The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner achieved a passing grade on the May 20, 1991, certified residential appraiser examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner took the May 20, 1991, certified residential appraiser examination. He was subsequently advised that he had correctly answered 74 out of the 100 questions and had therefore achieved a score of 74. A score of 75 is the passing score on that examination. In the development of the state certified residential appraiser examination, a job analysis was performed by Educational Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, a national psychometric company. From that job analysis, a list of tasks routinely performed by appraisers was developed. From that list of tasks, the uniform examination content outline was developed specifying the areas to be covered by the examination. From that uniform content outline, Educational Testing Service then developed a bank of questions to be utilized in the examinations for licensure or certification. Each item in the bank was validated by Educational Testing Service. Once Respondent received that bank of validated test items, it sent all of the items to the Appraiser Qualifications Board of the Appraisal Foundation, an entity involved in establishing uniform standards on a national level for real estate appraisers. Respondent's examination bank was also validated by the Appraiser Qualifications Board. In addition, Respondent has its own validation committee which meets prior to the administration of an examination to review the items on that examination to again verify that the test items are valid, are not ambiguous, and are correct and proper for a residential appraiser certification examination. The five questions challenged by Petitioner are part of the bank that was approved by the Appraiser Qualifications Board. Those five questions have been used on past examinations and have previously been determined to be valid. The five questions challenged by Petitioner ranged from moderately difficult to extremely easy. Subsequent to the filing of Petitioner's examination challenge, Respondent reviewed the questions challenged and performed a statistical item analysis. All of the questions had a positive point biserial correlation. The number of candidates correctly answering each of those questions was approximately the same as the number of candidates correctly answering those questions on previous examinations. For example, 94% of the candidates correctly answered question numbered 4. On previous examinations, 93% to 95% of the candidates had correctly answered that same item. Sixty-seven per cent of the candidates taking the May 20, 1991, certified residential appraiser examination achieved a passing grade. Their examination was a typical examination in that the usual percentage of candidates achieved a passing score. Question numbered 4 required the examinee to identify the item which was not a fixture. The correct answer was "D," which answer specified that the personalty was "unattached." Petitioner chose answer "C," which answer specified that the personalty was attached to the structure. Petitioner's answer was not correct. Question numbered 73 required the examinee to name the cost method defined in the question. The correct answer was "B." Petitioner chose answer "A," which was not a correct answer. Question numbered 32 tested the examinee's understanding of valuing property containing superadequacies and was written in the negative. The correct answer was "C." Petitioner's choice of "D" was not correct since that was one of the approaches that can be used. Question numbered 76 tested the examinee's understanding of the difference between reproduction costs and replacement costs. The correct answer was "B." Petitioner chose answer "D." Petitioner's answer was wrong. Although the testimony at the final hearing indicated that answer "A" may also have been a correct answer to this question, Petitioner did not choose answer "A." Question numbered 93 tested the examinee's knowledge of proper appraisal practices. Answer "A" was the correct answer. Petitioner chose answer "C," which was not correct. Although Petitioner questioned the propriety of this question as part of the residential appraiser examination, the expert testimony indicates that the question was appropriate. Further, the question has been validated as being appropriate by the Appraiser Qualifications Board applying national standards. The parties have stipulated that Petitioner meets all of the requirements for licensure as a certified residential appraiser except for achieving a passing grade on the certification examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petitioner's examination question challenges and finding that Petitioner failed to achieve a passing grade on the May 20, 1991, certified residential appraiser examination. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1992. Copies furnished: Mr. Stephen Metro 1841 Northwest 22nd Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Fred H. Wilsen, Chief Staff Attorney DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against the licenses held by Respondent as a real estate broker, licenses numbers 3000807, 3000808, and 300092222, and as a real estate instructor, license number 32195, for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1)(f), (n) and (p), Florida Statutes (2004)?
Findings Of Fact Facts Alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint Uncontested by the Answer: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed Florida real estate broker, issued license numbers 3000807, 3000808, and 3092222, in accordance with Chapter 475 of the Florida Statutes. The last licenses issued were as a broker at AAA Realty of Florida Comm. Real Estate Properties/Investments, Inc., 132 South Atlantic Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118, and at AAA Realty of Florida International Inc., 132 South Atlantic Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. Respondent is a licensed real estate instructor issued license number 32195 with AAA College of Real Estate. Additional Facts: More specifically concerning licenses issued to Respondent as a real estate broker, from January 1, 2005 through March 13, 2006, Respondent was a broker doing business as AAA Realty of Florida License No. BK3000807, a brokerage sole proprietorship located at 132 South Atlantic Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. From January 1, 2005 to March 13, 2006, Respondent was a broker, License No. BK3092222, affiliated with AAA Realty of Florida International, Inc., License No. CQ0000000, a brokerage corporation located at 132 South Atlantic Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. License No. BK3000808 expired March 31, 2004. In State of Florida vs. Fadel Fawzi Elbadramany, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Division 41, Case No. 2001-36519CFAES, the defendant, Respondent here, was tried and found guilty by a jury of grand theft of over $20,000, an offense recognized in Subsections 812.014(1) and (2) (b), Florida Statutes. On February 11, 2005, an order of judgment was entered by Circuit Judge R. Michael Hutcheson adjudicating the defendant in that cause, Respondent, in the present case, guilty of grand theft. On that same date an order of sentence was entered against the defendant/Respondent, by which he was committed to the Department of Corrections to be imprisoned for a term of 15 years, with credit for 105 days of time served while incarcerated before the imposition of this sentence. By separate order the defendant/Respondent was required to pay certain charges, costs and fees. That order was entered on February 11, 2005. In Fadel Elbadramany, Appellant, vs. State of Florida, Appellee, in the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fifth District, July term 2006, Case No. 5D05-754 decision filed August 8, 2006, the court entered a per curium affirmance. On September 27, 2006, that court ordered "that appellant's motion for rehearing, rehearing En Banc and request to issue a written opinion filed August 22, 2006 and Appellant's Supplemental to Request to Issue a Written Opinion, filed September 18, 2006 are denied." Respondent is presently confined in Washington Correctional Institution where the final hearing was held. He is inmate number V21541. His tentative release date from his imprisonment is October 26, 2019. His confinement is in relation to the grand theft offense.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Section 475.25(1)(f) and (n), Florida Statutes (2004), that Respondent did not violate Section 475.25(1)(p) Florida Statutes (2004), and revoking the real estate broker licenses and real estate instructor license held by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Documents introduced into evidence revealed that the Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke is a registered real estate broker and Clarke Real Estate is an entity registered as a partnership broker and authorized to act as such with the Commission. On or about September 15, 1975, Jerry Kent, a salesman with Respondent, Clark Real Estate, obtained an oral open listing from Esther Braverman on a condominium unit denominated as "Apartment B-804, 1111 Crandon Boulevard, Key Biscayne, Florida." Pursuant thereto, salesman Kent showed the condominium unit to Jacques Benoist and Jeanine Benoist, his wife, who executed a deposit receipt contract to purchase a condominium unit on September 27, 1975. Esther Braverman, the seller, executed the contract during October of 1975. The deposit receipt contract provided for a $10,000 earnest money deposit to be held in the escrow account of the law firm of Snider, Young, Barrett, and Tannenbaum, P.A., attorneys for seller Braverman. Said deposit was made on September 27, 1975, by delivering a check to attorney Bruce L. Hollander, a member of the firm, who deposited the deposit in the firm's escrow account. (See Commission's Exhibit No. 9). The deposit receipt contract also obligated the seller, Esther Braverman, to pay Respondent Jeremiah C. Clark a commission of $7,875. Specifically, the contract provides that "I, or we, agree to pay to the above assigned broker a commission for finding the above signed purchaser for the above described property, the sum of $7,875 . . . ." Closing took place on January 19, 1976, at the offices of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida, from whom the Benoists had obtained financing for the purchase. At the closing on January 19, 1976, Esther Braverman signed and delivered a warranty deed made out to Jacques Benoist and Janine Benoist, transferring the property to the Bravermans. The warranty deed was recorded with the clerk of the Dade County Circuit Court by the lending institution, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association. (See Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) At the closing, Jeremiah Clark was given a check representing the commission to Clarke Real Estate in the amount of $7,875. Thereafter, Jerry Clarke was requested by the lending institution to hold the funds in escrow until the bank dispursed the mortgage proceeds. He was then told that the mortgage proceeds would be paid within the following week. Respondent Clarke agreed, pursuant to a request from the seller's attorney, Bruce Hollander, to hold the commission check until January 27, 1976, without depositing same. Mr. Clarke held the commission check until January 29, 1976, as agree. On that day, he dispursed the proceeds to salesman Jerry Kent and the balance was credited to Clarke Real Estate. The mortgage funds were never disbursed because the lending institution could not obtain a quit-claim deed from the seller, Esther Braverman's former husband and therefore in the lending institution's opinion, the defect was not discovered until after the closing. On May 6, 1976, attorney Hollander acting for his law firm and the seller sent Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke and Respondent Clarke Real Estate a letter stating that the mortgage proceeds had not been disbursed by the lending institution and requested a demand for the commission check. The Commission takes the position that the closing which occurred on January 19, was an escrow closing and that the Respondent Jeremiah Clarke was not authorized to disburse the proceeds from the commission check until notification that the mortgage proceeds were disbursed by the lending Institution. The Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that their only obligation was to find a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the transaction, which acts were consummated by their salesman, Jerry Kent. Based on my examination of the document introduced herein, and the testimony adduced during the hearing, the undersigned concludes that the Respondent's position that it was entitled to receive the commission monies here in dispute has merit. Although the Commission takes the position that an escrow closing occurred, an escrow has been defined as a written instrument which by its term imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or a happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. It cannot be seriously contended herein that the Respondent Clarke was acting as an escrow for himself when consideration is given to the above definition of an escrow. See Love v. Brown Development Company, 131 So. 144. It is further essential to an escrow that delivery of the instrument be to a stranger or to a third person, that is, to one who is not a party to the instrument, or a person so free from any personal or legal identity with the parties to the instrument as to leave them free to discharge his duty as a depository to both parties without involving a breach of duty to either. For example, a deed delivered to a grantee cannot be regarded as held in escrow. Here, Respondent Clarke was in no way acting for anyone other than himself or as agent for his salesman, Jerry Kent, both of whom had a direct stake in the commission proceeds. Additionally, upon examination of the deposit receipt contract, the broker became entitled to the commission proceeds when the buyer (purchaser) was found. Additionally, and as an aside, it was noted that the lending institution in fact recorded its mortgage the day following the closing This would lead any examiner of the public records to believe that the lending institution was satisfied with the title as conveyed on the closing date. It was further noted that the Respondents had no indication that there was a problem with the title until approximately five months following the closing. Finally, the undersigned received a letter from attorney Lipcon dated August 1, 1975, advising that the civil case which was pending before the Dade County Circuit Court involving similar issues as posed herein before the commission had been fully and finally settled. There was a stipulation for dismissal signed by attorneys for each of the parties including the attorney for the firm that made the complaint against the Respondents stating in essence that the monies paid to Respondent Clarke and which was retained by him as full and final settlement of his brokerage commission were to be retained by Respondent Clarke as final payment of his commission in connection of the sale of the subject condominium. For all of these reasons, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as found above, it is hereby recommended that the complaints filed herein be dismissed in their entirety. Recommended this 23rd day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are, first, whether Respondent, a certified real estate appraiser, committed various disciplinable offenses in connection with three residential appraisals; and second, if Respondent is guilty of any charges, whether she should be punished therefor.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board ("Board") is the state agency charged with regulating real estate appraisers who are, or want to become, licensed to render appraisal services in the State of Florida. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against such appraisers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Elsa Cartaya ("Cartaya") was a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser. Her conduct as an appraiser in connection with the matters presently at issue falls squarely within the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Case No. 04-1680 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1680, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisal of a residence located at 930 East Ninth Place, Hialeah, Florida (the "Hialeah Property"). Specifically, the Department made the following allegations against Cartaya:1 Respondent developed and communicated an appraisal report (Report) for the property commonly known as 930 E. 9 Place, Hialeah, Florida 33010. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On the Report, Respondent represents that: she signed it on July 27, 2000, the Report is effective as of July 27, 2000. On or about October 26, 2001, Respondent provided a "Report History" to Petitioner's investigator. A copy of the report history is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. On the Report History, Respondent admits that she completed the report on August 7, 2000. On Report, Respondent represents that there were no prior sales of subject property within one year of the appraisal. Respondent knew that a purchase and sale transaction on subject property closed on July 28, 2000. Respondent knew that the July 28, 2000, transaction had a contract sales price of $82,000. A copy of the closing statement is attached hereto as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. Respondent knowingly refused to disclose the July 28, 2000, sale on Report. On [the] Report, Respondent represented that the current owner of subject property was Hornedo Lopez. Hornedo Lopez did not become the title- owner until on or about July 28, 2000, but before August 7, 2000. On [the] Report, Respondent represents that quality of construction of subject property is "CBS/AVG." The public records reflect that subject property is of mixed construction, CBS and poured concrete. On [the] Report, Respondent represents: "The income approach was not derived due to lack of accurately verifiable data for the mostly owner occupied area." The multiple listing brochures indicate as follows: for comparable one: "Main House 3/2 one apartment 1/1 (Rents $425) and 2 efficiencies each at $325. Live rent free with great income or bring your big family." A copy of the brochure for comparable one is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 4. for comparable three: "Great Rental . . . two 2/1 two 1/1 and one studio. Total rental income is $2,225/month if all rented." A copy of the brochure for comparable three is attached and incorporated as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 5. On or about October 23, 2001, Petitioner's investigator inspected Respondent's work file for Report. The investigation revealed that Respondent failed to maintain a true copy of Report in the work file. On [the] Report, Respondent failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180.000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits to having received a request for appraisal of subject property indicting a contract price of $195,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that the multiple listing brochure for subject property listed the property for $119,900, as a FANNIE MAE foreclosure. On [the] Report History, Respondent also admits that she had a multiple listing brochure in the file, listing subject property for $92,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that she did not report the listings in Report. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits knowledge that comparable three was "rebuilt as a 2/1 with two 1/1 & 1 studio receiving income although zoned residential." On [the] Report, Respondent failed or refused to explain or adjust for comparable three's zoning violations. On the foregoing allegations, the Department charged Cartaya under four counts, as follows: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest conduct, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes.[2] COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having accepted an appraisal assignment if the employment itself is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined result, analysis, or opinion, or if the fee to be paid for the performance of the appraisal assignment is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached upon the consequent resulting from the appraisal assignment in violation of Section 475.624(17), Florida Statutes.[3] In her Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5-9, 11, 13-15, 17-19, and 23-25 of the Amended Complaint. Based on Cartaya's admissions, the undersigned finds these undisputed allegations to be true. Additional findings are necessary, however, to make sense of these particular admissions and to determine whether Cartaya committed the offenses of which she stands accused. In April 2000, Southeast Financial Corporation ("Southeast") asked Cartaya to prepare an appraisal of the Hialeah Property for Southeast's use in underwriting a mortgage loan, the proceeds of which would be applied by the prospective mortgagor(s) towards the $205,000 purchase price that he/she/they had agreed to pay Hornedo Lopez ("Hornedo") for the residence in question.4 In preparing the appraisal, Cartaya discovered that the putative seller, Hornedo, was actually not the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Rather, title was held in the name of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Hialeah Property was "in foreclosure." Cartaya informed her contact at Southeast, Marianella Lopez ("Marianella"), about this problem. Marianella explained that Hornedo was in the process of closing a sale with Fannie Mae and would resell the Hialeah Property to a new buyer soon after acquiring the deed thereto. Cartaya told Marianella that, to complete the appraisal, she (Cartaya) would need to be provided a copy of the closing statement documenting the transfer of title from Fannie Mae to Hornedo. No further work was done on the appraisal for several months. Then, on July 25, 2000, Marianella ordered another appraisal of the Hialeah Property, this time for Southeast's use in evaluating a mortgage loan to Jose Granados ("Granados"), who was under contract to purchase the subject residence from Hornedo for $195,000. Once again, Cartaya quickly discovered that Fannie Mae, not Hornedo, was the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Once again, Cartaya immediately informed Marianella about the situation. Marianella responded on July 26, 2000, telling Cartaya that the Fannie Mae-Hornedo transaction was scheduled to close on July 28, 2000. On July 27, 2000, Marianella faxed to Cartaya a copy of the Settlement Statement that had been prepared for the Fannie Mae sale to Hornedo. The Settlement Statement, which confirmed that the intended closing date was indeed July 28, 2000, showed that Hornedo was under contract to pay $82,000 for the Hialeah Property——the property which he would then sell to Granados for $195,000, if all the pending transactions closed as planned. Upon receipt of this Settlement Statement, Cartaya proceeded to complete the appraisal. In the resulting Appraisal Report, which was finished on August 7, 2000,5 Cartaya estimated that the market value of the Hialeah Property, as of July 27, 2000, was $195,000. The Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the house at the Hialeah Property was, in fact, constructed from CBS and poured concrete, as alleged.6 At the time Cartaya gave the Department a copy of her workfile for this appraisal assignment, the workfile did not contain a copy of the competed Appraisal Report.7 (The workfile did, however, include a working draft of the Appraisal Report.) The allegation, set forth in paragraph 21 of the Administrative Complaint, that Cartaya "failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180,000," was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. First, there is no nonhearsay evidence in the record that "comparable one" was, in fact, listed at $145,000 and subsequently sold for $180,000. Instead, the Department offered a printout of data from the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"), which printout was included in Cartaya's workfile. The MLS document shows a listing price of $145,550 for "comparable one" and a sales price of $180,000 for the property——but it is clearly hearsay as proof of these matters,8 and no predicate was laid for the introduction of such hearsay pursuant to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (including Section 475.28(2)). Further, the MLS data do not supplement or explain other nonhearsay evidence.9 At best, the MLS document, which is dated July 25, 2000, establishes that Cartaya was on notice that "comparable one" might have sold for more than the asking price, but Cartaya has not been charged with overlooking MLS data. Second, in any event, in her Report History, Cartaya stated that she had analyzed the putative asking price/sales price differential with respect to "comparable one" and concluded that there was no need to make adjustments for this because available data relating to other sales persuaded her that such differentials were typical in the relevant market. Cartaya's declaration in this regard was not persuasively rebutted. Since the evidence fails persuasively to establish that Cartaya's conclusion concerning the immateriality of the putative asking price/sales price differential as a factor bearing on the value of "comparable one" was wrong; and, further, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that an appraiser must, in her appraisal report, not only disclose such information, even when deemed irrelevant to the appraisal, but also expound upon the grounds for rejecting the data as irrelevant, Cartaya cannot be faulted for declining to explicate her analysis of the supposed price differential in the Appraisal Report. The evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Cartaya "failed or refused to explain or adjust for "comparable three"'s zoning violations." This allegation depends upon the validity of its embedded assumption that there were, in fact, "zoning violations."10 There is, however, no convincing evidence of such violations in the instant record. Specifically, no copy of any zoning code was offered as evidence, nor was any convincing nonhearsay proof regarding the factual condition of "comparable three" offered. Cartaya cannot be found guilty of failing or refusing to explain or adjust for an underlying condition (here, alleged "zoning violations") absent convincing proof of the underlying condition's existence-in-fact. Case No. 04-1148 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1148, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisals of residences located at 1729 Northwest 18th Street, Miami, Florida ("1729 NW 18th St") and 18032 Northwest 48th Place, Miami, Florida ("18032 NW 48th Place"). These appraisals will be examined in turn. With regard to 1729 NW 18th St, the Department alleged as follows: On or about April 29, 1999, Respondent developed and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the property commonly known as 1729 NW 18th Street, Miami, Florida. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On or about March 18, 2001, David B. C. Yeomans, Jr., A.S.A., and Mark A. Cannon, A.S.A., performed a field review of the report. A copy of the review is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. The review revealed that unlike it states in the Report, the subject property’s zoning was not "Legal," but "legal noncomforming (Grandfathered use)." The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that if the improvements sustain extensive damage or demolishment or require renovation which exceeds 50% of the depreciated value, it is likely that a variance would be necessary to build a new dwelling. The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that subject property has two underground gas meters. The review further revealed that unlike Respondent states in Report, subject property’s street has gutters and storm sewers along it. The review further revealed that subject property is a part of a "sub-market" within its own neighborhood due to its construction date of 1925. Respondent applied three comparables built in 1951, 1953, and 1948, respectively, all of which reflect a different market, without adjustment. Respondent applied comparables which have much larger lots than the subject, which is of a non-conforming, grandfathered use. Respondent failed to adjust for quality of construction even though subject is frame and all three comparables are of concrete block stucco construction. Respondent failed to note on the Report that comparables 1 and 2 had river frontage. Respondent failed to adjust comparables 1 and 2 for river frontage. The review revealed that at the time of the Report there were at least five sales more closely comparable to Subject than those which Respondent applied. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Yeomans Report") that David B.C. Yeomans, Jr. prepared in March 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Yeomans Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, and Mr. Yeomans testified at hearing. Mr. Yeomans disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 1729 NW 18th St, concluding that the property's market value as of April 29, 1999, had been at the low end of the $95,000-to-$115,000 range, and not $135,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 6 and 7. The form that Cartaya used for her Appraisal Report regarding 1729 NW 18th St contains the following line: Zoning compliance Legal Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Illegal No zoning Cartaya checked the "legal" box. Mr. Yeomans maintains that she should have checked the box for "legal nonconforming" use because, he argues, the property's frontage and lot size are smaller than the minimums for these values as prescribed in the City of Miami's zoning code. The Department failed, however, to prove that Cartaya checked the wrong zoning compliance box. There is no convincing nonhearsay evidence regarding either the frontage or the lot size of 1729 NW 18th St.11 Thus, there are no facts against which to apply the allegedly applicable zoning code provisions. Moreover, and more important, the Department failed to introduce into evidence any provisions of Miami's zoning code. Instead, the Department elicited testimony from Mr. Yeomans regarding his understanding of the contents of the zoning code. While Mr. Yeomans' testimony about the contents of the zoning code is technically not hearsay (because the out-of-court statements, namely the purported code provisions, consisted of non-assertive declarations12 that were not offered for the "truth" of the code's provisions13), such testimony is nevertheless not clear and convincing evidence of the zoning code's terms.14 And finally, in any event, Cartaya's alleged "mistake" (which allegation was not proved) was immaterial because, as Mr. Yeomans conceded at hearing, in testimony the undersigned credits as true, the alleged "fact" (again, not proved) that 1729 NW 18th St constituted a grandfathered use would have no effect on the property's market value. Paragraphs 8 and 9. The Yeomans Report asserts that "[b]ased on a physical inspection as of March 17, 2001[,] it appears that the site has two underground gas meters and there were gutters and storm sewers along the subject's street." It is undisputed that Cartaya's Appraisal Report made no mention of underground gas meters or storm water disposal systems. While the Department alleged that Cartaya's silence regarding these matters constituted disciplinable "failures," it offered no convincing proof that Cartaya defaulted on her obligations in any way respecting these items. There was no convincing evidence that these matters were material, affected the property's value, or should have been noted pursuant to some cognizable standard of care. Paragraphs 10 and 11. The contention here is that Cartaya chose as comparables several homes that, though relatively old (average age: 48 years), were not as old as the residence at 1729 NW 18th St (74 years). Mr. Yeomans asserted that older homes should have been used as comparables, and several such homes are identified in the Yeomans Report. The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value with respect to 1729 NW 18th St is probably more accurate than Cartaya's. If this were a case where the value of 1729 NW 18th St were at issue, e.g. a taking under eminent domain, then Mr. Yeomans' opinion might well be credited as against Cartaya's opinion in making the ultimate factual determination. The issue in this case is not the value of 1729 NW 18th St, however, but whether Cartaya committed disciplinable offenses in appraising the property. The fact that two appraisers have different opinions regarding the market value of a property does not mean that one of them engaged in misconduct in forming his or her opinion. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned is not convinced that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if her analysis appears to be somewhat less sophisticated than Mr. Yeomans'. Paragraphs 12 through 16. The allegations in these paragraphs constitute variations on the theme just addressed, namely that, for one reason or another, Cartaya chose inappropriate comparables. For the same reasons given in the preceding discussion, the undersigned is not convinced, based on the evidence presented, that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if he is inclined to agree that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value is the better founded of the two. With regard to 18032 NW 48th Place, the Department alleged as follows: On or about August 9, 1999, Respondent prepared and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the Property commonly known as 18032 NW 48th Place, Miami, Florida, 33055. (Report) A copy of the Report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. On the Report, Respondent incorrectly stated that the property is in a FEMA Zone X flood area. In fact, the property is in an AE Zone. In Report, Respondent states: "Above sales were approximately adjusted per market derived value influencing dissimilarities as noted." Respondent failed to state in Report, that comparables 1 and 3 have in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent represented comparable 1 had one bath, where in fact it has at least two. In [the] Report, Respondent failed to state that comparable 1 has two in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent stated that comparable 3 is a two-bath house with an additional bath in the in-law quarters. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT V Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Marmin Report") that Frank L. Marmin prepared in May 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Marmin Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Mr. Marmin did not testify at hearing, although his supervisor, Mark A. Cannon, did. Mr. Marmin disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 18032 NW 48th Place, concluding that the property's market value as of August 9, 1999, had been $100,000, and not $128,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 19. Cartaya admitted that she erred in noting that the property is located in FEMA Flood Zone "X," when in fact (she agrees) the property is in FEMA Flood Zone "AE." She did, however, include a flood zone map with her appraisal that showed the correct flood zone designation. Cartaya's mistake was obviously unintentional——and no more blameworthy than a typographical error. Further, even the Department's expert witness conceded that this minor error had no effect on the appraiser's opinion of value. Paragraphs 20 through 24. The Department asserts that two of Cartaya's comparables were not comparable for one reason or another. The Department failed clearly and convincingly to prove that its allegations of fact concerning the two comparables in question are true. Thus, the Department failed to establish its allegations to the requisite degree of certainty. Ultimate Factual Determinations Having examined the entire record; weighed, interpreted, and judged the credibility of the evidence; drawn (or refused to draw) permissible factual inferences; resolved conflicting accounts of what occurred; and applied the applicable law to the facts, it is determined that: Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not commit culpable negligence in connection with the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not fail to exercise reasonable diligence in developing the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that, in connection with the Appraisal Report relating to the Hialeah Property, Cartaya did commit one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2- 2(b)(vi) of Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding that: As to Case No. 04-1148, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I through VI, inclusive; As to Case No. 04-1680, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I, II, and IV; she is, however, guilty, under Count III, of one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(vi) and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix). As punishment for the violations established, Cartaya's certificate should be suspended for 30 calendar days, and she should be placed on probation for a period of one year, a condition of such probation being the successful completion of a continuing education course in USPAP. In addition, Cartaya should be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a Florida-certified general real estate appraiser, holding license number RZ 2678 and doing business as Easthill Valuation and Consulting (Easthill). He has been doing real estate appraisal work since 1986. Respondent also holds a Florida real estate broker license. HBK Investments (HBK) is a hedge fund headquartered in Dallas, Texas. On June 23, 2006, HBK entered into a written agreement with Easthill in which Easthill agreed, for a $7,500.00 fee, to appraise for HBK the value of the remaining unsold inventory of an uncompleted high-rise, residential condominium project being developed by WCI Communities, Inc., on a barrier island in Pompano Beach, Florida (Ocean Side Project). The agreement did not specify, nor did HBK indicate at any time during the negotiations leading to the agreement, that time was of the essence in completing the appraisal. The agreement2 read, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * The purpose of this appraisal/consultation is to estimate the market value of the fee simple estate reflecting the unsold inventory in the subject property. The report is intended to be used in making internal management decisions related to potential investment by [HBK] related to specific properties, interests, direct investments and/or securities issued by WCI. The assignment is to be a limited appraisal in a summary report format in conformance with, and subject to, the Standards of Professional Practice and Code of Ethics of the Appraisal Institute and the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) developed by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation. The scope of [Easthill's] assignment is to evaluate the subject property based upon the estimated remaining inventory as of the date of value for the current development based upon information obtained by the appraiser through market research and analysis. [HBK] hereby acknowledges that the subject property is owned, controlled and in the process of development by WCI. [HBK] understands and agrees that [Easthill] will receive information for the report from third party sources and that [Easthill] bears no responsibility (and shall not be liable) for the accuracy or completeness (or lack thereof) of such information. [HBK] understands that despite [Easthill's] best efforts to obtain accurate direct data pertinent to the analysis, such as but not limited to the number of sold and/or unsold units, actual transaction prices, actual or proposed development costs, current price schedules, documents pertaining to the declaration and proposed operation of the condominium development, may not be available. [Easthill] will incorporate market derived information in an effort to estimate these variables in the analysis. [HBK] acknowledges that market derived estimates may vary considerably from the actual amounts expended by WCI and can therefore reflect diverged value indicators which reflect a higher degree of subjectivity versus an analysis performed had the actual information been made available. * * * [Easthill's] fee for this assignment will be $7,500.00 and requires a 50% retainer payment prior to commencement of work with the balance due upon delivery of the report. [Easthill] will provide one bound hard copy and one electronic copy of the report via email in PDF format. The report will be completed and delivered to [HBK} within approximately four (4) to six (6) weeks from receipt of this fully executed engagement letter, the retainer fee and any additional relevant information provided by [HBK]. In the event the assignment is canceled prior to completion, an invoice will be prepared reflecting the percentage of work completed as of that date. Any credits to [HBK] will be promptly returned or any remaining balances to the appraiser will be indicated on the invoice. * * * HBK made the "50% retainer payment" by check dated July 6, 2006. The check (in the amount of $3,750.00) was deposited in Respondent's account at BankAtlantic on July 11, 2006. Thereafter, Respondent began work on the appraisal. Matthew Luth of HBK attempted to contact Respondent by telephone to inquire about the status of the appraisal after four to six weeks had gone by and he had not heard anything from Respondent. Mr. Luth was unsuccessful in his efforts to speak with Respondent, but he did leave "voice mail" messages. Mr. Luth also sent Respondent three e-mails (on August 8, 2006, August 25, 2006, and September 8, 2006) requesting an update on the appraisal. Respondent received neither Mr. Luth's "voice mail" messages, nor the e-mails Mr. Luth had sent. Jon Mosle, HBK's General Counsel, subsequently sent the following letter, dated September 26, 2006, to Respondent: I am the General Counsel for HBK Investments L.P. On June 23, 2006, HBK engaged your company to perform an appraisal related to the Pompano Beach condominium development to be known as Oceans Side. A copy of our signed engagement letter is attached. Promptly after signing the engagement letter, HBK paid the initial $3,750 payment for your services (via our check #2611, which cleared our bank on July 11, 2006). The engagement letter stated that your appraisal would be completed and delivered within approximately four to six weeks, a time frame now long passed. To date, we have seen no evidence of any work on your part. Matt Luth (the business person at HBK, who is responsible for this project) and myself have now tried to contact you numerous times and you have chosen not to return our calls or to provide any update regarding the project. From this information, I can only conclude that you are attempting to steal our retainer. Please be assured that we will not simply stand by and let this happen. If you do not call Matt Luth in the next three days to discuss this matter, we will immediately file a complaint with the State of Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. We will then investigate the process for reporting this as a criminal matter to the appropriate authorities. Respondent received Mr. Mosle's letter on October 14, 2006.3 Within a day or two of receiving the letter, Respondent contacted HBK and spoke with Mr. Luth. Respondent apologetically told Mr. Luth that "the report had been delayed," but he "was finishing the assignment and would have it to [HBK] within about a week." Mr. Luth said "that would be fine." The next day, however, Respondent received a telephone call from Mr. Luth, who told him that HBK was "canceling the assignment" because it "no longer needed the report." At the time of HBK's "cancel[lation of] the assignment," Respondent "had completed just about everything there was to complete except for actually writing the narrative report." He had obtained information about the Ocean Side Project, as well 14 other, comparable projects in the area, through public records reviews, on-site visits, and discussions with project staff. The information gathering process had not proceeded as quickly as Respondent had planned inasmuch as it had turned out that project staff were not always accessible at the times it was convenient for Respondent to meet with them. Respondent spent a total of approximately 60 hours collecting and analyzing data for the appraisal. Although the percentage of work that Respondent had completed was greater than the percentage (50%) of the "consultant's fee" he had been paid, Respondent did not ask HBK to pay him any additional monies (notwithstanding that his agreement with HBK authorized the making of such a request). But for HBK's "cancel[lation of] the assignment," Respondent would have delivered the "limited appraisal in summary report format" that he had agreed to provide to HBK.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: According to the files and records of the Florida Real Estate Commission, respondent Greene F. Isaacs received his initial salesman license on April 12, 1979 and his initial broker license on April 29, 1980. He is currently a licensed broker holding license number 0308665. By an Order dated June 25, 1980, the Kentucky Real Estate Commission revoked the real estate broker's license of respondent Green F. Isaacs.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and that respondent's real estate broker's license number 0308665 be suspended for a period of one (1) year. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of July, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Gallagher, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David F. Kern, Esquire 516 Lakeview Road, Villa III Clearwater, Florida 33516 Mr. C. H. Stafford Fred Wilsen, Esquire Executive Director Real Estate Commission Real Estate Commission State Office Building P. O. Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Donald L. Stuart is a real estate broker registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission. He holds license number 215732 with expiration date of 3/3/77. In the renewal application received April 3, 1975 by FREC, Stuart reported his business address to be 407 S. Old Dixie Highway, Vero Beach, Florida. In early August, 1976 an investigator for FREC visited the address on South Old Dixie Highway and found a vacant house with no real estate broker's sign displayed. Inquiry in the neighborhood revealed the house had been unoccupied for a considerable period of time. By Election of Rights form submitted November 26, 1976, Stuart acknowledged receipt of the Administrative Complaint by checking Block 1 in which he acknowledged having read the explanation of rights, did not dispute the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint, and requested a hearing. Notice of Hearing was forwarded by Certified Mail, to the same address, viz. 407 S. Old Dixie Highway, Vero Beach, Florida to which the Administrative Complaint had been forwarded.
