The Issue Whether Petitioner, John Hasko ("Petitioner"), is entitled, pursuant to the City of Dania Beach Code of Ordinances ("Code") section 18-49(4), to be paid retirement pension benefits under the City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System's ("Respondent" or "System") "100 Percent Joint and Last Survivor Annuity" ("Last Survivor Annuity") or the "Modified Cash Refund Annuity" ("Life Annuity").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a retired police officer who was employed by the City of Dania Beach Police Department ("Police Department") and who has qualified for, and is receiving, retirement pension benefits under the System. Pursuant to chapter 18, article IV of the Code, Respondent is the retirement pension system provided for the benefit of firefighters and police officers, including Petitioner, who are or previously were employed by the City of Dania Beach. Evidence Adduced at Final Hearing Background Petitioner was hired by the Police Department on December 18, 1980, and, upon being employed, began accruing credit toward a pension under the System. Petitioner was employed by the Police Department for 20 years. On October 1, 1988, the City of Dania Beach Police Department merged with the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BCSO"). At that time, Petitioner was given the option whether to remain in the System or to retrieve his contributions and become enrolled in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which was and is the retirement program in which BSCO employees are eligible to enroll. At that time, Petitioner elected to remain enrolled in the System rather than enrolling in the FRS. On August 28, 2000, Petitioner executed a retirement benefits election form to select the type of pension under which he would receive pension benefits from the System starting on January 1, 2001. Petitioner retired from the Police Department effective December 31, 2000. In April 2001, Petitioner began receiving monthly pension payments under the System, and also received back payments for January through March 2001. Immediately upon retiring from the Police Department, Petitioner began working with the BCSO. At that time, he enrolled in the FRS and began accruing credit under a life annuity plan provided through the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the BCSO for slightly over 14 years. As the result of a series of work-related injuries, attendant surgeries, and permanent restrictions on his activities, Petitioner retired from the BCSO on April 14, 2014. In the 2006-to-2007 timeframe, Petitioner was diagnosed with a cardiac condition that ultimately necessitated placement of a stent in 2012. Petitioner remains under the regular care of a cardiologist and is on medication to treat his cardiac condition. He credibly testified that since 2012, his condition has remained stable. In June 2014, Petitioner applied for pension benefits under the FRS. Petitioner testified, credibly, that he had four options from which to choose,1/ and that he selected the Ten Year Certain option. Under this plan, Petitioner receives monthly payments for the rest of his life. If Petitioner were to predecease his beneficiary——in this case, his wife——before the 120-month period ends, she would continue to receive payments through the end of the 120-month period; however, if Petitioner were to predecease his wife after the end of the 120-month period, she would not receive any further payments. Petitioner testified that, based on his belief that he had enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity under the System, he selected the FRS Ten- Year Certain Option so that if he predeceased his wife, she would receive benefits payments from two sources for the remainder of her life——the Last Survivor Annuity and Social Security. Petitioner receives benefit payments through the FRS to date. Petitioner has received monthly retirement benefit payments through the System since April 2001, including back payments for January through March 2001. He continues to receive monthly retirement benefit payments from the System to date. Evidence Regarding Petitioner's Election of Benefits Under the System The City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Summary Plan Description ("SPD") summarizes the System's available pension plan options. The section titled "Forms of Benefits Payment," on page 16 of the SPD, states under the "Normal Form of Benefit Payment" subsection: "[u]nless you elect otherwise before your retirement, your pension is payable as a Single Life Annuity with a guaranteed refund of your contributions. This is a series of monthly payments for your life." This provision effectively makes the "Normal Form" the "default" form of benefits payments if the employee does not elect another form of benefit payments before retiring. The "Election of Optional Forms of Benefit Payments" subsection of the SPD states: "You have the right at any time before your retirement date to elect not to have your retirement benefit paid in the Normal Form." This subsection identifies other forms of benefit payments available that the employee may choose as an alternative to the Normal Form. These forms are the Joint and Last Survivor Annuity, the Ten Year Certain and Life Thereafter Annuity, and another optional form actuarially equivalent to the Normal Form. Petitioner decided to retire from City of Dania Beach Police Department at the end of 2000. On August 28, 2000, he met with Sonia Brown, then the plan administrator for the System, to fill out an application for retirement benefits. He completed a form titled "City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters' Retirement System Application for Benefits" ("Application Form"). Section 1 of the Application Form, titled "For Retirement or DROP Benefits," contained a section to identify the beneficiary for the Joint and Survivor and Ten Year Certain options. Petitioner completed this portion of the form, naming his wife as his beneficiary and providing pertinent information about her. He also completed section 4 of the form, designating his wife as his beneficiary for all purposes under the System. He signed and dated the Application Form. Petitioner testified that he met with Brown again in early December 2000, to finalize his election of his benefits that he would be paid under the System. According to Petitioner, at that time, he told Brown that he chose the Last Survivor Annuity option. He testified that Brown gave him paperwork to fill out, that he completed the paperwork, and that she told him that he would receive benefit payments of between $2,400 and $2,500 per month based on his chosen option. Petitioner testified that Brown did not give him the "City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Notification of Benefits Payable as a Result of Retirement" form ("Notification of Benefits Form") to complete at the December 2000 meeting. Petitioner testified that he did not specifically remember what documents he completed that day, and that he did not receive a copy of those documents. Respondent's file regarding Petitioner's benefits election does not contain either the original or a copy of the documents that Petitioner claims he signed in December 2000. In short, there is no physical evidence substantiating the existence of these documents. Petitioner testified that based on the December 2000 meeting with Brown, he believed he had selected the Last Survivor Annuity and that the payments under that option would start in January 2001. After Petitioner retired from the Police Department, he did not receive his benefit payments under the System for January, February, and March 2001. He testified that he assumed that this delay was due to the time involved in processing the paperwork he claims to have completed in December 2000. On January 23, 2001, Brown sent correspondence to the System's actuarial services firm requesting that Petitioner's early retirement benefit be calculated according to the various benefits options available to police plan participants who are eligible for early retirement with 20 years of service. Petitioner is shown as having been copied on this letter, and he acknowledges having received the letter. By letter dated February 19, 2001, Respondent sent Petitioner "several forms to be completed by you and returned to this office for further processing of your early retirement benefit." The letter identified these forms as the Notification of Benefits Form, a W-4P form for specifying the amount to be withheld from the benefit payments for federal income tax, and a form to authorize direct deposit of the benefit payments into Petitioner's bank account. Petitioner claims that he did not receive this letter. Petitioner testified that in March 2001, Brown contacted him to complete a "verification of beneficiary form." On March 8, 2001, Petitioner went to Brown's office, where she presented him with what he characterized as a "verification of beneficiary form." According to Petitioner, Brown "asked him to make sure my beneficiary information was correct" and to sign and date the form where she had placed check marks. The "verification of beneficiary form" Petitioner signed actually consists of the second page of the Notification of Benefits Form. The second page of the Notification of Benefits Form that Petitioner executed contains a table that identifies Petitioner's wife (whose name is redacted) as his beneficiary. Portions of the table consist of spaces in which to state information regarding the amount of the nontaxable portion of monthly benefits for the various annuity options, which are identified by number and listed on the first page of the form. There are no amounts listed in those spaces on the form that Petitioner signed; those spaces have been left blank. A paragraph below the table states: "[t]he Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above are based on the beneficiary named above and are payable only to this beneficiary. Should you wish to change your beneficiary before your payments begin, new amounts have to be calculated."2/ Near the bottom of the form is the sentence "I accept the terms above, including my choice of annuity form, and confirm the information shown above to be correct."3/ Immediately below the above-referenced sentence is a "Participant's Signature" line. Petitioner signed the form on this line and dated it "3/08/01." Petitioner testified that at the time he signed this form, the spaces for the signature by the Board of Trustees representative and the date of signature were blank. The form subsequently was executed by the Board of Trustees, through Eugene H. Jewell, on March 13, 2001. Petitioner testified that in November 2015, he became aware, through checking his various beneficiary designations as the result of a bank error,4/ that the System was paying his retirement benefits pursuant to the Life Annuity rather than the Last Survivor Annuity. Petitioner testified that on November 6, 2015, he went to the System office to verify that his wife was correctly designated as his retirement pension beneficiary. He met with Cathy David,5/ the current system plan administrator, to review the documents in his retirement pension file. Petitioner testified that, he saw, for the first time, the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form contained in his file. This page had a check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund"——i.e., the Life Annuity——option. He testified that he did not make the check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund" option on the form. Petitioner obtained documents contained in the Salem Trust ("Salem")6/ file regarding his retirement pension. Among these documents was a letter dated March 13, 2001, from Brown to Livia Nixon, with Petitioner shown as copied, transmitting the completed forms to enable Salem to process Petitioner's retirement pension, and requesting that Salem expeditiously issue retroactive checks to Petitioner for January through March 2001. Petitioner testified that he had not previously received a copy of the March 13, 2001, letter or the attached forms, and that he did not see them until he obtained the documents in the Salem file. Petitioner also testified that he did not receive a December 6, 2001, letter from Respondent notifying him that the System's auditors, S. Davis & Associates, P.A. ("SDA"), were conducting an annual audit of Respondent's financial statements.7/ This letter contained information regarding Petitioner's pension ——including information expressly identifying the type of benefit Petitioner was receiving as the "Life Annuity." The letter requested that Petitioner review the information contained in the letter and correct any errors by providing the correct information to SDA. Petitioner testified that he first saw this letter during his November 6, 2015, review of the documents in the System's file, so he did not respond to SDA in 2001. In sum, Petitioner claims that at a December 2000 meeting with Brown, he selected the Last Survivor Annuity as the form in which he would be paid retirement pension benefits under the System. He claims that he did not select the Life Annuity, and that he did not make the check mark by the "Modified Cash Refund" option on the first page of the Notification of Benefits form that was contained in the System file. In sum, Petitioner also claims that he did not receive or otherwise was not provided the following documents: (1) the unidentified "paperwork" that he claims he completed at a meeting with Brown in December 2000, at which he selected the Last Survivor Annuity; (2) the letter dated February 19, 2001, from Brown to Petitioner, transmitting forms——including the entire Notification of Benefits Form——that Petitioner needed to complete to enable processing of his early retirement benefit; (3) the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form on March 8, 2001, when he completed the second page of that form confirming his wife as his beneficiary; (4) the March 13, 2001, letter from Brown to Livia Nixon of Salem, transmitting Petitioner's retirement pension forms completed on March 8, 2001, to Salem for processing; and (5) the December 6, 2001, letter to Petitioner from Respondent's outside auditor, SDA, requesting him to verify the accuracy of the information regarding his pension and to correct any errors in that information. Petitioner acknowledges that he did receive a letter from Cathy David dated July 1, 2012, regarding a change in Florida law that could affect retirees. That letter expressly stated "[y]ou chose the life annuity when you retired on January 1, 2001." Petitioner claims that he did not read this letter in its entirety, so he did not see the statement in the letter regarding having chosen the life annuity. Findings of Ultimate Fact Upon careful consideration of the evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he selected the Last Survivor Annuity, rather than the Life Annuity, so that, pursuant to section 18-49(4) of the Code, he should be reclassified as being enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity. First, the undersigned finds implausible Petitioner's testimony that he signed unspecified "paperwork" selecting the Last Survivor Annuity——clearly, a very important decision on his part——but that he does not "remember specifically" what that paperwork was and that he did not receive a copy of that paperwork. Compounding that implausibility is that neither the original nor any copies of that "paperwork" were found in Respondent's file or in Salem's file. Simply stated, there is no physical evidence establishing the existence of this "paperwork" ——which Petitioner claims is the instrument through which he elected the Last Survivor Annuity.8/ Second, the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form that was contained in Respondent's file on Petitioner's retirement pension shows the "Modified Cash Annuity" option—— i.e., the Life Option——as having been selected by the placement of a check mark next to that option. It is undisputed that Petitioner executed the second page of the form. This complete Notification of Benefits Form contained in Respondent's file constitutes the complete, most credible evidence in the record that Petitioner selected the Life Annuity when he executed the form on March 8, 2001. To this point, Petitioner offered no credible evidence to support his assertion that someone——unknown to him and having unknown motives——must have placed the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form, having the check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund" option, in Respondent's file without his knowledge. The undersigned does not find credible or persuasive Petitioner's testimony that he was not given the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form on March 8, 2001,9/ and that based on the language in the paragraph below the table, quoted in paragraph 29 above, he reasonably believed that the second page of that form constituted a "verification of beneficiary" that simply confirmed his beneficiary for his previous selection of the "survivor annuity." However, in order for the clause "the Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above" in that paragraph to make sense, it must be read in conjunction with the table above the paragraph. As discussed above, in the table on page 2 of the Notification of Benefits Form that was executed by Petitioner, no amounts of nontaxable portion of monthly benefit for any of the survivor annuity options have been filled in, even though the paragraph below the table expressly refers to the "Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above." The absence in the table of any "Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above" is inconsistent with Petitioner having chosen a survivor annuity option. Thus, the paragraph below the table can only be reasonably read to mean that to the extent the employee has selected one of the different survivor annuity options on the first page of the form, the survivor annuity benefits amounts shown in the table apply to the particular beneficiary identified in the table. Accordingly, if no survivor annuity benefit amounts are "shown above"——i.e., set forth in the table ——that would indicate, and only be consistent with, the selection of a retirement option other than a survivor annuity. The undersigned also does not find plausible Petitioner's testimony that he did not receive or otherwise was not given copies of five crucial retirement-related documents—— four of which clearly informed him that he was enrolled in the life annuity——so that he was not timely informed of the need to correct a mistake in his retirement pension enrollment. That these documents were transmitted by different senders—— Respondent, Salem, and SDA——compounds that implausibility.10/ For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner has not sustained his burden in this proceeding to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has been erroneously classified as being enrolled in the Life Annuity, and that, pursuant to section 18-49(4) of the Code, he should be reclassified as being enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for reclassification of pension enrollment from Life Annuity to Last Survivor Annuity. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether the purported selection of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was valid and effective.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 20, 1990, Lon Emory Sweely executed a Division of Retirement Form FR-13 Florida Retirement System Application for Disability Retirement. The application indicated that Sweely's disability resulted from AIDS-related conditions. It selected Option 1, which the application designates as the "Maximum Benefit" and describes as follows: Full benefits payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. In so doing, Sweely rejected Option 2, which the application designates as "Ten Years Certain," and describes: Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime, and in the event of his death with a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. The application, also designated the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., as Sweely's sole beneficiary. (Sweely previously had designated the Petitioner as his beneficiary, with the Petitioner's mother as the first contingent beneficiary, on a Division of Retirement Personal History Record Form FRS-M10 (Revised 3/89) executed by Sweely on January 25, 1990.) At the time of Sweely's application for disability retirement, Sweely knew that he had full-blown AIDS and that his life expectancy would have to be estimated at approximately two years or less. There also is evidence that Eulah Lee McWilliams, the principal at the elementary school where Sweely taught, counseled Sweely on his options and advised Sweely to select the "Ten Years Certain" option. It is clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided. McWilliams believed that Sweely wanted the Petitioner to have the benefits of the "Ten Year Certain" Option 2. Based on their conversations, McWilliams believed that Sweely concurred with her recommendation in order to provide the maximum possible benefit to the Petitioner upon Sweely's death. But, in the face of Sweely's knowledge and McWilliams's advice and understanding, the application indicates that Sweely selected Option 1. There was evidence that the Petitioner was present and assisting Sweely when the Form FR-13 was executed and that the Petitioner filled out part of the form at Sweely's direction, as writing was inconvenient and difficult for Sweely at the time. But there was no evidence that Sweely was unable to make informed decisions when he executed Division of Retirement Form FR-13 on or about June 20, 1990. The evidence also did not prove that Sweely's choice of Option 1 was inadvertent error. At that point in time, Sweely may have wanted to be optimistic and to be able to enjoy and share with the Petitioner the maximum possible monthly benefit for as long as Sweely lived. McWilliams testified that, at the time, Sweely was trying to remain "up-beat" concerning his illness, in part thinking that this might extend his lifetime. A decision to choose Option 1, contrary to McWilliams's recommendation, also would not have been inconsistent with an earlier decision by Sweely in April, 1990, (this time in conformance with McWilliams's recommendation) to postpone applying for retirement benefits until he exhausted all of his accumulated fully-paid sick leave. Had Sweely died while on sick leave, the Petitioner would not have received the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. (It is not clear from the record exactly what the benefits would have been, but it seems that the Petitioner would not have been entitled to any of the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. Cf. Section 121.091(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990); F.A.C. Rule 60S-4.008.) A little over a month later, Sweely's condition worsened, and on or about August 14, 1990, he had to be hospitalized again (as already had happened from time to time during Sweely's full-blown AIDS.) On or about August 15, 1990, the Division of Retirement approved Sweely's application for disability retirement, effective July 1, 1990. On the same date, the Division of Retirement also sent Sweely a Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and a blank FRS- 11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Form FST-40c (R5/89) requested that Sweely "review carefully how the option one and two are paid to your beneficiary." The descriptions of the options in the Form FRS-11o were somewhat different from those in the Form FR-13 application. Option 1 was not called the "Maximum Benefit," and it was described as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthy benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributionss I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. (Emphasis in the original.) Option 2 was not called "Ten Years Certain," and it was described as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both me and my beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. The FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members" also stated in bold and underlined upper case type: "MEMBER MUST SIGN AND DATE IN THE PRESENCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC." Whenever Sweely was hospitalized, the emotional strain on the Petitioner increased, and the time spent with Sweely in the hospital left the Petitioner less time to accomplish normal household tasks. The Petitioner's life and home usually became disorganized during Sweely's hospitalizations, and the Petitioner often allowed mail to pile up at their home at these times. The Petitioner testified that, notwithstanding Sweely's hospitalization and its disruptive effect on his life and habits, he happened to collect and read the mail on August 16, 1990. He testified that among the items of mail he read that day was the envelope postmarked the day before in Tallahassee, Florida, containing the Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and the blank FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Petitioner testified that he telephoned McWilliams to discuss the forms with her, and she asked him to bring them to the hospital. He testified, and she confirmed, that she met with the Petitioner at the hospital, looked at the forms, and explained them to the Petitioner. Believing, based on the conversations she had with Sweely before June 20, 1990, that Option 2 was Sweely's actual choice, McWilliams advised the Petitioner to choose Option 2. McWilliams testified that she discussed the matter with Sweely and with the Petitioner in Sweely's presence on August 16, 1990. (It certainly is possible that, had they discussed the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990, Sweely might have chosen Option 2 at that time.) But the Petitioner testified that they did not discuss the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990. The Petitioner explained that, although Sweely was oriented and physically able to write his name and, from time to time, was mentally lucid on that day, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely was in a position to give full consideration to the matter at the time they were discussing the forms because he was on morphine, was lethargic, and was having difficulty breathing without a non-rebreather mask. The Petitioner also did not think it was necessary to trouble Sweely with the matter, since the Petitioner believed that the selection of Option 2 on the Form FRS-11o was redundant and also that he was authorized to execute the form for Sweely as his attorney-in-fact under a purported durable power of attorney which Sweely executed on or about February 28, 1990, authorizing the Petitoner to act in Sweely's behalf in all matters. Under the circumstances on the afternoon of August 16, 1990, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely would have wanted to be troubled with the matter unnecessarily. He checked Option 2 and signed Sweely's name to the Form FRS-11o. On numerous previous occasions, the Petitioner had signed Sweely's name on Sweely's personal checks to pay Sweely's bills. In doing so, the Petitioner believed that he was acting properly under the authority of the purported durable power of attorney, and the bank always honored the checks the Petitioner signed this way. But on June 13, 1990, a physician insisted that the Petitioner sign a Division of Retirement medical records release form FR-13b in his own name as attorney-in-fact for Sweely. Himself not thinking well or clearly under the circumstances, the Petitioner assumed that his signature on the Form FRS-11o was valid. The Petitioner testified that it did not occur to him that there were notary services available for his use at the hospital. He testified that, after checking Option 2 and signing the Form FRS-11o, he telephoned his father, who was a notary, and asked him to come to the hospital to notarize something for him. The Petitioner's father confirmed this and also confirmed the Petitioner's testimony that they met in the hallway outside Sweely's hospital room, where the Petitioner gave his father the signed form and asked him to notarize it. Both testified that they did not discuss the form in any detail before the Petitioner returned to Sweely's hospital room. The Petitioner's father testified that he notarized the form thinking that Sweely had signed it. Sweely died two days later on August 18, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order: (1) that the purported selection, on the Form FRS-11o dated August 16, 1990, of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was invalid and ineffective; and (2) that the previous selection of Option 1 on the Form FR-13 executed on or about June 20, 1990, is valid and shall be given effect. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to the Petitioner, his actions were not in accordance with the statement.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) Last sentence, not proven (as to expression of "clear and unqualified acknowledgment and understanding); also rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) 17.-30. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 31. "Substantially," rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 32.-35. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (The evidence was that the Patient Care Technician Records were prepared near the beginning of each nursing shift and reflected conditions at that time. Meanwhile, there was evidence that the patient's mental state would "wax" and "wane." When the patient "waned" and was lethargic, it was difficult to communicate with him. Changes during the course of a shift may or may not be noted in the Progress Notes. While the Patient Care Technician Records indicate that the patient was both oriented and lethargic, the 8 a.m. progress notes indicate "lethargic at times." The progress notes also indicate that, earlier in the day, the patient had difficulty breathing without the non-rebreather mask and that, by 2 p.m., he was wearing the mask continuously. Even disregarding the possibility that the morphine dosage was enough to affect his judgment, the patient's lethargy and his difficulty breathing without the mask probably would have made it difficult for him to communicate on legal matters on the afternoon of August 16, 1990.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (He did not allege that Sweely could not communicate or write his name. He testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily. He did not think he had to discuss it with Sweely or have Sweely sign it.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, Dr. Breen's curt medical evaluation of Sweely's general medical condition on August 16, 1990, was not for the purpose of evaluating whether it was possible or prudent to have him considering legal documents and making important legal judgments. In addition, Dr. Breen saw the patient early in the morning and would not have seen changes during the course of the day. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that Castillo, Jr., "insist[ed] that Sweely was incompetent, unable to provide or receive meaningful communication on August 16--and could not execute the form himself . . .." (Rather, he testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith F. Roberts, Esquire 201 North MacDill Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact The facts here involved are largely undisputed. Callie Grier was employed by the Polk County Hospital as a nurses aide from 1966 until July of 1972. She did not have 10 years employment for retirement purposes at the time of her death in 1976, hence her retirement had not vested. In 1966, and again in 1969, Callie Grier designated her husband, Timothy Grier, as beneficiary of her retirement benefits. At the beginning of her employment Callie Grier was covered under the City and County employees retirement system. In 1970 retirement provisions were modified to establish a Florida Retirement System to cover all city, county and state employees. Those employees covered under a previous retirement system were given the option of transferring to the new system or staying with their existing retirement system. In 1970 Mrs. Grier elected to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (Exhibit 7). On 18 September 1970 Callie Grier obtained a final judgment of divorce from Timothy Grier, Jr., which judgment provided for the payment of child support. (Exhibit 1) On 23 March 1971 an Order of Contempt was issued adjudging Timothy Grier, Jr. in contempt of court and sentencing him to IS days in jail for failure to pay child support. (Exhibit 2) . On 1 November 1971 Timothy Grier was adjudged to be in contempt of court and sentenced to jail for 90 days for being in arrears on child support payments (Exhibit 3) . Also on 1 November 1971 an order relinquishing jurisdiction over Timothy Grier to the Criminal Court was issued (Exhibit 4). On or about this time Timothy Grier departed Bartow and his present whereabouts is unknown to Petitioner. Callie Grier married Aaron Spencer after her divorce from Grier and was so married at the time of her death. Petitioner has custody of the minor child of Callie Grier and has had custody since the death of Callie Grier. On 10 February 1971 Callie Grier executed a change of beneficiary form for her insurance with The Travelers Insurance Company designating Willie Mae Barnes as beneficiary (Exhibit 6) At this time Callie Grier was suffering from a kidney disorder which later required the use of dialysis. Following a kidney transplant in 1976 Callie Grier died in a Gainesville hospital. In 1970 many of the employees in Polk County were not aware of all of their retirement benefits and little effort was expended by local employers to insure the employees had all information. The State Division of Retirement has held numerous seminars and workshops throughout Florida, including Polk County, for both supervisors and employees from time to time since the Division of Retirement was formed. In addition, at least annually brochures were prepared in sufficient numbers to provide one for each employee and sent to the various employers. These brochures explained the various retirement benefits to which employees are entitled. In these brochures. as well as he seminars and workshops, the requirement of having currently designated beneficiaries was stressed.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Rina Richard DeMichael (“Petitioner”), the surviving spouse of David DeMichael, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) retirement benefits payment Option 1 selected by Mr. DeMichael.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with administering the FRS. In 1991, Mr. DeMichael began employment with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”). Mr. DeMichael was a member of the FRS pension plan based on his employment with the BCSO as a deputy sheriff. Mr. DeMichael married Petitioner on November 19, 2011. On February 11, 2013, Mr. DeMichael retired from the BCSO. At that time, he signed the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement form (“Application for Service Retirement Form”) designating Petitioner as his primary beneficiary. On February 11, 2013, Mr. DeMichael also signed the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Option Selection for FRS Members form (Form FRS-110)(“Option Selection Form”). On the Option Selection Form, Mr. DeMichael was required to select one of four retirement benefit payment options. The Option Selection Form provided an explanation for each of the four options. Mr. DeMichael selected to receive an Option 1 retirement benefit by checking the line next to the Option 1 benefit payment option. Option 1 provides the maximum benefit for the life of the FRS member with no continuing benefit after the member’s death. On February 11, 2013, Petitioner signed the Spousal Acknowledgement Form (Form SA-1)(“Spousal Acknowledgement Form”) acknowledging that Mr. DeMichael “selected either Option 1 or 2.” The purpose of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form is to inform the spouse that he/she will not receive a lifetime benefit following the FRS member’s death. The Spousal Acknowledgement Form does not give a spouse control over which option the FRS member selects. That option selection decision is the sole choice of the member. The Spousal Acknowledgement Form provided an explanation of the four different retirement payment options available to FRS members. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged she signed the Spousal Acknowledgement Form. Ms. Tiffany Pieters was a duly licensed notary with the State of Florida and an employee of BCSO on February 11, 2013. Ms. Pieters notarized the Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form signed by Mr. DeMichael, and the Spousal Acknowledgement Form signed by Petitioner. The Division received Mr. DeMichael’s Application for Service Retirement Form, Option Selection Form, and Petitioner’s Spousal Acknowledgement Form on or about February 11, 2013. On February 20, 2013, Respondent mailed Mr. DeMichael an Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application letter acknowledging Respondent’s receipt of Mr. DeMichael’s Application for Service Retirement Form; his selection of Option 1 as the benefit payment option; his employment termination date of February 11, 2013; and retirement date of March 1, 2013. The Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application letter expressly provides that Mr. DeMichael cannot change the option he selected once his retirement becomes final, and that retirement benefits become final when any payment is cashed or deposited. Mr. DeMichael’s Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form also expressly provide that he cannot change the option he selected once his retirement becomes final, and that retirement benefits become final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. On February 20, 2013, Respondent also mailed Mr. DeMichael an Estimate of Retirement Benefit letter, which provides an estimate of the payment benefit for each of the four options. The letter also acknowledges that Mr. DeMichael selected Option 1, and that his option selection cannot be changed after any payment is cashed or deposited. On April 1, 2013, Respondent mailed a request for birth date verification to Mr. DeMichael. In response, on April 30, 2013, Respondent received Mr. DeMichael’s birth certificate. Based on his selection of Option 1, Mr. DeMichael received an initial retroactive payment of $7,809.76 on May 10, 2013; an initial regular retirement payment of $3,904.88 on May 31, 2013; and a subsequent retirement payment every month in 2013 in the monthly amount of $3,904.88. Mr. DeMichael received a retirement payment every month beginning May 2013 until he died on August 25, 2015. Mr. DeMichael received a total of 29 retirement payments for a total gross benefit amount of $119,832.92. Each retirement payment was cashed or deposited into Mr. DeMichael’s bank account. Respondent was notified of Mr. DeMichael’s death in August 2015. On or about October 6, 2015, Respondent notified Petitioner that Mr. DeMichael’s benefit had ended and that there would be no continuing benefit to her based on Mr. DeMichael’s Option 1 selection. In this proceeding, Petitioner claims she is entitled to change Mr. DeMichael’s Option 1 retirement benefit selection and receive a continuing monthly spousal benefit. In support of her position, Petitioner contends Mr. DeMichael’s selection of Option 1 is invalid because he lacked the mental capacity to make a retirement option at the time his Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form was submitted to Respondent. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing, Petitioner failed to establish that Mr. DeMichael lacked the mental capacity to make a retirement option at the time his Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form were submitted to Respondent. No medical evidence was presented establishing that Mr. DeMichael was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed the Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form on February 11, 2013. In fact, Mr. DeMichael was released from Sunrise Detoxification Center on February 11, 2013, following in-patient rehabilitative treatment for his alcoholism. Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 expressly states that Mr. DeMichael “was medically stable for discharge” at 8:00 a.m. that morning. Moreover, Petitioner and Mr. DeMichael ate breakfast together later that morning at the BCSO cafeteria. Subsequently, Petitioner was escorted to the BCSO Internal Affairs area where she was questioned about Mr. DeMichael’s alcoholism. After Petitioner refused to answer any questions, she was escorted to the BCSO rooftop terrace. After a while, Mr. DeMichael came to the rooftop terrace. According to Petitioner, Mr. DeMichael was smiling and they exchanged pleasantries. After February 11, 2013, Mr. DeMichael continued to manage his own financial affairs, including his bank account. On April 1, 2013, Respondent sent a request to Mr. DeMichael to provide verification regarding his date of birth. In response, Mr. DeMichael sent his birth certificate to Respondent. Finally, at no time did Petitioner ever seek a guardianship or power of attorney over Mr. DeMichael, and at no time was Mr. DeMichael adjudicated incompetent by a court. Petitioner also claims that Mr. DeMichael’s selection of Option 1 is invalid and that she is entitled to a continuing benefit because she lacked the opportunity to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form before signing it. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing, Petitioner failed to establish that she lacked the opportunity to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form before signing it. In support of her position, Petitioner testified at one point in the hearing that she only saw the area of the form near where she signed it. However, in the area of the form near where Petitioner signed (Respondent’s Exhibit No. 6) is the express “acknowledgement that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” At another point in the hearing, Petitioner testified she saw the small writing below her signature at the bottom of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form, but she did not read any of the writing. The small writing below Petitioner’s signature at the bottom of the form provides an explanation of the four retirement benefit payment options. Notably, Petitioner did not testify that she asked Ms. Pieters for any explanation of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form. Further, Petitioner did not testify that she needed or asked for more time to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form before signing it, or that Ms. Pieters refused to allow her to read the form. Petitioner could have asked Ms. Pieters for more time to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form if she felt it was necessary, but she did not. At no time did Petitioner ever file a complaint against Ms. Pieters or complain about her handling of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form. Had Petitioner been concerned about the Spousal Acknowledgement form or Mr. DeMichael’s mental capacity on February 11, 2013, she also could have spoken to Judy Cowell, Mr. DeMichael’s supervisor at BCSO. Ms. Cowell greeted Petitioner and Mr. DeMichael at the front office when they arrived at BCSO on the morning of February 11, 2013, and Ms. Cowell escorted them to the cafeteria and rooftop terrace. At hearing, Petitioner testified that Ms. Cowell “was like a mom,” and that she had spoken to her on numerous occasions when Mr. DeMichael had problems with his employment. At hearing, the undersigned had the distinct opportunity to observe Petitioner’s testimony and her demeanor. Petitioner’s testimony regarding Mr. DeMichael’s alleged mental incapacity on February 11, 2013, and her not having the opportunity to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form and the alleged invalidity of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form, Option Selection Form, and Application for Service Retirement Form, is not credited and is rejected as unpersuasive. In sum, Petitioner is not entitled to change Mr. DeMichael’s selection of Option 1 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option and she is not entitled to a continuing benefit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits payment Option 1 selected by Mr. DeMichael and receive a continuing monthly spousal benefit. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Casey, Esquire Law Offices of Slesnick and Casey, LLP 2701 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a resident of Florida and resides at 306 Sweetwater Cove Boulevard, North, Longwood, Florida 32779. Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, is an agency of the State of Florida located at Cedars Executive Center, Building C, 2639 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32303. Intervenor is a resident of 5448 San Luis Drive, Orlando, Florida 32807. The agency action challenged by the Petition is the determination that the continuing monthly retirement benefit available under Option 4 of the Florida Highway Patrol Pension Plan, which provides for a continuing monthly benefit to the "spouse" of the retiree shall be paid to the person who was the spouse at the time of the retiree's retirement, not the individual who was the spouse of the retiree at the time of the retiree's death. Petitioner was not married to Florida Highway Patrol retiree Jack E. Walden on the date of his retirement, which was November 1, 1972, but was the legal spouse of Jack E. Walden at the time of his death on January 9, 1985. Florida Highway Patrol retiree Jack E. Walden was married to Barbara C. Walden on the date of his retirement; however, subsequently on January 22, 1976, Barbara Walden and Jack Walden were divorced. Thereafter, on February 6, 1976, Jack Walden married Marilyn S. Walden and she remained his spouse during the following nine years until his death. Petitioner has sought to be paid a "surviving spouse" or other benefit available from the Florida Highway Patrol pension plan, however, the Agency has determined that any benefit must be paid to the former spouse of Jack E. Walden, not Petitioner. Intervenor, Barbara C Yeater, was married to Jack E. Walden on January 19, 1949. She was his spouse during the entire time of his service with the Florida Highway Patrol, at the time of his retirement in 1972, and until dissolution of their marriage in 1976. In September, 1972, prior to his retirement, Jack E. Walden designated Barbara Walden as his beneficiary under the Highway Patrol Retirement System. (Exhibit 1)2 On June 27, 1975, Respondent received Exhibit 2,3 but did not respond to it. At the time Exhibit 2 was received by Respondent, it was the Division of Retirement policy that a retiree who had selected Option 4 under Chapter 321, F.S., could not change the previously selected recipient of survivor benefits subsequent to retirement and cashing of the first warrant. A copy of Exhibit 2 was not sent to Barbara Yeater. There was no further communication from Jack E. Walden to Respondent concerning changes in beneficiary or option selection after June 27, 1975. There was an exchange of correspondence between Respondent and Barbara Yeater (Exhibits 3, 4 and 5),4 but copies of that correspondence were not sent to Jack E. Walden. The Petition and final judgment of dissolution between Jack Walden and Barbara Yeater are Exhibits 7 and 8 in evidence. The subject retirement benefits were not disposed of in the final judgment of dissolution. The monthly benefit payable to Jack E. Walden's surviving spouse is $622.00 plus cost-of-living adjustments. Decedent retired with 21.60 years service, which produced an initial benefit of $475.91. Jack E. Walden believed, at the time of his death, that he had accomplished the change in beneficiary which he sought to carry out by filing Exhibit 2 with Respondent. This fact is based on the absence of any reply by Respondent rejecting the proposed change, by Decedent's failure to make other arrangements for Marilyn Walden, by not seeking to modify the alimony payments awarded to Intervenor, and by his statements to Petitioner and to his friend, George Watson, indicating his belief that the change had been effected, and, finally, by the fact that Respondent accepted and thereafter utilized the change of address contained in the change of beneficiary notice. Respondent relied on the Arnow case5 in its decision to award the continuing benefits to Intervenor on the death of Jack E. Walden (discussed below).
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order awarding continuing retirement benefits to Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1985.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Albert F. Cook, had a relationship with the Department of Corrections (DOC) at any time during the month of April, 1993, and if so, whether he was eligible to receive a retirement benefit for that month, as well.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed at times pertinent hereto by the Department of Corrections (DOC) at its Baker Correctional Institution facility. On February 19, 1993, he was notified of his transfer to the Florida State Prison, purportedly for disciplinary reasons. Upon learning of this eventuality, the Petitioner immediately went on sick leave. He maintains that it was duly- approved sick leave. No medical evidence to that effect was presented, but the Petitioner suggested that his illness might be of a psychiatric nature. He clearly was disgusted with the action taken by the DOC to transfer him. Subsequently thereto, he decided to apply for retirement, effective March 31, 1993. Shortly thereafter, he sought to have his retirement request rescinded or withdrawn; however, that request was denied. He was thereupon removed from the DOC payroll, effective March 31, 1993, essentially as a termination action. He received a retirement benefit check for the period of April 1-30, 1993 in the amount of $2,324.53 from the Division of Retirement. The Petitioner appealed the DOC employment action to the Public Employees Relations Commission and an administrative proceeding ensued. Ultimately, a settlement agreement was reached in that case which resulted in the Petitioner being allowed to resign, effective April 16, 1993, rather than suffer termination effective March 31, 1993. That agreement entered into by the parties in that case specifically stated that "the agency [DOC] will take whatever action is necessary to return the employee [Cook] to the payroll for the period between March 31, 1993 and April 16, 1993". The Division of Retirement was, of course, not a party to that agreement since it was not a party to the litigation involved. The agreement was incorporated into a Final Order issued by the Public Employees Relations Commission in Case No. CF-93-196, entered June 7, 1993. The Petitioner sent a letter to E.I. Perrin, the Superintendent of Florida State Prison, dated April 12, 1993, in which he stated "that if I am still on the payroll, I hereby resign my position with the Florida Department of Corrections effective April 16, 1993 . . .". According to attendance and leave reports signed by both the Petitioner and Marion Bronson, the Personnel Director of Florida State Prison, the Petitioner was on sick leave for the payroll period of March 26, 1993 through April 8, 1993. While the date of the Petitioner's signature on the relevant time sheet was April 8, 1993, the end of the pay period, the Petitioner testified that the time sheets had actually been submitted earlier. Attendance and leave reports for the following pay period indicated that the Petitioner continued on sick leave status through April 16, 1993. The time sheets for the latter period were not signed by the Petitioner but were signed by Marion Bronson. DOC ordered a manual payroll made up to record payment and to pay the Petitioner through April 16, 1993. He received a salary warrant for $1,234.43 for that period from April 1-16, 1993. That salary check and warrant reflects that retirement contributions were paid as to that April payroll period salary. Because he received additional retirement service credit and a new average final compensation as a result of being in a payroll status and being paid for the period of time in April 1993, the Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits actually now exceed what he would receive as retirement benefit payments had he not been compensated as an employee for his service through April 16, 1993. The Petitioner testified at hearing that he was terminated on March 31, 1993 and not re-hired. He further testified that he neither wanted nor expected payment from DOC for the period of March 31, 1993 through April 16, 1993 and that he "merely wanted to clear his name". Nevertheless, he entered into the settlement agreement which provided for him to be compensated and on payroll status through April 16, 1993, when he entered into the settlement with DOC in the proceeding before the Public Employees Relations Commission. He is presumed to have full knowledge of the content of that settlement agreement, and it reflects that he freely and voluntarily entered into it, as does his testimony. According to Mr. Bronson's testimony, during the relevant period from March 31, 1993 through April 16, 1993, the Petitioner was occupying an authorized and established employment position with DOC. His employment relationship continued with the Department, as a result of the settlement agreement, until April 16, 1993. Because Mr. Bronson and DOC are not parties to the present proceeding and have no financial interest in the outcome of this litigation, Mr. Bronson's testimony is deemed credible and is accepted insofar as it may differ from that of the Petitioner. The Respondent agency learned that a payroll had been prepared for the period of time in April of 1993 in question and that a salary warrant was issued on the basis of the settlement agreement extending the Petitioner's employment with DOC through April 16, 1993. The Division of Retirement thus temporarily reduced the Petitioner's retirement benefits to recover the amount of the resulting, unauthorized April retirement check. It was unauthorized because he remained employed for the period of time in April and was paid as though he were employed, as a result of the settlement agreement. Consequently, he was not entitled to retirement benefits for that period of time in April 1993 ending on April 16, 1993. Mr. Snuggs testified that every retirement applicant, such as the Petitioner, receives a form FRS-TAR, entitled "Retirement System Termination and Re-Employment". The Petitioner did not deny receiving that form (Respondent's Exhibit 4) which advises prospective retirees of their rights and obligations in terms of retirement and retirement benefits as it relates to re- employment.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, temporarily reducing the Petitioner's retirement benefits, in the manner already proposed by that agency, until such time as his April 1993 retirement benefit, paid to him previously, has been reimbursed to the agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2292 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11. Accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert F. Cook Post Office Box 782 Sneads, Florida 32460 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Ste. 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Retirement System's retirement benefit option selected by Petitioner's deceased son should be changed from Option 1 to Option 2.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Kerr is the mother of the late Mr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr was employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) from January 2, 1990 through September 28, 2004. Mr. Kerr was a detective, hereinafter referred to as Det. Kerr. As a result of being an employee of the BSO, Det. Kerr was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). During his employment, BSO, not Det. Kerr, made contributions to the FRS for his benefit. Retirement is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. In complying with its duties, FRS publishes and provides an informational handbook and forms regarding retirement issues to its FRS members. FRS' staff also provide counseling to FRS members who inquire about FRS issues. A website is also maintained by FRS for its members to inquire about FRS issues and obtain information about retirement. On July 29, 2004, Det. Kerr completed an Application for Disability Retirement (Application), which was signed and notarized. The Application indicated, among other things, that he was applying for regular disability benefits and that Dr. Garry Friedberg was one of his treating physicians. Det. Kerr designated Ms. Kerr as his primary beneficiary on the Application. On August 2, 2004, Retirement received the completed application. Det. Kerr had over 16 years of creditable service, and he was, therefore, vested as a Special Risk member of the FRS and eligible for retirement benefits. Retirement acknowledged receipt of the documents needed to make a determination on Det. Kerr's disability retirement application. Also, Retirement advised him that, if his disability retirement application was approved, further documents would be required before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. One of the additional documents requested by Retirement was Form FRS-11o, which was FRS' Option Selection Form for its members. FRS-11o must be completed before retirement benefits can be paid. FRS-11o notices the member of four different options for payment of retirement benefits and contains a narrative describing the effect of the selection of each of the four options. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years, but, if the retiree dies before the end of the 10 years, the benefit is paid to the surviving beneficiary for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary. Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetime of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3 percent upon the death of either. By letter dated August 19, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr that his application for disability retirement was approved. The letter further advised him, among other things, of other documents that he had to submit, including a completed FRS-11o, before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. By letter dated August 23, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr of his estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Option 1 ($2,364.84) and Option 2 ($2,189.13). Insufficient information was available to Retirement to calculate the estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Options 3 and 4, so none were provided. The letter further advised Det. Kerr as to what was required for Retirement to calculate monthly estimates for Options 3 and 4. Additionally, the August 23rd letter, enclosed a blank FRS-11o for Det. Kerr to complete and return. Furthermore, the letter included an informational document, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," regarding making his option selection. This informational document is a standard document included by Retirement, with Retirement's estimates of disability retirement benefits. As to changing an option choice, the document provides in pertinent part: Once you cash or deposit a benefit payment, or begin the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), your [option] selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before [your] decision. Regarding Option 2, the document provided in pertinent part: [T]his option would be particularly appropriate if you are in ill health and your future physical condition is uncertain at the time of retirement since independent children, other heirs, charities, organizations, or your estate or trust can be designated as beneficiaries for Option 2. The document invites FRS members to contact Retirement with any questions. No evidence was presented to demonstrate the Det. Kerr contacted Retirement regarding questions as to the options. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr completed and had notarized FRS-11o. FRS-11o reflected, among other things, the following: the selection of Option 1 by an "X" and being circled; and his marital status as being not married. The language describing Option 1 next to the selection was as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. Also, on FRS-11o was Option 2. The language describing Option 2 next to the selection was as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. On September 1, 2004, Retirement received Det. Kerr's FRS-11o, on which Option 1 was selected and which was properly completed, signed, and notarized. It is undisputed that Det. Kerr's FRS-11o met all requirements as to being in a status of completion. Typically, FRS-11o is the only indication as to a member's wishes regarding his or her option selection. According to Retirement, usually, the disability retirement application is completed prior to receiving an estimate of benefits, and, therefore, it is not uncommon for an FRS member to designate a primary beneficiary and later select Option 1 after reviewing his or her estimate of benefits. According to Retirement, only a member or someone acting on his or her behalf, such as a legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, can make a retirement option selection for the member. No evidence was presented that Det. Kerr, himself, requested a change to his selection of Option 1. On September 28, Det. Kerr resigned from the BSO. October 1, 2004, was established as Det. Kerr's effective disability retirement date. Det. Kerr died on October 20, 2004, less than a month after resigning, without receiving his first disability retirement benefit payment. At the time of his death, Det. Kerr was not married and had no children. Further, no parent was his legal guardian or dependent upon him for support. Det. Kerr's circumstances surrounding his option selection do not place his situation in the usual or typical category of FRS members referred to above by Retirement. Det. Kerr was suffering from AIDS. His symptoms first appeared in 1995. He was being treated by Garry Friedberg, M.D., a physician whose specialty was infectious diseases. As Det. Kerr's treating physician, on July 26, 2004, (approximately three months before Det. Kerr's death) Dr. Friedberg completed a "Disability Insurance - Attending Physician's Statement" form, regarding Det. Kerr's medical condition. The form contained several questions, including those as to diagnosis, prognosis, and mental and cognitive limitations. Dr. Friedberg diagnosed Det. Kerr with the end- stage of AIDS, which included wasting, assistance with activities of daily living, 12 to 15 loose stools per day, and pain in his stomach. Dr. Friedberg determined Det. Kerr's prognosis as terminal. Dr. Friedberg described Det. Kerr's mental and cognitive limitations as poor memory, difficulty concentrating, and inattentiveness. Question 5.c. of the form asked whether Det. Kerr was competent to endorse checks and direct the use of proceeds, to which Dr. Friedberg checked the yes box. It is undisputed that Det. Kerry had a close, loving- relationship with his mother and nephews. Det. Kerr's mother testified as to her son's desires and wishes for his retirement benefits. The undersigned finds her testimony credible. As her son's health deteriorated, Det. Kerr made her co-owner of his home in order for the home to become hers at his death. Det. Kerr had a loving relationship with his nephews and he wanted to make sure that their education would be paid-for through his retirement benefits. Det. Kerr informed his mother that he designated her as the beneficiary of his disability retirement plan so that she could keep his house and pay for the education of his nephews. In a letter dated May 18, 2005, Det. Kerr's healthcare providers gave insight into his medical condition and his intent regarding his disability benefits. The undersigned finds the letter persuasive. Among other things, they indicate that they were Det. Kerr's healthcare providers for several years and that, throughout 2004, Det. Kerr was administered opium to help control his chronic wasting diarrhea and administered opioid- based analgesics for chronic pain. Det. Kerr made it clear to his healthcare providers that his intent was to provide financially for his family at the event of his death. Without question, they insist that the narcotic regimen in Det. Kerr's treatment, caused him to mistakenly mark Option 1, which was the opposite of and completely contrary to the whole intent of what he wanted to do with his disability benefits. Furthermore, they indicate that Det. Kerr intended to check Option 2 in that it would provide for Det. Kerr's family as Det. Kerr had intended. One of Dr. Friedberg's clerical employees, John Carriere, notarized the option selection form at Dr. Friedberg's office for Det. Kerr on August 27, 2004. At that time, the employee had known Det. Kerr for approximately five years and knew what Det. Kerr's intentions were towards his (Det. Kerr's) family, concurring that Det. Kerr wanted his disability retirement benefits to provide for his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews. The employee observed that on that day Det. Kerr had lost considerable weight, was sweating, and was not looking well. The undersigned finds the clerical employee's testimony persuasive. Det. Kerr was friends with Robert Brown for 16 years. Mr. Brown is a certified financial planner but was not Det. Kerr's financial planner. The undersigned finds Mr. Brown's testimony credible. Mr. Brown was well aware that Det. Kerr wanted to make sure that his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews were taken care of with his disability retirement benefits. Det. Kerr sought advice from his friend regarding the disability retirement benefits. Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr met with the BSO's human resource counselor to discuss the different options available. Det. Kerr knew that he was dying, and he decided upon Option 2 because only it provided the benefits that he wanted for his mother and nephews upon his death. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr was at Dr. Friedberg's office and was completing FRS-11o (the option selection form), and he called Mr. Brown, who was busy at work. Det. Kerr requested Mr. Brown to remind him which option number to select. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to call him after working-hours, but Det. Kerr insisted that Mr. Brown talk with him then and provide the requested information. Mr. Brown, not recalling the option number that had been previously determined to be selected but recalling only what the selection provided, informed Det. Kerr that the option decided upon was the one that left the money to his (Det. Kerr's) mother for ten years. Det. Kerr yelled back that he knew what the selection provided that he wanted, but now he only wanted the option number. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to wait a few hours and call him back; but Det. Kerr did not. Later, when Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr were together, Mr. Brown asked Det. Kerr whether he needed any assistance with the retirement paperwork. Det. Kerr responded in the negative, indicating that he had finished the paperwork by himself and convincingly stating that the family was protected. Mr. Brown asked to review the form, but Det. Kerr did not have the form with him. With Det. Kerr so convincingly expressing himself that the family was protected, Mr. Brown did not think of the retirement paperwork again. A finding of fact is made that Det. Kerr at all times had decided on Option 2 and at all times had intended to check Option 2. A finding of fact is made that the medical evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that, due to Det. Kerr's terminal illness and the medications given to him, his mental capacity to make an informed choice at the time that he selected Option 1 was affected; and that he mistakenly checked Option 1, whereas Option 2 would have protected his family as he had intended, which intent had never wavered or changed. By letter dated December 6, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr's family that his estate was entitled to the disability retirement benefits due for the month of October 2004. Additionally, included with the letter was a "Joint Annuitant Information" document, and the family was advised that, if Det. Kerr had a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant, a monthly benefit may be payable to such person. A joint annuitant was mentioned in several of the letters from Retirement to Det. Kerr, prior to his death, regarding his disability retirement. In a letter dated July 30, 2004, related to completing FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Application, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a letter dated August 10, 2004, again, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in two letters dated August 19, 2004, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Estimate of Retirement Benefit document, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as it relates to Options 3 and 4; in an Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits document, dated August 23, 2004, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a document provided to Det. Kerr by Retirement, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?" a joint annuitant is mentioned as it relates to all of the available options; in FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only for Options 3 and 4; and in a letter dated December 6, 2004, after Det. Kerr's death, Retirement refers to a joint annuitant and includes information regarding a joint annuitant. No information was received by Retirement as to a joint annuitant. Further, at hearing no assertion of Ms. Kerr being a joint annuitant was made. Ms. Kerr is the personal representative of her son’s, Det. Kerr's, estate. On September 26, 2005, Retirement received a letter from Ms. Kerr's counsel requesting Retirement to change Det. Kerr's option selection from Option 1 to Option 2, explaining, among other things, Det. Kerr's intent but that his medical condition prevented him from following through with his intent. No mention was made in the letter of a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant. Retirement contends that an option selection can only be changed in the event the designated beneficiary qualifies as a joint annuitant. On October 14, 2005, Retirement, by final agency action letter, denied the request to change Det. Kerr's option selection but erroneously cited Section 121.091(6)(h), Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the decision to deny the request, which stated as follows: (h) The option selected or determined for payment of benefits as provided in this section shall be final and irrevocable at the time a benefit payment is cashed or deposited or credited to the Deferred Retirement Option Program as provided in Subsection (13). Retirement admits that the basis for the denial stated in the final agency action letter is incorrect. No benefit payment had been issued, cashed or deposited. Retirement has never amended or sought to amend its denial-letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order granting the request of Rosalie J. Kerr and changing the retirement option selection of her deceased son, Robert R. Kerr, from Option 1 to Option 2. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive retroactive retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System account of her late husband for the period September 1999 through February 28, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Angela Roberts is the widow of Florida Retirement System (FRS) member Robert Randall Roberts. Mr. Roberts was employed by the Walton County Board of Commissioners and had approximately 25 years of creditable FRS service at the time of his death. Mr. Roberts died on August 20, 1999. At the time of his death, Mr. Robert’s most recent beneficiary designation on file with the Division of Retirement (Division) was made on August 15, 1980. That designation named Terri L. Roberts, who was married to Mr. Roberts at the date the designation was made. Sometime prior to June 25, 1997, Mr. Roberts and Terri L. Roberts were divorced. On June 25, 1997, Mr. Roberts and Petitioner were married. There is no dispute that at the time of his death, Mr. Roberts was married to Petitioner. According to the Division’s telephone records, Terri Ward, f/k/a Terri Roberts, contacted the Division and informed the Division that she and Mr. Roberts had divorced and that he remarried prior to his death. After being contacted by Terri Ward, Division employees contacted the Walton County Board of Commissioners and were given the last known address of Mr. Roberts: 718 Adams Street, Laurel Hill, Florida 32567. However, Petitioner and her five children were forced out of the Laurel Hill residence by her deceased husband’s father, Frank Eugene Roberts, shortly after the death of her husband. Frank Eugene Roberts also provided incorrect information to Evans Funeral Home in Florala, Alabama, regarding his son’s marital status at the time of his death. Because of this incorrect information, the death certificate indicated that Mr. Roberts was divorced at the time of his death. On December 7, 1999, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner at the Laurel Hill address which read in pertinent part as follows: We are sorry to learn of the death of Robert Roberts on August 20, 1999. According to our records, Terri L. Roberts is the designated beneficiary. However, under present law, you would become the beneficiary if your marriage to the member occurred after the date the beneficiary was designated. In order for us to determine the beneficiary and the benefits payable from this account, we need a copy of your Marriage Certificate. We cannot take any further action until this is received. If you have any questions, you may call the Survivor Benefits Section at (850) 488-5207. At the time the letter was sent to her, Petitioner was no longer residing at that address and did not receive the December 7, 1999, letter. In May 2001, Petitioner received a hand-written letter from her former step-daughter, Nichole Roberts, dated May 10, 2001, informing her that Nichole received a call from the Division regarding Mr. Roberts’ retirement money. Her step- daughter informed Petitioner that Petitioner needed to call the Division if she still wanted to receive her deceased husband’s retirement money or to notify the Division if she did not. Petitioner contacted the Division by telephone on May 17, 2001. Petitioner informed the Division that her late husband’s death certificate was incorrect regarding his marital status at the time of this death. She was informed that she would have to get the death certificate changed. The Division gave Petitioner the phone number of the local circuit court. The Division’s record of the phone conversation indicates that Petitioner would call the Circuit Court to inquire as to how to get the death certificate changed. On August 24, 2001, the Division sent Petitioner a letter to an address in Saint Mary, Georgia, informing her of what documentation was required to begin receiving benefits effective September 1, 1999, the date of Mr. Roberts' death. The letter read in pertinent part as follows: This is in reference to the retirement account of Robert R. Roberts. According to our records, Terri L. Roberts is the designated beneficiary. However, under present law, you would become the beneficiary if your marriage to the member occurred after the date the beneficiary was designated. In order to determine the beneficiary, we need a copy of your marriage certificate. If it is determined that you are the beneficiary, you would be entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. This benefit is payable for your lifetime and is approximately $585.43 effective September 1, 1999. To receive the Option 3 benefit, the following documents are needed: Copy of member’s death certificate. Proof of member’s date of birth. Proof of your date of birth. Completed application, Form FST-11B. Copy of your marriage certificate. The Division sent another letter to Mrs. Roberts on December 19, 2001, to the Saint Mary, Georgia address. That letter was entitled, "Request for Survivor Benefits Information" and again requested the same five documents that were referenced in the August 24, 2001, letter. A copy of the August 24, 2001, letter is also referenced as enclosed with the December 19, 2001, letter. No response was received by the Division to the letters of August 24 or December 19, 2001. Neither letter informed Petitioner of any deadline by which the information needed to be received by the Division. The Division sent another letter to Mrs. Roberts on March 15, 2002. That letter again requested the same five documents that were requested in the two previous letters and indicated that copies of the two previous letters were enclosed. Unlike the two previous letters, the March 15, 2002, letter also included a 30-day deadline if she wanted to receive retroactive benefits: If you will furnish this information within 30 days from your receipt of this letter, you may choose to have benefits paid retroactive to September 1, 1999. Otherwise, it will be your responsibility to contact us when you wish benefits to begin. Benefit payments will not be retroactive, but will be effective the month following receipt of the requested information. Ms. Stanley Colvin is the Benefits Administrator of the Survivor Benefits Section of the Division. She has worked at the Division for approximately 31 years. According to Ms. Colvin, when a letter is sent from the Division to members or beneficiaries indicating any missing form is needed, that blank form is automatically generated and sent to the recipient as an enclosure. Accordingly, a blank application form should have been included with the August 24, 2001, December 19, 2001, and March 15, 2002, letters sent to Mrs. Roberts. Mrs. Roberts acknowledges receiving the March 15, 2002, letter, but insists that no application form was enclosed. Further, Mrs. Roberts asserts that she and her friend, Nichole Tuttle, called the Division soon after Petitioner received the March 15, 2002, letter, using a speaker phone. Both Mrs. Roberts and Ms. Tuttle assert that Mrs. Roberts verbally received a two-year extension from an unidentified person at the Division in which to file the requested documentation. Ms. Tuttle’s telephone record does reflect a call that was made to the Division on April 30, 2002, which is not reflected in the Division’s records. Petitioner did not have the means to accomplish the task of correcting the death certificate on her own. She attempted to hire an attorney to get the death certificate corrected. However, Mrs. Roberts had serious financial difficulties as a result of having five children and, when able to find work, has not been able to maintain a good income. She also found it difficult to find an attorney who had not represented the deceased’s family. Because of these obstacles, she was unable to retain an attorney until January 23, 2003. Ms. Colvin acknowledges that extensions are sometimes given to people for filing documents but the longest extension granted is for 60 days. However, there is no record of a phone call or any other documentation in the Division’s records that a two-year extension was given. Only Ms. Colvin has the authority to grant such extensions. Ms. Colvin has a distinctive voice. Neither Mrs. Roberts nor Ms. Tuttle recalls hearing Ms. Colvin’s voice prior to the hearing. The next contact the Division had with Mrs. Roberts was a telephone call from Mrs. Roberts’ stepmother on February 24, 2003. The caller requested that the Division call Mrs. Roberts at a particular phone number,as Mrs. Roberts could not make long-distance calls from her phone. At this time, the caller supplied a new address for Mrs. Roberts in Bay Minette, Alabama, and informed the Division that Mrs. Roberts has an attorney attempting to get the death certificate corrected. A Petition to Correct Death Certificate was filed with the Walton County Circuit Court on or about March 10, 2003. An Order was signed by Judge Lewis Lindsey on March 24, 2003, directing the Bureau of Vital Statistics to correct the death certificate. On March 20, 2003, the Division sent a letter to Mrs. Roberts requesting a copy of her marriage certificate and the death certificate. No reference is made in this letter to any other document. Mrs. Roberts again called the Division on March 24, 2003, informing the Division that her attorney was still waiting to receive the corrected death certificate and that she was in possession of a marriage certificate indicating her marriage to Mr. Roberts. Mrs. Roberts also inquired about the retroactive payment of the retirement benefits. On April 14, 2003, Mrs. Roberts sent a letter to the Division requesting benefits retroactive to September 1, 1999. On April 14, 2003, the Division received the required proof of birth for Petitioner and for Mr. Roberts. On May 14, 2003, the Division sent another letter to Mrs. Roberts. This letter included the following: As the surviving spouse and joint annuitant, you are entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. This benefit is payable for your lifetime and is approximately $561.35 effective March 1, 2003. To receive the Option 3 benefit, we need the following: Completed application, Form FST-11b. (Emphasis supplied) A completed application Form FST-11b was received by the Division on May 21, 2003. Mrs. Roberts was added to the retirement payroll effective March 1, 2003. Ms. Colvin became involved in this case in May 2003 for the purpose of reviewing the file to see if retroactive benefits were appropriate. According to Ms. Colvin, Mrs. Roberts was added to the payroll effective March 1, 2003, instead of June 1, 2003 (the month following receipt of the completed application), because of the phone call Mrs. Roberts made to the Division on February 24, 2003. Ms. Colvin explained that she "bent the rule" in Mrs. Roberts’ favor by looking at the February 26, 2003, phone call as "starting a new folder." Ms. Colvin determined that retroactive benefits were not in order because the March 15, 2002, letter gave a 30-day deadline and the Division did not receive any of the required documents until approximately a year later. She did not find anything in the file to justify any change to the effective date. Some benefit recipients purposefully defer payments for a number of reasons, e.g., eligibility for public assistance programs. Mrs. Roberts never indicated to the Division that she wanted the benefits deferred. Mrs. Roberts was not aware that the Division would have accepted the requested documents in piecemeal fashion, but focused on getting the death certificate corrected.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Mrs. Roberts’ request for an effective benefit date of September 1, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Campbell, Esquire James C. Campbell, P.A. 4 Eleventh Avenue, Suite 2 Shalimar, Florida 32579 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner was properly enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Hybrid Option Plan (Hybrid Option) in 2002, and whether he should be retroactively re-enrolled in the Florida 1 All statutory references are to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes, except where indicated otherwise. Retirement System Pension Plan (Pension Plan) without having to pay a “buy-in” amount.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Marinak began employment with the Marion County Public School System, an FRS-participating employer, in 1989. At that time, the Pension Plan was the only retirement program available for eligible employees, and, thus, Petitioner was enrolled in the Pension Plan. The Pension Plan is administered by the Florida Division of Retirement (Division of Retirement), which is housed within the Department of Management Services. The Pension Plan is a defined benefit plan; the benefit is formula-based. The formula used for calculating a pension plan benefit is based on total years of service at the time of retirement, membership class, and average final compensation. Mr. Marinak has been continuously employed by an FRS-participating employer from 1989 to present. In 2002, the FRS Investment Plan (Investment Plan) became available to employees participating in FRS. The Investment Plan is administered by Respondent. The Investment Plan is a defined contribution plan; the benefit is based on gains and losses due to market performance. Mr. Marinak was provided a choice window of September 1, 2002, through November 30, 2002, to remain in the Pension Plan or switch to the Investment Plan. The parties stipulate that the Plan Choice Administrator at the time, now doing business as Voya, has records indicating Mr. Marinak elected the Hybrid Option by means of a telephone call on November 27, 2002. Voya no longer has a recording of the call. SBA does not have a recording of the telephone call either. The Hybrid Option is as its name indicates—it is a hybrid of the Pension Plan and the Investment Plan. When the Investment Plan was introduced in 2002, Pension Plan participants, with at least five years of service, could elect to enroll in the Investment Plan with a zero balance. With the election of the Hybrid Option, retirement funds from all years of service prior to the election remain in the Pension Plan; everything from the election forward is administered under the Investment Plan. Hybrid Option participants will receive the resulting defined benefit from the Pension Plan (earned prior to the election) upon retirement, plus the benefits from the investments in the Investment Plan after the election. The Pension Plan portion of the Hybrid Option remains with, and continues to be administered by, the Division of Retirement. The Investment Plan portion is administered by Respondent. Mr. Marinak disputes electing to enter the Hybrid Option. He credibly testified that he did not desire to transfer to the Investment Plan and has no recollection of authorizing such a transfer. Beginning at least as early as 2005, Respondent sent or otherwise made available to Mr. Marinak quarterly “FRS Investment Plan” statements. Mr. Marinak testified that he received these statements, but did not know what they meant. The earliest FRS Investment Plan statement documented by Respondent as having been sent to Mr. Marinak covered the period of January 1, 2005, to March 31, 2005. Mr. Marinak did not inquire about the statement or file a complaint with Respondent after receiving this statement. Beginning at least as early as 2008, the Department of Management Services sent or otherwise made available to Mr. Marinak annual “FRS Pension Plan – Hybrid Option” statements. These statements were sent to Mr. Marinak’s address of record at the time the statements were mailed. Mr. Marinak testified that the addresses where the statements were sent were, indeed, his addresses. Since the transfer in 2002, Mr. Marinak has updated his beneficiary designations for both the Pension Plan and Investment Plan portions of his Hybrid Option. In November 2008, Mr. Marinak communicated by e-mail with personnel at the Division of Retirement about the status of the Pension Plan and the years of service used to calculate his benefits. In December 2008, in response to his inquiry, the Division of Retirement prepared and provided to Mr. Marinak an Estimate of Retirement Benefit. The “Comments” section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefit stated as follows: This estimate is based on retirement at 30 years of service. It represents your 13.40 years of service in the Florida Retirement Pension Plan (8/1989 through 11/2002). You will have to terminate all employment with FRS employer to receive this benefit. You have an additional 6.00 years in the Hybrid Investment Plan through 11/2008; the years in the Hybrid Option are not used in calculating your monthly retirement benefit from the pension plan, which is why they are not reflected in your Member Annual Statement. Mr. Marinak did not inquire about the comment or file a complaint after receiving the Estimate of Retirement Benefit.2 Mr. Marinak testified that he saw the comment, but not being an expert in retirement financing, he did not comprehend what it meant. Mr. Marinak did not present documentary evidence or an audio recording demonstrating that he did not elect to transfer from the Pension Plan to the Hybrid Option. In early 2019, Mr. Marinak, nearing retirement, reviewed his retirement account and recognized that he was enrolled in the Hybrid Option. He contacted the Division of Retirement for guidance on how to switch back into the Pension Plan. The Division of Retirement informed Mr. Marinak that he may utilize a one-time “second election” to move back into the Pension Plan, but must pay a sum of approximately $160,000 as a “buy-in” amount to do so. This sum is derived from an actuarial calculation conducted by the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Florida Retirement System Investment Plan Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruth E. Vafek, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Herbert M. Hill Law Office of Herbert M. Hill, P.A. Post Office Box 2431 Orlando, Florida 32802 (eServed) Robert John Marinak 16531 Swan View Circle Odessa, Florida 33556 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
