The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a physician licensed to practice in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0025685. For 18 years prior to the event complained of herein, Respondent worked at Indian River Memorial Hospital, where he practiced as an anaesthesiologist. Also prior to the event complained of herein, Respondent was a tri- athlete, training in swimming, biking, and running. During the summer of 1992 he competed in five or six tri-athalons and did quite well in his age class. Respondent was also a snow skier. In accordance with his physical fitness values, Respondent does not drink alcoholic beverages or smoke cigarettes. He is also a vegetarian. Peter G. Wernicke is an orthopedic surgeon in the Vero Beach area. After arriving there, he and Respondent became social friends and went on ski trips together. He also became Respondent's treating physician, caring for Respondent when Respondent suffered broken bones, strains, and sprains as a result of his sporting activities. In early winter of 1992 Respondent seriously injured his knee while snow skiing. Respondent discussed his need for surgery with Wernicke after Respondent returned to the Vero Beach area. Wernicke was insistent that he perform Respondent's knee surgery, but Respondent wanted to have the surgery performed by Dr. Richard Steadman in Vail, Colorado, since he believed that Dr. Steadman was probably the best in the world at taking care of that particular kind of knee injury. Wernicke then insisted that Respondent allow Wernicke to perform the knee surgery with Respondent awake, and once the knee was opened up, Wernicke and Respondent would look at it and decide whether it was something Wernicke was able to take care of or if the knee should be closed and Respondent would then go to whomever he wanted to have the surgery performed. Respondent would not agree to that approach since he well understood that opening the knee twice would double Respondent's risk of infection in that injured knee. Up to the time that Respondent left to travel to Vail for his knee surgery, Wernicke maintained that he was not giving Respondent his blessing for having the surgery performed by someone else. Respondent went to Vail and had Dr. Steadman perform the surgery in early December of 1992. Respondent remained in Vail post-operatively undergoing physical therapy which commenced within hours of surgery being completed to increase his chances of obtaining full range of motion with that knee by keeping it moving and preventing scarring. Respondent returned to Vero Beach on December 13 and returned to work the next morning, working a full shift that day. After his shift was over, he drove himself to Orlando for a meeting. While in Orlando, Respondent began to have very severe pain and swelling in his knee. He drove back to Vero Beach, arriving at his home at approximately 9:30 p.m. Upon his arrival, he telephoned Wernicke, told Wernicke he was in a great deal of pain, and begged Wernicke to help him by meeting him at the hospital and looking at Respondent's knee. Wernicke told Respondent that he would not go to the hospital to meet Respondent, that Respondent should elevate his knee and apply ice, and then see Wernicke in the morning. Respondent elevated his leg and applied ice for the next few hours. By approximately midnight the pain had become "absolutely excruciating," unlike any Respondent had experienced with all of his broken bones and other sports injuries. Although Respondent's tolerance for pain was high enough that he had gone through the surgery performed by Dr. Steadman without pain pills and had tolerated getting on an exercise bike 12 hours after that surgery, Respondent knew that he could no longer endure the pain, that he had a serious problem with his post-operative knee, and that he needed to get help immediately. Respondent got himself up with crutches and got in the car to drive himself to the emergency room. While driving, he telephoned the emergency room at Indian River Memorial Hospital and told the staff he was on his way there and asked the name of the orthopedist who was on call. He was advised that Dr. Wernicke was not only on call, but was present in the emergency room at that moment. Respondent told the emergency room staff to tell Wernicke to wait for him. Respondent then called the operating room at Indian River Memorial Hospital and asked if an anaesthesiologist were there so he could get something to relieve his pain. He was told that Dr. Brennan had just finished with surgery and had taken the patient to the intensive care unit. Respondent then asked for two things: (1) to have Dr. Brennan go to the emergency room to take care of Respondent and (2) to bring Respondent's anaesthesia cart to the emergency room. The operating room staff agreed. Respondent's requests resulted from his experience with that hospital's emergency room staff and procedures. He knew he needed medication for his knee and for his pain. He knew that Dr. Brennan was not employed by the hospital and did not have his own anaesthesia cart there. He knew that the emergency room staff were notoriously slow in responding to patient needs or doctor requests. Therefore, over the years, Respondent had learned that whenever he was called to the emergency room, the patient was better served if Respondent took his own anaesthesia cart and supplies with him. As a result of his telephoning ahead, Respondent's arrival was expected. Dr. Wernicke waited for him. Someone took Respondent's anaesthesia cart to the emergency room and placed it next to a stretcher. Dr. Brennan was paged and told that Respondent needed him in the emergency room, and Dr. Brennan went to the emergency room to assist his colleague. When Brennan got there, Respondent had not yet arrived, but Wernicke was present. Brennan told Wernicke he was there to help with Respondent. For whatever reason, Wernicke told Brennan that Brennan was not needed and told him to leave. Before leaving the emergency room, Brennan told Wernicke that if he were needed he would be nearby in the intensive care unit and to please summon him. Respondent arrived at the hospital emergency room on crutches. The emergency room was currently under construction and had no dividing walls or partitions so that it was simply one room in which everyone could see everything occurring. There were no patients in the emergency room when Respondent arrived, but there were three or four nurses and the emergency room doctor at the nurses' station. Respondent went to the nurses' station to be admitted. He was told that he should wait in the lobby and he would be called when they were ready to begin the admission process. Respondent refused to do that, told them he was in excruciating pain, and insisted that he be given the emergency room release form and financial responsibility form to sign and be taken to one of the emergency room stretchers. He was given the forms to sign, which he did, and he was then escorted to the stretcher next to his anaesthesia cart. For the remainder of his time in the emergency room, Respondent remained on that stretcher which was no more than 30 feet from the nurses' station. No chart for his emergency room visit was prepared by the hospital personnel. Further, no one took his vital signs; no one took his blood pressure; no one asked what his problem or complaints were which caused his visit; and no one asked whether Respondent had any allergies or had recently eaten. Respondent lay on the stretcher waiting for Wernicke to return to the emergency room for approximately five minutes. When Wernicke came in, he was wearing a big smile. He remarked to Respondent that Wernicke could see that Respondent had a problem with his knee. Wernicke then gave one swipe across Respondent's knee with an alcohol swab and prepared to jab an 18 gauge needle into the knee to aspirate it, i.e., to drain the fluid. Respondent became terrified and told Wernicke to stop. Respondent's terror was caused by two fears. First, it was apparent that his knee was full of blood. He knew that blood outside of its normal confines is an irritant which causes inflammation and he knew that it was also the perfect medium in which bacteria could grow. He also knew that the risk of infection in his knee was substantial because it was a post-operative knee. Infection in such a knee presents a best-case scenario of a damaged knee and a worst-case scenario of rendering him a cripple, requiring a total knee replacement. Yet, Respondent saw that Wernicke intended to stick the needle into Respondent's dirty knee without even using a Betadine preparation to remove bacteria from the skin. Second, Respondent was in "unbelievable" pain from the significant swelling in his knee. The surgical incisions above and below his knee had ruptured from the pressure caused by the swelling. In order for Wernicke to aspirate Respondent's knee, it would be necessary for him to poke his fingers into the swollen knee area in order to locate the right place to stick the needle, and it was impossible for Respondent to hold his leg still for Dr. Wernicke to palpate, let alone insert the needle in the correct location. Respondent told Wernicke that he needed an I.V. started; that he needed Kefzol, an I.V. antibiotic, to prevent infection; that he needed Toradol intravenously for its anti-inflammatory effect; and that he was in very, very severe pain and needed pain medication so he could hold his leg still for Wernicke to aspirate. Although Wernicke recognized that Respondent was in significant, severe pain, he told Respondent he would agree to the antibiotic and he would agree to the anti-inflammatory, but that he didn't think Respondent needed anything for pain. Respondent's anaesthesia cart was not equipped with I.V. fluids. Someone brought an I.V. bag and set-up. Respondent does not know who brought the I.V. and whether it was on Dr. Wernicke's order or ordered by the emergency room doctor, but Respondent did not order the I.V. brought. No one offered to start Respondent's I.V. for him, and Wernicke did not tell Respondent that Dr. Brennan had come to the emergency room, had been sent away by Wernicke but was nearby, and had told Wernicke to summon him if he were needed. Wernicke kept telling Respondent to hurry up because it was late and he wanted to go home. He told Respondent that they needed to get finished because Wernicke was doing Respondent a favor just by being there. Respondent, while still lying on his stretcher, started his own I.V. Wernicke assisted Respondent by handing him tape for the I.V. since Respondent was performing the task with one hand. Respondent then removed his medication box from the bottom of his anaesthesia cart. He took out an ampule of Kefzol, a dry powder. He took a syringe and drew fluid from the I.V. that was running into him and mixed up that dry powder antibiotic by flushing it back and forth. He then gave the antibiotic to himself. He attempted to delay Wernicke from inserting the needle into his knee until after the antibiotic could circulate through his system and get to his knee before any bacteria was introduced, a process which would take approximately six minutes to complete enough circulations. Respondent next prepped his own knee with Betadine solution while Dr. Wernicke continued to stand there by his side, watching him. Respondent then took an ampule of Toradol, a new anti-inflammatory medication, and gave himself 60 milligrams intravenously, while Wernicke stood and watched. Although that anti-inflammatory medication would also serve to reduce Respondent's pain, Toradol is a slow-acting medication in that regard, having a slow onset but thereafter lasting for a number of hours. Respondent then removed from his medication box a 5 cc ampule of Alfenta. That ampule is a 2 1/2 inch object made of glass with its name in blue lettering on the outside, large enough to read. Alfenta is a Schedule II controlled substance and is a narcotic. Alfenta has a fast onset and a fast offset; it works in 30 to 60 seconds, and its effect lasts for approximately 10 minutes. While Dr. Wernicke watched, Respondent filled a needle and gave himself 1 cc of Alfenta which is a very conservative test dose for a man weighing 190 pounds who is in good condition. Respondent then waited a minute or a minute and a half to see what effect it had on his pain level and trembling leg. It had very little effect. Therefore, Respondent injected an additional 1/2 cc and waited. That additional amount was sufficient. Wernicke watched as Respondent gave himself the Alfenta, standing, as he had been, within inches of Respondent. As he injected the medications, Respondent filled out the chart on his anaesthesia cart, noting the medication, the dosage, and that he was the patient. Respondent then laid back on the stretcher, closed his eyes, and then told Wernicke he was ready. Wernicke then palpated Respondent's knee and inserted the needle to aspirate Respondent's knee. The pressure in his knee was so high that it blew the syringe back. Wernicke commented that he had never before seen that happen and had never seen pressure like that. Wernicke withdrew approximately 100 ccs of fluid from Respondent's knee, commenting that he did not think he'd seen one with more volume. Although initially Wernicke had said that he did not agree that Respondent needed any pain medication, Wernicke totally acquiesced in everything Respondent did to assist Wernicke in treating Respondent. Wernicke accepted Respondent's judgment and watched Respondent execute step by step the course of treatment Respondent said was needed to render proper medical treatment. Wernicke totally agreed and acquiesced with the use of Alfenta as much as he did the antibiotic and the anti-inflammatory as evidenced by Wernicke's own conduct. Wernicke never told Respondent to stop doing Wernicke's work for him. Wernicke never told him not to administer the medications. Wernicke never suggested that he or someone else perform the administration. Wernicke could have easily stopped Respondent who was laying on a stretcher but did not. Wernicke knew that Alfenta was a pain killer and a narcotic. He did nothing to stop or prevent Respondent from injecting a medication Respondent needed. Further, Wernicke continued to treat Respondent after the administration of Alfenta by thereafter performing the aspiration. After he completed the aspiration, Wernicke left. Respondent lay on the stretcher for a little while. The nurses and the emergency room doctor remained at the nurses' station, and there were still no other patients in the emergency room. Respondent asked if someone would bring him a wheelchair so he could leave, and he was told that they were too busy. Respondent took his crutches and hobbled out of the emergency room. The next morning Respondent reported to work for his regular shift which began at 7:00 a.m. After Respondent completed the first case on his shift that day, at approximately 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. he called Haynes McDaniel, the hospital's pharmacist, and told him what had happened the night before, what medications Respondent had used, and that he had used the medications on himself. Respondent said he needed to do whatever paperwork the pharmacist wanted and specifically asked the pharmacist to bill him for the medications he had used. McDaniel told Respondent that there was no problem regarding the Kefzol and the Toradol and that he would simply send Respondent a bill for those medications; however, as to the Alfenta, the pharmacist needed a prescription for his records. McDaniel asked Respondent who the attending physician had been, and Respondent told him that Peter Wernicke was the attending doctor. McDaniel told Respondent to get a prescription from Wernicke for the Alfenta so that the hospital record keeping would be proper. Respondent went to Wernicke and asked him for a prescription for the Alfenta that had been used, and Wernicke refused. Respondent then personally went to McDaniel and told him that Wernicke would not write the prescription and told McDaniel why, i.e., that Wernicke was still mad that Respondent had not considered him good enough to do Respondent's surgery. McDaniel asked Respondent who could write the prescription because Respondent needed a prescription from somebody and Respondent could not write the prescription for himself. Respondent told McDaniel that he had asked Dr. Brennan to be there to give him the pain medication, that Dr. Brennan had never showed up, but that Brennan was in the hospital at the time the medication was administered. McDaniel suggested that Respondent see if Brennan would sign a prescription. Respondent went to Brennan's office and told Brennan exactly what had happened. He told Brennan he had given himself 1 1/2 ccs of Alfenta and that Wernicke was the attending physician. He told Brennan that Respondent had self- administered and why, that Wernicke had refused to write the prescription and why, and that Haynes McDaniel had suggested that Brennan could sign the prescription for the hospital's records. Dr. Brennan became upset that he had not been there to help when his colleague needed him, agreed to sign the prescription, and offered Respondent pain pills or anything else Respondent needed for what remained a painful knee and leg. Respondent declined the offer of any additional medication. In good faith and in the course of his professional practice, Dr. Brennan signed a prescription for 1 1/2 ccs of Alfenta for Respondent. Respondent then hand- delivered that prescription to the pharmacist. After receiving the prescription from Respondent, the pharmacist wrote an Unusual Occurrence Report dated December 16, 1992. In January of 1993 the hospital summarily suspended Respondent's privileges, and he has been unable to practice medicine since that time. Respondent's emergency room visit happened on a Monday evening. On the following Thursday, Respondent and Wernicke's partner Dr. Jim Cain were in the doctor's lounge together. Respondent told Cain that his leg really hurt him and was swollen, and Cain offered to look at it. Respondent pulled up his scrub suit and showed Cain his calf which was twice its normal size and "hot". Cain suggested that Respondent get an ultrasound and get some blood thinner since it looked as though Respondent had developed phlebitis, a dangerous condition. Respondent immediately went to the x-ray department and had an ultrasound performed. The ultrasound revealed that Respondent had compartment syndrome in his calf, four days after the aspiration was performed. Dr. Wernicke's office notes regarding Respondent's emergency room visit, supposedly dictated that same evening or the following day, discussed the ultrasound that Respondent had. Accordingly, Dr. Wernicke did not dictate his notes regarding his treatment of Respondent on Monday evening or on Tuesday. Those notes, however, do bear Tuesday's date and are included in the hospital's medical record for Respondent's emergency room visit. The medical chart created by the hospital was likely created on December 21, 1992, the date stated on the Unusual Occurrence Report as the date the chart was initiated. The chart which thereafter purports to be Respondent's emergency room record is actually a composite of different patients' charts. To the extent it purports to be Respondent's chart, the entries contained therein are false. The Alfenta used by Respondent was an appropriate drug for the purpose for which it was used. It is a rapid but short-acting narcotic analgesic when given in the amount in which it was given. Further, the amount of Alfenta administered was an appropriate dose. Respondent used the Alfenta because it was an appropriate drug for immediate relief so he could endure the palpation and aspiration of his knee and so he could stop his leg from trembling allowing Wernicke to aspirate it. He knew the Alfenta would be worn off even before the analgesic effect of the anti- inflammatory medication was felt. It is noteworthy that all physicians who testified in this proceeding rated the pain Respondent was in as between eight and ten on a pain scale where ten is the worst. Respondent did not use Alfenta as a result of any addiction, and his use of the drug under the circumstances in this case was not related to any abuse of narcotics. Respondent has not exhibited any of the behavior of a drug user. Respondent did not engage in any attempt to "cover up" his administration of Alfenta to himself. He called the hospital and requested his anaesthesia cart be brought and that an anaesthesiologist come to the emergency room to administer the medication. The administration occurred with the implicit consent of Wernicke and it took place in front of Wernicke, in front of three or four emergency room nurses, and in front of the emergency room doctor. At the time, he filled out the narcotics record on his anaesthesia cart and telephoned the hospital's pharmacist the following day to tell him what had occurred and request that he be billed for the medication he used. His giving the hospital a prescription from Dr. Brennan was caused by Wernicke's refusal to document the treatment he rendered to Respondent, by Respondent's inability to write his own prescription, and was in response to the hospital's specific request that a prescription be written for the purpose of the hospital's record keeping. Further, Dr. Wernicke knew what had happened, as did the other emergency room personnel present that evening, and Respondent fully disclosed the events that had occurred to both Dr. Brennan and to the hospital pharmacist. Respondent's use of Alfenta on December 14, 1992, was not in any way related to patient care and had no impact on any patient care rendered by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-6 and 9-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 8, 13, 14, and 16 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3-19, 21-31, 33-35, 38-40, 42, 43, and 45 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 20, 32, 36, 37, and 44 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 41 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur B. Skafidas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Joseph L. Mannikko, Esquire 215 South Federal Highway, Suite 100 Stuart, Florida 34994 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Dr. Cambo is licensed by the Board of Medicine, holding license number 48428, and was licensed at all times pertaining to the events alleged in the Administrative Complaint. L. M., a 67 year old male, arrived at the emergency room of John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital in Atlantis, Florida, at 12:08 p.m., on April 15, 1987. L. M. had been a resident at the Atlantis Nursing Home. L. M. spoke Finnish; he did not speak English. He had had an amputation of a portion of his right leg two weeks earlier due to gangrene caused by peripheral vascular disease. The staples from this amputation were still visible. He had had a stroke, had irregularities in a prior E.K.G. and generally was in poor health. His current medications included ecotrin, motrin, vasotic, lopressor, halcion and catapress. He had indicated that he had chest pain to the nursing home staff and to the Fire-Rescue technicians by signing. When he arrived at the emergency room L. M. was described as cyanotic, diaphoretic and hypotensive. His breathing was labored. He was examined by the emergency room physician, Randall Wolff. L. M.'s chest pain, labored breathing and cyanotic appearance were consistent with cardiogenic shock. Dr. Wolff ordered certain diagnostic tests which included a complete blood count, a chest x-ray, and arterial blood gases. An E.K.G. was performed at approximately 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. L. M.'s urine color that afternoon was indicative of infection. Test results showed an elevated white blood count, and immature white blood cell forms. These are consistent with an active infection from the recent amputation or a myocardial infarction. Dr. Wolff thought the patient should have been admitted to J.F.K. because of his chest pain and abnormal vital signs. Dr. Cambo was contacted by the emergency room staff because Dr. Cambo was on call for the health maintenance organization which provided L. M.'s medical care. Dr. Cambo came to the hospital at about 2:40 p.m. and saw L. M. and other HMO patients. No treatment for L. M., other than oxygen, had been ordered by Dr. Wolff. Apparently, Dr. Wolff did not regard L. M.'s condition as serious. Dr. Cambo conducted a physical examination of L. M., who by that time denied having chest pain by signing. The examination revealed that the right stump had no femoral pulse, while the left leg had 2+ femoral pulse. His blood pressure was on the low side of the normal range. Dr. Cambo also reviewed L. M.'s test results, including the 3:00 p.m. E.K.G. tracing. Dr. Cambo then telephoned Dr. Jerome Vincente, the primary care physician who had managed the care of patient L. M. while L. M. was being served by the International Medical Center No. 90 in West Palm Beach. During that telephone call Dr. Cambo and Dr. Vincente compared the 3:00 p.m. E.K.G. tracing with a prior E.K.G. tracing from L. M.'s records at International Medical Center. The prior E.K.G. tracing was similar to that taken at 3:00 p.m. Dr. Cambo's reading of the 3:00 p.m. tracing led him to diagnose inferior wall ischemia and marked T anterior wall ischemia. Taken in isolation, the 3:00 p.m. tracing would indicate that L. M. might be having a heart attack. After the comparison Dr. Cambo made of the prior tracing, Dr. Cambo concluded that L. M.'s current cardiac condition was not abnormal for him, and decided to transfer L. M. to Humana Hospital for the purpose of achieving continuity of treatment, i.e., so that he would be seen at Humana by his regular physicians. Dr. Cambo believed L. M. had an infection resulting from the recent amputation and had circulatory problems which had resulted in gangrene that had caused the amputation. Dr. Cambo returned to J.F.K. Hospital at 3:30 p.m. to see HMO patients, including L. M. who had not yet been transferred to Humana Hospital. Dr. Cambo again examined L. M. and after reviewing the progress notes of L. M. maintained by the J.F.K. Hospital nursing staff, he determined that L. M.'s condition had not changed since 3:00 p.m. Dr. Cambo left J.F.K. Hospital between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. with the instruction that L. M. be transferred to Humana. Due to the delay encountered in obtaining transportation, Dr. Cambo ordered that the patient continue to receive oxygen and that he receive I.V. fluids. Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. Dr. Cambo contacted the nursing staff at the J.F.K. Hospital emergency room on two occasions. Each time he was told that L. M.'s condition remained the same and had not altered since his arrival at the emergency room shortly after noon. The Atlantis Ambulance Service arrived at J.F.K. Hospital at about 7:45 p.m. to transport L. M. to Humana Hospital. At about 11:00 p.m. on April 15, 1987, patient L. M. died from an anterior wall myocardial infarction at Humana Hospital.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the charges contained in Count I of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. Count II of the Administrative Complaint was dismissed by the Department at the final hearing and requires no further action by the hearing officer or the Board of Medicine. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1989. APPENDIX Rulings on the proposed findings of fact. Findings proposed by Department of Professional Regulation. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2 and 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. To the extent appropriate covered in finding of fact 3 and 4. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Rejected because the programming of the data scope to produce the quoted printout was not proven to be accurate. What is most important is the judgment of the physicians who examined the patient and were in a much better position to evaluate the significance of the results, not only of the E.K.G., but of all testing. Covered in finding of fact 4. The proposed finding that L. M. communicated non-verbally due to aphasia is rejected because it is equally likely that he could not communicate because English was not his primary language. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected because the testimony of Dr. Cambo and Dr. Vincente indicates that the E.K.G. was not clearly indicative of myocardial infarction in this patient. Covered in finding of fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary and because there is no way to know whether the patient's blood pressure was low due to cardiogenic shock or the medication he was taking. Rejected is inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. There is no indication that the patient suffered from any problem because of the absence of written instructions for care to be given during the transfer. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rejected because there was no argument between Dr. Wolff and Dr. Cambo about admitting the patient to J.F.K. The nursing notes, from which this inference is derived, are unreliable. Dr. Wolff did not testify to any such argument. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, the patient's breathing was not labored at 6:30 p.m. To the extent the nurses notes might indicate otherwise, they are rejected as unreliable. Rejected because the second page of the nurses notes is an after-the-fact creation. Rejected because the second page of the nurses notes is an after-the-fact creation. Rejected because the nurses notes have been found to be unreliable. Covered to the extent necessary in finding of fact 9. Covered to the extent necessary in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Findings proposed by Respondent The findings proposed by the Respondent are not submitted in numbered paragraphs. The burden of the proposed findings of Dr. Cambo have been accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: LEE SIMMS, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 ROBERT H. SPRINGER, ESQUIRE 3003 SOUTH CONGRESS AVENUE SUITE 1A PALM SPRINGS, FLORIDA 33461 DOROTHY FAIRCLOTH EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a physician should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint filed on December 21, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Kenneth Aung-Din, is a licensed medical doctor having been issued license number ME 0051923 by petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine (Board). He is board certified in emergency medicine having received his certification in 1994. When the events herein occurred, respondent was an emergency room physician at Memorial Medical Center (MMC) in Jacksonville, Florida. On the evening of February 21, 1991, V. P., a thirty-five year old female who was then eight months pregnant, presented herself to the MMC emergency room complaining of lower abdominal discomfort, difficulty urinating, and a five-hour history of nausea and vomiting. After being examined and treated by respondent, and diagnosed as having a urinary tract infection, the patient was released the same evening. Less than an hour later, however, the patient went into labor and delivered a new born. On December 21, 1992, the Board issued a two-count administrative complaint charging that, while treating V. P., respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances in that he "failed to obtain fetal heart tones, determine fetal position, and ausculatate for fetal heart tones with a doppler that was available to him in the ER when he examined (the) patient, who was a high risk near term obstetrical patient." The complaint further alleges that respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of V. P., "including, but not limited to, patient histories; examination results; test results; records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or administered; and reports of consultations and hospitalizations." Respondent denied all material allegations and requested this hearing to contest these charges. Did respondent deviate from the standard of care? On presentment to the emergency room nurse around 8:53 p.m. on February 21, 1991, V. P. complained of generalized abdominal pain and pressure since around 3:30 p.m. that day, with nausea and two episodes of vomiting. She also complained that she was unable to urinate since approximately 2:30 p.m. An additional complaint was allegedly made by the patient, but it is not a part of the nurse's notes and thus is hearsay in nature. The patient further disclosed that this was her second pregnancy. After recording in her notes the patient's complaints, the nurse, on her own volition, conducted a nitrozine test which was negative. It later came to light that the test was improperly conducted by the nurse, but respondent was never told this fact. Respondent first observed the patient around 9:08 p.m. and recalled that she "was obviously in discomfort." Based on V. P.'s complaints, respondent initially suspected that she might be in preterm labor. After obtaining a patient history, respondent palpitated V. P.'s abdomen for any pain, tenderness, abnormalities or contractions. Although V. P. was eight months pregnant, she was nontender and exhibited no signs of active labor. The patient also denied that she was having contractions. Based on V. P.'s primary complaint of urinary retention, respondent asked the nurse to insert a Foley catheter in V. P.'s bladder. Before the nurse did so, V. P. was able to urinate on her own accord. Even so, respondent ordered a catheter inserted around 9:30 p.m. to empty any residual in the bladder. This procedure yielded approximately 200cc. of urine which was used for a urinalysis test. By now, having urinated at least once, and having her bladder emptied, V. P.'s pain and discomfort had gone away, and she appeared to be "totally comfortable and with no complaints." After seeing the results of the nitrozine test around 9:55 p.m., respondent conducted a pelvic examination. Still considering the possibility of preterm labor, respondent inserted a vaginal speculum into the patient to see if there was any bleeding or fluid. Neither was present, and a manual examination of the patient revealed that the opening to her cervix was thick and closed. A patient in preterm labor would generally present signs of bleeding or fluid, and the cervix would have begun to open and "thin out." Given these findings, and the fact that V. P. was exhibiting no signs of labor or discomfort, it was reasonable for respondent to conclude that V. P. was not in preterm labor. The results of the urinalysis were reviewed by respondent around twenty minutes before the patient's discharge. By that time, she had voluntarily urinated at least three times since first arriving at the emergency room. The test results revealed 1+ protein, trace ketones, and 0-2 white and red blood cells. Also, they indicated that a sterile (uncontaminated) specimen had been taken, and that trace bacteria were present. Because trace bacteria, if not treated, can lead to "a very significant" urinary tract infection, and V. P. had previously experienced abdominal "pressure" and an inability to urinate, both signs of an infection, respondent prescribed Ampicillin, an antibiotic, on the assumption V. P. had a urinary tract infection. This diagnosis is not unusual for pregnant women, and even petitioner's expert agreed that V. P. had presented some of the "classical signs" of a urinary tract infection. After having observed the patient for almost two hours, during which time V. P. exhibited no objective clinical signs of active labor, respondent discharged the patient around 10:50 p.m. In doing so, respondent relied not only on the above observations, but also upon the results of his pelvic and abdominal evaluations, the urinalysis test results, and the fact that all of V. P.'s complaints (pain, nausea and vomiting) had been resolved. It was also reasonable to conclude that had the patient been in preterm labor, her symptoms would have progressed, rather than abated, during the two hours she was in the emergency room. At the time of discharge, respondent gave V. P. instructions to make a follow-up visit that week with her primary physician at University Medical Center (UMC), and if her condition did not improve during the interim, to return to MCC or call the "emergency department right away for further assistance." She was also given a prescription for an antibiotic for the urinary tract infection. Just prior to leaving the hospital, V. P. urinated one last time and allegedly told the nurse that she had started "spotting." Even if V. P. actually reported this critical fact, the nurse failed to disclose this to respondent, and he cannot be faulted for the nurse's omission. Had respondent known, or even suspected, that she had just begun bleeding, he would have sent her upstairs to the obstetrical wing for further observation. The complaint levels a number of criticisms at respondent's conduct which, if true, indicate that he failed to meet the appropriate standard of care. In addressing these criticisms, it should be noted that petitioner's own expert agreed that, at best, this was "a difficult case," and one that all emergency room physicians "hate to see." The complaint characterizes V. P. as a "high risk near term obstetrical patient." The use of the term "high risk" is based principally on the fact that an ultrasound conducted at UMC on February 19, 1991, revealed that the fetus was in a breech position. But respondent was never told this fact, and even petitioner's expert conceded that without this information, it was reasonable for respondent to consider V. P. as a normal risk pregnancy. The complaint first alleges that respondent "failed to assess the status of the fetus by neglecting to auscultate for fetal heart tones with a doppler that was available to him in the Emergency Department." A doppler is a device used to listen for fetal heart tones and, while not as effective as other monitoring devices, is nonetheless useful in detecting fetal distress or preterm labor. Here, respondent did not assess the status of V. P.'s fetus because her pain and discomfort had disappeared after her urinary tension was resolved, and she no longer exhibited any signs, clinical or otherwise, of preterm labor. At the same time, while doppler machines were available in emergency rooms, including MMC, during the early 1990's when this incident occurred, it was not prevailing protocol for emergency room physicians to automatically conduct fetus monitoring for what they perceived to be normal risk pregnancies. While the standard for emergency room physicians has subsequently changed, and fetal heart tones are now routinely monitored on all pregnant women twenty weeks and above, respondent did not deviate from the prevailing standard of care in February 1991 by failing to use a doppler. The complaint next alleges that a prudent physician "would have telephoned (V. P.'s) treating physician from UMC, or the obstetrician- gynecologist on call in order to properly assess (her) condition." As to calling V. P.'s treating physician, however, the more persuasive evidence shows that it would have been imprudent to attempt to contact V. P.'s primary treating physician because she had been treated by an unknown resident at another hospital, and at that hour of the night the chance of speaking with that resident was highly improbable. Then, too, since her complaints had been resolved, there was no need to contact another physician. As to respondent's failure to obtain a specialist consultation, the more persuasive evidence shows that the diagnosis of urinary tract infection was reasonable under the circumstances, and after the patient exhibited no signs of distress for at least an hour and a half, her discharge was appropriate. While it is true, as petitioner suggests, that the initial complaints by V. P. of pressure, nausea, vomiting and abdominal pains can be signs of preterm labor, these complaints were resolved after the catheter was inserted, and there were no corroborating indications of labor. Then, too, based on the information at hand, respondent reasonably concluded that V. P. was a normal risk pregnancy. Finally, later inquiry disclosed that during her first pregnancy, V. P. was in labor for only fifteen minutes, a remarkably short period of time. Respondent was not aware of this fact at the time of treatment. As it turned out, V. P. experienced another remarkably short period of labor on the evening of February 21, 1991. In summary, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that, while treating V. P. in February 1991, respondent practiced medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which was recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. C. Adequacy of Medical Records The complaint generally alleges that respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient. In the history section of his notes for patient V. P., which have been made a part of this record, respondent made the following recordations: 2110 - 35-year old white female, eight months pregnant; complaining of unable to urinate; dysuria; feels like pressure; denies vaginal bleeding; no contractions; Under the physical examination portion of his notes, respondent reported as follows: white female, well developed, awake, alert, times 3. Abdomen, pregnant uterus equals 8 months; nontender. Pelvic - zero blood; oz thick and closed. Late entry - 2/26/91, Nitrozine Test performed, which was negative. Finally, under his diagnostic impressions and discharge instructions, respondent wrote as follows: UTI (urinary tract infection) Ampicillin 250 mg, q.i.d., for 7 times. Tylenol if needed. Follow up, UMC this week. Return if any problems. In responding to the charge that his notes were inadequate or incomplete, respondent agreed that the diagnostic impressions section would have been more accurate and complete if he had written "urinary retention- resolved/UTI" rather than "UTI" alone. This is because urinary retention was a secondary diagnosis which was resolved during the patient's visit. In this respect, the records are not adequate. In addition, because the records fail to note that V. P.'s symptoms of abdominal pain and pressure were resolved, they lack completeness. In all other respects, they are found to be adequate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as described above, and that he be given a reprimand. Count I should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Kevin W. Crews, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 W. Jerry Foster, Esquire 1342 Timberlane Road, Suite 101-A Tallahassee, Florida 32312-1775 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner committed the alleged violations and, if so, should her paramedic license be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed as a paramedic by the City of Gulfport and worked as a paramedic for the Gulfport Fire Department. In this capacity, Petitioner worked under the auspices of the medical director for Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services (Pinellas County EMS). Petitioner was a paramedic from 1997 until March 2003. Prior to that time, from 1991 until 1997, she worked as an emergency medical technician (EMT). On February 20, 2003, Petitioner, along with Lt. Brian Campbell and Firefighter/EMT Dennis Jackson, were called to respond to the scene of a shooting. Petitioner was the only paramedic on the scene and, therefore, the only person on the scene certified by the Office of the Medical Director (OMD) to provide advanced cardiac life-saving treatment. Petitioner received the call at 12:22 a.m., and arrived at the patient's side at 12:30 a.m. When Petitioner arrived at the patient's side, she observed a white male, approximately 20 years old, lying on his back in the street. His skin color was ashen, his mouth and eyes were wide open, and his pupils were fixed and dilated. Upon physical examination, Petitioner could not detect a pulse and observed two small holes in the patient's trunk. At that point, Petitioner did not know whether the two holes represented two separate entry wounds or one entry and one exit wound. Petitioner observed a trail of blood, at least a block long, leading to the patient, but there was not a lot of blood around the patient. Petitioner attached an electrocardiogram (ECG) monitor to the patient to monitor the electrical activity of his heart. When Petitioner first turned on the ECG monitor, she observed four ticks of electrical activity within a 14-second span. Petitioner testified that based on her observation and physical examination of the patient, she believed that the electrical activity exhibited on the ECG monitor was not pulseless electrical activity (PEA), but rather "artifact" caused by her manipulation of the patient. Petitioner further testified that, thereupon, she stopped touching the patient and observed that the ECG read-out went mostly flat, showing only occasional ticks. Petitioner testified that these occasional ticks, as observed on the ECG monitor, indicated to her that the patient was in asystole. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner declared the patient dead. After Petitioner declared the patient dead, she prepared a Patient Care Report (Report or Patient Care Report) while still on the scene. In the Report, Petitioner wrote that she found a white male laying on the ground with an apparent small entrance wound in his upper chest and a possible small exit wound near his back rib. She further noted that the patient's temperature was normal, that his eyes were fixed and dilated, that he was not breathing (apneic), and that he had no discernible pulse. Petitioner also noted in the Report that the patient was in asystole within one minute after the ECG pads were attached, but she failed to note the initial four ticks she observed, which may have represented PEA. In the Report, Petitioner noted that at 12:30 p.m., the patient was hooked up to the monitor; at 12:31 p.m., he was asystolic; and at 12:32, she confirmed the patient dead. Upon completing the Report at the fire station, Petitioner attached to the Report the last of several ECG strips she had intermittently printed while at the patient's side. The ECG printout that Petitioner attached to the Report depicted a classic "flat line" indicative of asystole or no electrical activity. Petitioner discarded each of the ECG strips that contained some indicia of electrical activity. A Patient Care Report is a legal document that Petitioner is required to complete by law. By signing the Report, Petitioner acknowledged that the information contained in the Report was true and accurate. Later, on the morning of February 20, 2003, when the employees' shifts at the fire station were changing, Petitioner and Toni Lanahan (Lanahan), a firefighter/paramedic coming on duty, talked about the shooting incident. That such conversation occurred is undisputed. However, there was conflicting testimony as to what Petitioner told Lanahan during that conversation. According to Lanahan, Petitioner told her that when she (Petitioner) arrived at the scene, the patient looked dead but she hooked him up to the ECG monitor, that he had a rhythm but she did not work him, and that she turned off the monitor. Petitioner testified that she did not tell Lanahan that the patient had a heart rhythm, but only that the patient "was dead" and that she did not work him.1 About two hours after her conversation with Petitioner, Lanahan retrieved stored ECG code summary data of the patient described above.2 When Lanahan reviewed the ECG code summary, she saw that the patient had a presenting ECG rhythm showing approximately 40 beats per minute of PEA with gradually slowing PEA for the entire seven minutes depicted in intervals on the ECG summary. Based on her review of the ECG record of the gunshot wound patient, Lanahan believed that in this situation, the OMD protocols mandated that immediate resuscitative treatment be administered. Lanahan then reported these concerns to her emergency medical services (EMS) Coordinator, Lt. Marenkovic, who in turn, reported the incident to Gulfport Fire Chief Brian Brooks. Chief Brooks notified the OMD of the possible violations of its protocols by Petitioner. The OMD initiated an investigation, which included reviewing the written statements of Petitioner, Lt. Campbell, and EMT Jackson; the ECG code summary for the incident; Petitioner's Report; and the transcripts of the sworn interviews of Petitioner, Lt. Campbell, and EMT Jackson taken by the Gulfport Fire Department. After reviewing the above-referenced documents, Dr. Laurie Romig (Dr. Romig), the medical director of the Pinellas County EMS, decided to revoke Petitioner's certification. This decision was based on Dr. Romig's determination of the following: (1) Petitioner violated numerous protocols in the Medical Operations Manual, both administrative and direct patient care protocols; and (2) Petitioner attempted to make the situation appear differently from what it turned out to be, and that, apparently, she did that on purpose. Specifically, Dr. Romig charged Petitioner with violating Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services Protocol 2.3, Sections 5 and 6, and Protocol 10.8 and the following Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services Rules and Regulations: Sections XIII-3-b, related to falsification or inappropriate alteration of emergency medical services records; XIII-3-e, related to theft or dishonesty in performance of duty; XIII-3-i, related to demonstrated ability, failure or refusal to adhere to established protocols and standards as established by the authority; and XIII-3-k, related to just cause, including unbecoming behavior or unprofessional conduct reflecting a poor system image. The Pinellas County emergency protocols are written requirements that paramedics must follow when administering emergency treatment to patients. The protocols are published in a document entitled Pinellas County Medical Operations Manual, which is approved by the medical director and distributed to all Pinellas County EMS paramedics. Petitioner received a copy of the most recent medical operations manual in January 2003. EMS Protocol 5.10 prescribes treatment for patients presenting with PEA. As defined in Protocol 5.10, PEA is "any semi-organized electrical activity that can be seen on a monitor screen although the patient lacks a palpable, radial, brachial, or carotid pulse." When PEA is present in a patient, Protocol 5.10 mandates that immediate life-saving treatment be implemented. The patient initially had electrical activity. Nonetheless, Petitioner did not follow Protocol 5.10. According to Petitioner's testimony, she believed that the patient was asystolic and, thus, the protocol related to PEA was inapplicable to the shooting victim. Petitioner's belief was not supported by the ECG report. Protocol 5.4 delineates the procedures to be followed in the treatment of asystole. In the book utilized for Pinellas County EMS paramedic training, "asystole" is defined as a cardiac arrest rhythm associated with no discernible electrical activity on the ECG ("flat line"). Significantly, Protocol 5.4 and Protocol 5.10, discussed in paragraph 21, require that resuscitative efforts be started immediately and that such resuscitative efforts and treatment be terminated by the paramedic only "after 10 minutes of continuous asystolic arrest with appropriate interventions." Even if Petitioner's assertion that the patient was asystolic is accepted, she failed to provide the required resuscitative efforts and/or treatments prescribed by Protocol 5.4. Petitioner did not prematurely terminate resuscitative efforts, she never implemented them. Protocol 5.15 prescribes the treatment and transport considerations for "patients with cardiac arrest secondary to trauma, regardless of presenting cardiac rhythm." The protocol provides that such patients should be transported to the closest hospital emergency facility. Contrary to the requirements in Protocol 5.15, the patient was not transported to a hospital emergency facility. Protocol 2.3 requires paramedics, when possible, to contact and consult with On-line Medical Control (OLMC) in any case in "which a deviation from protocol has been made intentional or otherwise." The OLMC is a system which allows paramedics to contact the OMD and consult with a medical doctor regarding a situation in the field. Petitioner clearly deviated from Protocols 5.4 and/or 5.10, by failing to initiate and implement the resuscitation procedures required by both protocols, and Protocol 5.15, by failing to have the patient transported to a hospital emergency facility, yet she never contacted the OLMC as mandated by Protocol 2.3. Petitioner acknowledged that she did not follow either Protocols 5.4 or 5.10, both of which required immediate resuscitative efforts. Petitioner testified that instead, she followed Protocol 10.8, which provides an exception to the protocols that require initiation of resuscitative efforts. Petitioner contends that Protocol 10.8 provided the basis for her withholding resuscitation from the patient. Protocol 10.8 requires that cardiopulmonary cerebral resuscitation (CPCR) be initiated "in all cases when the patient is found in cardiopulmonary arrest unless one of the exclusion or special situation criteria applies." The exclusion criteria provides that CPCR may be withheld if the patient has, "in conjunction with apnea, pulselessness and asystole on the ECG," an "obviously unsurvivable trauma." If CPCR is withheld, Protocol 10.8 requires that exclusion criteria be fully documented and described. Protocol 10.8 does not define "obviously unsurvivable trauma." However, according to Dr. Romig, the term connotes catastrophic injuries observable by an untrained eye. Dr. Romig, an expert in emergency medicine and traumatic cardiac arrest, testified that nothing about this patient, based on her review of the records and documents, indicated that the patient had suffered an "obviously unsurvivable trauma." Also, Lt. Campbell, an EMT certified for 12 years, who was at the scene, testified that although the patient "looked dead," he could not say that the patient suffered an "obviously unsurvivable trauma" because the patient showed only a small bullet wound to the chest and a "little bit" of blood on his (the patient's) clothing. The weight of the evidence showed that the patient had not suffered an obviously unsurvivable trauma. However, even accepting Petitioner's testimony that she believed that the patient had suffered an obviously unsurvivable trauma, she failed to comply with Protocol 10.8. If Petitioner, in fact, relied on Protocol 10.8 in deciding to not administer CPCR, she was required to document and describe the exclusionary criteria, which was the basis of her decision to withhold CPCR. Petitioner failed to provide any such documentation and, thus, violated Protocol 10.8. In addition to violating the above-noted protocols, Petitioner was dishonest in the performance of her duties as a paramedic and also falsified EMS records. The ECG summary showed that despite the patient's having electrical cardiac activity of at least 40 beats, Petitioner turned off the ECG machine and pronounced the patient dead. After pronouncing the patient dead, she then turned the ECG machine on again, and intermittently printed activity on four separate occasions until reaching a reading showing no electrical cardiac activity. By engaging in this conduct, Petitioner was dishonest in the performance of her duties. Paramedics are required to truthfully and accurately complete the Patient Care Records of patients for whom they provide emergency medical services. Here, the ECG summary showed PEA of over 40 beats per minute initially and diminished electrical activity for over eight minutes total, six minutes of which were after Petitioner had already pronounced the patient dead. Petitioner initially saw a rhythm of four beats or ticks in a 14-second period, which was a beat rate of 40 and showed on the ECG strip as 42. Although the initial reading of approximately 40 beats and PEA was clearly visible during the entire nearly eight minutes depicted on the six-second intervals shown on the ECG code summary, this was omitted from Petitioner's Report. Petitioner omitted from the patient's Record the ECG readings that showed electrical activity. Instead, Petitioner reported that at the time she declared the patient dead, he was in "asystole" when, in fact, the ECG summary showed PEA. Moreover, Petitioner documented the Report with an asystole ECG strip reflecting a "flat line" reading printed some six or seven minutes after the reported time of death.3 Petitioner admitted during her sworn statement and at this proceeding that she deliberately did not attach to the Report any part of the ECG strip that reflected the interim electrical activity. Petitioner testified that the ECG strips showing interim electrical activity could raise doubts about the propriety of the treatment she gave this patient in a future criminal trial or other investigation.4 The medical director is required by law to ensure that Pinellas County EMS personnel provide quality care and are not a danger to the safety of the county's citizens, residents, or visitors. Here, Petitioner violated the protocols related to the standard of care for patients and completion of reports and rules and regulations related to dishonesty in the performance of duties and to falsification of records. These infractions are a possible threat to public health and safety of residents of and visitors to Pinellas County. As such, they constitute just cause to conditionally revoke Petitioner's Pinellas County Paramedic Certificate. The conditional revocation allows Petitioner to reapply for a paramedic certificate in two years. Such recertification may include a one-year probationary period, with monitoring by the medical director to include a review of all trauma-run reports. Petitioner's Pinellas County Emergency Medical Technician Certification was not revoked and she retains that certification.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice of Revocation dated March 28, 2003, and upholding revocation of Petitioner's Pinellas County Paramedic Certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's medical license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0027368. Respondent is board certified in family practice; however, he is not board certified in emergency medicine. On May 30, 1994, Dr. Dulay was on call in the hospital emergency room at Madison County Memorial Hospital (MCMH) in Madison, Florida. On May 30, 1994, Patient T.H. an obese, forty-eight year-old male was found unconscious on the floor of the bathroom by his brother, Wallace. T.H. had an arteriovenous malformation (AVM) in his brain. An AVM is a weakened area of a blood vessel which can fill with blood, expand and/or burst. AVMs located in the brain are very dangerous since a ruptured AVM can damage the brains tissue. The amount of damage depends on the amount and rapidity of the bleeding. Under any circumstances, a ruptured AVM is an emergency medical condition where time is of the essence in diagnosing and treating usually with some neurosurgical intervention. On May 30, 1994, at approximately 4:56 a.m., Carol Wells a Madison County 911 Operator received an emergency call regarding T.H. The call was originally received as a fall. An Advanced Life Support (ALS) ambulance was dispatched to T.H.'s location in Cherry Lake Garden Trailer Park. An ALS unit is intended to be a mobile critical care unit, able to render critical care and stabilization to a patient enroute to an appropriate hospital. An Advanced Life Support unit contains equipment needed for insertion of a chest tube, a lab, and an x-ray, as well as equipment and medications for cardiac emergencies. The equipment and medications needed for T.H.'s case were present. The ALS unit arrived at T.H.'s location at 5:19 a.m. Jimmy Kent was an EMT and driver of the ALS unit that responded to the 911 emergency call on T.H. Richard Kline was the paramedic on the ambulance. Mr. Kline was trained in ALS care and could administer certain drugs, including Procardia without a physician's order. Paramedic Kline found patient T.H. on the floor of the trailer. He observed T.H. to be comatose, unresponsive to painful stimuli, and exhibiting snoring-type respirations. His skin was hot and dry, and his face was red. T.H. scored a three on the Glasgow Coma Scale, the lowest possible score. T.H.'s vital signs were blood pressure estimated at 300 plus over 150, respiratory rate of 40, heart rate "tacking" at approximately 170, with raspy breathing. T.H. was considered in critical condition. At the scene, Paramedic Kline was having problems with his cardiac monitor, which became non-functional due to battery problems. However, patient T.H. could still be adequately monitored manually. Additionally, within twenty-five minutes of beginning the run, the cardiac monitor on the ALS unit was non- functional due to failure of the primary and back-up batteries. The lack of the units equipment did not significantly impact the paramedic's ability to monitor or treat T.H.'s condition. Paramedic Kline was informed by T.H.'s family that he had a history of Arterial Venous Malformation, paralysis on the right side, and strokes. T.H.'s sister was called and she advised that T.H. not be brought to Madison County Memorial Hospital (MCMH) because they usually don't have a doctor available. She wanted T.H. to go to South Georgia Medical Center (SGMC) in Valdosta, Georgia. The paramedic thought that they needed to take T.H. to MCMH because of the serious vital statistics that T.H. had. The paramedic felt T.H. could go into cardiac arrest. After being advised by the paramedic that T.H. needed immediate assistance at MCMH, T.H.'s sister agreed to have T.H. taken to MCMH. There are two hospital emergency facilities to choose from when transporting an emergency case in the Madison, Florida, area, MCMH and SGMC. In driving terms MCMH is slightly, but not significantly, closer to Cherry Lake Garden Trailer Park than SGMC. However, the facilities are very different in the services each can offer in an emergency situation. MCMH is not a trauma center. MCMH does not have any neurosurgical facilities, neurosurgical consults, diagnostic MRI's, diagnostic CT scans, or cerebral monitoring equipment available. MCMH cannot treat a cerebral vascular accident or bleeding in the brain. On the other hand, SGMC is a tertiary care facility. It has neurosurgical facilities, neurosurgical consults, diagnostic CT scans, and cerebral monitoring equipment available. SGMC can treat a cerebral vascular accident and is the closest facility which can provide such care. The ambulance was en route to MCMH when it contacted the hospital by radio; Joanie Cruce, R.N., spoke to the ambulance driver over the radio. Paramedic Kline informed Nurse Cruce of T.H.'s history, including the presence of T.H.'s AVM and vital signs. He also informed Nurse Cruce that he was bringing the T.H. to MCMH. Nurse Cruce relayed T.H.'s information to Joe Jaime, R.N. Nurse Jaimie was on the telephone to Dr. Dulay who was in another room at the hospital. Nurse Jaimie relayed over the telephone to Dr. Dulay the information Nurse Cruce gave her. At no time did Dr. Dulay speak directly with the paramedic. Dr. Dulay was informed that the patient had high blood pressure, was unconscious, and had a history that included an arterial venous malformation. Due to the patient being unconscious, he suspected a cerebral vascular accident/stroke (CVA). At approximately 5:40 a.m., while en route to MCMH, the paramedic asked for advice on whether to administer Procardia. Procardia is used to reduce blood pressure. Respondent advised that it was appropriate to administer 10mg of Procardia. There was some uncertainty in the testimony as to whether the administration of Procardia was requested by the paramedic and approved by Dr. Dulay, or ordered by Dr. Dulay. Either person could have authorized the use of the drug. In any event, 10mg of Procardia was the appropriate medication for the patient's condition and met or exceeded the appropriate standard of care for an emergency room physician under the circumstances. At some point, Dr. Dulay advised the ambulance to have T.H. taken to the nearest appropriate facility. The ALS unit was one to two miles from MCMH when Joanie Cruce, R.N., advised the ambulance driver to take T.H. to the nearest appropriate facility. Either Nurse Cruce misspoke and said Tallahassee or Richard Kline misunderstood her to say Tallahassee. Richard Kline questioned the direction to take T.H. to Tallahassee. He told nurse Cruce that the family wanted T.H. to go to the hospital in Valdosta. The information was passed to Dr. Dulay. He agreed that SGMC was an appropriate facility for T.H. and in fact SGMC was the closest appropriate facility for T.H.'s condition. Dr. Dulay never informed the nursing staff that T.H. could not be brought to MCMH and indeed the nurses thought that the ambulance was on its way even after the conversation about Valdosta. Patient T.H. was not in respiratory or cardiac arrest at the time the ambulance was turned around to go to Valdosta. After the change of direction, which is always within the discretion of the ambulance crew, there was no further contact with MCMH. Therefore Dr. Dulay was never informed of the results of the Procardia. Additionally, T.H. was never admitted to MCMH and never became a patient of Dr. Dulay or the hospital. Therefore, since T.H. was not a patient of the hospital no transfer from one facility to another facility occurred. While en route to SGMC, the ambulance contacted SGMC's emergency room. The staff advised the paramedic to give T.H. sodium nitroprusside. However, the ambulance did not carry sodium nitroprusside. Instead the paramedic was advised by SGMC staff to administer Lasix IV and nitroglycerine. Patient T.H. suffered respiratory arrest just outside the city limits of Valdosta. Efforts to intubate and revive him were unsuccessful. Patient T.H. arrived at SGMC in full arrest. The ambulance arrived at SGMC at 6:25 a.m. Attempts to revive the patient at the hospital were unsuccessful. T.H. was pronounced deceased shortly after his arrival at SGMC. T.H.'s cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest with an underlying cause of intracranial hemorrhage, probably due to an aneurysm. In short, all of T.H.'s symptoms were caused by a rapidly expanding and bleeding cerebral vascular incident from his AVM. T.H.'s condition was not due to a cardiac problem. The medical condition of T.H. at the time he was transported by Madison County ALS was indicative of an intracranial hemorrhage. Such a condition could only be evaluated for surgical treatment through the utilization of an MRI and CT scan, and required the immediate consultation of a neurosurgeon. None of which were available at MCMH. Moreover, it would generally be preferable to transport a patient with a score of three on the Glasgow Coma Scale to a trauma center. SGMC was the closet facility to Cherry Lake at which a neurosurgical consult was available, and which had the capability of treating an intracranial hemorrahage; therefore, patient T.H. was appropriately diverted to that facility. Dr. Dulay did not open a chart on T.H., and could not recall whether he made written notes during T.H.'s emergency. However, it is not customary practice that a medical chart be opened for an emergency case when consults are made via radio and the person is diverted or otherwise delivered to a separate facility. Generally, neither the hospital nor the doctor know the name of the person being transported. If the person does not arrive at the hospital, that facility has no information on which to open a patient record. Under such circumstances, the person's history, vital signs, and medication administration are recorded in the ALS run sheet, which accompanies the person to his or her ultimate destination. The radio communications are recorded by audiotape. In this case, the history, vital signs, and medication administration to T.H. were in fact recorded in the ALS run sheet. The run sheet appropriately accompanied T.H. to SGMC. The radio communications were recorded by audiotape. These documents are adequate records in emergency situations. Given these facts, there was no deviation by Dr. Aldolfo Dulay from the applicable standard of care for a physician under the circumstances presented in this case or that there was a failure to keep adequate written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Adolofo Dulay, M.D. did not practice below the accepted standard of care in his handling of the diversion of patient T.H. to a tertiary care facility, that there was no transfer of patient T.H. and that the records maintained were appropriate under the circumstances and that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John Terrell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Richard B. Collins, Esquire Ryan Garrett, Esquire Collins and Truett, P.A. 2804 Remington Green Circle, Suite 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6, Room 136 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the corrected administrative complaint, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Kenneth Douglas Glaeser (Respondent) was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0058606. Respondent's area of specialty is Emergency Medicine. On or about May 30, 1993, at approximately 9:45 p.m., Patient L. H., a 47 year old male, presented to the emergency room (ER) at Parkway Regional Medical Center (PRMC) in Miami, Florida complaining of chest pain. Patient L. H. and his wife were visiting his mother in Miami. At first, Patient L. H. believed he had heartburn, but it would not go away. His mother convinced him to go to the hospital. Patient L. H.'s wife and mother accompanied him to the hospital. His wife parked the vehicle while Patient L. H. and his mother entered the ER. Patient L. H.'s wife completed paperwork for the ER while the ER staff attended to her husband. Patient L. H.'s mother was with him. After completing the paperwork, approximately 10 minutes later, Patient L. H.'s wife joined Patient L. H. and his mother in the examining room. At the time, Respondent was the ER physician on duty at PRMC. Respondent was the only ER physician who attended to Patient L. H. Respondent has no independent recollection of Patient L. H. or what happened during Patient L. H.'s visit to the ER at PRMC. The first goal of an ER physician is to determine if the patient has a life-threatening condition, which, often times than not, involves excluding diagnoses. The second goal of an ER physician is to determine if the patient has a condition which can receive immediate treatment and to provide that immediate treatment whether the condition is life-threatening or not. Respondent obtained Patient L. H.'s history which included the type of pain, description of the pain, location of the pain, associated symptomatology, time frame of the pain (including onset), and past history. Respondent recorded, among other things, that Patient L. H. had chest pressure which radiated bilaterally to his shoulders and a numb left shoulder; that the pain lasted for approximately 10-15 minutes, subsided, and re-occurred 30 minutes later; that Patient L. H. had no shortness of breath, diaphoresis (sweating), nausea or vomiting, or palpitations; and that Patient L. H. had no cardiac history. Respondent's history of Patient L. H. was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent performed a physical examination on Patient L. H. The physical examination included taking vital signs and examination of the cardiovascular system, lungs, and pulses of the extremities. Respondent's physical examination was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent had laboratory work performed on Patient L. H. Respondent ordered SL (sublingual) nitroglycerine for Patient L. H. But, the nitroglycerine was not administered because Patient L. H. was not complaining of chest pains at the time. The ordering of the nitroglycerine and not administering it until chest pain developed was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent ordered diagnostic tests to be performed on Patient L. H. The tests included an electrocardiogram (EKG), a chest x-ray, and cardiac enzymes. Neither Patient L. H.'s wife nor his mother were present during the tests. ER physicians are trained to read EKGs. Generally, a cardiologist is not immediately available to the ER for the reading of EKGs. An ER physician looks for an injury pattern in the EKG, which would evidence an acute cardiac event. Most times, a cardiologist will over-read the EKG a day or two after the EKG is performed on a patient. Respondent's reading of Patient L. H.'s EKG did not show an injury pattern which would evidence an acute cardiac event. Respondent determined that Patient L. H.'s EKG was within normal limits. Even though an abnormality was demonstrated in the EKG, the abnormality could have been a false/positive reading. Respondent's reading of the EKG was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. A cardiologist over-read Patient L. H.'s EKG after he left PMRC. The cardiologist found a "definite abnormality." Respondent's reading of Patient L. H.'s chest x-ray indicated that it was within normal limits. Respondent's reading of the chest x-ray was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent's interpretation of the cardiac enzymes tests (CPK and LDH) indicated that they were within normal limits. If a heart is damaged, often times the enzymes contained in the heart cells will be released, and the cardiac enzymes tests would detect the enzymes. Respondent's interpretation of the cardiac enzymes tests was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. It is undisputed that based upon Patient L. H.'s history, the physical examination, the tests results, including diagnostic and laboratory results, a recommendation to Patient L. H. by Respondent for admission to PRMC was medically warranted. Admission would allow for monitoring and further evaluation. However, a patient has a right to refuse admission. Respondent discussed his findings with the doctor who was listed as Patient L. H.'s primary physician on the ER record. The primary physician was the private physician, a cardiologist, of Patient L. H.'s mother. The primary physician authorized Respondent to contact the physician on-call. Respondent discussed his findings and his concern with Patient L. H. Respondent recommended to Patient L. H. that he be admitted to PRMC. However, Patient L. H. did not wish to be admitted; he wanted to leave the hospital. Patient L. H. rejected Respondent's recommendation for admission to PRMC. 1/ Patient L. H.'s mother attempted to convince him to agree to admission and remain in the hospital, but he refused. It is undisputed that if a patient refuses admission, the physician should advise the patient of the risks involved and recommend admission. In Patient L. H.'s circumstances, it was medically warranted that Respondent advise Patient L. H. that, if he was not admitted, he could suffer a heart attack and die and recommended admission to Patient L. H. Taking the totality of the circumstances, an inference is drawn and a finding is made that Respondent advised Patient L. H. of the risks involved if he rejected admission and recommended to Patient L. H. that he be admitted. Respondent did not record in the ER record that he advised Patient L. H. of the risks involved in rejecting admission and recommended admission. ER physicians are not medically required to spell-out in the medical record what risks are discussed with a patient and that the patient left against medical advice. It is sufficient that the ER physician explains the risks to the patient. Respondent ordered a GI cocktail (Maalox, Donnatal, and viscous Lidocaine) for Patient L. H. 2/ The GI cocktail was not administered until approximately 12:15 a.m. on May 31, 1993. 3/ The ordering or not of the GI cocktail for or the time in which the GI cocktail was given to Patient L. H. has no effect on the standard of care that Respondent provided to Patient L. H. Respondent diagnosed Patient L. H.'s condition as atypical chest pain. This diagnosis essentially indicates that a number of different things may have been causing Patient L. H. to experience chest pain. Patient L. H. left PRMC on May 31, 1993, at approximately 12:20 a.m. against medial advice even though the ER record indicates that he was discharged. 4/ Before leaving PRMC, Patient L. H. was informed by Respondent to, among other things, follow-up with the primary physician and return to the ER if needed. Neither Patient L. H. nor his wife completed any discharge papers or received discharge instructions. It is not uncommon for a patient to be discharged from a hospital without completing discharge papers or receiving discharge instructions. However, hospitals attempt to prevent such occurrences. When a patient leaves PRMC against medical advice, the patient is requested to complete certain documentation. That documentation was not completed in the case of Patient L. H. However, the absence of the documentation is not considered to evidence that Respondent failed to advise Patient L. H. of the risks involved in rejecting admission and to recommend admission. On May 31, 1993, at approximately 8:45 a.m., Patient L. H. went into cardiac arrest at his mother's home. He was transported to the ER at PRMC by emergency vehicle, where he was pronounced dead. On June 1, 1993, Respondent entered an addendum to the ER notes of May 30 and 31, 1993. The addendum provided, among other things, that Patient L. H. was opposed to admission to PRMC and that, even when Respondent explained the risks to Patient L. H., he continued to oppose admission and wanted to leave. Furthermore, the addendum provided, among other things, that Respondent instructed Patient L. H. to return to the ER if the chest pain returns and to follow-up with the primary physician. An addendum to ER notes by an ER physician is not unusual and is an accepted practice. The Dade County Medical Examiner determined that Patient L. H.'s cause of death was occlusive coronary artery disease. Respondent's medical records justified the course of treatment of Patient L. H. Respondent practiced medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent is a defendant in a pending civil suit brought by Patient L. H.'s surviving spouse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine dismiss the corrected administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in this 27th day of January 1997 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January 1997.
