licensed to represent and "that solicitation of ABS members is in no way connected to or reliant upon insurance plans, programs, or policies, as no person's ability to obtain any insurance is helped or hindered by ABS membership; however, membership must be established prior to insurance solicita- tion through the American Benevolent Society. In contrast to the above-discussed specific written instructions and disclaimer forms requiring the signatures of agents and new customers, several agents employed by the respondent were of the opinion that those written forms and instructions were not consistent with what agents were verbally directed by respondent to use as a sales presentation. These agents believed that respondent, during the training sessions, was instructing them to blur together the presentations for sales of insurance and ABS membership so that the customer would believe that they could obtain better insurance (either in terms of coverage or lower premiums) through membership in the ABS. The agents were instructed in a sales technique which would begin with an explanation to the customer as to how difficult it is, because of the customer's age and/or physical condition, to obtain proper insurance coverage and then to explain that the ABS was formed for the purpose of solving those problems, could help its members in obtaining better and lower cost insurance, and could ultimately help them in their claims with the various companies. These agents admitted that they were instructed to avoid the term "group insurance," but stated that they were to use other terminology to suggest an association or group. Several former agents and employees testified that they received a "negative commission," or a reduction in their usual insurance commission, if they sold insurance to a customer without simultaneously selling that customer a membership in the ABS. No documentary evidence was offered to substantiate this testimony. Some of the respondent's insurance agents did tell customers that they had to be a member of the ABS before they could obtain certain insurance. These agents did, however, sell insurance without ABS membership and did sell ABS membership without insurance. They also sold ABS memberships simultaneously with the sale of insurance policies with companies which offered no benefits for ABS members. As noted above, CNA did offer a slight discount in premium on one of its policies to members of the ABS. The only three customers called as witnesses by the petitioner in this proceeding did join the ABS in order to acquire what they believed to a be a cheaper, group rate for their CNA policies, and to obtain discounts on other products. These customers did receive the discount provided to ABS members on at least one of the CNA policies purchased through respondent's agents. The agent did not explain the exact amount of the discount to them as compared with the ABS membership fee, nor did the agent compare the premiums with individual, as opposed to group, premiums. No other members of the ABS (which at one time had a membership of 700 or 800 persons) or the general public were called by the petitioner to testify in this proceeding. 1/ The only other member of the ABS who testified was called by the respondent, and he testified that he purchased a membership in the ABS after he bought insurance from one of the respondent's agents. He was told membership in the ABS would bring him certain services, benefits and discounts, but was not told he would receive a discount or reduction in his insurance premium. This witness was named in the Administrative Complaint as being one of the victims of the deceptive sales practices directed or authorized by the respondent. Insurance agents at Gulf Health/Life used various titles on their business cards and in reference to themselves. Some utilized the word "counselor," while others were referred to as "Regional Group Director." The purpose of utilizing the term "counselor" was not to disguise the fact that an agent was an insurance salesman, but rather to avoid the often poor public image associated with an insurance salesman. Upon inquiry to the State Insurance Commissioner's Office, the respondent's office was informed by letter dated January 21, 1980, that there was no statutory prohibition against use of the term "counselor" by insurance agents. An Insurance Department rule was referenced which prohibits the representation by an agent that he is a "counselor, advisor or similar designation" for any group or association of medicare eligible individuals, which representation does not reflect the true role of the agent in the solicitation of insurance. Salesmen were encouraged by respondent to avoid discussions with customers regarding the commission they may make on a potential sale. This was emphasized in training sessions for the purpose of illustrating what the proper attitude of an insurance salesman should be; to wit: to sell customers what they need and not what the salesman desires in terms of a commission. Respondent's employees and agents were not instructed to inform customers that they were not insurance salesmen or that they did not receive remuneration by way of commission. COUNT II Some thirty years ago, Earl Jacobs, a professional photographer prior to joining respondent's insurance company, constructed what he calls a "safe light." This is a wooden box which has a lightbulb in it and a glass filter across the face. The light can be openly used in a darkroom while working with light-sensitive photography paper. For some period of time, this device was kept on the premises of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. because the agency was putting together a brochure with each agent's picture. The restroom area was considered to be an ideal darkroom facility for the processing of prints. The "safe light" is referred to as a "light box" in the Administrative Complaint. Former employees and agents observed this device either in the closet of the woman's restroom or under the desk of Lynda C. Rushing, Vice President of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. Five witnesses observed the device in use by Lynda Rushing while either kneeling on the floor near her desk or while in another room. While it appeared to these witnesses that Ms. Rushing was using the device to trace customers' signatures onto insurance documents, no such documents were produced, no insured's name was given, nor did any customer or member of the general public present testimony as to a signature which was not genuine. 2/ Respondent ordered the device removed immediately after he was informed by a secretary that an irate customer had been in the office complaining that a signature on an insurance policy was not his signature. Applications and other insurance documents were frequently returned to respondent's agents for the purpose of obtaining an omitted signature. There was no testimony or other evidence in this proceeding to indicate that respondent Hanken ever used the device known as a "light box," or that he directed other employees to use this device to trace signatures. COUNT III Many, if not most, of the individuals employed by the respondent as insurance agents had no prior insurance experience. Sales techniques and practices were taught them by the respondent through extensive training sessions and the use of a sales manual called Psaleschology, which was primarily authored by the respondent. Agents were instructed to learn and were tested on the concepts expressed in the sales manual. The training sessions involved role- playing between the respondent and an agent, utilizing the concepts expressed in the manual. During the early stages of an agent's training, he was required to complete a form when he did not effectuate a sale, listing which steps in the manual were not followed by the salesman. While some salesmen believed that they were expected to follow the manual "verbatim" in their sales presentation, others, including the respondent, felt that the manual and the concepts expressed therein were simply guidelines or reminders of the principles of the psychology of salesmanship. Respondent considered the manual's purpose to be one of introducing to the salesman a formal attitude about selling and a demonstrative learning instrument. The sales manual under which the respondent's agents were trained does utilize the concepts of "MID/TIA" (Make It Difficult/Take It Away"); fear and greed, and fabrication. As explained by the respondent, these concepts of reverse psychology, motivation by relating to strong human emotion and demonstrations of risk are common techniques in salesmanship. They can as readily be described as concepts concerning the theory of supply and demand, the recognition of people's concerns and desires as motivating factors and the personalization of real events by fabrication of the characters. During a training session, the respondent related to his salesmen that he had once used the technique of telling an insurance customer who was reluctant to speak with him that he had come there to give the customer a Maas Brothers gift certificate. This was cited as an example of a method to persuade the unreceptive customer to open the door. There was no testimony that any of the respondent's salesmen ever actually used that technique or that respondent ever actually directed his employees to use such a technique. Maas Brothers gift certificates were in fact given to customers by Gulf Life/Health employees for a period of time when the customer gave an agent referrals for other sales. The respondent's manual does contain suggested techniques of reinstating lapsed policies by providing option or adjustment alternatives. One agent, who testified that he followed the respondent's manual literally during his early months with the company, stated that he would tell customers whose policies were about to lapse that they had a specific refund or monetary adjustment due them. This technique was utilized to gain entrance to the customer's home and to resell them insurance. This agent's technique was reported to the respondent by another agent, and respondent directed him to cease using the "refund" approach to reinstate lapsed policies. There was no testimony from any purchaser of insurance, potential insurance customer or other member of the general public that the techniques set forth in the respondent's sales manual or emphasized in his training sessions were actually practiced to the extent that the customer was frightened, coerced or deceived into purchasing insurance from the respondent's agency. 3/ COUNT IV Prior to becoming licensed to sell policies for Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Company, agent Edmund Shoman solicited and obtained applications for insurance with that company. Vice President Lynda Rushing, who was licensed with that company, signed these applications for him. At the time, Mr. Shoman was licensed to sell insurance with another company. There was no evidence to suggest that respondent had any knowledge that Ms. Rushing signed applications brought into the office by Mr. Shoman, or that Mr. Shoman received any commissions on these sales Bradley Wasserman had never sold insurance prior to being employed by the respondent. After one week of training, and prior to receiving his license, according to Bradley Wasserman, he was given leads, made contacts and sold two insurance policies by himself. He signed his brother Phillip's name to the applications and, according to him, received a commission on the two sales. Bradley's brother, Phillip, was employed as a licensed insurance agent by the respondent, was one of the respondent's top producers, and was also in law school at the time. Phillip recalled that respondent gave his approval to this practice, but could not recall whether he knew in advance that Bradley would be signing his name to the applications. During his first two weeks of employment with the respondent, Bradley Wasserman entered into and signed a "Training Agreement," acknowledging that during his training program he would be given a training allowance for his presence with a licensed instructor during a sale. The specific oral agreement was that Wasserman was to receive $25.00 for each presentation of two or more hours which he observed. Between February 20 and March 6, 1981, three checks were made payable to Bradley Wasserman in the amounts of $150.00, $150.00, and $100.00. Each check bore the words "training remuneration" or "training allowance." These amounts do not correspondent with the amounts claimed by Bradley Wasserman as his commission on the two sales of insurance. COUNT V Howard Cunix, at a time when he was not a licensed life agent, referred a life insurance customer, Mr. Miller, to Phillip Wasserman. Phillip Wasserman, who was licensed to sell life insurance, made the sale, but received only one-half of the commission for that sale. What happened to the remainder of the commission was not known by Mr. Wasserman and was not otherwise established. At that time, Mr. Cunix was a salaried employee and received the same amount of remuneration each week. He did receive one-half a production or referral credit on a board maintained at Gulf Health/Life to illustrate the production level of the various agents.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint dated April 29, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1983.

Florida Laws (8) 626.112626.611626.621626.794626.9521626.9541627.654627.663
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs. DENNIS VICTOR DANIELS, 82-000162 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000162 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to the allegations of the First Amended Administrative Complaint, respondent Dennis Victor Daniels was licensed as an Ordinary Life including Disability Agent in Florida and was employed by Gulf Health/Life, Inc. in St. Petersburg, Florida. On or about January 14, 1980, Julie Stratton (then Julie Marzec) contacted respondent at the offices of Gulf Health/Life, Inc. for the purpose of purchasing health insurance. She and respondent discussed different insurance policies, and respondent informed her that if she joined the American Benevolent Society (ABS) she could obtain a lower rate for her policy and obtain the best policy for her money. Mrs. Stratton could not remember if respondent informed her of the exact amount of money she would save on her insurance if she joined the ABS. She was informed that other benefits and discounts from area businesses would be available to her as a member of the ABS. Mrs. Stratton joined the ABS in order to obtain less expensive insurance. She wrote two checks -- one in the amount of $15.00 payable to the ABS and the other in the amount of $54.26 payable to CNA Insurance Company. She obtained two insurance policies. The form numbers on these policies were 51831 and 52176. Based upon a referral from an agent with Allstate Insurance Company, John Valentine and his wife went to the offices of Gulf Health/Life in order to obtain hospitalization and surgical insurance coverage. Before moving to Florida, Mr. Valentine was covered by a group policy through his place of employment. Respondent informed Mr. Valentine that members of the ABS could obtain a policy at group rates which entailed a lesser premium than individual rates. Mr. Valentine wrote two checks -- one in the amount of $178.73 payable to CNA Insurance Company and the other in the amount of $25.00 payable to the ASS. Mr. Valentine received two policies from CNA -- one bearing form number 51831 and the other bearing form number 52176. He also received a brochure listing the places of business from which he could receive discounts as a member of the ABS. Gulf Health/Life, Inc. was a general agent for CNA. During the relevant time periods involved in this proceeding, CNA had different policies for health insurance. Policies with a form number of 51831 required the policyholder to be a member of an organization endorsing CNA in order to purchase that policy. Form 51831 policyholders paid a lesser premium for their policies. The difference in premiums between the group or organization policy and an individual policy with the same coverage is approximately $10.00. To obtain the policy bearing form number 52176, there is no requirement that the policyholder be a member of a group or an organization. Ms. Watkins, a secretary employed with Gulf Health/Life, Inc. between December of 1978 and June of 1979 observed a device known as a "light box" on the premises of Gulf Health/Life. This was a square-shaped plywood box with a slanted glass top and a high-intensity lightbulb within the box. On from a half-dozen to a dozen occasions on Fridays between January and April, 1979, Ms. Watkins observed respondent bent over the light box with a pen in his hand tracing a signature onto an insurance application. She could not produce any documents or recall any names of any insurance applicant whose signature was traced or copied by the respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent on April 29, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Franz Dorn, Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William A. Patterson, Esquire Masterson, Rogers, Patterson and Masterson, P. A. 447 Third Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs FRANKLIN LEFLER, JR., 94-002210 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 22, 1994 Number: 94-002210 Latest Update: Feb. 03, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Insurance should discipline the Respondent for alleged violations of provisions of the Insurance Code governing agents.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Frank Lefler, Jr., is licensed in the State of Florida as a life and variable annuity contracts salesman, as a life insurance agent, and as a general lines insurance agent. During 1991 and 1992, he was employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). In the summer of 1991, a woman named Theresa Novovesky, a registered professional nurse living in New Orleans, Louisiana, received a telephone solicitation regarding a "Nurses Insured Retirement Plan." At the time, she was engaged to be married later in the summer to an Air Force pilot named David Russell. Not wanting to deal with the matter over the telephone, she asked the caller to mail her the information. She later received in the mail a brochure advertising for a "Nurses Insured Retirement Plan" being offered by "Metropolitan Life and Affiliated Companies." The Plan was advertised as "a convenient way for you to accumulate cash for the future you deserve." The plan's five "important benefits" included: CONTROL If you should leave your present nursing position, your retirement benefits can stay with you. FLEXIBILITY Accessibility of cash. TAX BENEFITS Tax deferred accumulation while providing a life insurance benefit. SECURITY Can be used to provide life time income. DISABILITY Your monthly contribution can continue to be deposited by Metropolitan should you become disabled. Novovesky was interested in the program described in the brochure and telephoned the toll-free number on the brochure for more information. Her call was received at the Tampa, Florida, offices of MetLife, and she used the descriptions contained in the advertising brochure to attempt to describe the reason for her call and the area of her interest. She left her telephone number so that she could be contacted at her residence in New Orleans. Not long afterwards, the Respondent telephoned Novovesky in New Orleans. She again used the descriptions contained in the advertising brochure to attempt to describe the reason for her call and the area of her interest. The Respondent made an appointment to visit Novovesky at her apartment complex in New Orleans to show her the MetLife products that were consistent with her area of interest. He mentioned at the time that he was new and in training with the company and that he would have his supervisor, Rick Urso, with him to assist. Urso and the Respondent met with Novovesky on July 25, 1991. They discussed aspects of Novovesky's career, personal and financial goals and ascertained that she was interested in a retirement savings plan. The Respondent presented a MetLife product that actually was a whole life insurance policy. He described the tax-free accumulation of cash value from contributions of $100 a month, and he estimated the cash value at age 59 as in the neighborhood of $600,000. It is unclear whether the Respondent orally explained to Novovesky in so many words during the July 25, 1991, meeting that the product being presented was in fact a whole life insurance policy. She testified that he did not, and the product could have been explained in terms that did not clarify to her that it was in fact a life insurance policy. But Novovesky also testified that she did not understand life insurance or investment terminology and knew little about either. It is conceivable that the Respondent explained the true nature of insurance product in terms that she should have been able to understand but that she did not understand what he was telling her. In his testimony, her husband (then fiance) confirmed that possibility. In addition, by Novovesky's own testimony, the Respondent asked her to verify the accuracy of information the Respondent took from her during the meeting and wrote on a form entitled, "Application for Life Insurance." Among other things, the form included a section on "Medical Data" "TO BE COMPLETED FOR ALL PERSONS TO BE INSURED." Although Novovesky denies that she read or understood the form, she clearly signed it. Although she testified that she did not recall, Novovesky also apparently was required to undergo a physical examination, including blood sampling and testing, to qualify for the insurance for which she had applied. When applying for the insurance she ultimately bought, Novovesky post- dated the check for the initial premium until after her fiance's scheduled return to the United States in August, 1991, for a brief period of leave from active Air Force duty in England. She reasoned that, in addition to helping her make final arrangements for their imminent wedding, he could advise her on whether to go through with the application she had signed. During the hustle and bustle of the prenuptial arrangements, her fiance telephoned the Respondent to assure himself and his fiancee that she had made reasonable retirement plans. From what she had told him, he assumed that she had purchased an annuity-type of retirement investment. He previously had made it clear to her that he did not think it was smart for her to buy life insurance. For whatever reason--perhaps because she preoccupied with planning their imminent wedding, or perhaps because she was afraid to tell him that she had applied for life insurance against his advice, or perhaps because she truly did not comprehend that she had in fact applied for a life insurance policy--she apparently did not tell him that she had applied for life insurance. Working from the incorrect assumption that his fiancee had purchased annuity-type of retirement investment, he asked the Respondent certain questions regarding guaranteed and anticipated performance and was given certain answers that did not alert him that the Respondent was referring to a life insurance policy. Satisfied with the answers he had gotten, Novovesky's fiance told her that it looked "OK" to him, and they got on with their busy lives. It appears that, on or about August 30, 1991, someone with MetLife delivered to Novovesky her whole life insurance policy, as well as a typical written illustration of predicted performance of the whole life insurance policy, given certain assumptions. The illustration included references to: life paid up at 95; total, initial annual, and initial semi-annual premium; annual dividend; a guaranteed death benefit; additional insurance purchased by dividends; illustrative death benefit; guaranteed cash value; cash value of additional insurance; illustrative cash value; life insurance surrender cost index; and life insurance net payment cost index. It is difficult to understand how, but Novovesky testified that, even after receipt of the policy and illustration, she still did not understand that she had applied for and purchased life insurance. She testified that she did not read the material when she received it and that, after the wedding, Novovesky (now Mrs. Russell) moved with her husband to England. The policy and other papers she relating to her dealings with the Respondent were packed away in boxes and were relatively inaccessible until after their return to the United States. Notwithstanding her testimony at final hearing and her prior hearsay statements to Insurance Department regulators, not only were the words "life insurance" mentioned in written statements she received from MetLife, she herself wrote a letter to the Respondent on November 4, 1991, advising that, while she was living in England with her husband, she would be unable to utilize the "Check-O-Matic" payment plan the Respondent had set up for her and that personal checks would be "my only means of paying my life insurance monthly." When the Mrs. Russell did not receive monthly or even quarterly statements from MetLife, and MetLife responded to inquiries by saying that only an annual statement was due her, Mr. Russell especially became concerned about exactly what his wife had purchased. Still, the policies and information was inaccessible, and they decided it could wait until after their return to the United States. When they returned and Mrs. Russell received her first Anniversary Statement in the mail, Mr. Russell could tell that his wife had not purchased an annuity-type investment, and he decided it was time to find the policy and related MetLife information to determine just what was going on. When he located and inspected the documentation, an incredulous Mr. Russell realized for the first time that his wife had purchased a life insurance policy, which was precisely what he told her not to buy. His reaction was that he could not understand how she could have been so foolish, and he told her so. She blamed it on the Respondent and MetLife. Approximately a year later, in summer of 1993, the Russells read a newspaper article indicating that many MetLife policyholders were registering similar complaints and that state insurance regulators were investigating. Mr. Russell became persuaded that, after all, perhaps MetLife, and not his wife, was to blame for the mistake. They successfully pursued their desire to rescind the life insurance policy, get a full refund from MetLife, and reinvest the refund in another investment vehicle. (Initially, they invested in an annuity; they later changed to a stock mutual fund.)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2210 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 7. The visit was on July 25, 1991; otherwise, first sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven exactly what the Respondent said. 8.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that life insurance was not discussed. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven that she did not read any of the application. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-13. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven: (1) that Russell formed any opinion about what the Respondent "was soliciting" (he was concerned only about what his fiancee was buying); or (2) that life insurance was discussed. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the documents were "numerous" or that she did not "review" them. Accepted, but not proven that the Respondent knew about them or sent them, and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that she did not know she had purchased a life insurance policy. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted, technically, but unnecessary. First sentence, rejected as not proven; second sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 20.-21. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, implication that they were informed for the first time is rejected as not proven.) First sentence, rejected as not proven; second sentence, accepted and incorporated. "Unknowingly" is rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Second and third sentences, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as not proven. "Understandingly unhappy" is rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as being conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. The year 1990 is rejected as being contrary to facts found. (The meeting was in 1991.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, not clear from the evidence. Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as being argument. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 9.-10. Accepted and incorporated. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13.-14. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 15.-17. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 23.-24. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. As to last sentence of the first paragraph, rejected as contrary to the evidence that "any misperception stemming from the brochure" "could not be due to" the Respondent (although not proven that it was). Otherwise, the first paragraph is accepted and incorporated. The second paragraph is argument and a transcript excerpt that is subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 27.-28. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 29. Accepted but argument, subordinate, and unnecessary. 30.-31. Cumulative. (Also, subordinate and argument.) Rejected as contrary to facts found that Lefler was not identified. Otherwise, largely accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Argument and subordinate. 34.-35. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Argument, subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as being argument and as being subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 38.-40. Largely accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 41. First sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as argument, as subordinate and as unnecessary. 42.-44. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Argument, subordinate and unnecessary. Largely, accepted and incorporated to the extent not argument, subordinate or unnecessary. Cumulative. First sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts found. Second sentence, cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: James B. Bossart, Esquire Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Jonathan L. Alpert, Esquire David Ferrentino, Esquire Alpert, Josey & Hughes First Union Center 100 S. Ashley Drive, Suite 2000 Tampa, Florida 33602 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 120.57624.11626.611626.621626.951626.9521626.9541626.9561626.99
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CARMEN ROSA MALDONADO vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 97-004847 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 17, 1997 Number: 97-004847 Latest Update: Feb. 03, 1999

The Issue Whether the Petitioner meets the pre-licensing qualifications for a general lines agent, pursuant to Sections 626.731 and 626.732, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Carmen Rosa Maldonado (Maldonado), has been employed by M & D Group, Inc. (M & D), an insurance agency, since 1992. M & D writes property and casualty lines of insurance. Maldonado is the bookkeeper for M & D. Her responsibilities include inputting data into the computer and translating for the Spanish-speaking customers. L & W Group (L & W) is a sister corporation of M & D. L & W writes life, health, and disability insurance policies and annuities. If M & D has a customer who desires a life, health, or disability policy, a representative of M & D will contact Mr. Weinberg at L & W and give him the customer information. Mr. Weinberg prepares the quote for the policy and either sends the quote to M & D for an agent at M & D to explain to the customer or comes himself to the M & D office to explain the quote and policy to the customer. If a Spanish-speaking client is involved, Maldonado is the translator. M & D provides three to seven quotes each month for health insurance through L & W. In September 1997, Maldonado participated in writing a surety bond, and on February 2, 1998, Maldonado assisted Erica Woodham, Vice President of M & D, in giving a quote on a surety bond. The evidence is not clear whether the quote and bond were provided through another insurance agency, because according to Ms. Woodham, M & D does not write surety bonds. On June 6, 1997, Maldonado filed an application for licensure as a general lines agent with the Department. She listed her insurance experience as "customer service" and indicated she wanted her experience to be the basis for meeting the pre-licensing qualifications. On June 13, 1997, the Department returned Maldonado's application and requested that she provide additional information concerning her experience. The letter stated: To qualify for this examination through experience you must have completed, within the past 4 years, at least 1 year of substantially full-time responsible duties as a bona fide employee. Your duties during this time must have been in all lines of Property, Casualty, Surety, Health and Marine Insurance. Please complete and return the enclosed certificates of employment. On or about June 18, 1997, Maldonado resubmitted her application with an addendum to the Department for the purpose of determining whether she was qualified to sit for the pre- licensing examination or to be licensed as a general lines insurance agent. Maldonado's addendum did not indicate that she was experienced in marine, health, or surety lines. By letter dated July 11, 1997, the Department advised Maldonado that her application for a general lines insurance agent was denied because she did not meet the pre-licensing educational requirements for a general lines agent. The denial letter was later amended to state that Maldonado lacked the one year of experience in health, flood, surety, and fire insurance. On August 1, 1997, Maldonado sent a letter to the Department, stating that she inadvertently failed to mark the appropriate boxes on the addendum form regarding her experience in health, surety, and marine insurance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for a general lines agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Joe DeMember, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Carmen Rosa Maldonado, pro se 2931 Southwest 11 Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312-2805

Florida Laws (6) 120.57624.462626.311626.321626.731626.732
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BRYAN T. KIDD vs DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 90-005004 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Quincy, Florida Aug. 13, 1990 Number: 90-005004 Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1990

The Issue The issue is whether Brian T. Kidd is entitled to additional reimbursement of medical care expenses under the State of Florida Employees' Group Insurance Plan.

Findings Of Fact Mr. Kidd is a state employee and has been diagnosed as having Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), commonly known as Lou Gehrig's Disease. When the disease was diagnosed, Mr. Kidd was covered by Capital Health Plan (CHP). CHP refused to cover the expenses of testing and treatment at the ALS clinic in Houston, Texas. During the October, 1989, open enrollment period, Mr. Kidd opted to change his medical insurance coverage to the State of Florida Employees' Group Insurance Plan (the State Plan). He made the change hoping to get coverage for the testing and treatment at the ALS clinic in Texas. The effective date of his coverage under the State Plan was January 1, 1990. Prior to leaving for the ALS clinic, Mr. Kidd talked to Lee Peacock and William Seaton in the Department's Division of State Employee Insurance. Mr. Kidd was told that the only way to determine the extent of coverage for the testing and treatment was to get prior approval from the Department's prior approval program. Mr. Kidd did not file a claim under the prior approval program. Instead, on January 29, 1990, Mr. Kidd sent a letter to William Seaton, together with a copy of a letter from Bernard. M. Patten, M.D., a doctor with the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas. Mr. Kidd's letter advises that he wants a predetermination regarding tests he is having from January 31 to February 8, 1990. Knowing that his letter requesting a predetermination could not have even been received by the Department, Mr. Kidd left for Texas and the scheduled tests and treatment. Mr. Peacock responded to the January 29, 1990, letter on February 13, 1990, advising that prior approval could not be given because the letter contained inadequate information and a prior approval claim had not been filed. Mr. Kidd did receive medical testing and treatment from January 31 to February 8, 1990. The State Plan paid approximately $8,400 of the total bills. Mr. Kidd believes that the State Plan should have paid more. Mr. Kidd offered no credible evidence to show entitlement to greater payment of benefits. While he did place numerous benefit payment schedule forms into evidence, he did not identify a single unpaid charge and show that it should have been paid. Further, his testimony in this regard is not entitled to great weight because some of his statements are plainly inaccurate. For example, Mr. Kidd identified a benefit payment schedule bearing a number of 00731581300 in which payment for $85.00 was excluded. He claimed that this charge should have been paid. On cross-examination, Mr. Kidd had to acknowledge that this charge was in fact paid on benefit payment schedule number 01271871300 except for $20.00 which was an ineligible expense. Mr. Kidd was unclear on and unable to identify those charges which had not been paid and the reasons he believed he was entitled to the benefits. The State Benefit Document limits payments for hospital services for non-PPC services at 80% of the hospital's average rate, not to exceed $152.00 per day. The Plan also requires a deductible of $200.00 per hospital admission. For example in this case Mr. Kidd had 9 days of hospitalization and was charged $230.00 per day. The eligible expenses were only $190.00 per day or $1710 leaving a total of $360 of ineligible expenses. Further, The Plan pays only 80% of eligible expenses (.80 x 1710=1368), leaving $342 or 20% as the patient's responsibility. Adding the ineligible expenses and the patient's responsibility leaves a total of $702 of the hospital room and board not paid under the Plan. The amount paid was correct. While there are other examples such as this where the Plan clearly paid the proper amount, there is no evidence to show one single example where the Plan did not pay all that was owed. All of Mr. Kidd's claims were properly paid under the Plan in accordance with the Benefit Document.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying Brian T. Kidd's request for additional reimbursement and dismissing Mr. Kidd's petition for relief. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Brian T. Kidd The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are in a format which combines findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument. The proposed findings of fact cannot be separated in such a way as to allow specific rulings on each proposed finding of fact. Hence the only ruling that can be made is that the proposed findings of fact are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Administration Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-5(1-7) and 9(12). Proposed finding of fact 6 is subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 7 and 8 are unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian T. Kidd Route 3, Box 4381 Quincy, Florida 32351 Augustus D. Aikens General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 110.123120.57
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