The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner was licensed by the Department to provide foster care for one child in the age group of 6 to 10. During the months of November and December, 1999, however, the Department had three infants and one toddler in Petitioner's care at Petitioner's small home. The youngest child placed in Petitioner's home by the Department was Domenica. When she was placed there, the Department did not tell Petitioner that Domenica had immune deficiency disease. On October 16, 1999, Petitioner's landlord began renovating the house. Over time, the central air conditioning system was replaced. When the workmen were on the roof making repairs, one of the workers stepped through a spot where the wood underneath was rotten, creating a hole in the kitchen ceiling. Wood around doorjambs unexpectedly needed replacement. As a tenant, Petitioner had no control over the speed with which the renovations to the house were accomplished. While the work was underway, the new kitchen appliances were stored in Petitioner's living/dining area. Although the house had three bedrooms, it was a small house. The extra appliances made the living/dining area very cluttered. The replacement bathtub and toilets were placed in the yard until they could be installed. At some points construction debris also lay in the yard until it could be removed. The only other items in the yard were a barbecue made from trashcans and several trash bags full of beer cans and soda cans that Petitioner collected when she went walking and later sold for extra money to spend on the children. During the morning of November 7, 1999, Petitioner took Domenica to a clinic where the doctor directed Petitioner to take her to the hospital. The child was very sick and was admitted to the hospital. While she was at the hospital with the infant, Petitioner's mother passed away. The following day a Department employee made an unannounced visit to Petitioner's home. That employee noted that the yard was cluttered and the house was cluttered and dirty. She told Petitioner to clean her house, which Petitioner did. While attending her mother's funeral, Petitioner learned that one of her sons had terminal cancer. That son came to stay at Petitioner's home the Friday before Thanksgiving and was there through the end of December, except for several hospital admissions during that time period. On December 27, 1999, three Department employees went to Petitioner's house for an unannounced site visit. The two who testified at the final hearing thought it noteworthy that Petitioner made them wait while she searched for her keys before admitting them. They also testified that a dog in the front yard had fleas. The dog was not Petitioner's. When Petitioner admitted the three employees, she had just finished taking down the Christmas tree and was in the process of cleaning the living/dining area. She held a large trash bag in her hand and continued putting the wrappings and boxes from gifts into the trash bag. The Department employees looked at tar from the roof that had been tracked onto the carpet and determined that it was dog feces. They noted that the house was very small and cluttered and saw the hole in the ceiling in the kitchen. They determined that the house was not safe for children. They saw the bathroom fixtures and the beer cans and soda cans in the yard and determined that the yard was not safe for the children to play outside. No consideration was given to the fact that the house was undergoing renovations or the fact that it would be unusual for anyone to have infants playing in a yard. Although the employees concluded that Petitioner's home constituted an "unsanitary" condition, they did note that the bedroom and bathroom used for the children were clean, that the sheets in the cribs were clean, and that the children's clothes were clean and neatly folded. Petitioner had placed one of the infants in a child seat in the living area so she could watch him while she was cleaning the house. One of the Department employees unreasonably feared that Petitioner could not get to the child quickly enough if there were a problem, due to the clutter. The child in the dining/living area was the only one at home when the Department's employees were there. Petitioner's sister had taken the other children to her home so that Petitioner could clean the house after Christmas. Petitioner's sister was her Departmentally-approved back-up, i.e., someone approved to care for the children if Petitioner were unable. Petitioner did not know that since her sister had just recently closed her own foster home, which had been licensed by the Department, her sister was no longer permitted to have Petitioner's foster children in her home but could only look after them in Petitioner's home. The Department employees went to Petitioner's sister's home and determined that the children were safe. They summoned other Department employees to remove the children from the care of both Petitioner and Petitioner's sister. A Department caseworker visited Petitioner's home on August 11, 1999; October 20, 1999; and November 17, 1999. That employee filed with the Department reports verifying that the condition of the home was acceptable; that the environment was safe for the children; that the children were healthy and well fed; that there were no signs of neglect or abuse; and that the children were appropriately placed in Petitioner's home. The forms completed by that caseworker contain an acknowledgement that the forms were accurately and truthfully completed under penalty of termination of employment. Petitioner now lives in her mother's home, which is much larger than the house she was renting.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner's request to renew her foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Lyles 14501 Polk Street Miami, Florida 33176 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue, N-10-14 Miami, Florida 33128 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent was initially licensed to operate a foster home in 1992. In April 1995, her license was renewed. As part of the licensing process, the Respondent signed documents entitled "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" and "Discipline Policy", thereby agreeing to comply with the terms of each document. Both of these documents clearly provide that corporal punishment of a foster child is prohibited. On October 30, 1995, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter of its intent to revoke her foster home license and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: This letter is to advise you that your Foster Home license is being revoked, effective November 1, 1995. This decision has been made based on our past concerns about inappropriate child-parent visits, the recent complaint about use of physical discipline, and the altercation on 09/18/95 between you and Foster Parent Veronica King. 1/ At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent provided foster care for three teenage girls under the age of 18 years. On September 29, 1995, Petitioner's abuse registry received a report that Respondent had been physically and verbally abusive to the children in her foster care. The report included allegations that Respondent had hit and knocked down one of the girls in her foster care and that she attempted to return the girl to her natural mother, who had abused her daughter in the past. In response to that report, Petitioner removed the three girls from Respondent's foster care and began an investigation of the allegations. As part of that investigation, Respondent and each of the three girls were interviewed by employees of the Petitioner with appropriate training. The three girls who had been in Respondent's foster care made statements to these employees pertaining to their treatment by Respondent. These statements are hearsay that cannot be used as the sole basis for a finding of fact in this proceeding. 2/ In her interview, Respondent denied that she physically abused her foster children, but she admitted that she intentionally pushed one of the girls to the ground. Respondent violated Petitioner's discipline policy by pushing this girl to the ground. Respondent denied that she threatened to return one of the girls to the girl's abusive mother. Instead, she testified that she arranged for this girl to visit with the abusive mother. There was no competent evidence to dispute Respondent's testimony. Respondent conceded that she talked firmly to the three girls, but she denied that she verbally abused them. There was no competent evidence to dispute Respondent's testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that revokes Respondent's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1996.
The Issue Whether the respondents’ foster home license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Children and Families (formerly the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services) is the state agency responsible for the regulation and licensing of family foster homes pursuant to section 409.175 (Florida Statutes (1995). On March 1, 1995, the Department issued a Certificate of License, number MCO395-001-2, to Carlos and Susan Del Valle to operate a foster home with a maximum capacity of two children of either sex between the ages of 6 and 18 years of age. This license expired February 28, 1996. The Del Valles had maintained a foster home license in Monroe County since 1991. On February 7, 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle signed the Department’s Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children. This document must be signed by foster parents each year as part of the relicensing procedure and each time a child is placed in the home. II. Providing care for a non-dependent child. In its Denial Notice, the Department alleged the following as the first reason for its decision not to renew the Del Valles’s foster home license: Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children (attached), Items 9 and 11. At the time of relicensing last year, it was brought to the department’s attention that you were providing care for a non-dependent child. This was discussed extensively with you during the relicensing visit at you home on February 7, 1995. You were informed at that time that caring for this child was in violation of your agreement with the department. Subsequently, it was brought to the attention of the department that this same child was ordered into Home Detention in your home on September 19, 1995, as a result of a juvenile offense. The child’s placement in your home was in no way related to your status as foster parents. Again, providing care for this child is in violation of your agreement with the department. In January, 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle took a child into their home who was not placed there by the Department and who lived there without the Department’s approval. C. P., a boy in his early teens, was living in the Del Valle home on February 7, 1995, when Helen Sample, a children and family counselor supervisor with the Department, made a home visit to conduct the annual interview that is a part of the Department’s procedure for renewal of a foster home license. At this visit, Ms. Sample told Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle that, because their home was a licensed foster home, they could not care for a child in their home who was not placed there or approved by the Department. Ms. Sample and Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle discussed C. P.’s family situation and the various facilities where he could be placed until his family situation improved and he could resume living at home. C. P.’s family began counseling shortly afterward, and he moved back into his family’s home several weeks after Ms. Sample’s home visit. The Del Valle home was relicensed as a foster home, effective March 1, 1995, however no foster children were placed in the home after March 6, 1995. In the late summer of 1995, C. P. got into trouble with the authorities, and he returned to live in the Del Valle home in September, 1995. A hearing involving C. P. was held on November 14, 1995, before a judge of the Juvenile Division of the Monroe County Circuit Court. At this hearing, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle presented themselves to the court and offered to take C. P. into their home as an alternative to his being placed in detention. In the Order of Disposition dated November 22, 1995, the court withheld adjudication of delinquency and placed C. P. on community control under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice. The court also stated in the Order that C. P. would be allowed to remain in the community control program as long as he abided by sixteen conditions enumerated in the order. Condition number 16 provides that C. P. is to “[s]tay with Foster Parent, Susan DeValle.” There is no question that the Del Valles are providing excellent care for C. P. and that he is doing well academically and socially. Nonetheless, the evidence is sufficient to prove that, because C. P. lives in their home, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle have violated item number 9 of the Substitute Care Agreement, which provides: We will accept children into our home for care only from the department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. Failure to report law enforcement involvement. In its Denial Notice, the Department alleged the following as the second reason for its decision not to renew the Del Valles’s foster home license: 2. Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children, Item 11. The department has record of a Sheriff’s Department Internal Affairs investigation of an incident that occurred on March 23, 1995, where you interfered in a law enforcement situation involving a juvenile. You authorized your interference based on your licensure as a HRS Foster Parent. Your actions resulted in you receiving disciplinary sanctions that included a three-day suspension and three months added to your probation period as a corrections officer for Monroe County. You did not notify the department of this incident which is in violation of your agreement with the department. You also failed to immediately notify the department of another situation involving law enforcement. At a conference on February 14, 1996, with Ann Scurlock and Helen Samples, you and HRS discussed that incident. You stated that an allegation had been made that you spanked a child You also stated that the incident had been resolved and that the case was closed; “that it was no big deal, the Sheriff’s Office just wanted to get in my pocket.” The Sheriff’s Office has advised the department that the case is not closed, that the incident is still under review. Additionally, the Sheriff’s Office reported to HRS that there is a pending third additional Internal Affairs investigation. Item 11 of the Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children provides: We will notify the department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. At all times material to the Department’s decision not to renew the foster home license issued to Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle, Mr. Del Valle was employed as a detention officer with the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office. At the February 7, 1995, home visit conducted by Helen Samples, which occurred not long after Mr. Del Valle began his employment with the Sheriff’s Office, Mrs. Del Valle asked Ms. Samples how the department defined “law enforcement involvement.” She asked this question because her husband would be continually “involved” with law enforcement because of his employment. Ms. Samples responded that the Department must be informed if Mr. or Mrs. Del Valle committed a crime or were arrested. 1 A. March 23, 1995, incident. Sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on March 23, 1995, a teenage boy named N. J. told several friends that he intended to steal his mother’s car, run it into a tree, and kill himself. Someone notified N. J.’s mother, and she telephoned Michael Holler, a member of the Department’s Mobile Team Guidance Clinic and a psychologist who had been counseling N. J. and his mother for two or three weeks prior to this incident.2 Mr. Holler met N. J.’s mother in the parking lot of the commercial building in Tavernier, Florida, where N. J. and a few friends were hanging out. N. J. was extremely agitated, pacing back and forth and threatening to commit suicide. Mr. Holler was trying to get N. J. to talk to him, without much success, when Sergeant Bryant and Detective Sharpe of the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office arrived in response to a call from N. J.’s mother. Shortly thereafter, a third member of the Sheriff’s Office, Detective Koppins, arrived at the scene; he had been asked to look into the situation by Mr. Del Valle. Mr. Del Valle and N. J. had a close relationship which had developed over several years. N. J.’s mother approved of the relationship and frequently called on Mr. Del Valle to help her deal with her son. N. J. asked a friend to call Mr. Del Valle on the night of March 23, 1995, to let him know what was going on and to ask him to come to the scene. Detective Koppins and Detective Sharpe each spoke separately with N. J. and reported to Mr. Holler that N. J. did not want to talk to him, that N. J. did not like him, and that Mr. Del Valle was coming and would talk to him. Mr. Holler responded that the detectives were interfering with his relationship with N. J. and that he did not care if N. J. liked him, he was just trying to do his job. About this time, Mr. Del Valle arrived at the scene. He was very upset and agitated and began shouting as soon as he got out of his truck. He used profanity, accused the people at the scene of handling N. J. “all wrong”, and asserted that he was a foster parent and knew how to handle the situation. Sergeant Bryant took Mr. Del Valle aside and spoke with him, and Mr. Del Valle calmed down and talked quietly with Mr. Holler about N. J.’s situation. Mr. Holler’s supervisor, Dr. Matthews arrived at the scene a short time later, and the situation with N. J. was resolved. Dr. Matthews, who is the executive director of the Department’s guidance center, called Ms. Samples the day after the incident to report that Mr. Del Valle was present at the parking lot during the incident and had behaved inappropriately.3 The only knowledge Dr. Matthews had of Mr. Del Valle’s behavior on the night in question was the description of the incident provided to him by Mr. Holler. The day after the March 23, 1995, incident involving N. J., Ms. Samples also received telephone calls regarding the incident from “two Sheriff’s duty officers” whom she did not identify; Mr. Del Valle also notified her of the incident the day after it happened. There was insufficient evidence presented by the Department to support the first allegation in paragraph 2 of its Denial Notice that Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle “did not notify the department of this [March 23, 1995] incident which is in violation of [item 11 of] your agreement with the department.” Firstly, on the day after it occurred, Mr. Del Valle, Dr. Matthews, and two employees of the Sheriff’s Office notified Ms. Samples of the incident and of Mr. Del Valle’s part in it. Secondly, no reasonable explanation was given at the hearing to support the Department’s conclusion that Mr. Del Valle’s involvement in the events of March 23, 1995, constituted “law enforcement involvement” for purposes of the reporting requirement in item 11 of the Substitute Care Agreement.4 Rather, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle were entitled to rely on Ms. Samples’s explanation at the February 7, 1995, home visit that the duty of foster parents to report “law enforcement involvement” to the Department involved situations where the foster parents were arrested or charged with commission of a crime. Finally, no credible evidence was presented at the hearing to support the Department’s allegations in the Denial Notice that, as a result of his involvement in the incident of March 23, 1995, Mr. Del Valle was the subject of an Internal Affairs Investigation by the Sheriff’s Office or that he was subject to employment-related disciplinary sanctions as a result of any such investigation. B. Investigation involving “spanking” incident. On April 7, 1995, N. J.’s mother made a complaint against Mr. Del Valle to the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, alleging that sometime between September and December, 1994, he had committed a battery on her son. The Department was apparently referring to the investigation of this complaint, which involved an allegation that Mr. Del Valle had spanked N. J., when it alleged in the Denial Notice that Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle failed “to immediately notify the department of another situation involving law enforcement,” in violation of item 11 of the Substitute Care Agreement. Immediately upon receiving the complaint from N. J.’s mother, the Sheriff’s Office initiated a criminal investigation of the allegation and an inspector with the Office of Professional Standards was assigned to the case. She took the statements of N. J. and his mother in September, 1995, and May, 1995, respectively. In a document entitled “Internal Affairs Investigation 95-010 Criminal Notification,” which was dated October 5, 1995, and delivered to Mr. Del Valle on October 10, 1995,5 Mr. Del Valle was notified that he was the subject of an investigation of a complaint that he had committed a battery on N. J., a misdemeanor under section 784.03, Florida Statutes, and a violation of various policies and procedures of the Sheriff’s Office. At some point during the investigation, a determination was made that the case should not be pursued as a criminal matter, and it was subsequently treated as an administrative matter involving Mr. Del Valle’s status as an employee of the Sheriff’s Office. The evidence is not clear whether, at the time Mr. Del Valle was notified of the investigation, it was being handled as a criminal matter or as an administrative matter. The Department learned of the investigation when the Sheriff’s Office contacted the Department and requested the names of all of the foster children who had been placed in Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle’s home. The evidence is not clear as to who at the Department took this call, but Ms. Samples testified that, when asked the purpose for which the Sheriff’s Office needed the names, the Sheriff’s Office told the Department’s representative that an investigation was being conducted into an allegation that Mr. Del Valle had spanked a child. The Department learned of the investigation at some point before Mr. Del Valle was notified.6 On March 27, 1996, in the Management Review conducted as a result of the administrative investigation of Mr. Del Valle, it was found that the complaint of battery were not sustained by the evidence but that charges of perjury arising out of statements Mr. Del Valle made in interviews conducted January 5 and 19, 1996, were sustained. The recommended discipline was the withdrawal of Mr. Del Valle’s appointment as an employee of the Sheriff’s Office. His employment was terminated in early April, 1996. The evidence is not sufficient to support the Department’s position that Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle breached item 11 of the Substitute Care Agreement by failing to report the Sheriff’s Office’s criminal and administrative investigation of the “spanking” allegation. Firstly, the weight of the credible evidence establishes that the Department knew of the criminal investigation of the battery complaint before Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle knew of it. The weight of the credible evidence also establishes that Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle learned that the Department had previously been informed of the investigation at or shortly before the time Mr. Del Valle received the Criminal Notification. Therefore, it would be reasonable for Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle to see no need to notify the Department of something it already knew. In addition, even if the Department had not been aware of the investigation at the time Mr. Del Valle received the Criminal Notification, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle were entitled to rely on Ms. Samples’s representation at the February 7, 1995, home visit that “law enforcement involvement” constituted arrest or commission of a crime. Since the Criminal Notification advised Mr. Del Valle that an investigation had been initiated into the complaint that he had committed a crime, the Del Valles could reasonably assume that they were not required to notify the Department until such time as Mr. Del Valle was arrested or charged with having committed the battery. The Department also alleged in the Denial Notice that, even though Mr. Del Valle had represented to the Department in February, 1996, that the “incident had been resolved and that the case was closed,” The Sheriff’s Office has advised the department that the case is not closed, that the incident is still under review. Additionally, the Sheriff’s Office reported to HRS that there is a pending third additional Internal Affairs investigation. The Department was apparently referring to the administrative investigation of the battery allegation after the determination was made not to pursue the complaint as a criminal matter and to the administrative investigation of charges that Mr. Del Valle had committed perjury in the statements he gave to the internal affairs investigator on January 5 and 19, 1996. Since both of these investigations related solely to Mr. Del Valle’s employment by the Sheriff’s Office, he was not obligated under any circumstance to notify the Department of these investigations as “law enforcement involvement.” Although not alleged in the Denial Notice, Department witnesses asserted at the hearing that Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle were required to report the administrative investigations pursuant to item 11 of the Substitute Care Agreement as a “change in . . . employment” because of the possibility that Mr. Del Valle could be suspended or terminated from his employment. Even had this been alleged in the Denial Notice as a ground upon which the decision to deny the license renewal was based, the language of the agreement is unambiguous and requires only that a change in employment be reported. Since the investigations were not such a change, Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle were under no obligation to report them. Not willing to work in partnership with the Department. In its Denial Notice, the Department stated the following as the third basis for its decision to refuse to renew the Del Valle’s foster home license: 3. At the conference on February 14, 1995, your letter of October 15, 1995, regarding the KISS Christmas project was discussed. The letter stated that, “at this point we do not want to deal with most members of HRS any more than we have to.” You stated the reason for the statement was that you felt HRS should have advised you of the spanking allegation. As was discussed, since the allegation did not involve a HRS child, HRS was not in a position to share information with you. Also HRS was bound by the rules of confidentiality governing the Sheriff’s Department’s Internal Affairs Division. Your sentiment does not reflect a willingness to work in partnership with the department which could compromise the care of dependent children placed in your home. “KISS” [Kids in Special Situations] is a non-profit organization started by Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle; the Christmas project referred to in the Denial Notice is the annual project in which KISS provides Christmas gifts to foster children and underprivileged children in Monroe County. It had been the practice of the Department’s local office to assist Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle in the Christmas project by distributing letters to foster parents and collecting information from the foster parents regarding the children so Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle could purchase appropriate Christmas presents for each child. Mrs. Del Valle’s letter of October 15, 1995, was directed to Ms. Gibson, an employee of the Department, and requested her help in gathering the information necessary to purchase appropriate presents for the children and in collecting the children’s Christmas lists. In the letter, Mrs. Del Valle stated: I am not in a position this year to chase down these lists through your various offices and to be perfectly honest at this point we do not want to deal with most members of HRS any more than we have to. Just in case you are not aware there have been accusations floating about for 5-6 months of Carlos being unjustly accused of spanking a child and no one saw fit to inform us of these accusations. This statement is the only evidence presented by the Department to support its determination that Mr. and Mrs. Del Valle were not willing to work in partnership with the Department to insure that adequate care would be provided to any children who were placed in the Del Valle home. Given the context in which the statement was made and the lack of any evidence tending to demonstrate that the Del Valles had ever refused to cooperate with the Department when providing care for a foster child, the evidence is insufficient to establish that the Del Valles were not willing to work in partnership with the Department as foster parents. The evidence presented is sufficient to establish the allegations in the Denial Notice that the Del Valles breached item 9 of the Substitute Care Agreement by taking C. P. into their home. The evidence presented is not, however, sufficient to establish the remaining allegations in the Denial Notice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the application of Carlos and Susan Del Valle for renewal of their foster home license for the period extending from March 1, 1996, through February 28, 1997, on the sole ground that a child was living in their home who had not been placed there by the Department and who was living in the home without the Department’s approval. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1997.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 5, 1977, the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Vincent A. Morris, filed an application for licensure to operate a foster home in District V of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Carol Parks, a Social Worker employed by the Petitioner and who is in charge of licensing in the Foster Care Section of District V, testified as to the procedures utilized in considering applications for foster home licensure. Ms. Parks testified that once an applicant files, she visits the applicant and goes through the orientation session, familiarizing the applicant with the forms, procedures and in a general manner outlining the standards necessary to obtain a foster home license. Ms. Parks ascertained that the Morrises were married and she additionally checked with the Sheriff's Department and other local law enforcement agencies to determine whether or not the Respondents had been convicted of a felony as an adult. 1/ Based on this search with the various local law enforcement agencies, Ms. Parks found no evidence of a conviction of the Respondents. As stated, the Respondents filed the application on or about December 5, 1977, and a license was granted them during April, 1978. On cross-examination, Ms. Parks failed to recall whether or not she asked the Respondents whether or not there were any outstanding felony convictions against them. She testified that she was satisfied with the manner in which the Respondents operated their facility and confirmed the fact that the Respondents were permitted to adopt a sixth foster child during January of 1979. Esther Morris testified that during the orientation session, Ms. Parks never inquired of her if she had been convicted of a crime. Mrs. Morris inquired of Ms. Parks and other agency personnel of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services whether or not she could begin to remodel her home when she initially filed her application. She was advised by Ms. Parks and others that she should defer any remodeling until they advised her to proceed. The Morrises later obtained approval from that Department to commence the remodeling of her home, which she did, and expended funds totaling approximately $22,000.00 for preparation of this facility as a foster home facility. Presently, she has six foster children, the last of which was adopted during January, 1979. She testified that Ms. Parks asked her whether or not she or her husband had been to jail and she replied that she had not. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 is a certified copy of a judgment and sentence indicating that on or about August 11, 1975, Respondent, Esther V. Morris, was convicted of welfare fraud, for which she was fined $500.00. Chapter 10C-10.29(7), Florida Administrative Cede, provides in pertinent part that: "No applicant can be considered who, as an adult, has been convicted of a crime." It is based on this rule that the Petitioner is here seeking to revoke the foster hose license of the Respondents. Inasmuch as the above-mentioned rule makes no mention of or provides any procedure for revocation of a license which has been granted, the undersigned is of the considered opinion that such rule provides no basis upon which the Petitioner can revoke the Respondents' license. Particular note was made of the fact that the Respondents credibly testified that they, at no time, misrepresented to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that they were convicted of a crime as an adult. While it is true that the cited rule indicates that no person can be considered who, as an adult, has been convicted of a crime, a different issue is here posed inasmuch as the Respondents are now possessed with a license, a right to which certain due process procedures must be complied with prior to revocation. With these facts in mind, the undersigned is not prepared to read into the above- quoted rule authority which is not contained in said rule. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the Administrative Complaint filed herein be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's foster home license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact From August 24, 2004, and throughout the period material to this proceeding, Petitioner Jannifer Thompson ("Thompson") and her husband, Dalkeith, held a license that authorized them to operate a family foster home under the supervision——and within the regulatory jurisdiction——of Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"). Like all licensed foster parents, Thompson and her husband had entered into a written contract with DCF known as the "Bilateral Service Agreement" ("Agreement"), most recently as of April 30, 2006. This Agreement, by its terms, "reflect[ed] standards of care that are current requirements in Florida [law]." On September 14, 2006, a counselor named Elboney Ojobor, who was employed by a private agency to whom DCF had delegated various responsibilities pursuant to contract, made a routine quarterly visit to Thompson's home. Ms. Ojobor was covering for a colleague (Rondalyn Woulard) who was on maternity leave; she had not met Thompson previously. While interviewing Thompson, Ms. Ojobor learned that Thompson was the only adult living in the home at the time, and that Thompson was getting divorced from Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor understood this to mean that Mr. Thompson had moved out of the home permanently. In fact, Mr. Thompson was away from the home then not because he had moved to another residence ahead of a divorce, but because his job with a shipping company had required him to be out of town for an extended period. Nevertheless, the couple was estranged; Mr. Thompson would leave the marital home for good in the middle of October 2006. Ms. Ojobor's visit was not the first occasion on which Thompson had notified DCF (through its private-sector agent) that her marriage to Dalkeith was in trouble. During an earlier home visit (probably around June 2006, during the quarter immediately preceding Ms. Ojobor's visit in September), Thompson had told her regular counselor, Ms. Woulard, that she might divorce Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor was not aware of this previous communication, however, and thus she reported the apparent change in circumstances (Mr. Thompson's absence) to her supervisor. The upshot was that on September 15, 2006, Ms. Ojobor called Thompson to inform her that, if she were to continue operating the foster home as a single parent, she would need to obtain a new license. As it happened, whatever steps Thompson took thereafter to become re-licensed came quickly to naught because, in early October 2006, DCF received an allegation that children in Ms. Thompson's home were being physically abused. Having brought up the abuse report, the undersigned believes it necessary here to interrupt the narrative flow of the findings, to call attention to some important points. The most serious charge against Thompson in this case is that she used "excessive" corporal punishment on foster children in her care. The accusation is not that Thompson was found by some other agency or investigator to have abused a foster child or children. The distinction is critical. Because DCF has alleged that Thompson used corporal punishment excessively, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) for DCF to prove that someone else, after investigating allegations of abuse, concluded that Thompson had inflicted some sort of physical injury on a foster child. Rather, DCF must prove that Thompson, in fact, actually used corporal punishment, which is a different fact. Indeed, that someone else found Thompson guilty of physical abuse is not especially probative, in this de novo proceeding, of the salient factual dispute, namely whether Thompson used corporal punishment on foster children.2 Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that, on October 9, 2006, DCF referred a report of abuse concerning Thompson to the local Child Protective Team ("CPT"). DCF requested that the CPT examine the allegedly abused foster child and make an assessment of the situation. One member of the CPT who took part in this particular assessment was Karl Dorelien. Though not a medical provider, Mr. Dorelien was present for the medical examination of the child in question, whose name is T. P. The examination was performed by an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP"). Mr. Dorelien testified at hearing. The ARNP did not. At the time of the examination, Mr. Dorelien saw some bruising on T. P.'s forearm. T. P. told Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP that she had been struck by a belt. The CPT did not independently investigate T. P.'s statement. Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP accepted at face value T. P.'s statement about the cause of her injury. The ARNP found that T. P.'s wound was "not accidental." (Mr. Dorelien specifically denied having the expertise to ascertain whether a bruise was caused accidentally or intentionally. There is, it should be added, no persuasive evidence that the ARNP possesses such expertise, either.) Based on the medical examination, the CPT concluded that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (It is not clear how the CPT determined that Thompson——as opposed to someone else——caused T. P.'s injury.3) The evidence shows, in short, that the CPT found Thompson had caused bodily injury to T. P., a foster child then in her care, whom (the CPT determined) Thompson had hit with a belt. There is, however, no persuasive evidence upon which the undersigned independently can find that Thompson actually hit T. P. with a belt (or otherwise). How can this be? First, no one claiming to have personal knowledge of the matter testified at hearing that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (T. P. was not called as a witness.) Thompson denied having perpetrated the alleged misdeed. Second, although there is competent and credible evidence (Mr. Dorelien's testimony) that T. P.'s forearm was bruised, the only evidence as to the cause of this injury was hearsay: (1) T. P.'s statements to the CPT revealing that she had been struck with a belt and (2) the ARNP's opinion (which Mr. Dorelien repeated at hearing) that the wound was not accidental. This uncorroborated hearsay is not a legally sufficient basis for any finding of fact, and even if it were, the undersigned, as the trier of fact, would give it too little weight to support a finding.4 Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that T. P. had been struck with a belt (and there isn't), there yet would be nothing but Mr. Dorelien's ambiguous testimony concerning the substance of T. P.'s out-of-court statement, coupled with inference or speculation (based on uncorroborated hearsay), tending to establish that Thompson did the striking. Again, such "proof" is neither legally sufficient nor, in any event, logically persuasive enough to support a finding that Thompson was at fault for the child's injury. DCF alleges that, in addition to striking T. P. with a belt (which allegation was not proved, as just found), Thompson also spanked J. D. F. and his brother, O. F. Both of these boys, respectively aged 8 and 7 years at the time of hearing, testified against their former foster mother. Each claimed that Thompson had spanked him with a belt. As witnesses, however, the boys did not inspire confidence in the truth of their accounts. Each gave testimony that was confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and lacking in precision. Neither one seemed distinctly to remember the important events at issue, much less any of the details surrounding them, causing the undersigned to wonder, at times, whether the boys were independently recalling the underlying events or, rather, testifying from the memory of what someone might have told them was alleged to have occurred. Doubtless many of these boys' shortcomings as witnesses stemmed from their youth and immaturity. Even so, all witnesses, regardless of age and experience, must be measured according to the same standards of credibility; the bar can be neither lowered nor raised to conform to a particular witness's capacity for giving testimony, for doing so would put a thumb on the scales of justice. At bottom, the accounts of J. D. F. and O. F., though not inherently incredible, nevertheless lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to produce in the undersigned's mind a firm belief or conviction that Thompson had spanked them with a belt. The undersigned hesitates to say more than that such is a possibility. Against the shaky testimonies of the boys was offered the decidedly stronger testimony of their sister, Sancia Jeantil, who swore that while she was living in Thompson's home (which admittedly was not at all times her brothers were there), she never saw Thompson spank either J. D. F. or O. F. She further testified that neither of her siblings had ever complained to her about being beaten. The undersigned has accorded considerable weight to Ms. Jeantil's testimony, because it seems unlikely that she would prevaricate to protect Thompson at her brothers' expense. Although Ms. Jeantil was not always present in the home, her testimony, which the undersigned accepts, is persuasive proof of the pertinent negative proposition, i.e. that Thompson did not use corporal punishment on the boys. Thompson herself testified at hearing and denied having used corporal punishment on J. D. F., O. F., or any other foster child. Mr. Thompson, too, testified that corporal punishment had not been used on any of the foster children in their home. Thompson's own child, J. T., said the same. None of these witnesses conclusively proved the negative of DCF's allegation regarding corporal punishment, but then again it was not Thompson's burden to disprove the charge. What these witnesses did do, effectively, was establish a credible, if simple, theory of innocence: Thompson never beat the foster children in her care. The undersigned has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence as a whole fails to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Thompson used corporal punishment on any of the foster children under her care. Aside from the allegations regarding corporal punishment, DCF has charged Thompson with the lesser offense of failing immediately to notify DCF that her husband had moved out of the home. The evidence shows, however, that Thompson satisfied her duty to notify DCF concerning changes that might affect the life and circumstances of the foster children residing in her home. To recap, briefly, the material facts, Thompson informed DCF's agent, Ms. Woulard, of the possibility that she and Dalkeith might divorce; thus, DCF was on actual notice of a potential change in Thompson's marital status. Thompson likely gave DCF this advance warning in June 2006; in any case, she spoke up long before Dalkeith established a new residence and before the divorce proceeding commenced. There is no clear proof that the couple's situation had changed materially as of September 14, 2006, when Mr. Ojobor visited the home. Without question, Mr. Thompson was away at that time——but he worked for a shipping company and thus extended absences were part of his routine. Having all the evidence of record in view, the undersigned is not convinced that Mr. Thompson had "moved out" of the home as of mid-September 2006 in the sense of having permanently relocated from that residence, which is what DCF maintains. While there is some evidence that such was the case, there is also persuasive evidence that Mr. Thompson did not leave the home for good until October 2006——evidence sufficient to preclude the undersigned from finding, without hesitancy, that DCF's allegation is accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order approving the renewal of Thompson's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2007.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioners committed violations of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code sufficient to justify revocation of Petitioners’ license to operate a foster care facility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners’ foster home is a private agency foster home licensed by Respondent to provide substitute care for children in foster care. On or about August 24, 2000, a report was made to the Florida Abuse Registry indicating that a child, A.C., who suffers from Downs Syndrome and who resided in Petitioners’ care at the time, had suffered a burn mark that was three to four inches long. The burn reportedly appeared to be from an iron. Pursuant to this report, Respondent’s Child Protective Investigator commenced an investigation of the matter on August 24, 2000. During the course of the August 24, 2000, investigation, Respondent’s investigator observed the burn on A.C.’s arm. Testimony of the investigator establishes the presence of such a burn on A.C.’s arm at the time. That testimony is corroborated by photographs in Respondent’s Composite Exhibit No. 3 and fairly and accurately depicts A.C.’s burned arm as it appeared on August 24, 2001. Petitioner Carol Golden, when asked about the situation, stated that she was unaware of the burn on A.C.’s right arm until the matter was brought to her attention by the investigation which commenced on August 24, 2000, following the discovery of the child's injury by school personnel. Interviews with other children in the home revealed that another child was ironing clothes on the evening of August 23, 2000, and left the iron unattended momentarily, during which time A.C. burned his arm on the iron. Respondent’s investigator referred A.C. to the Child Protection Team for an examination of his injury. Subsequently, A.C. was removed from Petitioners’ foster home after the findings of the Child Protection Team revealed that the child’s injury was indicative of inadequate supervision. Respondent’s investigator concluded her investigation and closed the case, Abuse Report 2000-133049, with verified findings for lack of supervision and failure to seek medical attention for A.C. Subsequently, Petitioners’ foster care license was revoked because of the verified findings of neglect and inadequate supervision found in Abuse Report 2000-133049. Medical examination of A.C.’s injury, as it appeared on August 24, 2000, reveals that the injury was on the child’s right arm; was five by eight centimeters in size; and was a charred burn in the shape of an iron with the circles for the steam holes clearly visible. The burn was in such a place, and of such a size, that any caretaker responsible for the bathing and clothing of A.C. should have seen the injury. Attempts by Respondent’s employees to conduct an assessment of A.C. were not successful. He was friendly and interacted well; however, he only pointed to his injury and could not communicate how it happened.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the testimony of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered confirming the revocation of Petitioner’s foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Golden Carol Golden 7939 Denham Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in DOAH Case No. 06-0347 is whether the Petitioner, Helena McIntyre (Petitioner) is entitled to the renewal of her foster care license. The issue in DOAH Case No. 06-0537 is whether the Petitioner is entitled to adopt a child placed in her home previously under a foster parent license that has since been denied for renewal (DOAH Case No. 06-0347).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has been a licensed foster care parent since 1993. Prior to the instant denial, the Petitioner’s license has been renewed on every occasion. P., a minor, was placed in the Petitioner’s home in 2000. Also in the Petitioner’s home at that time were minor twin brothers, M. and M. In the fall of 2003, the Petitioner became friends with Jimmie Lee Hodgest, a convicted sex offender. Mr. Hodgest pled guilty to three counts of sexual battery on a seven-year old girl. After serving his prison sentence, Mr. Hodgest was released and placed on parole. At all times material to the allegations in these cases, Mr. Hodgest was required to report to his probation officer, Sylvia Diez. According to Ms. Diez, when she became aware of the friendship between Mr. Hodgest and the Petitioner, she asked to meet the Petitioner so that she could explain the offender’s criminal history. Basically, Ms. Diez wanted the Petitioner to understand that she would be checking on Mr. Hodgest to assure he was complying with the terms of his parole. Also, Ms. Diez wanted to verify that Mr. Hodgest would not be left unsupervised with children. To that end Ms. Diez went to the Petitioner’s home to warn the Petitioner about Mr. Hodgest. Ms. Diez saw Mr. Hodgest at the Petitioner’s home on four or five occasions. Most troubling to Ms. Diez, however, was an incident in June of 2004, when she dropped by the Petitioner’s home at 8:21 p.m. and found him alone there. Additionally, on September 29, 2004, at 9:47 p.m., Ms. Diez went to the Petitioner’s home and found her in either a nightgown or housecoat with Mr. Hodgest upstairs in the bedroom area of the home. Mr. Hodgest came downstairs to speak with Ms. Diez. At that time no one represented that the Petitioner and Mr. Hodgest were painting the upstairs. In 2004, Duray Smith conducted an investigation regarding an allegation that the Petitioner allowed a convicted sex offender in her home. Mr. Smith is a Child Protective Investigator employed by the Department. When Mr. Smith interviewed the Petitioner regarding Mr. Hodgest, she admitted knowing the offender but stated that he was merely her yard man. Further, since from the neighbors, the children, and everyone he interviewed, Mr. Smith was unable to verify that the offender was in the home, the allegation was closed with no indicators. Then, in 2005, Mr. Smith received a second allegation of similar conduct. The claim alleged that Mr. Hodgest was frequenting the home such that the children might be at risk. When the 2005 investigation ensued, Mr. Smith interviewed a neighbor who represented that a male did frequent the Petitioner’s home. Mr. Smith was later able to ascertain that the male was Mr. Hodgest. In fact, a child in the home advised Mr. Smith that Mr. Hodgest “naps” at the house. It cannot be determined if Mr. Hodgest did, in fact, take naps at the home. When Mr. Smith confronted the Petitioner with the allegation, she stated that the offender was never at the home unsupervised. The Petitioner admitted that the offender cooked at the home but maintained that she was also in the home at the time (albeit in a different room). From the admissions of the Petitioner (that the offender was inside the home), the comments of others, and his verification that the offender had been frequenting the home for approximately two weeks, Mr. Smith filed a petition to take action to protect the children in the Petitioner’s home. That action removed the foster children from the Petitioner’s home. Mr. Smith believed that all of the children in the Petitioner’s home were at risk of being harmed. There was never an allegation of, or evidence of, any actual physical abuse to the children in the Petitioner’s home. All of the concerns raised by the Department were related to a risk of harm based upon the offender’s past criminal conduct. Mr. Smith’s sole responsibility in this regard was to investigate an allegation and to report on it. Mr. Smith did not investigate the terms of Mr. Hodgest’s probation. Similarly, Mr. Smith did not investigate whether or not the Petitioner’s foster home license should be renewed. Ada Gonzalez, however, was responsible for reviewing the foster home license. When Ms. Gonzalez learned of a second allegation regarding the Petitioner’s home had been confirmed, a staffing was scheduled to consider the status of the Petitioner’s foster home license. According to Ms. Gonzalez, the Petitioner had an affirmative duty to notify the Department of persons within the licensed home who may affect the foster child’s welfare. Ms. Gonzalez was concerned that the Petitioner had been less than candid in disclosing her relationship with the offender and his presence in the Petitioner’s home. The Bilateral Service Agreement between the Department and the Petitioner provided foster parent responsibilities owed to the Department. Those responsibilities included: To notify the department immediately of a potential change in address, living arrangements, martial status, family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child’s well being. To notify the department promptly of all contacts the family or any member of the home has with the police or any law enforcement agencies. The Bilateral Service Agreement also provided that: Non-compliance with any of the above provisions may result in administrative action by the department which could include corrective action, suspension, revocation or denial of further licensure pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner did not notify the Department that someone who frequented her home was required to be monitored by law enforcement. The Petitioner also did not notify the Department that she had been contacted by Mr. Hodgest’s probation officer. Ms. Gonzalez believed that the Petitioner had an affirmative duty to disclose the probation status of Mr. Hodgest since he was frequently at the home. Following the action initiated by Mr. Smith, the minor children in the Petitioner’s home were removed and a juvenile court judge adjudicated them dependent. The minor child, P., who is the subject of the instant adoption request was placed in another foster home. The Petitioner has denied that the offender was her boyfriend and that he was left unsupervised in the home with the children. The Petitioner acknowledged that she did not notify anyone that Mr. Hodgest was frequently at the home. The weight of the credible evidence dictates a finding that the Petitioner and Mr. Hodgest were not merely in an employer/employee relationship. The Petitioner’s representation that Mr. Hodgest was “the yard man” is not credible. Moreover, the Petitioner knew or should have known that an individual with Mr. Hodgest’s criminal record would be a concern to the Department. As early as 2004, the Petitioner was put on notice that an allegation of concern had been raised. The Petitioner did not remove Mr. Hodgest from access to her home (in fact his visits became more frequent over time), did not acknowledge that Mr. Hodgest could pose a threat to the children in her care, and did not seek counsel from the foster care authorities regarding the offender’s connection to the licensed home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter Final Orders that deny the renewal of the Petitioner’s foster home license and deny the Petitioner’s adoption application. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 8, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Greer Davis Wallace, Esquire Law Office of Greer Davis Wallace 1450 North Krome Avenue, Suite 101G Florida City, Florida 33034-2400 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128
The Issue Should Petitioner's application for foster home licensure be granted?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Petitioner operated a family foster home at 1028 Mississippi Avenue, Clewiston, Florida, which had been licensed by the Department or its predecessor, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, from April 18, 1991, through April 1, 1997. In December 1996, the Petitioner was advised that the Department's licensing staff would be recommending that Petitioner's family foster home not be granted licensure at the end of Petitioner's current licensure period of April 1, 1997. By letter dated March 17, 1997, the Department advised Petitioner that the Department would not be furnishing her a packet for relicensure except upon request by Petitioner. Subsequently, Petitioner requested a relicensure packet and made application for relicensure of her family foster home located at 1028 Mississippi Avenue, Clewiston, Florida. After reviewing Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license, the Department, by letter dated September 4, 1997, advised Petitioner that her application for renewal of her family foster home located at 1028 Mississippi Avenue, Clewiston, Florida, had been denied. The denial letter provides in pertinent part as follows: The Department of Children and Families hereby denies Priscilla Ghans a license for purposes of providing substitute care for children in the custody of the State of Florida and in support thereof, would show the following: Ms. Ghans' current income and expenses are insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 65C-13.025(5), Florida Administrative Code. (Formerly known as Rule 10M-6 F.A.C.) Paul Beadle, a current household member, has criminal offenses which are disqualifying within Chapter 435 of the Florida Statutes. In accordance with Section 409.175(5)(h), Florida Statutes, a license may not be issued if any member of the household failed to pass background screening. In addition, Priscilla Ghans was licensed as a foster parent in 1996. E.O. was a foster child placed in her home in 1996. During his placement, Ms. Ghans failed to provide adequate supervision which is a violation of Sections 409.175(4)(a)(1,2,4) and (8)(b)1, Florida Statutes and Rule 65C- 13.024(1)(b)(1,a), Florida Administrative Code. When E. O. left her home, his personal belongings were placed in a garbage bag along with trash and debris. The majority of his clothes were unwearable in that they were to small or unsuitable. This is a violation of Rule 65C-13.024(1)(b)(1,c) and (3,a-d) Florida Administrative Code. . . . Petitioner's monthly expenses total $491.00. Petitioner's monthly income from Social Security and SSI total $504.00. A Financial Statement filed with the Department by Petitioner refers to Petitioner having a savings account but does not indicate the amount of the savings account or if this savings account is available for monthly expenses. Neither the Department nor Petitioner offered any other evidence concerning this savings account. Likewise, there was testimony that Petitioner's son, Paul Beadle, paid Petitioner room and board while with Petitioner. However, there was no evidence as to the amount Beadle paid Petitioner for room and board. On June 23, 1997, Beadle pled nolo contendere to: (a) possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, and a violation of 893.13(6((a), Florida Statutes; (b) possession of marijuana (20 grams or less), a first degree misdemeanor, and a violation of Section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes; and (c) possession of paraphernalia, a first degree misdemeanor, and a violation of Section 893.147, Florida Statutes. Since the felony offense was committed less than three years ago, Beadle cannot be granted an exemption from disqualification under Section 435.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Paul Beadle lived in the home with Petitioner up until July 1997. Although Petitioner has never established the date that Beadle moved from her home, she contends that Beadle has moved out of her home. However, Petitioner testified that in the past when Beadle wanted to return, she has always allowed him to move back home. E.O., a foster child approximately 13 years of age, was placed in Petitioner's family foster home in 1996. After his placement, Petitioner allowed E.O. to attend a block party in the neighborhood without being under her supervision or the supervision of any properly screened adult. Around 11:00 p.m., E.O. had to bang on the door in order to get in since Petitioner had gone to sleep. On another occasion, E.O. made plans to stay overnight with a friend. However, the friend's parents had not been screened to supervise foster children. On this occasion, the father of the friend called Petitioner to advise her that E.O. could not spend the night. Although E.O. did not return home until the next morning, Petitioner did not contact law enforcement or the Department. Petitioner also went shopping without advising E.O. that she was leaving or when she would return. E.O., who had never been given a key by Petitioner, attempted to break into Petitioner's home. E.O. was removed from Petitioner's care in August 1996 on an emergency basis when E.O. threatened suicide. Subsequently, E.O.'s clothing was retrieved from Petitioner in two plastic bags and delivered to Valerie Welter, foster parent who had taken E.O. Upon opening the bags of clothing, it was clear that Petitioner had failed to properly maintain the clothes and had failed to furnished E.O. with clothes of the proper size.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Priscilla Ghans Post Office Box 2252 Clewiston, Florida 33440 Eugenie G. Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Children and Family Services should revoke the foster care license of Joe and Fatima Landon.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the home of Joe and Fatima Landon was licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services as a foster home, having been issued License No. 0900-17 by the Department. On January 31, 2001, the Department received a report alleging that a child in the Landons' care, K.N.F., had two scrapes on her left hand that might constitute abuse. As a result of these allegations, Harvey Clark and Kevin Daniels, Child Protective Investigators employed by the Department, went to the Landons' home on the day of the alleged incident to investigate. Deputy Steven Parker of the Clay County Sheriff's Office also went to the Landons' to investigate. At the time of the hearing, K.N.F. was seven years old. She recalled that on the day of the incident, Mrs. Landon was driving her and another foster child to school. K.N.F. was reading in the back seat of the van. K.N.F. was trying to sound out the words and was unable to sound them out properly. Mrs. Landon turned around and Mrs. Landon's hand hit K.N.F.'s hand. K.N.F. described the incident as follows, "She turned around. And I was holding my hand on the book. She was going to point to the word, but my hand was there." She perceived Mrs. Landon to be angry, but also thought that Mrs. Landon was pointing to the word and hit her hand by accident.2 K.N.F. was referred to the Child Protection Team for an examination of her injury. She was examined by Dr. Bruce J. McIntosh. Dr. McIntosh found two abrasions, or scrapes, on the back of her left hand near the thumb. It was Dr. McIntosh's opinion that the abrasions were inconsistent with the injury being an accident in that one would not be pointing at something with "such force and velocity" to produce two abrasions to the hand. Notwithstanding Dr. McIntosh's testimony, the abrasions are best described in the photographs taken the day of the incident which reveal two small reddish abrasions on K.N.F.'s left hand. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Mrs. Landon reaching around to K.N.F. caused the abrasions on K.N.F.'s hand. Dr. McIntosh determined that the abrasions did not require specific treatment. However, he recommended that K.N.F. and the other foster child in the car be removed from the Landons because it was his impression that the children were afraid of Mrs. Landon. This impression was based primarily on statements made to him by K.N.F. and the other foster child during his examination, which are hearsay. K.N.F. and the other foster children were then removed from the Landons' home by the Department. At the time of the incident, Tanya Lee was employed by the Jacksonville Youth Sanctuary, a private organization contracted by the Department to provide foster care services, as a foster care case worker. She was the case worker for the two other foster children in the Landons' home. She visited the home frequently and found a happy, stable environment. She found the Landons to be very supportive and nurturing of the foster children including what she witnessed with K.N.F. during her home visits. Ms. Lee conducted exit interviews of the children for whom she was the case worker when they were removed from the home after the incident. It was her impression that the children felt safe in the Landons' home and wanted to be placed back with the Landons. This impression was based on the statements made by the children during the exit interviews and are hearsay.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order rescinding its revocation of the Landons' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2002.
