The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a life and health insurance agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Thomas Keith McOwen, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a life and health insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was a sales representative for Western and Southern Life Insurance Company (WSLIC), an insurance firm having headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio. Respondent's contractual agreement with WSLIC began on April 18, 1988. Under the agreement, respondent was required to account for and remit all premiums collected and received on behalf of WSLIC. On March 3, 1993, WSLIC terminated respondent's appointment as a sales representative, thereby cancelling his agent's contract. In August 1988, Ruth Houston, a/k/a Tracy Houston, purchased a WSLIC life insurance policy from respondent. In 1991, respondent collected around $440.00 in cash from Houston as premium payments but remitted only $128.00 to WSLIC. In an affidavit given to petitioner's investigator, respondent acknowledged that he failed to account for the remaining $312.00 and had converted it to his own personal use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 626.561(1), 626.611(4), (7), (9), (10) and (13), and 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, and that his licenses and eligibility for licensure be revoked. The charge as to Subsection 626.611(8), Florida Statutes, should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4189 Petitioner: 1-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. NOTE: Where a finding has been partially adopted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bill Nelson Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Mr. Thomas Keith McOwen 2913 Langley Ave., #107 Pensacola, FL 32504
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Charles Anderson, currently is eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, general lines property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous agent, and health insurance agent. The Respondent moved to Florida from Michigan in September, 1983. In January, 1984, the Respondent and a partner bought Guaranteed Underwriters, Incorporated, a corporate general lines insurance agency doing business as Security Insurance Agency (Security) in New Port Richey, Florida. The Respondent's background was primarily in the life and health insurance business; his partner's background was primarily in property and casualty insurance. They planned to divide responsibilities for Security's operations along the lines of their respective areas of expertise. However, the partnership dissolved, leaving to the Respondent responsibility for all of the operations of the agency. After the dissolution of the partnership, the Respondent delegated to unlicensed employees most of the day-to-day responsibilities for the property and casualty and workmen's compensation side of the agency's business. The Respondent was personally involved primarily in the day-to-day operations of the health and life insurance side of the business, as well as in selected large commercial accounts. The conduct of Security's business, as described above, went smoothly (there were no charges of any license violations) until two disruptive factors entered into the picture. One was financial in nature; the other was personal. In 1986, Security bought an existing insurance agency (Sunland Insurance Agency) in Holiday, merged it into Security, and attempted to operate it as part of Security's overall business. In 1987, Security bought another, large agency (Village Insurance Agency) and also merged it into Security and attempted to operate it as part of Security's overall business. At this point, the Respondent essentially was attempting to operate three insurance agencies, something he never attempted before. With the purchase of Sunland and Village, in addition to Security, the Respondent incurred significant debt which had to be met for his business to just break even. By approximately 1988, the Respondent owed approximately $150,000 still outstanding on the purchase of Security, $100,000 borrowed to finance the purchase of Village, $43,000 to three different relatives and $3,500 to the NCNB bank on loans made in connection with the business. Payments on these debts, together with payroll, rent and other business expense left Security with a monthly operating budget of almost $12,000. At this expense level, the business was losing money. In calendar year 1989, the business lost between approximately $12,600 and (counting unpaid bills outstanding at the end of the year) $17,900. At the end of 1988, severe personal problems added to the Respondent's financial woes. In December, 1988, the Respondent's wife had to be hospitalized in Tampa for eight weeks for treatment for symptoms of mental illness. During this time, in addition to trying to supervise the operations of Security, the Respondent was required to travel back and forth to Tampa (about an hour drive by car, each way) to visit his wife and also make arrangements for the care of his eighteen month old son (either by himself or by a baby-sitter). As if the Respondent's personal problems were not enough, when his wife was discharged from the hospital (with a diagnosis of a chemical imbalance), she informed him that she wanted a divorce. She took up a separate residence in Tampa where she lived pending the dissolution of the marriage. As a result of the his personal problems, the Respondent delegated more and more responsibility to his unlicensed employees. He would go to the office only for an hour or two a day. Sometimes he was not able to get into the office at all. Judy Nelson (Count V). Judy Nelson, who is self-employed doing business as Pedals 'N' Presents, used Security for her insurance needs since 1986. In January, 1989, she applied through Security for renewal of a special multi-peril (SMP) insurance policy with American Professional Insurance for another year beginning January 21, 1989. On January 10, 1989, she gave Security her check for $485 as partial payment for the coverage. The $485 was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. Security never processed Nelson's application or secured the coverage. On or about March 10, 1989, Nelson received notice from American Professional that no application for renewal of coverage or premium had been received and that coverage was being cancelled. Nelson immediately contacted Security regarding the notification, and one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees acknowledged an error on Security's part but assured Nelson that Security would correct the situation and have Nelson's coverage reinstated. Security never got the policy reinstated, and the policy was cancelled on March 21, 1989. On or about April 8, 1989, Nelson's business was burglarized, and Nelson made a claim on her MPS policy. At this point, in handling the claim, the Respondent realized that the policy had been cancelled and that Nelson had no coverage. But, instead of telling her the facts, the Respondent paid the claim himself. Nelson thought the claim was paid under the terms of her SMP policy and still thought she had coverage. Later, Nelson had a question about a signature on her policy and telephoned the Professional American to get her question answered. Professional American told her that she had no coverage. At about the same time, Nelson was contacted by a Department investigator, who asked her not to contact the Respondent yet as he would make arrangements for a refund for her. On or about December 6, 1989, after the Department investigator cleared it, Nelson telephoned the Respondent and asked for a refund. This time, the Respondent acknowledged that Nelson had no coverage and agreed to a refund. The Respondent paid Nelson the refund at the end of December, 1989, or the beginning of January, 1990. Nelson still does business with Security. She has in force workmen's compensation insurance through Security. Fred J. Miller (Count VI). On or about February 24, 1989, Fred J. Miller came into the Security offices to get commercial automobile insurance for the vehicles he uses in his recycling business. He dealt with one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees. Several application and other papers for coverage with Progressive American Insurance Companies were prepared and were signed by Miller. Miller also made a partial payment for the coverage in cash in the amount of $296, for which the employee gave Miller a receipt. As he left the office, the Security employee assured him that he had coverage. A few days later, on or about February 28, 1989, Security contacted Miller and told him an additional $606 was needed to obtain the coverage for which he had applied. Miller returned to Security and gave the employee he was dealing with an additional $606 cash, for which he was given another receipt. It was not proven, and is not clear, whether the cash received from Miller was placed in the Security operating account. Security never submitted Miller's application for insurance. Contrary to Miller's understanding, Miller had no insurance on his vehicles. As of April 6, 1989, Miller had neither a policy (or copy of one) nor an insurance identification card. On or about April 6, 1989, Miller bought a new vehicle and had to contact Security to get an insurance policy number in order to have the vehicle registered in his name. The Security employee speaking to Miller discovered that Miller's undated application still was in the "pending matters" file and told Miller he could not get the policy number at that time. Miller said he had to have the policy number immediately. At that point, the employee brought the problem to the Respondent's attention. The Respondent had the employee tell Miller they would call right back. Security then dated Miller's application April 6, 1989, telephoned Progressive American to secure coverage effective April 6, 1989, and called Miller back with the policy number he needed. Security then processed Miller's application to secure the coverage for a year, through April 6, 1990. Miller has renewed the Progress American coverage through Security and still has his vehicles insured under the policy. Donald E. Wilkins (Count IV). Donald E. Wilkins, President of Apple Paradise Landscaping, Inc., used Security for his general liability and automobile insurance needs. He has no complaint about, and no issue is raised in this proceeding, as to Security's handling of those coverages. (The evidence is that the coverages Wilkins applied for were placed in the normal course of business.) On or about March 9, 1989, Wilkins decided he wanted a workmen's compensation insurance certificate. He went to Security's office, and one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees completed an application for the insurance and for premium financing. Wilkins gave her a $250 check "just for the certificate." The check was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. On March 9, 1989, Wilkins also specifically requested that Security furnish to Hawkins Construction of Tarpon Springs, Florida, a certificate of insurance. In response to the request, Security furnished to Hawkins Construction a certificate that Apple Paradise with the "S. Atlantic Council on Workers Compensation." A policy number appears on the certificate, and the certificate states that coverage was effective March 13, 1989, to expire on March 13, 1990. There is no evidence that the Respondent personally was involved in providing this certificate of insurance. The evidence did not prove whether Wilkins ever got any workmen's compensation insurance. The Department proved that Security never processed the premium financing application, and Wilkins testified that he never got a payment book or other request for payment from any premium financing company. But the representative of the National Council on Compensation Insurance gave no testimony on Wilkins or Apple Paradise. Wilkins himself did not appear to have any complaint against the Respondent or Security. Theoharis Tsioukanaras (Count III). Theoharis (Harry) Tsioukanaras owned and operated Harry's Painting and Enterprises, Inc. He had been doing business with the Respondent to meet his business and personal insurance needs since the Respondent first bought Security (and did business with the prior owner for a year before that). He had his business and personal automobile insurance, as well as his workmen's compensation insurance through Security. In the normal course of their business relationship, either Harry would telephone Security when he had insurance needs or Security would telephone Harry when it was time to renew insurance. Harry would then drop by the office to complete the necessary paperwork and pay the premium. When Harry did not have the necessary premium money when it was time to buy or renew insurance, the Respondent regularly loaned Harry premium money and Harry would pay the Respondent back later. Harry usually dealt with the Respondent's unlicensed employees, not with the Respondent directly. On or sometime after July 7, 1989, Harry telephoned Security for proof of insurance on a 1987 Subaru so that he could avoid having to pay for lender insurance on the vehicle at a bank where he was seeking to obtain financing. One of the Respondent's unlicensed employees gave Harry a purported insurance identification card for "Progressive American," listing a purported insurance policy number and purported policy effective dates of July 7, 1989, to January 7, 1990. The lending institution did not accept the card. In fact, no Progressive American policy had issued on the vehicle. At some point, Harry came by the Security office and told the Respondent that he (Harry) was due a $640 refund for automobile insurance renewal premium money on a policy that never issued. By the Respondent's own admission, he checked with his records and his unlicensed employees and confirmed that Harry was owed the money. On September 28, 1989, he gave Harry a check for $640. 1/ Despite the circumstances that resulted in the false Progressive American insurance identification card, in Harry's need to buy Allstate insurance on a vehicle he thought was insured through Security, and in Harry's need for a $640 refund from Security, Harry continues to do his insurance business with the Respondent and Security and also refers friends to the Respondent for insurance needs. John Stuiso (Count I). On or about June 7, 1989, John Stuiso, a self-employed building contractor, applied for both general liability and workmen's compensation insurance through Security. (Stuiso had been insured through Security for the preceding four years with no apparent problems.) Stuiso paid Security $3,250 as partial payment of the premiums on the policies and also applied for premium financing through Security. At least $3,000 was paid by check; the evidence is not clear how the other $250 was paid. The $3,000 check was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. It is not clear what happened to the other $250. It was understood between Stuiso and Security that Security would have the applications processed and would inform Stuiso if there was any problem with coverage. Not having heard anything to the contrary, Stuiso believed he had the general liability and workmen's compensation insurance for which he had applied. In fact, Security never processed either application for insurance or either application for premium financing. In late July or early August, 1989, Stuiso requested that Security furnish a certificate of insurance for him to provide to a customer, APCO Building Systems of Oldsmar, Florida. On August 4, 1989, Security issued to APCO a certificate that Stuiso had both general liability insurance with American Professional Insurance Company and workmen's compensation insurance with "South Atlantic Council on Work Comp." Purported policy numbers also appeared on the certificate. When Stuiso never received a payment book for his premium financing, he became concerned about his coverage and was about to approach the Department for assistance when he received a telephone call from a Department investigator who had been investigating the Respondent (unbeknownst to the Respondent.) The investigator told Stuiso that he had no coverage. Stuiso then approached the Respondent and asked for a refund. The Respondent checked his records and asked his unlicensed employees about Stuiso's claim that he had paid for and applied for insurance that never issued. He learned for the first time the facts about Stuiso and immediately wrote Stuiso two refund checks, one for $3,000 and one for $250. Due to the financial problems the Respondent was having, his $3,00 check was returned for insufficient funds. The Respondent tried to borrow the money to cover the $3,000 check from a friend who declined on advice of counsel. Stuiso then went to the police and had the Respondent charged with writing a worthless check. The Respondent was advised of this and turned himself in to the police. He was given a week to make good on the check. The Respondent was able to borrow the money from another friend and paid Stuiso in full. However, his encounter with the police brought home to him the depths to which he had sunk. He decided to commit suicide by monoxide poisoning but changed his mind before it was too late. He telephoned his wife in Tampa to report what he had just done, and she initiated steps to have him committed involuntarily for treatment for mental illness under Florida's Baker Act. He spent four days in the Community Hospital in New Port Richey, Florida, where he was diagnosed as having "adjustment reaction." He was released to the custody of his wife and spent the next week to ten days with her in Tampa. After the Respondent recovered, he decided to do whatever was necessary to save his business and pay off his debts. He laid off office staff and, to take up the slack, himself assumed the responsibilities he had been delegating to his unlicensed employees. He also decided, in light of the Harry's and Stuiso matters, to himself investigate to see if there were any other Security customers who did not have insurance coverage for which they had paid. He found Wanda Mae Riley (Custom Plumbing of Pasco, Inc.). Wanda Mae Riley (Count II). In about August, 1988, the Respondent himself called on Wanda Mae Riley of Custom Plumbing of Pasco County to advise her that the company's general liability and automobile insurance policies for its fleet of four trucks were up for annual renewal on August 24, 1988. The Respondent filled out applications for renewal of the policies and for premium financing and accepted Riley's check in the amount of $3,244 as down payment for the renewal policies. The $3,244 was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. The Respondent telephoned American Professional Insurance Company to bind the coverage. He or his office also issued proof of insurance identification cards for Custom Plumbing. But, for reasons he cannot explain (having no recollection), he never processed the applications and the binders expired when the applications were not processed and policies were not issued in the normal course of business. Having had a lapse of memory as to the matter and as to Security's responsibilities to Custom Plumbing, the Respondent did not know and never told Riley or Custom Plumbing that the insurance policies were not renewed and that Custom Plumbing did not have the coverage it thought it did. Later in 1988, Security also arranged for workmen's compensation insurance for Custom Plumbing. The evidence did not prove that there were problems in the way Security obtained this coverage for Custom Plumbing. In approximately April, 1989, Custom Plumbing requested that Security furnish a certificate of insurance for him to provide to the Barnett Bank of Hernando County. On April 21, 1989, Security issued to the bank a certificate that Custom Plumbing had automobile insurance with American Professional Insurance Company. The expired binder number (which perhaps was the same as the policy number of the prior year's policy) appeared on the certificate as the purported policy number. There is no evidence that the Respondent personally was involved in providing this certificate of insurance. When, in approximately late October or early November of 1989, the Respondent discovered that Security had not obtained the coverages for which Custom Plumbing had made down payments in August, 1988, he telephoned Riley to inform her 2/ and tell her that he would refund the down payments Custom Plumbing had made in August, 1988. When the refund was not made promptly, Riley went to a lawyer to have a promissory note drawn for the Respondent's signature. The promissory note reflected the $3,244 the Respondent owed to Custom Plumbing, payable $500 a month. On or about December 9, 1989, the Respondent signed the note, which was paid in full in accordance with the terms of the note. (As previously found in Finding 14, by this time the Respondent also had heard from Nelson.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Robert Charles Anderson, guilty of the charges contained in Counts I, II, III, V and VI of the Administrative Complaint, as set forth in the Conclusions of Law, above; and (2) suspending the Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure for six months. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Richard Sidney Cole, is currently eligible for licensure and licensed in this state as a Health Insurance Agent, and was so licensed at all times relevant to these proceedings. The Respondent, at all times relevant to these proceedings, was licensed in this state to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Insurance Company (National States). Count I -- Edith Kastel. On or about June 24, 1988, the Respondent visited the home of Edith Kastel of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of soliciting health insurance. She had responded to a "lead card" National States had sent to her, and her request for follow- up information was referred to the Respondent. Since Kastel was not yet eligible for Medicare, and could not purchase a Medicare supplement policy, the Respondent showed her the National States Limited Medical-Surgical Expense policy. This policy pays 40% of doctors' charges, outpatient hospital charges and outpatient charges for diagnostic laboratory and x- ray examinations and ambulance charges. During the application process, Kastel disclosed to the Respondent that she had suffered from diverticulitis in the past. The Respondent took this opportunity to explain to Kastel that the policy would not pay on preexisting conditions (i.e., according to the policy, loss "which results from sickness or disease for which treatment was advised or received, or medical advice given by a doctor, during the 180 day period just before the Policy Date") until after the expiration of a six-month waiting period. Kastel fully understood this provision of the policy. Kastel did not disclose to the Respondent during the application process any other preexisting conditions to which the waiting period would apply. She did tell him that she had an eye examination appointment that she had just scheduled for July 6, 1988, but she gave no indication that she knew there was something wrong with her eyes or that the appointment was for anything other than a routine vision check. She continued to maintain at the hearing that she did not know, at the time she applied for coverage through the Respondent, that she had cataracts. She did vaguely ask whether she would be covered if the examination revealed that something was wrong with her eyes, and the Respondent assured her that she would be covered and that she should submit any bills she might get with a claim on the policy. Kastel bought the policy, effective July 1, 1988. At her eye examination on July 6, 1988, Kastel was diagnosed with cataracts and was advised that elective cataract surgery would be beneficial. Kastel scheduled the surgery and had it performed in October, 1988. When she submitted her bills with a claim on the policy, National States rejected the claim as a preexisting condition for which claim was made within the policy's six_month waiting period. When the claim was rejected, Kastel complained to the Respondent, who made a written request to National States that the claim be paid. He reasoned that the claim should be covered because Kastel maintained that she did not know of the condition at the time she applied for coverage. Kastel and the Respondent were not able to change National States' position, and the claim still has not been paid. It was not proven that the Respondent misrepresented to Kastel that the policy paid 40% of all charges (as opposed to 40% of only doctors' charges, outpatient hospital charges and outpatient charges for diagnostic laboratory and x-ray examinations and ambulance charges) or that Kastel would not have purchased the policy if the Respondent had communicated to her exactly what kinds of charges it covered. Up to the time of the hearing, there is no indication that Kastel had any complaint against National States or the Respondent except that her cataract surgery claim was rejected as a preexisting condition. 2/ (All other claims Kastel has made under the policy have been paid.) Kastel's testimony elicited at the hearing, that the Respondent told her only that the policy covered 40% of all expenses, was not persuasive. Count II -- The Ogletrees. Like Kastel, Jack and Margaret Ogletree of Palm Bay, Florida, responded to National States advertising by sending in a "lead card" that was referred to the Respondent. The Respondent visited the Ogletrees on or about August 11, 1988. Margaret Ogletree was not yet eligible for Medicare, and the Respondent sold both her and her husband a National States Limited Medical-Surgical Expense Policy. These were not Medicare supplement policies, and the policies themselves state in bold print: "THIS POLICY IS NOT A MEDICARE SUPPLEMENT POLICY." The Respondent explained that the policy was totally unrelated to Medicare and would pay under its terms regardless of Medicare coverage. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent said or did anything to lead the Ogletrees to believe that they were buying a Medicare supplement policy, except perhaps to say that the policy would pay for some things that Medicare would not pay for. It was not proven that Jack Ogletree had a Medicare supplement policy in force at the time or whether he planned to, or did, replace a Medicare supplement policy with the policy the Respondent sold him. It was not proven that the Respondent was required to submit a replacement form or indicate on the application that the policy was "intended to replace any accident or sickness insurance, health service or health maintenance contract." The evidence proved that the Ogletrees told the Respondent during the application process that Jack Ogletree had successful open heart surgery for an aortic valve replacement in April, 1984, and remained on medication for his heart condition. The Respondent led the Ogletrees to believe that losses resulting from the heart condition would be covered after the six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions. In completing Jack Ogletree's application, the Respondent wrote "no" in answer to: question 6.c., asking whether he had or ever had "high or low blood pressure, varicose veins or disorder of the heart or circulatory system; question 7.a., asking whether he had consulted or been treated by any physician or practitioner in the last five years; and question 7.b., asking whether he had been confined in a hospital in the last five years. The evidence is that, under National States' underwriting policies, a successful aortic valve replacement performed over four years before an application would not mean automatic rejection of the application. Had questions 6.c., 7.a. and 7.b. on Jack Ogletree's application been answered correctly, National States typically would have investigated and may or may not have rejected the application, depending on the results of the investigation. Likewise, it is not clear from the evidence whether National States would consider the misrepresentation on the Jack Ogletree application to be a material misrepresentation that would require rejection if Jack Ogletree were to make a claim based on his heart disorder. To the date of the hearing, no such claim had been made. (Claims that have been made have been paid.) Count III -- Gunnar Sundstrom. Like Edith Kastel and the Ogletrees, Gunnar Sundstrom sent in a "lead card" that was referred to the Respondent. The Respondent visited Sundstrom on or about December 9, 1987. At the time, Sundstrom had in force an Old Southern Life Insurance Company (Old Southern) Medicare supplement policy. Sundstrom wanted to replace the Old Southern policy with a National States policy which the Respondent sold him. He wanted a minimum of overlap between the effective date of the new National States policy and the lapse of the Old Southern policy, but he also wanted to be sure that there would be no gap in coverage of any preexisting conditions. He and the Respondent discussed this thoroughly, but the Respondent could not answer all of Sundstrom's questions because he was not sure at the time whether National States was going to increase the waiting period for preexisting conditions from three to six months. It was decided that Sundstrom would apply for the policy, review it upon receipt, and cancel it and ask for a full refund within 30 days, as he had a right to do under the policy, if the waiting period for preexisting conditions turned out to be six months. On the Sundstrom application, the Respondent answered "no" to the question whether the National States policy for which Sundstrom was applying was "intended to replace any accident or sickness insurance, health service or health maintenance contract." The Respondent did not submit any replacement forms as required by F.A.C. Rule 4-51.007 when a Medicare supplement policy is being replaced. 3/ The Respondent explained that he thought the "no" answer on the Sundstrom application was appropriate and that no replacement form was necessary because Sundstrom was not cancelling the Old Southern policy, only perhaps allowing it to lapse. He now concedes that perhaps he was wrong. All claims Sundstrom made under the National States policy through the date of the hearing were paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance, enter a final order suspending the license, and eligiblity for licensure, of the Respondent, Richard Sidney Cole, for four (4) months. RECOMMENDED this 28th Tallahassee, Florida. day of August, 1990, in J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1990.
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Daniel Bruce Caughey has been licensed by petitioner as an insurance agent at least since 1981. He began working for Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. in 1971 as a file clerk. Once he was licensed, he worked as a salesman. In 1977, he assumed the executive vice-presidency of the agency, a position he still holds. Until the middle of March, 1983, respondent'- father, William Edward Caughey, managed the agency. He continues to own all 1,000 shares the corporation has issued, although he has not written a policy since he turned management of the agency over to the respondent and his brother Randy in 1983. In 1982 and thereafter until Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. (JORO), a multi-line general agency, stopped underwriting automobile insurance, Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. brokered automobile insurance through JORO. When an account current bookkeeping dispute arose between Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. and JORO, William Edward Caughey retained an accounting firm, Sizemore. On Sizemore's advice, he rejected JORO's claim for more than $20,900. On October 21, 1983, a JORO representative told Daniel Bruce Caughey that JORO would no longer deal with Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. unless he signed an "Individual Guarantee Agreement," personally guaranteeing the insurance agency's corporate indebtedness; and executed a promissory note in JORO's favor in the amount of $16,941. Respondent executed the documents. On December 3, 1986, JORO brought suit against the corporation and respondent personally. No. 86-21454 (Fla. 13th Cir.). On August 13, 1987, the court entered judgment against both defendants in the amount of $6,595.94. Jordan Roberts & Co. v. Cauqhey, No. 86-21454 (Fla. 13th Cir.; Aug. 13, 1987). Neither respondent nor the agency has paid the judgment. With the possible exception of filing the complaint that eventuated in the present proceedings, JORO has made no effort to collect. In Count I, JORO's complaint alleges the existence of a brokerage agreement between JORO and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc., entered into "[o]n or about April 27, 1982"; execution and delivery of respondent's guarantee "[o]n or about October 21, 1983"; and the agency's indebtedness "for premiums on policies underwritten by [JORO] for the sum of $20,975.36." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In Count II, the complaint also alleges execution and delivery of a promissory note "[o]n or about October 21, 1983," without, however, explicitly indicating its relationship (if any) with the guarantee executed the same date. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The final judgment does not specify which count(s) JORO recovered on. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Attached to the complaint are copies of the promissory note, executed by ?CAUGHEY INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., By: D B Caughey Vice President"; the guarantee, executed in the same way; and the brokerage agreement, executed on behalf of Caughey Insurance Agency by "William E. Caughey, President." Although the Individual Guarantee Agreement names respondent as guarantor in the opening paragraph, the corporation is shown as guarantor on the signature line. At hearing, both Daniel Bruce Caughey and William Edward Caughey testified that neither had withheld premiums owed JORO, and this testimony was not controverted.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint filed against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, respondent became an officer after the brokerage agreement had been executed. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the judgment could also be based on the promissory note. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, respondent did not sign as an individual guarantor. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 10 and 12 through 18 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11, evidence respondent himself adduced showed that the judgment had not been satisfied. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Elias, Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bruce A. McDonald, Esquire McDonald, Fleming & Moorehead 700 South Palafox Street Suite 3-C Pensacola, FL 32501 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters herein, the Respondent, Department of Insurance, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the insurance profession and the licensing of insurance agents in this state. Petitioner, Dale J. Dyer, was licensed as a health insurance agent in this state but his license had been suspended by the Department as the result of a disciplinary action in November, 1991, and was, at the time of the alleged misconduct, in a suspended status. The suspension period for Petitioner's license expired in May, 1992 and he thereafter applied for reinstatement of his license. The Department denied his application for reinstatement in July, 1992 because on or about June 19, 1991, a check for $13,971.00, made payable to Transport Life Insurance Company by Thiel Liukens, as payment for a nursing home policy to be issued, was deposited by Paula Dyer, Petitioner's wife and herself a general agent for Transport, to an agency bank account controlled by Ms. Dyer and upon which Petitioner was an authorized signatory. This check was neither transmitted to the insurance company nor returned to Mr. Liukens, nor was the coverage for which it was issued ever initiated. Petitioner met Mr. Liukens in late 1990 when he tried to sell him a Medicare supplement policy. He was not the one who sold him the policy in issue in June, 1991, however, nor did he either solicit or receive a check from him. In fact, there is no evidence he knew he had taken out this policy or paid by check. He had nothing to do with this policy, check or payment. Petitioner's wife, Paula, owns and operates the Paula A. Dyer & Associates agency. At the time in issue, he claims, he had nothing to do with the agency. He claims he did not help run it, didn't supervise any of the employees, and was neither an officer nor director. However, he was, with his wife, a signatory on the firm's checking account and several other accounts as well. He has drawn funds from the company account, as well as the others, for personal or business expenses and to facilitate the conduct of business in his wife's absence. Mr. Dyer asserts that premium deposits from Dyer and Associates agents were not to be deposited to that account. He did not know if they were, however. In any case, he denies ever consciously disbursing funds belonging to any insurance company from that account. To his knowledge, he never disbursed or took any funds from the Liukens payment to Transport Life Insurance Company nor, during 1991, did he have any relationship with that company. This was verified by Mrs. Dyer. Paula A. Dyer & Associates had netting authority with Transport which authorized it to deposit checks made payable to Transport to the agency account and thereafter remit to Transport the net premium portion due the company, retaining the balance as commission. There was no limitation on how the agency portion was to be used. The agency's checking account to which the Liukens check was deposited was with the Barnett Bank. As was stated above, both Dyers were cosignatories on the agency account because, though Petitioner was neither an officer, stockholder, director, nor employee of the agency, he had loaned his wife the money to open it and she wanted him to be able to get money if she were not available. The agency books were kept by a bookkeeper. The policy in issue here was solicited by Pedro Rodrigues, an agency employee, who received the instant check as a premium payment. The check, dated July 2, 1992, was thereafter deposited in July, 1991 to the agency account. Of the total amount of this check, slightly over $7,000.00 was the agency commission which was available for unrestricted use, including the personal use of Ms. Dyer or the Petitioner. Clearly a check written in July, 1992 could not be deposited in July, 1991, a year before being written. Consequently, it is found that the check was dated in error by the drafter. This is not the only error in dates in this matter, however. Mr. Stewart's July 21, 1992 letter of denial to Petitioner reflects the Liukens check was written on or about June 19, 1991. This is clearly not so. Records of the Barnett Bank for the time in issue reflect an account in the name of Paula A. Dyer & Associates, Inc., (Account No. 1263515600), on which the authorized signatories were Paula A. Dyer or Dale J. Dyer. Another account, in the name of Senior Trust of Florida, Inc., (Account No. 1263288130), showed David B. Judy as President, Paula A. Dyer as Secretary/Treasurer, and Dale J. Dyer as shareholder. All were signatories on this account. A third account, (Account No. 1264759744) was a joint account of Dale J. Dyer and Paula A. Dyer. The Liukens check was deposited to the Paula A. Dyer & Associates account and, after endorsement by Mrs. Dyer, cleared. Thereafter, numerous checks were written on that account. During the period June 28, 1991 to July 28, 1991, 11 deposits, totalling almost $66,500.00 were made to it and at the end of the period, the account had a balance of slightly over $21,000.00. From July to August, 1991, 14 deposits to the account totalled in excess of $65,600.00 and the ending balance for the period was $15,561.07. From August 30 to September 30, 1991, ten deposits totalled $18,590.29 and the ending balance for the period was $2,206.97, Among the checks written on the company account during the period were: $10,000 to Paula A. Dyer, deposited to the joint personal account. $8,000 to Senior Trust. $700 to Dale J. Dyer. $12,000 by Dale Dyer to Senior Trust. $945 by Dale Dyer to Willis Kelsey. $2,000 by Dale Dyer to Princess Casino (resort). $1,475 by Paula Dyer to Paula Dyer and deposited to the joint personal account. $600 by Paula Dyer to Senior Trust $2,000 by Paula Dyer to the joint personal account. $1,600 by Paula Dyer to Paula Dyer and deposited to joint personal account. In August, 1991, Transport Life Insurance Company was contacted by an attorney for Mr. Liukens about the check he had written to it for an insurance policy. When the company responded it had no knowledge of the check and had received no funds on his behalf, it was sent a copy of the check endorsed by Ms. Dyer and negotiated by her. A company representative then contacted Ms. Dyer about the check she had received. She acknowledged she had deposited it to her agency account and submitted a check for $971.00 in partial restitution. None of the balance has ever been repaid by Ms. Dyer, the agency, or anyone else, and in September, 1991, Transport Life terminated its agency agreement with Paula A. Dyer & Associates, Inc. It also repaid Mr. Liukens in full. According to Transport Life's representative, Mr. Shellhase, the company has no indication Petitioner had anything to do with this transaction nor any information he conspired with anyone to defraud Transport or Mr. Liukens. By Final Order dated May 3, 1990, the Florida Insurance Commissioner took disciplinary action against Petitioner's license as an insurance agent in Florida for several violations of Section 626.11, Florida Statutes, and several other violations of Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes. The specific violations found were not established at the instant hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that Petitioner's application for reinstatement of his health license be approved. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-5094 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Petitioner's counsel's proposed findings of fact were not specifically numbered. However, for the purposes of this Recommended Order they will be considered as numbered starting with the third paragraph on page 2 of the Proposed Recommended Order and continuing through the fifth paragraph on page 4. 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence not proven. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. However, evidence was introduced that during the period in question, Petitioner wrote checks totalling $14,945.00, a sum exceeding the amount represented by the Liukens check. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. (misnumbered 11 in PFOF). Accepted and incorporated herein. (misnumbered 12 in PFOF). Accepted and incorporated herein. (misnumbered 13 in PFOF). Accepted that the accounts were closed as indicated, but there is no evidence as to what was done with the funds therein. (misnumbered 14 in PFOF). Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Maloney, Esquire 5335 66th Street N., Suite 4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33709 James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1-7 of the Administrative Complaint. The Respondent is currently licensed in the State of Florida as a life and health (debit) agent, as well as a life and health agent. Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, the Florida Department of Insurance, the Petitioner, has jurisdiction over the insurance licenses and appointments of the Respondent. On August 26, 1983, the Respondent entered into an agent contractual agreement with Capital Security Life Insurance Company (Capital). The agent's contract required that the Respondent account for and remit to Capital all premiums collected and received on behalf of that company. On or about October 18, 1991, Capital terminated its appointment of the Respondent, as one of its agents. This had the effect of cancelling the agent contract of the Respondent. The Respondent was terminated because Capital had detected the fact that certain premium monies collected by the Respondent from policy holders had not been remitted over to Capital on a repetitive basis. On or about October 18, 1991, Capital conducted an audit of the account of the Respondent. It was thus shown through the subject audit and work papers in evidence, as well as the testimony of Mr. Reynolds for the Petitioner, that the account of the Respondent contained a proven deficiency in the sum of $812.41 in insurance premiums collected but not remitted to Capital. Other than protest that the deficiency was a mistake and the result of computer error or that the financial information resulting in that figure had been erroneously input into Capital's computer by Capital's office personnel in charge of accounting for such matters and monies, no cogent credible explanation for the failure to remit over that sum of money referenced above has been established. The testimony of Mr. Reynolds is accepted over that of the Respondent as more credible and worthy of belief. It has thus been established that the Respondent misappropriated and converted to his own use and benefit, and unlawfully withheld, premium monies rightfully belonging to Capital while engaged in the applicable and ordinary course of his business as an agent for Capital.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Petitioner agency finding that the Respondent, Willie Frank Dennis, is guilty of the violations set forth as and in the manner in the Conclusions of Law above and that, therefore, his licenses and eligibility for licensure be revoked pursuant to Sections 626.611 and 626.621, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1222 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: 1-9. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Childers, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Willie Frank Dennis 1113 Kennard Street, Apartment No. 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner as a physician in the State of Florida and has, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, held license number ME0030090. Andy Moya, a law enforcement investigator with the Division of Insurance Fraud of the Florida Department of Insurance, conducted an investigation of Respondent's billings to insurance companies. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Moya executed a probable cause affidavit that led to Respondent's arrest on multiple counts, including four counts of grand theft. Grand theft is a third degree felony. On June 12, 1991, Respondent was arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant that had been obtained by Mr. Moya. On October 8, 1991, Respondent freely and voluntarily entered a plea of nolo contendre to four counts of grand theft. The presiding circuit judge accepted Respondent's plea of nolo contendre, withheld adjudication of guilt, placed the Respondent on probation for a period of five years, and ordered Respondent to pay the Department of Insurance the sum of $1,000.00 and the State Attorney's office the sum of $750.00. A condition of Respondent's probation was that under no circumstances could he bill insurance companies for services he performed. All billings to insurance companies would have to be done by someone over whom Respondent had no control. A plea of nolo contendre to four counts of grand theft for billing insurance carriers for services not rendered is directly related to the practice of medicine. The following facts underlie the criminal charges to which Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendre. PATIENT #1 AND PATIENT #2 Patient #1 and #2 were in a car accident in Hialeah, Florida, and subsequently were referred to Respondent by attorney Richard H. Reynolds. Respondent billed U.S. Security Insurance Company, Inc., a total of $1,995.00 for treating Patient #1 on 41 different dates from January 17, 1990, through May 2, 1990. Patient #1 later testified that she had been treated by Respondent on no more than ten different dates. Respondent assigned to Patient #1 a disability rating of five to six percent permanent/partial impairment. Patient #1 later denied under oath that any disability resulted because of the accident. Respondent billed U.S. Security Insurance Company, Inc., a total of $2,195.00 for treating Patient #2 on 46 different dates from January 17, 1990, through May 7, 1990. Patient #2 later testified that she had been treated by Respondent on no more than ten different dates. Respondent assigned to Patient #2 a disability rating of five to six percent permanent/partial impairment. Patient #2 later denied under oath that any disability resulted because of the accident. On October 25, 1990, Respondent authenticated his medical records and billings on Patient #1 and Patient #2 and affirmed to Mr. Moya that these documents were correct. Respondent's medical records and billings for Patient #1 and Patient #2 were fraudulent. PATIENT #3 On July 13, 1990, Patient #3 was in a car accident. On July 27, 1990, an attorney referred Patient #3 to Respondent. Several days after July 27, 1990, Patient #3 visited Respondent (or any other doctor following the accident) for the first time. Respondent subsequently billed U.S. Security Insurance, Inc., for services rendered to Patient #3 on July 20, 23, 25, and 27, 1990. These billings, in the approximate amount of $300.00, were fraudulent in that they were for services purportedly rendered on dates before Respondent first saw this patient. PATIENT #4 Respondent billed Allstate Insurance Company for services that Respondent purportedly rendered to Patient #4 as follows: office visit on June 26, 1990, and physiotherapy treatments on June 26, 28, and 29, and July 3, 5, 6, and 9, 1990. These billings were fraudulent in that Patient #4 was hospitalized at Coral Gables Hospital from June 26, 1990, to July 11, 1990. Respondent did not provide the services for which he billed Allstate Insurance Company during June and July 1990. On February 6, 1991, Respondent signed an affidavit that provided, in pertinent part, as follows: I have read the attached medical report and bill for services rendered to [Patient #4]. I declare that the treatments indication on the attached medical report and bill for services were provided by me on the dates listed and that the treatment and services rendered were reasonable and necessary with respect to the bodily injury sustained. Respondent's billings for Patient #4, in the approximate amount of $300.00, were fraudulent and the affidavit he signed on February 6, 1991, was untrue. Respondent was born in Cuba and graduated from the University of Havana School of Medicine in 1962. Respondent testified at the formal hearing that he was born on May 26, 1919, but the application for licensure submitted by Respondent reflects that Respondent was born May 26, 1924. There was no explanation for this discrepancy. Respondent has been licensed as a physician in the State of Florida since 1977. There was no evidence that Respondent has been previously disciplined by Petitioner. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent was practicing medicine with Dr. Antonio Ramirez, M.D. Dr. Ramirez is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Ramirez was also educated in Cuba, and had known Respondent since the 1970s. Dr. Ramirez is of the opinion that the services rendered by Respondent have been satisfactory. Respondent has no responsibility for submitting bills to patients or to insurance companies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order which finds that Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and which revokes Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of February, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Carlos J. Ramos, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Manuel F. Fente, Esquire 1835 West Flagler Street, Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33135 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the licensure and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent in Florida held by Respondent Michael David Garrett should be disciplined based on the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed against him and, if so, the extent of such discipline.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency that is responsible for the regulation of insurance agent conduct and licensure. Respondent is currently eligible for licensure as an insurance agent and is licensed in this state as a life, variable annuity and health agent, life and health agent, and health agent. The Association for Independent Managers (AIM) is an entity that was founded in 1979 for the purpose of providing educational and other services or benefits to a membership base that is comprised primarily of small businesses. In February 2002, Jack Winebrenner, AIM’s chief executive officer, desired to secure health insurance benefits for AIM’s members. On or about February 7, 2002, Winebrenner delivered applications for health insurance and a cashier’s check in the amount of $23,920.77 to Respondent. The pertinent applications were intended to secure health insurance with an entity known as Mutual Service Life Insurance Company and/or an entity known as United States Life Insurance Company. Winebrenner agreed to gather the applications on behalf of AIM and to forward them to Respondent and Respondent’s company, known as Eastwich Re, Inc. Respondent had represented that he was a licensed insurance agent. The identifying number of the $23,920.77 cashier’s check referred to hereinabove that was delivered to Respondent is 381524555. Respondent’s company, Eastwich Re, Inc., had a business checking account at Flagship National Bank (Flagship) in Sarasota, Florida. On February 12, 2002, the $23,920.77 check that Winebrenner had delivered to Respondent was deposited into Eastwich Re’s Flagship account. Respondent was a signatory on Eastwich Re’s Flagship account. Respondent did not secure health insurance from United States Life Insurance Company or Mutual Service Life Insurance Company or any other company for any of the AIM applicants. Respondent did not forward any premium moneys in the year 2002 to United States Life Insurance Company or Mutual Service Life Insurance Company for the purpose of securing health insurance for any of the AIM applicants. Respondent returned only $10,000.00 from the amount that Winebrenner gave to him in the $23,920.77 cashier’s check. Winebrenner testified that he requested several times of Respondent that the full amount ($23,920.77) of the cashier’s check be returned, once it was clear that no health insurance had been secured for any AIM applicants. AIM engaged private counsel to seek return of the entire $23,920.77 amount, but the efforts of private counsel were not successful. No reason was offered for Respondent only returning $10,000.00. On September 19, 1991, Respondent’s licenses and appointments as an insurance agent were surrendered as part of a Consent Order into which he entered with the Department of Insurance. In 1996, Respondent’s application for licensure as an insurance agent was denied. Respondent’s application for licensure was denied based on information “indicating that Respondent transacted insurance in 1992, in violation of the September 19, 1991 Consent Order which resulted in the surrender of all licenses and appointments held by Respondent . . . [and] had the same force and effect as a revocation.” Respondent was again granted a license as an insurance agent in 1997. Respondent was a licensed insurance agent in Florida at the relevant times that are material to the Administrative Complaint that is the basis for the instant action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Michael David Garrett guilty of violating the provisions of Section and Subsections 626.561(1); 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13); 626.621(6); 626.9521; and 626.9541(1)(o)1., Florida Statutes. As penalty for these violations, it is recommended that Petitioner (1) revoke Respondent's insurance licenses and eligibility for licensure; (2) that Respondent be required to pay an administrative fine of $20,000.00; and (3) that Respondent be required to pay restitution to AIM for the benefit of the defrauded insurance applicants in the amount of $13,920.77. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2005.
The Issue The issue for consideration is whether the Respondent's license as an insurance agent should be disciplined because of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Shirley Ann Cramer, was licensed as a life, health and general lines insurance agent in Florida, and was the sole owner and operator of Consolidated Insurance Associates, Inc., an incorporated general lines life and health insurance agency in Clearwater, Florida. The Department of Insurance was and is the state agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of insurance professionals in this state. In February, 1987, Mercedes Wescott went to the Respondent's agency in Clearwater where she spoke with whom she assumed to be an employee, an individual named Jack. "Jack" is Jack Jarr, Respondent's former husband and a licensed insurance professional who works in a different agency from Respondent, but who was licensed with Respondent's agency at the time in question as well. Ms. Wescott wanted a policy of life insurance, and after talking with Jack, wrote and delivered a check for $167.00, payable to Consolidated Insurance Associates, Inc., as initial down payment therefor. About a week later, she took the required insurance physical but never received the policy she had bought. She called the agency several times about the matter and was repeatedly told the policy was coming. Finally, in June, 1987, she received a letter from American Health and Life Insurance Company, the company with whom, apparently, she was to be insured, advising her that her application for insurance was being cancel led because certain required information was not received. When she called the agency, (Jack), to get her money back, he promised to send it but never did. As a result, she finally called Respondent who, in November, 1987, mailed her a check on the account of Consolidated Insurance Associates, Inc., dated November 24, 1987, in the amount of $117.00, $50.00 less than the initial payment. Ms. Wescott admittedly did not deposit that check immediately. For one thing, it was not for the correct amount, and in addition, she overlooked it. When she finally did deposit it for collection, it was dishonored and returned because of insufficient funds, and she was charged a $12.00 service charge. On January 9, 1988, Ms. Wescott wrote to Respondent outlining what had happened and requested a replacement check in the amount of $179.00, ($167.00 plus $12.00). In this letter, which was mailed to Respondent's home address since the agency had, in the interim, been sold, Ms. Wescott recited the lack of Respondent's response to prior calls and threatened to report the matter to the Insurance Commissioner. Even with this, she received no response from Respondent. Ms. Wescott determined that Respondent was working at a real estate office and when called there, too, failed to return calls. Ms. Wescott ultimately received a check for the entire amount from, she believes, the Department of Insurance. Though she is not sure from whom the check was received, she is certain it was not Respondent or Respondent's agency. When she contacted the new owner of the agency, her request for reimbursement was denied and the new owner suggested she contact the Department. Admittedly, Ms. Wescott dealt only with Mr. Jarr up until the time the cancellation letter was received. Only at that point did she talk with Respondent, and the check, purportedly in reimbursement for the premium paid, which was dishonored, was signed by Respondent. Respondent claims that she was only the subagent for the company with whom Mr. Jarr placed Ms. Wescott but paid Ms. Wescott back herself with a check she claims was good when written. However, since the check in question is dated November 24, and even though held by Ms. Wescott for a while, it had been deposited and dishonored by January 9, 1988 when Ms. Wescott's letter to Respondent was written. This accounts for a total time of 46 days from date of check to date of letter, and with mail times and bank processing times deducted, the time the check was held before deposit cannot be considered unreasonable. Ms. Cramer sold the agency in December, 1987 to an individual who was to assume all the agency liabilities. At the time she sent Ms. Wescott the check for $117.00, she was, she claims, unsure of the amount owed since she no longer had the books in her possession. Considering the probabilities of her testimony and it's corroboration or lack thereof by other evidence of record, it is considered unworthy of belief. On April 4, 1988, Thomas J. Secondo, who was, at the time, having a personal relationship with the Respondent, went to her to get insurance on his two automobiles. He wrote a check that day for $1,641.00 for what he believed was the total premium for the coverage sold and gave it to Respondent personally. He never received a policy of insurance for his money but on June 9, 1988, was notified that his coverage would be cancelled on June 18, 1988 for "underwriting reasons." Somewhat before that time, he also received a book of payment coupons, the reason for which he could not fathom, since it was his understanding he had paid for his policy in full by the check he had given Respondent. Documents introduced into evidence by the parties reflect that on May 18, 1988, Mr. Secondo's policy, purportedly with American United Insurance Company, was to be financed through Express Premium Finance, Inc. in Hollywood, Florida. Mr. Secondo denies having signed the premium finance agreement which bears what is purported to be his signature, and examination of that document clearly reveals that the signature thereon is not his. Just as all this was happening, Respondent contacted Mr. Secondo in writing on June 15, 1988 and requested he come to the office to sign a new application for the requested coverage. Enclosed with that request was a copy of an insurance binder for auto coverage with Bankers Insurance Company, to be effective on June 18, 1988. Again, Mr. Secondo was sent a premium finance notice by Bankers representing a total premium of $1,358.00. This notice, dated August 29, 1988, reflected the first premium of $14.30, due on August 12, 1989, the second in the amount of $193.34, and the remainder, also at $193.34, due on the 28th of each month thereafter. By memo of August 19, 1988, Bankers Insurance Company notified Mr. Secondo that his policy was being cancelled for nonpayment of the initial $14.30 premium. However, by notice of September 1, 1988, the company reinstated the coverage and included a new billing schedule reflecting a slightly higher monthly premium of $197.54. On August 16, 1988, Respondent wrote to Mr. Secondo informing him of a change in policies and noting that the new policy was somewhat less expensive than the former. Notwithstanding this, by letter dated September 25, 1988, she advised him of the need for him to pay an additional $171.31. Mr. Secondo did not understand the reason for this additional charge in light of the fact that the second policy, that issued, was less costly than the first which was never issued. This discrepancy was not successfully explained at hearing nor has it yet been clearly explained. Notwithstanding his confusion, on the advice of a representative from the Department's St. Petersburg office, Mr. Secondo paid the additional sum requested. Ms. Cramer claims that all she asked from Mr. Secondo at the time she sold him the insurance was the down payment on the policy. However, he insisted on giving her more money to impress her with how much money he had. She further claims she put the balance over the down payment in the account of ASAP Insurance, (not further identified). On examination, she claimed this was a unique situation and she never does business this way. Ms. Cramer has been licensed as an insurance agent in Florida for almost 20 years and claims never to have had a problem with the Department before now. There is no evidence of any prior complaints against her or of prior disciplinary action. She had known Mr. Secondo for about 3 months before he came to her for insurance on his vehicles. She admits to having received his check for $1,641.00 for the premium for that coverage. Because of some difficulty with his driver's license, which she discussed with him at the time, she processed the application, sending in only the required 30% down payment so that if the application was rejected, he would not have to wait to get back the full amount of his premium. She claims to have advised him at the time there might be a problem and that the policy, when issued, might carry a higher or lower premium. When she sent the deposit for the auto insurance to the broker with whom she was dealing, he required a premium finance agreement which she filled out and sent in without, she claims, affixing Mr. Secondo's signature thereto. She claims to have no knowledge as to who signed it, but this is unworthy of belief. The automobile insurance was not issued by the first company because of some underwriting problem. Respondent claims she told Mr. Secondo this but by then he had received a payment schedule and was upset about that. Ms. Cramer claims that Mr. Secondo had been fully advised that only a part of the $1,641.00 he had paid originally was to go to payment of premium, but she does not explain where the balance went, other than into the account of ASAP. She also claims to have procured insurance for him from Bankers Insurance Company without financing any part of the premium, but it is clear from the documents introduced that this coverage was financed as well. Her exculpatory comments are confusing and far less than convincing, and are not believed. Respondent asserts she made the premium payments for Mr. Secondo, (presumably from the sums deposited to ASAP), until she got an accounting from the company. She then wrote to Mr. Secondo, (their personal relationship having dissolved by then), and claimed the amount she felt was due her, (the $171.31). She admits that in the interim, while she was awaiting the refund from the first policy deposit, she neglected to make the initial $14.30 premium payment on the second policy, causing it to be cancelled. At that point, she made the payment to have the policy reinstated. The reinstatement notice, however, does not show the policy paid in full, but calls for continuing installments. Ms. Cramer now claims that the $1,641.00 figure she gave Mr. Secondo was tentative and subject to change and that he knew it. She claims the discrepancy involving his policy was a bookkeeping error, and at no time did she intend to take his money and not get him insurance. The evidence, however, shows otherwise.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Insurance Commissioner issue a Final Order in this case suspending Shirley Ann Cramer's license and eligibility for license as an insurance agent of any kind in Florida for one year. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Elias, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 John L. Waller, Esquire 100 2nd Avenue, North Suite 210 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Office of the Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
