The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht broker.1 She is the yacht broker for Yachting Consultants, Inc. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In April 1999, Respondent was the listing broker of record regarding the sale of a 43-foot Pilgrim yacht. The selling broker was Mark Lipkus, a licensed yacht broker. John Pribik, a licensed salesperson, was Respondent's representative in the sale of the Pilgrim yacht. Mr. Pribik was under the supervision and control of Respondent and Respondent was responsible for his actions. Respondent had a buyer for the Pilgrim yacht, and the closing for the sale of the yacht was scheduled for April 13, 1999. The buyer was financing the purchase of the yacht. In a sale situation, a buyer and a seller have different responsibilities. The seller is responsible for providing all of the documents needed for a sale. The buyer is responsible for providing the funds for a sale. In the sale of the Pilgrim yacht, the responsibilities of the Seller and the Buyer did not change. There is a commission from the sale of a yacht, which is paid by the seller and, in accordance with standard industry practice, paid at closing. By standard industry practice, the commission split is 70/30, but can differ upon agreement. Mr. Lipkus received a down payment of $15,000.00 from the Buyer and placed the down payment in his escrow account. Mr. Lipkus was of the mistaken belief that the commission was payable by the Buyer, not the Seller. No co-broker agreement was entered into between Respondent or Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus regarding commission. There was no discussion regarding the split of the commission between them. On a prior sale involving Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, the commission split was 60/40. Mr. Pribik and Respondent assumed the commission split of the sale of the Pilgrim yacht would again be 60/40. Considering the prior sale, it was not unreasonable for Respondent and Mr. Pribik to assume a 60/40 split of the commission. Mr. Lipkus assumed the commission split would be 70/30. A power of attorney had been prepared by the Seller who was unavailable for closing due to being in a remote area in the Philippine Islands. Mr. Pribik provided the power of attorney to the documenting agent who reviewed the power of attorney and found it to be satisfactory. The mortgage broker received a copy of the power of attorney prior to closing and forward a copy to the lending institution. The lending institution notified the mortgage broker at some point before closing that the power of attorney was unacceptable. In turn, the mortgage broker contacted the documenting agent regarding the unacceptability of the power of attorney and informed the documenting agent that a new power of attorney was required before closing could take place. Mr. Pribik was notified by the mortgage broker that a new power of attorney was required. The responsibility to obtain the new power of attorney was the responsibility of the listing broker, who was Respondent via Mr. Pribik. As far as Mr. Pribik was concerned, with the time remaining before closing2 and with the Seller being in the Philippine Islands, he believed that it was virtually impossible to obtain a new power of attorney by the time of closing. The mortgage broker, taking the position that he should do whatever he could to effectuate a closing, encouraged Mr. Pribik to attempt to contact the Seller. Complying, Mr. Pribik was able to make telephonic contact with the Seller and Mr. Pribik and the mortgage broker spoke with the Seller, who agreed to provide a new power of attorney. Based on the verbal assurance by the Seller to provide the new power of attorney, the lending institution agreed to proceed with the closing, which was re- scheduled for April 14, 1999. A new power of attorney was faxed to the Seller, and the Seller executed it and faxed it back. According to industry standard, all commissions are paid at closing when a seller receives the funds. Also, according to industry standard, closing is not delayed until a commission is paid. Mr. Lipkus mistakenly believed that the commission was paid by a buyer, coming out of a buyer's deposit. As a result, he expected to take the commission out of the Buyer's down payment, which was held in Mr. Lipkus' escrow account. After obtaining his commission, Mr. Lipkus was going to forward the remaining monies. On April 13, 1999, the original date for the closing, the closing could not take place because the financing from the lending institution was not available, based upon the absence of a new power of attorney. Also, Mr. Lipkus had not made arrangements for the deposit monies to be at closing or forwarded a settlement statement to closing, which were both needed for the closing. Respondent contacted Mr. Lipkus by fax regarding the commission monies and the settlement statement, demanding both items in order for closing to take place. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Respondent demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Respondent was threatening to delay the closing unless she had the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Respondent was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Additionally, on the original closing date, closing was to take place at the office of the mortgage broker. Mr. Pribik, the Buyer, and the mortgage broker were present for the closing. Mr. Lipkus did not intend to attend, and did not attend, the closing. Since the commission monies were not available at closing, Mr. Pribik telephoned Mr. Lipkus and demanded that the commission monies be available and, told him that if not made available, the closing could not take place. In Mr. Pribik's opinion, the monies were needed for closing. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Mr. Pribik demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Mr. Pribik was threatening to delay the closing if he did not have the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Mr. Pribik was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Furthermore, for the first time, Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, during the telephone conversation, became aware of their disagreement as to the proper commission split, whether 60/40 or 70/30. Believing that Mr. Pribik would prevent a timely closing, Mr. Lipkus agreed to Mr. Pribik's split of 60/40. Closing occurred on April 14, 1999. The necessary documents and finances were present. At the final hearing, Respondent expressed with sincerity that, if she did anything wrong, she wanted to know exactly what it was, so that she would not engage in the same conduct again. Furthermore, Respondent expressed the frustration that, prior to hearing, no one had explicitly told her what she had done wrong and that, at hearing, she continued to be unsure what she had done wrong because she had not been explicitly told what she had done wrong. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Finding that Giovanna Gallottini did not violate Rule 61B-60.008(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Not sustaining the Notice to Show Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
The Issue The issue is whether Kenneth Baurley should be eligible to sit for the examination to become licensed as a real estate salesman.
Findings Of Fact On July 14, 1988, Mr. Baurley's application for licensure as a real estate salesman was received by the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission). By letter dated October 3, 1988, the Commission notified Baurley that his application had been denied based on his answer to question 6 on the application. In responding to that question, Mr. Baurley disclosed that he had been involved in two criminal proceedings; in both an adjudication of his guilt had been withheld. The first case arose in 1982 on the charge of battery on a law enforcement officer, for which he received 18 months of supervised probation. The incident had its genesis in a shoving match involving Baurley and someone who turned out to be an off-duty police officer for a small municipality. The second was in 1983 for the municipal offense of prowling. Although under no obligation to do so, Mr. Baurley also stated that he had been arrested for driving under the influence in 1988. He was found not guilty on the last charge, so it has no bearing on the decision in this case. Mr. Baurley's response to question 6 was complete and truthful. At the time of these incidents, Mr. Baurley was 19 and 20 years of age. He successfully completed his probation. He has had no further relevant contacts with the criminal justice system for more than five years. Mr. Baurley is now 26 years old. He has resided in Pompano Beach, Florida since 1972, although he attended college in Tallahassee. He is employed currently as President of A Better Limousine Service, Inc. and as a supervisor at Baurley Marine Works, Inc., which is owned by his father. Prior to his employment in these two positions, Mr. Baurley worked in a business established by his brother, Baurley "No Frills" Auto Rental. Before he held these positions, Mr. Baurley attended college in Tallahassee and worked at Doc's Sports Bar and Grill and at Forest Meadows Athletic Club. He was also an adjunct instructor at Florida State University where he taught Tae Ywon Do for college credit. In the course of his employment in the positions set out in Findings 6 and 7 above, Mr. Baurley has been required to interact with patrons, sometimes under difficult circumstances. In all the positions delineated in Findings 6 and 7 (other than the position as adjunct instructor at Florida State University) Mr. Baurley has been required to handle other people's money on at least a weekly basis. Most of the positions have required him to deal with his employers' or customers' money on a daily basis. Petitioner has performed all his employment responsibilities honestly and without incident. Darlene Vlazeny, a real estate salesperson and housewife, met Mr. Baurley in a business capacity by telephone in October, 1988. At that time Mrs. Vlazeny was soliciting in-kind contributions on behalf of a school for hearing impaired children. Mrs. Vlazeny testified that Mr. Baurley's was the only limousine company which agreed to her request to provide limousine services in connection with a benefit for the school at reduced rates. Since the school benefit, Mrs. Valzeny has had social contact with Mr. Baurley. She is aware of the incidents detailed in his answer to question number 6 on his licensure application, but believes he is trustworthy, honest and has a high moral character based on her experiences with Baurley. Mrs. Vlazeny would have no reservation about working with Mr. Baurley in any professional capacity. John Belegesky, a practicing attorney for more than 30 years, has known Mr. Baurley since he was a small boy. Baurley and Mr. Belegesky's son have been friends since grade school. Mr. Belegesky is also aware of Mr. Baurley's past and believes that the acts disclosed in the response to question number 6 to be out of character for him, and the result of youthful indiscretion. Mr. Belegesky trusts Petitioner to have a key to his home, which contains many valuables, and to houseset when he and his wife are away for weeks at a time. Mr. Belegesky would have no reservation about referring his clients, including major developers, to work with Mr. Baurley, if he is licensed. Mr. Belegesky believes Mr. Baurley possesses a high moral character and is honest and trustworthy. Mr. Baurley has matured and regrets his past actions. Mr. Baurley is honest and trustworthy and is of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Kenneth M. Baurley, be allowed to take the examination for licensure as a real estate salesman and if he passes the examination, be issued a real estate salesman license. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5537 The proposed findings of Mr. Baurley have generally been adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32802 Marion E. Baurley, Esquire 1025 Vermont Avenue, North West Suite 915 Washington, D.C. 20005 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32902
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Broker's Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At times prior to June 21, 1991, Respondent Bongiovi was licensed by Petitioner as a yacht broker. Respondent Bongiovi did not hold any license as a yacht broker at any time after June 21, 1991. Respondent AJB Yachts was not licensed as a yacht broker at any time pertinent to this proceeding. Respondent Bongiovi does business as AJB Yachts or AJB Yacht Sales, Inc. There was no evidence that AJB Yacht Sales, Inc., is legally incorporated. On various dates in September and October 1994, Respondent Bongiovi placed two separate advertisements in the classified ads section of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Sun-Sentinel newspaper. The first of these ads offered for sale a 41' Hatteras yacht for the sum of $150,000. The second of these advertisements offered for sale a 43" Portofino yacht for the sum of $125,000. Both advertisements contained the Respondent's telephone number, 305-942-7425. On or about May 28, 1993, Respondent, acting as a yacht broker, represented Charles Robbins in the purchase of a 66' Pacemaker yacht named the Sea Cow. The owner of the yacht, Dennis Gaultney, was represented by Mauch Yacht Sales, Inc., the listing broker. As part of the offer made by Mr. Robbins, he gave to Respondent Bongiovi a check in the amount of $33,000 as earnest money. Respondent Bongiovi deposited this money in a bank account at First Union National Bank of Florida, Pompano Beach branch on June 1, 1993. This account is entitled "AJB Yacht Sales, Inc., Escrow Account." Respondent Bongiovi was the sole signatory on this account. Respondent Bongiovi immediately began making withdrawals from this account that were not related to the Robbins transaction. 1/ As of June 10, 1993, the balance in this account was $29,575.54. As of June 21, 1993, the balance was $23,570.83. As of June 30, 1993, the balance was $21,554.04. Negotiations for the sale of the Sea Cow continued between the purchaser and the owner until July 20, 1993. The final version of the owner's proposal was a response to the last proposal made by Mr. Robbins and contained several changes to the last offer made by Mr. Robbins, including a change in the price of the vessel and an extension of the closing date to July 22, 1993. These changes were initialed by the owner of the boat, but they were not initialed by Mr. Robbins. Mr. Robbins never received a signed copy of the final proposal from the owner of the Sea Cow. A survey to evaluate the condition of the vessel was conducted and a copy of the inspection report faxed to Respondent Bongiovi by Jan Mauch of Mauch Yacht Sales on June 9, 1993. The transmittal note that accompanied the fax stated the following: "Here is the 'Schedule A' 2/ to go with the contract. After Charlie sees the survey, have him sign this and Acceptance of Vessel on contract and fax back both to me and I'll have Denny sign." Included in the inspection report was the following information: ". . . an engine inspection did not include a detailed mechanical inspection or test of components. A complete engine survey by a qualified mechanic is recommended in all cases." Mr. Robbins thereafter requested that Respondent Bongiovi arrange for an inspection of the vessel's engines before he accepted the vessel. Mr. Robbins never received an inspection report for the engines, he did not obtain his own financing for the vessel, and he never tendered the balance of the purchase price. The transaction involving Mr. Robbins did not timely close because the inspection of the engines were not completed. Because there was a delay in closing the transaction, the owner sold the yacht to another buyer. Neither Mr. Gaultney nor Mauch Yacht Sales demanded a portion of the $33,000 earnest money deposit. Mr. Robbins demanded the return of his money from the Respondent after he learned that the Sea Cow had been sold to another purchaser. Respondent Bongiovi refused to return the deposit and asserted the position that he was entitled to keep all of the deposit as liquidated damages because the transaction had not closed. Respondent Bongiovi relies on Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the form agreement for his contention that he was entitled to retain the $33,000 deposit as liquidated damages. Those provisions are as follows: The purchase of the vessel is subject to survey - seatrial - capt (sic) - inspection showing condition subject to purchasers (sic) sole judgment and approval to be conducted as soon as practicable after execution of this agreement at the option and expense of the PURCHASER. The PURCHASER shall give written acceptance or rejection of the Vessel by June 10, 1993, and if written notification is not received by the BROKER (A.J.B. Yacht Sales) on or before said date, it shall be construed as acceptance of the Vessel by PURCHASER. In the event, after written or construed acceptance of the Vessel, the PURCHASER fails to pay the balance of the purchase price and execute all papers necessary to be executed by him for the completion of his purchase, pursuant to the terms of this contract, on or before July 10, 1993, the sum this date paid shall be retained by A.J.B. Yacht Sales as liquidated and agreed damage and the parties shall be relieved of all obligations under this contract. In paragraph 2 of the agreement executed by Mr. Robbins on May 28, 1993, there was a provision that the offer submitted by Mr. Robbins was withdrawn if not accepted by June 5, 1993. There was no evidence that there was a final and complete agreement sufficient to bind the parties by June 5, 1993, or at any time thereafter. The agreement executed by Mr. Robbins on May 28, 1993, also contained the following provision: In the event that this sale is not consummated by reasons of unsatisfactory survey . . . the deposit shall be returned, providing all expenses incurred by the PURCHASER against the Vessel have been paid, and this agreement shall be null and void. Mr. Robbins verbally notified Respondent Bongiovi that he would require additional testing on the engine before accepting the vessel. Mr. Robbins did not receive the results of those additional tests and learned soon thereafter that the vessel had been sold to another purchaser. Following the failure and refusal of the Respondents to return the deposit, Mr. Robbins sued the Respondents in the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 772.11 and 812.014, Florida Statutes. Based on the evidence presented, the Circuit Judge in that civil proceeding entered a final judgement for treble damages ($99,000) in favor of Mr. Robbins and against the Respondents based, in part, on the following: . . . On the evidence presented, the Court finds: * * * Plaintiff (Mr. Robbins) gave Defendants (Mr. Bongiovi and his corporation) a check in the amount of $33,000.00 on May 28, 1993, to be held in escrow as a deposit pending accep- tance by the owner of a vessel for the purchase of said motor vessel. Said $33,000.00 was deposited into a bank account owned and/or controlled by Defendants. The owner of the vessel failed to accept Plaintiff's offer within the time provided in the written contract attached to the Amended Complaint; and, therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to return of his $33,000.00 deposit. Plaintiff demanded return of said $33,000.00 deposit, but Defendants failed and refused to return same, which sum has been due with interest since June 5, 1993. Defendants breached the Purchase Agree- ment on June 5, 1993, by failing and refusing to return Plaintiff's deposit of $33,000.00 when the offer to purchase the vessel was not accepted by the owner by that date. Defendants had a fiduciary responsibility to Plaintiff as escrow agents under the Purchase Agreement, and they breached their fiduciary responsibility by failing and refusing to return the $33,000.00 deposit when the offer to purchase the vessel was not accepted by the owner by June 5, 1993. . . .
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order in this proceeding that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law and which imposes an administrative fine jointly and severally against the Respondents in the amount of $10,000 for the violations of Count I and imposes an additional administrative fine jointly and severally against the Respondents in the amount of $10,000 for the violation of Count II. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1995.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined, for alleged violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in Administrative Complaint, dated December 4, 1981. This proceeding involves allegations by the Florida Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission) that Respondent, James R. Siebert, violated Subsection 475.25(1)(h) Florida Statutes, by sharing a commission with a person not properly licensed under the real estate law, and that he employed a person as a salesman who is not the holder of a valid license, in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(c) , Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The incident which prompted the Administrative Complaint involved an auction sale of a restaurant in Brooksville, Florida which was conducted by an auctioneer who did not have a license to practice real estate in Florida. Respondent requested an administrative hearing and filed an answer to the Administrative Complaint admitting the occurrence of the auction, but denying that it involved the sale of real estate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James L. Siebert, is a licensed real estate broker at Orange Lake, Florida, and was so licensed at all times relevant in this proceeding. (Stipulation) On several occasions prior to February 21, 1981, Respondent had gratuitously assisted Albert W. (Billy) Mitchell, an auctioneer, in conducting auctions by serving as a "ring man" and clerk. A "ring man" normally is one of several such individuals at an auction who assists the auctioneer by encouraging bidding and identifying bidders. Mitchell is not licensed under real estate laws of Florida, but operates under a local occupation license. None of the prior auctions in which Respondent assisted Mitchell involved the sale of real estate. (Testimony of Respondent, Mitchell) On January 28, 1981, Mitchell entered into an "auction sale contract" with Welberta Pruitt whereby Mitchell agreed to sell at auction to the highest and best bidder: . . . the following described business and personal property owned by the Party of the First Part: Pruitts Golden Wagon Steak House Restaurant and Contents on attached inventory list and located 1702 Howell Avenue, Brooksville, in Hernando County, State of Florida. The terms of this sale shall be 10 percent of the amount of the purchase price to be paid on day of sale and the balance to be paid as follows: On delivery of title - There is a mortgage on the business of $67,838.20 with interest at 8 3/4 percent on the unpaid balance. The attachment to the contract listed various items of food supplies and restaurant furniture and equipment, plus decorative items of personal property. Pruitt and her husband had purchased the real property on which the restaurant building was located under an agreement for deed in 1979 which provided that the Pruitts would make the payments on a mortgage of about $67,000 from the sellers to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Citrus County and, when such mortgage was paid in full, the sellers would convey title to the property by warranty deed. The contract reflected that the total purchase price of the property was $75,000, and that a down payment had been made in the sum of $7,000. Mrs. Pruitt owned furniture, fixtures and equipment which she transported from Tennessee to operate a restaurant on the premises. (Testimony of W. Pruit Kelly, Mitchell, Johnston, Respondent's Exhibits 1,2) It was the understanding of the parties to the auction agreement that only the personal property in and around the restaurant building would be sold to the highest bidder, and it was anticipated that the successful bidder would take up the mortgage payments on the real property. The equity which the Pruitts had acquired by prior mortgage payments was to be "given" to whoever purchased the "business" at the auction. Accordingly, on February 20, 1981, the day preceding the auction, Mrs. Pruitt issued a "notice" that she would sell her "entire Restaurant, business, furnishings, equipment, and Inventory at Public Auction". The notice further stated that she would give her equity in the real estate to the purchaser on which there was an existing mortgage of $67,821.36 "that you may assume". The noticewas placed on the door of the restaurant. In addition, Mitchell issued a brochure advertising the auction wherein it was stated that the "entire business, furnishings, equipment, and stock" would he sold at absolute auction and that the purchaser would have the "privilege of assuming the payments on the existing mortgage." Mitchell had Respondent's name placed at the bottom of the brochure without Respondent's knowledge because he thought it would be a good advertisement for him. (Testimony of Mitchell, W. Pruitt, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent's Exhibit 3) Mitchell asked Respondent to assist at the Pruitt auction and told him that since Mrs. Pruitt and her attorney were having a disagreement, it might be necessary for Respondent to write the contract resulting from the auction. No fee for Respondent's services was discussed prior to the auction. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent) On February 21, 1981, the auction was conducted at the restaurant in Brooksville, and Respondent was present to act as a "ring man". There were only about 3 individuals who entered bids at the auction. Prior to receiving bids, Mitchell announced that he was auctioning the contents of the business and that whoever bought the property would take over the payments on the mortgage. The successful bidder was Robert Shrader, who bid $9,600. He made a 20 percent down payment at the time in the amount of $1,920 which Mitchell retained as a commission on the sale. Mitchell had not described the real estate at the auction, but merely stated that he was auctioning the business and that Mrs. Pruitt would give the successful bidder her equity in the property. After accepting Schrader's bid, Mitchell gave the figures on the sale to Respondent who prepared a standard contract for sale and purchase of the real estate in the total amount of $77,421.36. The contract reflected a deposit of $1,920 to be held in escrow by Billy Mitchell and Associates, that the contract was subject to assumption of a mortgage of $67,821.36, and that there would be a balance of $7,680. Shrader and Mrs. Pruitt signed the agreement on February 21, 1981, which was witnessed by Mitchell and Respondent. Although no brokerage fee was listed, Respondent signed as broker on the contract. He testified at the hearing that he had done this out of habit. A real estate contract was prepared rather than merely a bill of sale of the personal property in order that the parties would have the figures they needed to close which they could take to the closing attorneys. After the auction, Mitchell gave Respondent $200 as a gift for his gasoline and other expenses on the Pruitt and prior auctions. Respondent testified, and Mitchell confirmed, that the latter insisted that he accept that amount as reimbursement for expenses. (Testimony of Mitchell, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On April 6, 1981, Joseph P. Johnston, an attorney in Brooksville, closed the transaction by means of a bill of sale for the furnishings and equipment in Pruitts restaurant, and assignment of the Pruitt interest in the mortgaged real property. The closing statement reflected that a "broker's commission" in the amount of $1,920 was held by the "broker" to apply on commission, In actuality, the sum retained by Mitchell as a commission was based solely upon a percentage of the personal property sold at auction. (Testimony of Johnston, Mitchell, Petitioner's Exhibit 2)
Recommendation That the Florida Real Estate Commission dismiss the charges against Respondent, James R. Siebert. DONE and ENTERED this 3d day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3d day of June, 1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harvey R. Klein, Esquire Klein & Klein 333 North West 3rd Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a Florida-licensed yacht salesman, should be disciplined for violation of Rule 61B- 60.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, DBPR, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (the Division) was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and discipline of yacht salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the yacht-brokering profession. Respondent, Justo Lamar (Lamar), has been licensed as a yacht salesperson since November 1976. Prior to this action, Lamar has never been the subject of disciplinary action arising out of the practice of his profession. This action was precipitated by a yacht owner, Juan A. Galan (Galan), who unsuccessfully attempted to sell his yacht to a client of Lamar's. In July 1998, Galan listed his yacht, the Caliente, for sale through Ardell Yacht and Ship Brokers (Ardell). The listing resulted in negotiations for the purchase of the Caliente by one Larry Griggs (Griggs), a prospective customer represented by Lamar. At all times relevant to this case, Lamar was acting as a sales agent for Allied Marine and its broker, Dwight Tracy (Tracy). As set forth in more detail below, the negotiations between Galan and Griggs took place over a three-month period from October 1998 through December 1998 with no meeting of the minds. On July 12, 1999, some seven months after negotiations between Griggs and Galan terminated, Galan lodged a complaint with DBPR. Although the complaint was ostensibly directed against salesman Lamar and broker Tracy, each and every allegation in the complaint was directed to the broker's conduct, not Lamar's. Galan, who did not testify at final hearing, alleged in his complaint that "Broker presented a contract representing that deposit had been received/deposited (upon acceptance). In fact, broker never deposited check and we wasted our time and money on survey/sea trial as buyer was not (at that time or any time later) financially capable of buying boat @ $1.75 million." Galan provided some, but by no means all, of the documents which revealed the details of the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between Galan and Griggs. In the narrative portion of his complaint, Galan asserted that he lost money on sea trials and implied, without actually stating, that the Caliente had been taken off the market during the pendency of negotiations with Griggs. For reasons which remain unclear, the Division did not focus its investigation on Tracy, who was the obvious target of Galan's complaint. Instead, it targeted Lamar, who was an obvious add-on target of Galan's ire. The exhibits reveal a complex series of offers and counteroffers and jockeying for negotiating advantage, not just between Galan and Griggs as prospective Seller and Buyer of the Caliente, but also between Lamar and the two brokers, all three of whom stood to profit if the transaction were consummated. Negotiations for the Caliente began in late October 1998. On October 30, 1998, Lamar's client Griggs, through a corporation he controlled, issued a $150,000 check for "Deposit, 72' (sic) Caliente Sportfisherman." This check accompanied a Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, offering to purchase the Caliente for $1,500,000. That same day, Galan's representatives faxed Lamar to advise that Griggs' offer was insufficient. Lamar forthwith provided the check to his broker, Tracy. Negotiations between Galan and Griggs continued in November. Galan chose to by-pass his own Broker and negotiate directly with Lamar over lunch on November 18, 1998. Lamar wrote Galan's demands on the back of a restaurant placemat. The primary sticking point was Galan's insistence on a "bottom line" of $1,665,000 to him, after all commissions and other expenses, if any, were paid. Griggs nevertheless persevered in his effort to buy the Caliente for $1,500,000. On November 24, 2000, Griggs executed another Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement in which he offered an entity called Majua, Inc., of which Galan was President, the opportunity to sell the Caliente to Griggs for $1,500,000. Galan signed the November 24 agreement, but added an addendum which materially changed the terms. The addendum unilaterally purported to raise the sales prices to Galan's previously stated "bottom line" of $1,665,000. Thanksgiving passed, and negotiations wore on. On December 4, 1998, Griggs executed a third Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement, raising his offer to $1,755,000. The new offer expressly stipulated that Griggs' $150,000 earnest money check could be deposited when and if all parties executed this new proposed agreement. Like the October 29 and November 24 brokerage purchase and sale agreements, the December 4 document never ripened into a contract. The December 4 document was a clear and unembarrassed reminder from Griggs that an earnest money check had been written by Griggs, but was not on deposit, and was not going to be on deposit until such time as Galan had signed off on the contract as written by Griggs. Galan nevertheless permitted a sea trial of the Caliente in furtherance of negotiations, now in their fifth week. Also as part of the negotiating process, Galan permitted some, but not all, of the inspections requested by Griggs. Expenses for the sea trial and inspections were borne entirely by Griggs. By Christmas Eve, relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point where Lamar retrieved the check from the Allied Marine corporate files and returned it to Griggs. At no time did negotiations with Lamar's client Griggs preclude or interfere with efforts by Galan to negotiate with and sell the Caliente to any other prospective purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DBPR enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2001.
The Issue On February 28, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued a Notice To Show Cause to Robert O'Brien (O'Brien) alleging that O'Brien violated Section 326.006(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. Specifically, O'Brien was charged with allowing an unlicensed person to attempt to sell a 52' Hatteras known as "Watermellon" on behalf of O'Brien Yacht Sales. The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. On May 15, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued an Amended Notice To Show Cause to David Sandmann (Sandmann) alleging that Sandmann violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Sandmann was charged with offering or negotiating to sell a 52' Hatteras, known as "Watermellon". The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT Petitioner filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes, states that: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence. A thorough review of the record has been made. The Division adopts and incorporates by reference the first sentence of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Petitioner's exceptions to the remainder of Finding of Fact number 15 are accepted because the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The second sentence, "The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat." is rejected because, the Petitioner presented testimony which proved that Sandmann: offered "to help" the Division investigators when they approached the boat. (T. 20, 38-39). gave the Division investigators a business card with his name and O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc. written on it. (T. 19, 38-19, 52)( P's Exh. 2) gave the Division investigators a spec sheet containing information about the boat. (T. 21, 32, 39, 52). (P's Exh. 3). told the Division investigators that the price of the boat was negotiable. (T 22, 29-30, 39-40, 52). told the Division investigators that the commission would be paid by the seller. (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43) had a copy of a blank sales contract faxed to him (from O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc.) at the boat show. (T. 22- 23, 41, 52) Also at Recommended Order, page 5, paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12. Additionally, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact that Respondent Sandmann was not offering or negotiating to sell the boat, because these actions were uncontroverted. Respondent Sandmann never denied that he was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. Furthermore, the sentence in question is not a Finding of Fact, but rather a Conclusion of Law. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of this as a Finding of Fact, does not make it so. In Hernicz v. State Dept. of Professional Reg., 390 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), facts were undisputed that a nurse practitioner had done certain acts, and when the Board concluded that the actions were a violation of the statute, the court held that that amounted to a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. The "facts" were the individual actions that were taken by the Respondent, whether these acts violated the statute was a Conclusion of Law. As stated above, the acts, themselves, in this case were neither denied nor disputed. The second sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The third sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 states that "[I]t is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts". The "expectation of receiving compensation" was the argument relied on by the Respondents at hearing as their defense to participating in the boat show. Because "compensation" is an integral part of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, its interpretation should be left to the expertise of the agency. It is a well settled principle that the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great weight, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985); Shell Harbor Grou, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 487 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Division believes that "compensation" can be other than a monetary commission, as claimed by Respondents. "Compensation" can be "perks" such as transportation or use of a house or yacht, or something intangible, such as friendship and affection. The existence of a quid pro quo is what is looked for. Furthermore, from a thorough reading of the record, it was proven by substantial competent evidence that a commission was anticipated being paid, because Petitioner's investigators were told that "the commission would be paid by the seller". (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43). Possibly, no monetary commission was paid to Sandmann, because the yacht did not sell. Regardless, the Division finds that the friendship between Mr. Mellon and Sandmann was adequate compensation under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The third sentence of Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The fourth sentence, "Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the `Watermellon' solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner", is also rejected. The Division does not dispute the long standing friendship of Respondent Sandmann and Mr. Mellon, however being someone's "friend", does not exempt them from Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. There was uncontroverted testimony that Respondent Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. That is all that is necessary for him to be within the jurisdiction of the Division, and require him to have a license. Although his friendship could be his motivation or compensation for being on the yacht, his actions, while there, show that he was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon". The fourth sentence of Finding of Fact Number 15 is stricken in its entirety. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner filed an Exception to Conclusion of Law number 23 contained in the Recommended Order. This conclusion stated that the Petitioner had failed to meet its burden as to Sandmann because it failed to establish that he was attempting to sell the yacht, and, if the case against Sandmann failed, then the case against O'Brien failed. The Division rejects this Conclusion of Law because it believes that Petitioner proved by substantial competent evidence that Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon", and that friendship is adequate compensation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that administers and enforces the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent O'Brien has been licensed as a Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent O'Brien owns and operates O'Brien Yacht Sales. Respondent O'Brien resides in and has his principal place of business in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Sandmann is a resident of Essex, Connecticut. He has never been licensed as a yacht salesman or as a yacht broker. Mr. Sandmann makes his livelihood as the owner of a dog collar manufacturing business. Henry Mellon, the boat's owner, held a salesman's license issued by Petitioner that expired in August 1994. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Mellon was not licensed by the Petitioner. Respondent Sandmann, Respondent O'Brien, and Mr. Mellon have been close friends for many years. Mr. Mellon formerly worked for O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon and Respondent Sandmann are old friends from college. The Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show permitted only new yachts or brokered yachts. Individuals were not supposed to sell boats in this show. Respondent O'Brien was aware of this restriction. In October 1995, Respondent O'Brien had the boat "Watermellon" displayed and listed for sale at the 36th Annual Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show. The asking price for the sale of the Watermellon was $425,000. Mr. Mellon is neither an officer or a director of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon signed a form styled "Application and Contract for Exhibit Space" so that the Watermellon could be exhibited at the boat show and on this application represented that he was a vice president of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Neither Respondent O'Brien or his company paid to put the Watermellon in the Boat Show and neither expected to receive any commission from the sale of the Watermellon. Respondent O'Brien was acting out of friendship with Mr. Mellon. 1/ On October 27, 1995, Peter Butler and Robert Badger, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, attended the Boat Show and went to the Watermellon. They observed a sign on the back of the boat that advised that the boat was being offered by O'Brien Yacht Sales and gave its telephone number. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger approached the boat and asked a person, later identified as Respondent Sandmann, whether Respondent O'Brien was aboard. Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that Respondent O'Brien was not aboard, asked if he could help them, and gave them a business card with his name and the name of O'Brien Yacht Sales on it. No licensed salesman was on board at this time, but Mr. Mellon, the owner of the boat, was aboard. 2/ Respondent Sandmann gave Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger a copy of a printed sheet containing basic information about the Watermellon. This sheet, referred to as a spec sheet, contained errors that Respondent Sandmann verbally corrected when he gave them the sheet. In response to questions, Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that the price of the boat was negotiable and that the commission would be paid by the seller. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger asked Respondent Sandmann if they could see a copy of the contract that a buyer would need to sign if he purchased the boat. In response, Respondent Sandmann contacted the O'Brien Yacht Sales office and had someone fax to him a copy of the contract used by O'Brien. Respondent Sandmann then gave the form contract to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger. The business card given by Respondent Sandmann to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger was printed in 1994 when Respondent Sandmann, who is fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian, accompanied Mr. Mellon to a boat show in Europe. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger did not inquire as to the amount of the commission that would have been paid by the seller of the Watermellon because Petitioner does not regulate commissions. None of Respondent Sandmann's acts, when considered individually, required a license from the Petitioner. 3/ The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat. It is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts. Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the Watermellon solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order as to these consolidated cases that dismisses the charges filed against these respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1996.
Findings Of Fact On May 29, 1977, petitioner Artur Zoelfel entered into a written agreement to buy the yacht Superior Queen from H-E-R Leasing Corporation "for the total sum of $125,000.00 (one hundred, twenty-five thousand dollars)." Petitioners' exhibit No. 1. H-E-R Leasing Corporation is not a licensed or registered dealer in Florida. An addendum to the contract, dated May 30, 1977, was signed by Artur Zoelfel but was not signed by anybody on behalf of H-E-R Leasing Corporation. Petitioners' exhibit No. 2. On June 16, 1977, an assistant secretary for maritime affairs in the United States Department of Commerce entered an order, No. MA-15079, approving the sale of the Superior Queen to "Artur Zolfel, a West German citizen, and the transfer of said vessel to Federal Republic of Germany registry and flag . . . upon the condition that there shall be no liens or encumbrances recorded against such vessel . . . at the time of its transfer . . ." Petitioners' exhibit No. 2. On June 27, 1977, an anonymous telephone caller told Bernard Frank Fox, respondent DOR's area supervisor in Broward County, that petitioner had bought the Superior Queen. As the result of investigation by other employees of respondent DOR, Mr. Fox concluded that this information was correct and set in motion events that culminated, on June 30, 1977, in a levy on the Superior Queen by the Broward County sheriff's office. At that time, respondent DOR claimed that fifty-two hundred dollars ($5,200.00) in tax was owed, on the assumption that the Zoelfels had paid the asking price for the Superior Queen, which had purportedly been one hundred thirty thousand dollars ($130,000.00). After the levy, one Paul C. Mueller approached Mr. Fox on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Zoelfel and represented to Mr. Fox that petitioners had purchased the Superior Queen for one hundred twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($112,500.00). On that basis respondent DOR accepted forty-five hundred dollars ($4,500.00) in satisfaction of its claim for tax, and the sheriff released the Superior Queen. As reflected by the bill of lading, petitioners exhibit No. 4, on August 2, 1977, petitioner Artur Zoelfel caused the Superior Queen to be loaded onto a freighter, M/S Finn Enso, in Tampa, Florida, bound for Hamburg, West Germany. Neither of the petitioners is a licensed exporter.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the notice of assessment be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Thomas E. Hunt, Esquire Suite 302, Building 2 3020 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Mr. Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Harry A. Bayly, Jr., a real estate salesman, obtained a listing for the Sails Motel in 1975, while he was employed by respondent Donald M. Mlinarich, a real estate broker. Mr. Perz, at that time co-owner with his wife of the Sails Motel, showed Mr. Bayly a piece of paper on which he had written figures which he claimed represented gross income earned and expenses incurred on account of the Sails Motel. At the same time, Mr. Perz told Mr. Bayly that the figures on the piece of paper did not agree with federal income tax returns, or with state sales tax returns which Mr. Perz had filed. Mr. Perz told Mr. Bayly that income from the motel was understated on the tax returns, but that the figures he alleged were accurate could be substantiated by examining the motel's registration slips. The discrepancy between the gross income figure reported for tax purposes for 1974 and the gross income figure Mr. Perz gave Mr. Bayly for 1974 was twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00). Mr. Bayly did not tell Mr. Mlinarich about the double bookkeeping at the Sails Motel. Mr. Charles George was also a real estate salesman in Mr. Mlinarich's office. Mr. George procured a purchaser for the Sails Motel, one Anton K. P. Loetschert, who signed a duly witnessed agreement to buy the motel. Before the transaction closed, however, Mr. Loetschert appeared at the Sails Motel, accompanied by an accountant, and asked to see the motel's books. Learning for the first time of the dual bookkeeping, Mr. Loetschert indicated his unwillingness to go through with the purchase. Even though the deal fell through, the broker's office obtained five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) in satisfaction of its claim for commission on the sale. Mr. Mlinarich caused half of this sum to be paid to Mr. George, in accordance with a standing agreement between Mr. Mlinarich and each of his employees. Under the same standing agreement, Mr. Bayly, because he had secured the listing, had presented Mr. Loetschert's offer, and had otherwise assisted in the transaction, was entitled to one fifth of any commission, or one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). By letter dated September 23, 1975, Mr. Bayly demanded this sum, but Mr. Mlinarich refused payment at that time, on the advice of counsel. In addition to the circumstances surrounding the Sails Motel transaction, Mr. Mlinarich related the following facts to his lawyer which were proven to be true at the hearing: On at least two occasions, Mr. Bayly added provisions to listing contracts of which he did not inform Mr. Mlinarich, so that Mr. Mlinarich was lead to believe and did believe that the property owners involved had agreed to pay a broker's fee if the property were sold within 180 days of listing, while in actuality the owners contractual obligations were subject to termination earlier, and were in fact terminated early. Mr. Bayly accomplished this by writing additional contract clauses in his own hand on the sellers' copies of the contracts, while taking care that his handwriting did not appear on the realtor's carbon copies. Mr. Mlinarich and the other salesmen in his office advertised the properties and took other steps in the mistaken belief that the property owners were legally bound for the full 180 days. Mr. Mlinarich's lawyer advised him that he had a claim against Mr. Bayly for damages in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and told Mr. Mlinarich he need not pay Mr. Bayly his share of the commission settlement, for that reason. Shortly after Mr. Mlinarich learned that Mr. Loetschert wanted his earnest money back, he advised Mr. George Illi, an investigator for the Florida Real Estate Commission, of the details of the Sails Motel transaction. Mr. Mlinarich kept Mr. Illi posted as matters developed, through and including the time of the dispute between over payment of the one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). Altogether, Mr. Mlinarich spoke to Mr. Illi, on the telephone and in person, between five and ten times. He kept Mr. Illi fully apprised of every detail, including his lawyer's advice to pay Bayly. When the administrative complaint was filed against Mr. Mlinarich, he caused Mr. Bayly to be paid one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in full satisfaction of Mr. Bayly's claim.
Recommendation It is strongly recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of April, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles E. Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Emerson L. Parker, Esquire 3835 Central Avenue Post Office Box 15339 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733
