The Issue Whether Ketura Bouie suffers from “retardation”, as that term is defined by Section 393.063(43), Florida Statutes, and therefore qualifies for developmental services offered by the Respondent agency under Chapter 393, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ketura Bouie is 15 years old. She currently resides in Tallahassee, Florida. She is enrolled in a new school after transferring from Chatahoochee. Ketura has had several “social” promotions from grade to grade over the years. Her application for developmental services has been denied by the Respondent agency. Wallace Kennedy, Ph.D., is a Board-certified and Florida-licensed clinical psychologist. He was accepted as an expert in clinical psychology and the testing of children. He conducted a psychological evaluation of Ketura on April 12, 1995, for which he has provided a written narrative dated April 13, 1995. His narrative was admitted in evidence. Ketura was 13 years old at the time of Dr. Kennedy’s evaluation. He administered three standardized tests which are recognized and accepted for determining applicants’ eligibility for developmental services. These tests were: a wide range achievement test, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children— Revised (WISC-R), and Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale. (Vineland) The wide range achievement test generally measures literacy. Ketura recognized only half of the upper-case letters of the alphabet and only a few three-letter kindergarten words. Her results indicated that she has the achievement level expected of a five and a half year old kindergarten student, even though she was then placed in the seventh grade. In Dr. Kennedy's view, there is "no chance Ketura will become functionally literate". The WISC-R measures intellectual functioning and academic aptitude without penalizing the child for handicaps. The mean score on this test is 100. To score two or more deviations from this mean, a subject must score 70 or below. All of Ketura’s WISC-R scores on the test administered by Dr. Kennedy in April 1995 were well below 70. They consisted of a verbal score of 46, a performance score of 46, and a full scale score of 40. Ketura’s full scale IQ of 40 is in the lowest tenth of the first percentile and represents a low moderate level of mental retardation. Ketura’s full scale score of 40 is the lowest result that WISC-R can measure. The Vineland measures communication, daily living skills, and socialization. Ketura’s composite score for Dr. Kennedy on the Vineland was 42. In conducting the Vineland test, Dr. Kennedy relied on information obtained through his own observation of Ketura and information obtained from Ketura’s mother. It is typical in the field of clinical psychology to rely on information supplied by parents and caregivers, provided they are determined to be reliable observers. Dr. Kennedy assessed Ketura’s mother to be a reliable observer. Dr. Kennedy’s Vineland test revealed that Ketura has a social maturity level of about six years of age. Her verbal and written communication skills are poor. Ketura has poor judgment regarding her personal safety. She cannot consistently remember to use a seatbelt and cannot safely use a knife. She has poor domestic skills. She has no concept of money or of dates. She does not help with the laundry or any other household task. She cannot use the phone. Ketura’s socialization skills are also poor. She does not have basic social manners. Her table manners and social interactive skills are poor. She has no friends, and at the time of Dr. Kennedy’s evaluation, she was unhappy due to classmates making fun of her for being unable to recite the alphabet. Dr. Kennedy rendered an ultimate diagnosis of moderate mental retardation and opined that Ketura's retardation is permanent. Although Dr. Kennedy observed that Ketura was experiencing low levels of depression and anxiety during his April 1995 tests and interview, he did not make a clinical psychological diagnosis to that effect. He attributed these emotional components to Ketura’s lack of confidence in being able to perform the tasks required during testing. In his opinion, Ketura did not have any behavioral or emotional problems which interfered with the reliability of the tests he administered. Also, there were no other conditions surrounding his evaluation which interfered with the validity or reliability of the test scores, his evaluation, or his determination that Ketura suffers from a degree of retardation which would qualify her for developmental services. In Dr. Kennedy’s expert opinion, even if all of Ketura's depression and anxiety were eliminated during testing, her WISC-R scores would not have placed her above the retarded range in April 1995. The retardation range for qualifying for developmental services is 68 or below. Ketura’s I.Q. was tested several times between 1990 and April 1995 with resulting full scale scores ranging from 40 to All or some of these tests and/or reports on the 1990 - 1995 tests were submitted to the agency with Ketura’s application for developmental services. Also included with Ketura’s application to the agency were mental health reports documenting depression, a recognized mental disorder. The most recent of these was one done as recently as May of 1996. However, none of these reports were offered or admitted in evidence at formal hearing. Respondent’s sole witness and agency representative, was Ms. JoAnne Braun. She is an agency Human Service Counselor III. Ms. Braun is not a Florida-licensed psychologist and she was not tendered as an expert witness in any field. As part of the application process, she visited with Ketura and her mother in their home. She also reviewed Petitioner’s application and mental health records described above. She reviewed the fluctuating psychological test scores beginning in 1990, one of which placed Ketura at 70 and another of which placed her at 74 on a scale of 100. Ms. Braun also reviewed a March 1995 psychological testing series that showed Ketura had a verbal 50, performance 60, and full scale 62 on the WISC-R test, one month before Dr. Kennedy’s April 1995 evaluation described above. However, none of these items which she reviewed was offered or admitted in evidence. The agency has guidelines for assessing eligibility for developmental services. The guidelines were not offered or admitted in evidence. Ms. Braun interpreted the agency's guidelines as requiring her to eliminate the mental health aspect if she felt it could depress Ketura's standard test scores. Because Ms. Braun "could not be sure that the mental health situation did not depress her scores," and because the fluctuation of Ketura’s test scores over the years caused Ms. Braun to think that Ketura’s retardation might not “reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely”, as required by the controlling statute, she opined that Ketura was not eligible for developmental services. Dr. Kennedy's assessment and expert psychological opinion was that if Ketura's scores were once higher and she now tests with lower scores, it might be the result of better testing today; it might be due to what had been required and observed of her during prior school testing situations; it might even be because she was in a particularly good mood on the one day she scored 70 or 74, but his current testing clearly shows she will never again do significantly better on standard tests than she did in April 1995. In his education, training, and experience, it is usual for test scores to deteriorate due to a retarded person's difficulties in learning as that person matures. I do not consider Ms. Braun’s opinion, though in evidence, as sufficient to rebut the expert opinion of Dr. Kennedy. This is particularly so since the items she relied upon are not in evidence and are not the sort of hearsay which may be relied upon for making findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.58(1)(a), Florida Statutes. See, Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Unemployment Appeals Commission and Robert Stack, 654 So.2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); and Tenbroeck v. Castor, 640 So.2d 164, (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Particularly, there is no evidence that the "guidelines" (also not in evidence) she relied upon have any statutory or rule basis. Therefore, the only test scores and psychological evaluation upon which the undersigned can rely in this de novo proceeding are those of Dr. Kennedy. However, I do accept as binding on the agency Ms. Braun’s credible testimony that the agency does not find that the presence of a mental disorder in and of itself precludes an applicant, such as Ketura, from qualifying to receive developmental services; that Ketura is qualified to receive agency services under another program for alcohol, drug, and mental health problems which Ketura also may have; and that Ketura’s eligibility under that program and under the developmental services program, if she qualifies for both, are not mutually exclusive.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families issue a Final Order awarding Ketura Bouie appropriate developmental services for so long as she qualifies under the statute.RECOMMENDED this 24th day of February, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Marla Ruth Butler Qualified Representative Children's Advocacy Center Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32302-0287 Marian Alves, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 100A Tallahassee, FL 32399-2949
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's proposed decision to award a computer-maintenance contract to Intervenor is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact On November 20, 1998, Respondent issued a Request for Proposals titled "The Maintenance of Network Terminal Equipment" (RFP). The purpose of the RFP is to obtain a three-year maintenance service contract for video display terminals, printers, microcomputers, and related components located throughout the State of Florida. The RFP seeks a three-year, labor-intensive contract projected at the hearing to be worth between $3 million and $3.5 million. RFP Section 6.1 promises a "comprehensive, fair, and impartial evaluation" of all timely submitted offers by an "Evaluation Committee," which is an undefined term. Nothing in the RFP describes the Evaluation Committee, in terms of number or qualifications, except that repeated references to "each evaluator" imply the existence of more than one member. Section 6.1.A identifies four evaluation categories: Corporate Experience (100 points), Project Staff (200 points), Minimum Maintenance Service Requirements (200 points), and Cost (500 points). The category at issue in this case is Corporate Experience. Section 6.1.B states that the Procurement Officer will evaluate whether each offer meets the "fatal criteria." The only relevant fatal criterion is 10, which states: "Are there three (3) years of financial statements for the proposer and any proposed subcontractors, TAB 6?" RFP, Section 6.3.A.10. The RFP does not define "financial statements," nor does it require audited financial statements. The Procurement Officer bore the responsibility for determining whether offers complied with the fatal criteria, and he testified that he applied this fatal criterion by checking for a balance sheet, income statement, and statement of changes in financial position. Tr., p. 84. However, the Procurement Officer, acknowledging the absence of any definition of "financial statements," testified that he would accept "even a balance sheet and income statement," which is exactly what he received from Intervenor. Tr., p. 99. The Procurement Officer added: "I didn't throw out anyone for lack of submitting any other financial statements that are commonly included in audited financial statements." Id. Section 6.1.B also provides that offers meeting the "fatal criteria" will be scored by the Evaluation Committee, which will score each responsive offer "based on the evaluation criteria provided in Section 6.3 " Regarding Corporate Experience, Section 6.1.C.3 states: "The criteria, which will be used in evaluating Corporate Experience, are listed in the Rating Sheet, see Section 6.3.B." Section 6.3 states that the non-fatal criteria for each of the four categories are listed on the Rating Sheet, which is part of the RFP. Each evaluator must assign a score from 0-4 for each of these criteria. The meaning of each point value is as follows: 0 = no value; proposer has no capability or has ignored this area 1 = poor; proposer has little or no direct capability or has not covered this area, but there is some indication of marginal capability 2 = acceptable; proposer has adequate capability 3 = good; proposer has a good approach with above average capability 4 = superior; proposer has excellent capability and an outstanding approach Section 6.3.B lists 40 evaluation criteria divided among three categories. (The fourth category is Cost; its scoring methodology is irrelevant to this case.) Project Staff and Minimum Maintenance Service Requirements contain a total of 37 criteria. Corporate Experience contains only three criteria. The three criteria of Corporate Experience are: Does the proposal present financial information that supports the proposer's ability to perform this work required by this Request for Proposal? (RFP section 5.6.B) Is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities at least 2:1? Is the debt to net worth ratio (total liabilities/net worth) equal to or less than 1? Has the cash/operating capital exceeded projected monthly operating expenses over the past three years? Does the proposer have sufficient financial resources to complete the project? Does the proposal document the proposer's experience, organization, technical qualifications, skills, and facilities? (RFP section 5.6.B) Is the experience supplied (including subcontractor experience) relevant? Has the proposer (including any subcontractors) previously provided the maintenance services required by the department? Have the proposer and any subcontractors previously worked together? Does the proposer[-]supplied organization chart demonstrate the capability to perform well on this project? Have the projects supplied by the proposer or for any subcontractors been performed recently enough to be relevant? What percentage of the work is to be done by the proposer and each subcontractor? Does the proposal present maintenance projects similar to the requirements of this RFP as references? (RFP section 5.6.B) Is each project described in sufficient detail so that the department is able to judge its complexity and relevance? Are projects similar or greater in scope? How broad is the range of equipment that was serviced? How current is the project? The challenge focuses exclusively on the first criterion under Corporate Experience. On this criterion, the evaluators gave Intervenor an average of 3.0 and Petitioner an average of 2.0. The Procurement Officer prepared an Evaluation Manual for the evaluators. The Evaluation Manual states: Scoring should reflect the evaluator's independent evaluation of the proposal's response to each evaluation criterion. Following each evaluation criterion are considerations each evaluator may use in determining an evaluation score. These considerations are only suggestions. The considerations provided are not intended to be an all-inclusive list and will not be scored independently for the criterion that they address. Joint Exhibit 8, page 4. Nothing among the documents given prospective offerors informed them explicitly that the evaluators were not required to consider any of the bulleted items listed under each of the criteria. However, the Procurement Officer conducted a Proposers' Conference, at which he stated that the bullets under all of the criteria were strictly suggestions that the evaluators were free to ignore. Tr., p. 115. The Procurement Officer provided this information in response to a question asked by a representative of Intervenor. Joint Exhibit 23, pp. 63-64. The RFP did not require attendance at the Proposers' Conference, nor did Respondent publish the response following the conference. The three bullets under the first criterion under Corporate Experience appear in Respondent's manual titled "Developing a Request for Proposal (RFP)." The exhibit in evidence is a copy of the manual issued on April 1, 1998, but this manual has been in existence well prior to that. The manual suggests that the RFP include a criterion for evaluating the adequacy of the offeror's financial resources. Under the category of reviewing financial statements, the manual lists the first three bullets, as well as other considerations. However, nothing in the manual requires the inclusion of these bulleted items as scoring criteria or the consideration of these bulleted items within one or more scoring criteria. The rating sheets contain a space for comments. The following are the scores and comments from each of the five evaluators for the challenged criterion regarding the financial resources of Petitioner and Intervenor. Evaluator 1 assigned Intervenor a 2, noting "high debt, loss in income 1998." Evaluator 1 assigned Petitioner a 1, noting "financial information limited. Total assets less than value of contract." Evaluators 2 and 4 each assigned Intervenor a 3 and Petitioner a 2 without any comments. Evaluator 3 assigned Intervenor a 3, noting "Exceeds all requirements." Evaluator 3 assigned Petitioner a 3, noting "financials appear to meet this requirement. However, the replacement parts-inventory [sic] dollars seem very low in relations [sic] to the mentioned state contracts that are currently existing [sic]-[.]" Evaluator 5 assigned Intervenor a 4 without any comments, but citing the presence of a 10-K report in response to where he found the financial information. Evaluator 5 assigned Petitioner a 1 originally, noting "asset/liabilities 1:1." However, he changed his score to a 2 and lined out his comment. In general, the five evaluators have technical backgrounds in telecommunications or information management. They do not have significant backgrounds in business or financial matters. Evaluator 1 has a limited financial background, having taken a couple of accounting courses in college. His testimony during his deposition was evasive. Unwilling or unable at the deposition to discuss substantively the financial statements, Evaluator 1 claimed not to recall nearly all material aspects of the evaluation that had taken place about four months earlier. Evaluators 2 and 3 testified at the hearing. Evaluator 2 owns a company, although he has never read the financial statements of any company besides his own. However, he believes that he can read financial statements to determine if a corporation is profitable. On the other hand, Evaluator 2 admits that he does not know how to calculate the ratio of current assets to liabilities from the financial statements or the difference between a balance sheet and an income statement. Evaluator 2 also admits that he does not know how the value of determining whether the ratio of debt to net worth is less than 1. Evaluator 2 concedes that he does not know how to determine if an offeror had sufficient cash to complete the contract. However, during his deposition, Evaluator 2 testified that he checked the financial statements for cash on hand and monthly income, although he admitted that he did not know how much cash a company would need to perform the contract. Evaluator 2 also admitted in his deposition that, in giving Intervenor a 3 and Petitioner a 2, he did not compare the net worth or ratio of cash to operating expenses of the two offerors. Evaluator 3 testified that he has some relevant education in college, but he has not previously examined financial statements for Respondent. Like Evaluator 2, Evaluator 3 testified that he did not compute any of the bulleted ratios and was incapable of calculating the current ratio described in the first bullet or the other ratios described in the second and third bullets. Evaluator 3 conceded that he did not determine whether the offerors had sufficient resources to complete the project. In his deposition, Evaluator 3 admitted that his review of the financial criterion was largely confined to checking to see if an offeror's assets exceeded its liabilities. Evaluator 3 conceded that he did not compare debt loads. In two respects, Evaluator 3 approached the evaluation differently from his counterparts. First, he assumed that someone had already determined that the offerors were financially able to service the contract. Second, evidently relying on information not contained in the offers or RFP, Evaluator 3 determined that Petitioner's parts inventory was too low. In his deposition, Evaluator 4 stated that he felt that it was optional whether he had to consider whether the financial information supported an offeror's ability to perform the contract. In rating Intervenor, Evaluator 4 admitted that he was unaware of its debt load. Evaluator 4 testified in his deposition that he did not feel qualified to decide whether an offeror could perform financially under the RFP. In his deposition, Evaluator 5 testified that he did not know what financial resources an offeror must possess to be able to complete the contract. He also admitted that he never determined if Intervenor had operated at a loss for the past two years. In addressing the qualifications of the evaluators to score the financial criterion, it is useful to compare their evaluations to what was being evaluated. The Administrative Law Judge rejects Petitioner's implicit invitation to assess the qualifications of the evaluators without regard to the extent to which their evaluations corresponded with, or failed to correspond with, that which they were evaluating. It is impossible to perform much of a comparative analysis of the financial resources of Petitioner and Intervenor because of the paucity of financial information supplied by Petitioner. Petitioner did not submit audited, reviewed, or even compiled financial statements, so that a credibility issue attaches to its owner-generated statements. Also, Petitioner did not submit a statement of changes in financial position, which is the first financial document that the Procurement Officer testified that he would consult in assessing a corporation's financial resources. Tr., p. 88. Absent this data concerning cash flow, it is not possible to identify reliably the information necessary to consider the third bullet, which asks the evaluator to compare historic cash flow from operations (which is derived from the statement of changes in financial position) with the "projected monthly operating expenses" (which is derived from the income statement). Subject to these important qualifications concerning Petitioner's financial statements, Petitioner's balance sheet reveals a current ratio of 5:1 and a ratio of total liabilities to net worth of well under 1. By contrast, Intervenor's audited financial statements (for DecisionOne Corporation and Subsidiaries) reveal a current ratio of barely 1:1, total liabilities in excess of total assets, and a negative shareholder's equity of $204,468,000. Intervenor's income statement discloses a net loss of $171,641,000 in fiscal year ending 1998 with a note suggesting that $69,000,000 of this loss is attributable to nonrecurring merger expenses. If interest is included, as it should be (given its impact on real-world cash flow), Intervenor's statement of changes in financial position reports negative cash flows for the past three years. Counting interest and taxes, the negative cash flow in 1998 is $37,298,000. This negative cash flow is attributable to the payment of a $244,000,000 to Intervenor's parent, but negative cash flows of $13,144,000 and $11,961,000 in 1997 and 1996, respectively, do not include any dividend payments. Perhaps partly due to the already-discussed problems in ascertaining the role, at hearing, of the accuracy of the scoring, Intervenor did not elicit explanatory testimony concerning its relatively complicated financial statements, although Intervenor's forbearance seems directed more to not developing the evidentiary record concerning the formal and substantive deficiencies of Petitioner's financial statements. However, it is clear that, except for Evaluator 1, Respondent's evaluators could not and did not understand much more of Intervenor's financial statements than that they were professionally prepared and contain large numbers. Turning to the extent to which the scores correspond to what the evaluators were scoring, Petitioner's financial statements are incomplete and owner-generated. Given these facts, the evaluators could legitimately give Petitioner a 2, which is an "acceptable" score, reflective of "adequate capability." The evaluators could also have legitimately given Petitioner a 1, indicative of a "poor" score with "some indication of marginal capability." The evaluators could not have given Petitioner a 0 because its financial statements are at least partly present in the offer and reflect some financial capability. By contrast, Intervenor's financial statements are completed and audited. However, they portray a company that is in financial distress with substantial losses, a negative shareholder's equity, and ongoing negative cash flows. Although much better in form than the financial statements of Petitioner, Intervenor's financial statements raise at least one question as to form because, although disclosing interest and tax payments, they attempt to stress a modified cash flow without regard to these substantial cost items. Given the sizeable losses suffered recently by Intervenor, the evaluators could not rationally assign Intervenor a 3, which is "good" and reflective of "above average capability." Without dealing with Intervenor's losses and specifically identifying cash flow that would be available, after debt service and other expenditures, to service the contract, the evaluators could not rationally assign Intervenor even a 2. Except for Evaluator 1, the evaluators never identified the financial condition of Intervenor and thus never considered it in their scoring. Undermined from the start by a lack of knowledge of roughly how much financial capacity would be necessary to service the three-year contract, the scoring process, as applied to Intervenor, is further undermined by the near-total absence in the record of any informed reason for the scoring of Intervenor's offer. Evaluator 3 erroneously believed that someone not on the evaluation team had already determined that the offerors were financially capable of performing the contract. Evaluator 4 erroneously believed that evaluating the financial condition of the offerors was optional, and admitted that he was unqualified to perform this task in any event. Evaluator 2 claimed to be able to identify losses on a financial statement, but, if he did so as to Intervenor's statements, there is no evidence in the record that he gave the matter any thought. Evaluator 5 expressly admitted that he never made this determination. The only informed bases in the record, either contemporaneous with the scoring process or at any later time through the hearing, for the scoring of the subject criterion in the offers of Petitioner and Intervenor are the evaluation forms of Evaluator 1. In these forms, Evaluator 1 correctly noted the loss suffered by Intervenor in 1998 and the already- mentioned formal deficiencies of Petitioner's financial statements. However, the sole contribution of Evaluator 1 to this case is in the comments on his forms. He was unwilling and unable to discuss any aspect of his scoring when questioned at his deposition. The case of the financial qualifications of the evaluators thus comes down to four evaluators who had no idea what they were doing and one evaluator who offers only two spare, handwritten notes suggestive of a rational basis for distinguishing between the financial capabilities of the two offerors. This is insufficient. The RFP promised an informed evaluation by more than one evaluator. Even if the RFP did not so promise, the promising comments of Evaluator 1 are not indicative of his qualifications when, for no good reason, he could not recall the recently completed evaluation process or could not or would not respond meaningfully to questions concerning the financial materials that he was evaluating. For the purpose of assessing the qualifications of Evaluation 1, the hint of rationality present in his two comments is overwhelmingly offset by the actual financial condition of Intervenor. Rejecting a chance to discuss his evaluation, Evaluator 1 has chosen to let his evaluation be judged on the strength of its correspondence to the subject matter of the evaluation, Intervenor's financial statements. Under all of the circumstances, Evaluator 1's evaluation of the subject criterion in Intervenor's offer was clearly erroneous and contrary to competition. The remaining evaluators' evaluations of this criterion were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious. However, Petitioner has elected not to make a direct issue of the accuracy of the scores. Addressing the qualifications of the evaluators, then, their evident lack of qualifications, coupled with the already-described grave deficiencies in the results of their scoring the first criterion of Intervenor's offer and the material impact on the outcome of the relative scoring of the offers of Intervenor and Petitioner, has rendered the evaluation process clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order rejecting all offers. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 William E. Williams Andrew Berton, Jr. Huey Guilday Post Office Box 1794 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1794 R. Beth Atchison Assistant General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory P. Borgognoni Kluger Peretz 17th Floor, Miami Center 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to receive supported living services from Respondent? See Section 393.066, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 18 years old. He lives with his paternal grandmother and step-grandfather at 3109 Brandywine Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. On March 23, 1994, the Petitioner applied for developmental services. Petitioner's natural mother was institutionalized for retardation for an indeterminate length of time at a Sunland Center. Shortly after the Petitioner's birth, his mother left the Petitioner and his father. Petitioner has lived with his paternal grandmother since he was 13 weeks old. Petitioner's grandmother raised her own three children and has experience in child rearing and the development of children. She noticed that Petitioner's development was slow when Petitioner did not begin walking at age 17 months and did not begin to speak intelligible words until 30 months of age. Petitioner was taken to the Florida State University Psychology Clinic at age 4 years 3 months (4.3 years) in an effort to determine why his development was slow. This was the first time the Petitioner's Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was tested. He obtained a 77 on the Stanford-Binet L-M test, and an 87 on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales. FSU advised the Petitioner's grandmother that Petitioner might have developmental problems and to observe him closely and retest him if he had problems in school. As a result, Petitioner's IQ was tested several times between ages 5 and 17. Testing dates and scores of these test are as follows: October 80 4.3 Stanford-Binet FSU Psy. Clinic IQ 77 Vineland Adaptive FSU Psy. Clinic 87 July 81 5.0 FSU Psy. Clinic Stanford-Binet IQ 84 May 84 7.10 WISC-R FSIQ 84-87 85 9.0 WISC-R FSIQ 80 April 86 9.9 WISC-R Psych. Assoc., Dr.Cook FSIQ 69 June 86 9.11 WISC-R Leon Cty. School, Barnes FSIQ 72 March 91 14.8 WISC-R Leon Cty. School, Popp FSIQ 69 April 92 15.9 Vineland Adapt. Psych. Assoc. Dr. Clark 62 July 93 17.0 WAIS-R, Psych. Assoc. Dr. Deitchman 70 Dr. Thomas Clark, who holds a doctorate in clinical psychology and is a board certified clinical psychologist, testified regarding intelligence testing and his examination of the Petitioner and the records of Petitioner's intelligence testing. The numbers in the far right column in Paragraph 5, above, all reflect the IQ of the Petitioner. IQ scores of 70 or lower placed a person two or more standard deviations below the mean on standardized intelligence tests. Individuals with mental retardation, who may exhibit higher IQ test scores when they are younger, may have their scores decrease as they get older. This is a recognized phenomenon in the mildly retarded. Scores on IQ tests may be inflated by a practice factor which occurs when the test is administered more than once within a six-month period. The record reflects that the Petitioner was tested two times in 1986, and his second score of 72 was higher because of the practice factor. The increase of Petitioner's score was within 2 to 3 points above his general performance on the first test in 1986 and his subsequent tests in 1991, 1992, and 1993, which is the predicted increase due to the practice factor. Since age 9.9, with the exception of the 72 due to the practice factor, the Petitioner has not scored above 70 on an IQ test. Based upon his examination and testing of the Petitioner and his review of the Petitioner's records, Dr. Clark's professional opinion was that the Petitioner was more than two standard deviations below the average in intellectual performance. Although the Petitioner suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder and has some emotional problems, Dr. Clark stated this did not alter his opinion regarding the Petitioner's IQ or his intellectual performance. Dr. Clark found that Petitioner's adaptive behavior was low for Petitioner's IQ. The parties stipulated that the measurement of Petitioner's general intellectual functioning existed concurrently with deficits in his adaptive behavior as manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Based upon its assessment, the Leon County Schools recommended that the Petitioner be placed in the community-based educational program which is designed for students who are mentally retarded within the educable range. The Petitioner has been awarded Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act upon a determination that he is mentally retarded. Since his completion of school, the Petitioner has been attending workshops conducted by Goodwill Industries to develop job skills and job coping skills. He has been unable to maintain employment, and has been discharged from all of the positions to which he has been referred. Petitioner was referred to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Developmental Services by officials of Vocational Rehabilitation (Composite Exhibit 1-C). Petitioner's grandparents take him shopping, assist the Petitioner in maintaining his daily life, live with Petitioner on a daily basis, and give him support and try to assist him in controlling his "excessive loud talking". Without the care of his grandparents, the Petitioner would not be able to maintain the activities of daily living. Petitioner's friends include neighborhood children whose ages range from 3 years to 12 years. Their parents have requested Petitioner no longer play with them due to his size, age and conduct. Petitioner's testimony and demeanor while testifying reveal a young adult who is mentally retarded and whose adaptive skills are consistent with his IQ. Petitioner's grandmother testified that even though he is 18 1/2 years old, the Petitioner acts like a boy between 9 and 10 years old. The Respondent's position was that Petitioner's earlier test scores indicated that he was not two deviations below average intellectual performance, and the Petitioner's later test scores were adversely impacted by his emotional and attention deficit problems; therefore, Petitioner was ineligible for developmental services. The testimony of Dr. Clark clearly refuted the assertion that the Petitioner's earlier high test scores indicated a higher IQ, and refuted the alleged negative impact upon IQ testing of Petitioner's attention deficit and emotional disorder. Petitioner presented competent evidence and expert testimony concerning Petitioner's intellectual function to establish that Petitioner's performance was two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test. Petitioner's showing was unrebutted by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is; RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Subsumed in Paragraph 14 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 4 Subsumed in Paragraph 14 Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 16 Paragraph 6 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 9 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 10 Paragraph 5 Paragraph 11 Subsumed in Paragraph 9 Paragraph 12 Irrelevant Paragraphs 13,14 Subsumed in Paragraphs 16-19 Paragraphs 15-17 True, but made part of Statement of Case Paragraphs 18-21 Subsumed in Paragraph 20 Paragraphs 22-25 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-10,21 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 11 Paragraph 27 Paragraph 22 Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to the more credible evidence summarized in Paragraph 20. Paragraph 3 Paragraph 5 in which the typographical error regarding the test of October 1980 is corrected. The facts set forth in the footnotes are rejected, particularly the assertion that Dr. Cook's reference to a "recent" administration of an IQ test did not fix the date of the test sufficiently to say whether the practice effect would impact its administration. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 7 and 21 Paragraph 6 See comments for Paragraph 3. As stated in the findings, this premise was specifically rejected. Paragraph 8 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 9 Irrelevant Paragraph 10 Subsumed in various other findings. Paragraph 11 True; however, the Petitioner's application is based solely upon his allegation that he is mentally retarded. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Dobbins, Esquire 433 North Magnolia Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, FL 32399-2949 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondent are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida teacher, holding Florida Educator's Certificate 780153 (covering the area of Emotionally Handicapped education) valid through June 30, 2007. At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed as a teacher of emotionally handicapped third-grade students at Skycrest Elementary School in the Pinellas County School District. Respondent was employed by the Pinellas County School Board as a teacher of emotionally handicapped students for more than six years. The Pinellas County School District assessed student and instructional performance through the use of the "Pinellas Instructional Assessment Portfolio." The portfolio consisted of two tests administered three times each school year. The tests were known as the "Parallel Reading-Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test" and the "Parallel Math-Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test." The portfolio tests were used by the school district to gauge progress towards meeting the Sunshine State Standards established by the Florida Department of Education (DOE) to determine the academic achievement of Florida students. The portfolio tests, administered over a two-day period, also served to prepare students to take the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). The FCAT was administered according to requirements established though the DOE and was designed to measure progress towards meeting Sunshine State Standards. Third-grade students were required to achieve a passing score on the FCAT in order to move into the fourth grade. One of the purposes of the portfolio tests was to measure student progress and provide information relative to each student's abilities. Based on test results, additional instruction was provided to remedy academic deficiencies and further prepare students to pass the FCAT. Emotionally handicapped students were required to take the reading and the math portfolio tests. The school district had specific procedures in place related to administration of the tests. Teachers responsible for administration of the tests received instruction on appropriate test practices. Respondent was aware of the rules governing administration of the tests. The procedures permitted teachers to offer general encouragement to students, but teachers were prohibited from offering assistance. Teachers were not allowed to read questions to students. Teachers were not permitted to provide any information to students related to the content of test responses. During the December 2002 testing period, Respondent provided improper assistance to the nine emotionally handicapped students he taught. During the test, Respondent reviewed student answers to multiple-choice questions and advised students to work harder on the answers, indicating that the answers were incorrect. Respondent assisted students by reading questions, helping students to pronounce words and phrases, and advising students as to the location in the test materials where answers could be found. Some of Respondent's students were apparently overwhelmed by the test process and ceased working on the tests. Respondent reviewed their progress and advised the students to continue answering questions. There is no evidence that Respondent directly provided answers to students, but Respondent clearly assisted students to determine which responses were correct. The assistance provided by Respondent to his students exceeded that which was allowed under test rules. Respondent acknowledged that the assistance was inappropriate, but asserted that he did so to provide confidence to the students that they could take and pass the FCAT, and advance to the fourth grade. Respondent's improper assistance to his students prevented school officials from obtaining an accurate measurement of the academic abilities of his students. The test results were invalidated and the students were retested. According to the parties, a newspaper article related to the matter was published in a local newspaper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order reprimanding Respondent for violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a), and placing him on probation for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 2595 Tampa Road, Suite J Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 5675 Douglasville, Georgia 30154-0012 Marian Lambeth, Program Specialist Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, Esquire Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for services offered by Respondent pursuant to the "Developmental Disabilities Prevention and Community Services Act", Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. The resolution of that issue requires a determination as to whether Petitioner's condition meets the definition of "retardation" found in Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Brian P. Dunaway, was born on January 22, 1975. At the time of the formal hearing, Brian resided in Homestead, Florida, with his parents, Joseph and Dotty Dunaway, and was a resident of the State of Florida. Brian's mother is a licensed mental health counselor who was, at the time of the formal hearing, employed as a counselor for emotionally handicapped children and was working to complete the dissertation necessary to earn her Ph.D. in psychology. Mrs. Dunaway is Brian's main caretaker. Brian's father is a pilot in the U. S. Air Force and spends as much time with Brian as he can. Both parents are very involved in Brian's care and are concerned as to his well- being. Neither parent is overly protective of Brian. Brian has a well documented history of psychological evaluations dating from age sixteen months. He has a complex history of mental disorders and learning disabilities. He has attention deficits and visual processing deficits that impair his ability to learn and to function. He has exhibited behavioral problems, including physical aggression, in the school setting. Brian was enrolled in Devereux Hospital and Children's Center of Florida, which is located in Melbourne, Florida, from May 17, 1990 (when he was 15 years old) until he attained his eighteenth birthday. His participation at Devereux was funded by the Dade County Public Schools as an exceptional education student placement. The school district contracted with Devereux because the district did not have an appropriate program in which to address the educational needs of Brian. Since his discharge from Devereux in 1993, Brian has lived in Homestead with his parents. At the time of the formal hearing, Brian was not participating in any program, despite the efforts by his parents to locate an appropriate program for him whether operated privately or by a public agency. Brian has a short term memory deficit that impairs his ability to maintain his activities of daily living and a severe learning disability in almost every major area of learning. His verbal skills are much better than his nonverbal skills. While he is able to take care of his basic hygiene, tasks that require visual/spatial skills, such as combing his hair or shaving, are difficult for him to accomplish. While his reading ability is only slightly below average, he has difficulty retaining what he reads and he can write only his name. He has an interest in airplanes and enjoys books about that subject. He also plays with his personal computer and is able to follow the basic instructions as to its use. He does not know his telephone number, is unable to tell time, and has no understanding of money. Brian has no capacity to live independently. Brian has never been formally diagnosed as being mentally retarded. There was evidence as to three formal diagnoses of the Brian. The first was by Dr. Josephine Perez, M.D., on March 3, 1989, as follows: Axis I 314.01 Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Axis II 315-90 Developmental Disorder N. O. S. Axis III 312-39 Trichotillimania The second was an admitting diagnosis at Devereux by Dr. Kenneth Moss, M.D. on May 18, 1990, as follows: Axis I 314.01 Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder. Rule out Affective Disorder. Axis II Rule out Pervasive Development Disorder. Rule out Specific Developmental Disorders. Axis III Neurological Impairment. Rule out Cerebral Palsy. The third, was by Bill Mosman, Ph.D., J.D., on September 10, 1993, as follows: Axis I 310.10 Organic personality disorder that has cyclic components of depression, anxiety, and impulse control difficulties. Axis II 315.80 Developmental expressive writing disorder by history. 315.10 Developmental arithmetic disorder by history. Axis III Documented history of organic anomalies. Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes, contains the following definitions that are pertinent to this proceeding: (41) "Retardation" means significantly sub- average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. "Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning", for the purpose of this definition, means performance which is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the department. "Adaptive behavior" for the purpose of this definition, means the effective- ness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his age, cultural group, and community. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised (WISC-R) is recognized in the profession as being a reliable intelligence test and has been accepted as such by Respondent's rules. The Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales test (Vineland) is recognized in the profession and by Respondent as being a reliable measure of adaptive behaviors. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Brian's general intellectual functioning is "significantly subaverage " within the meaning of Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes. Brian applied for eligibility for services under the "Developmental Disabilities Prevention and Community Services Act", Chapter 393, Florida Statutes, on March 22, 1993. On August 9, 1993, Brian was referred to Dr. Mosman for a comprehensive evaluation as part of the diagnostic and evaluation process. Dr. Mosman reviewed Brian's entire record and administered the Vineland test to assess Brian's adaptive behaviors. Dr. Mosman did not administer an IQ test to Brian. Among the records reviewed by Dr. Mosman, were the results of a WISC-R test that was administered to Brian at Devereux on October 16, 1990. 1/ This is the last intelligence test that was administered to Brian before his eighteenth birthday. 2/ The following scores are reflected on the WISC-R that was administered October 16, 1990: Verbal IQ was 77, Performance IQ was 55, and Full Scale IQ was 64. On the WISC-R, the mean score is 100 and one standard deviation is 15 points. Performance on the WISC-R which is two or more standard deviations from the mean score would be a Full Scale IQ of 70 or less. WISC-R tests were administered to Brian in April 1981 and in May 1982. Those tests reflect a Full Scale IQ of 78 and 81, respectively. Dr. Mosman discounted the full scale IQ results of the WISC-R test administered at Devereux because he believed the low results were caused by Brian's "visual processing organically derived deficits", including his weak computational facility and short term auditory memory processing problems. Dr. Mosman's testing of Brian verified that he has deficits in visual processing that are organically derived. The following excerpts from Dr. Mosman's report (found at tab A-3 of Joint Exhibit 1) summarize his opinions (see also page 69 of the amended transcript): Devereux Foundation psychological evaluation resulted in a WISC-R VIQ [Verbal IQ] of 77, PIQ [Performance IQ] of 55 and FSIQ [Full Scale IQ] of 64. It is noted that Brian's vocabulary, analytical skills, and ability to synthesize information was equivalent to an IQ of 90 to 110, page 3. Once again, Brian's Arithmetic and Digit Symbol scores of 1 and 2 significantly impacted Brian's verbal IQ. It was concluded that the extreme variation in Brian's subscale scores was related to weak computational facility and short term auditory memory processing problems. . . . (Dr. Mosman's report, page 4) * * * Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales - Brian received a Communication Domain Standard Score of 64; a Daily Living Skills Domain Standard Score of 78; and a Socialization Domain Standard Score of 82. The average of these three scores is 74. Examining the scatter of the subdomains it is noteworthy that as is found during earlier WISC-R testing Brian's visual processing organically derived deficits produced a statistically low score reflective of learning disabilities in the written subdomain artificially lowering this particular score. In other words, the sole reason for the low Communication Domain Standard Score is because of deficits recorded during a portion of one of the three subdomains in that area. A 12 point increase on the Written subdomain results in a 36 point increase in Communication Domain standard Score raising the 64 to 100. Hence, as per manual instructions this score can be prorated. Brian's prorated Overall Adaptive Composite Score is 82. Thus, it is clear that Brian is not mentally retarded but does have learning disabilities which solely result in a lowered Communication score. This test will not tell where those disabilities come from; could be lack of motivation, could be organic problems . . . (Dr. Mosman's report, page 5) * * * Brian seems to have all the clinical criteria needed to be considered for the services from the Dual Diagnosis Committee and should be referred there for their determination and guidance. Brian has developmental disabilities as per PL 95-602 mental illness as per Fla. Stat. [Chapter] 394; impairments of his emotional process and his ability to exercise conscious control of his actions is substantially impaired and interferes with his daily living. The reasons for these manifestations and difficulties is because of an underlying organic problem. However, neither PL 95-602 or Fl. Stat. [Chapter] 394 exclude organic ideology (sic) from their service programs. In this context, I would request consideration be given to developing a broad base service plan including socialization experiences, recreational activities, vocational training through DVR, support services for independent living, etc. (Dr. Mosman's report, page 7) Dr. Mosman was of the opinion that Brian is not retarded and notes, correctly, that Brian has never been formally diagnosed as being "mentally retarded." Dr. Mosman found Brian to be a young man with very good analytical skills who is burdened by highly specific and discreet organic anomalies. (See Dr. Mosman's report at page 5 under the discussion of the Bender Gestalt test.) Dr. Phillip C. Boswell reviewed Brian's records, evaluated Brian, and also administered to him the Vineland test to evaluate his adaptive functioning. Dr. Boswell did not administer an IQ test to Brian. Dr. Boswell testified that the WISC-R intelligence test administered to Brian at Devereux should be accepted as an accurate measurement of Brian's IQ. Dr. Boswell also was of the opinion that the results of the IQ tests in 1981 and 1982 are not inconsistent with the results of the 1990 since Brian's relatively unimpaired verbal ability enabled him to achieve higher scores on the IQ tests at a younger age than he could be expected to score at age 15. Dr. Boswell's evaluation of Brian's testing history is discussed at page two of his report (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) and summarizes his opinions: . . . Brian has consistently shown intellectual functioning in the range of mental retardation on Wechsler series tests of Performance IQ. However, intellectual functions related to understanding spoken language were less severely affected, and Brian's Verbal IQ scores in his early years were generally near the average range. His language functioning had been, to a degree "spared" from the damage that affected his nonverbal IQ and his motor impairments. The test scores in these spared areas, however, declined over time. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised administered 10/16/90 at the Devereux Foundation is the most current intellectual testing on Brian which meets statutory requirements for assessment of general intelligence. On that testing, Brian's Full Scale IQ, as well as his Performance IQ, had fallen into the mentally retarded range. It is not at all uncommon to see IQ scores drop in this fashion in the presence of a developmental functional impairment. IQ scores are calculated by comparing an individual's performance with that of his age peers who are normal. Even if the impaired individual is able to make some progress in learning, he will learn slower than his peers, and eventually hit a maximum plateau. His peers will continue to advance and the individual's IQ scores will drop, since they measure his relative standing compared to the peers. In resolving the conflicts in opinions expressed by Dr. Mosman's and Dr. Boswell, it is concluded that the WISC-R test administered to Brian at Devereux is a valid measurement of his IQ. While Dr. Mosman identified certain deficits that adversely impacted Brian's Full Scale IQ score, there was no evidence that those deficits can be discreetly treated or that Brian will ever overcome those deficits. The greater weight of the evidence established that Brian meets the definition of "subaverage general intellectual functioning" contained in Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes, in that his Full Scale IQ as measured by the WISC-R administered October 16, 1990, was two or more standard deviations form the mean score on that generally accepted standardized intelligence test. The fact that Brian has never been formally diagnosed as being "mentally retarded" is not controlling since there is no requirement either in statute or rule that such a formal diagnosis be made as a condition of eligibility. There was also a conflict in the opinions of Dr. Mosman and the other witnesses as to the level at which Brian functions, specifically, whether Brian has deficits in adaptive behavior within the meaning of Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes. The Vineland test administered by Dr. Mosman to evaluate Brian's level of functioning was based, in large part, on a joint interview with Brian and his mother. Ms. Dunaway was questioned as to Brian's abilities to function while Brian was present. Those responses by Mrs. Dunaway were used by Dr. Mosman as part of the evaluation test. Mrs. Dunaway testified that she was not as candid in her answers as she would have been had Brian not been present. Col. Dunaway testified that Dr. Mosman incorrectly evaluated Brian's functioning ability in several areas. Dr. Mosman adjusted the results of the Vineland upward (from a score of 74 to a score of 82) because he was of the opinion that "visual processing organically derived deficits produced a statistically low score reflective of learning disabilities in the written subdomain artificially lowering this particular score." Dr. Mosman concluded that Brian's intellectual and analytical capabilities have never been measured to reside in the mentally retarded range and that his adaptive level of behavior is not in the retarded range. Dr. Mosman was of the opinion that Brian functions above the mental retardation level and that he did not meet the "mental retardation" definition. Dr. Boswell administered to Brian the same diagnostic test (Vineland) that had been administered by Dr. Mosman. The results of the Vineland administered by Dr. Boswell were significantly lower than those from the test administered by Dr. Mosman. Dr. Boswell's results established that Brian is functioning at the bottom one percentile of the population in measures of adaptive functioning. This finding is consistent with Brian's records and the testimony from his parents and his counsellor. The opinions expressed by Dr. Boswell that Brian has significant deficits in adaptive behavior and that he functions in the one percentile of the population is more persuasive than the testimony of Dr. Mosman that Brian functions above the mental retardation level. It is concluded that Brian has deficits in adaptive behavior within the meaning of Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes, which were first manifested as an infant and which continue. The record clearly established that Brian has been disabled throughout his life and that there is no reason to believe that he will not remain disabled. The greater weight of the evidence established that Brian meets the criteria for the classification of mental retardation as defined by Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes, and that he is entitled to services pursuant to Chapter 393, Florida Statutes.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order that adopts the findings of facts and the conclusions of law contained herein and which orders that Petitioner is eligible to receive services under the "Developmental Disabilities Prevention and Community Services Act," Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1994.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Monroe County School Board, has “just cause” to terminate the employment of Respondent, Maryeugene E. Dupper, as a teacher for Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Monroe County School Board (hereinafter referred to as the “School Board”), is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the School District of Monroe County, Florida. Article IX, Florida Constitution; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. Specifically, the School Board has the authority to discipline employees. § 1012.22(1)(f), Fla. Stat. Respondent, Maryeugene E. Dupper, has been a classroom teacher with the School Board since August 2000. She began her employment as a substitute teacher and was subsequently employed as a full-time teacher at Poinciana Elementary School (hereinafter referred to as “Poinciana”), where she worked with profoundly handicapped students. She remained at Poinciana through November 2006. Throughout her employment at Poinciana, Ms. Dupper received good performance evaluations, although they did decline over time. On November 17, 2006, Ms. Dupper transferred to Gerald Adams Elementary School (hereinafter referred to as “Gerald Adams”), where she taught a Pre-K Exceptional Student Education or ESE class for the first time. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Ms. Dupper was employed as a teacher pursuant to a professional services contract. 2006-2007 School Year. From the beginning of her employment at Gerald Adams, Ms. Dupper evidenced difficulty implementing the curriculum in a meaningful way. In particular, Ann Herrin, Principal at Gerald Adams, whose testimony has been credited, found that Ms. Dupper was having a difficult time establishing the scope and sequence of lessons and effective classroom management techniques. Among the deficiencies Ms. Herrin found with Ms. Dupper’s performance was the lack of progress notes for her students. Ms. Dupper failed to keep any notes indicating that she had performed any formal evaluation of her students. When Ms. Herrin asked Ms. Dupper how she could tell whether her curriculum was successfully reaching each student, Ms. Dupper simply replied that “I am a teacher and I just know.” After conducting two formal observations and a number of informal observations of Ms. Dupper, Ms. Herrin, in her 2006- 2007 annual teacher evaluation concluded that Ms. Dupper “Needs Improvement” in Management of Student Conduct, Instruction Organization and Development, Knowledge of Subject Matter, and Evaluation of Instructional Needs. Ms. Herring used a Teacher Annual Assessment Plan Comprehensive Assessment Form for this evaluation. Overall, Ms. Herrin rated Ms. Dupper as “Needs Improvement” noting that “Curriculum content is lacking – making the learning environment unacceptable and unmanageable.” Subsequent to Ms. Herrin’s evaluation of Ms. Dupper, Ms. Herrin issued a Professional Development Plan for Ms. Dupper dated May 30, 2007. Ms. Dupper, who had been provided assistance throughout the school year by Gerald Adams administrative staff, was offered guidance in the Professional Development Plan intended to improve her performance as a teacher. That guidance is accurately described in paragraph 9 of the School Board’s Proposed Recommended Order. At the beginning of the 2007-2008 school year, the School Board instituted a new curriculum for use by Pre-K teachers. That curriculum, the Galileo Curriculum (hereinafter referred to as “Galileo”), is a computer-based program which includes lessons plans and benchmarks and goals for teachers to use in assessing student performance. Although Galileo includes a means for teachers to keep track of student progress, Galileo is not a student evaluation instrument intended for use in “testing” student progress. 2007-2008 School Year. During the 2007-2008 school year, Ms. Dupper was observed on October 11, November 8, and December 18, 2007, and on March 20 and 26, and May 6 and 22, 2008. Despite efforts to provide Ms. Dupper with professional assistance and making several changes in the teacher’s aide assigned to assist her, Ms. Dupper’s performance remained inadequate. Ms. Dupper was provided with assistance by teachers at Gerald Adams, including a “mentor," and by the head of the Exceptional Student Education department and an Exceptional Student Education Program Specialist. Ms. Dupper was observed on one occasion by Ms. Herrin when every student in Ms. Dupper’s “learning center” left the area while she continued to “teach.” One student stood on a table dancing, uncorrected by Ms. Dupper. On two occasions, a student left Ms. Dupper’s classroom altogether and were taken back to Ms. Dupper’s classroom before she realized they were gone. On nine different occasions during the 2007-2008 school year, Ms. Herrin requested a discipline plan from Ms. Dupper. No plan was ever provided. Ms. Dupper’s use of Galileo was minimal during the 2007-2008 school year. The system contained a checklist, by domain or skill, which was intended for use by a teacher in determining whether each student was learning the listed skills. Ms. Dupper rarely used the system, however, only logging into the Galileo system 19 times. Nine of those times were on the same day and four were on another day. Other Pre-K teachers utilized Galileo an average of 100 times more than Ms. Dupper. Ms. Herrin’s 2007-2008 annual evaluation of Ms. Dupper, dated April 4, 2008, found that her performance had declined and was “Unsatisfactory.” Ms. Herrin found Ms. Dupper “Unsatisfactory” in Management of Student conduct, Instruction, Organization and Development, Knowledge of Subject Matter, and Evaluation of Instructional Needs. Ms. Dupper’s performance in Professional Responsibilities also declined due to her failure to complete Individual Education Plans on time, incomplete and inaccurate progress notes, and her failure to follow suggestions for improvement. The 90-Day Probation Period. As a result of her continuing decline in performance, Ms. Dupper was informed on April 9, 2008, that she was being placed on a 90-day probation period pursuant to Section 1012.34, Florida Statutes. She was informed that her deficiencies included the inability to manage student conduct, lack of lesson planning, inadequate knowledge of subject matter, lack of student progress evaluation, and inadequate professional responsibility. Ms. Dupper was given suggestions for how to improve her deficiencies over the summer break, suggestions which Ms. Dupper did not follow. While on probation, Ms. Dupper was also offered an opportunity to transfer to another school, an offer which was not accepted. On June 6, 2008, at the request of Ms. Dupper’s union representative, a second annual evaluation was performed by Ms. Herrin. While Ms. Herrin found some improvement, she found that, overall, Ms. Dupper’s performance was “Unsatisfactory.” Ms. Dupper was on probation during the 2007-2008 school year a total of 62 days, excluding holidays and “professional days.” During the summer months between the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, Ms. Dupper, who was not teaching, failed to follow any of Ms. Herrin’s suggestions for personal improvement opportunities. The first day of school for the 2008-2009 school year and the commencement of the 90-day probation period was August 11, 2008. Ms. Herring formally observed Ms. Dupper during the third week of September 2008, and on October 2, 2008. Assistant Principal Willis observed Ms. Dupper on October 8, 2008. Ms. Dupper’s performance and use of Galileo continued to be unsatisfactory, despite continuing efforts of the administration staff to assist her, as more particularly and accurately described in paragraphs 30 through and including 35 of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order. Additionally, Ms. Dupper continued to fail to prevent her very young students from leaving the classroom without her knowledge. Excluding non-school days, Ms. Dupper was given more than 120 days from the commencement of her probation period until her probation period was considered ended in October 2008. By the middle of October 2008, Ms. Herrin concluded that Ms. Dupper had not evidenced satisfactory improvement in her teaching skills. Ms. Herrin’s conclusions concerning Ms. Dupper’s unsatisfactory performance as a teacher, which were not contradicted, are credited. The Decision to Terminate Ms. Dupper’s Employment By letter dated October 30, 2008, Ms. Herrin recommended to Randy Acevedo, Superintendent of the Monroe County School District, that Mr. Acevedo review documentation concerning Ms. Dupper’s 90-day probation period and make a recommendation pursuant to Section 1012.33, Florida Statutes, concerning her continued employment. Ms. Herrin provided Mr. Acevedo with the following information for his review: Attached please find a copy of the professional development plan and this year’s observations conducted by Assistant Principal, Grace Willis and me. The remaining documentation for the 2007 and 2008 school years have been submitted to personnel. I have also attached the follow up documentation, the review of the 90-Day plan and the observations that outline the deficiencies that still remain. This teacher’s performance remains unsatisfactory. Petitioner’s Exhibit 7. Missing from the information provided for Mr. Acevedo’s consideration was any information concerning student performance assessed annually by state or local assessment. By letter dated November 14, 2008, Mr. Acevedo informed Ms. Dupper that he was going to recommend to the School Board at its December 16, 2008, meeting that her employment as a teacher be terminated. By letter dated November 18, 2008, Ms. Dupper requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to challenge her anticipated termination of employment. The School Board accepted the Superintendent’s recommendation at its December 16, 2008, meeting, suspending Ms. Dupper without pay, pending a final determination of whether her employment should be terminated. Student Performance Assessment. The Florida legislature has specified in Section 1008.22, Florida Statutes, a “Student assessment program for public schools.” This assessment program is to be considered in evaluating student performance as part of a teacher’s evaluation. The assessment program, however, does not apply to Pre-K students. “FLICKRS” is a state assessment tool intended for use in evaluating Kindergarten students. FLICKRS allows schools to evaluate whether a Kindergarten student is actually ready for Kindergarten-level work. FLICKRS is not utilized by the School Board to evaluate the progress of Pre-K students. The School Board has not developed any means of annually assessing the performance of Pre-K students. As a consequence, the decision to terminate Ms. Dupper’s employment by the School Board was not based upon any annual assessment of her students’ performance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order: (a) dismissing the charges of the Administrative Complaint; (b) providing that Ms. Dupper be immediately reinstated to the position from which she was terminated; and (c) awarding Ms. Dupper back salary, plus benefits, to the extent benefits accrued during her suspension, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Clinton Black, Esquire Vernis and Bowling of the Florida Keys, P.A. 81990 Overseas Highway, Third Floor Islamorada, Florida 33036 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761 Randy Acevedo, Superintendent Monroe County School Board 241 Trumbo Road Key West, Florida 33040-6684 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner has a developmental disability that makes her eligible to receive services from the Department of Children and Family Services pursuant to Section 393.061, Florida Statutes, et seq.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner is almost 59 years old. She has lived a very sheltered life, and she has always been considered to be "slow" by her family. Petitioner moved to Florida in the early 1990's, and she currently resides in Merritt Island. Petitioner lived at home with her parents until two and one-half years ago when her mother had a debilitating stroke and was moved into a nursing home. Since then, Petitioner has lived by herself. Petitioner never learned to ride a bike or drive a car. She did not date. Petitioner's work experience, as detailed in the 1974 report prepared by psychologist William McManus (discussed below), was limited to 11 years as a stock clerk in a family business. She has not worked since 1973. Petitioner has the social skills of a 12 to 13-year-old child. She reads at the fifth grade level. Petitioner is incapable of managing her own finances. Petitioner's social security check is sent to Ms. Michalsky, who pays Petitioner's rent for her. Petitioner is incapable of managing her own diet. Her meals consist primarily of sweets, microwave foods, and sodas. Ms. Michalsky, Petitioner's second cousin and the only relative who lives near her, has been Petitioner's de facto guardian since Petitioner's mother suffered the stroke. Ms. Michalsky has children of her own, and she is unable to adequately care for Petitioner. It was apparent from Ms. Michalsky testimony at hearing that she is genuinely concerned for Petitioner's safety and well-being. Petitioner attended and graduated from St. Mary of Perpetual Help High School (St. Mary) in June 1962. Out of a class of 99 students, Petitioner was ranked 99th. Petitioner's transcript from St. Mary shows that she received grades at or near the lowest passing grade in all of her classes. This suggests that Petitioner was being "socially promoted." Petitioner's transcript also shows that she scored very poorly on all of the standardized tests that she took. Petitioner took the Otis S-A Test Form A (Otis Test) in January 1958. She was 14 years old at the time. The purpose of the Otis Test is to determine a cognitive IQ. A score of 100 is considered average. The standard deviation for the test is 15. A person whose score is more than two standard deviations below the average, i.e., a score below 70, is considered to be retarded. Petitioner's IQ, as determined by the Otis Test, was 73. The margin of error for the Otis Test is +/- five points. Thus, Petitioner's "actual" IQ was between 68 and 78. Petitioner scored in the third percentile of the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT), meaning that she scored higher than only three percent of the people who took the test. Petitioner took this test in April 1959. She was 15 years old at the time. Her score on the DAT roughly translates into an IQ level of 75. Petitioner was in the first percentile on the SRA National Education Development Test, meaning that she scored higher than only one percent of the people who took the test. Petitioner took this test in the spring of 1960. She was 17 years old at the time. In July 1974, Petitioner was examined by William McManus, a licensed psychologist. Mr. McManus examined Petitioner based upon the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler Scale). Petitioner was 31 years old at the time. The Wechsler Scale includes 11 subtests, each of which are separately scored. The scores of the subtests are used to formulate a verbal IQ, a performance IQ, and an overall IQ. The separate scoring of the subtests allows a more detailed analysis of the subject's IQ, which in turn results in a more accurate reflection of the subject's learning abilities. The average score on each subtest is ten. Scores between seven and ten are considered average; scores between five and seven are considered borderline; and scores less than five are considered very low. There is typically no "scatter" in the scores of a person who is retarded. In other words, the person's score on all or almost all of the 11 subtests are in the very low range, i.e., below five. There was considerable "scatter" in the Petitioner's scores on the subtests. She scored in the average range on five of the 11 subtests; she scored in the borderline range on four of the subtests; and she scored in the very low range on only two of the subtests. Petitioner's overall IQ, as determined by the Wechsler Scale, was 75. Her verbal IQ was 79 and her performance IQ was 73. The information originally submitted to the Department with Petitioner's application for developmental services included only medical records. Those records did not include any of the IQ test scores described above. Neither the medical records originally submitted to the Department (which were not introduced at the hearing), nor any of the evidence introduced at the hearing suggest that Petitioner suffers from cerebral palsy, autism, spina bifida, or Prader-Willi syndrome. The denial letter issued by the Department on July 24, 2001, was based only upon the medical records submitted with the application. After receiving the denial letter, Ms. Michalsky spoke with Department employee Pat Rosbury regarding the type of information needed by the Department. Based upon those conversations, Ms. Michalsky provided additional records to the Department, including records showing the IQ test results described above. Ms. Michalsky was unable to obtain any additional records from Petitioner's childhood because such records are over 50 years old. The Department forwarded the supplemental records to Dr. Yerushalmi on October 16, 2001, because the scores showed borderline retardation. Dr. Yerushalmi did not personally evaluate Petitioner, but based upon her review of the IQ test scores described above, she concluded that Petitioner is not retarded and, hence, not eligible for developmental services from the Department. Dr. Yerushalmi "suspects" that Petitioner had a learning disability as a child and that disability, coupled with her sheltered upbringing, led to her current state. The Department did not issue a new denial letter after Dr. Yerushalmi's review of the supplemental records confirmed the Department's original decision that Petitioner is ineligible for developmental services. Petitioner's request for a formal administrative hearing was dated October 17, 2001, and was received by the Department on October 19, 2001.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order that determines Petitioner to be ineligible for developmental services. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2002.
The Issue The primary issue is whether the process used by the Department of Education (Department) for evaluating and ranking the proposals submitted in response to Request For Proposal (RFP) 99-03 for the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) administration contract was contrary to the provisions of the RFP in a way that was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The RFP for the FCAT describes a five stage process for evaluating proposals. In Stage I, the Department’s Purchasing Office determined whether a proposal contained certain mandatory documents and statements and was sufficiently responsive to the requirements of the RFP to permit a complete evaluation. Stage II involved the Department’s evaluation of a bidder’s corporate qualifications to determine whether the bidder has the experience and capability to do the type of work that will be required in administering the FCAT. Stage III was the Department’s evaluation of a bidder’s management plan and production proposal. In Stage IV, the Department evaluated a bidder’s cost proposal. Stage V involved the ranking of proposals based on points awarded in Stages II-IV. If a proposal did not meet the requirements at any one stage of the evaluation process, it was not to be evaluated in the following stage. Instead, it was to be disqualified from further consideration. Stages II and III of the evaluation process were conducted by an evaluation team comprised of six Department employees: Dr. Debby Houston, Ms. Lynn Joszefczyk, Dr. Peggy Stillwell, Dr. Cornelia Orr, Dr. Laura Melvin, and Ms. Karen Bennett. Dr. Thomas Fisher, head of the Department’s Assessment and Evaluation Services Section, and Dr. Mark Heidorn, Administrator for K-12 Assessment Programs within the Department’s Assessment and Evaluation Services Section, served as non-voting co-chairs of the evaluation team. The focus of this proceeding is Stage II of the evaluation process addressing a bidder’s corporate qualifications. RFP Provisions Regarding Corporate Qualification The FCAT administration contractor will be required to administer tests to approximately one and a half million students each year in a variety of subject areas at numerous grade levels. The FCAT program involves a complex set of interrelated work activities requiring specialized human resources, technological systems and procedures. The FCAT must be implemented annually within limited time periods. The FCAT administration contractor must meet critical deadlines for the delivery of test materials to school districts and the delivery of student scores prior to the end of the school year. In developing the RFP, the Department deliberately established a set of minimum requirements for corporate qualifications that a bidder was to demonstrate in order for its proposal to be eligible for further evaluation. The purpose of the RFP’s minimum corporate qualifications requirements was to limit bidding to qualified vendors who have demonstrated prior experience in successfully administering large-scale assessment projects like the FCAT, thereby providing the Department with some degree of assurance that the winning bidder could successfully administer the FCAT. The instructions to bidders regarding the minimum requirements for corporate qualifications are contained in RFP Section 10, which gives directions on proposal preparation. Section 10.1, which lists certain mandatory documents and statements to be included in the bidder’s proposal, requires that a transmittal letter contain "[a] statement certifying that the bidder has met the minimum corporate qualifications as specified in the RFP." These "minimum corporate qualifications" are set forth in RFP Appendix J. RFP Section 10.2 identifies what a bidder is required to include in its proposal with respect to corporate qualifications. The first paragraph of Section 10.2 directs a bidder generally to describe its qualifications and experience performing tasks similar to those that it would perform in administering the FCAT, in order to demonstrate that the bidder is qualified where it states: Part II of a bidder’s proposal shall be entitled Corporate Qualifications. It shall provide a description of the bidder’s qualifications and prior experience in performing tasks similar to those required in this RFP. The discussion shall include a description of the bidder’s background and relevant experience that qualifies it to provide the products and services required by the RFP. RFP Section 10.2, however, is not limited to a directive that qualifications and past experience be described generally. Instead, Section 10.2, also communicates, in plain and unambiguous terms, that there are specific minimum corporate qualifications a bidder must demonstrate: The minimum expectations for corporate qualifications and experience are shown in Appendix J. There are two separate sets of factors, one set of eight for the developmental contractor and another set of nine for the administration contractor. Bidders must demonstrate their Corporate Qualifications in terms of the factors that are applicable to the activities for which a bid is being submitted -- development or administration. For each criterion, the bidder must demonstrate that the minimum threshold of experience has been achieved with prior completed projects. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Section 10.2 singles out for emphasis, in relation to the administration component of the RFP, the importance placed on a bidder’s ability to demonstrate experience processing a large volume of tests: The [bidder’s prior completed] projects must have included work tasks similar to those described herein, particularly in test development or processing a comparable number of tests. The bidder will provide a description of the contracted services; the contract period; and the name, address, and telephone number of a contact person for each of the contracting agencies. This description shall (1) document how long the organization has been providing similar services; (2) provide details of the bidder’s experience relevant to the services required by this RFP; and (3) describe the bidder’s other testing projects, products, and services that are similar to those required by this RFP. (Emphasis added.) The Department thus made clear its concern that bidders demonstrate experience with large-scale projects. RFP Appendix J sets forth nine different criteria (C1 through C9) for the administration contractor. As stated in RFP Section 10.2, "[f]or each criterion, the bidder must demonstrate that the minimum threshold of experience has been achieved with prior completed projects . . . ." (emphasis added). Appendix J contains a chart which lists for each criterion: (1) a summary of the related FCAT work task, (2) the detailed criteria for the bidder’s experience related to that work task, and (3) the necessary documentation a bidder must provide. Criterion C4 and Criterion C6 include work tasks that involve the use of image-based scoring technology. C4 and C6 are the only corporate qualifications criteria at issue in this proceeding. RFP Provisions Involving Corporate Qualifications for Image-Based Scoring "Handscoring" is the test administration activity in which open-ended or performance-based student responses are assessed. This practice involves a person reading something the student has written as part of the test, as distinguished from machine scoring multiple choice responses (i.e., the filled-in "bubbles" on an answer sheet). There are two types of handscoring: (1) paper-based handscoring, and (2) image-based handscoring. Paper-based handscoring requires that a student response paper be sent to a reader, who then reviews the student’s response as written on the paper and enters a score on a separate score sheet. Image-based handscoring involves a scanned image of the student’s response being transmitted to a reader electronically. The student’s response is then projected on a computer screen, where the reader reviews it and assigns a score using the computer. The RFP requires that the reading and math portions of the FCAT be handscored on-line using imaging technology beginning with the February 2000 FCAT administration. The RFP provides that the writing portion of the FCAT may be handscored using either the paper-based method or on-line imaging technology during the February 2000 and 2001 FCAT administrations. However, on-line image-based scoring of the writing portion of the FCAT is required for all FCAT administrations after February 2001. An image-based scoring system involves complex computer technology. William Bramlett, an expert in designing and implementing large-scale imaging computer systems and networks, presented unrefuted testimony that an image-based scoring system will be faced with special challenges when processing large volumes of tests. These challenges involve the need to automate image quality control, to manage the local and wide area network load, to assure adequate server performance and storage requirements, and to manage the work flow in a distributed environment. In particular, having an image-based scoring system process an increasing volume of tests is not simply a matter of adding more components. Rather, the system’s basic software architecture must be able to understand and manage the added elements and volume involved in a larger operation. According to Bramlett, there are two ways that the Department could assess the ability of a bidder to perform a large- scale, image-based scoring project such as the FCAT from a technological perspective: (1) have the bidder provide enough technological information about its system to be able to model or simulate the system and predict its performance for the volumes involved, or (2) require demonstrated ability through completion of prior similar projects. Dr. Mark Heidorn, Administrator for Florida’s K-12 Statewide Assessment Programs, was the primary author of RFP Sections 1-8, which describe the work tasks for the FCAT -- the goods and services vendors are to provide and respond to in their technical proposals. Dr. Heidorn testified that in the Department’s testing procurements involving complex technology, the Department has never required specific descriptions of the technology to be used. Instead, the Department has relied on the bidder’s experience in performing similar projects. Thus, the RFP does not specifically require that bidders describe in detail the particular strategies and approaches they intend to employ when designing and implementing an image-based scoring system for FCAT. Instead, the Department relied on the RFP requirements calling for demonstrated experience as a basis to understand that the bidder could implement such an image-based scoring system. Approximately 717,000 to 828,000 student tests will be scored annually by the FCAT administration contractor using imaging technology. The RFP, however, does not require that bidders demonstrate image-based scoring experience at that magnitude. Instead, the RFP requires bidders to demonstrate only a far less demanding minimum level of experience using image-based scoring technology. Criterion C4 and Criterion C6 in Appendix J of the RFP each require that a bidder demonstrate prior experience administering "a minimum of two" assessment programs using imaged- based scoring that involved "at least 200,000 students annually." The requirements for documenting a "minimum of two" programs or projects for C4 and C6 involving "at least 200,000 students annually" are material because they are intended to provide the Department with assurance that the FCAT administration contractor can perform the large-scale, image-based scoring requirements of the contract from a technological perspective. Such experience would indicate that the bidder would have been required to address the sort of system issues described by Bramlett. Dr. Heidorn testified that the number 200,000 was used in C4 and C6 "to indicate the level of magnitude of experience which represented for us a comfortable level to show that a contractor had enough experience to ultimately do the project that we were interested in completing." Dr. Fisher, who authored Appendix J, testified that the 200,000 figure was included in C4 and C6 because it was a number judged sufficiently characteristic of large-scale programs to be relevant for C4 and C6. Dr. Fisher further testified that the Department was interested in having information that a bidder’s experience included projects of a sufficient magnitude so that the bidder would have experienced the kinds of processing issues and concerns that arise in a large-scale testing program. The Department emphasized this specific quantitative minimum requirement in response to a question raised at the Bidder’s Conference held on November 13, 1998: Q9: In Appendix J, the criteria for evaluating corporate quality for the administration operations C4, indicates that the bidder must have experience imaging as indicated. Does this mean that the bid [sic] must bid for using [sic] imaging technology for reading and mathematics tests? A: Yes. The writing assessment may be handscored for two years, and then it will be scored using imaging technology. To be responsive, a bid must be for imaging. The corporate experience required (200,000 students annually for which reports were produced in three months) could be the combined experience of the primary contractor and the subcontractors. (Emphasis added.) Criterion C4 addresses the RFP work tasks relating to handscoring, including both the image-based handscoring of the reading and math portions of the FCAT for all administrations and the writing portions of the FCAT for later administrations. The "Work Task" column for C4 in Appendix J of the RFP states: Design and implement efficient and effective procedures for handscoring student responses to performance tasks within the limited time constraints of the assessment schedule. Handscoring involves image-based scoring of reading and mathematics tasks for all administrations and writing tasks for later administrations at secure scoring sites. Retrieve and score student responses from early district sample schools and deliver required data to the test development contractor within critical time periods for calibration and scaling. The "Necessary Documentation" column for C4 in Appendix J states: Bidder must document successful completion of a minimum of two performance item scoring projects for statewide assessment programs during the last four years for which the bidder was required to perform as described in the Criteria column. (Emphasis added.) The "Criteria" column for C4 in Appendix J, like the related work tasks in the RFP, addresses both image-based handscoring of reading and math, as well as paper-based or image- based handscoring of writing. In connection with all handscoring work tasks, "[t]he bidder must demonstrate completion of test administration projects for a statewide program for which performance items were scored using scoring rubrics and associated scoring protocols." With respect to the work tasks for handscoring the reading and math portions of the FCAT, "[t]he bidder must demonstrate completion of statewide assessment programs involving scoring multiple-choice and performance items for at least 200,000 students annually for which reports were produced in three months." In addition, for the reading and math work tasks, "[e]xperience must been shown in the use of imaging technology and hand-scoring student written responses with completion of scoring within limited time restrictions." This provision dealing with "imaging technology" experience self-evidently addresses the reading and math components, because separate language addresses imaging experience in connection with the writing component. The relevant handscoring experience for the reading and math aspects of the program is experience using image-based technology. By contrast, with respect to the work tasks for scoring the writing portions of the FCAT, "the bidder must also demonstrate completion of statewide assessment programs involving paper-based or imaged scoring student responses to writing assessment prompts for at least 200,000 students annually for which reports were produced in three months." (Emphasis added.) Criterion C6 addresses work tasks relating to designing and implementing systems for processing, scanning, imaging and scoring student responses to mixed-format tests within limited time constraints. The "Work Task" column for C6 in RFP Appendix J states: Design and implement systems for the processing, scanning, imaging, and scoring of student responses to test forms incorporating both multiple-choice and constructed response items (mixed-format) within the limited time constraints of the assessment schedule. Scoring of student responses involves implementation of IRT scoring tables and software provided by the development contractor within critical time periods. The "Necessary Documentation" column for C6 in Appendix J states: Bidder must document successful completion of a minimum of two test administration projects for statewide assessment programs during the last four years in which the bidder was required to perform as described in the Criteria column. (Emphasis added.) The Criteria column for C6 in Appendix J states: The bidder must demonstrate completion of test administration projects for statewide assessment programs or other large-scale assessment programs that required the bidder to design and implement systems for processing, scanning, imaging, and scoring responses to mixed-format tests for at least 200,000 students annually for which reports were produced in three months. Experience must be shown in use of imaging student responses for online presentation to readers during handscoring. (Emphasis added.) RFP Provisions Per Corporate Qualifications The procedure for evaluating a bidder’s corporate qualifications is described in RFP Section 11.3: The Department will evaluate how well the resources and experience described in each bidder’s proposal qualify the bidder to provide the services required by the provisions of this RFP. Consideration will be given to the length of time and the extent to which the bidder and any proposed subcontractors have been providing services similar or identical to those requested in this RFP. The bidder’s personnel resources as well as the bidder’s computer, financial, and other technological resources will be considered in evaluating a bidder’s qualifications to meet the requirements of this RFP. Client references will be contacted and such reference checks will be used in judging a bidder’s qualifications. The criteria to be used to rate a bidder’s corporate qualifications to meet the requirements of this RFP are shown in Appendix J and will be applied as follows: * * * Administrative Activities. Each of the nine administration activities criteria in Appendix J will be individually rated by members of the evaluation team. The team members will use the rating scale shown in Figure 1 below. Individual team members will review the bidder’s corporate qualifications and rate the response with a rating of one to five. The ratings across all evaluators for each factor will be averaged, rounded to the nearest tenth, and summed across all criteria. If each evaluator assigns the maximum number of points for each criterion, the total number of points will be 45. To meet the requirements of Stage II, the proposal must achieve a minimum rating of 27 points and have no individual criterion for which the number of points averaged across evaluators and then rounded is less than 3.0. Each proposal that receives a qualifying score based on the evaluation of the bidder’s qualifications will be further evaluated in Stage III. Figure 1 Evaluation Scale for Corporate Qualifications 5 Excellent 4 3 Satisfactory 2 1 Unsatisfactory The bidder has demonstrated exceptional experience and capability to perform the required tasks. The bidder has demonstrated that it meets an acceptable level of experience and capability to perform the required tasks. The bidder either has not established its corporate qualifications or does not have adequate qualifications. RFP Section 11.3 provides that each of the nine corporate qualifications criteria for administration operations in Appendix J (C1 through C9) will be individually rated by the six members of the evaluation team using a scale of one to five. A rating of three is designated as "satisfactory" which means that "[t]he bidder has demonstrated that it meets an acceptable level of experience and capability to perform the required tasks." In order to be further evaluated, Section 11.3 provides that there must be no individual corporate qualifications criterion for which the bidder’s proposal receives a score less than 3.0 (average points across evaluators). Dr. Fisher, the primary author of Section 11.3 of the RFP, referred to the 3.0 rating as the "cut score." (Emphasis added.) The RFP’s clear and unambiguous terms thus establish the "minimum threshold" of experience that a bidder "must demonstrate" in its proposal for Criterion C1 through Criterion C9. The "minimum threshold" of experience that a bidder must demonstrate for each criterion is described in Appendix J of the RFP. If a proposal failed to demonstrate that the bidder meets the minimum threshold of experience for a particular criterion in Appendix J, the bidder obviously would not have demonstrated "that it meets an acceptable level of experience and capability to perform the required tasks." Thus, in that setting, an evaluator was to have assigned the proposal a rating of less than "satisfactory," or less than three, for that criterion. (Emphasis added.) The fact that a score less than "3" was expected for -- and would eliminate -- proposals that did not demonstrate the "minimum threshold" of experience does not render meaningless the potential scores of "1" and "2." Those scores may reflect the degree to which a bidder’s demonstrated experience was judged to fall below the threshold. Although some corporate capability minimums were stated quantitatively (i.e., "minimum of two," or "at least 200,000"), others were open to a more qualitative assessment (i.e., "large-scale," "systems," or "reports"). Moreover, a proposal that included demonstrated experience in some manner responsive to each aspect of Appendix J might nevertheless be assigned a score of less than "3," based on how an evaluator assessed the quality of the experience described in the proposal. By the terms of the RFP, however, an average score across evaluators of less than 3 represented essentially a decision that the minimum threshold of experience was not demonstrated. Had the Department truly intended Appendix J to reflect only general targets or guidelines, there were many alternative ways to communicate such an intent without giving mandatory direction about what bidders "must demonstrate" or without establishing quantitative minimums (i.e. "a minimum of two," or "at least 200,000"). RFP Appendix K, for instance, sets forth the evaluation criteria for technical proposals in broad terms that do not require the bidder to provide anything in particular. Even within Appendix J, other than in Criterion C4 and Criterion C6, bidders were to show experience with "large-scale" projects rather than experience at a quantified level. Pursuant to the RFP’s plain language, in order to meet the "minimum threshold" of experience for Criterion C4 and Criterion C6, a bidder "must demonstrate," among other things, successful completion of a "minimum of two" projects, each involving the use of image-based scoring technology in administering tests to "at least 200,000 students annually." Department’s Evaluation of Corporate Qualifications In evaluating Harcourt’s proposal, the Department failed to give effect to the plain RFP language stating that a bidder "must document" successful completion of a "minimum of two" testing projects involving "at least 200,000 students annually" in order to meet the "minimum threshold" of experience for C4 and C6. Dr. Fisher was the primary author of Sections 10, 11 and Appendix J of the RFP. He testified that during the Stage II evaluation of corporate qualifications, the evaluation team applied a "holistic" approach, like that used in grading open-ended written responses in student test assessments. Under the holistic approach that Dr. Fisher described, each member of the evaluation team was to study the proposals, compare the information in the proposals to everything contained in Appendix J, and then assign a rating for each criterion in Appendix J based on "how well" the evaluator felt the proposal meets the needs of the agency. Notwithstanding Dr. Fisher’s present position, the RFP’s terms and their context demonstrate that the minimum requirements for corporate qualifications are in RFP Appendix J. During the hearing, Dr. Fisher was twice asked to identify language in the RFP indicating that the Department would apply a "holistic" approach when evaluating corporate qualifications. Both times, Dr. Fisher was unable to point to any explicit RFP language putting bidders on notice that the Department would be using a "holistic" approach to evaluating proposals and treating the Appendix J thresholds merely as targets. In addition, Dr. Fisher testified that the Department did not engage in any discussion at the bidders’ conference about the evaluation method that was going to be used other than drawing the bidders’ attention to the language in the RFP. As written, the RFP establishes minimum thresholds of experience to be demonstrated. Where, as in the RFP, certain of those minimum thresholds are spelled out in quantitative terms that are not open to interpretation or judgment, it is neither reasonable nor logical to rate a proposal as having demonstrated "an acceptable level of experience" when it has not demonstrated the specified minimum levels, even if other requirements with which it was grouped were satisfied. The plain RFP language unambiguously indicates that an analytic method, not a "holistic" method, will be applied in evaluating corporate qualifications. Dr. Fisher acknowledged that, in an assessment using an analytic method, there is considerable effort placed up front in deciding the specific factors that will be analyzed and those factors are listed and explained. Dr. Fisher admitted that the Department went into considerable detail in Appendix J of the RFP to explain to the bidders the minimums they had to demonstrate and the documentation that was required. In addition, Dr. Orr, who served as a member of the evaluation team and who herself develops student assessment tests, stated that in assessments using the "holistic" method there is a scoring rubric applied, but that rubric does not contain minimum criteria like those found in the RFP for FCAT. The holistic method applied by the Department ignores very specific RFP language which spells out minimum requirements for corporate qualifications. Harcourt’s Corporate Qualifications for C4 and C6 Harcourt’s proposal lists the same three projects administered by Harcourt for both Criterion C4 and Criterion C6: the Connecticut Mastery Test ("CMT"), the Connecticut Academic Performance Test ("CAPT") and the Delaware Student Testing Program ("DSTP"). Harcourt’s proposal also lists for Criterion C4 projects administered by its proposed scoring subcontractors, Measurement Incorporated ("MI") and Data Recognition Corporation ("DRC"). However, none of the projects listed for MI or DRC involve image- based scoring. Thus, the MI and DRC projects do not demonstrate any volume of image-based scoring as required by C6 and by the portion of C4 which relates to the work task for the imaged-based scoring of the math and reading portions of the FCAT. Harcourt’s proposal states that "[a]pproximately 35,000 students per year in grade 10 are tested with the CAPT." Harcourt’s proposal states that "[a]pproximately 120,000 students per year in grades 4, 6 and 8 are tested with the CMT." Harcourt’s proposal states that "[a]pproximately 40,000 students in grades 3, 5, 8, and 10" are tested with the DSTP. Although the descriptions of the CMT and the CAPT in Harcourt’s proposal discuss image-based scoring, there is nothing in the description of the DSTP that addresses image-based scoring. There is no evidence that the evaluators were ever made aware that the DSTP involved image-based scoring. Moreover, although the Department called the Delaware Department of Education ("DDOE") as a reference for Harcourt’s development proposal, the Department did not discuss Harcourt’s administration of the DSTP (including whether the DSTP involves image-based scoring) with the DDOE. Harcourt overstated the number of students tested in the projects it referenced to demonstrate experience with image-based scoring. Harcourt admitted at hearing that, prior to submitting its proposal, Harcourt had never tested 120,000 students with the CMT. In fact, the total number of students tested by Harcourt on an annual basis under the CMT has ranged from 110,273 in the 1996- 97 school year to 116,679 in the 1998-99 school year. Harcourt also admitted at hearing that, prior to submitting its proposal, Harcourt had never tested 35,000 students in grade 10 with the CAPT. Instead, the total number of grade 10 students tested by Harcourt on an annual basis with the CAPT ranged from 30,243 in 1997 to 31,390 in 1998. In addition, Harcourt admitted at hearing that, prior to submitting its proposal, it had conducted only one "live" administration of the DSTP (as distinguished from field testing). That administration of the DSTP involved only 33,051, not 40,000, students in grades 3, 5, 8 and 10. Harcourt itself recognized that "field tests" of the DSTP are not responsive to C4 and C6, as evidenced by Harcourt’s own decision not to include in its proposal the number of students field tested under the DSTP. Even assuming that the numbers in Harcourt’s proposal are accurate, and that the description of the DSTP in Harcourt’s proposal reflected image-based scoring, Harcourt’s proposal on its face does not document any single project administered by Harcourt for C4 or C6 involving image-based testing of more than 120,000 students annually. When the projects are aggregated, the total number of students claimed as tested annually still does not reach the level of "at least 200,000;" it comes to only 195,000, and it reaches that level only once due to the single administration of the DSTP. Moreover, even if that 195,000 were considered "close enough" to the 200,000 level required, it was achieved only one time, while Appendix J plainly directs that there be a minimum of two times that testing at that level has been performed. The situation worsens for Harcourt when using the true numbers of students tested under the CMT, CAPT, and DSTP, because Harcourt cannot document any single image-based scoring project it has administered involving testing more than 116,679 students annually. Moreover, when the true numbers of students tested are aggregated, the total rises only to 181,120 students tested annually on one occasion, and no more than 141,663 tested annually on any other occasion. Despite this shortfall from the minimum threshold of experience, under the Department’s holistic approach the evaluators assigned Harcourt’s proposal four ratings of 3.0 and two ratings of 4.0 for C4, for an average of 3.3 on C4; and five ratings of 3.0 and one rating of 4.0 for C6, for an average of 3.2 on C6. Applying the plain language of the RFP in Sections 10 and 11 and Appendix J, Harcourt did not demonstrate that it meets an acceptable level of experience and capability for C4 or C6, because Harcourt did not satisfy the minimum threshold for each criterion by demonstrating a minimum of two prior completed projects involving image-based scoring requiring testing of at least 200,000 students annually. Harcourt’s proposal should not have received any rating of 3.0 or higher on C4 or C6 and should have been disqualified from further evaluation due to failure to demonstrate the minimum experience that the Department required in order to be assured that Harcourt can successfully administer the FCAT program. NCS’s Compliance With RFP Requirements Even though the NCS proposal did not meet all of the mandatory requirements, and despite the requirement of Section 11.2 that the proposal be automatically disqualified under such circumstances, the Department waived NCS’s noncompliance as a minor irregularity. The factors in C4 and C6 were set, minimal requirements with which NCS did not comply. For example, one of the two programs NCS submitted in response to Criteria C4 and C6 was the National Assessment of Educational Progress program ("NAEP"). NAEP, however, is not a "statewide assessment program" within the meaning of that term as used in Criteria C4 and C6. Indeed, NCS admitted that NAEP is not a statewide assessment program and that, without consideration of that program, NCS’s proposal is not responsive to Criteria C4 and C6 because NCS has not have submitted the required proof of having administered two statewide assessment programs. This error cannot be cured by relying on the additional experience of NCS’s subcontractor because that experience does not show that its subcontractor produced reports within three months, and so such experience does not demonstrate compliance with Criteria C4. The Department deliberately limited the competition for the FCAT contract to firms with specified minimum levels of experience. As opined at final hearing, if the Department in the RFP had announced to potential bidders that the type of experience it asked vendors to describe were only targets, goals and guidelines, and that a failure to demonstrate target levels of experience would not be disqualifying, then the competitive environment for this procurement would have differed since only 2.06 evaluation points (out of a possible 150) separated the NCS and Harcourt scores. Dr. Heidorn conceded that multiple companies with experience in different aspects of the FCAT program -- a computer/imaging company and a firm experienced in educational testing -- might combine to perform a contract like the FCAT. Yet, that combination of firms would be discouraged from bidding because they could not demonstrate the minimum experience spelled out in the RFP. Language in the RFP, indicating the "holistic" evaluation that was to be applied, could have resulted in a different field of potential and actual bidders.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Education, enter a Final Order rejecting the bids submitted by Harcourt and NCS for the administration component of the RFP. The Department should then seek new proposals. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Walker, Esquire Holland and Knight, LLP Post Office Drawer 810 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mark D. Colley, Esquire Holland and Knight, LLP Suite 400 2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest Washington, D.C. 20037 Charles S. Ruberg, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Paul R. Ezatoff, Jr., Esquire Christopher B. Lunny, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant and Yon, P.A. 106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-7741 Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated standardized testing procedures while proctoring the SAT-9 Test for her first grade class, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida Educator Certificate No. 467712, covering the area of Elementary Education. Her certificate is valid through June 30, 2007. Respondent has been a public school teacher in Florida for 21 years. During that time, she has worked as a classroom teacher in fifth and first grades at four different schools. At all times material here, Respondent was a first grade teacher at Niblack Elementary School (Niblack) in Columbia County, Florida. Respondent was the curriculum resource teacher at Niblack for the 2000/2001 school term, the first year Niblack was established. She helped organize the new school, selecting textbooks and other school materials. She assisted in the development of school improvement plans and the creation of the Parent Teacher Organization. Respondent worked long hours beyond the normal school hours to ensure the success of Niblack as a neighborhood school. She had good report with the parents and the community. After her first year at Niblack, Respondent returned to the classroom as a first grade teacher because she missed being with the children. Prior to the incident at issue here, Respondent has never been the subject of any disciplinary action. She has always received positive teacher evaluations. For the school years 1999/2000, 2000/2001, and 2001/2002, Respondent's evaluations reflect that she met or exceeded expectations. When school began in the Fall of 2001, Nikki Crawford was the paraprofessional assigned to work with the first grade students at Niblack. In the first week of classes, a conflict arose between Ms. Crawford and some of the first grade teachers, including Respondent. The initial conflict involved the scheduling of Ms. Crawford's time in each of the first grade classrooms. Eventually, Mark Crutcher, Niblack's Principal, and personnel at the school district level had to intervene in order to resolve the conflict. The purpose of the intervention was to clarify that the teachers and not Ms. Crawford were in control of the classrooms. The SAT-9 is a standardized test that is used to evaluate student performance. The staff at Niblack uses the test results as a guide to determine what the students learned over the past year, how they compared to other students nationally, and where the students should be placed the following school year. The test results do not benefit an individual teacher personally or professionally. The school does not receive a grade or funding based on the test results. The administration of the SAT-9 in the first grade is the first time that students at Niblack experience a standardized test. For the 2001/2002 school year, the test was administered in April 2002. The SAT-9 is a secure test that requires teachers and proctors to undergo training on test procedures. Amber Todd, Niblack's guidance counselor and testing coordinator, provided that training for the 2001/2002 school term. During the training, Ms. Todd gave Respondent a copy of the state statutes governing testing procedures. On or about April 5, 2002, Respondent signed a document indicating that she had received a copy of the test security requirements for the 2001/2002 administration of the SAT-9. Ms. Todd gave Respondent a document outlining the general testing procedures at Niblack. The document explained the mechanics of distributing and returning the tests to the guidance counselor's office. In regard to test preparation, the document listed spatial seating as one of several topics. The topics relating to procedures during testing included, but were not limited to, cheating and disruptive behavior. The document did not reference appropriate or inappropriate communication between teachers and students during the test. Ms. Todd gave Respondent a photocopy of the test security page out of the test manual but did not give her a copy of the test manual. However, Ms. Todd informed Respondent that she could review the manual in Ms. Todd's office. Respondent had prior experience in administering the SAT-9. She did not take advantage of the opportunity to review the test manual in Ms. Todd's office prior to the test in April 2002. Ms. Todd informed Respondent that the desks in the classroom needed to be separated. Ms. Todd and the test manual directed Respondent to read the script in the manual verbatim and to strictly follow the time allowed for each test section. Finally, Ms. Todd told Respondent and Ms. Crawford that they had discretion to redirect students but not to coach them. Respondent and Ms. Crawford could tell students to stay in their seats, to stop talking, and to pay attention. Teachers and proctors were allowed to tell students they were working in the wrong section, to erase the answers in the wrong section, and to go back to the correct section. Ms. Crawford was assigned to proctor the SAT-9 in Respondent's class in April 2002. When the test began, Respondent had not separated all of the students' desks. With the exception of a couple of desks that had been moved to one side, the desks were arranged in the normal classroom configuration with desks touching in groups of threes. The only other change in the classroom was that the seating location of some students had been rearranged. Respondent did not separate the desks because she wanted room to walk between the students during the test. The classroom was small and crowded with 18 desks. However, the most persuasive evidence is that Respondent did not make an effort to separate the desks to the extent possible. When Respondent began the first section of the test, she read the script of the instructions to her students. She read the sample question, which was in a story format, and the multiple choice answers as required. Pursuant to the test instructions, Respondent had to direct some of the students to erase their answers to the sample question and to mark the correct answers. Respondent then deviated from the script by reading aloud the first part of the first test question and telling the students to put their finger where the question began. She did not read the answers to the first question. Respondent did not improperly read any other portion of the test. Respondent was responsible for timing each section of the test. At one point during the test, Ms. Crawford asked Respondent how long the students had to finish a test section. Respondent replied that they had until 9:20 a.m. Ms. Crawford's testimony that Respondent began the timed test at 8:54, allowing the students an extra 6 minutes to complete the section is not persuasive. Students are not allowed to work on test sections that are not being timed. In other words, if a student begins to work in section 2 while section 1 is being timed, the teacher and the proctor should tell the student to erase his or her answers in section 2 and go back to work on section 1. During the test, Ms. Crawford informed Respondent that a student named Tyler was working in the wrong section. Respondent then told Tyler to go back to the section she should have been working on. Respondent's communication with Tyler was not improper according to the training provided by Ms. Todd. Ms. Crawford also had to redirect a couple of Respondent's students to erase their answers in the wrong section of the test and to begin working in the correct test section. A second student named Latrice put her head on her desk and closed her booklet within five minutes after a timed test began. Respondent did not believe Latrice could not have finished the test so quickly. Respondent picked up and opened Latrice's booklet. Respondent told Latrice that she could not possibly be finished and needed to go back and check her answers. Respondent also told Latrice she must have some of the answers wrong. Respondent made this statement to Latrice without actually checking to see if any of her answers were wrong. Even so, Respondent's communication with Latrice was inappropriate. If Latrice had finished the test and closed her booklet, Respondent should have taken the booklet without telling Latrice that she needed to keep working because she must have some of the answers wrong. After the test, Ms. Crawford informed Ms. Todd that Respondent had violated the reading portion of the SAT-9 test procedures by failing to separate the desks, by failing to properly time the test on one section, by failing to follow the script, and by improperly coaching two students. Ms. Todd then informed Mr. Crutcher about the allegations of improper test procedures. The Columbia County School District decided to invalidate the reading portion of the SAT-9 test for Respondent's first grade class. They did not invalidate the math portion of the test. The school district then administered a substitute reading test to the students. The Columbia County School District subsequently suspended Respondent without pay from May 21, 2002, through May 28, 2002. Respondent transferred to another Columbia County school for the 2002/2003 school term. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent continued to be employed by the Columbia County School District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the EPC enter a final order, placing Respondent’s teaching certificate on probation for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Betty N. Goggins 1291 East Camp Street Lake City, Florida 32025 William B. Graham, Esquire Ginger L. Barry, Esquire McFarlain & Cassedy 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Marian Lambeth, Program Specialist Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
