The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's Florida real estate sales associate license?
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, issued license number 3015177, in accordance with Chapter 475 of the Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a sales associate with Diane Lynne Severino, P. O. Box 354491, Palm Coast, Florida 32135-4991. On or about August 6, 2004, Joaquin Torres and Marine Hopson (Torres) entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the real property located at 9 Rockwell Lane, Palm Coast, Florida. Respondent was the sales associate on the above transaction. The closing did not occur on the above transaction. Additional Facts: According to Petitioner's records, the following constitutes the history of Respondent's sales associate license: Francis Anthony Severino, Sr., Sales Associate, License #SL-3015177 From January 1, 2004 to October 4, 2004, he was a sales associate affiliated with Team Real Estate, Inc. doing business as Realty Executives Fun Coast Team license number CQ 1008966, a brokerage corporation located at 185 Cypress Point Parkway, suite 4, Palm Coast, Florida 32164; From October 4, 2004 to March 31, 2005 said licensee was invalid due to no employing broker or no filing of a request to remain a sales associate under another broker. From March 31, 2005 to the Present he is a sales associate affiliated with Diane Lynne Severino license number BK 666867, a brokerage sole proprietorship doing business as Severino Realty located at 170 North Beach Street, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1. In his testimony Respondent indicated that his affiliation with Team Real Estate, Inc. ended on September 13, 2004, when he became inactive with that firm. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 2 is a copy of a DBPR RE-2050-1 Request for Change of Status form intended to establish the separation from that business. Mark Vost the real estate broker for Team Real Estate, Inc. filled out, signed, and sent it in. It has a fax stamp of September 13, 2004. The request by Mark Vost to inactivate Respondent as a sales associate with Team Real Estate, Inc., through the form DBPR RE-2050, was dated September 13, 2004, and officially received by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation on October 4, 2004. More significantly, Respondent testified that he filled out a DBPR RE-2050-1 a Request for Change of Status to be affiliated with Severino Realty whose broker was Diane L. Severino. At that time, Ms. Severino was Respondent's wife. A copy of the Request for Change of Status is found as Respondent's Exhibit numbered 3. It is dated September 13, 2004. Unlike Respondent's Exhibit numbered 2, Respondent's Exhibit numbered 3 does not have a fax stamp showing the date of transmission. Respondent indicated that he personally went to the fax machine in the office of Severino Realty and transferred his license to Petitioner by fax machine. On September 13, 2004, the date reflected on the form, Petitioner did not confirm the fax receipt by Petitioner. Respondent's explanation is that the fax machine upon which the transfer to Severino Realty of his sales associate license "did not have a receipt that prints out." Respondent in his testimony stated " . . . When I dialed the phone I got the dial tone, it rang, it answered, it made that beeping noise, and it never came and said anything that it did not go through and that it was an error. So I just assumed that it was accepted, because normally when a fax machine answers you, that beeping sound and it means that it is acknowledged and if it does not answer it’s a busy signal and you try dialing again." According to Respondent, from that point forward he assumed that his sales associate license had been transferred from Team Real Estate, Inc. to Severino Realty. It had not. Petitioner had evidence of the change of status of Respondent's license to inactive with Team Real Estate, Inc. It did not have evidence of the activation of Respondent's sales associates license with Severino Realty, even should one accept Respondent's testimony that he tried to fax the DBPR RE-2050-1 form designating a change in his broker to Diane L. Severino of Severino Realty on September 13, 2004. Ultimately the portrayal of Respondent's license history established in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1 is accepted where Respondent is recognized as being affiliated with Severino Realty commencing March 31, 2005. Respondent was involved with the Torres in a number of real estate transactions. One involved a purchase of a residence at 98 Ulysses Trail in Palm Coast, Florida, through a contract between Joaquine Torres and Holiday Builders, Inc. On July 21, 2004, the parties signed the contract. The total purchase price was $180,190.00. Respondent was named in the Sales/Forms FHA-VA- Std. in the portion of the forms described as "Realtor Referral" and Realty Executive is written next to his name. This is understood to refer to Team Real Estate, Inc. where Respondent was employed as a sales associate. The real estate commission involved with the purchase was 6 percent. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. The real estate commission due Realty Executives (Team Real Estate, Inc.) was $8,129.00 in Respondent's name. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. On September 24, 2004, when the purchase was settled at closing, the $8,1029.00 was paid, in relation to the property at 98 Ulysses Trail. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3. On September 24, 2004, the Torres as seller, with Severino Realty being reflected as the broker signed an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement for the 98 Ulysses Trail property. The price reflected was $229,800.00 with a broker's commission of 5.5 percent. The listing agreement bore one signature, that of the seller. The form did not name the authorized listing associate or broker. It referred to the brokerage firm name as Severino Realty. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. Earlier, Mr. Torres entered into a "Showcase Home Purchase Completed Field Model Agreement" with Holiday Builders, Inc. for a residence at 9 Rockwell Lane, Palm Coast, Florida. On August 6, 2004, the parties signed the agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. On September 24, 2004, an Exclusive Rights of Sale Listing Agreement form was prepared between the Torres and Severino Realty on 9 Rockwell Lane, listing the sales price as $164,900.00. At the time, the Torres did not own the home. The brokerage commission was 5.5 percent. A seller's signature was attached. No other signature was provided. No one was listed as associate or broker. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. The Torres' contract on 9 Rockwell Lane never closed due to the inability of the Torres to provide sufficient funds to conclude the purchase. On October 7, 2004, the Torres executed a Promissory Note to pay Respondent $5,000.00 upon the first sale of homes at 98 Ulysses Trail, 9 Rockwell Lane and 14 Ethel Lane. The amount was to be paid in 180 days from the date of the note payable at PO Box 354491, Palm Coast, Florida 32135 or "at such other place as payee or holder may specify in writing or in person." Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7. On October 7, 2004, Mark Vost, broker/manager for Realty Executives Fun Coast Team Real Estate, Inc., wrote the title company that would be handling the closing on the 9 Rockwell Lane Property to advise that $5,000.00 of commission should be credited to the buyer with the balance of $879.00 being paid to Realty Executives the Fun Coast Team. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 8. This coincides with the settlement charges in the settlement statement for the 9 Rockwell Lane property that did not close on the anticipated date. October 12, 2004, was the scheduled closing date. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9. After the Torres purchase of 9 Rockwell Lane did not close, Respondent telephoned Ms. Torres and said that she would have to pay him $6,000 because of the percentage (commission) he was losing. He made more than one call. Respondent told Ms. Torres that the failure to close on the 9 Rockwell Lane property was not his problem. Respondent told Ms. Torres that she had to pay because she did not buy the property at 9 Rockwell Lane, that he lost his time and lost his commission and that it was her fault. Respondent told Ms. Torres to give him a check. Eventually, Respondent came to the Torres home to get money from the Torres that he said was due. Based upon the demand for money, Ms. Torres wrote a check payable to Frank Severino in the amount of $6,000.00. The face of the check stated the purpose for the check as "9 Rockwell Lane." The check was written on October 12, 2004, the date Respondent went to the Torres' home. The payment was not intended as any form of gift or gratuity to Respondent. Respondent deposited and cashed the check. A replica of the check and its execution is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Sections 455.227(1)(n) and 475.25(1)(b), (d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2004), and revoking Respondent's sales associate license.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2007
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
Recommendation Having found the Respondent technically guilty of a violation of Section 489.129(1)(d), and thereby guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and based upon the matters in mitigation, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent receive a private letter of reprimand for his technical violation. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael E. Egan, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. David H. Otto 1527 C Road Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 J. K. Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a Florida-licensed yacht salesman, should be disciplined for violation of Rule 61B- 60.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, DBPR, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (the Division) was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and discipline of yacht salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the yacht-brokering profession. Respondent, Justo Lamar (Lamar), has been licensed as a yacht salesperson since November 1976. Prior to this action, Lamar has never been the subject of disciplinary action arising out of the practice of his profession. This action was precipitated by a yacht owner, Juan A. Galan (Galan), who unsuccessfully attempted to sell his yacht to a client of Lamar's. In July 1998, Galan listed his yacht, the Caliente, for sale through Ardell Yacht and Ship Brokers (Ardell). The listing resulted in negotiations for the purchase of the Caliente by one Larry Griggs (Griggs), a prospective customer represented by Lamar. At all times relevant to this case, Lamar was acting as a sales agent for Allied Marine and its broker, Dwight Tracy (Tracy). As set forth in more detail below, the negotiations between Galan and Griggs took place over a three-month period from October 1998 through December 1998 with no meeting of the minds. On July 12, 1999, some seven months after negotiations between Griggs and Galan terminated, Galan lodged a complaint with DBPR. Although the complaint was ostensibly directed against salesman Lamar and broker Tracy, each and every allegation in the complaint was directed to the broker's conduct, not Lamar's. Galan, who did not testify at final hearing, alleged in his complaint that "Broker presented a contract representing that deposit had been received/deposited (upon acceptance). In fact, broker never deposited check and we wasted our time and money on survey/sea trial as buyer was not (at that time or any time later) financially capable of buying boat @ $1.75 million." Galan provided some, but by no means all, of the documents which revealed the details of the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between Galan and Griggs. In the narrative portion of his complaint, Galan asserted that he lost money on sea trials and implied, without actually stating, that the Caliente had been taken off the market during the pendency of negotiations with Griggs. For reasons which remain unclear, the Division did not focus its investigation on Tracy, who was the obvious target of Galan's complaint. Instead, it targeted Lamar, who was an obvious add-on target of Galan's ire. The exhibits reveal a complex series of offers and counteroffers and jockeying for negotiating advantage, not just between Galan and Griggs as prospective Seller and Buyer of the Caliente, but also between Lamar and the two brokers, all three of whom stood to profit if the transaction were consummated. Negotiations for the Caliente began in late October 1998. On October 30, 1998, Lamar's client Griggs, through a corporation he controlled, issued a $150,000 check for "Deposit, 72' (sic) Caliente Sportfisherman." This check accompanied a Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, offering to purchase the Caliente for $1,500,000. That same day, Galan's representatives faxed Lamar to advise that Griggs' offer was insufficient. Lamar forthwith provided the check to his broker, Tracy. Negotiations between Galan and Griggs continued in November. Galan chose to by-pass his own Broker and negotiate directly with Lamar over lunch on November 18, 1998. Lamar wrote Galan's demands on the back of a restaurant placemat. The primary sticking point was Galan's insistence on a "bottom line" of $1,665,000 to him, after all commissions and other expenses, if any, were paid. Griggs nevertheless persevered in his effort to buy the Caliente for $1,500,000. On November 24, 2000, Griggs executed another Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement in which he offered an entity called Majua, Inc., of which Galan was President, the opportunity to sell the Caliente to Griggs for $1,500,000. Galan signed the November 24 agreement, but added an addendum which materially changed the terms. The addendum unilaterally purported to raise the sales prices to Galan's previously stated "bottom line" of $1,665,000. Thanksgiving passed, and negotiations wore on. On December 4, 1998, Griggs executed a third Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement, raising his offer to $1,755,000. The new offer expressly stipulated that Griggs' $150,000 earnest money check could be deposited when and if all parties executed this new proposed agreement. Like the October 29 and November 24 brokerage purchase and sale agreements, the December 4 document never ripened into a contract. The December 4 document was a clear and unembarrassed reminder from Griggs that an earnest money check had been written by Griggs, but was not on deposit, and was not going to be on deposit until such time as Galan had signed off on the contract as written by Griggs. Galan nevertheless permitted a sea trial of the Caliente in furtherance of negotiations, now in their fifth week. Also as part of the negotiating process, Galan permitted some, but not all, of the inspections requested by Griggs. Expenses for the sea trial and inspections were borne entirely by Griggs. By Christmas Eve, relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point where Lamar retrieved the check from the Allied Marine corporate files and returned it to Griggs. At no time did negotiations with Lamar's client Griggs preclude or interfere with efforts by Galan to negotiate with and sell the Caliente to any other prospective purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DBPR enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2001.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner must forfeit his vested benefits in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), pursuant to section 112.3173(3), Florida Statutes, due to Respondent's commission of an act of extortion, as defined in section 836.05, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has lived for much of his life in West Palm Beach. Petitioner's family owned a Pepsi-Cola bottling company in West Palm Beach until selling it five or six years ago. Petitioner started with the company as a truck driver and eventually served as a vice-president. Petitioner served as a locally elected official in West Palm Beach for nearly 20 years. Petitioner was elected commissioner of the Board of Commissioners of the City of West Palm Beach and served for 12 years. Subsequently, he was elected and reelected commissioner of the Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County. Petitioner was prevented by term limits from serving beyond his second four-year term, which was due to end in December 2010. However, Petitioner resigned from the county commission five months earlier after he pleaded guilty to, and was adjudicated guilty of, the extortion that is described below. Petitioner had planned to retire from public office after finishing his term in December 2010. In his early 60s and evidently secure financially, Petitioner looked forward to retirement, during which he planned to volunteer in the community and play with his grandchildren. In the final year of his final term in public office, Petitioner busied himself with--or, perhaps more aptly, obsessed over--one major piece of unfinished business: the South Cove Restoration Project. The South Cove Restoration Project is an ecological restoration project in the Lake Worth Lagoon in downtown West Palm Beach. The Lake Worth Lagoon is a 20-mile long body of water in central Palm Beach County. Located just east of Flagler Drive and north of the Royal Park Bridge, the South Cove Restoration Project's primary sponsor is Palm Beach County, although the state has provided funds and the City of West Palm Beach and the Florida Inland Navigation District are also identified as project "partners." The project consists of the creation of two acres of mangrove/spartina habitat, 3.5 acres of potential seagrass habitat, and one acre of rock revetment/oyster reef. The project also includes a 565-foot elevated boardwalk running from the sidewalk along Flagler Drive to the largest mangrove island and a 16-foot square observation deck. Lastly, the project includes the capping of an old dredge hole with clean sand. This will reduce turbidity in the adjacent water column by preventing the continual resuspension of fine-grained particles that tend to collect in the dredge hole. For many years, water-quality issues in the Lake Worth Lagoon have received the attention of state, regional, and local officials, including Petitioner. For a couple of years, Petitioner had served as the county representative to, and chair of, a consortium of governmental entities that had formed the Lake Worth Lagoon Initiative (Initiative). Members of the Initiative have been drawn from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the South Florida Water Management District, the Palm Beach County chapter of the League of Cities, and Palm Beach County. The mission of the Initiative is to restore water quality in the lagoon by obtaining and providing funding from various sources for projects to address such issues as water quality, habitat, and pollution-control. The Initiative has supported the South Cove Restoration Project, which is located to the south of a larger project recently undertaken by the City of West Palm Beach to dredge the Intracoastal Waterway adjacent to Flagler Drive as part of extensive renovations of an old city marina. The dredge spoil from the city marina project will provide the fill for the dredge hole in the South Cove Restoration Project. The South Cove Restoration Project was first identified in 1997 as a Surface Water Improvement and Management project. In August 2008, the Department of Environmental Protection proposed to issue the permits necessary for the project's construction and operation. Trump Plaza challenged the proposed permits in DOAH Case No. 08-4752, and Flagler Center Properties, LLP, intervened on the side of Trump Plaza. Trump Plaza is the owner- association of two 30-story condominium buildings, and Flagler Center Properties is the owner of two eight- or nine-story office buildings. Due to the proximity of their buildings to the South Cove Restoration Project, both parties challenged the project on the grounds of, among other things, the potential obstruction of their view and the unreasonable infringement on their qualified rights to a dock. These properties and the uplands adjoining the South Cove Restoration Project are all entirely within the city limits of the City of West Palm Beach. This litigation delayed the issuance of the permits by 15 months. However, in September 2009, an Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order approving the permits, and, in November 2009, the Department of Environmental Protection issued the final order issuing the permits. Members of the Johnson family own Flagler Center Properties. Like the Koonses, the Johnsons have lived in West Palm Beach for many years. The eldest Johnson is of the age of Petitioner's parents, and Petitioner knew the next generation of Johnsons, as they grew up together in West Palm Beach. The third generation of Johnsons and Koonses even attend the same school. But all of these relationships notwithstanding, at least certain members of the Johnson family with ownership interests in Flagler Center Properties have opposed at least certain aspects of the South Cove Restoration Project. The extortion occurred late in the approval process for the South Cove Restoration Project. The two acts of extortion took place in the six weeks before a vote by city commissioners to allow a fourth wheelchair-ramp access to be constructed from the existing sidewalk, over the seawall, and onto the boardwalk. The city commission vote took place on June 17 or 19, 2010. As expected, the city commissioners unanimously approved the fourth wheelchair ramp. Within a few days after the city vote, the last project sponsor to commit funds--the board of the Florida Inland Navigation District--approved its $1.5 million contribution. Evidently, the District vote was even more of a certainty that the city vote because--to the extent that Petitioner's extortion was designed to ensure final passage of the South Cove Restoration Project--Petitioner's concern, at the time of the extortion, was the city vote, not the District vote. In anticipation of the city vote, on May 6, 2010, at 9:14 a.m., Petitioner called the Johnson family attorney to discuss the Johnson family's continued objection to the project, especially the boardwalk. Petitioner failed to reach the attorney, so he left a voicemail. After a brief greeting, Petitioner demanded that the attorney send Petitioner immediately a memo outlining the remaining objections of the Johnson family to the South Cove Restoration Project. And if you don't--then I'm going to do a Public Records Request to the City of West Palm Beach on this. Dean, just for the heads up, good friend of mine, I'm going to work as hard as I've ever worked in twenty years of public service to take the Johnsons through the ringer on this if they don't support the City of West Palm Beach. I'll have kids picketing at the building and what I'm going to say is they want [a] marina instead of an island. I told you, this is very personal for me. Okay. This is something I really, really want. After twenty years I want the Johnsons to step away and congratulate me personally on all the work I've done. Okay? I have no idea why they're trying to fuck me on the deal but this is very personal. I'm going to work five [sic] hours a day for the next six weeks. I'm going to leverage every possible person, program--I have to get a five-oh vote out of the City Commission. It's very personal, Dean. So, I can't understand why they want to do it ultimately, I want them to say we've [sic] love to have this project. I'm going to door to door at every tenant in the building and throw them under the fucking bus. I'm going to say they want a marina out here versus a public island. I'm going to the FBI--I'm going to the Foundation. I'm going to every tenant in the building. I'm going to see if I have a banking relationship with anybody in there. I want this done and it's a personal thing for me. Shortly after this voicemail, Petitioner instructed a county employee to visit the Flagler Center Properties' site and photograph dead trees and the property's stormwater outfall. The record is not reliably developed on these points, except to the extent that these two issues are mentioned in Petitioner's next voicemail to the Johnson family attorney, which took place after the photographs were taken. To dispel any doubt of his seriousness, Petitioner called the Johnson family attorney again on June 9, 2010, at 6:18 pm: Hey, it's Koons. Just wondering, are the Johnsons still fighting that island on the maintenance issue? I was just wondering because I don't know if you noticed the dead trees that they have in their building in downtown West Palm Beach. Can't even take care of their own property with the dead trees. I don't know why they're worrying about maintenance on something else [the South Cove Restoration Project]. Anyway, also, do you have a map of where their stormwater goes? I was just trying to think if they were ever under a pre- treatment of their stormwater that goes off, I think, right where that island is going to be. Anyway, just let me know. Let me know if you want me to call Code Enforcement or what you want me to do. Thanks. By Information dated August 3, 2010, the State of Florida alleged that Petitioner "on or between May 6, 2010, and June 17, 2010, . . . did either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threaten an injury to the reputation of [the Johnson family] with intent to compel the persons so threatened . . . to do any act or refrain from doing any act against their will, contrary to Florida Statute 836.05 (2 DEG FEL)". The Information also alleges two misdemeanors that are irrelevant to this case. After three interviews with the authorities, Petitioner resigned from the county commission on August 3, 2010. The next day, Petitioner pleaded guilty to extortion and the two misdemeanors, and the court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of all three offenses and sentenced him to five years' county probation for the extortion and fined him $10,000 for the extortion. There is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner extorted the Johnson family for personal financial gain. He had already declined to run for another elected office, so the record does not support a finding that he engaged in this extortion for his personal political gain. There is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner engaged in this extortion for any other personal purposes, including obtaining wheelchair access for a family member or obtaining improper sexual advantage. It is difficult to find that Petitioner engaged in this extortion to cement some sort of personal legacy. The South Cove Restoration Project is not an exceptionally large project, in terms of water quality impacts. It appears to have already been named, so general naming rights--to paraphrase a theater critic, the graffiti of the political/philanthropic class--do not seem to be involved. (Charles Isherwood, "The Graffiti of the Philanthropic Class," N.Y. Times, December 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/theater/02ishe.html). As noted above, the sole practical concern of Petitioner, at the time of the acts of extortion, was the city vote on the fourth wheelchair ramp. But this vote was a near certainty and concerned an inconsequential matter--a fourth wheelchair ramp--that would not have prevented the project from going forward. Some proponents of the project even believed that the city vote was unnecessary, and a fourth ramp could have been located nearby at a location not within the jurisdiction of the city. Almost all that is left to explain the extortion is Petitioner's characterization of his acts, which he admitted were driven by anger, frustration, and stupidity. The narcissistic demands in the first voicemail that the Johnson family pay public homage to Petitioner and the eerie passive- aggressive nature of the second suggest pride to the point of hubris. But nothing else--except, of course, anger and stupidity. At all material times, Petitioner was in FRS-covered employment, owned vested FRS benefits, and had not filed for FRS retirement benefits. By letter dated November 8, 2010, Respondent advised Petitioner that he had forfeited his FRS benefits when he entered a guilty plea to the felony of extortion. He timely requested a hearing.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement Services enter a final order determining that Petitioner's acts of extortion, described above, do not constitute grounds for forfeiture of his FRS pension. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Jason Dimitris, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark A. Emanuele, Esquire Panza, Maurer and Maynard, P.A. Bank of America Building, Third Floor 3600 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308
