The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for his answers to questions 42 and 81 of the morning session of the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination portion of the engineering licensure examination given on April 15, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Worku took the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination portion of the examination for licensure to practice as an engineer intern on April 15, 2000. The examination is a national multiple-choice examination developed and administered by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors (NCEES). The examination is divided into a morning session and an afternoon session. The questions in the morning session are worth one raw point each. The questions in the afternoon session are worth two raw points each. Worku challenged questions 42 and 81, which were on the morning session of the examination. Worku received 56 raw points for the morning session and 52 raw points for the afternoon session for a total raw score of 108 on the examination. Based on the NCEES' Score Conversion Table, a raw score of 108 converts to a score of 69. A converted score of 70, which equates to a raw score of 109-113, is a passing score. Question 81 asked the examinee to identify the geometric shape that was given by an equation provided in the question. Each examinee was given a reference manual during the examination. The manual contains general formulas for the types of geometric shapes listed as possible answers to question 81. The equation given in question 81 was for a specific shape and was not listed among the general formulas in the reference manual. Worku felt that because the general equation was not used that the equation was stated incorrectly. However, the equation was stated correctly. The equation differed from the equation listed in the reference manual because it was for a special shape of the geometric figure. Worku did not answer question 81 correctly. Question 42 dealt with recrystallization as it relates to metal. The question asks the examinee to pick the answer which explains the reference to the term "recrystallization" in the question. Worku contends that there are two correct answers to question 42 and that the answer which he provided is one of the correct answers. The answer which Worku provided is not a correct answer. It refers to the process of annealing, which is the process of decreasing the toughness of a metal. Recrystallization can be a part, but is not always part of annealing. Recrystallization and annealing are not synonymous terms; thus Worku is not entitled to credit for question 42.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Amanuel Worku failed the Engineering Fundamentals Examination with a score of 69. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ Susan B. Kirkland Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Amanuel Worku 18492 Northwest 52nd Path Miami, Florida 33055 Douglas Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Natalie A. Lowe, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara D. Auger, General counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's request for license by endorsement as a professional engineer should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, James R. Eason (Petitioner), is the pavement management coordinator for the Hernando County Public Works Department. He is a registered professional engineer in the State of Georgia, having received Professional Engineering Registration Number 17320 in 1988. In March 1997, Petitioner filed an application with Respondent, Board of Professional Engineers (Board), seeking licensure by endorsement as a professional engineer in this state. On July 1, 1997, the Board issued its preliminary decision in the form of a letter advising Petitioner that his application had been denied. As grounds, the Board stated that Petitioner had received a raw score of 67 with five points awarded for Veterans Preference on the Principles and Practice portion of the examination. The letter further explained that a raw score of 70 or above was required in order for his score on the Georgia examination to be recognized in the State of Florida and that "Chapter 471, F.S. does not provide for awarding of points for Veterans Preference." The denial of the application prompted Petitioner to bring this action. Petitioner is a graduate of, and holds a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from, the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has a record of four years active engineering experience of a character indicating competence to be in responsible charge of engineering. The parties have also stipulated he is of good moral character, and he has never been under investigation in another state for any act which would constitute a violation of Chapters 455 or 471, Florida Statutes. Petitioner passed the Fundamentals portion of the professional engineering examination administered in 1973 by the State of Georgia. He obtained a score of more than 70. In April 1988, Petitioner took the Principles and Practice portion of the examination. A grade of 70 was required to pass the Georgia examination. Petitioner received a grade of 67 on the initial scoring of the Principles and Practice portion of the examination, plus a five-point Veterans Preference credit, for a total grade of 72. The Veterans Preference credit is provided by Georgia law to all candidates who are members or former members of the Armed Forces of the United States and meet certain service requirements. In Petitioner's case, he had served eight years on active duty as a member of the United States Naval Reserve, and he was honorably discharged as a Lieutenant on July 3, 1969, upon expiration of his active duty commitment. At least ninety days of his active duty military service was during wartime or at a time when military personnel were committed by the President of the United States. The examination administered by the State of Georgia in April 1988 was a national examination published by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying, and it was identical to the examination administered by the State of Florida at that time. Florida, like Georgia, requires a grade of 70 to pass the examination, but it does not provide a Veterans Credit for service to candidates who are members or former members of the Armed Forces of the United States. Therefore, in the State of Georgia, a veteran can pass the examination with a raw score as low as 65. To this extent, the two examinations are not substantially equivalent. Among other things, Petitioner pointed out at hearing that he needed only three points to achieve a passing grade on the Principles and Practice portion of the examination. Therefore, he concluded that the awarding of that amount of extra points for being a veteran amounted to only a single standard deviation, and thus the extra points were immaterial in relation to the overall score. However, the Board does not construe this three-point deficiency as being "immaterial," and had Petitioner received the same score in Florida, he would not have passed the examination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Professional Engineers enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for licensure by endorsement as a professional engineer. DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of November 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Mason, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 1090 Brooksville, Florida 34605-1900 Edwin A. Bayo, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0755
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to additional credit for his solutions to four problems on the Principles and Practice of Engineering portion of the engineering licensure examination administered on October 30, 1998, by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On October 30, 1998, as part of his effort to obtain a Florida engineering license, Petitioner sat for the Principles and Practice of Engineering Examination (Examination). This is a national examination developed and administered by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors (NCEES). Petitioner chose to be tested in civil engineering. Petitioner received a raw score of 45 on the Examination. For the civil engineering specialization, a raw score of 45 converts to a score of 67. To pass the Examination, a converted score of 70 is needed. Petitioner formally requested (in writing, by letter dated March 26, 1999) that his solutions to Problems 120, 125, and 222 on the Examination be rescored. Petitioner's written request was made to Natalie Lowe of the Board, who forwarded it to the NCEES. Appended to Petitioner's letter to Ms. Lowe were two pages of "scratch paper" on which Petitioner had written during his post-examination review on March 19, 1999. On the first page were written comments he had made regarding the scoring of Problems 120 and 125. On the second page were the following written comments he had made regarding the scoring of Problems 220 and 222: 220 a, b, & c 2 parts b & c correct. Min. mark I should get[:] At least 5 instead of 2 and maybe 7. There is an error. 222 ok The NCEES's rescoring of Petitioner's solutions to Problems 120, 125, and 222 resulted in his receiving a raw score of 43 (or a converted score of 65, 5 points less than he needed to pass the Examination). The Board received the NCEES's rescoring results on May 12, 1999. The Board subsequently referred the matter to the Division to conduct an administrative hearing. At the administrative hearing that was held pursuant to the Board's referral, Petitioner challenged the grading of his solutions to Problems 120, 125, and 220 of the Examination, and indicated that he had "no dispute concerning the grading of [his solution to Problem] 222," notwithstanding that he had requested, in his March 26, 1999, letter to Ms. Lowe, that his solution to Problem 222 be rescored. Petitioner explained that he had made this request as a result of inadvertence and that he had actually intended to seek rescoring of his solution to Problem 220, not Problem 222. Problems 120, 125, and 222 were worth ten raw points each. Problem 120 contained four subparts (or requirements). Petitioner initially received four raw points for his solution to Problem 120. Rescoring did not result in any change to this score. Petitioner solved two subparts of Problem 120 correctly (subparts (a) and (b)). The solutions to the other two subparts of Problem 120 (subparts (c) and (d)), however, were incorrect inasmuch as Petitioner had neglected, in making the lateral force calculations and drawing the diagrams required by these subparts, to include the force attributable to the movement of the groundwater referred to in the problem. Therefore, in accordance with the requirements and guidelines of the NCEES scoring plan for this problem, the highest raw score that he could have received for his solution to this problem was a four, which is the score he received. Problem 125 contained three subparts (or requirements). Petitioner initially received a raw score of two for his solution to Problem 125. Upon rescoring, no change was made this raw score. Petitioner correctly solved only one of the three subparts of Problem 125 (subpart (c)). In his solution to subpart (a) of Problem 125, Petitioner did not provide, as required by this subpart, the quantities of water, cement, and aggregate necessary for the project described in the problem. Petitioner's solution to subpart (b) did not describe one of the acceptable slump increasing methods that the candidates were required describe in their solution to this subpart. Accordingly, giving Petitioner a raw score of two for his solution to Problem 125 was consistent with the requirements and guidelines of the NCEES scoring plan for this problem. Petitioner received a raw score of two for his solution to Problem 220. He did not request, in his March 26, 1999, letter to Ms. Lowe, a rescoring of his solution to this problem, and, as a result, his solution was not rescored. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behalf regarding the scoring of this solution and, during his testimony, contended that the score he received was too low; however, neither a copy of the problem, nor a copy of the NCEES scoring plan for this problem, was offered into evidence. Accordingly, the record is insufficient to support a finding that the score Petitioner received for his solution to Problem 220 was undeservedly low in light of the NCEES scoring plan for this problem. Petitioner initially received a raw score of eight for his solution to Problem 220. Rescoring resulted in this score being reduced two points to a six. Petitioner did not present any evidence supporting the position (which he advances in his Proposed Recommended Order) that he should have received a higher score for his solution to this problem, and, consequently, Respondent's expert, in his testimony at hearing, did not address the matter. While there were exhibits offered (by Respondent) and received into evidence relating to the scoring of Petitioner's solution to Problem 222, it is not apparent from a review of these exhibits that such scoring deviated from the requirements of the NCEES scoring plan for this problem (which was received into evidence as part of Respondent's Exhibit 12).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered rejecting Petitioner's challenge to the failing score he received from the NCEES on the Principles and Practice of Engineering portion of the October 30, 1998, engineering licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1999.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for licensure by endorsement as a professional engineer and/or waiver of Part I of the engineering licensing examination.
Findings Of Fact From 1969 through 1974, Petitioner attended the Lipetsk Branch of the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys. In 1974, Petitioner graduated from the Lipetsk Polytechnical Institute (Institute) in Russia, with a degree in industrial and civil engineering. The degree in civil engineering earned by Petitioner is equivalent to a bachelor of science degree in civil engineering in the United States. Upon graduation from the Institute, Petitioner commenced her professional employment as an engineer on August 30, 1974, at the LIPTSKGRAZHDANPROEKT Design Institute. In January 1976, Petitioner was employed as a professional engineer at the State Design Institute DNEPRPROEKKTSTALKONSTRUKSIYA (DNEPR), where she was continuously employed until leaving the Soviet Union in December 1993. There are no specific licensing or registration requirements in Russia with respect to engineers. Therefore, after earning a degree in industrial and civil engineering, Petitioner could work as an engineer in Russia without taking any professional examination. However, in 1979, Petitioner took an examination in Russia that allowed her to sign her own drawings and calculations. During Petitioner's tenure at the DNEPR, she achieved the status of Senior Engineer in 1986; was promoted to the position of Category II Engineer for Steel Structures in 1988; was promoted to the post of Category I Engineer for Steel Structures in 1990; and was elevated to the position of Leading Engineer in 1991. To achieve the status of Category II Engineer for Steel Structures and Category I Engineer for Steel Structures at DNEPR, Petitioner had to take an examination in 1988 and in 1990, respectively. The promotion to each of these positions was predicated upon Petitioner's passing these examinations and demonstrating expertise in the areas of economics, chemistry, mathematics, physics, building materials, corrosion prevention, resistance of materials, and construction mechanics. As a result of passing the examinations in 1988 and 1990, Petitioner was not only promoted, but also received salary increases. Petitioner believes that the two examinations she took in Russia in 1988 and in 1990, while working at the DNEPR were substantially equivalent to the Fundamentals Examination. However, no evidence was presented to support this claim. The Fundamentals Examination is one component of the engineering licensing examination, and is designed to assess whether an individual is qualified to practice in this state as an engineer intern. This examination is usually taken either in the applicant's last year in engineering school or shortly after graduation. With regard to format, the Fundamentals Examination is an eight-hour examination and consists of 120 multiple-choice questions. The Principles and Practice Examination is the second part of the engineering licensing examination and is taken after successful completion of the Fundamentals Examination. Oscar E. Olsen, a structural engineer and owner of O.E. Olsen and Associates, a structural engineering firm, is currently Petitioner's employer. Mr. Olsen, who is generally familiar with the Fundamentals Examination, testified that the list of subjects covered on the two examinations taken by Petitioner in 1988 and 1990, coincide with the subject matter on the Fundamentals Examination. Mr. Olsen further testified that it appeared to him that the two examinations taken by Petitioner were comparable to the Fundamental Examinations required in Florida. Notwithstanding his testimony that the exams taken by Petitioner are substantially equivalent to the Fundamentals Examination, Mr. Olsen admitted that he has never seen or reviewed the examinations taken by Petitioner while she was in Russia. It is impossible to render a reasonable opinion as to whether the two examinations taken by Petitioner in Russia are substantially equivalent to the Fundamentals Examination, where the only information provided with regard to the former is a list of subject areas covered. Such a list gives no indication of the depth and specific content of the subject matter on the examinations; the difficulty of the examinations; the passing scores; the number and format of the questions; and the length of the examinations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, the Board of Professional Engineers, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for waiver of Part I, the Fundamentals Examination, and for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Murray Silverstein, Esquire Powell, Carney, Hayes, and Silverstein One Plaza, Suite 1210 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-1689 Edwin A. Bayo Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0755 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for resolution in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional credit for his response to question 124 in the Principles and Practice of Engineering portion of the engineering licensure examination administered on October 30, 1998, by the National Council of Examinees for Engineers and Surveyors (NCEES).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a candidate for licensure as a professional engineer. On October 30, 1998, Petitioner sat for the Principles and Practice of Engineering portion of the examination in civil engineering. This is a national examination developed, controlled, and administered by the NCEES. Respondent is a Florida non-profit corporation created by Section 471.038, Florida Statutes, to provide administrative and other services to the Florida Board of Professional Engineers (Board). Petitioner was notified in January 1999, that his raw- score on the examination was 45, which converted to a full score of 67, was below the required passing score of 70. He contested the score and asked for a rescore of his responses to examination questions 123 and 124. NCEES reviewed the responses and awarded two additional points for question 123; it awarded no additional points for question 124. The rescore resulted in a raw-score of 47 and a full score of 69, still short of a passing grade. Petitioner then requested a formal administrative hearing and, as stated above, confined his challenge to his score on question 124. Question 124 involved computations for a detour roadway during a bridge replacement project. The question had four parts, thus requiring four computations (a-d). Segments of the detour were expressed in metric lengths (meters) in the question. A beginning station was described as 5 + 000.000. The question required that all computations be carried out to the appropriate significant digits. As described by the scoring plan for question 124, a perfect score was 10 points for an "exceptionally competent" response. The next highest score was 8 points for "more than minimum but less than exceptional competence," described as: Failure to provide answers to the required accuracy and a correct solution to requirements (a)-(d) OR an incorrect solution to one of the requests (a)-(d) with all answers within the required accuracy. Failure to provide the answers to the required accuracy will result in a deduction of two points at any level of scoring. (Respondent's Exhibit no. 8) The NCEES scorers awarded Petitioner a "6" for question 124, both initially and upon his requested review. Six points indicated "minimum competence," described as: Demonstrated a competent knowledge of reverse curves with a correct solution to at least two of the requirements meeting the required accuracy or a correct solution to at least three of the four possible requirements but answer(s) fail to meet the required accuracy. (Respondent's Exhibit no. 8) A solution is the methodology or process employed to reach a numerical result or answer in the examination problem, according to the competent credible testimony of Petitioner's experts. Those experts would have scored Petitioner's responses to question 124 as an "8" or "9". On rescoring, the NCEES score's comments in assigning a score of "6" were: SCORER'S COMMENTS: Requirement (a)-Failed to meet accuracy requirements of +/-0.015m. Requirement(b)-Decimal error was made. The station was in km and the curve length was in meters. Requirement(c)-Same error as in Requirement (b). No points were deducted for this error. Requirement (d)-Solution is correct. Minimum competence was shown by this solution. The grading process for the portions of the examination of which question 124 was a part was subjective within the guidelines provided by NCEES. Different scorers could award different points for the same answer. Petitioner's experts and Respondent's expert, all competent, credible witnesses, differed as to the score they would award. Petitioner's response to (a) of question 124 was not accurate within +/- 0.015m. That error alone would have resulted in a 2-point penalty. However, he also mis-read the initial stationing provided in the problem statement, resulting in inaccurate answers for (b) and (c). A correct solution generally includes the appropriate use of available data. In this case Petitioner's error in reading the correct station position was a technical error only and was caused by a misleading expression of the position in the question itself. His solutions to (a)-(d) were otherwise correct. In Florida, the only engineers who use the metric system are consultants for the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) and even that agency is phasing out the use of metrics. The use of metric measurements is not the standard of practice for Florida Professional Engineers. Out of the 30 projects that Respondent's expert has done since he was licensed, only one involved the use of the metric units. J. Keith Dantin, P.E., one of Petitioner's experts, has never in his 14 years of experience worked on a roadway or surveying problem in metric units. The Candidate Information Booklets provided by the Respondent to the examinees are conflicting and confusing. The February 1998 version states: "Examinees should be prepared to solve bridge problems using either metric or English units of measure. All other problems are in English units." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). The October 1998 version states under the category Structural Design Standards: "All problems are in English units" (Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, boldface in original). When FDOT uses metric units it still expresses those units in English terminology. Thus, where question 124 positioned the beginning station at 5 + 000.000, the English translation would have been 50 + 00. It is evident that Petitioner read the station to be 5 + 00, missing one of the O's; if he had used the 5 + 000, or if the question had expressed the position at 50 + 00 (the English terminology used by the FDOT), all of Petitioner's answers would have been correct and his solutions would not have included the merely mechanical error of utilizing the wrong beginning station position. While he felt that he, personally, would understand the problem, Respondent's expert agreed there might be a bit of confusion. Respondent's expert was candid and credible but his professional experience was substantially less than Petitioner's experts, who also were candid and, on balance, more competent. Petitioner should have been scored an 8 on question 124. His solutions were basically correct and his answers were off merely due to the confusing expression of the beginning station. In real practice his error would have been caught before it reached the field and the error in no way betrayed a lack of fitness to practice as a professional engineer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's challenge to his score on question 124 be sustained and that his score be upgraded by 2 points, from a "6" to "8". DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Hollimon, Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. 227 South Calhoun street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeff G. Peters, Esquire Cedar Woods Office Center 1266 Paul Russell Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Natalie A. Lowe, Esquire Vice President for Legal Affairs Florida Board of Professional Engineers 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact In October, 1973, the Petitioner filed an application for registration to practice architecture in the State of Florida with the Board. By letter dated November 21, 1973, the Board, through its Executive Secretary, denied the application stating that the Petitioner lacked the required degree (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Petitioner requested that his experience be reviewed to determine whether he had training fully equivalent to such a degree (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). By letter dated August 19, 1974 the Board notified the Petitioner that his educational background was insufficient, and that the application would be denied. Petitioner thereupon filed a Declaratory Judgment Action in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County, Florida. The court adjudged that the Board was required to consider not only the Petitioner's educational training, but his private study, on-the-job training and other practical experience. A copy of the court's Final Declaratory Judgment was received in evidence as Hearing Officer's Exhibit 12. Petitioner again appeared before the Board and offered evidence respecting his training and practical experience. See: Petitioner's Exhibits 5 and 6, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 8. On June 11, 1976, the Board entered its order finding the Petitioner to be not qualified and denying the application (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). Petitioner thereupon requested a hearing in accordance with Florida Statutes Section 120.57(1). Petitioner's application for licensure is an administrative adjudicatory proceeding which commenced prior to January 1, 1975. The parties have nonetheless stipulated that the provisions of Section 120.57(1) will hereafter govern the proceeding. The Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree from Chicago Technical College, Chicago, Illinois on December 17, 1954. Petitioner's course of study was architectural engineering. The Chicago Technical College was not, during the time that Petitioner attended it, and is not now on the approved list of schools and colleges of architecture adopted and published by the Board. The course of study pursued by the Petitioner at Chicago Technical College was not the same as a program in architecture. The program was a highly technical engineering program. The design studio which is perhaps the major facet of an architectural program was not present in the architectural engineering program pursued by the Petitioner. Following his graduation the Petitioner worked with other architects in the general practice of architecture. His longest periods of employment were with Cabanban and Wasserman, architects, where he worked for four years and eleven months from 1958 until 1963; and with Ohrnstein and Wasserman, with whom he was employed for four years and four months from 1966 through 1971. In each of these jobs the Petitioner performed the sort of work ordinarily performed by architects. A listing of the different projects in which the Petitioner performed design and supervisory functions is set out as a part of Hearing Officer's Exhibit 10. A wide variety of commercial buildings, apartment complexes, and private residences are included. Petitioner served as a partner in Cabanban and Wasserman, and in Ohrnstein and Wasserman. Augustine Cabanban and Earl Ohrnstein were both registered architects during the course of the partnerships. Cabanban and Ohrnstein each testified that the Petitioner performed the full range of architectural services during the course of the partnerships, and that his work was excellent. Architectural drawings submitted by the Petitioner to the Board demonstrate that the Petitioner did not achieve a high level of design proficiency from his work experience. The best drawings submitted demonstrated a level of competence of approximately a third year architecture student in a five year program. Other drawings demonstrated a lack of design competence, and were inadequate. During 1972, the Petitioner passed the standard examination offered by the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards. Petitioner holds a current certificate issued by the National Council, and is registered to practice architecture in the State of Illinois. Schools or colleges of architecture approved by the Board have many common features, and the curricula offered at the schools are fairly consistent. Generally the programs and the curricula have remained consistent since approximately 1955 with minor variations, or changes of a technical sort. There is no real distinction between the sort of program which would have been approved in 1955, and the sort of program which would be approved today. Typically an approved program which operated on a quarter hour academic basis would require approximately 240 quarter hours for graduation. Approximately 75 quarter hours would be in architectural design culminating in a thesis. Approximately 60 quarter hours would be in general education subject matter, with between 30 to 35 hours in social science and humanities. The social science background is important because an architect must bring together all the factors which relate to the building environment, including social factors. The educational program followed by the Petitioner lacked the necessary design courses and social science courses which would be required in an approved architectural program. An architectural engineer is an engineer involved with buildings. The design courses in an architectural engineering program are set up to enable the engineer to work with an architect. Through on-the-job training the Petitioner received considerable design experience; however, drawings which he submitted to the Board did not evidence that he had achieved the level of design competence which would be required of a graduate of an approved architectural program. The fact that the Petitioner passed the National Council's test does not in itself establish that Petitioner reached the necessary level of competence. Petitioner did not offer evidence from which it could be concluded that his studies and experience would substitute for the social science background required of a graduate of an approved program. The Petitioner did not establish that he took social science courses, or engaged in individual study in the social sciences, or engaged in any other activities which would substitute for such an academic background.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to the issue herein, Petitioner, Ronald R. Corum, Examinee Identification No. 200619, was a candidate for licensure by examination as a professional engineer, and the Board of Professional Engineers was and is the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of Professional Engineers and the regulation of the practice of professional engineering in the state of Florida. Petitioner sat for the October 1990, Florida Professional Engineer Licensure Examination (Principles and Practice of Engineering). This part of the examination is divided into a morning session and an afternoon session. The morning session requires the examinee to choose four essay questions from a choice of twelve essay questions and produce a numerical solution to each question. The afternoon session is multiple choice and the examinee has to solve four questions from a choice of twelve questions. Each of the questions, both morning and afternoon, are worth ten points (raw score) for a total maximum raw score of 80 points, with a minimum passing raw score of 48 points. Petitioner received a raw score of 47 points. Question 124 was one of the essay question selected by Petitioner to solve in morning session of examination. Question 124 consisted three parts, 124A, B and C which required the examinee to: compute the area of traverse (in acres) a five-sided polygon; compute the net area (in acres) in the land parcel after adding sector area AB and excluding sector area DE; and compute the length of curve DE (in feet). The problems posed by Question 124 are not uncommon in the day to day practice of professional engineering and are not particularly difficult to solve. Petitioner attempted to solve Part A by using the method of coordinates which is an acceptable method of determining the area of a traverse. However, the Petitioner made a fundamental error in applying the method, not a simple mathematical error, in that he did not return to the beginning point of the traverse which resulted in an unrealistic answer. The correct answer to Part A was 16.946 acres. The Petitioner calculated the area to be 126.12 acres. In attempting to solve Part B, the Petitioner misapplied a correct methodology by erroneously expressing the central angle of the area in degrees rather than in radians. A radian is equal to approximately 57 degrees and this resulted in substantial error in Petitioner's calculation. The correct answer was 17.607 acres. Petitioner's answer was 219.63 acres which was not possible in relation to the area the Petitioner had already calculated for the traverse in Part A. This was a very serious error, a fundamental error, not a mathematical error. The maximum raw score for question 124 was ten points. Petitioner received a raw score of two points. On review, Petitioner was again granted only two points out of ten possible points. The examinee's identity is not known to the scorer during the initial scoring or the review. Both question 124 and the scoring plan used in grading question 124 were approved by the National Council of Examiners of Engineers and Surveyors (NCEES). The scoring of question 124 was weighted so that Parts A and B were worth four points each, and Part C was worth two points. Petitioner correctly answered Part C and received two points. The Petitioner did not receive any points for Part A or Part B. The examinee was not aware of this weighting policy at the time of the examination. The scoring plan for question 124 which was used by the NCEES grader was set up in six (6) categories from 0 - 10 in two-point increments as follows: 10 - Exceptionally competent. 8 - More than minimum competence but less than exceptionally competent. 6 - Minimum competence. 4 - More than rudimentary knowledge but insufficient to demonstrate competence. 2 - Rudimentary knowledge. 0 - Nothing presented to indicate significant knowledge of the problem. Petitioner's use of acceptable methodologies in attempting to solve the problems of Parts A and B may indicate at least rudimentary knowledge and possibly more than rudimentary knowledge but insufficient knowledge to demonstrate competence which would have entitled Petitioner to at least two points on Parts A and B each. However, the unreasonableness and the impossibility of his answers and his failure to recognize the unreasonableness and impossibility of his answers coupled with his fundamental error in solving the problems of Parts A and B were such that the Petitioner did not demonstrate significant knowledge of the problems for Parts A and B. Therefore, any credit that would have been given for using acceptable methodologies in attempting to solve the problems would be negated by this lack of significant knowledge of the problems. Because of this lack of significant knowledge of the problems the scorer correctly adjusted Petitioner's score on Part A and Part B each to zero. Unreasonable answers result in credit being deleted, and this policy is uniform among all of the states. However, the examinee is not made aware of this policy at the time of the examination. There was no instruction or guide to indicate to the examinee that if the examinee recognized that any answer was unrealistic that the examinee should so indicate on the answer sheet. Likewise, there was no instruction or guide to indicate that the examinee would be more heavily penalized if the examinee did not indicate on the answer sheet that the answer was unrealistic. An examinee's inability to recognize an unrealistic answer and to so indicate on the answer sheet without specific instruction goes to the examinee's competence as a professional engineer. Therefore, Petitioner has not been treated unfairly by the lack of instruction or guide advising him to indicate his ability to recognize an unrealistic answer on the answer sheet. The NCEES scorer for question 124 attempted to award the same score to all examinees of the October 1990 examination who gave similar unrealistic answers to question 124 as did Petitioner without noting on the answer sheet that the answer was unrealistic. The examinees are not informed of how the scoring plan will be applied in advance of the examination or that the essay question will be scored in two- point increments only. There was no evidence that this information would be of significant benefit to the examinee. In fact, the Petitioner did allocate his time in attempting to solve question 124 similar to the weighting of the scoring plan, spending only a small part of the time on Part C. Part B should have identified the curved areas to be computed as segments, rather than sectors. Petitioner attempted to solve Part B as though it referred to segments, and did not raise this issue in the request for review. Petitioner's use of degrees rather than radians would have been equally erroneous in determining the area of a sector. There was no evidence to show that identifying the curved area as a sector rather than a segment had any effect on Petitioner's attempt to solve the problem. The official solution to Part B contained a typographical error made during the transcription of the grader's handwritten solution. This had no effect on the scoring of Part B. The solution cannot affect the answer given by the examinees, as the solution is only available after the examinee has completed the examination and is challenging the scoring. There is a lack of competent substantial evidence in the record to establish that the scores which Petitioner received on Part A and Part B of question 124 of the October, 1990 Professional Engineering Licensure Examination were incorrect, unfair or invalid, or that the examination, and subsequent review, were administered in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's challenge to the grading of his response to question 124 on the October 1990 Professional Engineer's Licensure Examination. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1 (2); 2 (3); 3 (3); 4 (5); 5 (5); 6 (7); 7 (9); 8 (9); 9 (13); 10 (13); 11 (12); 12 (9); 13 (5); 14 (6); 15 (9); 16 (11); 17 (7); 18 (1); 20 (16); 21 (16) and 22 (18). Proposed finding of fact 19 is not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see finding of fact 11. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which adopts the proposed findings of fact: 1 (2); 2 (3); 3 (4); 4 (5); 5 (6); 6 (6); 7 (7); 8 (8); 9 (9); 10 (12); 11 (11); 12 (15); 13 (9, 16); 14 (17); 15 (18). COPIES FURNISHED: Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 David W. Persky, Esquire Spicola & Larkin 806 Jackson Street Tampa, FL 33602 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners AIA is a trade association made up of 40 groups of insurance companies. AIA member companies annually write $6 billion in property, casualty, and automobile insurance in Florida. AIA's primary purpose is to represent the interests of its member insurance groups in regulatory and legislative matters throughout the United States, including Florida. NAMIC is a trade association consisting of 1,430 members, mostly mutual insurance companies. NAMIC member companies annually write $10 billion in property, casualty, and automobile insurance in Florida. NAMIC represents the interests of its member insurance companies in regulatory and legislative matters throughout the United States, including Florida. PCI is a national trade association of property and casualty insurance companies consisting of 1,055 members. PCI members include mutual insurance companies, stock insurance companies, and reciprocal insurers that write property and casualty insurance in Florida. PCI members annually write approximately $15 billion in premiums in Florida. PCI participated in the OIR's workshops on the Proposed Rule. PCI's assistant vice president and regional manager, William Stander, testified that if the Proposed Rule is adopted, PCI's member companies would be required either to withdraw from the Florida market or drastically reorganize their business model. FIC is an insurance trade association made up of 39 insurance groups that represent approximately 250 insurance companies writing all lines of insurance. All of FIC's members are licensed in Florida and write approximately $27 billion in premiums in Florida. FIC has participated in rule challenges in the past, and participated in the workshop and public hearing process conducted by OIR for this Proposed Rule. FIC President Guy Marvin testified that FIC's property and casualty members use credit scoring and would be affected by the Proposed Rule. A substantial number of Petitioners' members are insurers writing property and casualty insurance and/or motor vehicle insurance coverage in Florida. These members use credit-based insurance scoring in their underwriting and rating processes. They would be directly regulated by the Proposed Rule in their underwriting and rating methods and in the rate filing processes set forth in Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. Fair Isaac originated credit-based insurance scoring and is a leading provider of credit-based insurance scoring information in the United States and Canada. Fair Isaac has invested millions of dollars in the development and maintenance of its credit-based insurance models. Fair Isaac concedes that it is not an insurer and, thus, would not be directly regulated by the Proposed Rule. However, Fair Isaac would be directly affected by any negative impact that the Proposed Rule would have in setting limits on the use of credit-based insurance score models in Florida. Lamont Boyd, a manager in Fair Isaac's global scoring division, testified that if the Proposed Rule goes into effect Fair Isaac would, at a minimum, lose all of the revenue it currently generates from insurance companies that use its scores in the State of Florida, because Fair Isaac's credit-based insurance scoring model cannot meet the requirements of the Proposed Rule regarding racial, ethnic, and religious categorization. Mr. Boyd also testified that enactment of the Proposed Rule could cause a "ripple effect" of similar regulations in other states, further impairing Fair Isaac's business. The Statute and Proposed Rule During the 1990s, insurance companies' use of consumer credit information for underwriting and rating automobile and residential property insurance policies greatly increased. Insurance regulators expressed concern that the use of consumer credit reports, credit histories and credit-based insurance scoring models could have a negative effect on consumers' ability to obtain and keep insurance at appropriate rates. Of particular concern was the possibility that the use of credit scoring would particularly hurt minorities, people with low incomes, and young people, because those persons would be more likely to have poor credit scores. On September 19, 2001, Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher appointed a task force to examine the use of credit reports and develop recommendations for the Legislature or for the promulgation of rules regarding the use of credit scoring by the insurance industry. The task force met on four separate occasions throughout the state in 2001, and issued its report on January 23, 2002. The task force report conceded that the evidence supporting the negative impact of the use of credit reports on specific groups is "primarily anecdotal," and that the insurance industry had submitted anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Among its nine recommendations, the task force recommended the following: A comprehensive and independent investigation of the relationship between insurers' use of consumer credit information and risk of loss including the impact by race, income, geographic location and age. A prohibition against the use of credit reports as the sole basis for making underwriting or rating decisions. That insurers using credit as an underwriting or rating factor be required to provide regulators with sufficient information to independently verify that use. That insurers be required to send a copy of the credit report to those consumers whose adverse insurance decision is a result of their consumer credit information and a simple explanation of the specific credit characteristics that caused the adverse decision. That insurers not be permitted to draw a negative inference from a bad credit score that is due to medical bills, little or no credit information, or other special circumstances that are clearly not related to an applicant's or policyholder's insurability. That the impact of credit reports be mitigated by imposing limits on the weight that insurers can give to them in the decision to write a policy and limits on the amount the premium can be increased due to credit information. No evidence was presented that the "comprehensive and independent investigation" of insurers' use of credit information was undertaken by the Legislature. However, the other recommendations of the task force were addressed in Senate Bills 40A and 42A, enacted by the Legislature and signed by the governor on June 26, 2003. These companion bills, each with an effective date of January 1, 2004, were codified as Sections 626.9741 and 626.97411, Florida Statutes, respectively. Chapters 2003-407 and 2003-408, Laws of Florida. Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, provides: The purpose of this section is to regulate and limit the use of credit reports and credit scores by insurers for underwriting and rating purposes. This section applies only to personal lines motor vehicle insurance and personal lines residential insurance, which includes homeowners, mobile home owners' dwelling, tenants, condominium unit owners, cooperative unit owners, and similar types of insurance. As used in this section, the term: "Adverse decision" means a decision to refuse to issue or renew a policy of insurance; to issue a policy with exclusions or restrictions; to increase the rates or premium charged for a policy of insurance; to place an insured or applicant in a rating tier that does not have the lowest available rates for which that insured or applicant is otherwise eligible; or to place an applicant or insured with a company operating under common management, control, or ownership which does not offer the lowest rates available, within the affiliate group of insurance companies, for which that insured or applicant is otherwise eligible. "Credit report" means any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency, as defined in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1681 et seq., bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or expected to be used or collected as a factor to establish a person's eligibility for credit or insurance, or any other purpose authorized pursuant to the applicable provision of such federal act. A credit score alone, as calculated by a credit reporting agency or by or for the insurer, may not be considered a credit report. "Credit score" means a score, grade, or value that is derived by using any or all data from a credit report in any type of model, method, or program, whether electronically, in an algorithm, computer software or program, or any other process, for the purpose of grading or ranking credit report data. "Tier" means a category within a single insurer into which insureds with substantially similar risk, exposure, or expense factors are placed for purposes of determining rate or premium. An insurer must inform an applicant or insured, in the same medium as the application is taken, that a credit report or score is being requested for underwriting or rating purposes. An insurer that makes an adverse decision based, in whole or in part, upon a credit report must provide at no charge, a copy of the credit report to the applicant or insured or provide the applicant or insured with the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency from which the insured or applicant may obtain the credit report. The insurer must provide notification to the consumer explaining the reasons for the adverse decision. The reasons must be provided in sufficiently clear and specific language so that a person can identify the basis for the insurer's adverse decision. Such notification shall include a description of the four primary reasons, or such fewer number as existed, which were the primary influences of the adverse decision. The use of generalized terms such as "poor credit history," "poor credit rating," or "poor insurance score" does not meet the explanation requirements of this subsection. A credit score may not be used in underwriting or rating insurance unless the scoring process produces information in sufficient detail to permit compliance with the requirements of this subsection. It shall not be deemed an adverse decision if, due to the insured's credit report or credit score, the insured continues to receive a less favorable rate or placement in a less favorable tier or company at the time of renewal except for renewals or reunderwriting required by this section. (4)(a) An insurer may not request a credit report or score based upon the race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence of the applicant or insured. An insurer may not make an adverse decision solely because of information contained in a credit report or score without consideration of any other underwriting or rating factor. An insurer may not make an adverse decision or use a credit score that could lead to such a decision if based, in whole or in part, on: The absence of, or an insufficient, credit history, in which instance the insurer shall: Treat the consumer as otherwise approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation if the insurer presents information that such an absence or inability is related to the risk for the insurer; Treat the consumer as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information, as defined by the insurer; Exclude the use of credit information as a factor and use only other underwriting criteria; Collection accounts with a medical industry code, if so identified on the consumer's credit report; Place of residence; or Any other circumstance that the Financial Services Commission determines, by rule, lacks sufficient statistical correlation and actuarial justification as a predictor of insurance risk. An insurer may use the number of credit inquiries requested or made regarding the applicant or insured except for: Credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer or inquiries requested by the consumer for his or her own credit information. Inquiries relating to insurance coverage, if so identified on a consumer's credit report. Collection accounts with a medical industry code, if so identified on the consumer's credit report Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another, unless only one inquiry is considered. Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry and made within 30 days of one another, unless only one inquiry is considered. An insurer must, upon the request of an applicant or insured, provide a means of appeal for an applicant or insured whose credit report or credit score is unduly influenced by a dissolution of marriage, the death of a spouse, or temporary loss of employment. The insurer must complete its review within 10 business days after the request by the applicant or insured and receipt of reasonable documentation requested by the insurer, and, if the insurer determines that the credit report or credit score was unduly influenced by any of such factors, the insurer shall treat the applicant or insured as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information or shall exclude the credit information, as defined by the insurer, whichever is more favorable to the applicant or insured. An insurer shall not be considered out of compliance with its underwriting rules or rates or forms filed with the Office of Insurance Regulation or out of compliance with any other state law or rule as a result of granting any exceptions pursuant to this subsection. A rate filing that uses credit reports or credit scores must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. An insurer that requests or uses credit reports and credit scoring in its underwriting and rating methods shall maintain and adhere to established written procedures that reflect the restrictions set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, this section, and all rules related thereto. (7)(a) An insurer shall establish procedures to review the credit history of an insured who was adversely affected by the use of the insured's credit history at the initial rating of the policy, or at a subsequent renewal thereof. This review must be performed at a minimum of once every 2 years or at the request of the insured, whichever is sooner, and the insurer shall adjust the premium of the insured to reflect any improvement in the credit history. The procedures must provide that, with respect to existing policyholders, the review of a credit report will not be used by the insurer to cancel, refuse to renew, or require a change in the method of payment or payment plan. (b) However, as an alternative to the requirements of paragraph (a), an insurer that used a credit report or credit score for an insured upon inception of a policy, who will not use a credit report or score for reunderwriting, shall reevaluate the insured within the first 3 years after inception, based on other allowable underwriting or rating factors, excluding credit information if the insurer does not increase the rates or premium charged to the insured based on the exclusion of credit reports or credit scores. The commission may adopt rules to administer this section. The rules may include, but need not be limited to: Information that must be included in filings to demonstrate compliance with subsection (3). Statistical detail that insurers using credit reports or scores under subsection (5) must retain and report annually to the Office of Insurance Regulation. Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Standards for review of models, methods, programs, or any other process by which to grade or rank credit report data and which may produce credit scores in order to ensure that the insurer demonstrates that such grading, ranking, or scoring is valid in predicting insurance risk of an applicant or insured. Section 626.97411, Florida Statutes, provides: Credit scoring methodologies and related data and information that are trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 and that are filed with the Office of Insurance Regulation pursuant to a rate filing or other filing required by law are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.3 Following extensive rule development workshops and industry comment, proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005 was initially published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, on February 11, 2005.4 The Proposed Rule states, as follows: 69O-125.005 Use of Credit Reports and Credit Scores by Insurers. For the purpose of this rule, the following definitions apply: "Applicant", for purposes of Section 626.9741, F.S., means an individual whose credit report or score is requested for underwriting or rating purposes relating to personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance and shall not include individuals who have merely requested a quote. "Credit scoring methodology" means any methodology that uses credit reports or credit scores, in whole or in part, for underwriting or rating purposes. "Data cleansing" means the correction or enhancement of presumed incomplete, incorrect, missing, or improperly formatted information. "Personal lines motor vehicle" insurance means insurance against loss or damage to any motorized land vehicle or any loss, liability, or expense resulting from or incidental to ownership, maintenance or use of such vehicle if the contract of insurance shows one or more natural persons as named insureds. The following are not included in this definition: Vehicles used as public livery or conveyance; Vehicles rented to others; Vehicles with more than four wheels; Vehicles used primarily for commercial purposes; and Vehicles with a net vehicle weight of more than 5,000 pounds designed or used for the carriage of goods (other than the personal effects of passengers) or drawing a trailer designed or used for the carriage of such goods. The following are specifically included, inter alia, in this definition: Motorcycles; Motor homes; Antique or classic automobiles; and Recreational vehicles. "Unfairly discriminatory" means that adverse decisions resulting from the use of a credit scoring methodology disproportionately affects persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. Insurers may not use any credit scoring methodology that is unfairly discriminatory. The burden of demonstrating that the credit scoring methodology is not unfairly discriminatory is upon the insurer. An insurer may not request or use a credit report or credit score in its underwriting or rating method unless it maintains and adheres to established written procedures that reflect the restrictions set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, Section 626.9741, F.S., and these rules. Upon initial use or any change in that use, insurers using credit reports or credit scores for underwriting or rating personal lines residential or personal lines motor vehicle insurance shall include the following information in filings submitted pursuant to Section 627.062 or 627.0651, F.S. A listing of the types of individuals whose credit reports or scores the company will use or attempt to use to underwrite or rate a given policy. For example: Person signing application; Named insured or spouse; and All listed operators. How those individual reports or scores will be combined if more than one is used. For example: Average score used; Highest score used. The name(s) of the consumer reporting agencies or any other third party vendors from which the company will obtain or attempt to obtain credit reports or scores. Precise identifying information specifying or describing the credit scoring methodology, if any, the company will use including: Common or trade name; Version, subtype, or intended segment of business the system was designed for; and Any other information needed to distinguish a particular credit scoring methodology from other similar ones, whether developed by the company or by a third party vendor. The effect of particular scores or ranges of scores (or, for companies not using scores, the effect of particular items appearing on a credit report) on any of the following as applicable: Rate or premium charged for a policy of insurance; Placement of an insured or applicant in a rating tier; Placement of an applicant or insured in a company within an affiliated group of insurance companies; Decision to refuse to issue or renew a policy of insurance or to issue a policy with exclusions or restrictions or limitations in payment plans. The effect of the absence or insufficiency of credit history (as referenced in Section 626.9741(4)(c)1., F.S.) on any items listed in paragraph (e) above. The manner in which collection accounts identified with a medical industry code (as referenced in Section 626.9741(4)(c)2., F.S.) on a consumer's credit report will be treated in the underwriting or rating process or within any credit scoring methodology used. The manner in which collection accounts that are not identified with a medical industry code, but which an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of significant and extraordinary medical expenses, will be treated in the underwriting or rating process or within any credit scoring methodology used. The manner in which the following will be treated in the underwriting or rating process, or within any credit scoring methodology used: Credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer; Requests by the consumer for the consumer's own credit information; Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry or the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another; Multiple lender inquiries that are not coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry or the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another, but that an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of such inquiries; Inquiries relating to insurance coverage, if so identified on a consumer's credit report; and Inquiries relating to insurance coverage that are not so identified on a consumer's credit report, but which an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of such inquiries. The list of all clear and specific primary reasons that may be cited to the consumer as the basis or explanation for an adverse decision under Section 626.9741(3), F.S. and the criteria determining when each of those reasons will be so cited. A description of the process that the insurer will use to correct any error in premium charged the insured, or in underwriting decision made concerning the insured, if the basis of the premium charged or the decision made is a disputed item that is later removed from the credit report or corrected, provided that the insured first notifies the insurer that the item has been removed or corrected. A certification that no use of credit reports or scores in rating insurance will apply to any component of a rate or premium attributed to hurricane coverage for residential properties as separately identified in accordance with Section 627.0629, F.S. Insurers desiring to make adverse decisions for personal lines motor vehicle policies or personal lines residential policies based on the absence or insufficiency of credit history shall either: Treat such consumers or applicants as otherwise approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation if the insurer presents information that such an absence or inability is related to the risk for the insurer and does not result in a disparate impact on persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), This information will be held as confidential if properly so identified by the insurer and eligible under Section 626.9711, F.S. The information shall include: Data comparing experience for each category of those with absent or insufficient credit history to each category of insureds separately treated with respect to credit and having sufficient credit history; A statistically credible method of analysis that concludes that the relationship between absence or insufficiency and the risk assumed is not due to chance; A statistically credible method of analysis that concludes that absence or insufficiency of credit history does not disparately impact persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S.; A statistically credible method of analysis that confirms that the treatment proposed by the insurer is quantitatively appropriate; and Statistical tests establishing that the treatment proposed by the insurer is warranted for the total of all consumers with absence or insufficiency of credit history and for at least two subsets of such consumers. Treat such consumers as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information, as defined by the insurer. Should an insurer fail to specify a definition, neutral is defined as the average score that a stratified random sample of consumers or applicants having sufficient credit history would attain using the insurer's credit scoring methodology; or Exclude credit as a factor and use other criteria. These other criteria must be specified by the insurer and must not result in average treatment for the totality of consumers with an absence of or insufficiency of credit history any less favorable than the treatment of average consumers or applicants having sufficient credit history. Insurers desiring to make adverse decisions for personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance based on information contained in a credit report or score shall file with the Office information establishing that the results of such decisions do not correlate so closely with the zip code of residence of the insured as to constitute a decision based on place of residence of the insured in violation of Section 626.9741(4)(c)(3), F.S. (7)(a) Insurers using credit reports or credit scores for underwriting or rating personal lines residential or personal lines motor vehicle insurance shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures consistent with Section 626.9741(4)(e), F.S. providing appeals for applicants or insureds whose credit reports or scores are unduly influenced by dissolution of marriage, death of a spouse, or temporary loss of employment. (b) These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. (8)(a)1. Insurers using credit reports or credit scoring in rating personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures to review the credit history of an insured who was adversely affected by such use at initial rating of the policy or subsequent renewal thereof. These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. The procedures shall comply with the following: A review shall be conducted: No later than 2 years following the date of any adverse decision, or Any time, at the request of the insured, but no more than once per policy period without insurer assent. The insurer shall notify the named insureds annually of their right to request the review in (II) above. Renewal notices issued 120 days or less after the effective date of this rule are not included in this requirement. The insurer shall adjust the premium to reflect any improvement in credit history no later than the first renewal date that follows a review of credit history. The renewal premium shall be subject to other rating factors lawfully used by the insurer. The review shall not be used by the insurer to cancel, refuse to renew, or require a change in the method of payment or payment plan based on credit history. (b)1. As an alternative to the requirements in paragraph (8)(a), insurers using credit reports or scores at the inception of a policy but not for re-underwriting shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures. These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. The procedures shall comply with the following: Insureds shall be reevaluated no later than 3 years following policy inception based on allowable underwriting or rating factors, excluding credit information. The rate or premium charged to an insured shall not be greater, solely as a result of the reevaluation, than the rate or premium charged for the immediately preceding policy term. This shall not be construed to prohibit an insurer from applying regular underwriting criteria (which may result in a greater premium) or general rate increases to the premium charged. For insureds that received an adverse decision notification at policy inception, no residual effects of that adverse decision shall survive the reevaluation. This means that the reevaluation must be complete enough to make it possible for insureds adversely impacted at inception to attain the lowest available rate for which comparable insureds are eligible, considering only allowable underwriting or rating factors (excluding credit information) at the time of the reevaluation. No credit scoring methodology shall be used for personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential property insurance unless that methodology has been demonstrated to be a valid predictor of the insurance risk to be assumed by an insurer for the applicable type of insurance. The demonstration of validity detailed below need only be provided with the first rate, rule, or underwriting guidelines filing following the effective date of this rule and at any time a change is made in the credit scoring methodology. Other such filings may instead refer to the most recent prior filing containing a demonstration. Information supplied in the context of a demonstration of validity will be held as confidential if properly so identified by the insurer and eligible under Section 626.9711, F.S. A demonstration of validity shall include: A listing of the persons that contributed substantially to the development of the most current version of the method, including resumes of the persons, if obtainable, indicating their qualifications and experience in similar endeavors. An enumeration of all data cleansing techniques that have been used in the development of the method, which shall include: The nature of each technique; Any biases the technique might introduce; and The prevalence of each type of invalid information prior to correction or enhancement. All data that was used by the model developers in the derivation and calibration of the model parameters. Data shall be in sufficient detail to permit the Office to conduct multiple regression testing for validation of the credit scoring methodology. Data, including field definitions, shall be supplied in electronic format compatible with the software used by the Office. Statistical results showing that the model and parameters are predictive and not overlapping or duplicative of any other variables used to rate an applicant to such a degree as to render their combined use actuarially unsound. Such results shall include the period of time for which each element from a credit report is used. A precise listing of all elements from a credit report that are used in scoring, and the formula used to compute the score, including the time period during which each element is used. Such listing is confidential if properly so identified by the insurer. An assessment by a qualified actuary, economist, or statistician (whether or not employed by the insurer) other than persons who contributed substantially to the development of the credit scoring methodology, concluding that there is a significant statistical correlation between the scores and frequency or severity of claims. The assessment shall: Identify the person performing the assessment and show his or her educational and professional experience qualifications; and Include a test of robustness of the model, showing that it performs well on a credible validation data set. The validation data set may not be the one from which the model was developed. Documentation consisting of statistical testing of the application of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a disproportionate impact on the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory. Statistical analysis shall be performed on the current insureds of the insurer using the proposed credit scoring model, and shall include the raw data and detailed results on each classification set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. In lieu of such analysis insurers may use the alternative in 2. below. Alternatively, insurers may submit statistical studies and analyses that have been performed by educational institutions, independent professional associations, or other reputable entities recognized in the field, that indicate that there is no disproportionate impact on any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. attributable to the use of credit reports or scores. Any such studies or analyses shall have been done concerning the specific credit scoring model proposed by the insurer. The Office will utilize generally accepted statistical analysis principles in reviewing studies submitted which support the insurer's analysis that the credit scoring model does not disproportionately impact any class based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. The Office will permit reliance on such studies only to the extent that they permit independent verification of the results. The testing or validation results obtained in the course of the assessment in paragraphs (d) and (f) above. Internal Insurer data that validates the premium differentials proposed based on the scores or ranges of scores. Industry or countrywide data may be used to the extent that the Florida insurer data lacks credibility based upon generally accepted actuarial standards. Insurers using industry or countrywide data for validation shall supply Florida insurer data and demonstrate that generally accepted actuarial standards would allow reliance on each set of data to the extent the insurer has done so. Validation data including claims on personal lines residential insurance policies that are the result of acts of God shall not be used unless such acts occurred prior to January 1, 2004. The mere copying of another company's system will not fulfill the requirement to validate proposed premium differentials unless the filer has used a method or system for less than 3 years and demonstrates that it is not cost effective to retrospectively analyze its own data. Companies under common ownership, management, and control may copy to fulfill the requirement to validate proposed premium differentials if they demonstrate that the characteristics of the business to be written by the affiliate doing the copying are sufficiently similar to the affiliate being copied to presume common differentials will be accurate. The credibility standards and any judgmental adjustments, including limitations on effects, that have been used in the process of deriving premium differentials proposed and validated in paragraph (i) above. An explanation of how the credit scoring methodology treats discrepancies in the information that could have been obtained from different consumer reporting agencies: Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion. This shall not be construed to require insurers to obtain multiple reports for each insured or applicant. 1. The date that each of the analyses, tests, and validations required in paragraphs (d) through (j) above was most recently performed, and a certification that the results continue to be applicable. 2. Any item not reviewed in the previous 5 years is unacceptable. Specific Authority 624.308(1), 626.9741(8) FS. Law Implemented 624.307(1), 626.9741 FS. History-- New . The Petition 1. Statutory Definitions of "Unfairly Discriminatory" The main issue raised by Petitioners is that the Proposed Rule's definition of "unfairly discriminatory," and those portions of the Proposed Rule that rely on this definition, are invalid because they are vague, and enlarge, modify, and contravene the provisions of the law implemented and other provisions of the insurance code. Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, does not define "unfairly discriminatory." Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a rate filing using credit reports or scores "must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that the FSC may adopt rules, including standards to ensure that rates or premiums "associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence." Chapter 627, Part I, Florida Statutes, is referred to as the "Rating Law." § 627.011, Fla. Stat. The purpose of the Rating Law is to "promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates . . . to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." § 627.031(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The Rating Law provisions referenced by Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, in relation to ensuring that rates are not "unfairly discriminatory" are Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, titled "Rate standards," provides that "[t]he rates for all classes of insurance to which the provisions of this part are applicable shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." § 627.062(1), Fla. Stat. Subsection 627.062(2)(e)6., Florida Statutes, provides: A rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory as to a risk or group of risks if the application of premium discounts, credits, or surcharges among such risks does not bear a reasonable relationship to the expected loss and expense experience among the various risks. Section 627.0651, Florida Statutes, titled "Making and use of rates for motor vehicle insurance," provides, in relevant part: One rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory in relation to another in the same class if it clearly fails to reflect equitably the difference in expected losses and expenses. Rates are not unfairly discriminatory because different premiums result for policyholders with like loss exposures but different expense factors, or like expense factors but different loss exposures, so long as rates reflect the differences with reasonable accuracy. Rates are not unfairly discriminatory if averaged broadly among members of a group; nor are rates unfairly discriminatory even though they are lower than rates for nonmembers of the group. However, such rates are unfairly discriminatory if they are not actuarially measurable and credible and sufficiently related to actual or expected loss and expense experience of the group so as to assure that nonmembers of the group are not unfairly discriminated against. Use of a single United States Postal Service zip code as a rating territory shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory. Petitioners point out that each of these statutory examples describing "unfairly discriminatory" rates has an actuarial basis, i.e., rates must be related to the actual or expected loss and expense factors for a given group or class, rather than any extraneous factors. If two risks have the same expected losses and expenses, the insurer must charge them the same rate. If the risks have different expected losses and expenses, the insurer must charge them different rates. Michael Miller, Petitioners' expert actuary, testified that the term "unfairly discriminatory" has been used in the insurance industry for well over 100 years and has always had this cost-based definition. Mr. Miller is a fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society ("CAS"), a professional organization whose purpose is the advancement of the body of knowledge of actuarial science, including the promulgation of industry standards and a code of professional conduct. Mr. Miller was chair of the CAS ratemaking committee when it developed the CAS "Statement of Principles Regarding Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking," a guide for actuaries to follow when establishing rates.5 Principle 4 of the Statement of Principles provides: "A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk." In layman's terms, Mr. Miller explained that different types of risks are reflected in a rate calculation. To calculate the expected cost of a given risk, and thus the rate to be charged, the insurer must determine the expected losses for that risk during the policy period. The loss portion reflects the risk associated with an occurrence and the severity of a claim. While the loss portion does not account for the entirety of the rate charged, it is the most important in terms of magnitude. Mr. Miller cautioned that the calculation of risk is a quantification of expected loss, but not an attempt to predict who is going to have an accident or make a claim. There is some likelihood that every insured will make a claim, though most never do, and this uncertainty is built into the incurred loss portion of the rate. No single risk factor is a complete measure of a person's likelihood of having an accident or of the severity of the ensuing claim. The prediction of losses is determined through a risk classification plan that take into consideration many risk factors (also called rating factors) to determine the likelihood of an accident and the extent of the claim. As to automobile insurance, Mr. Miller listed such risk factors as the age, gender, and marital status of the driver, the type, model and age of the car, the liability limits of the coverage, and the geographical location where the car is garaged. As to homeowners insurance, Mr. Miller listed such risk factors as the location of the home, its value and type of construction, the age of the utilities and electrical wiring, and the amount of insurance to be carried. 2. Credit Scoring as a Rating Factor In the current market, the credit score of the applicant or insured is a rating factor common to automobile and homeowners insurance. Subsection 626.9741(2)(c), Florida Statutes, defines "credit score" as follows: a score, grade, or value that is derived by using any or all data from a credit report in any type of model, method, or program, whether electronically, in an algorithm, computer software or program, or any other process, for the purpose of grading or ranking credit report data. "Credit scores" (more accurately termed "credit-based insurance scores") are derived from credit data that have been found to be predictive of a loss. Lamont Boyd, Fair Isaac's insurance market manager, explained the manner in which Fair Isaac produced its credit scoring model. The company obtained information from various insurance companies on millions of customers. This information included the customers' names, addresses, and the premiums earned by the companies on those policies as well as the losses incurred. Fair Isaac next requested the credit reporting agencies to review their archived files for the credit information on those insurance company customers. The credit agencies matched the credit files with the insurance customers, then "depersonalized" the files so that there was no way for Fair Isaac to know the identity of any particular customer. According to Mr. Lamont, the data were "color blind" and "income blind." Fair Isaac's analysts took these files from the credit reporting agencies and studied the data in an effort to find the most predictive characteristics of future loss propensity. The model was developed to account for all the predictive characteristics identified by Fair Isaac's analysts, and to give weight to those characteristics in accordance to their relative accuracy as predictors of loss. Fair Isaac does not directly sell its credit scores to insurance companies. Rather, Fair Isaac's models are implemented by the credit reporting agencies. When an insurance company wants Fair Isaac's credit score, it purchases access to the model's results from the credit reporting agency. Other vendors offer similar credit scoring models to insurance companies, and in recent years, some insurance companies have developed their own scoring models. Several academic studies of credit scoring were admitted and discussed at the final hearing in these cases. There appears to be no serious debate that credit scoring is a valid and important predictor of losses. The controversy over the use of credit scoring arises over its possible "unfairly discriminatory" impact "based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence." § 626.9741(8)(c), Fla. Stat. Mr. Miller was one of two principal authors of a June 2003 study titled, "The Relationship of Credit-Based Insurance Scores to Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Loss Propensity." This study was commissioned by several insurance industry trade organizations, including AIA and NAMIC. The study addressed three questions: whether credit-based insurance scores are related to the propensity for loss; whether credit- based insurance scores measure risk that is already measured by other risk factors; and what is the relative importance to accurate risk assessment of the use of credit-based insurance scores. The study was based on a nationwide random sample of private passenger automobile policy and claim records. Records from all 50 states were included in roughly the same proportion as each state's registered motor vehicles bear to total registered vehicles in the United States. The data samples were provided by seven insurers, and represented approximately 2.7 million automobiles, each insured for 12 months.6 The study examined all major automobile coverages: bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments coverage, personal injury protection coverage, comprehensive coverage, and collision coverage. The study concluded that credit-based insurance scores were correlated with loss propensity. The study found that insurance scores overlap to some degree with other risk factors, but that after fully accounting for the overlaps, insurance scores significantly increase the accuracy of the risk assessment process. The study found that, for each of the six automobile coverages examined, insurance scores are among the three most important risk factors.7 Mr. Miller's study did not examine the question of causality, i.e., why credit-based insurance scores are predictive of loss propensity. Dr. Patrick Brockett testified for Petitioners as an expert in actuarial science, risk management and insurance, and statistics. Dr. Brockett is a professor in the departments of management science and information systems, finance, and mathematics at the University of Texas at Austin. He occupies the Gus S. Wortham Memorial Chair in Risk Management and Insurance, and is the director of the university's risk management and insurance program. Dr. Brockett is the former director of the University of Texas' actuarial science program and continues to direct the study of students seeking their doctoral degrees in actuarial science. His areas of academic research are actuarial science, risk management and insurance, statistics, and general quantitative methods in business. Dr. Brockett has written more than 130 publications, most of which relate to actuarial science and insurance. He has spent his entire career in academia, and has never been employed by an insurance company. In 2002, Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff of Texas asked the Bureau of Business Research ("BBR") of the University of Texas' McCombs School of Business to provide an independent, nonpartisan study to examine the relationship between credit history and insurance losses in automobile insurance. Dr. Brockett was one of four named authors of this BBR study, issued in March 2003 and titled, "A Statistical Analysis of the Relationship between Credit History and Insurance Losses." The BBR research team solicited data from insurance companies representing the top 70 percent of the automobile insurers in Texas, and compiled a database of more than 173,000 automobile insurance policies from the first quarter of 1998 that included the following 12 months' premium and loss history. ChoicePoint was then retained to match the named insureds with their credit histories and to supply a credit score for each insured person. The BBR research team then examined the credit score and its relationship with prospective losses for the insurance policy. The results were summarized in the study as follows: Using logistic and multiple regression analyses, the research team tested whether the credit score for the named insured on a policy was significantly related to incurred losses for that policy. It was determined that there was a significant relationship. In general, lower credit scores were associated with larger incurred losses. Next, logistic and multiple regression analyses examined whether the revealed relationship between credit score and incurred losses was explainable by existing underwriting variables, or whether the credit score added new information about losses not contained in the existing underwriting variables. It was determined that credit score did yield new information not contained in the existing underwriting variables. What the study does not attempt to explain is why credit scoring adds significantly to the insurer's ability to predict insurance losses. In other words, causality was not investigated. In addition, the research team did not examine such variables as race, ethnicity, and income in the study, and therefore this report does not speculate about the possible effects that credit scoring may have in raising or lowering premiums for specific groups of people. Such an assessment would require a different study and different data. At the hearing, Dr. Brockett testified that the BBR study demonstrated a "strong and significant relationship between credit scoring and incurred losses," and that credit scoring retained its predictive power even after the other risk variables were accounted for. Dr. Brockett further testified that credit scoring has a disproportionate effect on the classifications of age and marital status, because the very young tend to have credit scores that are lower than those of older people. If the question is simply whether the use of credit scores will have a greater impact on the young and the single, the answer would be in the affirmative. However, Dr. Brockett also noted that young, single people will also have higher losses than older, married people, and, thus, the use of credit scores is not "unfairly discriminatory" in the sense that term is employed in the insurance industry.8 Mr. Miller testified that nothing in the actuarial standards of practice requires that a risk factor be causally related to a loss. The Actuarial Standards Board's Standard of Practice 12,9 dealing with risk classification, states that a risk factor is appropriate for use if there is a demonstrated relationship between the risk factor and the insurance losses, and that this relationship may be established by statistical or other mathematical analysis of data. If the risk characteristic is shown to be related to an expected outcome, the actuary need not establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the risk characteristic and the expected outcome. As an example, Mr. Miller offered the fact that past automobile accidents do not cause future accidents, although past accidents are predictive of future risk. Past traffic violations, the age of the driver, the gender of the driver, and the geographical location are all risk factors in automobile insurance, though none of these factors can be said to cause future accidents. They help insurers predict the probability of a loss, but do not predict who will have an accident or why the accident will occur. Mr. Miller opined that credit scoring is a similar risk factor. It is demonstrably significant as a predictor of risk, though there is no causal relationship between credit scores and losses and only an incomplete understanding of why credit scoring works as a predictor of loss. At the hearing, Dr. Brockett discussed a study that he has co-authored with Linda Golden, a business professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Titled "Biological and Psychobehavioral Correlates of Risk Taking, Credit Scores, and Automobile Insurance Losses: Toward an Explication of Why Credit Scoring Works," the study has been peer-reviewed and at the time of the hearing had been accepted for publication in the Journal of Risk and Insurance. In this study, the authors conducted a detailed review of existing scientific literature concerning the biological, psychological, and behavioral attributes of risky automobile drivers and insured losses, and a similar review of literature concerning the biological, psychological, and behavioral attributes of financial risk takers. The study found that basic chemical and psychobehavioral characteristics, such as a sensation-seeking personality type, are common to individuals exhibiting both higher insured automobile losses and poorer credit scores. Dr. Brockett testified that this study provides a direction for future research into the reasons why credit scoring works as an insurance risk characteristic. 3. The Proposed Rule's Definition of "Unfairly Discriminatory" Petitioners contend that the Proposed Rule's definition of the term "unfairly discriminatory" expands upon and is contrary to the statutory definition of the term discussed in section C.1. supra, and that this expanded definition operates to impose a ban on the use of credit scoring by insurance companies. As noted above, Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, does not define the term "unfairly discriminatory." The provisions of the Rating Law10 define the term as it is generally understood by the insurance industry: a rate is deemed "unfairly discriminatory" if the premium charged does not equitably reflect the differences in expected losses and expenses between policyholders. Two provisions of Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, employ the term "unfairly discriminatory": (5) A rate filing that uses credit reports or credit scores must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. * * * (8) The commission may adopt rules to administer this section. The rules may include, but need not be limited to: * * * (c) Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners contend that the statute's use of the term "unfairly discriminatory" is unexceptionable, that the Legislature simply intended the term to be used and understood in the traditional sense of actuarial soundness alone. Respondents agree that Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, calls for the agency to apply the traditional definition of "unfairly discriminatory" as that term is employed in the statutes directly referenced, Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes, the relevant texts of which are set forth in Findings of Fact 18 and 19 above. However, Respondents contend that Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, calls for more than the application of the Rating Law's definition of the term. Respondents assert that in the context of this provision, "unfairly discriminatory" contemplates not only the predictive function, but also "discrimination" in its more common sense, as the term is employed in state and federal civil rights law regarding race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. At the hearing, OIR General Counsel Steven Parton testified as to the reasons why the agency chose the federal body of law using the term "disparate impact" as the test for unfair discrimination in the Proposed Rule: Well, first of all, what we were looking for is a workable definition that people would have some understanding as to what it meant when we talked about unfair discrimination. We were also looking for a test that did not require any willfulness, because it was not our concern that, in fact, insurance companies were engaging willfully in unfair discrimination. What we believed is going on, and we think all of the studies that are out there suggest, is that credit scoring is having a disparate impact upon various people, whether it be income, whether it be race. . . . Respondents' position is that Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that a proposed rate or premium be rejected if it has a "disproportionately" negative effect on one of the named classes of persons, even though the rate or premium equitably reflects the differences in expected losses and expenses between policyholders. In the words of Mr. Parton, "This is not an actuarial rule." Mr. Parton explained the agency's rationale for employing a definition of "unfairly discriminatory" that is different from the actuarial usage employed in the Rating Law. Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, already provides that an insurer's rate filings may not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory" in the actuarial sense. To read Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, as simply a reiteration of the actuarial "unfair discrimination" rule would render the provision, "a nullity. There would be no force and effect with regards to that." Thus, the Proposed Rule defines "unfairly discriminatory" to mean "that adverse decisions resulting from the use of a credit scoring methodology disproportionately affects persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S." Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(1)(e). OIR's actuary, Howard Eagelfeld, explained that "disproportionate effect" means "having a different effect on one group . . . causing it to pay more or less premium than its proportionate share in the general population or than it would have to pay based upon all other known considerations." Mr. Eagelfeld's explanation is not incorporated into the language of the Proposed Rule. Consistent with the actuarial definition of "unfairly discriminatory," the Proposed Rule requires that any credit scoring methodology must be "demonstrated to be a valid predictor of the insurance risk to be assumed by an insurer for the applicable type of insurance," and sets forth detailed criteria through which the insurer can make the required demonstration. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(9)(a)-(f) and (h)-(l). Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(9)(g) sets forth Respondents' "civil rights" usage of the term "unfairly discriminatory." The insurer's demonstration of the validity of its credit scoring methodology must include: [d]ocumentation consisting of statistical testing of the application of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a disproportionate impact on the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory.11 Mr. Parton, who testified in defense of the Proposed Rule as one of its chief draftsmen, stated that the agency was concerned that the use of credit scoring may be having a disproportionate effect on minorities. Respondents believe that credit scoring may simply be a surrogate measure for income, and that using income as a basis for setting rates would have an obviously disparate impact on lower-income persons, including the young and the elderly. Mr. Parton testified that "neither the insurance industry nor anyone else" has researched the theory that credit scoring may be a surrogate for income. Mr. Miller referenced a 1998 analysis performed by AIA indicating that the average credit scores do not vary significantly according to the income group. In fact, the lowest income group (persons making less than $15,000 per year) had the highest average credit score, and the average credit scores actually dropped as income levels rose until the income range reached $50,000 to $74,000 per year, when the credit scores began to rise. Mr. Miller testified that a credit score is no more predictive of income level than a coin flip. However, Respondents introduced a January 2003 report to the Washington State Legislature prepared by the Social & Economic Sciences Research Center of Washington State University, titled "Effect of Credit Scoring on Auto Insurance Underwriting and Pricing." The purpose of the study was to determine whether credit scoring has unequal impacts on specific demographic groups. For this study, the researchers received data from three insurance companies on several thousand randomly chosen customers, including the customers' age, gender, residential zip code, and their credit scores and/or rate classifications. The researchers contacted about 1,000 of each insurance company's customers and obtained information about their ethnicity, marital status, and income levels. The study's findings were summarized as follows: The demographic patterns discerned by the study are: Age is the most significant factor. In almost every analysis, older drivers have, on average, higher credit scores, lower credit-based rate assignments, and less likelihood of lacking a valid credit score. Income is also a significant factor. Credit scores and premium costs improve as income rises. People in the lowest income categories-- less than $20,000 per year and between $20,000 and $35,000 per year-- often experienced higher premiums and lower credit scores. More people in lower income categories also lacked sufficient credit history to have a credit score. Ethnicity was found to be significant in some cases, but because of differences among the three firms studied and the small number of ethnic minorities in the samples, the data are not broadly conclusive. In general, Asian/Pacific Islanders had credit scores more similar to whites than to other minorities. When other minority groups had significant differences from whites, the differences were in the direction of higher premiums. In the sample of cases where insurance was cancelled based on credit score, minorities who were not Asian/Pacific Islanders had greater difficulty finding replacement insurance, and were more likely to experience a lapse in insurance while they searched for a new policy. The analysis also considered gender, marital status and location, but for these factors, significant unequal effects were far less frequent. (emphasis added) The evidence appears equivocal on the question of whether credit scoring is a surrogate for income. The Washington study seems to indicate that ethnicity may be a significant factor in credit scoring, but that significant unequal effects are infrequent regarding gender and marital status. The evidence demonstrates that the use of credit scores by insurers would tend to have a negative impact on young people. Mr. Miller testified that persons between ages 25 and 30 have lower credit scores than older people. Petitioners argue that by defining "unfairly discriminatory" to mean "disproportionate effect," the Proposed Rule effectively prohibits insurers from using credit scores, if only because all the parties recognize that credit scores have a "disproportionate effect" on young people. Petitioners contend that this prohibition is in contravention of Section 626.9741(1), Florida Statutes, which states that the purpose of the statute is to "regulate and limit" the use of credit scores, not to ban them outright. Respondents counter that if the use of credit scores is "unfairly discriminatory" toward one of the listed classes of persons in contravention of Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, then the "limitation" allowed by the statute must include prohibition. This point is obviously true but sidesteps the real issues: whether the statute's undefined prohibition on "unfair discrimination" authorizes the agency to employ a "disparate impact" or "disproportionate effect" definition in the Proposed Rule, and, if so, whether the Proposed Rule sufficiently defines any of those terms to permit an insurer to comply with the rule's requirements. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(2) provides that the insurer bears the burden of demonstrating that its credit scoring methodology does not disproportionately affect persons based upon their race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners state that no insurer can demonstrate, consistent with the Proposed Rule, that its credit scoring methodology does not have a disproportionate effect on persons based upon their age. Therefore, no insurer will ever be permitted to use credit scores under the terms of the Proposed Rule. As discussed more fully in Findings of Fact 73 through 76 below, Petitioners also contend that the Proposed Rule provides no guidance as to what "disproportionate effect" and "disparate impact" mean, and that this lack of definitional guidance will permit the agency to reject any rate filing that uses credit scoring, based upon an arbitrary determination that it has a "disproportionate effect" on one of the classes named in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioners also presented evidence that no insurer collects data on race, color, religion, or national origin from applicants or insureds. Mr. Miller testified that there is no reliable independent source for race, color, religious affiliation, or national origin data. Mr. Eagelfeld agreed that there is no independent source from which insurers can obtain credible data on race or religious affiliation. Mr. Parton testified that this lack of data can be remedied by the insurance companies commencing to request race, color, religion, and national origin information from their customers, because there is no legal impediment to their doing so. Mr. Miller testified that he would question the reliability of the method suggested by Mr. Parton because many persons will refuse to answer such sensitive questions or may not answer them correctly. Mr. Miller stated that, as an actuary, he would not certify the results of a study based on demographic data obtained in this manner and would qualify any resulting actuarial opinion due to the unreliability of the database. Petitioners also object to the vagueness of the broad categories of "race, color, religion and national origin." Mr. Miller testified that the Proposed Rule lacks "operational definitions" for those terms that would enable insurers to perform the required calculations. The Proposed Rule places the burden on the insurer to demonstrate no disproportionate effect on persons based on these categories, but offers no guidance as to how these demographic classes should be categorized by an insurer seeking to make such a demonstration. Petitioners point out that even if the insurer is able to ascertain the categories sought by the regulators, the Proposed Rule gives no guidance as to whether the "disproportionate effect" criterion mandates perfect proportionality among all races, colors, religions, and national origins, or whether some degree of difference is tolerable. Petitioners contend that this lack of guidance provides unbridled discretion to the regulator to reject any disproportionate effect study submitted by an insurer. At his deposition, Mr. Parton was asked how an insurer should break down racial classifications in order to show that there is no disproportionate effect on race. His answer was as follows: There is African-American, Cuban-American, Spanish-American, African-American, Haitian- American. Are you-- you know, whatever the make-up of your book of business is-- you're the one in control of it. You can ask these folks what their ethnic background is. At his deposition, Mr. Parton frankly admitted that he had no idea what "color" classifications an insurer should use, yet he also stated that an insurer must demonstrate no disproportionate effect on each and every listed category, including "color." At the final hearing, when asked to list the categories of "color," Mr. Parton responded, "I suppose Indian, African-American, Chinese, Japanese, all of those."12 At the final hearing, Mr. Parton was asked whether the Proposed Rule contemplates requiring insurers to demonstrate distinctions between such groups as "Latvian-Americans" and "Czech-Americans." Mr. Parton's reply was as follows: No. And I don't think it was contemplated by the Legislature. . . . The question is race by any other name, whether it be national origin, ethnicity, color, is something that they're concerned about in terms of an impact. What we would anticipate, and what we have always anticipated, is the industry would demonstrate whether or not there is an adverse effect against those folks who have traditionally in Florida been discriminated against, and that would be African-Americans and certain Hispanic groups. In our opinion, at least, if you could demonstrate that the credit scoring was not adversely impacting it, it may very well answer the questions to any other subgroup that you may want to name. At the hearing, Mr. Parton was also questioned as to distinctions between religions and testified as follows: The impact of credit scoring on religion is going to be in the area of what we call thin files, or no files. That is to say people who do not have enough credit history from which credit scores can be done, or they're going to be treated somehow differently because of that lack of history. A simple question that needs to be asked by the insurance company is: "Do you, as a result of your religious belief or whatever [sect] you are in, are you forbidden as a precept of your religious belief from engaging in the use of credit?" When cross-examined on the subject, Mr. Parton could not confidently identify any religious group that forbids the use of credit. He thought that Muslims and Quakers may be such groups. Mr. Parton concluded by stating, "I don't think it is necessary to identify those groups. The question is whether or not you have a religious group that you prescribe to that forbids it." Petitioners contend that, in addition to failing to define the statutory terms of race, color, religion, and national origin in a manner that permits insurer compliance, the Proposed Rule fails to provide an operational definition of "disproportionate effect." The following is a hypothetical question put to Mr. Parton at his deposition, and Mr. Parton's answer: Q: Let's assume that African-Americans make up 10 percent of the population. Let's just use two groups for the sake of clarity. Caucasians make up 90 percent. If the application of credit scoring in underwriting results in African-Americans paying 11 percent of the premium and Caucasians paying 89 percent of the premium, is that, in your mind, a disproportionate affect [sic]? A: It may be. I think it would give rise under this rule that perhaps there is a presumption that it is, but that presumption is not [an irrebuttable] one.[13] For instance, if you then had testimony that a 1 percent difference between the two was statistically insignificant, then I would suggest that that presumption would be overridden. This answer led to a lengthy discussion regarding a second hypothetical in which African-Americans made up 29 percent of the population, and also made up 35 percent of the lowest, or most unfavorable, tier of an insurance company's risk classifications. Mr. Parton ultimately opined that if the difference in the two numbers was found to be "statistically significant" and attributable only to the credit score, then he would conclude that the use of credit scoring unfairly discriminated against African-Americans. As to whether his answer would be the same if the hypothetical were adjusted to state that African-Americans made up 33 percent of the lowest tier, Mr. Parton responded: "That would be up to expert testimony to be provided on it. That's what trials are all about."14 Aside from expert testimony to demonstrate that the difference was "statistically insignificant," Mr. Parton could think of no way that an insurer could rebut the presumption that the difference was unfairly discriminatory under the "disproportionate effect" definition set forth in the proposed rule. He stated that, "I can't anticipate, nor does the rule propose to anticipate, doing the job of the insurer of demonstrating that its rates are not unfairly discriminatory." Mr. Parton testified that an insurer's showing that the credit score was a valid and important predictor of risk would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of disproportionate effect. Summary Findings Credit-based insurance scoring is a valid and important predictor of risk, significantly increasing the accuracy of the risk assessment process. The evidence is still inconclusive as to why credit scoring is an effective predictor of risk, though a study co-authored by Dr. Brockett has found that basic chemical and psychobehavioral characteristics, such as a sensation-seeking personality type, are common to individuals exhibiting both higher insured automobile losses and poorer credit scores. Though the evidence was equivocal on the question of whether credit scoring is simply a surrogate for income, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the use of credit scores by insurance companies has a greater negative overall effect on young people, who tend to have lower credit scores than older people. Petitioners and Fair Isaac emphasized their contention that compliance with the Proposed Rule would be impossible, and thus the Proposed Rule in fact would operate as a prohibition on the use of credit scoring by insurance companies. At best, Petitioners demonstrated that compliance with the Proposed Rule would be impracticable at first, given the current business practices in the industry regarding the collection of customer data regarding race and religion. The evidence indicated no legal barriers to the collection of such data by the insurance companies. Questions as to the reliability of the data are speculative until a methodology for the collection of the data is devised. Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the FSC to adopt rules that may include: Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners' contention that the statute's use of "unfairly discriminatory" contemplates nothing more than the actuarial definition of the term as employed by the Rating Law is rejected. As Respondents pointed out, Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a rate filing using credit scores must comply with the Rating Law's requirements that the rates not be "unfairly discriminatory" in the actuarial sense. If Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, merely reiterates the actuarial requirement, then it is, in Mr. Parton's words, "a nullity."15 Thus, it is found that the Legislature contemplated some level of scrutiny beyond actuarial soundness to determine whether the use of credit scores "unfairly discriminates" in the case of the classes listed in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes. It is found that the Legislature empowered FSC to adopt rules establishing standards to ensure that an insurer's rates or premiums associated with the use of credit scores meet this added level of scrutiny. However, it must be found that the term "unfairly discriminatory" as employed in the Proposed Rule is essentially undefined. FSC has not adopted a "standard" by which insurers can measure their rates and premiums, and the statutory term "unfairly discriminatory" is thus subject to arbitrary enforcement by the regulating agency. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(1)(e) defines "unfairly discriminatory" in terms of adverse decisions that "disproportionately affect" persons in the classes set forth in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, but does not define what is a "disproportionate effect." At Subsection (9)(g), the Proposed Rule requires "statistical testing" of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a "disproportionate impact" on the listed classes. This subsection attempts to define its terms as follows: A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory. Thus, the Proposed Rule provides that a "disproportionate effect" equals a "disparate impact" equals "unfairly discriminatory," without defining any of these terms in such a way that an insurer could have any clear notion, prior to the regulator's pronouncement on its rate filing, whether its credit scoring methodology was in compliance with the rule. Indeed, Mr. Parton's testimony evinced a disinclination on the part of the agency to offer guidance to insurers who attempt to understand this circular definition. The tenor of his testimony indicated that the agency itself is unsure of exactly what an insurer could submit to satisfy the "disproportionate effect" test, aside from perfect proportionality, which all parties concede is not possible at least as to young people, or a showing that any lack of perfect proportionality is "statistically insignificant," whatever that means. Mr. Parton seemed to say that OIR will know a valid use of credit scoring when it sees one, though it cannot describe such a use beforehand. Mr. Eagelfeld offered what might be a workable definition of "disproportionate effect," but his definition is not incorporated into the Proposed Rule. Mr. Parton attempted to assure the Petitioners that OIR would take a reasonable view of the endless racial and ethnic categories that could be subsumed under the literal language of the Proposed Rule, but again, Mr. Parton's assurances are not part of the Proposed Rule. Mr. Parton's testimony referenced federal and state civil rights laws as the source for the term "disparate impact." Federal case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, has defined a "disparate impact" claim as "one that 'involves employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.'" Adams v. Florida Power Corporation, 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1705, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993). The Proposed Rule does not reference this definition, nor did Mr. Parton detail how OIR proposes to apply or modify this definition in enforcing the Proposed Rule. Without further definition, all three of the terms employed in this circular definition are conclusions, not "standards" that the insurer and the regulator can agree upon at the outset of the statistical and analytical process leading to approval or rejection of the insurer's rates. Absent some definitional guidance, a conclusory term such as "disparate impact" can mean anything the regulator wishes it to mean in a specific case. The confusion is compounded by the Proposed Rule's failure to refine the broad terms "race," "color," and "religion" in a manner that would allow an insurer to prepare a meaningful rate submission utilizing credit scoring. In his testimony, Mr. Parton attempted to limit the Proposed Rule's impact to those groups "who have traditionally in Florida been discriminated against," but the actual language of the Proposed Rule makes no such distinction. Mr. Parton also attempted to limit the reach of "religion" to groups whose beliefs forbid them from engaging in the use of credit, but the language of the Proposed Rule does not support Mr. Parton's distinction.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for his answers to Questions 34, 65, and 75 on the Fundamentals of Engineering portion of the engineering licensure examination administered on the morning of April 15, 2000, by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On April 15, 2000, as part of his effort to obtain a license to practice as an engineer intern in the State of Florida, Petitioner sat for the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination (Examination). This was a national multiple-choice examination developed and administered by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors (NCEES). The Examination was divided into two sessions: a morning session (AM Part), which tested "lower division subjects" (that is, "the first 90 semester credit hours . . . of engineering course work for a typical bachelor engineering degree program"), and an afternoon session (PM Part), which tested "upper division subjects" (that is, "the remainder of the engineering course work"). Questions on the AM Part were worth one raw point each. Questions on the PM Part were worth two raw points each. The NCEES provided candidates taking the Examination with a Fundamentals of Engineering, Discipline Specific, Reference Handbook (Reference Handbook) that they were allowed to refer to during the Examination. The Reference Handbook, as noted in its Foreword, "contain[ed] only reference formulas and tables; no example problems [we]re included." Petitioner received a total raw score of 104 on the Examination (54 for the AM Part and 50 for the PM Part). According to the NCEES's Score Conversion Table, a raw score of 104 converted to a score of 69. To pass the Examination, a converted score of 70 (or 107-109 raw points) was needed. Accordingly, Petitioner fell three raw points short of receiving a passing score. Petitioner has formally requested that the grading of his answers to Questions 34, 65, and 75 of the AM Part be reviewed. He received no credit for any of these answers. Had these answers been deemed correct (and he received one raw point for each answer), he would have passed the Examination (with a converted score of 70). Question 34 of the AM Part was a clear and unambiguous multiple-choice question that covered subject matter (integral calculus) with which Petitioner and the other candidates should have been familiar. There was only one correct answer to this question, and it was among the responses from which the candidates had to choose. Petitioner chose another answer that was clearly incorrect because it represented a particular solution or expression, and not the "general expression" (representing all solutions) called for by the question. He therefore appropriately received no credit for his answer. Questions 65 and 75 of the AM Part, like Question 34, were clear and unambiguous multiple choice questions that covered subject areas (centroids and thermodynamics, respectively) with which Petitioner and the other candidates should have been familiar. Each of these questions, again like Question 34, had only one correct answer that was listed among the choices from which the candidates had to choose. To answer each question correctly, the candidates had to use a formula that was set forth in the Reference Handbook (on page 21 in the case of Question 65 and on page 46 in the case of Question 75). Petitioner selected neither the correct answer to Question 65, nor the correct answer to Question 75, and therefore was not entitled to any credit for his answers to these questions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered rejecting Petitioner's challenge to the failing score he received from the NCEES on the Fundamentals of Engineering portion of the April 15, 2000, engineering licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2000.
