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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs RAY HENRY ANDERSON, 99-002919 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Port Richey, Florida Jul. 06, 1999 Number: 99-002919 Latest Update: Jan. 03, 2000

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 648.30(1), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact On June 3, 1999, pursuant to Section 626.9581, Florida Statutes, the Department filed a Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order and Assess Penalty against Respondent, alleging that he was not currently nor was he at all times relevant to the notice, licensed to transact bail bond business in the State of Florida. Respondent requested a hearing in the matter but failed to appear at the appointed time and place duly noticed for the administrative hearing in this matter. Respondent is not and was not at all times relevant to the subject matter of Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order and Assess Penalty, licensed to transact bail bond business in the State of Florida. On February 6, 1998, Respondent, in the Circuit Court of Pasco County, Florida, in Case No. 9603891CFAWS, entered a plea of nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty attempting to perform the responsibilities of a bail bondsman without a license, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of Section 648.30, Florida Statutes. It is a violation of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, for an unlicensed person to act in the capacity or attempt to act in the capacity of a bail bond agent, temporary bail bond agent, or runner or perform or attempt to perform any of the functions, duties, or powers prescribed therefor.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer: Enter a final order finding that Respondent engaged in a deceptive act by acting or attempting to act in the capacity of a bail bond agency. Issue a Cease and Desist Order directing Respondent to immediately cease and desist from acting or attempting to act in the capacity of a bail bond agent until or unless he is properly licensed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson Commissioner of Insurance and Treasurer Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ray Henry Anderson 13933 Muriez Avenue Hudson, Florida 34667 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128

Florida Laws (3) 120.569626.9581648.30
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. OSVALDO AND ROSALBA IGLESIA, D/B/A AIRES COSTENO, 79-001689 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001689 Latest Update: Nov. 01, 1979

Findings Of Fact Petitioner issued license No. 23-1635-2COP to respondents, authorizing them to sell beer and wine for consumption on the premises. Later, on February 2, 1978, after Osvaldo Iglesia's indictment for conspiracy to import "approximately 50,000 pounds of marijuana . . . and 25 kilos of cocaine," Special Agent Harold Lierly of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) telephones petitioner's Officer Alford, seeking assistance in apprehending Osvaldo Iglesia. Officer Alford then telephoned Osvaldo Iglesia and asked him to come to petitioner's office and to bring his driver's license with him; and notified the DEA. When Mr. Iglesia arrived, Officer Alford checked his identification, and DEA agent Leslie W. Thompson effected an arrest, pursuant to warrant. Subsequently, Osvaldo Iglesia was released from custody upon the posting of a $150,000.00 bond. When he failed to report for his removal hearing on February 16, 1978, a bench warrant issued, Petitioner's exhibit No. 4, and the magistrate recommended bond forfeiture. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. On February 24, 1978, a United States District Judge ordered forfeiture of the bond. Petitioner's exhibit No. 2. On April 18, 1978, a judgment of bail bond forfeiture, in the amount of $50,000.00, seems to have been entered. Petitioner's exhibit No. 3.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner revoke respondent's license, No. 23-1635-2COP. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis E. LaRosa, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Osvaldo & Rosalba Iglesia 2500 Palm Avenue Hialeah, Florida

Florida Laws (2) 561.15561.29
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY LORENZO JONES, 06-000707PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 23, 2006 Number: 06-000707PL Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2007

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57648.442648.45648.49648.52648.571
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EDUARDO FEDERICO GODOY vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 04-000213 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 16, 2004 Number: 04-000213 Latest Update: Aug. 05, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent.

Findings Of Fact On July 22, 2002, Petitioner signed, under penalty of perjury, a statement declaring that his application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent was true. In the application, Petitioner answered "no" to the question: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?" By Information dated February 28, 1971, the State of Florida charged Respondent with "unlawfully and feloniously break[ing] and enter[ing]" into a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony--namely, grand larceny. By Order entered October 15, 1971, the court acknowledged that Respondent had entered a plea of guilty to "breaking and entering with intent to commit a misd[demeanor]," withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Petitioner on three years' probation. By Order entered August 15, 1974, the court terminated Petitioner's probation, noting that he had successfully completed it.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Santiago Lavan-dera Law Office of Pena and Lavan-dera 7950 Northwest 155th Street, Suite 201 Miami Lakes, Florida 33016 Eduardo Federico Godoy 969 East 29th Street Hialeah, Florida 33013 Ladasiah Jackson Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57648.27648.34648.355648.45
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BENNIE SMALL, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 03-004496 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 02, 2003 Number: 03-004496 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a temporary limited surety/bail bond agent pursuant to Sections and 648.355, Florida Statutes, should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received into evidence; stipulations by the parties; evidentiary ruling made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes; and the record evidence submitted, the following relevant and material facts are determined: Pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, Respondent has jurisdiction over bail bond licensure, appointments, and related activities. Petitioner appeared before the undersigned in this proceeding, identified himself and admitted that he is the individual prosecuted in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for, Hillsborough County, Florida, Case No. 88-CF-15373, State of Florida v. Bennie Small, Jr., on a Direct Information of two counts of grand theft, and that Respondent has jurisdiction over him and the subject matter involved in its denial letter. The record evidence demonstrated that on or about January 21, 1987, Petitioner entered into a real estate contract with Deltricia Wiggins, a prospective homebuyer. Ms. Wiggins, believing Petitioner to be the realtor representing the seller, gave Petitioner $500.00 to assist her in the purchase of the home. Thereafter, she became aware that the subject home had been sold and demanded that Petitioner return her $500.00. Petitioner failed or refused to return her $500.00. Ms. Wiggins contacted the Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office and made a report. At no time during the above transaction was Petitioner a licensed real estate sales person or licensed real estate broker. The record evidence demonstrated that Petitioner entered into a real estate contract with Janet Richardson, a prospective homebuyer. Ms. Richardson, believing Petitioner to be the realtor representing the seller, gave Petitioner $500.00 to assist her in the purchase of a family home. Thereafter, she became aware that the subject home had been sold and demanded that Petitioner return her $500.00. Petitioner failed or refused to return her $500.00. At no time during the above transaction was Petitioner a licensed real estate sales person or licensed real estate broker. On October 26, 1988, the State Attorney's Office filed a Direct Information charging Petitioner with two counts of grand theft. The two counts of grand theft stemmed from Petitioner's above two unlicensed real estate transactions. At some unknown time on or before January 5, 1989, Petitioner returned the money to both Misses Wiggins and Richardson. The fact that he subsequently returned money to his two victims did not negate his taking their money under illegal and false pretense. Record evidence demonstrated that on January 17, 1989, Petitioner was represented by the Office of the Public Defender of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for, Hillsborough County, Florida, in Case No. 88-CF-15373, and a plea of no contest to the charge of grand theft was entered on his behalf. Circuit Judge Harry Lee Coe accepted the plea of no contest on behalf of Petitioner, withheld adjudication of guilt, imposed no probation, and ordered that Petitioner not practice law nor practice real estate without appropriate licensure. Petitioner produced no record evidence that the no contest plea entered on his behalf by the public defender and that the judgment and sentence of the Court imposed by Circuit Judge Harry Lee Coe, of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court on January 17, 1989, in Case No. 88-CF-15373, has been overturned, reversed or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Petitioner, through his evidence and post-hearing submittals, presented the following arguments in support of his position that "he did not enter a plea of no contest to the grand theft charge." First, Petitioner argued that while in court, "he" personally did not enter a no contest plea. Second, he argued that "his" personal approval that a no contest plea be entered on his behalf was neither requested nor given to the public defender that represented him. Third, he argued that he was not made a party at the bench conference between the presiding Judge, the prosecutor, and his public defender, when discussions regarding the terms and condition of resolving his case were ongoing and concluded. Fourth, he argued that copies of the court docket sheet, recording entries written by the court's clerk, who sat in court and made each docket sheet entry as pronounced by the court, were insufficient to establish that those recorded actions were actually taken by the court. Because of the foregone alleged irregularities, argued Petitioner, there is no "official court record" of his having entered a no contest plea to the grand theft charge. Petitioner put forth no evidence in support of his several arguments challenging Respondent's denial of his license application. Petitioner proffered no evidence of the official judicial disposition of the two counts of grand theft filed against him. Petitioner failed to produce a scintilla of evidence in support of his assertions that Respondent did not fully comply with the Florida Statutes when Respondent, by letter dated June 2, 2003, informed Petitioner that his application for licensure as a surety/bail bond agent was denied, and the denial was based on a January 17, 1989, plea of no contest to the charge of grand theft, a felony, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for, Hillsborough County, Florida.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's, Bennie Small, Jr., application for licensure as a temporary limited surety/bail bond agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57624.01648.27648.355648.44648.45775.082775.083775.084
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. ROBERT EUGENE RADNEY, 79-001632 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001632 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 1979

Findings Of Fact The facts relevant to the charges here preferred are largely undisputed. In May 1978 Respondent's business address as reported by him to Petitioner was 2812 North 34th Street, Tampa, Florida. This address was visited by Petitioner's investigators on 23, 24, 25, and 30 May 1978. The building located at that address is owned and used by Scaglione Construction Company as its main office. There is no sign on the exterior of this building indicating a bail bondsman's office is located inside. While visiting the address, the investigators were advised that Respondent had no office there but Frank Puig did have a bail bond office in the building. Although there was some dispute regarding whether the investigators were shown Puig's office, or even allowed to go to the door of that office, whether they did or not is immaterial because Respondent readily admitted he had no files at this location and conducted no business therefrom. Again witnesses differed on whether there was a sign on the door of the office occupied by Puig. Whether there was a sign on that door reading "Frank Puig - Bail- bondsman" is irrelevant to the charge that Respondent had no sign designating his office. During the period in question, in fact, during most, if not all, of 1978, Respondent testified he was without power [of attorney] to write bonds. Exhibit 1 shows that three companies, Midland Insurance Company, Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, and Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc. all renewed Respondent's limited surety agency in October 1977 and all cancelled his limited surety agency 12-14-78. Respondent's testimony indicated that he was an agent only for Cotton Belt and that his power to write bonds had been withdrawn. According to Respondent's own testimony, he had no permanent office in which to keep his files and records and that these records were carried in his car and stored at his residence when not in his car. He was using Puig's telephone number as a place at which messages could be left for him. Respondent also testified that during 1978 he wrote no bonds and was only servicing existing accounts which preceded 1978.

Florida Laws (6) 11.111648.34648.36648.39648.43648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs ROBERT MITCHELL THOMAS, 91-001726 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 18, 1991 Number: 91-001726 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1991

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Robert Mitchell Thomas, was licensed and eligible for licensure and appointment as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as manager/agent of the Fort Myers office of Hamilton Bonding, Inc. (Hamilton). At hearing respondent represented he has been licensed as a bail bondsman for approximately fifteen years. The facts which underlie this dispute are as follows. On November 16, 1989, Debra Rahn, a resident of Cape Coral, Florida and the wife of Richard A. Rahn, had Richard arrested for possession of a controlled substance and/or narcotic paraphanelia. She did this so that Richard could be placed in a drug treatment program. His bond was thereafter set in the amount of $2500. In order to get Richard released from jail and placed in the drug program, Debra contacted respondent at Hamilton's Fort Myers office and, after conferring with respondent, agreed to enter into an indemnity agreement with Thomas wherein respondent, acting as agent for Hamilton, agreed to post a $2500 surety bond with the Lee County Sheriff's Department for the release of Richard. In return for this service, Debra paid respondent a premium in the amount of $250. In addition to paying the foregoing sum of money, Debra was asked to sign a blank security agreement, notice of lien and power of attorney, and to deliver to respondent the title to her 1983 Chevrolet Chevette. After doing so, she received a receipt for the premium and automobile title. Finally, Debra was told there would be no other fees for this service. A few weeks later, Debra decided she wanted off of the bond because Richard was not responding favorably to the drug treatment. She accordingly telephoned Thomas who offered her several alternatives. One alternative suggested by respondent was for Debra to file new charges against Richard so that he would be arrested and shown to be in violation of the terms of the bond. Acting on respondent's advice, in early January 1990 Debra filed additional unspecified charges against her husband. On January 10, 1990, Ronald W. Millette, a licensed bail bondsman who had worked for respondent on previous occasions, was told by respondent that Debra wanted off of the bond and to pick up Richard and return him to the Lee County jail. He was paid a $50 fee for this service. That evening Millette went to Debra's house and advised her to go to respondent's office because Richard might seek retribution against her. Later on that evening, Millette apprehended Richard and carried him to respondent's office. Respondent and Millette then transported Richard to the jail. It may be reasonably inferred from the evidence that on a later date, the obligation of the surety on the bond was released by the court. In accordance with Millette's instructions, Debra went to respondent's office the evening of January 10 and was told by respondent that Richard was handcuffed in the next room. Whether this statement was accurate is not of record. In any event, respondent told Debra she must pay an additional $250 pick-up fee or he would not return her automobile title. This amount was derived by taking ten percent of the original $2500 bond. Respondent requested this fee even though there is no evidence that he forfeited any portion of Richard's bond or that the court ordered any fees. Debra replied she did not have the money but would return on Saturday to pay the money due. On a later undisclosed date, Debra's Chevette was "totaled" in an automobile accident. Because of this, she claimed she was unable to promptly pay the $250 fee. Even so, respondent continued to make demands for the money. The record does not show whether the automobile title was returned to Debra although Millette believes another employee in respondent's office did so at a later date. On May 29, 1990, respondent sent Debra a letter in which he again demanded payment of the $250 fee. However, based upon advice from a Department employee, he apologized to her for calling the fee a "pick-up fee" and instead characterized the charge as a "principal's apprehension fee" for expenses incurred in having Millette place Richard in custody on January 10. The record reflects that on June 10, 1990, Debra sent respondent a $10 check as partial payment on the demand but the check was never cashed. There is no evidence that respondent's license has ever been disciplined during his lengthy tenure as a bail bondsman.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 648.44(1)(g), 648.45(2)(d), (g), (j), (l), and 648.45(3)b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1989), and that his license be suspended for ten days and a $500 administrative fine be imposed. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1991.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57648.44648.442648.45648.571903.29
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs PAMELA JEAN COLEMAN, 03-001957 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida May 27, 2003 Number: 03-001957 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent violated Subsections 648.44(8)(a), 648.44(8)(b), 648.45(2), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(j), 648.45(2)(k), 648.45(3), 648.45(3)(c), 648.45(3)(e), 648.30(1), 648.30(2), 648.30(3), and 648.30(4), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 648, the Department has jurisdiction over bail bond licensure, appointments, and related activities. Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, appeared before the undersigned in this proceeding, identified herself as Pamela Jean Coleman, and admitted that she is the Respondent in this matter and that the Department has jurisdiction over her and the subject matter involved in the Notice of Intent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Notice of Intent, Respondent was also known as Deborah Lee Diehl, Pamela Jean Jones, Pamela Jones, Pamela Coleman, Pam Jones, and Pamela J. Coleman. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Notice of Intent, Respondent was not licensed as a bail bond agent in the State of Florida. On March 28, 1975, in Case Number 75-239CF, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), Respondent pled guilty and was adjudged guilty of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony (a crime of moral turpitude). On October 22, 1975, in Case Number 75-2390CF, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), Respondent, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, pled guilty and was adjudged guilty of the felony of violation of drug abuse law. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 6 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violation. At the final hearing counsel for Respondent stated: Mr. Franklin: . . . I don't think there is any dispute as to those underlying facts about what happened in 1975 -- Ms. Coleman: Correct. Mr. Franklin: -- and what happened subsequent. And the subsequent event was that Ms. Coleman was -- received the grace of executive clemency. She did receive a limited restoration of civil rights that granted to her the restoration of all of her civil rights with the exception of a specific statutory authority to own or possess a firearm, at least as to all of the '75 convictions. . . . By Executive Order Number 80-C-0 filed with the Florida Secretary of State on March 7, 1980, Respondent was granted restoration of civil rights, except to specific authority for possession or owning a firearm, for any and all felony convictions in the State of Florida and/or restoration of civil rights in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in any state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court for which this person has been duly discharged from imprisonment and/or parole, adult community control or probation, and for which this person has not been heretofore granted clemency. This grant of clemency included, but was not limited to, Case Nos. 75-239CF and 75-2390CF, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach, Florida. On April 16, 1991, in Case Number CF91-1923AI-XX, Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, Respondent, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, was charged with grand thief. On or about November 25, 1991, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the reduced charge of petit theft and was found guilty and convicted of petit theft.1 Petit theft is a first-degree misdemeanor, which constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Record of the Delaware Secretary of State, dated May 5, 1997, confirmed that the Clarence Luther Cephas, Ltd., Inc. (Cephas Bail Bond Agency) was duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, was in good standing, and had a legal corporate existence as of May 5, 1997. Record of the Florida Secretary of State, Application for Reinstatement, confirmed that the Cephas Bail Bond Agency applied as a corporation qualified to do bail bond business in Florida and was reinstated to do bail bond business as of January 19, 1999. The Cephas Bail Bond Agency's application listed Pamela J. Coleman, 2353 Mammoth Grove Road, Lake Wales, Florida, as its president, secretary, director, and registered agent. The application dated October 26, 2000, bore the signature of Respondent and listed her telephone number as (863) 533-0405. Two Uniform Business Reports (UBR) of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency were filed with the Florida Secretary of State on August 6, 2001, and March 29, 2002. Both reports bore the signature of Respondent as President of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Testimony of Petitioner's witnesses conclusively established, without dispute, that Respondent participated in the bail bond business of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency during the approximate period of March 1997 to November 27, 2002. During that span of time, Respondent did on various occasions act and represent herself to the public as one having power to act in several capacities and positions with the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Her activities included acting as a registered agent, a director, a bail bond agent, a temporary bail bond agent, a runner, a bail enforcement agent, and a bounty hunter. Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., under oath on November 27, 2002, gave the following statement: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She has a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an officer of the corporation. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, State of Florida vs. Pamela Jean Coleman, W/F, 09/17/1958, XXX-XX-9751, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in Polk County, Florida, Respondent, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof, or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office, or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business, contrary to Section 684.44. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly and convincingly, during the period of November 2000 through December 2001, identified Respondent as the person who, on various occasions, did act in several capacities and positions as a bail bond agent and performed functions, duties, or powers prescribed for licensed bail bond agents. Undisputed evidence identified Respondent as the person who, early in 2001, presented herself to another and engaged in conduction and solicitation of bail bond business in the office of the Cephas Bail Bond Agency. Undisputed evidence identified Respondent as the person who, on June 19, 2001, presented herself and identified herself as Pamela Jean Coleman, Vice-President of Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds, to Noel Collier who was working in her husband's law office as a paralegal. Respondent presented to Ms. Collier bond release paperwork from the Cephas Bail Bond Agency and requested that a mutual client facing criminal charges sign the paperwork. Undisputed evidence demonstrated that on or about September 2001, Respondent held herself out as the person with whom to conduct bail bond business with Constance Castro in or about the home of Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., that served also as the Cephas Bail Bond Agency office. The records of Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, show that on or about January 31, 2003, in criminal Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, Respondent (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, a/k/a Pam Jones, and a/k/a Pamela J. Coleman) was tried, found guilty, and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Subsection 648.44(8), acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Respondent was sentenced by the court to 60 days in county jail (to be served on weekends) and placed on probation for a period of five years. The conditions of Respondent's probation required her to: (1) Pay restitution in the amount of $457.99 to the Department of Insurance within two years; (2) pay court costs of $400.00 within two years; and (3) not to be employed as a bail bondsman or to have any contact with her husband's (Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr.) business. Counsel for Respondent represented on this record that: (1) he was counsel of record in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX and that Respondent, in this proceeding, was the person charged, tried, convicted, and adjudicated guilty; and (2) he has filed a timely appeal of the conviction and sentence on behalf of Respondent in Case No. CF02-00597A-XX, in the Second District Court of Appeal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order as follows: Finding that Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, is disqualified from participation in bail bond-related activities by a prior conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; and that Respondent is guilty of participating in the bail bond business, in violation of Subsections 648.30(1) through (3); 648.44(8)(a); 648.45(2)(e), (j), and (k); and 648.45(3)(a), (c), and (e). Enter a Cease and Desist Order pursuant to Section 626.9581 and the Florida Insurance Code, directing Respondent, Pamela Jean Coleman, to immediately cease and desist any and all bail bond-related activities in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2003.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57624.01626.9581648.30648.44648.45775.082775.083775.084
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs SANDRO LORENZ DEANDRADE, 95-003016 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 16, 1995 Number: 95-003016 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 1996

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Sandro L. De Andrade, committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been licensed by the Department as a limited surety agent performing bail bond services. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority of regulating limited surety agents such as Respondent. On or about March 18, 1995, Bernard Barrineau and Maggie Porto, on special assignment to investigate activities occurring at the Dade County courthouse, went to the east wing of the county jail to observe. While there they met an individual later known to them as Respondent who was assisting someone regarding bail bond services. Respondent asked Mr. Barrineau to go outside with him for a cigarette break. While on the grounds outside Respondent handed Mr. Barrineau a business card bearing the business name "Curly Bail Bonds" and the address as 1670 N.W. 17th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125. When Ms. Porto came out and approached the two men, Respondent handed her an identical business card with the instruction "just in case." Neither Mr. Barrineau nor Ms. Porto asked Respondent for assistance. Neither did anything to encourage Respondent to think either sought bail bond assistance from him. Either Mr. Barrineau or Ms. Porto answered "yes" when asked if they were at jail to get someone out. The question may have been posed by the client Respondent was at the jail to assist. Respondent was called to the jail to assist someone whose parent was charged with DUI. Ms. Porto and that individual talked while Respondent filled out papers. Respondent alleged he did not hear the conversation. According to Respondent, he was only at the jail to assist the client whose parent was charged with DUI. The "client" did not testify in this matter. At all times material to this case, the business address on record with the Department for the Respondent was McCroys Store, 23 E. Flagler Street, Miami, Florida. Respondent received an appointment to execute bail bonds on behalf of Allegheny Mutual Casualty Company on August 1, 1994. Respondent had been conducting bail bond business for seven months when the incident complained of occurred.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order suspending Respondent's limited surety agent license for a period of six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3016 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 Northwest 53rd Street Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166 Larry E. Rogers, Esquire 2121 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 240 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Sandro Lorenz De Andrade 1670 Northwest 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125

Florida Laws (2) 648.44648.45
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