The Issue Whether Petitioners violated provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause filed August 23, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Chapters 97 through 106, Florida Statutes, comprise the Florida Election Code (Code). Pursuant to the Code, the Commission is empowered specifically to enforce the provisions of Chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. Mary McCarty was elected to the City Commission of Delray Beach, Florida in 1987. She was elected to the Palm Beach County Commission in 1990. She has been returned to that office in each subsequent election and she is currently a member of the Palm Beach County Commission. In November of 2002, she was elected to her fourth term as Chairman of the Palm Beach County Republican Executive Committee. The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary was an unincorporated entity. It was a de facto committee, which, for reasons addressed herein, did not ever become a "political committee" as defined in Section 106.011(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. McCarty has run for public office six times and was successful on each occasion. Prior to each election she received from the Florida Secretary of State a handbook addressing campaign financing. She is familiar with the statutes and rules with regard to financing an individual campaign. Sometime before the Thanksgiving Holiday in 2000, Ms. McCarty received a telephone call from Roger Stone of Washington, D.C. Ms. McCarty knew Mr. Stone, who at various times had been a campaign operative for Senator Arlen Specter, had been involved in opposing the sugar tax amendment in Florida, and had been a consultant to Donald Trump, during his short-lived presidential campaign. Ms. McCarty was aware that Mr. Stone and Craig Snyder were principals of IKON Public Affairs, a business entity with offices in Washington, D.C., and Miami Beach, Florida. Roger Stone informed Ms. McCarty that he was forming a committee to raise funds for the purpose of taking action against the Florida Supreme Court. Mr. Stone stated that he had formed The Committee and that he wished for her to be the chairperson. She did not initially commit to undertake this responsibility. A few days after the conversation with Mr. Stone, Ms. McCarty received a facsimile draft of a fundraising letter that The Committee proposed to post. The facsimile was sent by Roger Stone from Washington. She made some suggested changes and returned it to the address in Washington from whence it came. Subsequently, she had a telephone conversation with Lora Lynn Jones of Unique Graphics and Design in Alexandria, Virginia. Ms. Jones was in the business of making mass mailings. Ms. McCarty told Ms. Jones that her name could be used on the fundraising letter although Ms. McCarty did not sign the fundraising letter. Nevertheless, the document was mailed to a large number of people and it bore the printed name, "Mary McCarty, Palm Beach County Commissioner." The first time Ms. McCarty saw The Committee's finished product it was in the form of a "Telepost, high priority communication." She first saw the "Telepost" when it arrived in her mailbox in early December 2000. The wording of the letter was different from the draft Ms. McCarty had seen earlier. Unlike the draft, it targeted specific justices on the Florida Supreme Court. It cannot be determined from the evidence the date the December "Telepost" was posted, but it was posted before Ms. McCarty determined that she had become Chairperson of The Committee. The "Telepost," dated December 2000, solicited funds so that The Committee could, ". . . send a clear message to the Florida Supreme Court that we will not tolerate their efforts to highjack the Presidential election for Al Gore." Later in December 2000, Mr. Stone called Ms. McCarthy and told her that she should be the chairman of The Committee. She agreed. Ms. McCarty signed a "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," which was dated December 19, 2000. This is a form provided by the Division of Elections, which, if properly completed and filed, officially establishes a political committee. She also signed a form entitled "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee." Mr. Stone, or his operatives, provided these forms to Ms. McCarty. She signed them and mailed them to Mr. Stone's address in Washington, D.C., which was the headquarters of the IKON Public Affairs Group. The "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," dated December 19, 2000, was received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. It listed Amber McWhorter as Treasurer. Inez Williams, who works in the document section of the Division of Elections, processed the form. When Ms. Williams received it, she recognized that the form was incomplete because on the face of it the reader could not determine if the committee was an "issue" committee, or a "candidate" committee. Ms. Williams noted that the mailing address on the form dated December 19, 2000, was "c/o VisionMedia," 1680 Michigan Avenue, Suite 900, Miami Beach, Florida. Ms. Williams found a telephone number for that business and dialed it, on December 27, 2000. No one answered so she left a message on VisionMedia's answering machine. In addition to the telephone call, Ms. Williams prepared a letter with the address of, "Mary McCarty, Chairperson, The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary, 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, Miami Beach, Florida." This letter was dated December 27, 2000, and was signed by Connie A. Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records. This is the address found on the "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee," which had also been received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. The letter signed by Ms. Evans on December 27, 2001, informed Ms. McCarty that items 3 and 7 needed to be "rephrased." It further informed Ms. McCarty, that upon receipt of the requested information the committee would be included on the "active" list. The message recorded on The Committee answering machine on December 27, 2001, generated a response from a person who identified himself as Mr. Snyder, on January 2, 2002. Mr. Snyder engaged in a telephone conversation with Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams explained to Mr. Snyder that items 3, 5, 7, and 8, would have to be completed properly as a condition of The Committee's being recognized. A letter dated January 4, 2001, bearing the letterhead of "The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary," and signed by Amber Allman McWhorter, was faxed to the Division of Elections on January 4, 2001, and received that date. This letter referenced the telephone call between Ms. Williams and Craig Snyder, who was further identified as The Committee's attorney. The letter stated that a corrected Statement of Organization of Political Committee, and a designation of treasurer, would be forwarded to the Division of Elections within the next 72 hours. On January 8, 2001, a filing was received by the Division of Elections that was deemed by the Division to be complete. Subsequently, in a letter dated January 10, 2001, and signed by Connie Evans, informed Ms. McCarty and The Committee that the Statement of Organization and the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for The Committee complied with the Division of Elections' requirements. The Committee was provided with Identification No. 34261. Posted with the letter was a copy of the "2000 Handbook for Committees," which is published by the Division of Elections. The letter and the handbook were sent to The Committee operation in Miami, not Ms. McCarty, and no one in the Miami Beach operation ever forwarded it to her. Connie Evans, Bureau Chief of Election Records, the entity that supervises the filing of the forms mentioned above, believes that due to a court ruling in Florida Right to Life v. Mortham, Case No. 98-770-Civ-Orl-19A, the language in Section 106.011, Florida Statutes, which defines a "political committee," has been found to be unconstitutional. She believes that a political committee is not required to register with the Division of Elections but that if a committee does register, it must abide by the statutes regulating political committees. Ms. Evans has informed numerous entities of this interpretation of the law in letters. The efficacy of that case, and Ms. Evans' interpretation of it, will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Law, below. Ms. McCarty signed a "Campaign Treasurer's Report Summary"(CTR-Q1) which was filed with the Division of Elections on April 10, 2001. This addressed the period January 1, 2001 until March 31, 2001. Under the certification section of the CTR-Q1 are the words, "It is a first degree misdemeanor for any person to falsify a public record (ss. 839.13, F.S.)." Immediately above her signature are the words, "I certify that I have examined this report and it is true, correct, and complete." The box found immediately above and to the right of her signature, was checked to signify that Ms. McCarty was the chairperson of The Committee. According to Ms. Evans, The Division of Elections regulates several kinds of committees. There are "issues" committees, "candidate" committees," "party executive" committees, and "committees of continuing existence." Depending on the nature of the committee, different rules apply. The Committee was a "candidate" committee so the contribution regulations of a political candidate applied to the committee. That meant that the maximum contribution per person was $500. The CTR-Q1 indicated in the "Itemized Contributions Section" that seven people contributed $1,000 and one person contributed $2,000. Walter Hunter, Neda Korich, Arthur Allen, William Shutze, Caroline Ireland, Henry Allen, and Honore Wansler, contributed $1,000, each. Robert Morgan contributed $2,000. The amounts in excess of $500 were eventually returned to the $1,000 contributors, except that in the case of Henry Allen, the refund was made to Allen Investment corporation. The sum of $1,500 was returned to Robert Morgan, the $2,000 contributor, but the CTR-Q1 listed only a $500 repayment. Therefore, the CTR-Q1 in its expenditures section was incorrect with regard to Mr. Morgan. The CTR-Q1 also listed in the "Itemized Contributions Section" the receipt, on January 2, 2001, of $150,000 for "LOA/INK extension of credit for direct mail services." These words may be interpreted to mean that a loan in the form of an "in kind" service had been provided. This was reported under the name of Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The Committee had a bank account at CityBank of Miami, Florida. The sole authorized signatory on the account was Diane Thorne. The Account No. was 3200015694. There was no entry in the bank account of the receipt of $150,000. This indicates that the item was not processed through the bank and it would not have been processed through the bank if it were really an "in kind" contribution. Because the beginning balance was zero on February 8, 2001, it is concluded that the inception date of Account No. 3200015694 was February 8, 2001. Lora Lynn Jones, is the principal of Unique Graphics and Design, which is located in Suite 253, at an address in Alexandria, Virginia, which is not further identified in the evidence of record. Ms. Jones prepared and posted the fundraising letter of December 2000, at the direction of Mr. Stone. Ms. Jones talked on the telephone with Ms. McCarty prior to mailing the fundraising letter and determined that the language in the letter was agreeable to Ms. McCarty. At the direction of Mr. Stone, Ms. Jones requested payment and received payment for her work, but from whom she cannot remember, except that she is sure that Creative Marketing did not pay it. The money for this production was paid in advance by wire transfer. There is no evidence in the record that this was paid from the account of The Committee. In fact, because the payment was made sometime in early December 2000, it could not have been paid from the account because it had not been opened. Ms. Jones is aware of an entity by the name of Creative Marketing Company and she believes it may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. It is found by clear and convincing evidence that the fundraising letter was not paid for by Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The bank records of The Committee reflect a $50,000 expenditure made to Unique Graphics and Design, paid with a check dated May 9, 2001. This represents a payment for something other than the fundraising letter dated December 2000. The $50,000 item was reported as an expenditure on the CTR-Q1 that was reported to have been made on March 12, 2001. It was reported as having been made to Creative Marketing as payee. The only check in the amount of $50,000, reflected in The Committee checking account for the period February 8, 2001, to June 30, 2001, was payable to Unique Graphics and Design and was dated May 9, 2001. Therefore, it is found that the CTR-Q1 is incorrect when it was reported as having been made on March 12, 2001, to Creative Marketing. Ms. Jones believes there is a company by the name of Creative Marketing Company, which she believes may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. Contributions remitted in response to the fundraising letter were forwarded to one of Mr. Stone's two addresses. Because the address of 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, in Miami Beach, Florida, is the address listed on the fundraising letter, it is likely that contributions in response to the fundraising letter went to Mr. Stone's Miami Beach operation. In any event, it is found as a fact that Ms. McCarty did not personally receive or have any contact with any of the contributions remitted to The Committee. The people handling the receipt of funds and the deposits were Roger Stone and people paid by his organization, including Diane Thorne, the secretary; Amber McWhorter, the treasurer; and Craig Snyder. Just as Ms. McCarty was not involved in the receipt of income to The Committee, she was also not involved in the disbursement of funds. The CTR-Q1 was completed by The Committee's staff in either Miami Beach or Washington, D.C., but Ms. McCarty had no input into its preparation. When Ms. McCarty signed the CTR-Q1 she was without knowledge as to whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. It is further found that she made no effort to ascertain whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. She believed it to be true and correct because she trusted Mr. Stone's operatives to accurately prepare the report. Ms. McCarty, excepting the current litigation, has never been the subject of a Commission action. Ms. McCarty has an income of approximately $80,000. She owns a residence jointly with her husband which is valued at approximately $300,000 and which is subject to a mortgage of approximately $200,000. She owns a vacation home in Maine jointly with her husband that is valued at approximately $25,000. She and her husband own three automobiles. She owns stocks, annuities, mutual funds or certificates of deposit of an indeterminate value.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Orders of Probable Cause entered in the case of both Mary McCarty and The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kendall Coffey, Esquire Coffey & Wright, LLP 2665 South Bayshore Drive Grand Bay Plaza, Penthouse 2B Miami, Florida 33133 J. Reeve Bright, Esquire Bright & Chimera 135 Southeast 5th Avenue, Suite 2 Delray Beach, Florida 33483-5256 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Ruching, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether petitioner, a sales tax dealer, must pay taxes, interest and penalties for collecting sales taxes on certain nontaxable transactions and then failing to remit those funds to respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the pleadings, filings, and stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: On an undisclosed date, respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), conducted an audit of petitioner, Blackshears II Aluminum, Inc. (Blackshears), a registered sales tax dealer located in Crystal River, Florida. The audit covered the period from June 1, 1985, through March 31, 1989. As a result of that audit, on December 27, 1989, DOR issued a notice of intent to make sales and use tax audit charges. After petitioner availed itself of various informal procedures, a notice of reconsideration (notice) was issued on January 7, 1992, imposing a final assessment of $623,131.69. This action prompted Blackshears to initiate this proceeding. Although the notice addressed five issues, only issue three is relevant to this proceeding. That issue is broadly defined in the notice as "whether taxes collected on nontaxable transactions are state funds." According to the notice, the issue should be answered in the affirmative because (e)very dealer in the State of Florida is an agent for the state in that it is their responsibility to collect and remit sales tax. Blackshears collected the funds in the name of the State of Florida and has presented no refund assignments from the purchasers to permit them to apply for refunds, therefore, the State of Florida is due the funds. If the Department were to permit the use of its name to unjustly enrich Blackshears, a continuing deception would occur. The parties agree that petitioner collected sales taxes on various transactions (real property contracts) during the audit period. Whether such transactions were subject to the sales tax is in dispute, but for purposes of resolving the issue presented here, the parties have agreed that the undersigned can assume that the transactions were nontaxable. It is further agreed that even though petitioner collected the taxes from its customers, it failed to remit them to the state, and it has likewise failed to furnish proof that it refunded those moneys to its customers. Accordingly, DOR's assessment seeks to collect those taxes together with interest and substantial penalties. The parties have also agreed that the portion of the total tax assessment attributable to real property contracts is $277,406.53. As of March 29, 1993, the assessment totaled $636,570.37, after the accrual of interest and penalties. However, petitioner has paid to the state $16,180.19, for which it should receive credit. During the audit period, Rule 12A-1.014(6), Florida Administrative Code, was in effect and provided as follows: (6) Whenever a dealer credits a customer with tax on returned merchandise or for tax erroneously collected, he must refund such tax to his customer before his claim to the State for credit or refund will be approved. Under the terms of this rule, which interpreted the provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, any moneys erroneously collected by a dealer as taxes were to be remitted to the state. However, if the moneys were refunded to the customer, the dealer could then receive a refund of the moneys previously paid or a credit towards other taxes due.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order granting its motion for partial summary adjudication and sustaining the assessment on issue three of its notice of reconsideration, plus interest and penalties, less those taxes already paid and identified in paragraph 2 of the parties' joint stipulation. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 C. Lynne Chapman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire 315 South Calhoun Street Suite 500 Tallahassee, FL 32301
The Issue Whether Marvin Couch, the Respondent, should be required to pay attorney's fees and costs to Linda Chapin, the Petitioner, pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Linda Chapin's Public Office. Linda Chapin was elected to the Orange County Commission in November, 1990. Ms. Chapin ran for office as a Democrat. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Chapin served as Chairman of the Orange County Commission. Ms. Chapin was sworn in as a member of the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Authority") on December 19, 1990. Ms. Chapin was automatically considered to be an ex-officio member of the Authority due to her position as Chairman of the Orange County Commission. Ms. Chapin's Treatment of Her Son's Employment with Greiner Engineering. In a letter dated December 18, 1990, Ms. Chapin informed the Chairman of the Authority that her son, Andrew Chapin, was employed by Greiner Engineering (hereinafter referred to as "Greiner"), as a project coordinator on the "Central Connector Interchange at I-4", a project of the Authority. In the December 18, 1990, letter to the Chairman of the Authority Ms. Chapin informed the Chairman that she had requested an opinion of the Orange County Attorney as to whether her son's employment and her public office might create any conflict of interest. A copy of an opinion from Harry A. Stewart, then Orange County Attorney, indicating no conflict of interest, was attached to the letter. The December 18, 1990, letter and the opinion of the Orange County Attorney were provided to the Authority at the meeting of the Authority held on December 19, 1990. Approval of Greiner for the project referenced by Ms. Chapin in her December 18, 1990, letter to the Chairman of the Authority had been approved by the Authority at an August 22, 1990, meeting of the Authority. Greiner was therefore approved by the Authority before Ms. Chapin was elected to the Orange County Commission and before she became an ex-officio member of the Authority. (Stipulated Fact). Ms. Chapin did not vote to retain the services of Greiner while sitting as a member of the Authority between December 19, 1990, and May 22, 1991 or at any other time. (Stipulated Fact). Ms. Chapin has voted on the payment of invoices submitted by Greiner to the Authority. (Stipulated Fact). Andrew Chapin was an employee of Greiner. Andrew Chapin did not, however, hold any position of control of Greiner. Nor did he own a material interest in Greiner. The May 9, 1991, Newspaper Article. On May 9, 1991, an article was printed in The Orlando Sentinel (hereinafter referred to as the "May 9th Article"). (Stipulated Fact). The article was printed under the title "Pignone's interest in connector questioned." The article, as the title suggests, discussed whether another member of the Orange County Commission, Fran Pignone, had a conflict of interest with an Orange County road project. The May 9th Article included the following statement concerning Ms. Chapin: And Chapin noted in her letter that she tries to "tread very carefully" because she sits on the agency proposing to build the road and her son Andrew works for an engineering firm that is designing one of the interchanges. Mr. Couch read the May 9th Article. Based upon the May 9th Article, Mr. Couch believed that Ms. Chapin may have been involved in some impropriety as a member of the Authority. (Stipulated Fact). Mr. Couch's Ethics Complaint. After reading the May 9th Article, Mr. Couch telephoned the Florida Commission on Ethics and requested complaint forms. On May 13, 1991, Mr. Couch filed a Complaint against Ms. Chapin (hereinafter referred to as the "Complaint") with the Florida Commission on Ethics. (Stipulated Fact). The Complaint contained the following allegations: Chairman Chapin violated Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes by serving on the Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority and voting to retain the services of an engineering company that employs her son as admitted by Chairman Chapin in Orlando Sentinel dated week of May 6-10th. The allegations in the Complaint were based solely upon the information contained in the May 9th Article. In particular, Mr. Couch relied upon the paragraph of the May 9th Article quoted in finding of fact 14. The May 9th Article does not support the allegations contained in the Complaint. The May 9th Article does not indicate that Ms. Chapin voted to retain Greiner. The May 9th Article suggests just the opposite. It is stated in the article that Ms. Chapin "tries to 'tread very carefully' . . ." because of her son's work for Greiner. At the time the Complaint was filed, Mr. Couch did not know when Ms. Chapin had become a member of the Authority or when Greiner was retained by the Authority. (Stipulated Fact). Although Mr. Couch was aware generally of when Ms. Chapin was elected to the Orange County Commission, Mr. Couch was unaware at the time he filed the Complaint when Greiner had been retained by the Authority. Mr. Couch made no effort to obtain information to substantiate his Complaint other than the May 9th Article. (Stipulated Fact). Mr. Couch's Press Release. Simultaneously with the filing of the Complaint, a document (hereinafter referred to as the "Press Release") was provided to several radio and television stations in Orange County, weekly newspapers and The Orlando Sentinel: At the top of the Press Release, the following heading appeared: "Orange County Republican Executive Committee". The heading was followed by an address and telephone number. It was indicated that Mr. Couch should be contacted "for further information" and his telephone number was listed. The Press Release was titled "Republican Party Files Ethics Complaints Against Chapin/Pignone." The Press Release indicated that Mr. Couch had filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Ethics against Ms. Chapin (and Ms. Pignone) and indicated: Orange County Chairman Linda Chapin is being charged with violating the Government in the Sunshine law by meeting with fellow Commissioner Fran Pignone privately and allegedly discussing county business and by serving on the Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority and voting to retain the services of an engineering company that employs her son. The Press Release contained the following quoted statements from Mr. Couch: "These commissioners have betrayed the public trust by meeting behind closed doors without the benefit of their having either the public or the press present to protect our interests," stated Couch. "Linda Chapin voting for the firm that employs her son represents the very worst type of backroom, financial impropriety I have seen in some time," Couch continued. "We need a full and public investigation of these activities," Couch concluded. Although Mr. Couch appeared to have a difficult time during the final hearing remembering how the Press Release came into being, his deposition testimony and other evidence during the final hearing indicates that he created the first draft of the Press Release on a personal computer. The Press Release was then provided to a public relations consultant and political ally, Douglas M. Guetzloe, of Advantage Consultants, Inc. Mr. Guetzloe finalized and ultimately distributed the Press Release. The precise quotes from Mr. Couch contained in the Press Release were created by Mr. Guetzloe but were based upon general comments from Mr. Couch and were ultimately approved by Mr. Couch. The Press Release was prepared at the request, direction and with the approval of Mr. Couch. Mr. Couch was provided a copy of the Press Release for review before it was distributed. Mr. Couch approved the Press Release or it would not have been distributed. Mr. Couch directed that his name and telephone number be included on the Press Release. Mr. Couch also disclosed the filing of the Complaint with television stations (Channels 2, 6 and 9) in Orange County, radio station WDBO and The Orlando Sentinel. Mr. Couch's Purpose in Filing the Complaint. Mr. Couch testified that he filed the Complaint against Ms. Chapin because he was a concerned citizen who just wanted the proper authorities to check out Ms. Chapin's actions with regard to Greiner and determine if there were any improprieties. This testimony is not credible. Mr. Couch is the Chairman of the Republican Executive Committee in Orange County. He was elected to that position in February, 1991. Mr. Couch has been a member of the Republican Executive Committee since 1988. As characterized by Mr. Guetzloe, Mr. Couch was playing "adversarial politics". Mr. Couch, a Republican, filed the Complaint and issued the Press Release in an effort to criticize a member of the opposition party, a Democrat. Mr. Couch used the Commission for his political purposes, charging Ms. Chapin had committed a violation of Florida law, when there was no basis for his allegations. Mr. Couch was motivated because of his belief that Ms. Chapin was "getting too big for her britches". He believed that "something had to be done about it." Mr. Couch's actions evidenced a malicious intent to injure the reputation of Ms. Chapin. The Complaint was frivolous and without basis in law or fact. Legal Representation of Ms. Chapin and Disposition of the Complaint. The Orange County Attorney's office represented Ms. Chapin before the Commission. There was no written agreement between Ms. Chapin and Orange County concerning her representation by the Orange County Attorney. Mr. Wilkes, the Orange County Attorney at the time the Complaint was filed, determined that the charges against Ms. Chapin in the Complaint arose out of her position on the Orange County Commission. Mr. Wilkes made this determination based upon the fact that Ms. Chapin served on the Authority by virtue of Section 348.753, Florida Statutes, which provides that the Chairman of the Orange County Commission will serve as an ex officio member of the Authority. Mr. Wilkes also concluded that the actions complained of in the Complaint were actions which would have been taken in Ms. Chapin's official position. Based upon the conclusions described in finding of fact 38, Mr. Wilkes concluded that Ms. Chapin was entitled to representation by his office pursuant to Section 706 of the Orange County Code. Ms. Chapin made no request for this representation. Mr. Wilkes' conclusion was reasonable and, although Mr. Couch has questioned the propriety of Orange County providing representation for Ms. Chapin, the evidence on this question was unrefuted. On or about July 16, 1991, after Ms. Chapin received a copy of the Complaint, a Motion for Summary Judgment and Attorney Fees was prepared and filed with the Commission by the Orange County Attorney's Office. On September 18, 1991, the Commission entered a Public Report and Order Dismissing Complaint. Pursuant to this Order the Complaint was determined to be legally deficient and was dismissed. A Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs dated October 14, 1991, was filed by the Orange County Attorney's Office on behalf of Ms. Chapin. Cost and Attorney's Fees Incurred. The Orange County Attorney at the time, Thomas J. Wilkes, and Joseph L. Passiatore, an Assistant Orange County Attorney, represented Ms. Chapin before the Commission. Ms. Chapin's attorneys performed research (factual and legal), reviewed and initiated correspondence, reviewed orders of the Commission, took the deposition of Mr. Couch and prepared and participated in the final hearing of this matter. Mr. Wilkes invested 22.9 hours through October 14, 1991, and 1 hour subsequent to October 14, 1991, representing Ms. Chapin in this matter. Through September 20, 1991, the date the order dismissing the Complaint was received, Mr. Passiatore invested 25 hours representing Ms. Chapin in this matter. Subsequent to September 20, 1991, Mr. Passiatore spent 20.5 hours through January 6, 1992, representing Ms. Chapin in this matter (preparing a draft of the Petition, conducting discovery and preparing for the final hearing of this case). Between January 6, 1992, and the date of the final hearing of this case, Mr. Passiatore spent 20 hours preparing for the final hearing. Ms. Chapin is seeking reimbursement for 22.9 hours of Mr. Wilkes' services and 45.5 hours of Mr. Passiatore's services. The 22.9 hours spent by Mr. Wilkes and the 45.5 hours spent by Mr. Passiatore in the defense of Ms. Chapin constituted reasonable amounts of time. Motions for summary judgement are neither specifically authorized by the Commission's rules nor prohibited. The filing of the motion for summary judgement was, however, prudent and reasonable in light of the frivolous nature of the Complaint and the potential harm to Ms. Chapin's reputation caused by the issuance of the Press Release. A reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Wilkes' and Mr. Passiatore's services to Ms. Chapin is $175.00 per hour. Based upon an hourly rate of $175.00 per hour, the 22.9 hours invested by Mr. Wilkes and the 45.5 hours invested by Mr. Passiatore would result in total attorney's fees of $11,970.00. Mr. Wilkes and Mr. Passiatore were not paid $175.00 an hour for their services. They received their normal salaries as the Orange County Attorney and an Assistant Orange County Attorney, respectively. Mr. Wilkes and Mr. Passiatore were paid their salaries during the time that they represented Ms. Chapin, and all costs associated with this matter were paid, out of the Orange County General Fund. Any recovery of attorney's fees and costs in this case will deposited in the Orange County General Fund. The evidence failed to prove what Mr. Wilkes' and Mr. Passiatore's salaries were. As of February 11, 1992, reasonable costs of $661.90 had been incurred by the Orange County Attorney's Office in defense of Ms. Chapin. If Ms. Chapin had been determined to have violated the law as alleged in the Complaint, she would have been required to reimburse Orange County for the cost incurred by Orange County in defending her. The evidence failed to prove that, at the time of the final hearing of this matter, Ms. Chapin was liable for or subject to any amount of attorney's fees or costs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Ms. Chapin's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 4. 2 6. 3 7-8. 4 9. 5-6 10. 7 12. 8 17. 9 13, 18 and 22. 10 14 and 19. 11 19. 12 22. 13 20-21. 14 21. 15-16 Hereby accepted. 17 16. 18-21 Hereby accepted. 22 34. 23 24 and 27-28. 24 25. 25 27-29. 26 27-28. 27 29. 28 28. 29 23. 30 See 23e and 26. 31 Hereby accepted. 32 30. 33 Hereby accepted. 34 37. 35 40. 36 41. 37 42. 38 44-48. 39-40 45. 41 49. 42 46. 43 47. 44 48. 45 49. 46 51. 47 56. 48 Hereby accepted. 49 54. 50 54. Mr. Couch's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2. 2 4. 3 17. 4 41. 5 42. Not relevant to this proceeding. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 8 37. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Joseph L. Passiatore Assistant Orange County Attorney Orange County Administration Center Post Office Box 1393 Orlando, Florida 32802-1393 Marvin Couch 974 Pinelli Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Bonnie J. Williams Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105 Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of Section 104.051(2), Florida Statutes (2002), by willfully neglecting to perform her duties as alleged in the 55-count Order of Probable Cause and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.1
Findings Of Fact THE PARTIES Petitioner is created by Section 106.24, Florida Statutes, and has the authority conferred upon it by the Florida Election Code. Respondent was elected as the Broward County SOE in November 2000. She was sworn into office in January 2001. Respondent was serving as the Broward County SOE for the 2002 Primary. Respondent was suspended from office by Governor Jeb Bush in November 2003. At the time of the final hearing in this proceeding, Respondent was not working, had little equity in any asset, and owed money to her attorneys and to various credit card companies. She was borrowing money from relatives to meet monthly expenses. BCSOE OFFICE At the time of the 2002 Primary, the Broward County SOE Office (BCSOE Office) had a main office in the Broward County Governmental Center (BCGC), six regional offices, and a facility referred to as the Voting Equipment Center (VEC). Respondent had her main office in the BCGC. The VEC was essentially a warehouse at which voting equipment and supplies were stored. The six regional offices were spread throughout Broward County. At the time of the 2002 Primary, there were more that 60 full- time employees of the BCSOE Office.3 Walter Foeman served as Respondent’s Deputy SOE for the 2002 Primary. Respondent replaced the employee who had served as the Deputy SOE for Respondent’s predecessor in office. Pat Nesbit served as chief of the Poll Worker’s Department. Ms. Nesbit had the responsibility of recruiting and training poll workers. Ms. Nesbit was a veteran employee of the BCSOE Office of approximately 12 years.4 Mr. Foeman was Ms. Nesbit’s direct supervisor. Barbara Adams was the chief financial officer for the BCSOE Office. Carol Hill was a director in the BCSOE office. Petitioner attempted to establish that Respondent’s management style and her hiring practices created dissension among the employees of the BCSOE Office so that it became a matter of us (the employees from Respondent’s predecessor in office) versus them (the new employees hired by Respondent). That attitude did exist to a degree within the office and was exacerbated by staff turnover, including supervisors who had served Respondent’s predecessor in office. However, Petitioner did not prove that the negative attitude within the office was a contributing factor to the 23 precincts opening late or the 32 precincts that failed to comply with Governor Bush’s Executive Order. As will be demonstrated below, Respondent’s management style of totally relying on staff contributed to the problems with the 2002 Primary that are at issue in this proceeding. PRE-ELECTION PLANNING The 2002 Primary represented a considerable challenge for Respondent, who was relatively inexperienced. As a result of legislative and congressional redistricting, the number of precincts in Broward County went from 619 for the 2000 election to 809 for the 2002 election. For the 2002 election there were approximately 500 polling places throughout the county.5 New touch-screen voting equipment was utilized for the first time in the primary election, which required training of staff and poll workers. That training was conducted. These voting machines replaced the infamous punch card ballots that had been used in the 2000 Presidential election. For the first time provisional ballots were utilized. A provisional ballot would be issued to an individual when his or her name could not be located in the precinct register. The provisional ballot would be counted only if it was subsequently verified that the voter was in the proper precinct. While the use of provisional ballots required training for poll workers, there was no evidence that the use of provisional ballots delayed the opening of any precincts or contributed to any precinct’s failure to comply with Governor Bush’s Executive Order. Each county is divided geographically into voting precincts. Each precinct has its own poll workers, including a precinct clerk and a deputy precinct clerk. For the 2002 Primary (809 precincts and approximately 500 polling places), Respondent’s staff determined that a total of 4,941 precinct poll workers were needed to conduct the election. Poll worker recruitment and training is an essential part of conducting an election. Ms. Nesbit and her department recruited experienced poll workers using a computer data base of poll workers who had worked prior elections and recruited new poll workers at community functions and from business, educational, and governmental entities. There was insufficient evidence to establish that there were too few poll workers recruited or that the poll workers were inadequately trained. The poll workers were provided appropriate checklists and appropriate instructions as to how and when to report for duty. To prepare for the 2002 Primary, weekly staff meetings were held to assess the BCSOE Office’s readiness for the election. On the Friday before the Tuesday election, Respondent met with all the managers in the office. Based on the reports that were provided, Respondent reasonably concluded that the office was ready for the election. The VEC is responsible for putting together a box of supplies that is referred to as the “gray box.” Included in the gray box are various signs, ballots, envelopes, and other supplies that are needed by the poll workers. The VEC is also responsible for placing additional voting materials into what is referred to as the precinct’s “blue bag”. The blue bag contains materials that are essential to the opening of the poll. Among other items, the blue bag contains the poll register (which is a list of the precinct’s eligible voters), the precinct’s Personal Electronic Ballots (which are necessary to activate the precinct’s voting machines), and a checklist (which the precinct clerks are to follow to make sure that the election is properly conducted). The precinct clerk is in charge of the precinct’s polling place the day of the election, but his or her official duties begin the day before election day. The VEC is responsible for arranging delivery of the voting equipment and the gray box to each precinct at its polling place prior to election day. A trucking company was hired for this purpose for the September 2002 primary election. The precinct clerk is responsible for visiting the polling place the day prior to the election to verify that the equipment and the gray box have been delivered. In the gray box is a white form that the precinct clerk is responsible for taking to the regional office when the clerk picks up the blue bag. The precinct clerk uses the form to verify that the correct number of voting machines and all required materials in the gray box have been delivered to the precinct’s polling place. The precinct clerk also verifies that he or she will be able to open the facility on election day. The VEC is responsible for delivering all blue bags to the appropriate regional site. The precinct clerk is responsible for going to the appropriate regional site to pick up the blue bag the day before the election. The precinct clerk must empty the contents of the blue bag while at the regional center and, using a checklist, verify in front of a regional office staff person that all items that are required to be in the blue bag have been included. If all items are present, the precinct clerk and a regional center staff worker sign the checklist and the precinct clerk keeps the bag until it is time to open the polls the next morning. Any item missing from the blue bag should be secured before the precinct clerk leaves the regional office or arrangements should be made to deliver the missing item(s) to the polling place the next morning in time for the precinct clerk to open the precinct for voting by 7:00 a.m. Pick up of the blue bags for the 2002 Primary was to be between 1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. for one regional center and between 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. at the other regional centers on the day before the election. The precinct clerk is responsible for opening and closing the poll and for overseeing the vote while the poll is open. The assistant precinct clerk performs the clerk’s duties if the clerk is absent or unable to perform his or her duties. The assistant clerk also answers the phone, deals with the public, and generally assists in the conduct of the election. CANCELLATIONS BY PRECINCT CLERKS On Friday, September 6, 2002, Ms. Nesbit learned that some individuals who had agreed to serve as precinct clerks had subsequently declined to serve. Ms. Nesbit made reasonable efforts to replace the precinct clerks who she knew had cancelled as of that Friday. On the day before the 2002 Primary, Ms. Nesbit and her staff spent the day talking to various poll workers about various problems. Ms. Nesbit heard during the day from more than one precinct clerk that there were long waiting lines at the regional centers (up to two hours) and that some precinct clerks had become frustrated and had left without picking up the precinct’s blue bag from the precinct’s regional site. Ms. Nesbit received no communication from any regional site that blue bags were not being picked up by precinct clerks and she did not know that those blue bags were being returned to the VEC until approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening when Damian Robinson, an employee of the BCSOE Office’s outreach department, told her that approximately 50 blue bags had been returned to the VEC because the blue bag had not been picked up at the regional site by a precinct clerk. Mr. Robinson also told her that a fax had been sent to her with a list of the precincts whose blue bag had not been picked up and a list of the precincts whose blue bag was incomplete when it was picked up. Ms. Nesbit had been working all day in an area that was not close to the fax machine and was unaware that the fax had been sent. Ms. Nesbit retrieved the fax, which was not introduced as an exhibit. Ms. Nesbit testified that there were 30 to 35 precincts listed on the fax, but she did not remember the number of precincts on each list. By midnight, there were approximately 15 blue bags at the VEC that had not been picked up. The total number of incomplete bags that had been picked up was not established and it was not established what was missing from each bag. If an essential item, such as a poll register, was missing from a blue bag, the precinct clerk could not open the precinct’s polling place for voting until someone from the BCSOE Office delivered the missing item to the precinct’s polling place. Ms. Nesbit saw Mr. Foeman and Ms. Adams shortly after she saw Mr. Robinson and read the fax. Ms. Nesbit gave the information she had received to Mr. Foeman and Ms. Adams. Ms. Nesbit proposed to Ms. Adams and Mr. Foeman that sufficient staff of the BCSOE Office be called that night and be ordered to appear at the VEC the following morning at 5:00 a.m. for the purpose of delivering each undelivered bag and missing material to the appropriate precinct. Ms. Nesbit contemplated that poll workers (other than the missing precinct clerk) would be present at the polling place and that one of those workers could substitute as the precinct clerk. Ms. Adams informed Ms. Nesbit that they were not going to call BCSOE Office employees at that time of night. As she and Mr. Foeman turned and left Ms. Nesbit, Ms. Adams said to Mr. Foeman: “We’ll take care of this.” Ms. Nesbit received no further instructions from any of her supervisors that night. Respondent returned to her home at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the day before the 2002 Primary. When she left, she knew that some precinct clerks had cancelled, but she relied totally on Ms. Nesbit and four employees under Ms. Nesbit’s supervision, to resolve the problem. Shortly after Respondent returned home, Mr. Riley informed her by telephone that approximately 15 blue bags had been returned to the VEC and that a news reporter had contacted him about the matter. Respondent’s reaction was to try to contact a fellow SOE for advice. After several calls, Respondent spoke with Gertrude Walker, an experienced SOE from St. Lucie County, Florida. After Respondent told her about the undelivered blue bags, Ms. Walker told Respondent that she had a serious problem and that she should immediately make arrangements to have staff available to deliver the blue bags to the appropriate precinct and to make sure the precinct opened on time. The telephone call between Respondent and Ms. Walker occurred around midnight on the eve of the election. Ms. Walker specifically advised Respondent to wake staff up and have them ready for action the next morning. Respondent knew about the problems with the undelivered bags for almost three hours before she talked to Ms. Walker. Why Respondent felt the need to verify with another SOE that the undelivered blue bags constituted a serious problem was not clear. Why she did not follow Ms. Walker’s advice was also not clear.6 Instead, Respondent tried to contact Mr. Foeman at his office and at his home. When she could not reach him, she left a voice message ordering him to make sure that all precincts opened on time. There was no evidence that Respondent talked to Ms. Adams or Ms. Nesbit that evening. Ms. Adams called Linda Levinson, the BCSOE Office Assistant Director of Finance and Administration, at 4:00 a.m. the morning of the 2002 Primary and ordered her to report to the VEC immediately. Ms. Adams was Ms. Levinson’s direct supervisor. As will be discussed below, Ms. Levinson helped deliver blue bags to precincts that morning. POLLS MUST OPEN AT 7:00 A.M. Section 100.011(1), Florida Statutes, regulates the opening and closing times for polls as follows: The polls shall be open at the voting places at 7:00 a.m. on the day of the election, and shall be kept open until 7:00 p.m., of the same day, and the time shall be regulated by the customary time in standard use in the county seat of the locality. Respondent knew that polls had to be open at 7:00 a.m. on the day of the election. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER On September 10, 2002, Governor Bush entered the following Executive Order Number 02-248: WHEREAS, today, September 10, 2002, is the regularly-scheduled date for the conduct of primary elections throughout the state; and WHEREAS, the Secretary of State has reported to me that there have been substantial delays in the opening of certain polling places in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties; and WHEREAS, today’s election is the first time that many election officials will have had an opportunity to implement the major technological and procedural changes mandated by the recent wholesale revision of our state’s election code; and WHEREAS, under this unique combination of circumstances, there is a possibility that certain residents of our state could be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to vote and that certain election officials will be unable to conduct an orderly election; and WHEREAS, in light of the above-described conditions and in an abundance of caution, the Secretary of State has requested that I order that polling places throughout the state remain open for an additional two hours beyond their regularly-scheduled closing times; and WHEREAS, the Secretary of State has made the request after consultation with the Attorney General of Florida, the President of the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections, and the chairmen of the Florida Republican and Democratic parties; NOW, THEREFORE, I JEB BUSH, as Governor of Florida, by virtue of the authority vested in me by Article IV, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution, by the Florida Elections Emergency Act, and by all other applicable laws, do hereby promulgate the following Executive Order, to take immediate effect: I hereby declare that, based on the above- described conditions, a state of emergency exists. In order to ensure maximum citizen participation in the electoral process and to protect the integrity of the electoral process, for today’s election all polling places in the state shall remain open for two hours beyond their regularly scheduled closing times. FACTS DEEMED ADMITTED7 A total of 24 precincts in Broward County failed to open by 7:00 a.m. on September 10, 2002. In the list that follows, the precinct number is followed by the time that morning that precinct actually opened with the exception of precinct 5K, whose opening time was unknown. The following list contains 23 precincts, with each listed in the order in which it appears as a separate count in the Petitioner’s Order of Probable Cause. In addition to the precincts listed below, Precinct 13D opened five minutes late. Precinct 13D is not included in the following list because no count in Petitioner’s Order of Probable Cause was based on the failure of that precinct to open at 7:00 a.m. Precinct 50C (8:00 a.m.) Precinct 10D (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 11D (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 5E (7:20 a.m.) Precinct 7E (8:45 a.m.) Precinct 3F (8:30 a.m.) Precinct 5K (unknown) Precinct 15K (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 9M (9:15 a.m.) Precinct 31N (7:55 a.m.) Precinct 38N (7:55 a.m.) Precinct 10R (7:30 a.m.) Precinct 18V (10:00 a.m.) Precinct 23V (8:00 a.m.) Precinct 11W (10:00 a.m.) Precinct 21X (7:15 a.m.) Precinct 22X (9:00 a.m.) Precinct 23X (7:10 a.m.) Precinct 32X (12:20 p.m.) Precinct 37X (8:30 a.m.) Precinct 62X (11:00 a.m.) Precinct 63X (8:30 a.m.) Precinct 65X (11:00 a.m.) The following 32 Broward County precincts failed to comply with Executive Order Number 02-248 by failing to remain open for two hours beyond their regularly scheduled closing time of 7:00 p.m. on September 10, 2002: 13A, 17A, 19C, 22C, 24C, 21E, 1G, 3G, 6G, 11J, 19J, 24J, 15L, 16L, 27M, 38M, 40N, 51Q, 36R, 75R, 1T, 12T, 7U, 34V, 35V, 36V, 44V, 8W, 12Y, 14Y, 7Z, and 23J. These precincts are listed in the order they appear in Counts 24-55 of the Order of Probable Cause. In addition to the foregoing, the following facts were deemed admitted based on Respondent’s failure to respond to Petitioner’s First Request for Admissions: Thirteen precincts opened late due to a lack of election supplies and the remainder opened late due to a lack of personnel. Because of delays in opening the polls in Broward and one other county on September 10, 2002, Governor Bush issued Executive Order Number 02-248 requiring all polling places in the State of Florida to remain open for an additional two hours beyond their regularly-scheduled closing time or until 9:00 p.m. The Broward County SOE Office received Governor Bush’s Executive Order at 3:41 p.m. Miriam Oliphant instructed her staff not to say anything about the Executive Order until she gave further instructions. Respondent, upon receiving the Executive Order at 3:41 p.m., assigned Rick Riley, an independent contractor hired by the SOE’s Office, the task of writing a press release to the person in charge of each precinct. Mr. Riley made the final revisions to the press release at 4:49 p.m. after Walter Foeman completed his last review. It took from 3:41 p.m. until approximately 6:15 p.m. for Miriam Oliphant’s staff and volunteers to begin notifying the [809] precincts.[8] The following problems occurred at various precincts: 19 precincts could not run a zero tape 1 precinct had incorrect time precinct had incorrect date precinct locations were unable to select [political] parties 2 precincts did not have an ADA voting unit 4 precincts did not have a cellular phone 6 precincts did not have registers 23 precinct clerks did not pick up supplies 2 precincts did not receive communication package or activation card BLUE BAG DELIVERY The scene at the VEC was chaotic on the morning of the election with no one, including Respondent, taking charge or attempting to organize the bag delivery in a rational manner. Respondent testified that she panicked that morning because she was very angry with her staff, who she believed had let her down. Shortly before 6:00 a.m., Respondent ordered Mr. Foeman to get the blue bags and other materials delivered without giving further instructions and without devising a rational plan for such delivery. Ms. Levinson delivered three blue bags and opened three precincts in the Pembroke Pines area that morning. She was not instructed where to go and got lost. Ms. Levinson opened her last precinct around noon on the day of the election. Mr. Riley was recruited to deliver blue bags. He could not testify to how many he delivered, where he delivered them, or when he delivered them. He could not testify that the precincts to which he delivered opened by 7:00 a.m. Respondent delivered blue bags that morning. She was in a van with her driver, Mike Lindsay (a representative of the Department of State, Division of Elections), Respondent’s attorney, and Jimmy Davis (an employee of BCSOE Office outreach program). Respondent’s group did not deliver the last blue bag until shortly after noon on the day of the election. There was no evidence as to whether the other three blue bags were delivered in time for the precincts to open at 7:00 a.m. Respondent’s group had difficulty locating at least one precinct. Respondent could not testify whether her group had a map or accurate driving directions to each precinct. Michelle Feinberg was a precinct clerk for a precinct in Plantation for the 2002 Primary. When Ms. Feinberg picked up her precinct’s blue bag from the regional center the day before the election she inventoried the bag and discovered that it lacked essential voting material (including the precinct register). Staff at the regional center told her that the missing material would be delivered to her precinct in time for her to timely open the poll. That voting material was not delivered to the precinct on the morning of the election in time for the precinct to open by 7:00 a.m. The poll opened approximately 30 minutes late because the voting materials were not delivered on time. There was insufficient evidence to identify the other employees who delivered blue bags and other materials to the various precincts. Respondent knew shortly after 9:00 p.m. on September 9, 2002, that approximately 15 blue bags had not been picked up by the precinct clerk. She knew that the precinct could not open without the blue bag. She also should have suspected that each precinct clerk who failed to pick up the precinct’s blue bag would likely not show up for duty the next day. Respondent knew that she was mandated by statute to open all precincts for voting at 7:00 a.m. the next day. After learning of the problem with the blue bags, Respondent failed to take reasonable action either the evening before the election or the morning of the election to ensure that each blue bag and other required voting material would be delivered to the appropriate precinct. Likewise, she failed to take reasonable action either the evening before the election or the morning of the election to ensure that the precincts whose clerk had not picked up the precinct’s blue bag the day prior to the election would be staffed with a precinct clerk. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER The BCSOE Office received Governor Bush’s Executive Order 02-248 at 3:41 p.m. on the day of the election. Respondent immediately instructed Mr. Riley to prepare a memorandum to the poll workers pertaining to the extended hours for the polls and basic instructions on how to close the polls. Respondent further instructed her staff not to call precincts until they had the memorandum. Mr. Riley made the last revision of the memorandum at 4:49 p.m. It was not until 6:04 p.m. that Respondent gave the memorandum to Ms. Nesbit and instructed her and assigned staff to read the memorandum to each precinct clerk. The following is the memorandum (Memorandum): Due to delays in the opening of certain polls, voting for the September 10, 2002, primary election has been extended by Governor Jeb Bush, for all polling locations throughout the State of Florida (pursuant to Executive Order 02-248), for an additional two hours beyond their regularly-scheduled closing time, from 7 pm till 9 pm. After 7 pm the following voting procedures will be in effect. When the Personal Electronic Ballots (PEB) is [sic] inserted, the herein below listed questions will appear: Close menu options, follow the sequence below. Close terminal Lock terminal Press no For each voter after 7 pm, and until 9 pm the poll worker that is activating the ballot shall press the box designated for no, and the ballot page will appear. Please due (sic) not press the close terminal until 9 pm. All terminals should be closed using the green master Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB) at 9 pm. Carol Hill and her staff were responsible for copying the Memorandum and for dividing the precincts into call lists. Each participating staff member was given a copy of the Memorandum and a list of precincts with telephone numbers to call. It took approximately ten minutes for Carol Hill’s staff to copy the memorandum and to make the calling assignments. Errors were made while making the calling assignments. Some of the precincts were on the calling lists more than once while other precincts were omitted. As a result, some precincts received two calls from staff while others received none. After approving the contents of the Memorandum, Respondent had no further involvement with advising the 809 precincts that the Governor had extended the voting day by two hours. Respondent did not participate in the actual calling of the precincts or in making the call assignments. Respondent testified that she did not know that some polls had closed at 7:00 p.m. until the next day. There was no rational explanation for the time that elapsed from the time the BCSOE Office received the Executive Order (3:41 p.m.) until the time staff began contacting poll workers (6:15 p.m.). Respondent knew that she was responsible for ensuring that all precincts complied with the Executive Order. Respondent abdicated that responsibility to her staff without providing any oversight. Petitioner established that some of the 32 precincts that failed to comply with the Executive Order did so because the precinct clerk was not notified of the Executive Order, despite having an operable telephone.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that finds Respondent guilty of two violations of Section 104.051(2), Florida Statutes, and imposes against her an administrative fine in the total amount of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated various election laws and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician. For many years, he practiced as a heart surgeon in Springfield, Illinois. After developing a hand tremor resulting from a medical condition, Respondent relocated to Naples, where he had vacationed for several years. In early 1996, after moving to Naples, Respondent opened a walk-in clinic in Naples. At all material times, Respondent has worked at the clinic about 60 hours weekly. Respondent has never assumed responsibility for financial matters or record-keeping at his home or in his office. At home, these responsibilities are borne by his wife of 28 years. At the office, these responsibilities are assumed by his office manager. Prior to fall 1996, Respondent had never had any significant experience in politics. However, dissatisfied with aspects of the training and qualifications of certain personnel who responded to emergency medical calls, Respondent decided to run in the fall 1996 election for Seat 3 of the North Naples Fire and Rescue Commission. On July 1, 1996, Respondent obtained a "candidate packet" from the Filing Officer of the Office of the Collier County Supervisor of Elections. The packet contained considerable information, including treasurer's report forms; a list of key dates, including filing deadlines; a Division of Elections Candidate Handbook; copies of Chapters 99, 105, and 106, Florida Statutes; itemized contribution forms; and itemized expenditure forms. Without studying any of the information, Respondent signed and filed a Statement of Candidate on the same day that he picked up the candidate packet. The signed Statement of Candidate acknowledges that Respondent received, read, and understood the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. On the same day, Respondent signed a form appointing himself as his campaign treasurer and designating The Huntington Bank as his campaign depository. The campaign bank account, which was a checking account, was titled, "Dr. Robert C. McGann Campaign Account for North Naples Fire District" and bore account number 02628208279. The only authorized signatories on the account were Respondent and his wife. The same bank also handled the checking account for Respondent's medical practice. On July 18, 1996, Respondent signed and filed a form titled, "Acknowledgment by Candidate." In this form, Respondent acknowledged that he had reviewed and understood various items, which he initialed. These initialed items included two items concerning the deadlines for filing campaign treasurer reports. On the same day, the Filing Officer provided Respondent with a two-sided document titled, "State of Florida 1996 Calendar and Election Dates." This document summarizes the deadlines for filing election reports and provides report-filing deadlines. For the First Primary, the filing deadlines are: August 2 for the period from July 1 through July 26; August 16 for the period from July 27 through August 9; and August 30 for the period from August 10 through August 29. For the Second Primary, the filing deadlines are: September 13 for the period from August 30 through September 6 and September 27 for the period from September 7 through September 26. The State of Florida 1996 Calendar and Election Dates requires that each candidate whose candidacy terminates as of the Second Primary must file his or her final report by December 30, 1996. Respondent filed six campaign treasurer reports. He signed each of the reports and filed each of the reports on time. The first allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent failed to timely deposit timely campaign contributions. Petitioner proved that Respondent failed to timely deposit campaign contributions on several occasions. However, Petitioner failed to prove that any of these failures was willful. The modest amounts do not invite a finding of willfulness, nor do the identities of the contributors, none of whom appears to be someone whom Respondent would wish to hide from public scrutiny. The preponderance of the evidence suggests only that Respondent's failures to timely deposit campaign contributions were due to his carelessness, and nothing in the record suggests that this carelessness was studied, purposeful, or otherwise calculated to avoid the requirements of the law. The second allegation is that Respondent failed to include his political party affiliation in a political advertisement. Petitioner proved that Respondent published at least two political advertisements that failed to disclose his political party affiliation. However, Petitioner failed to prove that these nondisclosures were willful. The nondisclosures occurred during the Republican primary elections. Failing to alert potential voters of Respondent's political affiliation could only hurt Respondent, as potential voters who found his campaign literature appealing might not be able to find the particular race in which Respondent was involved. In a larger sense, concealing his Republican affiliation hurt Respondent because he was running in a largely Republican area. The third allegation is that Respondent failed to use, in his political advertisements, the word "for" between his name and the office for which he was running. The stated purpose of this requirement is to alert potential voters that a candidate is not an incumbent. Petitioner proved that Respondent published at least two political advertisements that failed to include the word "for" between his name and the office for which he was running. However, Petitioner failed to prove that the failures were willful. The first advertisement ran during the First Primary, which included Respondent, the incumbent, and another challenger. The advertisement showed the incumbent's name followed by: "Incumbent- committed to the status quo." The advertisement showed the other challenger's name followed by: "Union Candidate." The advertisement showed Respondent's name followed by: "Candidate for Change." The whole thrust of Respondent's campaign in the First Primary was to change the policies of the North Naples Fire and Rescue Commission. Emphasizing his outsider status through the use of "for" would have served this purpose. The omission is thus due to neglect, not willfullness. The second advertisement evidently ran during the Second Primary because it mentions only the challenger, who eventually won this primary. The advertisement again emphasizes the outsider status of Respondent as an agent for change. Given this campaign theme, it is impossible to infer willfulness, rather than carelessness, in the failure of this advertisement to include "for" between Respondent's name and the position that he was seeking. The fourth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent made expenditures from campaign funds other than by a check drawn on his campaign depository. Petitioner proved that Respondent made the following expenditures with funds not drawn from his campaign depository: $23 and $110 to Home Depot, $29 to Sam's Club, $6.15 to Mary Morgan, $25 to Office Depot, $30.60 to Office Depot, and $28 to Kinko's. Respondent reported each of these expenditures, but the campaign checking account does not reveal payments of these sums. However, Petitioner failed to prove that these acts were willful. With the exception of $6.15 given to Mary Morgan, the recipients of these sums are commercial establishments that provide goods and services of obvious usefulness to a political campaign. Mary Morgan is the Supervisor of Elections, whose office received $6.15, apparently in payment of some filing fee. Also, these relatively modest sums qualify as petty cash expenditures. The fifth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent signed a check drawn on the campaign depository without sufficient funds on deposit in the campaign depository to pay the full amount of the check, to honor all outstanding checks, and to pay all previously authorized but unpaid expenses. Petitioner proved that Respondent's wife, who was an authorized signatory on the campaign checking account, signed a $507.15 check to Sir Speedy. The check is dated August 1, although the evidence does not establish that Sir Speedy received the check on that date. However, the evidence does establish that Sir Speedy presented the check for payment on August 6, at which time the bank honored the check and paid Sir Speedy $507.15. The bank statement for the campaign checking account reveals that the bank credited the account with a $500 deposit on August 2, leaving a balance of $2.30. The next activity was August 6, when the bank debited the account for the Sir Speedy check in the amount of $507.15, leaving a negative balance of $4.85, which increased the next day to a negative balance of $7.35 after the application of monthly checking fees. Although Respondent is responsible for the acts of his wife, as his agent in making this expenditure, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent or his wife willfully delivered a campaign check without sufficient funds. If this had been their intent, their effort was stymied by the bank's honoring the check. In fact, they had no such intent. Although they probably did not know that this check would cause a negative balance of a few dollars, it is more likely that they delivered the check knowing that the bank would honor the check because the account had sufficient funds or, if it did not, it was short only a few dollars and the bank, consistent with its policy on their accounts, would nonetheless honor the check. Additional evidence that this was bank policy is the absence of any overdraft fee on the August or September bank statement. The sixth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent failed to report a contribution required by law to be reported. Petitioner proved that Respondent received numerous contributions that he failed to report, including $500 from himself on August 2, $1000 from himself on August 19, $100 from Barry or Diane Flagg on August 16, $50 from Gordon Radcliff in late September, $50 from Thomas Jewell on September 26, $50 from David Grieder on September 26, and $100 from Peter or Carol Boyd on September 26. The evidence in support of the allegation that Respondent failed to report a contribution consists of seven contributions over a seven-week period. These omissions totaled $1850 out of a total reported contributions of $9414.75 (including $4500 in loans from Respondent); in other words, Respondent failed to report nearly 20 percent of the contributions. Bank records for the campaign checking account record only $6820 in deposits. Reporting contributions is arguably the most basic requirement of the applicable law. Respondent's reports reveal a knowledge of the requirement to report contributions. Respondent even testified that he understood that he was required to report contributions, as well as expenditures. Although he reported numerous contributions, he failed to report a considerable amount of contributions under circumstances that reveal that this failure to report was willful. The seventh and eighth allegations are, respectively, that, "on six occasions" each, Respondent certified to the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete and falsely reported or failed to report information required by law. Petitioner has proved numerous inaccuracies and omissions in the campaign reports filed by Respondent. To the extent that the seventh and eighth allegations cover the sixth allegation, Petitioner has proved a willful violation, but the same acts and omissions cannot provide grounds for double discipline under two different statutes. To the extent the seventh and eighth allegations cover other acts and omissions, besides the mere failure to report contributions, Petitioner has failed to prove willfullness. To the contrary, the many inaccuracies and omissions (apart from the violations covered by the sixth allegation) again appear to be the product of Respondent's carelessness, rather than a studied attempt to avoid complying with the reporting requirements imposed by law. Petitioner infers willfullness from Respondent's failure to respond to six certified letters from the County filing officer alerting him to the deficiencies in his previously filed reports. The cited deficiencies consist mostly of 22 contributions or expenditures lacking a date, six contributions or expenditures lacking an address (i.e., one contributor for which Respondent previously supplied an address, Office Depot for which Respondent supplied an address on a later report, the County Supervisor of Elections (twice; this is the employer of the filing officer), Kinko's in Naples, and Desk Top Results in Naples). There are two problems in using the unanswered letters as grounds for inferring willfullness. First, the letters ignore most of the deficiencies on which Petitioner relies. Most of these ignored items are facially evident, and the filing officer's failure to mention them does not assist Petitioner's effort in showing willfullness. Such items include the wrong reporting timeframes; the failure to identify the report as quarterly, first primary, etc.; and the failure to indicate whether the report is an original or amendment. Second, the letters only raise two claimed deficiencies--the failure to disclose dates and addresses for contributions and expenditures. Even as to these matters, the letters provide no basis for an inference of willfullness for several reasons. First, the filing officer sent all of the letters on the same date, December 6. The most recurring failing cited in the letters is the absence of dates for contributions and expenditures. The record suggests that Respondent's carelessness in recordkeeping rendered impossible any accurate amendment of his reports to add the dates. The situation might have been different if the filing officer had sent such a letter after Respondent had filed the first report without the required dates. As to that report, it would have been more likely that Respondent could have reconstructed the dates. As to subsequent reports, it is much more likely that the carelessness defense would have been unavailing, after Respondent would have received a specific demand for this information. Given the outcome of the case, the Administrative Law Judge has examined the sealed exhibit containing copies of Respondent's personal income tax returns for 1996 and 1997. There is no indication in these tax returns that a fine of $1000 would be excessive.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order imposing a $1000 fine against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael T. McGuckin Assistant General Counsel Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert B. McKay Carney & McKay 1140 Franklin Avenue, Suite 201 Garden City, New York 11530
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in this proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, and if so, the amount of such attorney's fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Gordon Sands (Petitioner or Mayor Sands), is and at all times material to this proceeding was mayor of the Town of Welaka, Florida (Town or Town of Welaka), having served in that position for four years. Initially, Petitioner was appointed mayor in May 1996, after the then-mayor resigned. In 1997, Petitioner ran unopposed for mayor and, in March 1999, he was re-elected. Respondent, Caron Speas (Respondent), is and has been a resident of the Town of Welaka for two years. Respondent, who has practiced law since 1981, considers herself a "watchdog" of the actions of the Town's local government. She is chair of and has been active in a local "political committee" currently known as Concerned Citizens for Public Integrity, Inc. Respondent's brother, Rand Speas, is also a resident of the Town of Welaka. During January to March 1999, Mr. Speas was running for a position on the Town Council at the request of his sister, Respondent. Mr. Speas lost his election campaign on March 3, 1999. During Mr. Speas' unsuccessful 1999 election campaign, Mayor Sands was running for re-election. Respondent was opposed to Petitioner's re-election bid and had actively opposed many of the official actions taken by Mayor Sands. Moreover, Respondent had openly expressed her dislike and dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Town of Welaka was governed and her opposition to the administration of Mayor Sands. On April 9, 1999, Respondent filed an amended ethics complaint (Amended Complaint) against Mayor Sands alleging that the mayor violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by orchestrating a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws in order to aid his re-election campaign. After an investigation and consideration of the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, the Ethics Commission issued an order finding that there was no probable cause to believe that the mayor had violated the Code of Ethics as alleged by Respondent and dismissing both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. In this case, Petitioner asserts a right to attorney's fees and costs by reason of Respondent's filing the Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint made against Mayor Sands, Respondent submitted an Amended Statement of Facts, which stated: AMENDED STATEMENT OF FACTS During the months from January 1999 to March 1999, said party [Mayor Sands] did violate Florida Statute [sic] 112.313(6) by orchestrating a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws for the purpose of aiding his re-election campaign. Said party did use his position as Mayor of the Town of Welaka (population approximately 600) to instruct the town clerk not to provide his political opponents with public records that contained information relating to campaign issues. On January 13, 1999, The Concerned Citizen's Group, a political committee opposing Mayor Sands [sic] bid for re-election, requested copies of very specific public records. The town clerk produced records which were wholly incomplete--rather than producing the audited financial statements that were requested, she produced only the balance sheets taken from the audited financial statements. When the deficiency was pointed out to her, she wrote a letter on February 16, 1999, improperly requesting a $100.00 deposit for the "extensive labor" involved in locating the records. When it was pointed out that she had already located the records because she copied the balance sheets from them, she finally had to accede to copying the audited financial statements that day. Over one month after they were requested. [sic] On January 22, 1999, The Concerned Citizen's Group, served a second written request for copies of very specific public records, to wit: grant applications. On February 16, 1999, the town clerk wrote the above- referenced letter improperly requesting a $100.00 deposit but did not object to the public nature of the records requested. When the $100.00 deposit was paid under protest, the records were nevertheless not forthcoming. One day before the election, The Concerned Citizen's Group was contacted and told it could pick up the records that afternoon. The records consisted of 11 pages for which the Concerned Citizen's Group was charged $66.50, or $6.60 per page. On January 22, 1999 Philip J. Cobb, campaign manager for Rand Speas, requested a copy of the Absentee Ballot Voter's List for the last two Welaka elections and did not receive the requested document until one day before the election. It was three pages long and he was charged 45 cents. On January 28, 1999, Edna Moore, a political opponent of the mayor, made a request for public records, (specifically: two ordinances, a permit, a receipt for equipment purchase, Minutes of a town council meeting, and employee work sheets for 4 months). Ms. Moore also received a letter requesting a $100.00 deposit, which she was unable to pay. The day after the election, Ms. Moore was told that her public records were ready for pick up. She was charged $39.75 for 115 copies, or 35 cents per page. On February 15, 1999, May Nigh, a member of the Concerned Citizen's Group, made a request for specific public records. Ms. Nigh also received a letter requesting a $100.00 deposit, which she was unable to pay. Ms. Nigh received the requested records a week after the election. The records consisted of 19 pages for which she was charged $31.25, or $1.64 per page. The excuses and explanations given for the delays in producing the above records were totally lacking in plausibility. Each of the persons who requested public records were [sic] told that the requests were either voluminous or could not be located and that the town clerk would have to work on the weekends to provide the records. The records that were ultimately produced were not "voluminous" and a former town employee, Irene Perrins, (who has a lifetime of experience in office work) has indicated verbally to the complainant that there is not enough work at town hall to keep the town clerk busy for more than 3 hours a day, let alone on the weekends. The statute cited by Respondent and the facts alleged in support of her charges comprise a specific accusation by Respondent that Mayor Sands, a public officer of the Town of Welaka, corruptly used his official position by orchestrating a willful and deliberate violation of public records laws in order to secure a special privilege or benefit for himself by directing the Town Clerk not to provide his political opponents with requested records. At the time Respondent completed and filed the Amended Complaint, she had no personal knowledge that Mayor Sands had, in fact, "orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws for the purpose of aiding his re-election campaign." Respondent relied on statements of three individuals in making the charge against Mayor Sands contained in the Amended Complaint. First, according to Respondent, Grace Evans, a former member of the Town Council of the Town of Welaka, told Respondent that Mayor Sands totally controls and directs the activities of the Town Clerk, Renee Peterson. Next, Virgil Posetti, a political ally of Rand Speas and the political opponent of Mayor Sands in the 1999 election, allowed Respondent to tape a statement in which Posetti stated that Mayor Sands controls what goes on in Town Hall and supervises the Town Clerk. Finally, in a telephone conversation initiated by Respondent, Eileen Perrins, a former town employee who was fired, told Respondent that the Town Clerk had only three or four hours of work to do during the work day. Respondent put credence in Ms. Evans' statements because Respondent believed that Ms. Evans knew Mayor Sands well. Respondent testified that Ms. Evans had formerly served on the Town Council under Mayor Sands but resigned from the Council "saying that Mayor Sands violates the Sunshine Laws regularly." Respondent apparently believed the statements made by Posetti because he had been a former member of the Town Council. However, it is significant that at the time the public records requests were made to the Town Clerk, Posetti was not a member of the Town Council, was not active in Town Hall, and did not work in Town Hall. Moreover, prior to and at the time Respondent filed the Amended Complaint, she was aware that Posetti was running against Mayor Sands for mayor of the Town of Welaka. Lastly, Respondent apparently believed the statements of Ms. Perrins because Perrins had previously worked in Town Hall as an employee of the Town. Respondent relied on Ms. Perrins' statements although she knew or believed that Perrins had been fired from her job with the Town. Respondent's reliance on any statements made by Evans, Posetti, or Perrins was not well-founded. By her own testimony, Respondent was aware that the statements by these individuals should be weighed carefully in light of their likely biases against Mayor Sands. Moreover, there was no evidence that Evans, Posetti, or Perrins worked at Town Hall or were aware of or had any knowledge of what was going on in Town Hall at the time the subject public records request were made. Finally, Respondent acknowledged that none of the aforementioned individuals ever told her that Mayor Sands had orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records laws. Respondent also based the charges in the Complaint on the chronology--the dates the public requests were made; the information that was requested; the length of time she believed it reasonably should have taken to produce the documents; the time it actually took to produce the documents; and the dates that the records were actually produced. In summary, Respondent testified that the basis for the charges she made in the Amended Complaint was as follows: [W]hat I was hearing around town, what I was hearing from former council people, what I heard from Irene Perrins in the telephone conversation I had with her and the timing of the requests, the demands for $100 deposits, and the actual production of documents and what was produced. The totality of the circumstances is the reason this complaint was filed. (Transcript, pages 71-71). Respondent was "upset" and "outraged" when some of the public records requests were not responded to in the time frame and manner that she thought was reasonable. As a result, after the March 1999 election, she filed the Complaint against Mayor Sands. Respondent chose to file the Complaint against Mayor Sands although she knew that all the subject public records requests had been directed to the Town Clerk and/or the Town Custodian of Records. The only Town official with whom Respondent communicated regarding the subject public records requests was Renee Peterson. However, Respondent believed Mayor Sands was a "dictator" in that he "controls" and "runs everything" at Town Hall. In light thereof, Respondent believed that Ms. Peterson was delaying and withholding production of documents at the direction of Mayor Sands. Despite Respondent's belief that Mayor Sands controlled everything at Town Hall, including responses to public records requests, she never communicated with him about the delay in the Town Clerk's responding to the subject public records requests. In fact, Respondent has never had a conversation with Mayor Sands. At all times material to this proceeding, Renee Peterson was the Town Clerk and Custodian of Records for the Town of Welaka, having been employed in that position since September 1998. Among her various duties, Ms. Peterson was responsible for keeping and providing public records for review and copying such records upon request. In that connection, the Town of Welaka has a duly-adopted ordinance establishing a procedure for Ms. Peterson to follow. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mayor Sands was charged with supervising the Town Clerk, Ms. Peterson. When Ms. Peterson was first employed, Mayor Sands instructed Ms. Peterson to refer any questions about public records to the Town's attorney or to use the "Sunshine Manual." However, the mayor was not involved in and did not direct the day-to-day work activities of Ms. Peterson. Ms. Peterson used her discretion in establishing and accomplishing her job priorities. Between approximately January 13 and March 9, 1999, Ms. Peterson received at least 13 public records requests from the Concerned Citizens Group and several individuals. Ten of the thirteen public records requests were made in January 1999 and some required research back to 1990. In January 1999, when ten of the public records requests were made, Ms. Peterson had been employed as Town Clerk for only three or four months. Given her varied responsibilities as Town Clerk, the number and the volume of the public records request, and the extensive research required to comply with some of the public records requests, Ms. Peterson took several weeks to respond to several of the public records requests. In instances when Ms Peterson determined that there would be some delay in fully responding to the requests, she wrote letters to the appropriate individuals and informed them of the status of their public records requests. Subsequently, with the help of two other people, Ms. Peterson worked seven hours one Saturday to satisfactorily respond to the public records requests. Respondent testified that the public records requests were relevant to campaign issues in the March 1999 election. However, none of the persons who had made the subject public records requests ever complained to Ms. Peterson about the time frame within which she responded to their public records requests. Furthermore, when the requests were made and after they received letters advising them of the status of their requests, none of the individuals advised Ms. Peterson that the requested records were needed by a date certain. Ms. Peterson did not think in terms of the subject public requests as related to the election. She simply thought of them as public records requests. Under all the circumstances, there was no unreasonable delay in her response to those public records requests. Ms. Peterson testified credibly that she never told Mayor Sands that the subject public records requests had been made; that Mayor Sands never orchestrated any willful or deliberate violation of the public records law; and that the mayor never instructed her not to provide his political opponents with public records that contained information relating to campaign issues or to delay providing such records to his political opponents. Mayor Sands' credible testimony was that Ms. Peterson never advised him that she had received the subject public records requests and that he never instructed her not to provide his political opponents with public records or to delay providing such records to his political opponents. Mayor Sands' credible testimony was that he first heard about problems concerning an individual's obtaining public records at a political rally two weeks before the March 1999 election. While at that rally, he heard Posetti, his opponent in the election, and Edna Moore, make statements that Ms. Moore could not get public records that she desired. Neither Posetti nor Ms. Moore accused Mayor Sands of interfering with Ms. Moore's getting the records. However, after hearing these complaints, Mayor Sands asked the former Town Clerk and a former Town Council member who had served as assistant records keeper to assist Ms. Peterson in responding to the public records requests. Soon thereafter, all records were produced. Respondent acknowledged that no one told her that Mayor Sands orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records law to assist his re-election campaign. Rather, in filing the Amended Complaint, Respondent relied on statements made to her by individuals who were obviously biased against Mayor Sands and whose statements, even if true, do not support the charge that the mayor orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records law for the purpose of aiding his re-election efforts. Respondent had no first-hand knowledge of any facts that would reasonably support the charge she made against Mayor Sands in the Amended Complaint. In absence of such knowledge, Respondent relied on the statements of Ms. Evans, Ms. Perrins, and Mr. Posetti and on Respondent's conclusion that the chronology of events related to the public records was evidence that Mayor Sands: (1) orchestrated a willful and deliberate violation of the public records law for the purpose of aiding his re-election campaign; and (2) instructed the Town Clerk not to provide his political opponents with public records that contained information relating to campaign issues. Contrary to Respondent's beliefs, the aforementioned statements and the chronology of events relative to the public records requests do not support or provide a reasonable basis for charges against Mayor Sands in the Amended Complaint. The allegations and statements of fact in the Amended Complaint are mere conjecture and surmise. Based on the foregoing, Respondent filed the Amended Complaint with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of Mayor Sands and with reckless disregard for whether said Amended Complaint contained false allegations material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. In defending himself against the allegations in the Complaint and in this proceeding, Petitioner has been represented by Allen C. D. Scott, II, Esquire. Mr. Scott's hourly rate is $125.00. Prior to the final hearing, Mr. Scott expended 43 hours on this matter and a related case, McGuire v. Speas, DOAH Case No. 00-0267FE, Recommended Order issued August 24, 2000. One- half of that time is attributable to the instant case. The hourly rate of $125.00 billed by Mr. Scott is reasonable. Likewise, the pretrial time of 21.80 hours expended in this matter is reasonable. Accordingly, the attorney's fee of $2,725.00 incurred is reasonable. Judith Ginn, Esquire, an attorney who has practiced law in the state of Florida since 1974, testified as an expert witness in this case. Ms. Ginn's hourly rate of $150.00 is reasonable. The reasonable cost of Ms. Ginn's expert witness services in this case and in the companion case is $650.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The Ethics Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Caron Speas, is liable for attorney's fees of $2,725.00 and costs of $325.00; and The Ethics Commission award fees and costs which were incurred on the day of and after the administrative hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen C. D. Scott, II, Esquire Scott & Scott 101 Orange Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Peter Ticktin, Esquire Scholl, Ticktin, Rosenberg, Glatter & Litz, P.A. Net First Plaza 5295 Town Center Road, Third Floor Boca Raton, Florida 33486-1080 Sheri L. Gerety, Complaint Coordinator and Clerk Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in which the parties have stipulated 1/ that the only disputed issues to be resolved by the Hearing Officer are: Whether the Petitioner qualifies as a small business party as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Whether the agency's actions were substantially justified. Whether special circumstances exist that would make an award of attorney's fees unjust.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Stephen S. Spector, M.D., has at all times material to this proceeding been licensed in the State of Florida as a physician. At all times material to this proceeding the Petitioner has engaged in the practice of medicine specializing in ophthalmology and ophthalmic surgery. In connection with his medical practice, the Petitioner also owns and operates, directly or indirectly, at least one outpatient surgery center where he performs most of his surgical procedures. In the normal course of events, when the Petitioner performs surgery at the outpatient surgery center he owns, the patient, or the patient's insurance carrier, is billed separately for the Petitioner's professional services as surgeon and for the use of the outpatient facility. 3/ In the course of his professional practice as a physician/surgeon and the operation of his outpatient surgery center, the Petitioner does business under a variety of business names or business entities, including the following: 4/ Steve S. Spector, M.D., P.A.; Presidential SurgiCenter, Inc.; Presidential Optical, Inc.; and Presidential Eye Center, P.A. At all times material, the Petitioner owned 100 percent of the stock in each of the four corporate entities listed immediately above. At all times material, the Petitioner was employed by Presidential Eye Center, P.A., as a physician/surgeon specializing in ophthalmology, and has been so employed for a period of approximately fourteen or fifteen years. In recent years, the Petitioner's estimated monthly income from his employment by Presidential Eye Center, P.A., was $10,000.00 per month. In some recent years, his income from his employment by Presidential Eye Center, P.A., was somewhat higher. 5/ The Petitioner also receives monthly rental payments from Presidential Eye Center, P.A., Presidential SurgiCenter, Inc., and Presidential Optical, Inc., of approximately $9,500.00. As of the date on which the Administrative Complaint was filed, the Petitioner's net worth was approximately $691,000.00. The evidence in the case does not reveal the number of Petitioner's employees or the number of people employed by the corporate entities through which the Petitioner does business. 6/ The evidence in this case does not clearly reveal which professional and/or business activities are engaged in by the Petitioner in his individual capacity and which are engaged in through each of the four corporate entities of which he is the 100 percent owner. 7/ The Case of Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine v. Stephen S. Spector, M.D., DOAH Case No. 93-1307, DPR Case No. 92-0666, had its genesis in a September 17, 1991 letter from Marc Freeman, M.D., Medical Director of the Family Medical Centers, to the Department of Professional Regulation 8/ (Department) alleging that the Petitioner had made false representations related to billing practices regarding five cataract surgeries and that the Petitioner also made a practice of submitting bills for services and facilities that were allegedly covered by a capitation contract. The case was assigned to DPR Investigator Robert Herron, who notified Petitioner of the complaint and investigation by letter of February 6, 1992. Investigator Herron obtained copies of the medical records for four of the patients indicated in Dr. Freeman's complaint letter, which included records from Humana Hospital and Presidential SurgiCenter, Petitioner's surgical center. Investigator Herron interviewed Dr. Freeman, interviewed the Petitioner through his attorney, and interviewed the attorney representing Humana Health Care Plan. The Petitioner, through counsel, represented that any overbilling to Humana occurred due to errors in bookkeeping and accounting, and not through any fraud on the part of the Petitioner. Other documents obtained as part of this investigation included, but were not limited to, capitation agreements between Petitioner and Humana Medical Plan, Inc., and related court documents from civil litigation which transpired as a result of Petitioner's alleged breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Investigator Herron did not interview the employees of the Petitioner who handled the Petitioner's billing for professional services and for use of facilities. Humana's civil complaint against Petitioner, Case No. CL 90-8421 A B, alleged that Petitioner breached his contract with Humana and profited unfairly as a result, by performing surgeries and billing for same contrary to the provision of capitation agreements between the Petitioner and Humana. Humana claimed that the overbilling by the Petitioner totaled almost $400,000.00. On or about May 21, 1992, Investigator Herron compiled a report which was reviewed and approved by his supervisor on the same date. Settlement of the case between Humana and Petitioner was reached, and an Order of Dismissal was filed in that cause on September 23, 1991. The settlement called for Petitioner to pay Humana Medical Plan, Inc., a total sum of $210,000.00 over an approximate four-year period of time. This settlement was also to include a letter by Humana indicating that this case involved a contractual dispute based upon accounting procedures, and was not based upon allegations of fraud. 9/ Prior to the Probable Cause Panel meeting of July 29, 1992, the Department forwarded to the panel members copies of the complete investigative file regarding the Petitioner, along with a copy of the Department's recommendation in the form of a draft Administrative Complaint. Each panel member received and reviewed the materials related to this case prior to the Probable Cause Panel meeting. DPR Case No. 92-0666 was forwarded to the Probable Cause Panel with a recommendation that probable cause be found for an Administrative Complaint. Present at the July 29, 1992, Probable Cause Panel meeting were panel members Richard McEven, Chairman; Gerard Kaiser, M.D.; and Edward Dauer, M.D. Also present were M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire, from the Attorney General's office, Carlos J. Ramos, attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation, and Teresa Corley, also from the Department. Probable cause was found to exist unanimously by the Panel members, with Dr. Dauer noting that the proposed Administrative Complaint accurately represented "the facts of law at issue." Probable cause was found to exist that Petitioner violated the following statutory provisions: Section 458.331(1)(h), (k) and (n), Florida Statutes. On or about August 7, 1992, the Department initiated action against the Petitioner's license to practice medicine as directed by the Probable Cause Panel of the Board in DPR Case No. 92-0666, later DOAH Case No. 93-1307, through the filing of an Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint filed on August 7, 1992, charged Petitioner with the following violations: filing false reports which the licensee knew to be false in that Petitioner billed patients' insurance carriers for use of his private surgical facility when, in fact, he did not use the facility to perform the surgeries and had agreed to provide services under a capitation agreement; by making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine in that Petitioner billed patients' insurance carriers for use of his private surgical facility when, in fact, he did not use the facility to perform the surgeries and had agreed to provide service under a capitation agreement; and exercising influence on a patient or client in such a manner as to exploit the patient or client for financial gain of the licensee or of a third party in that Petitioner billed patients' insurance carriers for use of his private surgical facility when, in fact, he did not use the facility to perform the surgeries and had agreed to provide services under a capitation agreement. At the time of the four surgeries that form the basis for the underlying Administrative Complaint, there was no capitation agreement between the Petitioner and Humana, because Humana had terminated the agreement. The materials presented to the original Probable Cause Panel included several documents, all apparently overlooked, which showed that the capitation agreement had been terminated and that the effective date of the termination was prior to the date of the four surgeries at issue in the Administrative Complaint. At the time of the four surgeries at issue in the underlying Administrative Complaint, an employee of Petitioner, Jeanne Gold, had the responsibility of billing for Petitioner's services and for the Presidential SurgiCenter facility fee. For each patient listed in the Administrative Complaint, Ms. Gold billed Humana a surgical facility fee for surgeries purportedly rendered by Petitioner at the Presidential SurgiCenter, even though the surgeries were actually performed at Humana Hospital. There were logical explanations for how the errors occurred, which explanations are set forth in affidavits from Jeanne Gold, Brenda Gruber, and Stephen Cohen. These affidavits which explain how the errors in billing occurred were not part of the materials reviewed by the original Probable Cause Panel, but the information contained in these affidavits could have been obtained prior to the original Probable Cause Panel meeting if the case has been adequately investigated. When the Petitioner was told that Humana believed he had incorrectly billed for the four surgeries at issue, he instructed his staff to inquire into the matter and take any necessary corrective action. The Petitioner subsequently made appropriate reimbursements to correct the subject billing errors. On or about September 14, 1993, Department legal counsel presented DPR Case No. 92-0666 to the Probable Cause Panel for reconsideration based upon information which indicated that Petitioner did not have a capitation agreement with Humana at the time of the subject surgeries and that the incorrect billing was simply an error, not an intentional or fraudulent act. Based upon the recommendation of Department legal counsel, the second Probable Cause Panel dismissed all charges against the Petitioner. The evidence presented to the original Probable Cause Panel was an insufficient basis upon which to find probable cause for the violations asserted in the Administrative Complaint. That evidence failed to contain evidence that would reasonably support a belief that the Respondent acted intentionally or fraudulently, and the evidence also affirmatively showed that some of the facts asserted in the Administrative Complaint were incorrect. Adequate investigation would have revealed that all of the incorrect billing alleged in the Administrative Complaint resulted from unintentional error, for which there was a logical explanation.
The Issue Whether Respondent, John J. Fugate, Sheriff of DeSoto County, willfully violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), which prohibits an officer or employee of the state, or of any county or municipality, from using his or her official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination of office or coercing or influencing another person's vote or affecting the results thereof.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At the time of hearing, Respondent, John J. Fugate, was the incumbent Sheriff of DeSoto County, Florida. He was first elected in November 2000 and took office in January 2001. At the times pertinent to this case, Sheriff Fugate was a candidate for re-election, having filed the initial paperwork appointing a campaign treasurer and naming a depository for campaign contributions on May 20, 2003. Also on May 20, 2003, Sheriff Fugate submitted his signed "Statement of Candidate," pursuant to Section 106.023, Florida Statutes (2003). This document attested that Sheriff Fugate had received, read, and understood "the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003)." These statutory provisions were included in the "2000 Candidate Handbook On Campaign Financing," published by the state Division of Elections and given to Sheriff Fugate by the local Supervisor of Elections, when Sheriff Fugate filed his paperwork for the 2000 election. The "2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook" was given to Sheriff Fugate when he filed his re-election paperwork with the local Supervisor of Elections and also included the provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003). During the Commission's investigation, Sheriff Fugate admitted that he had also read Chapter 104, Florida Statutes (2003), and believed he understood its provisions. Though Sheriff Fugate had filed the papers establishing his candidacy for re-election, some Sheriff's Office employees openly questioned whether he really intended to stand for re-election. These questions stemmed from the fact that Sheriff Fugate's teenage son had been killed in an automobile accident in 2002. Sheriff Fugate was aware of these questions and was concerned that loyal employees were unsure of his intentions. For some time, Sheriff's Office employees had also been discussing the status of Major William Wise, the second-in- command to Sheriff Fugate. Major Wise had been the chief deputy under Sheriff's Fugate's predecessor, was kept in that position by Sheriff Fugate, and was very popular among the Sheriff's Office employees. Major Wise was a participant in the State of Florida's Deferred Retirement Option Program ("DROP"), which he believed would require him to separate from the Sheriff's Office for one year upon his official retirement in October 2004. However, in October 2003, Major Wise learned that there was a way for him to reduce his separation to 30 days and still retain his full retirement benefit. Sheriff Fugate decided to prepare a letter to all Sheriff's Office employees that would convey both his re-election intentions and the good news concerning the fact that Major Wise would not have to vacate his position. The letter was written on stationery with a header reading, "Re- Elect Fugate for Sheriff," along with Sheriff Fugate's mailing address and phone number. The text of the letter read as follows: It hardly seems possible that the second half of the third year of this term of office is upon us and I can only concur with the saying that "time stands still for no one." For those that have been here for a while, we have made giant strides for the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office in the past two and a half years and for the newer employees, with your help and our combined efforts, I look forward to more success in the future. Thank you for your help and I truly appreciate the service given to the citizens of DeSoto County. In anticipation of running for a second term of office and as legally required, I have opened my official campaign account. This is the first step in any campaign and this announcement is not to be construed as a request for a contribution to my campaign. I, like you, have been in an employment position when the incumbent was seeking another term of office and can personally relate to pressure applied to assist with the campaign. Please understand that I will, and do value your support in any way that you may be inclined to offer. I also encourage anyone that feels that I have not earned your support in any way in the performance of my duty to feel free to talk to me and you can be assured that it will remain professional and will not be made personal. On another note, I know that there has been some question as to what was going to happen to the position of Major due to Major Wise being in the Drop program and it coming to an end. It is with great pleasure that I announce that a way has been found for Major Wise to continue in his position and he has made the decision to do so. Major Wise has contributed a great deal to this office and I am very pleased that he will be staying with us. If anyone has any questions about this letter, I remind you of our "open door" policy and invite you to feel free to stop by and visit with me. Again, thank you and I look forward to our working together to build a better office for the employees and the community. Beneath Sheriff Fugate's signature was the following: "Pd. Pol. Adv. Paid For In-Kind By John J. Fugate. Approved by John J. Fugate (D)." Sheriff Fugate's review of the Candidate Handbooks led him to conclude that he should not use the Sheriff's Office or DeSoto County resources in preparing or distributing his letter and that none of the costs involved in preparing or distributing the letter should be borne by the Sheriff's Office or the County. Thus, Sheriff Fugate drafted the letter on his home computer. He printed approximately 120 copies of the letter on his home printer, using paper and ink that he purchased at Wal- Mart. On his campaign treasurer's report for the third quarter of 2003, Sheriff Fugate reported the cost of ink and paper associated with this letter as an in-kind contribution from himself to his campaign. Sheriff Fugate brought the copies of the letter to the Sheriff's Office and placed one copy in the pay envelope of each Sheriff's Office employee. At the DeSoto County Sheriff’s Office, it was common practice for items other than pay checks to be included in the pay envelopes. Such items had included advertising circulars and public service memoranda, but not political advertisements. The Sheriff's Office had no specific policy setting forth what may or may not be placed in the pay envelopes, nor was there any particular procedure for obtaining approval of what was to be placed in the pay envelopes. Neither Sheriff Fugate, Major Wise, nor payroll supervisor Kathy Willcutts could recall a request to place an item in the pay envelopes ever having been denied. The pay envelopes, including Sheriff Fugate's letter, were distributed to the Sheriff's Office employees in the usual manner, either at the front desk in the Records Division for pickup or in the employee's mail slot. The employees received Sheriff Fugate's letter upon retrieving their paychecks on or about October 2, 2003. Several Sheriff's Office employees testified at the hearing. None of these employees felt that Sheriff Fugate was attempting to influence their vote or pressuring them to make a monetary contribution to his campaign. Lieutenant Carol Williamson is a 28-year Sheriff's Office employee and has worked for five different sheriffs. Lt. Williamson testified that in the past, she has been essentially ordered to campaign for her bosses, but that she did not consider Sheriff Fugate's letter to be anything other than informational. Deputy Mark Lawrence testified that "I read it, said 'okay,' and threw it away." Sheriff Fugate disclaimed any intent to influence his employees' votes or pressure them for campaign contributions. During his career, he had been forced to campaign for his elected superiors. Because of this experience, Sheriff Fugate did not wish to place his own employees in the position of feeling coerced to support him. Sheriff Fugate testified that he used campaign letterhead and included the "paid political advertisement" disclaimer because his reading of the statutes led him to conclude that those items were legally required on any correspondence referencing his campaign. Nevertheless, Sheriff Fugate maintained that his letter was intended solely to convey information, not to coerce or influence anyone's vote. Sheriff Fugate's testimony is supported by the letter itself, which expressly stated that he was not seeking contributions to his campaign and that employees should feel no pressure to support his candidacy. Nonetheless, Sheriff Fugate's letter was clearly an attempt to favorably influence his employees, albeit a low-key one that did not demand support in the apparent manner of previous sheriffs. The letter solicited the support of Sheriff's Office employees, "in any way that you may be inclined to offer." The letter may not have been coercive, but it was disingenuous for Sheriff Fugate to suggest that the letter was not designed to influence his employees in the upcoming election. Sheriff Fugate was cognizant of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003), and its prohibition on the use of "official authority or influence for the purpose of . . . coercing or influencing another person's vote . . . ." However, Sheriff Fugate believed, mistakenly but in all good faith, that his placement of the letters was allowed under another provision of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003): The provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to prevent any person from becoming a candidate for and actively campaigning for any elective office in this state. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates. For reasons expressed in the Conclusions of Law below, Sheriff Fugate's good faith belief that his actions were within the ambit of the statute negates any suggestion that he "willfully" violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). Sheriff Fugate did not seek advice from the local Supervisor of Elections or an advisory opinion from the state Division of Elections pursuant to Subsection 106.23(2), Florida Statutes (2003), because he believed that he understood the application of the relevant statutes to his situation, including Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, John J. Fugate, did not violate Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), as alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner effectively elected to move her retirement account from the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Pension Plan to the FRS Investment Plan prior to her retirement from state employment or, if not, whether Respondent, State Board of Administration (“SBA”) is estopped from claiming that Petitioner did not successfully elect to move her retirement account into the FRS Investment Plan.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Adrian Wagner began her state employment on April 22, 1994, with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which was renamed the Department of Children and Family Services after a 1996 reorganization. Since 2012, the agency has been named the Department of Children and Families. Upon her hiring, Ms. Wagner was enrolled in the Pension Plan, which was the only retirement program available for eligible employees in 1994. In 2002, the Investment Plan was made available for employees participating in the FRS. Ms. Wagner was provided a three month window, from December 1, 2002, through February 28, 2003, to switch to the Investment Plan. The Plan Choice Administrator did not receive an election from Ms. Wagner during the three month period. Therefore, Ms. Wagner remained in the Pension Plan by statutory default. See § 121.4501(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Wagner changed employers but remained in the FRS system until her last day of employment on April 3, 2019. At the time of her retirement from FRS-eligible employment, Ms. Wagner was working for the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office. On March 4, 2019, Ms. Wagner logged onto the FRS website, MyFRS.com, from her home computer. Her intention was to use the second election opportunity afforded by section 121.4501(4)(f), Florida Statutes, to move from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner recalled clicking a green button to change her plan, which took her to a page that read, “ready to make a decision” to change from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. It set out the steps needed to make the change. Ms. Wagner testified that she clicked on a green arrow that said, “change your plan,” which took her to a page that set forth the amount of money she would have in the Investment Plan. She continued to a page showing the different plans available to participants in the Investment Plan. The website advised her to contact an Ernst and Young (“EY”) financial planner to discuss her plan options. Ms. Wagner testified that a few minutes later she used the phone number provided by the MyFRS.com website to contact the EY financial planners. She testified that the EY planner with whom she spoke was named “Josh.” The EY call summary log for Ms. Wagner was entered into evidence. The log is a record of every phone call between EY and Ms. Wagner. It includes the date and time of the call, the name of the EY employee who spoke to Ms. Wagner, and a brief summary of their discussion. The EY call summary log identified the EY planner who spoke with Ms. Wagner at 12:10 p.m., on March 4, 2019, as Joshua Kantrowitz. Ms. Wagner testified that Mr. Kantrowitz told her that he could not see in his computer that she had made the switch to the Investment Plan. While Mr. Kantrowitz waited, Ms. Wagner clicked several “back” buttons on the MyFRS.com website. She then went through the same page progression she had done previously to make her plan selection. Ms. Wagner recalled finalizing her decision by clicking a button that read “send,” or “submit,” or “continue.” Ms. Wagner testified that Mr. Kantrowitz told her that he could now see that she had elected to change her retirement from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. They discussed fund options, tax questions, and penalties for taking funds out of the Investment Plan. Mr. Kantrowitz verified Ms. Wagner’s email address so that he could send her an FRS Investment Beneficiary Form. Ms. Wagner understood Mr. Kantrowitz to say that she would not be able to see that she had changed to the Investment Plan on the website for about a month. The conversation was interrupted when the phone connection was lost. Ms. Wagner testified that it was her understanding that she had successfully changed her retirement from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan, and that this change had been confirmed by Mr. Kantrowitz. A transcript of the conversation between Ms. Wagner and Mr. Kantrowitz was entered into evidence. The transcript does not confirm every aspect of Ms. Wagner’s recollection. The transcript records that Ms. Wagner told Mr. Kantrowitz that she “just switched over from the FRS Pension Plan to the Investment Plan.” Mr. Kantrowitz asked when she made the switch. Ms. Wagner responded, “I just hit it today. Did it today.” She added that she made the election “about ten minutes ago.” The transcript clarifies that Mr. Kantrowitz accepted, but did not confirm, Ms. Wagner’s statement that she made the switch to the Investment Plan. After Ms. Wagner told him that she made the switch only 10 minutes ago, Mr. Kantrowitz stated: Okay. And you did it by--basically, you know, if you do--you know, it’s still being processed at the moment. Basically, you know, in the next month, it’s going to make that conversion. In order to, you know, switch and make that choice, you know, the types of investments you’re putting into. Okay. So I do want to keep you aware of that if you did fill it out today, okay. Mr. Kantrowitz never confirmed that the second election had been completed nor did he state whether he could or could not see the change on his computer. Mr. Kantrowitz simply accepted Ms. Wagner’s word and went on to tell her what would happen next if she indeed made the change. Mr. Kantrowitz did state that the conversion would be made in the next month, confirming in part Ms. Wagner’s recollection that she was told that it would be a month before she could see the switch to the Investment Plan on the website. Again, however, this statement was contingent: if Ms. Wagner made the change, the conversion would take about a month. The EY call summary log entry for the March 4, 2019, conversation, presumably completed by Mr. Kantrowitz, records Ms. Wagner’s “Question or Problem” as “made a switch to the FRS IP. [D]oesn’t plan to work in the FRS anymore.” The log records the “Resolution” with a series of four bullet points: talked about IP. taxation, timelines, HIS. says she spoke with admin and they said she would hit NRA at April 1 for 25 YOS SR. she did the 2nd election online and was defaulted into the FRS RDF. needs to set up beneficiaries sending out beneficiary form It could be argued that the second bullet point confirms that Ms. Wagner successfully completed the second election into the Investment Plan. However, when read in tandem with the transcript, Mr. Kantrowitz’s notes clearly set forth his summary of the conversation as it occurred, not his independent conclusion that Ms. Wagner had completed the second election. After the call with Mr. Kantrowitz was dropped, Ms. Wagner called back to inquire as to her exact retirement date. She spoke briefly with another EY planner, Zach Brown, who told her that the Division of Retirement keeps the record of official years of service for employees. Mr. Brown transferred the call to the Division of Retirement. The transcript indicates that Ms. Wagner remained on hold for some time, then hung up before speaking with a Division of Retirement representative. Ms. Wagner testified that on March 18, 2019, she again contacted the EY financial planners. She spoke for roughly a half-hour with a woman whose name she did not recall. The woman verified Ms. Wagner’s personal account information. After being verified, Ms. Wagner asked tax and health care subsidy questions and stated that she planned eventually to move her Investment Plan account from EY to an outside investment firm. Ms. Wagner testified that the EY planner never stated that she was not enrolled in the Investment Plan. The EY call summary log does not show a phone call from Ms. Wagner on March 18, 2019. Ms. Wagner testified that on March 19, 2019, she met with Shawn Powers, the human resources manager for the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, to discuss Ms. Wagner’s impending retirement. As Ms. Powers filled out a retiree insurance data sheet, Ms. Wagner told her that she had enrolled in the Investment Plan. Ms. Powers cautioned her about the risks involved in the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner assured her that she understood the risks. Ms. Powers checked the “Investment Plan” box on the insurance form. Ms. Wagner signed the form, attesting to her understanding that she had made the election to move from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner testified that, after the March 4, 2019, conversation with Mr. Kantrowitz, she received several emails from EY financial planners. She understood these emails as indirect confirmation that she had successfully elected to move to the Investment Plan. During cross-examination, Ms. Wagner conceded that none of these communications affirmatively stated that she was now in the Investment Plan. The third-party Plan Choice Administrator for the Investment Plan is Alight Solutions. FRS members who wish to utilize their second election have multiple options: they may complete and mail in a hard copy form; they may submit a second election form on the MyFRS.com website; or they may log into their account on the MyFRS.com website and go through the process of submitting and confirming their second election online. Fla. Admin. Code R. 19-11.007(3). If an FRS member successfully utilizes the online MyFRS.com process for submitting a second election, an “election confirmation” page appears that informs the member that the election has been received by Alight Solutions. Ms. Wagner had no specific recollection of receiving an electronic confirmation that her election to move to the Investment Plan had been successfully submitted or that it had been received by Alight Solutions. If an FRS member successfully submits an election form to Alight Solutions, a hard copy letter is mailed to the member confirming receipt. Ms. Wagner had no specific recollection of receiving any type of correspondence confirming receipt of her Investment Plan election via conventional mail. Ms. Wagner retired from the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office on April 3, 2019. The parties stipulated that the SBA has no record of receiving a second election from Ms. Wagner during her term of employment with an FRS-participating employer. On April 8, 2019, Ms. Wagner logged onto the MyFRS.com website and saw that she was still enrolled in the Pension Plan. Ms. Wagner immediately phoned the number for the EY financial planners and was transferred to a “solutions person” named Nichole. Ms. Wagner explained to Nichole that on March 4, 2019, she had elected to move her retirement account from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan via the MyFRS.com website. She provided Nichole with the chronology of events from March 2019 as she remembered them. Nichole told Ms. Wagner that she would research the matter and get back to her within two weeks. Ms. Wagner testified that on or about April 22, 2019, Nichole phoned her to say that she could find no record of anything Ms. Wagner claimed to have done on the MyFRS.com website. Nicole told Ms. Wagner that she would need more time, possibly another two weeks, to do further research on the matter. Ms. Wagner told Nichole how upset she was. Nichole assured Ms. Wagner that she would do her best to find out what happened. Nichole also stated that she would send Ms. Wagner a form to request that the SBA intervene. Ms. Wagner subsequently filed a Request for Intervention, which was received by the SBA on May 17, 2019. Ms. Wagner testified that after she filed her Request for Intervention, but before the SBA responded, she attempted to contact Nichole. Her call was answered by an unnamed EY planner who stated that he would remain on the line while putting her through to a solutions person. Ms. Wagner began speaking with the solutions person but was interrupted by the EY financial planner, who stated that he had found notes by Mr. Kantrowitz indicating that she had changed from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. It is highly likely that the unnamed EY financial planner was referencing the EY call summary log notes quoted at Finding of Fact 18. As found above, Mr. Kantrowitz’s contemporary notes reflected what he was told by Ms. Wagner. The notes do not constitute an independent confirmation that Ms. Wagner successfully completed her second election. The SBA submitted into evidence a spreadsheet titled “Participant Web Activity Detail.” SBA witness Allison Olson testified that this document was produced by Alight Solutions in response to her request for all records of Ms. Wagner’s March 4, 2019, activity on the MyFRS.com website. Ms. Olson is the Director of Policy, Risk Management, and Compliance in the Office of Defined Contribution Programs. She credibly testified that she is familiar with reading the Alight Solutions spreadsheets and that she saw nothing on Ms. Wagner’s page indicating that Alight Solutions received her Investment Plan election. Petitioner’s information technology expert, Philip Schwartz, testified that the document provided by Alight Solutions was a “program log,” a high level program that runs to handle a particular task such as an accounting function. Mr. Schwartz testified that he suggested to his client that she request the “server log” for the relevant date. The server log captures every keystroke and click made by a user such as Ms. Wagner, even in situations in which the server is too busy to complete the requested function. Mr. Schwartz believed the program log was insufficient because it showed only which page of the website Ms. Wagner was on at a given moment, not which buttons she clicked or whether she had hit the “send” button. Mr. Schwartz’s suggestion was that Ms. Wagner might have done everything necessary to complete the second election but that the MyFRS.com server may not have recorded her election. The server log would have provided a more accurate representation of Ms. Wagner’s intentions. Ms. Olson testified that, after an informal hearing attempting to resolve the case, she requested a server log from Alight Solutions. The company responded that it did not have the server log. Ms. Olson testified that the program log would indicate the second election had it been completed by Ms. Wagner. Ms. Olson stated that FRS members are always advised to follow through and make sure their election has been received. Mr. Schwartz testified that there is no industry standard as to the length of time a program log should be kept. He has known companies to hold them for as long as a year, but has also known companies to keep them for only 90 days. Mr. Schwartz testified that there is no legal requirement for a company such as Alight Solutions to maintain a program log at all. Mr. Schwartz testified that he did not have enough knowledge of Alight Solutions’ terminology to state whether the program log indicated that Ms. Wagner’s election had been received. Thus, there is no evidence to contradict Ms. Olson’s credible testimony that the Alight Solutions program log did not indicate receipt of Ms. Wagner’s Investment Plan election. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Ms. Wagner intended to make her second election on March 4, 2019, and to move her retirement account from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. The preponderance of the evidence also establishes that Ms. Wagner failed to complete her second election and that Alight Solutions, the Plan Choice Administrator for the Investment Plan, did not receive her election.1/ The evidence was insufficient to show that the SBA or any entity or person acting on its behalf or as its agent made any representation to Ms. Wagner that her second election had been received by the Plan Choice Administrator.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Florida Retirement System Investment Plan Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2020.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, as campaign treasurer, signed two checks drawn on the candidate's primary campaign account when such account lacked sufficient funds to cover the checks and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a certified public accountant since 1996. Since 2000, Respondent has been employed with a Hollywood, Florida accounting firm, where he is now a partner. Respondent has been licensed since 1996 to practice accounting in Florida. Sometime prior to June 2005, a friend of Respondent told him that a candidate for office in Miami needed help with his campaign. Respondent agreed to meet with the candidate, Richard Dunn, who was running for the District 5 seat on the City of Miami Commission. At the meeting, Respondent became acquainted with Mr. Dunn, who is a minister and an experienced candidate for public office. During the meeting, Mr. Dunn asked Respondent to serve as his campaign treasurer. Mr. Dunn explained that his main duty would be to maintain the campaign checkbook and make deposits of campaign contributions. Respondent also understood that he would have to attend some fundraising events. Respondent had never previously served as a campaign treasurer, but the parties agreed upon a satisfactory payment, and Respondent assumed his duties as campaign treasurer in July 2005. When Respondent started as treasurer, Mr. Dunn's campaign staff gave him checkbooks and deposit slips. At no time did Respondent ever investigate whether the election laws imposed upon him any special requirements. No one on Mr. Dunn's campaign staff gave Respondent a copy of the explanatory campaign materials provided each campaign by the Clerk's Office of the City of Miami. These materials include all relevant campaign finance laws. Respondent's lack of familiarity with the duties of a campaign treasurer emerged early. He learned that he had to file campaign treasurer reports when campaign staff informed him of this responsibility. At the same time, Respondent learned that campaign staff, including Mr. Dunn, were not careful in the management of the campaign's finances. In trying to prepare his first report, Respondent had problems obtaining all of the necessary information, such as all of the checks that had been written. Despite his lack of familiarity with campaign finance laws, Respondent knew that he could not write a check if an account had insufficient funds. Respondent assumed (wrongly, as noted below in the Conclusions of Law) that he could sign a check, even if the account lacked funds to cover it, as long as sufficient funds would be deposited before the check was presented for payment at the payor's bank. Respondent was not the first campaign treasurer for this campaign. However, the existence of a prior treasurer did not make it any easier for Respondent to assemble the necessary documents, such as copies of bank statements, so that he could do his job. Also, 30-45 days after taking over as treasurer, Respondent learned that the campaign maintained at least one other checking account. In short order, Respondent learned that the bank mailed the statements to Mr. Dunn, not the treasurer. Respondent suggested to Mr. Dunn that the bank issue a copy to Respondent. Mr. Dunn agreed with this proposal, but the bank, Wachovia Bank, said that it could not do so. Respondent never suggested to Mr. Dunn that he direct the bank to mail the statements to Respondent, who would then send a copy to Mr. Dunn. Quickly, Respondent also learned that Mr. Dunn was writing most of the checks, including counter checks. Respondent repeatedly impressed upon Mr. Dunn the importance of keeping Respondent informed about these checks, but Mr. Dunn and his campaign staff did not routinely do so. After failing to convince Mr. Dunn to restrict check- issuing privileges to Respondent, Respondent prepared a check authorization form that Mr. Dunn and his campaign staff could use each time that they issued checks. However, despite all of these efforts, consisting of five to ten telephone calls and meetings, Respondent never succeeded in obtaining Mr. Dunn's cooperation for very long. On the 10-15 occasions that Respondent wrote and signed campaign checks, he often, but not invariably, contacted the bank and asked it to fax transaction reports or partial statements to cover a specific date range. On those 10-15 occasions, Respondent often, but not invariably, called Mr. Dunn for confirmation of deposits before writing. If Respondent ever attempted to obtain this information by online banking, he never so indicated during the hearing. Although Respondent did something to update himself on current activity in the checking account each time that he had to write and sign a check, his information was necessarily incomplete. Overall, Respondent admits that he never was able to get the accounting problem within the campaign under control. Although Respondent wrote and signed relatively few checks, he wrote and signed the two checks at issue in this case many months after discovering the problems described above. On October 27, 2005, Respondent signed a check to The Miami Times for $3625.63 and drawn on the campaign account. Account balances were $542.34, $792.34, and $1892.34 on October 26, 27, and 28, 2005, respectively. Clearly, Respondent signed this check at a time that the account lacked sufficient funds to cover it. Respondent delivered the $3625.63 check to a member of the Dunn campaign and instructed her to ensure that the account had sufficient money before giving it to the payee. He added that she should deliver the check only to Mr. Dunn. On the same day, Mr. Dunn signed a check drawn on the same account in the amount of $500 and payable to the prior campaign treasurer, Johnny Studstill. Although the October bank records reveal no insufficient funds fees, the November bank records reveal seven instances of insufficient funds: November 10, 21, 22, and 30 (four times). Respondent explained that the bank imposed these fees because deposits had not yet cleared, but the imposition of these fees was sufficient to alert Respondent to mounting problems, and two of these instances had arisen prior to the date on which he signed the November 22 check, which is the second check at issue in this case. On November 22, 2005, Respondent signed a check to radio station WMBM for $2000 and drawn on the campaign account. Account balances were $694.25, $2909.25, and $6091.84, on November 21, 22, and 23, 2005, respectively. The relevant day is November 22, so it would appear that the bank balance was sufficient to cover this check. However, on the same day, Respondent signed checks in the amounts of $1065 and $1492.65 and payable to ASAP Mailing Service and Dodd Printing, although the latter check was marked void shortly after Respondent signed it. Thus, the total of the $2000 check to WMBM and $1065 check to ASAP (counsel for Petitioner conceding at the hearing that a voided check should not count) exceeded the account balance of $2909.25. On the same day, Mr. Dunn signed three checks drawn on the same account. One was in the amount of $850 and payable to radio station WEDR, one was in the amount of $185 and payable to Isaiah Walker, and the third was in the amount of $2000 and payable to radio station WHQT. About three weeks prior to the end of the campaign, Respondent realized that the situation was unworkable, even though his administrative assistant at the accounting firm was devoting 20 hours weekly to campaign-related bookkeeping work. Respondent remained with the campaign only to avoid the negative appearance that would be created by his leaving his post in the days running up to the election. Respondent asked Mr. Dunn not to leave him "high and dry," but Respondent was never paid for his services to the campaign, beyond a single $1000 check to cover costs. When signing the October 27 check, Respondent knew that, due to the campaign's poor financial management practices, he lacked even the information to determine whether the account balance would be sufficient when the check was presented to Wachovia. He did not consider whether the account balance was sufficient when he signed the check because he was not aware of this requirement of law. Respondent's violation of law was willful when signing the October 27 check. By this time, Respondent had been serving as campaign treasurer for nearly four months. He was increasingly aware that he did not have the full cooperation of the candidate. Although he did not know the relevant requirement of law, Respondent recklessly disregarded this requirement because he had never made any effort--let alone a reasonable effort--to inform himself of this legal requirement. The circumstances likewise establish recklessness in the signing of the November 22 check. Factually, Respondent's acts and omissions on November 22 were less defensible because the account had twice incurred insufficient-funds fees in the two weeks preceding the signing of the November 22 check, and he had another month to see that Mr. Dunn and the campaign staff would not agree to reasonable financial-management controls. Legally, Respondent's ongoing failure to inform himself of the applicable legal requirements imposed upon him as a campaign treasurer remained entirely unreasonable, with the passing of another month, the incurring of insufficient-funds fees, and the repeated confirming that Respondent would not have any significant cooperation from Mr. Dunn as his campaign approached its completion. The key factual determination in this case is that Respondent willfully violated the legal requirement that sufficient funds be in the account when the checks were signed. Respondent was understandably unfamiliar with this requirement, which is different from the more common requirement, with which he was familiar, that sufficient funds must be available when a check is presented to the issuing bank for payment. The requisite finding of Respondent's recklessness in failing to exercise any apparent effort to inform himself of this requirement of law is facilitated by the manner in which he handled the more common responsibilities of bookkeeping. Respondent proceeded recklessly in this area, as well. Respondent knew that the probability of bounced checks elevated considerably, the longer that more than one person wrote checks and the campaign staff was so lax in getting him the information on their activity in the account. Reckless disregard for the proper discharge of basic bookkeeping responsibilities is evidence of Respondent's overall state of mind at the relevant time. If Respondent did not initially realize his ignorance of campaign finance laws, he had to understand the limits of his knowledge when campaign staff told him he had to file campaign treasurer reports. By not informing himself of Section 106.11(4), Florida Statutes, by the time that he signed the two checks that are the subject of this case, Respondent displayed reckless disregard of his legal obligations. Under the law set forth below, Respondent's reckless disregard of the law constitutes a willful violation of the law. Here, Respondent, an accountant, has wholly disregarded Section 106.11(4), Florida Statutes, without making any reasonable inquiry into the limitations on check signing in a campaign.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of two counts of violating Section 106.11(4), Florida Statutes, and imposing a civil penalty of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317
