The Issue The issue is whether to approve, approve with conditions, or deny Top Flight's development application approved by the Board on July 26, 2004. That decision approved a Flexible Development application to permit a reduction on the side (east) setback from 10 feet to 5.85 feet (to pavement) and an increase of building height from 35 feet to 59 feet from base flood elevation of 13 feet MSL (with height calculated to the midpoint of the roof slope) in association with the construction of 62 multi-family residential (attached) units at 1925 Edgewater Drive, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On September 25, 2003, Top Flight filed a Flexible Development Application for Level Two approval of a comprehensive infill for redevelopment of properties located on the southeast corner of the intersection of Sunnydale Drive and Edgewater Drive and just north of Sunset Pointe Road in Clearwater, Florida. A Comfort Suites motel is just north of the property, while a Chevron gasoline station sits on the south side. The property is located within the Tourist zoning district, which allows condominiums as a permitted use. The project, as originally proposed, involved the construction of a seventy-seven unit, seven-story (including covered parking), luxury condominium on a 2.572-acre tract of land now occupied by 32 motel units and 9 rental apartments with ancillary structures, which the developer intends to raze. The original application requested a deviation from the requirement in the Code that structures in the Tourist zoning district not exceed 35 feet in height. Under flexible development standards for that zoning district, however, a structure may be built to a maximum height of between 35 and 100 feet. (Although the City staff is authorized to approve requests for a deviation up to a maximum height of 50 feet without a hearing, Top Flight was requesting a flexible deviation to allow the building to be constructed an additional 25 feet, or to a height of 75 feet. This was still less than the 100 feet allowed under flexible development standards.) On December 24, 2003, Top Flight filed a second application which amended its earlier application by seeking a reduction of the front yard setback on Sunnydale Drive from 25 feet to 17 feet to allow the placement of balcony support columns within the setbacks. Without a deviation, the Code requires a minimum 25-foot front yard setback. The second application continued to seek a deviation in height standards to 75 feet. Because of staff concerns, on February 5, 2004, Top Flight filed a third Flexible Development application for the purpose of amending its earlier applications. The matter was placed on the agenda for the March 16, 2004, meeting of the Board. At the meeting on March 16, 2004, the City's staff recommended that certain changes in the design of the building be made. In order to make these suggested changes, Top Flight requested that the matter be continued to a later date. That request was granted, and the matter was placed on the agenda for the April 20, 2004, meeting. At the April 20, 2004, meeting, Board members again expressed concern over the height of the building, the lack of stair stepping, and the bulk, density, and height. Because of these concerns, Top Flight requested, and was granted, a 90-day continuance to address these concerns. Appellant, who was present at that meeting, did not object to this request. The matter was then placed on the agenda for May 18, 2004, but because of a notice problem, it was continued to the July 20, 2004, meeting. During the April 20, 2004, meeting, the Board allowed Top Flight's architect, Mr. Aude, and a City Planner III, Mr. Reynolds, to make their presentations prior to asking if any persons wished party status. (Section 4-206.D.3.b. provides that, as a preliminary matter, the chair of the Board shall "inquire of those attending the hearing if there is any person who wishes to seek party status.") Mr. Reynolds was not sworn, even though Section 4-206.D.3.d requires that all "witnesses shall be sworn." After the presentations by Mr. Aude and Mr. Reynolds, Appellant was given party status. Therefore, Appellant could not cross-examine the two witnesses immediately after they testified. However, Appellant did not request the right to examine those witnesses nor did she lodge an objection to the procedure followed by the Board. Also, assuming that Mr. Aude and Mr. Reynolds were treated as experts by the Board, there is no indication that either witness submitted a resume at the hearing. (Section 4-206.D.5.a. requires that "[a]ny expert witness testifying shall submit a resume for the record before or during the public hearing.") However, no objection to this error in procedure was made by any person, including Appellant. Based on the concerns of staff and Board members at the April 20, 2004, meeting, and to accommodate objections lodged by nearby residents, Top Flight modified its site plan by reducing the height of the building from 75 to 59 feet (which in turn reduced the height of the building from six stories over parking to four) and increasing the number of parking spaces. Other changes during the lengthy review process included decreasing the side (rather than the front) setback from a minimum of 10 feet to 5.85 feet and preserving two large oak trees on the property. The proposed height was significantly less than the maximum allowed height in the Tourist district (100 feet), and the proposed density of 59 units was also considerably less than the maximum allowed density on the property (30 units per acre, or a total of 77 on the 2.57-acre tract). The application, as amended, was presented in this form at the July 20 meeting. Documents supporting the various changes were filed by Mr. Aude in February, March, April, May, and June 2004, and are a part of the record. At the hearing on July 20, 2004, Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Aude again testified in support of the application, as amended. The staff report prepared by Mr. Reynolds was made a part of the record. (Section 4-206.G provides that the record shall consist of, among other things, "all applications, exhibits and papers submitted in any proceeding.") The report found that "all applicable Code requirements and criteria including but not limited to General Applicability criteria (Section 3-913) and the flexibility criteria for attached units (Section 2-803.B) have been met." The Board accepted this evidence as the most persuasive on the issue. The Board further accepted the testimony of Mr. Aude, and a determination in the staff report, that the project would be compatible with the character of the neighborhood. In doing so, it implicitly rejected the testimony of Appellant, and other individuals, that the height of the building was inconsistent with the character of the neighborhood. Finally, the Board accepted Mr. Reynolds' recommendation that the application should be approved, subject to eighteen conditions. The vote was 4-2 for approval. During the July 20, 2004, meeting, Mr. Reynolds was cross-examined by another party, Mr. Falk. Although given the right to do so, Appellant did not question the witness. All parties, including Appellant, were given the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Aude, but none sought to do so. The parties were also given the opportunity to ask questions of Top Flight's counsel, who gave argument (but not evidence) on behalf of his client. Although members of the public, and Appellant, were limited in the amount of time allowed for statements to three minutes, all persons who gave testimony or made statements that day, including Appellees, were urged by the chair to limit their remarks. Finally, Top Flight's counsel was allowed to make a closing argument at the meeting, at which time he used a demonstrative exhibit (a "chart" containing the names of area residents who supported the project), which was shown to Board members. (The same information can be found in the City files, which are a part of this record and contain correspondence from numerous area residents, some supporting, and others opposing, the project.) Although Appellant was not shown a copy of the document, the record does not show that she objected to the use of a demonstrative exhibit, or that she requested to see a copy. Mr. J. B. Johnson was appointed to the Board sometime after the April 20, 2004, meeting. At the July 20, 2004, meeting, he made the following statement concerning Top Flight's application: I can't speak for everybody here. Some people have lived here a short period of time. In view of every word that I have heard, every word that I have read, and I've been keeping up with this for several months because several months ago I had telephone calls from your area. I don't know how you could satisfy everybody. It's impossible, but I do know this, this is a great project. One that would be good for the City. One for the area, good for the area and I will support this. Appellant has not cited to any evidence showing that Mr. Johnson did not review the record of the prior meetings or the application file before he cast his vote. Further, Appellant did not object to Mr. Johnson's participation. On July 26, 2004, the Board entered its DO memorializing the action taken on July 20, 2004, which approved Top Flight's application. In the DO, the Board made the following findings/conclusions supporting its decision: The proposal complies with the Flexible Development criteria per Section 2-803.B The proposal is in compliance with other standards in the Code including the General Applicability Criteria per Section 3-913. The development is compatible with the surrounding area and will enhance other redevelopment efforts. The decision also included 18 Conditions of Approval and a requirement that an application for a building permit be made no later than July 20, 2005. On August 3, 2004, Appellant filed her Appeal Application seeking a review of the Board's decision. The Appeal Application set out two relevant grounds (without any further specificity): that the Board's decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the Board departed from the essential requirements of the law. On August 19, 2004, the City referred the Appeal Application to DOAH. The specific grounds were not disclosed until Appellant presented oral argument and filed her Proposed Final Order.1
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Return on Investment The respondent Lake County Service Corporation is a private water and wastewater treatment system which provides water and sewer service to residents of Valencia Terrace near Leesburg in Lake County, Florida. The respondent utility is entirely owned by First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lake County, which is the sole supplier of funds to the utility. The respondent utility has not had a rate increase since 1972 and has been operating at a loss. Inasmuch as the First Federal Savings and Loan Association is the sole supplier of funds and the 100 percent owner of the utility, it is appropriate to use the capital structure of that Savings and Loan Association to determine a reasonable and proper cost of capital or rate of return on investment for the respondent utility. However, adjustments should be made to the capital structure of the Savings and Loan institution by removing short-term debts and liabilities (such as customer savings of less than one year) since they are subject to demand withdrawals and would be inappropriate for inclusion. After short-term maturities or debts are adjusted out, the capital structure of the financial institution resembles more closely that of a utility. After adjustments, the capital structure of the parent company was made up of 85.04 percent debt and 14.96 percent equity. The average cost of debt was 9.29 percent and the appropriate cost of equity was 17 percent, based upon a leverage scale developed by the PSC in Order No. 10603, Docket Number 820006-WS, issued on February 17, 1982. Based upon the adjusted capital structure of the Savings and Loan Association and the utilization of the leverage formula, the appropriate weighted cost of capital for the respondent utility is 10.44 percent. A rate of return on investment of 4 percent, as suggested by the petitioner, is not reasonable or appropriate in today's market place. A totally riskless investment would render a return from 8 percent (short-term) to 11 percent (long-term). Quality of Service The respondent utility's plant facilities were inspected by a PSC engineer. The utility has two wells, a primary well and an auxiliary or backup well. The auxiliary well was found to contain a small amount of dissolved iron. This well is not used as a primary water source, but is used only for fires, etc. Both wells comply with the Department of Environmental Regulation's (DER) water quality standards and requirements. Neither the water nor the sewer plants operated by the utility are under citation by the DER, and there are no outstanding corrective orders against these plants. The water tank is "blown out" twice a month and all pipes utilized by the utility are of PVC material. Three customers testified that they had problems with the quality of water and service provided by the utility. On occasion, they have found the water coming into their homes to be greatly discolored. Rust spots or stains have been observed on sidewalks and driveways and water pressure has varied. Ms. Holland has experienced problems with her laundry, primarily with white articles of clothing turning a yellow color after a period of time. She has also noticed a "pesticide smell" in her water, and now buys bottled water for consumption by her family. The caretaker for the respondent's water and sewer system, who spends six days a week in Valencia Terrace, has heard no complaints from the residents regarding service or quality of water.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that an overall return on investment in the amount of 10.44 percent is reasonable and appropriate; the quality of water and sewer services provided by the utility to its customers is safe, efficient and sufficient; and the respondent utility be authorized to increase its rates for water and sewer services in accordance with the PSC's Notice of Proposed Agency Action. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Fredric W. Holland 1619 Sailfish Avenue Leesburg, Florida 32748 M. Roberta Christ, Esquire Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul K. Mueller Lake County Service Corporation Post Office Box 420 Leesburg, Florida 32748 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph P. Cresse, Chairman Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent, KaShamba Miller-Anderson, violated section 112.3145(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), by willfully failing to file a 2015 CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests”; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently a member of the Riviera Beach City Council. As a member of the Riviera Beach City Council, Respondent served as a “local officer” as defined in section 112.3145(1)(a), throughout the year 2015. Respondent was aware that she was required to file a CE Form 1 every year, including for the year 2015. Financial disclosures are filed in order to allow the public to monitor public officials and employees for any conflicts of interest that may arise. The requirement that financial disclosures be filed is intended to deter corruption and increase the public’s confidence in government. In 2016, Respondent received e-mails at the address kmiller@rivierabch.com. She received regular mail at the address 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404. The CE Form 1, “Statement of Financial Interests,” for calendar year 2015 was required to be filed on or before July 1, 2016. There is a grace period for filing the form that expired on September 1, 2016. After the expiration of the grace period, an automatic fine of $25 per day was imposed for each day the form is late, up to a maximum fine of $1,500. The maximum fine accrued on October 31, 2016. The Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections (Palm Beach SOE) office sent Respondent the original blank 2015 financial disclosure form, along with the requirements for filing the form, before June 1, 2016. She was instructed to file her completed form no later than July 1, 2016. Respondent failed to file her 2015 CE Form 1 by either July 1, 2016, or September 1, 2016. Respondent received notice from the Commission regarding her failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. On July 31, 2016, the Palm Beach SOE sent a delinquency memorandum to Respondent at 430 West 28th Street, Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 by certified mail. The mail was unclaimed. The July 31, 2016, memorandum included the following statement: Pursuant to State law, please be advised that although you are delinquent in filing Form 1, a grace period is in effect until September 1, 2016. If your form is not received by September 1, 2016, we will be required by law to notify the Commission on Ethics of the delinquency. A fine of $25 for each day late will be imposed, up to the maximum penalty of $1500. In addition, pursuant to enacted legislation, the Commission on Ethics must initiate investigations of delinquent filers in certain circumstances. This can result in you being removed from your public office or employment. Respondent took no action to file her form by September 1, 2016. If she had done so, it would have been considered timely. Commission staff sent Respondent a courtesy letter on September 7, 2016, and advised her that she was accruing a fine of $25 per day for failure to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The Commission also e-mailed Respondent on September 20, 2016, using the e-mail address kmiller@rivierabch.com. Respondent accrued the maximum fine of $1,500 as of October 31, 2016, as authorized by section 112.3145(7)(f), for failing to file her CE Form 1 for the year 2015. On November 4, 2016, the Commission again e-mailed Respondent at the same e-mail address, advising her that the maximum fine had accrued and she still needed to file her 2015 CE Form 1. The November 4, 2016, e-mail attached a blank 2015 CE Form 1 and a form to appeal her fine. Respondent did not avail herself of the opportunity to appeal the fine that had accrued. On February 21, 2017, the Commission sent Respondent a Notice of Assessment of Automatic Fine by certified mail, using the 430 West 28th Street address. Respondent acknowledged receipt of the February 2017 notice. This e-mail also provided the appeal process for contesting the maximum fine. Respondent did not pay the fine at that time because she did not have the funds to do so. She believed, in error, that she now could not file the 2015 CE Form 1 until she paid the fine. Her belief, however misplaced, was sincere. On June 16, 2017, the Commission mailed Respondent a Notification of Issuance of Default Final Order at the 430 West 28th Street address. The Notice was not returned to the Commission as undeliverable. On June 22, 2017, Respondent paid the $1,500 fine. On June 28, 2017, Respondent filed her CE Form 1 for calendar year 2015. Respondent did not have a particularly compelling reason for not timely filing her 2015 CE Form 1. Her position on the city council is a part-time position, for which she is not assigned an assistant. She admitted at hearing that the notice and the form simply got lost on her desk, and she did not make it a priority. However, Respondent claims that while filing her 2015 CE Form 1 was not the priority it should have been, she never intended not to file the form, and she never indicated to anyone that she would not do so. Respondent filed her 2015 CE Form 1 and paid the fine prior to the finding of probable cause in this case. There are some differences between the financial disclosure Respondent filed when she initially ran for office and the one filed for 2015. Those differences however, are not so great as to support an inference or finding that she was attempting to hide something by not filing timely. The term for which Respondent was elected expired on March 21, 2018. She was re-elected for another term which began March 21, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that no violation of section 112.3145(8)(c) has been demonstrated. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A. 131 North Gadsden Street (32301) Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed)
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as an assisted living facility should be granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner's application for a license to operate an ALF, subject only to Petitioner providing the required inspection report from the Palm Beach County Public Health Unit. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian M. O'Connell, Esquire Boose, Casey, Ciklin, Lubitz, Martens, McBane & O'Connell Post Office Box 4626 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Jennifer Stewart, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 3810 Inverrary Boulevard Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309
The Issue Whether Michael Clay Bishop, d/b/a J and M Enterprises (“Respondent”), failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees; and, if so, whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (“Petitioner” or “Department”), correctly calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent purports to be a “Private Common Law Non- Associated Unincorporated Business Trust Organization,” or “UBTO,” engaged in business in Florida.2/ Michael Clay Bishop is one of Respondent’s trustees. The nature of Respondent’s business was a disputed issue at the final hearing. Mr. Bishop testified that he performed handyman services, such as cleaning, yardwork, removal of old furniture, and repair of flood-damaged properties. The record contains Respondent’s business card, which Mr. Bishop provided to the Department’s Compliance Investigator, Carl Woodall, on January 31, 2017. The business card reads, “J & M Enterprises,” and advertises as follows: Quality repairs, restoration and remodels; paint interior/exterior, flooring, fencing, decks, crown molding, concrete. BIG OR SMALL WE DO IT ALL! The business card indicates the business is “Insured” and has “references available.” Mr. Bishop did not dispute that the business card belonged to Respondent, or that it accurately represented the services provided by Respondent. Respondent accepts monetary payments for work performed by check made out to J and M Enterprises.3/ Respondent maintains a business checking account in the name of J and M Enterprises to which Respondent deposits payments for services performed by Respondent. On January 31, 2017, Mr. Woodall encountered Mr. Bishop at a residence undergoing remodeling at 8623 Lagoon Drive in Panama City Beach. Mr. Woodall observed Mr. Bishop engaged in the act of filling cracks in a bar area of the residence with putty, presumably to prepare the surface for painting. Mr. Bishop testified that he was “cleaning some caulking that wasn’t done very well.” Mr. Bishop objected to characterization of his work as painting, or preparing the surface for painting. However, Mr. Bishop admitted that he was hired by Chris Roberts of Rainbow International as a subcontractor on the remodel. Mr. Woodall testified that he spoke with Chris Roberts on the date in question, who informed him that Mr. Bishop was hired to perform painting services on the remodel, and that he was compensating J and M Enterprises at the rate of $20 per hour for the painting services. Mr. Woodall’s notes, made on his Field Interview Worksheet, corroborate his testimony on these facts. Mr. Bishop’s testimony was neither credible nor reliable. It is inconceivable that Rainbow International hired Respondent to clean caulking at $20 per hour. The evidence supports a finding that Respondent is engaged in the business of residential painting, including preparation of surfaces for painting. It is uncontested that Respondent was not covered by workers’ compensation insurance at all times material hereto. Mr. Bishop testified that he was under a mistaken assumption that he was exempt from workers’ compensation insurance since he had no employees. However, at final hearing, he explained that he had been made aware that the requirement applies to any business in the construction industry with one or more employees. Mr. Woodall personally served Mr. Bishop with a Stop-Work Order and Request for Production of Business Records on January 31, 2017. At all times material hereto, Mr. Bishop maintained that Respondent’s business records were confidential, pursuant to the business trust agreement, and that to disclose those business records would violate his obligation to Respondent’s trustees. A document purported to be Respondent’s trust indenture was admitted in evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit R4. Article 29, Section 29.1, of the Indenture is titled, “Disclosure of Documents,” and provides as follows: NO document, record, bank account, or any other written information dealing with the internal affairs or the operations of this UBTO shall be disclosed to any third party, except upon formal written board approval of the Board of Trustees given at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Trustees as set forth above. Respondent did not comply with the Department’s request for business records, such as check stubs, bank statements, or tax returns, from which the Department could establish Respondent’s payroll for the audit period.4/ Department Penalty Auditor, Eunika Jackson, was assigned to calculate the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. Pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes, the Department’s audit period is the two-year period preceding the date of the Stop-Work Order. The audit period in this case is from February 1, 2015 through January 31, 2017. Respondent provided no evidence that Respondent was not engaged in business at any time during the audit period. Respondent’s trust indenture is dated January 19, 2012. Because Respondent provided no business records from which the Department could establish Respondent’s payroll for the audit period, Ms. Jackson imputed Respondent’s payroll, pursuant to section 440.112(2). Based upon Mr. Woodall’s observations of the work being performed at the jobsite, Ms. Jackson determined that the type of construction work performed was painting. Ms. Jackson consulted the Scopes Manual published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and utilized classification code 5474, the general painting classification, for purposes of calculating the penalty. Ms. Jackson then applied the corresponding approved manual rates for classification code 5474 for the related periods of non-compliance. Ms. Jackson applied the correct approved manual rates and correctly utilized the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69L-6.027 and 69L-6.028 to determine the penalty to be imposed. Because Respondent did not provide records sufficient to determine its payroll during the audit period, Ms. Jackson correctly assigned the statewide average weekly wage (AWW) to Mr. Bishop, the only employee identified on the jobsite on the date in question. § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. Ms. Jackson likewise correctly utilized the AWW multiplied by two when applying the statutory formula for calculating the penalty to be assessed. See § 440.107(7)(d)1., Fla. Stat. On April 18, 2017, by certified mail, the Department served Respondent with an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessing a penalty of $30,600.44, which was fully imputed. Respondent made a payment of $1,000 to the Department which has been applied to the imputed penalty. The Department’s Penalty Calculation worksheet notes a balance due of $29,600.44.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, finding that Michael Clay Bishop, d/b/a J and M Enterprises, violated the workers’ compensation insurance law and assessing a penalty of $30,600.44. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent should grant the Petitioner's application for licensure as a "community association manager."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, George Charles Fair, applied for licensure as a "community association manager" on or about April 26, 1992. His application included three character references. Licensure as a "community association manager" is a license to perform community association management services to one or more associations containing more than 50 units, or having an annual budget or budgets in excess of $100,000. A "community association manager" is licensed to control or disburse funds of a community association, prepare budgets or other financial documents for a community association, assist in the noticing or conduct of community association meetings, and coordinate maintenance for the residential development and other day-to-day services involved with the operation of a community association. Performance of the functions of a "community association manager" involves specialized knowledge, judgment and managerial skill; it is not a clerical or ministerial position under the direct supervision of another. It can involve writing checks, disbursing association funds, accounting for and depositing unit owner assessments, some of which might be paid in cash, placing association funds in investment accounts, and budgeting association funds. Depending on the size of the association, a "community association manager" could have access to subtantial sums of money in the form of cash, credit cards, and checking accounts. On or about August 20, 1990, the Petitioner pled guilty to and was convicted of one federal felony count of misapplication of bank funds. While an officer with the Southeast Bank in Dunedin, Florida, the Petitioner made a supposed loan of approximately $60,000 to a fictitious borrower. He personally used the proceeds of the supposed loan. For a time, he paid the interest on the "loan." But when he did not repay the "loan," the bank discovered what the Petitioner had done and reported him to the authorities. Upon his conviction for the offense, the Petitioner was sentenced to ten months in prison. After serving the prison term, the Petitioner was released under the supervision of a probation officer for a period of 24 months. The Petitioner also was ordered to pay restitution to the Southeast Bank "in the amount of $61,634.92 in payments under such terms and conditions as prescribed by the probation office." The Petitioner is making small monthly payments at this time due to his lack of funds and unemployment. The Petitioner's federal conviction is for conduct that is related to the work of a "community association manager." Despite the Petitioner's character references, cooperation with federal authorities and personal assurances that he would not repeat the kind of conduct that resulted the federal conviction, inadequate time has passed for the Petitioner to be able to prove that he has rehabilitated himself so as to be trusted handling others' money. The Petitioner testified that he was conditionally offered a job that primarily would involve soliciting community association clients for a property management company. He understood that licensure as a "community association manager" would be necessary for him to get and perform the job. That is why he applied for licensure. The Petitioner's testimony at final hearing was to the effect that the real reason he asked for formal administrative proceedings was to raise objections to the manner in which his application was processed by the Respondent. First, he felt that he was invited to apply for licensure despite his conviction, and to pay his application fee, although his conviction was enough to preclude licensure. Second, he felt that the process took too long, especially if denial was a foregone conclusion in view of the conviction. Third, the application was denied although his references were not contacted by the Respondent. As to the Petitioner's first complaint, it was not demonstrated that the Petitioner fully explained to the representatives of the Respondent with whom he spoke on the telephone, before he applied, the nature of the offense for which he was convicted. To the contrary, he asked generally whether a felony conviction necessarily would preclude licensure, and he was told, "not necessarily." He testified that he did not think it would make any difference what kind of felony it was. As to the second complaint, the process indeed seemed to be unduly prolonged. The Petitioner received no response to his application by June 17, 1992, and telephoned to inquire. He was told the application was just sent "downstairs" for investigation of the criminal conviction. He then got a letter asking for an explanation of the conviction, and he supplied the information by letter dated June 26, 1992. In two subsequent telephone inquiries, the Petitioner was told that his application was "in process." In three telephone inquiries on August 18 and 19, 1992, the Petitioner was told that the person responsible for his application was on vacation until August 24, 1992. The Petitioner called the person back on August 24 and was told that his application was on her desk but that she had to review it. She called the Petitioner the next day to tell him that his application was being denied, but the written Notice and Order of Rejection was not issued until on or about October 22, 1992. As for the third complaint, the evidence was that the Petitioner's written character references in his application were considered even though the references themselves were not personally contacted. The Petitioner suggested, as a compromise resolution to his license application, that he be issued a conditional license. He envisions that the job he has been offered, conditioned upon his licensure, will not require that he handle funds but only that he solicit association clients for his employer. He suggests the issuance of a conditional or probationary license that would not allow him to handle money for a time certain. The Respondent's agency policy and practice is not to issue "conditional" or "probationary" or "conditional" licenses, or the like.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a "community association manager." RECOMMENDED this 24th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: George Charles Fair 1540 Fife Court Dunedin, Florida 34698 Jeanne M. L. Player, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Henry M. Solares, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1000
The Issue The issue in this case, as stipulated by the parties, is whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2010),1/ by attempting to enter into, or by entering into, pre- dated employment agreements, and/or by attempting to destroy or destroying public records and/or evidence of wrongdoing and/or by attempting to enter into or entering into agreements which exceeded the Respondent's purchasing authority.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Oel Wingo was employed as the city manager for the City of Holly Hill (City) from January 1, 2010, until October 2010. Prior to serving in that capacity, she was the assistant city manager for the City of Palm Coast for ten years, and the assistant city manager for the City of Ocala for five years. Respondent earned a Ph.D. in Education Administration from the University of Florida. At all times material to the allegations herein, the City operated under a commission/city manager form of government. This meant that the commission decided policy, while the city manager was responsible for implementing policy and handling all operational matters, including the hiring and firing of personnel. Respondent's employment as city manager was governed by an employment agreement. The agreement provided for the payment of severance pay to Respondent in the event she was "terminated" by the City. Under section 10 of the agreement, termination could occur under a number of scenarios, including the following: If the Employer reduces the base salary, compensation or any other financial benefit of the Employee, unless it is applied in no greater percentage than the average reduction of all department heads, such action shall constitute a breach of this agreement and will be regarded as a termination. In the event that Respondent was terminated pursuant to the above provision, "[T]he Employer shall provide, initially, a severance payment equal to six months' salary at the current rate of pay " Respondent's employment agreement with the City further provided that she would not be entitled to receive severance benefits in the event she was terminated for cause. At the time she was terminated from her employment as city manager, Respondent’s annual rate of pay was $124,500.00. When Respondent assumed her duties as city manager, the City was experiencing significant budget problems because of declining property values, and the resultant reduction in tax revenues. Faced with a reduced budget, Respondent was nonetheless charged with the duty to maintain the current level of city services. Consequently, Respondent implemented budget cuts, reorganizations, layoffs, and position eliminations within months of her arrival. Understandably, the atmosphere in city commission meetings was, at times, tense and volatile. Similarly, the rapid personnel changes negatively affected employee morale and fostered resistance to many of the changes proposed by Respondent. When Respondent was hired by the City, only one City department head, City Clerk Valerie Manning, had an employment contract. Ms. Manning's contract with the City provided that if the City were to reduce her compensation in a greater percentage than the applicable across-the-board reduction for all City employees, she could elect to resign and “be terminated without cause,” and therefor eligible for full severance benefits. Manning left the employ of the City in April, 2010. In April 2010, Respondent replaced Manning with Joshua Fruecht. Fruecht testified that he requested an employment contract soon after he was hired. Respondent told him she would consider it after he had worked for the City for six months. Early during Respondent's employment with the City she and the City Attorney, Scott Simpson, had conversations about the desirability of the department heads having employment agreements because, as department heads, they had no protection from arbitrary termination. Entering into employment agreements with the department heads would protect them from being terminated by the city commission for personal reasons. By that time Respondent had already been approached by Administrative Services Director Kurt Swarzlander, who was concerned about his position and also wanted an employment agreement. On May 6, 2010, Respondent e-mailed Attorney Simpson with the following inquiry: We recently discussed the need to contract with Department Heads. Previously, the City Clerk had a contract. I am reviewing similar employment contracts from other cities and would like to pursue this for several reasons. My primary question for you is whether these contracts must go before the Commission. My interpretation of the Charter and my hiring and firing capabilities is that they do not, as long as I remain within the adopted job descriptions and pay ranges. Later that day, Simpson responded to Respondent's inquiry as follows: I agree that an employment contract with department heads should be within your authority as the City Manager. However, if severance is going to be provided to the department heads, then I would recommend having the commission approve this change in benefits even if individually the cost would not exceed your spending authority as cumulatively they probably would and it is a new benefit. This should not be an issue as the commission approved this for the City Clerk. Roland Via served on the city commission from November 2005 through November 2010, and was the mayor when Respondent was hired as the city manager. Mr. Via testified that in January 2010, during her first month of employment, Respondent advanced the idea of employment agreements for City department heads. According to Respondent, employment agreements would permit the City to hire the best managerial talent from other cities and provide a benefit to both the City and the employee. In May 2010, Respondent negotiated an employment agreement with Brad Johnson to serve as the public works director. The contract was executed without approval by the City Commission. City Attorney Simpson and Respondent collaborated in the preparation of the contract. Mr. Johnson's agreement provided that if the City were to reduce his financial benefits in a greater percentage than the applicable across-the-board reduction for all City employees, he could resign and be terminated without cause, thus being eligible for full severance benefits. Specifically, section 4(c) of Mr. Johnson’s employment agreement provided as follows: If the City reduces the financial benefits of the Employee in a greater percentage than the applicable across-the-board reduction for all City employees, or if the City refuses, allowing written notice, to comply with any other provision benefitting the Employee as set forth herein, then Employee may, at his/her option, elect to resign and be “terminated without cause” within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the Agreement and shall receive all compensation and benefits in Section (4)(a). Such resignation shall be in writing to the City Manager. In the event there was a termination under the above circumstances, Mr. Johnson’s agreement provided that the City would pay a minimum of four months’ salary and benefits pursuant to the City’s Personnel Policies. Respondent forwarded an e-mail to the members of the City Commission on May 7, 2010, informing them of her decision to enter into an employment agreement with Mr. Johnson based on a similar agreement with the former City Clerk, Ms. Manning. Respondent also informed the commissioners that the “City Attorney has advised that we consider utilizing employment agreements with new Department Heads.” At the time Respondent offered an employment agreement to Mr. Johnson, she elected not to do so for the other department heads. This was because she needed more time to evaluate each department head’s capabilities and determine on a case by case basis whether offering contracts to them would in the best interest of the City. However, the unrebutted testimony established that early in her tenure as city manager Respondent had formulated the intent to enter into employment contracts with qualified department heads at some future time. When Respondent entered into the written agreement with Mr. Johnson she was aware of the potential limitations imposed on her purchasing authority as a result of the severance provisions of the employment agreement. However, at the time that Respondent entered into the agreement with Mr. Johnson, no language was suggested or offered by the city attorney regarding the limitations imposed on the city manager's purchasing authority by virtue of the City’s purchasing code. While Respondent was hired by unanimous vote of the City commission, her relationship with certain commissioners, particularly Commissioner Glass and Commissioner Patton, began to deteriorate within the first months of her employment. This was the result of several actions by Respondent, including challenging Commissioner Glass about directing an employee to expend funds in a manner inconsistent with commission action, and deciding not to authorize the use of City funds to pay for the spouses and children of commissioners to attend the League of Cities convention. As a result of this friction, Respondent testified, she was threatened by Commissioner Glass on more than one occasion. The July 28, 2010, Employment Agreements (Dated May 21, 2010) At a city commission workshop on the evening of July 27, 2010, Commissioner Patton suggested that Respondent take a 20 percent cut in pay, and that salaries of the department heads also be reduced. At the time that Commissioner Patton suggested the pay cuts, the only department head that had an employment agreement was Mr. Johnson. However, no formal motion was made at this meeting to cut Respondent’s or department head pay, and no evidence was introduced that any action was ever taken by the city commission on this suggestion. In the hours immediately following the commission meeting of July 27, 2010, which Respondent and other witnesses characterized as being "vicious, dysfunctional, screaming and yelling," Respondent wrote a resignation letter and prepared a list of things that needed to be done before she left the City. Among the items on Respondent’s “to do” list was to prepare and complete the employment agreements that she and the city attorney had been discussing for department heads. Respondent testified that she had two reasons for implementing employment agreements immediately following the July 27th commission meeting. The first was to protect the department heads from the personal vendettas of the city commission. The second was to ensure that the City had a professional management team in place and continuity of professional management. On the morning of July 28, 2010, Respondent met with all of her department heads at the regularly scheduled weekly executive team meeting. She informed them that she would be working with the human resources director, Diane Cole, to immediately prepare employment agreements for all department heads modeled on the Brad Johnson, May 21, 2010, employment agreement. The reason given by Respondent for the agreements was that the department heads “should all have some protections due to the atmosphere within the city . . . .” During this meeting she also informed her department heads of her intention to resign as city manager. Respondent directed Ms. Cole to use the exact same agreement as had been prepared for Mr. Johnson, and to include the same dates as were included in that agreement. Accordingly, each of the employment agreements was dated as being signed on May 21, 2010, and each contained the same severance pay provision at section 4(c), as did Mr. Johnson’s agreement. Likewise, the effective date of each of the employment agreements was June 7, 2010. On the afternoon of July 28, 2010, each of the department heads, except Police Chief Barker, who was out of town, was presented with and signed their respective employment agreement. Although not present, Chief Barker conferred by telephone with Respondent regarding the employment agreement and advised her that he would not sign a "post-dated" agreement. The July 29, 2010, Agreements Upon further reflection that evening, Respondent became concerned about the “signature date” of May 21, 2010, appearing on contracts actually signed on July 28, 2010. This concern was no doubt fueled by Chief Barker’s comment regarding the “post- dated” nature of the agreements. Accordingly, Respondent decided to have new agreements prepared the following day which would reflect signature dates of July 29, 2010. In addition, both she and Ms. Cole had noted that the some of the agreements signed on July 28, 2010, contained typographical errors that needed to be corrected.2/ On July 29, 2010, Respondent presented a second employment agreement to each of the City department heads for them to sign. Each employment contract was dated as having been executed on July 29, 2010. Each of the employment agreements contained the identical language at section 4(c) as had appeared in the earlier versions signed the previous day. Similarly, the “effective date” of each agreement remained June 7, 2010. Following the execution of the agreements on July 29, 2010, Respondent instructed Ms. Cole to destroy all the agreements dated May 21, 2010. Ms. Cole testified that Respondent directed her to destroy them because they were drafts, they contained typographical errors, and they had been superseded by the July 29, 2010, agreements. Notwithstanding her direction that the hardcopies be destroyed, Respondent testified that she understood that a copy of all of the agreements dated May 21, 2010, remained on the City's computer system, consistent with the City’s record retention procedures. The new agreements tied Respondent's potential severance benefits to base salary reductions of all department heads whose severance benefits were, in turn, tied to reductions in pay and benefits to all City employees.3/ Thus, any potential benefit to Respondent of the new agreements would depend on the type of action taken by the City. At least three scenarios were possible. First, if the City proposed cutting Respondent’s pay and benefits by 20 percent, with no other corresponding reductions to department heads or city personnel, there would be no new benefit to Respondent. She would be entitled to severance as provided in her employment agreement, because her pay and benefits were being cut in a greater percentage than her department heads. Second, if the City reduced salary and benefits paid to department heads or city personnel by 10 percent, but reduced Respondent’s pay and benefits by 20 percent, there would be no new benefit to Respondent. She would be entitled to severance as provided in her employment agreement, because her pay and benefits were being cut in a greater percentage than her department heads. Third, if the City reduced Respondent's salary and benefits by 20 percent and her department heads by 20 percent, and the remaining City employees by five percent, Respondent would receive no new benefit. She would not be entitled to severance as provided in her employment agreement because her pay and benefits were not being cut in a greater percentage than her department heads. Under this scenario, the department heads would be entitled to elect to treat the disproportionate pay and benefit reduction as a “termination without cause,” and while the department heads would benefit, Respondent would not. On or about August 20, 2010, having heard about the employee contracts, City Commissioner Rick Glass telephonically requested a copy of all the employment agreements "from 5/21 to present . . . ." In response, Respondent sent an e-mail to all the City Commissioners, the Executive Team, and to the City Attorney stating, in part: Pursuant to the advice of the City Attorney and based on the fact that the Commissioners previously approved the concept of a Department Head Employment Agreement in 2008, the City Attorney prepared an Employment Agreement in May 2010 for implementation. See Attached. Consistent with the City Manager's approved purchasing authority, all non-union managers were subsequently offered the opportunity to enter into the proposed employment agreement. The Employment Agreement protects the City as well as the professionals. The City is protected by ensuring that we have sufficient lead time, four months, prior to a resignation to ensure we have adequate coverage for a professional position and services can continue uninterrupted. Respondent provided the recipients of the e-mail a copy of "the agreement prepared by the City Attorney." On August 23, 2010, Commissioner Glass sent an e-mail to Respondent requesting a copy of the "first signed copy of the employee agreements predated back to May 2010, that Scott, Brad, Diane, Josh, Oel, Kurt, Ron, and Mark signed! Not the contracts you had them re-sign on July 29th." In response, on August 23, 2010, Respondent wrote: This is a follow-up to Mr. Glass's request for Employment Agreement signed on May 21, 2010. The only Department Head that signed an agreement on that date is Brad Johnson. At that time, I chose not to have the other Department Heads sign Employment Agreements as I felt that I needed more time to determine their capabilities in their jobs and whether an employment agreement which committed the City to those individuals was in the best interest of the City. Subsequently, given the tone of the Commission meetings, the pressure to terminate certain individuals, as well as the pressure to treat those without union contracts differently, I chose to provide those employees with the same agreement that Brad Johnson signed on May 21, 2010. I felt morally and ethically obligated to ensure that those employees had similar protections to those employees with union agreements. These employees signed an agreement on July 28, 2010, which still had the May 21, 2010 date on it. On July 29, 2010, we corrected not only the date to reflect July 29, 2010, but several other errors related to titles and responsibilities within the proposed agreements. It was never my intent to imply that these employees had signed the agreement on May 21, 2010. It was my intent to show that they had the same protective status as Brad Johnson acquired on May 21, 2010, so that all were treated the same. As the date could have reflected a different intent and there were other errors in the intermediate document, I corrected the proposed employment agreement the next day and had the managers sign a new agreement. The documents signed on July 28, 2010, are considered draft or intermediate records which are not in and of themselves considered public records and were disposed of in accordance to state guidelines. In an August 24, 2010, e-mail, Attorney Simpson responded to Ms. Wingo's August 23, 2010, e-mail. He wrote that inasmuch as the documents in question "contained errors that were corrected, including the date, and the revised agreements was [sic] subsequently executed by the City Manager and the employees. Based on these facts the original agreements executed would appear to be drafts or precursors to the final employment agreement." Mr. Simpson concluded, "draft documents are not public records." The August 30, 2010, Agreements On August 30, 2010, yet a third version of the employment agreements was presented to each of the department heads. These agreements were prepared and executed following communications with Attorney Simpson regarding whether the severance pay provisions of the July 30, 2010, agreements potentially exceeded Respondent's purchasing authority of $25,000. At issue was the manner in which Respondent had originally calculated the potential severance benefits available to the department heads under the agreements. In an e-mail dated August 24, 2010, Attorney Simpson expressed his concern that the severance pay provisions in the July 30, 2010, agreements had the potential to exceed $25,000 for all of the department heads, with the exception of Joshua Fruecht. The third and final version of the agreement addressed the limitations in the severance benefits offered as a result of the limits on the city manager’s purchasing authority set forth in the City’s purchasing ordinances. Specifically, section 4(a) of the agreement was amended to provide: In the event the Employee is terminated without cause by the City while the Employee is willing and able to perform the duties of the position as Human Resources Manager, the City agrees, subject to the below conditions, to pay the Employee a minimum of four (4) months of salary and benefits health insurance provided to the Employee pursuant to the City’s Personnel Policies not to exceed the City Manager’s purchasing Authority. Additionally, the City shall be responsible to pay all leave accruals at the Employee’s current rate of pay, consistent with City Personnel Rules and Regulations. (Emphasis in original). Each of the employment agreements signed on August 30, 2010, reflects execution on that date. Other than the signature date and revision to section 4(a), the August 30, 2010, agreements are identical to the July 29, 2010, versions. There is no persuasive evidence in this record that Respondent did not have authority to enter into employment agreements with the City's department heads on behalf of the City. To the contrary, the City's outside labor counsel opined that a strong argument could be made that the city manager possesses the authority to enter into employment contracts, subject to the city manager's purchasing authority. Similarly, Attorney Simpson testified that he believed Respondent had the authority to enter into employment agreements. The only question in his mind was whether the agreements should be presented to the City Commission for review and approval, since in his opinion, offering a severance benefit was a policy issue. There is no question that the City’s department heads received a benefit from having employment agreements with the City. It protected them from arbitrary personnel actions and provided severance benefits under certain circumstances. Specifically, their pay and benefits could not be reduced unless there was a corresponding reduction for all City employees. The evidence adduced at hearing does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent acted corruptly in entering into pre-dated employment agreements with her department heads, or in directing that the July 28, 2010, versions of the agreements be destroyed. Rather, the competent substantial evidence established that Respondent believed that she was acting in a manner consistent with the proper performance of her duties as city manager.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a Final Order dismissing the Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2012.
