Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Lydia Miller, ran for election to the Hillsborough County Commission, District 4, in 1992. It was her first campaign for election to public office. She declared her candidacy in September, 1991, and appointed her husband as her campaign treasurer and herself as deputy campaign treasurer. She ran as a Republican and had several Republican opponents in the primary. She did not have the backing of the Republican Party and had difficulty attracting financial support, especially at first. Of necessity, she ran a "grass roots" campaign and spent countless hours going door-to-door in her district asking for support and, when possible, making public appearances. She also tried to capitalize on the "grass roots" nature of her campaign. Trying to emulate a campaign technique that worked for Governor Lawton Chiles, she pledged that she would not accept financial contributions in excess of $100 (versus the $500 statutory maximum) and would not accept financial contributions (or endorsements) from "special interests." To substantiate the strength of her "grass roots" campaign, the Respondent saw value in her campaign treasurer's reports showing as large a number of relatively small contributions from individuals. In all, the Respondent raised less than $14,000. Yet, she was able to survive the first primary, win the second primary, and beat her Democrat opponent in the general election. Cash Not Deposited or Reported The Respondent admitted that she accepted a $20 cash contribution from Irene Herring and put it in her campaign's petty cash without reporting it in her campaign treasurer's reports. Herring made two other cash contributions to the Respondent's campaign- -one in the amount of $20 and another in the amount of $30. Neither contribution was reported. Both contributions were given to Susie Farmer, a campaign worker. Similarly, David Gill contributed between $50 and $100 cash to the Respondent's campaign, but the contribution was not reported. This contribution also was given to Susie Farmer. The Respondent denied specific knowledge of the two other cash contributions from Herring and the cash contribution from Gill. The only evidence which could support a finding that the Respondent knew of them was testimony of Larry Sweat, an aide the Respondent hired after her election but fired three months later. From an evaluation of the testimony of the Respondent and Sweat, taking into account all of the relevant evidence as well as their demeanor and overall credibility, and it is found that Sweat's testimony was not sufficient to overcome the Respondenet's denials by a preponderance of the evidence. By her own admission, however, it would not have been unusual for the Respondent to use small cash contributions (or allow and approve their use) to replenish her campaign's petty cash without reporting them in her campaign treasurer's reports. It certainly is possible that the other two cash contributions from Herring and the cash contribution from Gill were handled in that manner. The Respondent was aware that all contributions had to be deposited in her campaign account and reported in her campaign treasurer's report. Yet, for reasons not fully explained in her testimony, the Respondent also thought that it was permissible to use small cash contributions to replenish her campaign's petty cash. It is possible that the Respondent misread or misunderstood the election campaign financing laws dealing with petty cash and the reporting of expenditures from petty cash. See Conclusions of Law 79 through 81, below. The Respondent certainly was not handling the small cash contributions that way to "beef up" her campaign treasurer's reports. Cash Deposited and Reported But Donor Allegedly Unknown The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports show the following cash contributions: $100 from Phillip Preston on August 17, 1992 $ 90 from Robert Preston on August 17, 1992 $100 from Kelley Preston on August 22, 1992 Robert, Kelley, and Phillip are the minor children of Allen and Rosina Preston, aged 16, 4, and 2. It is possible but improbable that Robert donated $100 of his own cash to the Respondent's campaign; it is all but impossible that Kelley or Phillip did. The Prestons were supporters of the Respondent and contributors to her campaign. The Respondent's Sun City Center campaign headquarters was in office space donated by Allen Preston. The offices of Preston's business also was in the same building. Allen Preston often visited the campaign headquarters and helped with the campaign, in addition to his financial contributions. Yet, Preston denied donating $290 cash in the names of his children. Preston does not think his wife would have done so without telling him, but his wife did not testify. The Respondent denies any specific knowledge concerning the $290 in cash contributions attributed to the Preston children. But it would not have been unusual for Susie Farmer or other campaign workers to leave cash contributions with "Post-It" notes attached to identify the donors. The campaign treasurer's reports normally would be prepared using the information on the "Post-It" notes. Especially in the days leading up to the three elections, the campaign headquarters became hectic and confused, and it is possible that incorrect information inadvertently was placed on the "Post-It" notes for these cash contributions. When the Respondent saw cash contributions from the Preston children in preparing or reviewing reports, she would not have questioned the accuracy of the information. She would have assumed that the Prestons had made the donations in the names of their children. She did not think there was anything wrong with adults making campaign contributions in the names of their minor children. She denies intentionally misreporting the contributions in order to hide contributions from Allen and Rosina Preston, or their businesses, or artificially to "beef up" the number of small contributions reflected in her campaign treasurer's reports. The evidence was not sufficient to overcome the Respondenet's denials by a preponderance of the evidence. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also show a $25 cash contribution from Evelyn Ackerman on October 14, 1992. The parties stipulated in their Joint Prehearing Stipulation that Ackerman is an elderly woman on a fixed income and that Ackerman denies making the contribution. But the Respondent has a specific recollection that Ackerman offered the contribution, that the Respondent tried to decline in view of Ackerman's meager financial means, and that Ackerman insisted. It is found that the Respondent's testimony outweighs the statements from Ackerman, who has been know to hallucinate and whose memory may not be trustworthy. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also showed a $100 cash contribution from Henry Farmer on October 18, 1992. Henry Farmer denies making the contribution and does not believe that his wife, Susie, would have donated $100 cash in his name without telling him. Susie did not testify, but she was an enthusiastic supporter, campaign worker and fund-raiser for the Respondent's campaign, and it certainly is possible that she donated the cash in her husband's name without his knowing it. Regardless of the actual source of the cash, the Respondent testified to her recollection of seeing a $100 cash contribution with a "Post-It" notes attached indicating that it was from Henry Farmer. She indicated that she had no reason to think it was not a contribution from Susie's husband, and it would not have been unreasonable for the Respondent to believe, without question, that the information on the "Post-It" note was accurate. The evidence was not sufficient to overcome the Respondent's testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent knew her campaign treasurer's report of the $100 cash contribution from Henry Farmer was not accurate. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports also showed a $100 cash contribution from Marie Schrag on October 18, 1992. Neither she nor her husband made the contributions. The Respondent did not testify to any specific recollection about the Schrag contribution. But Schrag was Allen Preston's bookkeeper and worked in the same building of Preston's where the Respondent's Sun City Center campaign headquarters was. Although she was not an active campaign worker for the Respondent, she did type one letter for the campaign, and her husband stuffed envelopes for the campaign on at least one occasion. In addition, she had been friends with Susie Farmer, one of the Respondent's most successful fund-raiser, for over 20 years. If the Respondent saw a $100 cash contribution with a "Post-It" notes attached indicating that it was from Marie Schrag, she would have had no reason not to believe, without question, that the information on the "Post-It" note was accurate. The evidence did not prove that the Respondent knew her campaign treasurer's report of the $100 cash contribution from Marie Schrag was not accurate. Alleged Business Contributions Allegedly Falsely Reported From Individuals The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a June 1, 1992, contribution in the amount of $25 from "Phil Boggs, Occupation (if over $100), Boggs Jewelry," when the check was written on the account of Boggs Jewelry, and signed by Phil R. Boggs. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Boggs contribution was reported. When the Respondent pledged not to take financial contributions or endorsements from "special interests," she did not intend to indicate that she would not accept financial support from any businesses or corporations. (In her mind, "special interests" meant political action committees, not any and all businesses and corporations.) The Respondent does not know Phil Boggs, and Boggs Jewelry had no business before the County Commission during the Respondent's term. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Boggs contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Boggs contribution or make it look like it was coming from Boggs, individually, instead of the business, Boggs Jewelry. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 2, 1992, in the amount of $25 from "Charles Hostetter, Occupation (if over $100), Fisher Beauty Salon," when the check was written on the account of Fisher's Beauty Salon, and signed by Charles Hostetter. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Hostetter contribution was reported. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Hostetter contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Hostetter contribution or make it look like it was coming from Hostetter, individually, instead of the business, Fisher's Beauty Salon. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 22, 1992, in the amount of $25 from "Charles Bingham, Occupation (if over $100), c/o Floral Decor Florist," when the check was written on the account of Floral Decor Florist, and signed by Charles Bingham. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Bingham contribution was reported. Bingham is a personal friend of the Respondent and personally gave the check to the Respondent. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Bingham contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Bingham contribution or make it look like it was coming from Bingham, individually, instead of the business, Floral Decor Florist. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on June 24, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "John Williams Coppes Kitchen, Occupation (if over $100), Owner," when the check was written on the account of Williams Kitchens & Baths, Inc. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the John Williams contribution was reported. The Respondent knows Williams's business as "John Williams Coppes Kitchens," the name on the business's signage. (Coppes is the name of the brand Williams sells.) The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the John Williams contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the John Williams contribution or make it look like it was coming from Williams, individually, instead of the business, whether known as Williams Kitchens & Baths, Inc., or as John Williams Coppes Kitchens. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on August 16, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "Ann Williams, Guys & Dolls," when the check was written on the account of Guys 'N Dolls of Brandon, Inc., and signed by Ann Williams. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Ann Williams contribution was reported. Ann Williams is the Respondent's regular hairdresser and personally gave the check to the Respondent at the beauty parlor. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Ann Williams contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Ann Williams contribution or make it look like it was coming from Ann Williams, individually, instead of the business, Guys 'N Dolls of Brandon, Inc. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on September 12, 1992, in the amount of $50 from "Martha Simmons, Tropical Fish Farms," when the check was written on the account of Gerald Simmons Tropical Fish Farm, and signed by Martha Simmons. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Simmons contribution was reported. The Simmonses were neighbors of the Farmers. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Simmons contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Simmons contribution or make it look like it was coming from Martha Simmons, individually, instead of the business, Gerald Simmons Tropical Fish Farm. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on September 23, 1992, in the amount of $50 from Tommy Brock, when the check was written on the account of Brock Farms, and signed by Tommy Brock. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Tommy Brock contribution was reported. The Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Brock contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Brock contribution or make it look like it was coming from Tommy Brock, individually, instead of the business, Brock Farms. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 15, 1992, in the amount of $100 from William Stearns, when the check was written on the account of F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc., and signed by William Stearns. If the Respondent had carefully compared check to the report, she probably should have known that the Stearns contribution was not reported properly. The check arrived in the mail, and there was no reason to think it was not from the F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc. Nonetheless, the Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Stearns contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Stearns contribution or make it look like it was coming from Williams Stearns, individually, instead of the business, F.E. Stearns Peat Co., Inc. It just as easily could have been a mistake or oversight. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 15, 1992, in the amount of $100 from "William Bishop, c/o L.L. Corporation," when the check was written on the account of Leslie Land Corporation, signed by William Bishop, with the "memo": "William L. Bishop." If she had carefully compared check to the report, the Respondent probably should have known that the Leslie Land Corporation contribution was not reported properly. However, the "memo" on the check indicated "William L. Bishop," and the report gave Bishop's address as "c/o L. L. Corporation." It was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Leslie Land Corporation contribution or make it look like it was coming from William Bishop, individually, instead of the business, Leslie Land Corporation. It is just as possible that the intention was to include all of the information on the check for full disclosure and that the initials "L. L." were used instead of the full name of the Leslie Land Corporation by mistake or oversight, or to compress all of the information into the limited space allotted on the report form. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 22, 1992, in the amount of $100 from the "Bill Kincaid Company," when the check was written on the account of the Kincaid Company, and signed by William F. Kincaid. The Respondent reasonably did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Kincaid contribution was reported. All the report did was provide the additional information of Kincaid's first name, along with the company name. It was not proven that the Respondent was trying to hide the true source of the Kincaid contribution or make it look like it was coming from Kincaid, individually, instead of from the Kincaid Company. The Respondent also reasonably did not perceive the Kincaid contribution to have come from a "special interest." The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 29, 1992, in the amount of $50 from Kenneth Wetherington, when the check was written on the account of the Morgan and Wetherington Chiropractic, and signed by Kenneth Wetherington. The Respondent did not think there was anything wrong with the way the Wetherington contribution was reported. She thought that a chiropractor in partnership with other chiropractors acted in his own behalf when making a political contribution, even when writing a partnership check. Although the Respondent probably incorrectly reported this contribution, the Respondent reasonably did not perceive the Wetherington contribution to have come from a "special interest," and it was not proven that the Respondent intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the Wetherington contribution or make it look like it was not coming from the partnership of Morgan and Wetherington Chiropractic. The Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports listed a contribution on October 28, 1992, in the amount of $100 from Paul Rozeman, when the check was written on the account of the McCaw Communications of Florida, Inc., and signed by someone other than Rozeman. (The signature was illegible, and it could not be identified through testimony.) However, the check was delivered by Rozeman, who worked in McCaw's local office, and who introduced himself to the Respondent. Although McCaw Communications is a large corporation, the Respondent was not familiar with it and was willing to assume that the contribution was from Rozeman's company and to decided err on the side of using his name. Obviously, her assumption was incorrect, and the report was in error. In any event, the Respondent probably should have known that the contribution was not reported properly. (See Finding of Fact 36, above.) But the evidence did not prove that the Respondent was lying, and that she actually perceived McCaw Communications to be a "special interest," and intentionally was trying to hide the true source of the contribution and make it look like it was coming from Rozeman, individually, instead of from McCaw Communications. In all, the Respondent's campaign treasurer's reports that were admitted in evidence listed 216 separate contributions. ($3,052 in cash and check contributions and $1615.80 of in-kind contributions would have been listed in earlier reports that were not admitted in evidence.) Of the 216 separate contributions, 31 (aside from the ones discussed in paragraphs 15 through 43, above) unambiguously and properly listed the contributions as coming from corporations, businesses or organizations. Contributions Allegedly Over $100 And Falsely Reported As Several $100 Contributions On or about October 5, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $500 check on the account of, and signed by Allen Preston, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being a $100 contribution from each of the five family members: Allen; his wife, Rosina; and their three children, Robert, Kelley, and Phillip. On or about September 3, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $300 check on the account of Aquarius Water Refinery, Inc., and signed by Joe Gaskill, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being a $100 contribution from him, another $100 contribution from his wife, and another $100 contribution from his company, Aquarius Water Refinery, Inc. On or about September 3, 1992, the Respondent's campaign received a $200 check on the account of Care Animal Hospital, Inc., and signed by Richard Kane, a veterinarian and the corporation's president, with explicit instructions to consider it and report it as being one $100 contribution from him and another $100 contribution from his corporation. The Respondent did not specifically request that the Preston, Gaskill and Kane contributions be considered and reported as being several contributions of $100. Preston, Gaskill and Kane all were aware of the Respondent's campaign pledge to limit contributions to $100, and it was their desire and intention not to cause the Respondent to violate the pledge. The Respondent did not think it was improper or illegal or inaccurate to reports the Preston, Gaskill and Kane contributions as requested. It appears that the Petitioner has issued an advisory opinion that contributions in excess of the statutory maximum by check drawn on a joint account only can be divided into smaller contributions from more than one account holder if all of the donors sign the check. (The Petitioner's investigator testified to the existence of such an advisory opinion, but none was admitted in evidence at the hearing. The Petitioner attached to its proposed recommended order a copy of what purports to be its advisory opinion on the subject, designated DE 93-10, but technically the advisory opinion still is not in evidence in this case.) But there is no evidence that the advisory opinion was furnished to the Respondent or that she was aware of it. If the Respondent were aware of the advisory opinion, she should at least have been on notice to inquire whether it was permissible to report the contributions as she did. But it still would not have been clearly impermissible. Allegedly False Termination Report And Improper Disposition of Surplus Funds The deadline for submission of the Respondent's termination campaign treasurer's report was 90 days after the general election, or Monday, February 1, 1993. As the deadline approached, the Respondent reasonably thought she needed two things in order to file the termination report: first, the January, 1993, bank statement on the campaign account; and, second, the resolution of a dispute she had with the phone company (GTE of Florida, Inc., or GTE) about charges on bills she received after having the campaign headquarters phone disconnected. On the weekend before the termination report was due, the Respondent attempted to obtain the bank statement but was told that it just had been put in the mail and could not be regenerated by the bank's computer at that time. The bank personnel advised the Respondent to wait until the statement arrived in the mail. Without the bank statement, the Respondent reasonably could not prepare the termination report before the deadline. She asked officials at the local elections supervisor's office for advice and was told to write a note explaining the reasons why she could not meet the deadline. She wrote a note dated February 1, 1993, stating that she "could not report on the closing of my campaign account until I received the final Banking Statement." It is found that the note was truthful and that she did not have the January, 1993, bank statement at the time she wrote it. Testimony from Larry Sweat to the effect that the Respondent came into her office that day and gave him the bank statement to hide in a drawer is rejected as false or mistaken. The Respondent did not receive the bank statement in the mail until later that week. It is possible, as testified by Sweat, that he and the Respondent had a discussion to the effect that it was to the Respondent's advantage that her termination report would not be available for public scrutiny on the deadline, along with the reports of other candidates (assuming they were filed on time). But it is as likely, or more likely, that Sweat thought of the fortuitous side- benefit of filing late. In any event, it is found that the Respondent did not intentionally file late in order to reap the perceived side-benefit that might have been discussed. It is possible that, when the January, 1993, bank statement was received in the mail, the Respondent brought it into the office and gave it to Sweat to keep in his desk drawer until she was in a position to prepare the termination report. (The dispute with the telephone company still was not resolved.) But it is found that, contrary to Sweat's testimony, the Respondent did not give the bank statement to Sweat to "hide" in his desk drawer. On February 18, 1993, the Respondent filed the termination report. It showed a January 6, 1993, check on the campaign account (check number 1070) in the amount of $88.45, made out to cash. The check memo stated, "petty cash reimbursement," but the report clarified that the cash actually was paid to the Respondent and two others for the purchase of party goods for the celebration of the Respondent's victory in the general election. The February 18, 1993, termination report also showed that a February 16, 1993, check for $48.95 to GTE of Florida (check number 1072) "on account, balance due in dispute" was written on the campaign account on the day of the report. The report also showed a zero balance in the account. Check number 1072 never was presented to the bank, and its whereabouts is not known. The Petitioner contends that check number 1072 and the disputed telephone bill were fabrications to cover the improper disbursement of $48.95 of surplus to the Respondent. But the check just as easily could have been lost or, for some reason, simply not presented to the bank for payment. Besides, as reflected in the following Findings of Fact, the evidence was clear both that there was in fact a dispute regarding the GTE bill and that the $48.95 was not disbursed to the Respondent in February, 1993. The Petitioner presented the GTE telephone records for the Respondent's campaign office telephone account in an apparent attempt to prove that, as of November 10, 1992, there was only a $1.02 balance on the account and that GTE was not pursuing collection of the $1.02. But, while only a $1.02 balance appeared on the campaign telephone account as of November 10, 1992, approximately $154.68 was transferred at that time from the campaign telephone account to the Respondent's personal home telephone account. It was the transferred charges that the Respondent was disputing. For reasons not apparent from the record, on or about December 10, 1992, GTE reduced the balance transferred to the Respondent's home phone bill to $131.37. Apparently, GTE further reduced the transferred balance to $84.09 on December 19, 1992; again, no explanation for the further reduction is apparent. The $84.09 charge remained on the GTE records at least until an entry on one of the records indicating that GTE wrote it off as uncollectible on or about February 12, 1993. Although the records include the notation dated February 12, 1993, indicating that GTE was writing off the $84.09 charge as being uncollectible, the Petitioner did not call a witness from GTE to explain the GTE records, and the records presented at the hearing do not go beyond the February 12, 1993, entry. It is not clear from the records that GTE stopped soliciting payment of the charge at that time. On May 12, 1993, the Respondent filed an amended termination report showing a March 30, 1993, disbursement to the Respondent in the amount of $36.95 for reimbursement for partial payment of the campaign's GTE bill. It also attached a copy of the March 31, 1993, bank statement on the campaign account showing a beginning balance as of March 1, 1993, in the amount of $36.95 and one withdrawal/debit in the same amount during the month, for a zero balance at the end of the month. The Respondent testified that she paid the $84.09 charge in June, 1993. Unfortunately, the Respondent's testimony was not corroborated by any records. But the GTE records presented by the Petitioner did not go beyond February 12, 1993, and without testimony from a witness from GTE, they were insufficient to disprove the Respondent's contention that she paid the charge in June, 1993. If the June, 1993, payment date is correct, the amended termination report filed on or about May 12, 1993, would indicate that the Respondent disbursed the $36.95 balance of the campaign account (representing the $48.95 she thought she had paid to GTE on or about February 16, 1993, less a $12 bank service charge for February, 1993) to herself on or about March 30, 1993, believing that there still was a disputed $84.09 charge to GTE, and that she held the money pending resolution of the disputed charge. When she paid the GTE charge, she considered the March 30, 1993, disbursement to herself to be reimbursement for her payment of the GTE charge. The Respondent knew or should have known that it was improper to disburse surplus from the campaign account to herself, except to reimburse her own contributions to her campaign. But, according to the Respondent's testimony, she did not consider the $36.95 payment to herself to be "surplus" since she considered there to be an outstanding disputed liability to GTE.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent, Lydia Miller. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6612 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. First sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is conclusion of law. 2.-3. Last two sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last two sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (Rather, she complied with the donors' instructions as to the source of the donations and how to report them.) First sentence, rejected as argument. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent willfully filed false reports. As to Ackerman, rejected as not proven that the report was inaccurate. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven that he admitted his wife did not make the contribution. (He said it was possible that she made it but he does not think she did.) Second sentence, rejected as not proven as to Ackerman but otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Third sentence, rejected as not proven that she said Suzie Farmer was responsible; the Respondent admitted to handling the Ackerman contribution and testified that said that someone, quite possibly Farmer, attached an explanatory "Post-It" note to the other cash contributions. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Third, fifth and last sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent willfully made false reports. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. First, sixth penultimate and ultimate sentences, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as not proven. (A review shows that she usually followed Barr's advice although not in each and every case.) Penultimate sentence, rejected as not proven as to petty cash. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Third sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Penultimate and ultimate sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First and last sentences, ejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First, sixth, seventh and eighth sentences, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven as to petty cash. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. Third paragraph, fourth sentence (that the small size of the individual alleged "masked" cash donations makes the allegation "absurd"), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The point of the Petitioner's argument that a single fairly large cash contribution--which could have been in addition to reported contributions--could have been "masked" by fabricating many small cash contribution.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. Second paragraph, first sentence (that the dispute concerned check #1072), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Third paragraph, first sentence, rejected in part (omission of January, 1993, bank statement as a cause of initial delay) as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and in part (the Respondent's first campaign and the amounts involved) as irrelevant on the issue whether she willfully violated the law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: David R. Westcott, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Elections The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ralph C. Stoddard, Esquire Hampton, Stoddard, Griffin & Runnells 915 Oakfield Drive, Suite F Brandon, Florida 33511 Carlos Alvarez, Chairman Florida Elections Commission Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Miami-Dade Community College, has adopted a statement of agency policy in violation of Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 2, 2002, the Respondent employed the Petitioner, Lonny Ohlfest. At the time of his termination, the Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing with the Respondent to challenge his termination from employment. The Petitioner challenged the basis for his termination as he wanted to clear his name regarding some unflattering allegations but, equally important, he wanted to keep his job with MDC. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing and found that the Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing. More specifically, the Respondent concluded that since the Petitioner did not have a contract of employment he was not entitled to an administrative hearing. The Petitioner disputed the Respondent's claim and argued that he did have a contract, that he had a reasonable expectation that his employment would continue, and that the Respondent unlawfully refused to afford him regress through the administrative process. When the Petitioner's appeal of his request for an administrative hearing failed, he filed the instant case to challenge the Respondent's policy of not referring administrative cases for formal hearing. The delays in the appeal process explain and support the Petitioner's delay in filing the instant challenge to the agency's alleged rule. To understand the historical perspective of this case, the following findings are made pertinent to the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent: The Petitioner began employment with the MDC on or about April 4, 2001. He was hired as a part-time, hourly worker within the school of allied health technologies. The position he assumed was funded and operated within the "Health Careers Opportunities Program" or HCOP. The HCOP was funded by a federal grant. The monies coming from the grant were renewable each year and ran concurrent with the school's fiscal year (July 1-June 30). All employees paid through the HCOP grant were considered "temporary" as the grant monies were necessary to assure continued employment. In January 2002 the Petitioner was given a full-time position within the HCOP. He was designated "Program Leader/Student Services" for the upcoming summer bridge program. At all times material to this case, all parties knew that absent federal funding the HCOP would not continue to operate. Moreover, the Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his employment with the Respondent would run only until June 30, 2002. Thereafter, it was expected that if and when the federal funding came through, the HCOP employees (including the Petitioner) would continue to work within the scope of the program. At the end of the summer program in 2001, the HCOP employees took leave until the school year started and the funding of the program was assured. Accordingly, after the summer bridge program was completed, the Petitioner expected to be on leave during the summer of 2002 until called back to work. Instead, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment. The 2002 summer bridge program had not finished well for the Petitioner. Amid allegations of sexual harassment (unsubstantiated and not at issue in this proceeding) the Petitioner's working relationship within the HCOP floundered. The Petitioner was aghast that unsubstantiated claims had been reported, he wanted the accusations resolved, he wanted his name cleared, and he was disappointed by the process that failed to timely and fully resolve the issues. When the Petitioner left the campus for what he believed would be the break (similar to the one they had taken the prior year), he was uncertain as to his employment status. In fact, when he left the campus he cleaned out his desk and returned his keys. Nevertheless, on July 26, 2002, Dr. Miller directed the Petitioner to present for work on July 29, 2002. He did not do so. On July 29, 2002, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor directed him to appear for work on July 30, 2002. He did not do so. In fact, the Petitioner did not return to the office until July 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not understand that his attendance was mandatory for the two days that he did not appear for work. When the Petitioner did check in with the HCOP office on the 31st he came to understand the gravity of the situation. As a result of the absences, the Respondent cited the Petitioner with insubordination and terminated his employment with MDC. The Petitioner timely challenged the termination but the Respondent ruled he was not entitled to an administrative review of the decision. The Petitioner filed for, and received, unemployment compensation. The termination was not justified by the standards applicable to that forum. The rules governing unemployment compensation do not, however, govern the administrative process regarding whether or not one's employment constitutes a property interest that is protected by law. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's petition seeking an administrative review, the Respondent declined to afford the Petitioner with a hearing. The Respondent does not forward petitions filed by non- contract employees when such individuals seek to challenge their termination of employment. The Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, they are not required to forward such petitions for formal review. The Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are not entitled to administrative review when their employment is terminated. Conversely, the Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are entitled to an administrative review when their employment is terminated. The Petitioner was not a full-time, contract employee of the Respondent. The Respondent's policy affords full-time contractual personnel a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption as a charitable institution or as a military museum fundraiser within the respective meanings of Sections 212.08(7)(o)2.b or (l), Florida Statutes (1997). (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a non-profit corporation incorporated in Florida. Respondent is the state agency responsible for the issuance of certificates of exemption from sales and use tax in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 212. Petitioner applied for a certificate of exemption on December 22, 1997. On April 22, 1998, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The application and denial are based on information from Petitioner's 1997 tax year. Petitioner is not a charitable organization within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b. Petitioner is qualified as a nonprofit corporation pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. However, Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that its sole or primary purpose satisfies the requirements of Section 212.07(o)2.b. and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.001(3)(g). (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code on the date of this Recommended Order.) Petitioner failed to show that in 1997 it provided a reasonable percentage of the services enumerated in Sections 212.08(7)(o)2.b.(I)-(VII) for free, or at a substantially reduced charge, to persons who are unable to pay for those services. Petitioner did not show that it raised funds for organizations that provide a reasonable percentage of the statutorily qualified services for free, or at a substantially reduced charge, to persons who are unable to pay for those services. Petitioner asserts that it provides some portion of its computer time for qualified services and that Petitioner provides volunteers for other qualified services. However, Petitioner failed to show the value of the computer time, admitted that the value of the computer does not satisfy the 50 percent test in Rule 12A-1.001(3)(g), and was unable to quantify the amount or value of its volunteer services. Petitioner failed to show that it complied with the requirements of Rule 12A-1.001(3)(g). Petitioner did not show that more than 50 percent of its expenditures in 1997 directly related to statutorily qualified services provided by Petitioner to persons who cannot afford such services. Petitioner did not show that more than 50 percent of its expenditures directly related to raising funds for organizations that provide qualified services to persons who cannot afford those services ("qualifying organizations"). Petitioner's 1997 annual report shows that none of its expenditures were made for statutorily qualified services provided to persons who cannot afford those services. Similarly, the report did not show that more than 50 percent of expenditures were made to raise funds for qualifying organizations. Petitioner is not a military museum fundraiser within the meaning of Section 212.08(7)(l). Petitioner admitted that it made no cash contributions to military museums during 1997. Petitioner claims that it allowed other organizations to use Petitioner's tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to facilitate in-kind contributions to military museums or to related organizations which, in turn, contributed the items to military museums. The primary item Petitioner claimed to have obtained in this manner in 1997 was a Huey helicopter allegedly donated by the U. S. Army to Vietnam Veterans of Central Florida, Inc. ("Veterans Central"). Petitioner failed to show that the title to the helicopter ever passed from the U. S. Army to Petitioner or to any other organization designated by Petitioner to receive an in- kind contribution. Petitioner failed to show that either Petitioner or its designee otherwise obtained title to the helicopter or any other in-kind contributions. Petitioner claims that a contribution to Veterans Central is a contribution to Petitioner because the two organizations are members of the same group. The group purportedly operates as the Vietnam Veterans of Florida State Coalition (the "state coalition"). However, Petitioner failed to provide any documentary evidence which establishes the relationship between the two organizations or their membership in the state coalition. Petitioner admits that the two organizations have separate boards and that Petitioner does not control or own stock in Veterans Central as required in Sections 617.0601 and 617.0721 (providing that corporate members of a not- for-profit group have no voting rights and, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation and by-laws, the directors of each corporation have sole voting rights for each corporation and do not have voting rights in other member corporations.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for a certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Ken Baker, President Vietnam Veterans of Florida Foundation, Inc. 1509 Tate Street Cocoa, Florida 32922 George C. Hamm, Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314
Findings Of Fact Union Trucking is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of trucking. Its net worth is less than $2,000,000.00 In DOAH Case NO. 87-4007, the Department sent Petitioner a letter dated August 6, 1987, denying Petitioner's request for certification as a minority business enterprise pursuant to the Department's Rule 14-78.005, Florida Administrative Code. The reason stated in the letter was that Petitioner was not actually under the control of a minority person. On August 25, 1987, Petitioner timely requested a hearing and the case was sent to the Division Of Administrative Hearings on September 11, 1987. By Notice of Hearing dated September 23, 1987, hearing was scheduled for November 16, 1987 and later continued until February 10, 1988. Rule 14-78.002, Florida Administrative Code, was amended on September 21, 1987. The amendment effectively removed DOT's reason-for denial of Petitioner's certification. However, on February 11, 1988, well after the rule change came into effect, DOT formally decided to certify Petitioner. Petitioner was therefore forced to proceed for several months in preparation for an action which Respondent admits it had no basis for after the rule change took effect. Respondent's initial decision occurred on August 6, 1987, when Respondent notified Petitioner of its denial of minority business status. At some point in time, Respondent had filed its proposed rule change. Petitioner failed to demonstrate the time of the proposed change. Depending on the facts surrounding the rule change as to its likelihood of adoption at the time Respondent initiated this action, no findings regarding substantial justification can be made at the time of the agency's initial action on August Most certainly after September 21, 1987, the date the MBE rule was amended, Respondent lacked any substantial justification to continue to litigate this matter. The Final Order of the Department recognized the earlier certification of Petitioner and dismissed the action. However, the Final Order of Respondent did not dispose of the attorney's fees issue which had also been raised during the principal action. The order, therefore, did not dispose of substantially all the issues raised in the principal action. Additionally, there was no settlement of this case since a written settlement agreement was drafted and signed by Petitioner, but refused by Respondent. Respondent's unilateral certification is not enough to force a settlement on Petitioner, especially since Respondent elected to enter a Final Order in this case. Petitioner, therefore, became a prevailing party when Respondent entered its Final Order on April 18, 1988. Section 57.111(4)(b)(2) , Florida Statutes. The application and affidavit which initiated this action were filed on May 23, 1988. The application substantially meets the requirements of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fairly put Respondent on notice of Petitioner's claim. The application and affidavit were timely, having been filed within 60 days after the date on which Petitioner became a prevailing small business party. According to the affidavit of Frank M. Gafford, Petitioner incurred legal fees of $3,572.86. These fees and costs are found to be reasonable. The Department does not dispute the reasonableness of the fees in this case.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's response to Respondent's RFP 90 PY is responsive so as to be eligible for an award of "Wagner-Peyser 10% funds."
Findings Of Fact Section 7(b)(2) of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. s. 49f. is a federal grant source which permits ten percent of the sums allotted by Congress to each state to be used to provide certain services and functions within the discretion of the governors of the respective states. Included among such services are job placement services for groups determined by the Governor of Florida to have special needs as set forth in Subsection 7(b)(2) of the Wagner- Peyser Act. Petitioner Goal Employment is a private-for-profit Florida corporation engaged in the business of finding gainful employment for offenders, i.e., those persons who have been convicted of a crime but who are now out of prison seeking employment. On January 26, 1990, the Respondent, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (LET) of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES), published a request for proposals (RFP) soliciting competitive sealed proposals for job placement programs in accordance with Section 287.057(3) F.S. and the federal grant source, commonly referred to as "Wagner-Peyser 10% funds." The response date and time for this 1990 RFP, a/k/a RFP 90 PY, was 3:00 p.m., March 23, 1990. Petitioner, Goal Employment, filed a timely proposal with Respondent, but the agency found Goal Employment's proposal to be nonresponsive and notified Petitioner of this determination in a letter dated April 4, 1990. That letter set out the grounds of the Respondent agency's determination as follows: This nonresponsiveness is due to failure to have proposed program activities that are legal and allowable, i.e., private for profit entities are not eligible to apply for Wagner-Peyser 7(b) funds. Petitioner had 72 hours from that notification in which to protest. It has been stipulated that Goal Employment's proposal would have been found responsive but for the exclusion of private-for-profit organizations from eligibility. By letter dated April 9, 1990, Petitioner gave written notice of receipt of notification of nonresponsiveness on Saturday, April 7, 1990 "around 10:00 a.m." and of its intent to file formal written protest. Date and time of Respondent's receipt of this letter of intent are not clear, but Respondent has not asserted lack of timeliness. Interim negotiations failed, and on April 17, 1990 Petitioner timely filed a formal written protest, which was "fast-tracked" at the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5) F.S. In the immediate past, the Respondent agency had, indeed, permitted contracting with private-for-profit organizations, and Petitioner corporation had been a successful bidder in Respondent's 1988 and 1989 letting of similar contracts. Therefore, Petitioner's principal and president, Ernest S. Urassa, was thoroughly familiar with how these types of contracts had been bid in the past. Mr. Urassa's familiarity with the earlier agency bid policy and procedure was also the result of his prior employment by the agency. The RFP for 1989 did not prohibit private-for- profit organizations from participating. Goal Employment's contract pursuant to that prior RFP had not been completed as of the date of formal hearing, and at all times material to the 1990 RFP which is at issue in this proceeding, Mr. Urassa and Goal Employment coordinated the 1989 contract's compliance through an agency contract manager, Dan Faughn. On November 8, 1989, before the final draft of the 1990 RFP was finalized, Mr. Faughn informed Mr. Urassa by telephone that for the next program year, that is for the 1990 RFP, the agency would no longer permit private-for-profit company participation in Wagner-Peyser contracting. In response to January 11, 1990 oral inquiries from Mr. Urassa, the Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Job Training, Shelton Kemp, sent Mr. Urassa a January 16, 1990 letter as follows: The program year 1990 Request for Proposals prohibits private-for-profit companies from participating in Wagner-Peyser 7(b) contracting. The Wagner-Peyser Act, Section 7(b)(2), allows the governor of each state to provide, "...services for groups with special needs, carried out pursuant to joint agreements between the employment service and the appropriate private industry council, and chief elected official or officials or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations,..." [Emphasis supplied] Those involved in the agency RFP process had reached the foregoing position after receiving advice from their General Counsel who, in turn, had relied on legal advice from the Governor's legal staff. Roy Chilcote, Labor Employment and Training Specialist Supervisor in Respondent's Contract Section, participated in the draft of the 1990 Project Year Request for Proposal (RFP 90 PY) which is at issue in these proceedings. Prior to drafting the 1990 RFP, Mr. Chilcote was unable to locate any written issue papers or legal opinions interpreting the following language contained in the Wagner-Peyser legislation: ...the Governor of each such State to provide-- (2) services for groups with specific needs, carried out pursuant to joint agreements between the employment service and the appropriate private industry council and chief elected officials or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations; [Emphasis supplied] Up until that time, the issue of whether private-for-profit organizations could compete had not resulted in any specific opinion from legal personnel, however it is fair to say that lay personnel of the agency, including Mr. Urassa, who had previously been employed there, had based agency policy and earlier RFP requirements on lay interpretations either of the foregoing statutory language or of the Job Training Partnership Act's (JTPA) pre-amendment language, and that the lay interpretations had always permitted private-for- profit organizations to bid for Wagner-Peyser 10% funds just as they had competed for JTPA funds. Upon his own review of the statutory language, Mr. Chilcote, also a layman, did not share his predecessor's opinion, and he requested legal advice from the agency's General Counsel, and, in turn, received the legal interpretation that private-for-profit organizations were ineligible. Mr. Chilcote received this legal advice in the fall of 1989, and he accordingly drafted the 1990 RFP to preclude private-for-profit entities as bidders for Wagner-Peyser funds. The actual language contained in the 1990 RFP published January 26, 1990, as found on page 2 thereof, is as follows: All governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (both for profit and not for profit entities) may apply for funds under the JTPA Title I Program. All governmental agencies and not for profit nongovernmental organizations (private for profit entities are not eligible) may apply for funds under the Wagner-Peyser 7(b) program. Documen- tation supporting the legal structure of the proposer must be on file with the Bureau of Job Training before any contract resulting from a response to the RFP can be executed. [Original emphasis] Under the next major heading of the 1990 RFP (page 5 thereof), all potential bidders, including Petitioner, were advised: The Bureau of Job Training conducts a two step proposal review process. The first step is a technical review to determine if a proposal is responsive to the requirements of the RFP and the second step is a programmatic review of the relative merit of that proposal. The following is a description of the specific criteria that the Bureau will use to determine the responsiveness of a proposal. Each of the criteria listed must be satisfactorily addressed for a proposal to be determined responsive. A proposal determined nonresponsive will be given no further consideration. The proposer will be notified in writing of the nonresponsive determination and the reason(s) for the determination. No exception will be made to these requirements. Although the "specific criteria" listed thereafter do not make reference to the ineligibility of for-profit organizations, that contract specification was clearly noted and emphasized under the preceding heading. See, Finding of Fact 14, supra. Before publication of the 1990 RFP, Mr. Chilcote circulated the draft within the agency for comments. It was at this point, November 8, 1989, approximately 10 weeks before the 1990 RFP was published, that Mr. Faughn orally notified Mr. Urassa of its contents, that Mr. Faughn and Mr. Urassa began inquiries concerning the reinterpretation, and that Mr. Faughn and Mr. Urassa commented unfavorably on the new draft RFP because it precluded private-for- profit bidders. See, Finding of Fact 9, supra. The agency's position allowing Wagner-Peyser 7(b) funding for private- for-profit organizations prior to Program Year 1990 was based in part upon its earlier layman's understanding of the Congressional intent underlying the language of Section 7(b)(2). See, Findings of Fact 12-13, supra. In 1990, the agency altered its position so as to begin excluding for-profit organizations from eligibility for Wagner-Peyser money solely due to its reinterpretation of the statute by legal counsel. This reinterpretation was applied to prohibit the agency from contracting for the delivery of services with all private-for-profit organizations and has not been formally adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54 F.S. Petitioner has been aware of this reinterpretation since November 8, 1989 (actual oral notice), was notified of it in writing on January 16, 1990 (Shelton Kemp's letter), and was again notified of it in writing on January 26, 1990 (1990 RFP publication). Petitioner did not file a formal rule challenge directly with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to the March 3, 1990 bid/proposal deadline, the agency held three RFP workshops: February 20, 22, and 23, 1990. At no time during this process was Petitioner led to believe that private-for-profit entities were to compete for the 1990 RFP. Nonetheless, Petitioner, a private-for-profit entity, submitted its proposal timely before the March 23, 1990 bid closing and was rejected as nonresponsive. It thereafter proceeded solely with a bid protest. See, Findings of Fact 3, 4, and 5, supra.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order ratifying its previous decision that the Respondent's 1990 bid/proposal is nonresponsive. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2667BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2, 15 Accepted. Accepted except for what is unnecessary. Accepted except for what is subordinate or cumulative. 5-6 Subordinate and cumulative. 7-10, 19 Accepted. 11-14, 16, 18 Rejected as mere legal argument. 17 Rejected as subordinate. Respondent's PFOF: 1-5 Rejected as mere legal argument. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, The Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security The Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent's proposed award of a contract to Intervenor is contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications, pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On January 14, 2003, Respondent advertised for bids by way of an invitation to bid (ITB) for Contract Number E3C42, Maintenance Financial Project Number 40952917201. This would be a "Push Button" contract for the replacement of damaged guardrails along various roadways in Okaloosa and Walton Counties. Pursuant to this Contract, the successful bidder would respond upon notice, and repair or replace guardrails, or take other measures to ensure safety of the traveling public. The bid solicitation and contract were issued pursuant to Section 337.11, Florida Statutes. All bidders had to certify compliance with Florida Statutes and other applicable law, and all contractors were held to strict compliance with all legal requirements. There were no protests to the terms and conditions of the bid solicitation. The instant challenge does not allege non-compliance with the statutes or terms of the ITB generally. The challenge is whether award of the bid to Intervenor, as a non-profit corporation, is "contrary to competition." This maintenance contract does not require that the contractor be pre-qualified pursuant to Section 334.14, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code. Four bidders responded to the solicitation, with the apparent low bidder being Intervenor, and the apparent second low bidder being Petitioner. Respondent posted its intended award of the contract to Intervenor, and Petitioner timely filed a protest that initiated this proceeding. Intervenor is a not-for-profit corporation created under the provisions of Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. As such, pursuant to Sections 617.0301 and 617.2001, Florida Statutes, Intervenor can engage in any lawful purpose not for pecuniary profit. As a not-for-profit corporation, Intervenor may receive certain tax breaks and other economic advantages not enjoyed by a for-profit corporation. Petitioner is a for-profit corporation. No evidence exists that Intervenor is not capable and responsible to perform the work. Intervenor is qualified to contract with Respondent for the performance of work related to the construction and maintenance of transportation-related facilities by youths enrolled in youth work experience programs, pursuant to Section 334.351, Florida Statutes. Respondent spends appropriations under this section, and Intervenor is the recipient of such contracts. However, the instant contract will not be let under Section 334.351, Florida Statutes, but pursuant to Section 337.11, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the protest filed by Petitioner be dismissed and Respondent shall award the subject contract to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Bottcher, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Brant Hargrove, Esquire Law Office of Brant Hargrove 2984 Wellington Circle, West Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Timothy Patrick Driscoll, Esquire Timothy Patrick Driscoll, P.A. 101 First Avenue South, Suite 340 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) Whether Respondent, David M. Whitehead, a member of Escambia County Commission, violated Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, by having or holding an employment or contractual relationship with B & W Productions of Pensacola, Inc. (B & W Productions) which created a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between his private interests and the performance of his public duties or which impeded the full and faithful discharge of his public duties; whether Respondent violated Section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, by voting on measures that came before the Escambia County Commission regarding Carlan Killam Consulting Group, Inc. (Carlan Killam Consulting or Carlan Killam), Baskerville-Donovan, Inc. (Baskerville-Donovan), DelGallo-Morette Construction Company (DelGallo-Morette), and/or Champion International Corporation (Champion), all of whom were sponsors of a television show hosted by Respondent; and (3) if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, David M. Whitehead (Respondent), currently serves as county commissioner for Escambia County, Florida, and has continuously served in that capacity since taking office after his election in 1992. As a county commissioner for Escambia County, Respondent is subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees (Code of Ethics), and is a "public officer" as that term is defined in Sections 112.313(1) and 112.3143(1)(a), Florida Statutes. As a county commissioner for Escambia County, Respondent is subject to the provisions of Sections 112.313(7)(a) and 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Respondent formed B & W Productions, a Subchapter S, for-profit corporation, for the purpose of producing a morning television show that was to be known as the "Lois and Mike Show" or the "Wake-Up with Lois and Mike Show" (the "Lois and Mike Show"). Respondent is "Mike" on the Lois and Mike Show and co- hosts the show with Lois Benson. B & W Productions was incorporated to shield the personal assets of Respondent and Benson in case of liability. B & W Productions was organized under the laws of the State of Florida, effective June 17, 1998. B & W Productions was active from June 17, 1998, through September 23, 1999. On September 24, 1999, B & W Productions was administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report, as required by law. During its corporate existence, B & W Productions maintained a corporate bank account at SunTrust Bank, West Florida; produced periodic profit and loss statements of its activities; applied for a federal tax identification number as a Subchapter S corporation; filed a corporate tax return with the Internal Revenue Service; and entered into sponsorship agreements with specific sponsors of the Lois and Mike Show. However, during its corporate existence, the corporation failed to conduct meetings of its shareholders, to take minutes, and to file its annual report. Respondent served as chief executive officer of B & W Productions until approximately March of 1999. In March 1999, after Respondent stepped down as CEO, Benson took over the books and management of B & W Productions. Thereafter, Respondent was not involved in the active management of B & W Productions. In November of 1999, Respondent transferred to Benson "all ownership rights, rights to compensation in any form, and right to any benefits, accrued or accruing in the future, with regard to B & W Productions, Inc., and "Wake Up with Lois and Mike . . . ." Respondent transferred complete ownership of B & W Productions to Benson, free and clear of any obligation for repayment. The Lois and Mike Show began airing on a local cable station in Pensacola known as "BLAB TV" in September of 1998. Respondent and Benson have received no compensation for their efforts in connection with the Lois and Mike Show. Since the Lois and Mike Show first aired, over 200 guests, all local people, have appeared on the show. Daily rundowns of the show for the calendar year 1999 evidence a program highlighting local community events and personal information presented by local residents consistent with a weekly theme developed by Benson. As a political figure, Respondent receives an incidental benefit of appearing as local personality on the Lois and Mike Show. However, the show is not a political show. Rather, consistent with its mission, the show entertains and informs its audience on issues specific to the Pensacola area, highlighting local news and issues, local events, and local people. BLAB TV requires the payment of $1,250.00 for each week that the Lois and Mike Show is aired. Other costs incurred in the production of the show included contract labor and outside production companies used to produce a portion of the show. The primary source of income to pay for the Lois and Mike Show is money paid by sponsors or supporters of the Lois and Mike Show. Using a public broadcasting system model, Benson developed a market plan to secure sponsors for the Lois and Mike Show. The plan proposed different tiers of sponsorship: segment sponsors; traditional commercial sponsors; and friends and benefactors. Benson developed lists of potential sponsors which included a wide range of businesses in the Pensacola area. These businesses included but were not limited to Baskerville-Donovan, DelGallo-Morette and Champion. Various potential sponsors including Baskerville-Donovan, DelGallo-Morette and Champion, were targeted for a personal solicitation from either Benson and/or Respondent. Initially, B & W Productions was responsible for billing and collecting sponsorship fees. However, in December 1998, three months after the show was first aired, responsibility for billing and collection of sponsorship fees was assumed by BLAB TV. Since BLAB TV took over these responsibilities, all sponsors of the Lois and Mike Show are billed directly by BLAB TV. Both Respondent and Benson personally paid a portion of the costs for the airing and production of the Lois and Mike Show. Respondent paid approximately $16,000.00 of his personal funds for the production of the Lois and Mike Show. Benson expended approximately $30,000 of her personal funds for the production of the show. These payments have at various times been characterized as loans and capital contributions. In March of 1999, Respondent determined that he could not put anymore of his personal funds into B & W Productions and did not do so. Both before and after the airing of the first Lois and Mike Show, Respondent solicited funds from sponsors to help pay the amount charged by BLAB TV for airing the show. Sponsorships were solicited from over 200 individuals and entities in the Pensacola community by Respondent and Benson. Respondent solicited funds in 1998 for the sponsorship of the Lois and Mike Show from a number of sources, including Baskerville-Donovan, Carlan Killam Consulting, Champion, and DelGallo-Morette, all of whom gave money for the sponsorship of the Lois and Mike Show. There was never any discussion at the time the solicitations were made that any of these potential sponsors might have matters before the Escambia County Commission (County Commission or Commission). Respondent has not solicited sponsors for the show since March of 1999. Baskerville-Donovan, Carlan Killam Consulting, Champion, and DelGallo-Morette have all had matters come before the Escambia County Commission after giving money for the Lois and Mike Show. Respondent, as a county commissioner for Escambia County, has voted on matters that have come before the County Commission regarding Baskerville-Donovan, Carlan Killam Consulting, Champion, and DelGallo-Morette after those companies gave money to support the airing and/or production of the Lois and Mike Show. However, Respondent has never been employed by and has never owned property with or engaged in a business enterprise with Baskerville-Donovan, Carlan Killam Consulting, Champion, or DelGallo-Morette. Since July of 1998, Respondent has cast approximately 3,000 votes as a member of the County Commission. He has never abstained from a vote as a county commissioner or filed a conflict of interest disclosure form based upon payments that have been made by any entity to B & W Productions or for the Lois and Mike Show. Baskerville-Donovan provides architectural and engineering services to Escambia County. These services are provided pursuant to an on-going contract with the county. Respondent solicited a sponsorship from Baskerville- Donovan. Subsequently, Baskerville-Donovan became a regular sponsor of the Lois and Mike Show paying $200 a month, beginning September or October 1998, and continuing through April 2000. The following matters that came before the Escambia County Commission for a vote regarding Baskerville-Donovan just before and after it became a sponsor of the Lois and Mike Show: On June 23, 1998, the Commission approved issuance of a Task Order to Baskerville-Donovan on Contract PD 95- 96.74 in the amount of $394,568 to design several road projects to the 35 percent stage. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission upon motion made by Respondent. This vote occurred prior to any sponsorship funds being paid to B & W Productions by Baskerville- Donovan. On September 22, 1998, the Commissioner approved the extension of six contracts with various consultants, including Contract PD 95-96.74 to Baskerville- Donovan for the second consecutive one- year option period, October 1, 1998, through September 30, 1999, at the same price, terms, and conditions. The extensions applied to contracts that had been awarded on August 6, 1996. This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid by Baskerville-Donovan to B & W Productions. On December 22, 1998, the Commission approved Addendum Number 7 to Contract 95-96.63 to Baskerville-Donovan in the amount of $316,775.60 to provide full- time inspection and contract administration for the University Parkway Widening and Realignment Projects. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission with Respondent seconding the motion for approval made by Commissioner Boss. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Baskerville-Donovan and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On January 21, 1999, the Commission approved issuance of a Task Order on Contract PD 95-96.74 to Baskerville- Donovan, in the amount of $490,729.00 to design various paving and drainage projects to the 30 percent stage. This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On January 21, 1999, the Commission approved extension of five current contracts with various consultants, including Contract PD 95-96.100 to Baskerville-Donovan, for the third consecutive one-year option period, March 14, 1999, through March 13, 2000, at the same prices, terms and conditions. The extensions applied to contracts that had been awarded March 14, 1998. The item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On February 4, 1999, the Commission approved Amendment Number 4 to Contract PD 94-95.59 between Escambia County and Baskerville-Donovan, in the amount of $51,200, for architectural and engineering services for various projects. (The original contract was approved on April 25, 1995.) This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda, with Respondent moving approval of the Consent Agenda. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On April 22, 1999, the Commission approved the expenditure of approximately $3,000 to Baskerville-Donovan to complete the design package for renovations to the Board Chambers located in the Old Courthouse. This item was approved by a vote of 4-0, with Commissioner Robertson absent. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On May 20, 1999 the Commission approved three items extending Contract PD 95- 96.83 to allow three consultants, including Baskerville-Donovan, to proceed with various tasks with respect to the extension of I-110. In the first vote, the Commission unanimously approved extension of the contract to allow consultants to proceed with the preparation of applications associated with the request for funds for the I-110 extension project. In the second vote, the Commission unanimously approved extension of the contract to allow the consultants to proceed with design and preparation of other documents required in connection with extension of I-110 to Nine Mile Road. In the third vote, the Commission approved, by a vote of 3-2, extension of the contract to allow consultants to proceed with design and preparation of related documents for further extension of I-110 using as much of the Gulf Power right-of-way as possible. With respect to each vote, Respondent seconded the motion for approval and voted in the affirmative on each item. These votes occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On October 7,1999, the Commission approved Contract PD 98-99.83 to Baskerville-Donovan, in the amount of $100,000 for a feasibility study for the Central Commerce Park. This item was approved unanimously by the Commission upon motion seconded by Respondent. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. With respect to each of the matters which were the subject of votes referenced in paragraph 25, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services to Baskerville- Donovan. Nor did Respondent or B & W Productions have any responsibility for evaluating or inspecting Baskerville-Donovan's performance under any of these contracts. Moreover, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services with respect to any of the projects which were the subject of the Commission votes. Finally, neither the Respondent nor B & W Productions benefited from the votes of the County Commission approving various items involving Baskerville-Donovan. Respondent has never been employed or retained by Baskerville-Donovan. Respondent has never been engaged in a business enterprise with Baskerville-Donovan as a partner, a joint venturer, a co-owner of property, or in a corporate entity whose shares are not listed on a national or regional stock exchange. Carlan Killam Consulting provides architectural services to Escambia County, and has done so since 1973. These services have been provided to the county through on-going contracts. Carlan Killam Consulting provided one payment of $1,500.00 to sponsor the Lois and Mike Show. That payment was made on or about July 29, 1998. Benson initially approached Charles Carlan, the president of Carlan Killam Consulting, about sponsoring the Lois and Mike Show. Subsequently, Carlan met with Respondent and decided to have his company sponsor the show because it showed the positive side of Pensacola, as opposed to the negative side shown in the regular media. Carlan Killam Consulting engaged in a similar sponsorship endeavor with respect to the Pensacola Independent Newspaper. The following matters came before the Escambia County Commission for a vote regarding Carlan Killam Consulting just before and after it became a sponsor of the Lois and Mike Show: On June 23, 1998, the Commission, upon motion by Respondent, unanimously approved the issuance of a Task Order on Contract PD 95-96.74 to Carlan Killam in the amount of $254,920 to design several road projects to 30 percent stage. This vote occurred before sponsorship funds were paid by Carlan Killam. On July 28, 1998, the Commission unanimously approved, as part of its Consent Agenda, a Task Order on Contract PD 95-96.74 to Carlan Killam in the amount of $379,618 for various road paving and draining design projects. This vote occurred before any sponsorship funds were paid by Carlan Killam. On September 22, 1998, the Commission approved extensions of six current contracts with various consultants, including Carlan Killam (Contract PD 95.96.74), for the second consecutive one-year option period, October 1, 1998, through September 30, 1999, at the same prices, terms and conditions. (The extensions applied to contracts that had been awarded August 6, 1996.) This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda. The vote occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made to B & W Productions by Carlan Killam. On November 24, 1998, the Commission considered and unanimously approved the Proposal Review Committee's ranking of firms based on their letters of interest regarding providing professional architectural consulting services to prepare a 10-year master space plan. Carlan Killam ranked second. This vote occurred after Carlan Killam made a one- time sponsorship payment to B & W Productions. On December 3, 1998, the Commission approved issuance of a Task Order on Contract PD-96.74.3P to Carlan Killam in the amount of $134,748 for services on various waste water projects. This vote occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made by Carlan Killam to B & W Productions. On December 22, 1998, the Commission approved issuance of a Task Order on Contract 95-96.74 in the amount of $104,927 for design, engineering, and surveying services for storm-water and drainage projects. This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda. This vote occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made by Carlan Killam to B & W Productions. On March 18, 1999, the Commission approved issuance of three task orders on Contract PD 95-96.74 to Carlan Killam in amounts of $136,476; $504,771; and $69,087. These items were unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda. Respondent was not present for this meeting. On April 22, 1999, the Commission approved issuance of a Task Order on Contract PD 95-96.74 to Carlan Killam in the amount of $110,666 for the design and engineering for various road projects. This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda for this date. This vote occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made by Carlan Killam to B & W Production. On May 20, 1999, the Commission approved three items extending Contract PD 95-96.83 to direct named consultants, including Carlan Killam, to proceed with various tasks with respect to the extension of I-110. In the first vote, the Commission unanimously approved extension of the contract to allow consultants to proceed with the preparation of applications associated with the request for funds for the I-110 extension project. In the second vote, the Commission unanimously approved extension of the contract to allow the consultants to proceed with design and preparation of other documents required in connection with extension of I-110 to Nine Mile Road. In the third vote, the Commission approved, by a vote of 3-2, extension of the contract to allow consultants to proceed with design and preparation of documents for further extension of I-110 using as much of the Gulf Power right-of-way as possible. With respect to each item, Respondent seconded the motion for approval and voted in the affirmative. These votes occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made by Carlan Killam to B & W Productions. On October 21, 1999, the Commission approved issuance of Task Order on Contract PD 95-96.83 to Carlan Killam in an amount not to exceed $263,727.28, to provide the first phase of project development to study the I-110 extension to Nine Mile Road. This item was approved by the Commission, by a vote of 4-1, with Respondent voting in the affirmative. This vote occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made to B & W Productions. With respect to each of the matters which were the subject of votes referenced in paragraph 31, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services to Carlan Killam. Moreover, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions had any responsibility for evaluating or inspecting Carlan Killam's performance under the aforementioned contracts or for providing any services with respect to any of the projects which were the subjects of these votes. Finally, neither Respondent or B & W Productions benefited in any manner from the votes of the County Commission approving various items involving Carlan Killam. Respondent has never been employed or retained by Carlan Killam. Respondent has never been engaged in a business enterprise with Carlan Killam as a partner, a joint venturer, a co-owner of property, or in a corporate entity whose shares are not listed on a national or regional stock exchange. DelGallo-Morette provides construction services to Escambia County. Benson suggested that Respondent contact DelGallo- Morette as a potential sponsor. Both Respondent and Benson discussed sponsorship of the Lois and Mike Show with Steve DelGallo, the president of DelGallo-Morette. Subsequently, DelGallo-Morette provided a one-time payment of $2,500 to sponsor the Lois and Mike Show. That payment was made on or about August 21, 1998. Benson's credible testimony was that she and DelGallo are good friends and that if there was any reason for DelGallo-Morette to sponsor the show, it was because she had just recently drawn the house plans for DelGallo free of charge. Matters that came before the Escambia County Commission for a vote regarding DelGallo-Morette just before and after it became a sponsor of the Lois and Mike Show include the following: On June 23, 1998, the Commission approved the unanimous recommendation of the Bid Review Committee to award a lump sum contract to DelGallo-Morette, in the amount of $89,5000 as the lowest, most responsive, and most responsible bidder, for a renovation construction project. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission, upon motion made by Respondent. This vote occurred prior to any sponsorship funds being paid to B & W Productions by DelGallo-Morette. On June 30, 1998, upon motion by Respondent, the Commission approved an increase in maximum price, by a sum not to exceed $385,000, for telecommunication system improvements at the M.C. Blanchard Judicial Center pursuant to a contract approved by the Commission on November 19, 1996, with Brown and Root Building Company, in association with DelGallo-Morette. This vote occurred prior to any sponsorship funds being paid to B & W Productions by DelGallo-Morette. On November 24, 1998, upon motion by Respondent, the Commission unanimously approved a guaranteed maximum price on the Escambia County Control Booking and Detention Facility in the amount of $14,661,576 with Brown and Root Building Company, as the contractor, in association DelGallo-Morette and a total project cost of $16,054,682 relative to Contract PD 97-97.155. This vote occurred after the one-time sponsorship payment was made paid to B & W Productions by DelGallo-Morette. On March 18, 1999, the Commission approved amending Contract PD 95-96.113 with Brown and Root Building Company, in association with DelGallo-Morette, to increase the guaranteed maximum price of $900,000 to provide for additional costs for construction change orders and other items associated with renovation of the M.C. Blanchard Judicial Center Expansion Project. This item was unanimously approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda by a vote of 4-0. Respondent was absent and did not vote. With respect to each of the matters which were the subject of votes referenced in paragraph 37, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services to DelGallo-Morette. Nor did Respondent or B & W Productions have any responsibility for evaluating or inspecting DelGallo-Morette's performance under the contracts addressed by the votes. Neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services with respect to any of the projects which were the subjects of those votes. Further, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions benefited in any manner from the votes of the Commission approving various items involving DelGallo-Morette. Respondent has never been employed or retained by DelGallo-Morette. Moreover, Respondent has never been engaged in a business enterprise with DelGallo-Morette as a partner, a joint venturer, a co-owner of property, or in a corporate entity whose shares are not listed on a national or regional stock exchange. Champion is a forest products company whose primary products are a variety of papers, lumber, and plywood. Champion has a contract with Escambia County for the disposal of ash at the landfill in exchange for natural gas. In August or September 1998, Respondent and Benson met with representatives of Champion to discuss sponsorship of the Lois and Mike Show. Benson made most of the presentation which focused on the negative public image of Champion in the community at that time. Champion's negative image resulted from Champion's planned wastewater discharge into Escambia Bay. The Escambia County Commission did not have regulatory jurisdiction over this issue. Rather, regulatory jurisdiction resided at the Department of Environmental Protection and the Environmental Protection Agency. Champion was a segment sponsor of the Lois and Mike Show for a year, beginning in September 1998 through September 1999, at a rate of $260 a month. As a segment sponsor, Champion paid $260 monthly. From October 1999 through December 1999, Champion paid $178.50 per month to sponsor the show and in December 1999, Champion paid $119 in sponsorship fees. After December 1999, Champion discontinued its sponsorship of the show. The following matters that came before the Escambia County Commission regarding Champion before and after it became a sponsor of the Lois and Mike Show: On July 28, 1999, the Commission approved retaining Chris H. Bentley, Esquire, to monitor and advise the Commission on Champion's permitting activities regarding discharge of treated wastewater into Escambia River. This item was unanimously approved by Commission upon motion seconded by Respondent. This vote occurred prior to any sponsorship funds being paid to B & W Productions by Champion and did not address any item which Champion had before the Commission. On September 22, 1998, the Commission amended its License Agreements with Champion for the period January 1, 1998, through December 31, 1998, to include installation of gas monitoring wells at various landfill sites which was inadvertently omitted from the prior approved agreements. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission, upon motion made by Respondent. This vote occurred prior to any sponsorship funds being paid to B & W Productions by Champion. On October 8, 1998, the Commission took two actions concerning Champion. First, it voted to accept, for filing in the minutes of the Commission, the "Escambia County Citizens' Executive Point Paper" regarding Champion's proposed discharge of wastewater into the Escambia River. This action was taken unanimously, upon motion seconded by Respondent. Second, the Commission voted to approve the staff's making a written request to Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) "Technology Team" to evaluate the impact of Champion's proposed wastewater discharge into Escambia Bay relative to the request of the Escambia County Citizen's Coalition, Inc. This action was taken unanimously, upon motion made by Respondent. This vote occurred prior to any sponsorship funds being paid to B & W Productions by Champion and did not address any item which Champion had before the Commission. On November 5, 1998, the Commission discussed a proposal from the Department of Environmental Protection that Escambia County form a partnership with Santa Rosa County and the EPA for a unified peer review approach to Champion's proposed relocation wastewater discharge point and to analyze the processing of wastewater discharge permitted for Champion and its impact on Escambia Bay and Perdido Bay. The Commission voted unanimously to refer to DEP's proposal to the County's Department of Neighborhood and Environmental Services for analysis and recommendation. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Champion and did not address any item which Champion had before the Commission. On November 24, 1998, the Commission approved the renewal of four License Agreements with Champion for the operation of water quality monitoring and gas wells located at various landfill sites, for the period January 1, 1999, through December 31, 1999. This item occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Champion. On February 2, 1999, the Commission adopted a resolution urging Champion to use monies encumbered for construction and permitting of its proposed pipeline to the Escambia River to fund improvements to the effluent being dumped into Eleven Mile Creek. This item was approved by the Commission, by a vote of 3-2, with Respondent voting in the affirmative. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Champion and did not address any item which Champion had before the Commission. On April 8, 1999, the Commission authorized staff to negotiate the purchase of a parcel of property from Champion to be used as a district park. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission, upon motion made by Respondent, with Commissioner Boss absent. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Champion and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On April 22, 1999, the Commission amended a previously approved Qualified Industry Tax Refund Incentive for Champion's dimensional lumber production facility. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission, upon motion made by Respondent, with Commissioner Robertson absent. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Champion and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On June 22, 1999, the Commission adopted an ordinance establishing an economic development ad valorem tax exemption for Champion for its expansion of its Pensacola Mill located in Cantonment and for its hiring of additional employees. (Champion had expended $40 million in improvements at the facility that resulted in increased production and employment.) An employee of Champion met individually with Respondent as well as other members of the Commission to discuss this issue. The value of the ad valorem tax exemption to Champion was $1.8 million spread over 6.9 years. This item was unanimously approved by the Commission. This vote occurred after sponsorship funds were paid to B & W Productions by Champion and after responsibility for collecting and accounting for sponsorship funds for the Lois and Mike Show was transferred to BLAB TV. On July 15, 1999, the Commission approved the purchase of real property for a park from Champion for $375,000. This item was approved as part of the Commission's Consent Agenda by a vote of 4-0, with Respondent absent. With respect to each of the matters which were the subject of votes referenced in paragraph 43, neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services to Champion. Nor did Respondent or B & W Productions have any responsibility for evaluating or inspecting Champion's performance under the items addressed by the votes. Neither Respondent nor B & W Productions provided any services with respect to any of the matters which were the subject of these votes. Neither Respondent nor B & W Productions benefited in any manner from the votes of the Commission on these items involving Champion. Respondent had no interest in the real property which the Commission directed staff to negotiate with Champion regarding purchase by the county. Respondent has never been employed or retained by Champion. Moreover, Respondent has never been engaged in a business enterprise with Champion as a partner, a joint venturer, a co-owner of property, or in a corporate entity whose shares are not listed on a national or regional stock exchange. Respondent was present and voted in favor of all of the issues involving sponsors as set forth in paragraphs 25, 31, 37, and 43 above, except as otherwise noted. All of the aforementioned sponsors paid for the sponsorship of the Lois and Mike Show. Furthermore, two of these sponsors, Baskerville-Donovan and Champion, continued to make monthly sponsorship payments in months just before, as well as after the votes, in the amounts of $200 and 260, respectively. Since the sponsorships reduced the personal contributions that had to be made by Respondent and his business associate, Benson, for the airing of the Lois and Mike Show, they directly benefited from money received from sponsors who did business with and regularly appeared before the Escambia County Commission. The facts show that all four of the above-mentioned sponsors were doing business with the Escambia County Commission and that both Baskerville-Donovan and Champion made sponsorship payments for the Lois and Mike Show during this interim period after dissolution but prior to the time that Respondent transferred his interest in the show to Lois Benson. Neither Respondent nor Benson believed that soliciting sponsorship from businesses that appear before the Escambia County Commission for a vote was a conflict. However, Respondent's contractual relationship with B & W Productions, and its interest in the Lois and Mike Show, his direct solicitation of sponsorships from businesses appearing before the County Commission, and Respondent's and B & W's dependence upon funds derived from those sponsors, constituted a continuing and frequently recurring conflict between Respondent's private interests and the performance of his public duties as a member of the Escambia County Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Ethics Commission enter a final order and public report finding that Respondent, David Whitehead: (1) did not violate Section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes; and (2) violated Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that for the violation of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, the Commission impose a civil penalty of $2,000 against Respondent and issue a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Peterson, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mark Herron, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Edison, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32801 Sheri L. Gerety, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Dr. Herbert R. Slavin, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs in an amount not exceeding $50,000 pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Dr. Slavin, a licensed physician who specializes in internal medicine, has practiced in the state of Florida since 1981. In or around 2008, Dr. Slavin formed, and is the sole shareholder of, "Ageless Medicine Associates," a subchapter S corporation1/ under which he practices medicine. On October 31, 2011, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that charged Dr. Slavin with two statutory violations, both of which were ultimately dismissed by the Board of Medicine. In connection with that proceeding, Dr. Slavin now seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111. As explained later in this Final Order, a party seeking fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111 must demonstrate that he or she was a "small business party" at the time the underlying action was initiated by the state——in this instance, October 31, 2011. Section 57.111(3)(d) contemplates that a small business party can take four alternative forms, only two of which require discussion here: a partnership or corporation, including a professional practice, that, during the relevant timeframe, had 25 or fewer full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2,000,000 (section 57.111(3)(d)1.b.); or an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 during the relevant period (section 57.111(3)(d)1.c.). The evidence establishes that, as of October 2011, Ageless Medicine Associates had fewer than 25 employees and a net worth that did not exceed $2,000,000. The problem, though, and as discussed elsewhere in this Order, is that section 57.111(3)(d)1.b. has no application where, as in this case, the underlying complaint was filed against a licensee individually, rather than the partnership or corporation under which the licensee conducts business. As for Dr. Slavin's personal finances, his 2011 tax return reflects income of $171,810, virtually all of which comprises wages and business income derived from Ageless Medicine Associates, and an adjusted gross income of $161,400. The remainder of Dr. Slavin's financial picture (including, for example, any assets on hand that did not generate taxable income) during October 2011 is nebulous, however, for nearly all of his testimony focused incorrectly on his finances at the time of the final hearing: Q. Are you, doctor, currently worth $2,000,000? A. No. * * * Q. Dr. Slavin, do you own a home? A. Yes. Q. How much, if you know, is that home worth? A. Probably around $300,000 to $350,000. Q. And do you have a mortgage on that home? A. Yes. Q. How much is the mortgage; do you know? A. $145,000. Q. And do you have any cash in the bank? A. Yes. Q. How much? A. Around $10,000 . . . . * * * Q. Do you own any boats? A. No. Q. Do you own any vacation homes? A. No. Q. Do you own any interest in any other businesses? A. No. Q. Do you have a lot of stock accounts? A. No. * * * Q. Okay. Is there any other asset that you have that has not been mentioned; your home, your business? Do you own your vehicles? A. No, they're leased. Q. Do you own any other stocks or bonds that provide you with an income or that are worth money, that you know of? A. No. * * * Q. Dr. Slavin, you testified that -- You were asked by counsel whether or not you had a lot of stocks or bonds as assets and you stated no. Do you -- what does a lot mean? A. Well, I have -- I don't have any direct ownership of stocks or bonds. There are some annuities I have that have, I guess, investments and mutual funds or something. You know, I'm not -– * * * Q. Dr. Slavin, have you presented any information or any documentation as to what items are within your home? A. Not that I'm aware of. I have a television, -- Q. Do you have -- A. -- a refrigerator and -- Q. Do you have furniture in your home? A. Yeah. I have furniture, a refrigerator, stove, microwave. I have -- Q. Do you have computer equipment in your home? A. I have laptop computers in the home. Q. Do you have any personal items; jewelry, watches in your home? A. I have -– Yes, I have watches. Final Hearing Transcript, pp. 23; 25-28; 30-31 (emphasis added). Even assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Slavin's testimony had been properly oriented to the relevant time period (which it was not, in nearly all instances), his overall evidentiary presentation was simply too fragmentary to permit the undersigned to independently determine the value of his net worth——a figure derived2/ by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. For example, Dr. Slavin provided: no information concerning his annuities and mutual funds, the value of which could be non- trivial due to the remunerative nature his profession and his length of time in practice; no details regarding the value of his household assets; and no credible evidence regarding the value of his home.3/ In light of these gaping holes in the evidence, which preclude anything more than rank speculation concerning the value of Dr. Slavin's personal net worth, it is determined that status as a small business party has not been proven.4/ Because Dr. Slavin's failure to establish his status as a small business party is fatal to his application for attorney's fees, it is unnecessary to determine whether the underlying proceeding was substantially justified.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Conval-Care, Inc., is entitled to the payment of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, from the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest to the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated November 4, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), notified Conval-Care, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Conval-Care"), that it intended to impose an administrative fine on Conval-Care pursuant to Section 409.913(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Conval-Care contested the proposed fine and requested a formal administrative hearing, including a request that it be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The matter was designated case number 92-0126 and was assigned to the Honorable Judge Robert T. Benton, then Hearing Officer Benton. On June 30, 1993, following a formal hearing held on March 24, 1993, Hearing Officer Benton entered a Recommended Order recommending dismissal of the sanctions letter of November 4, 1991. The findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton, in Conval-Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 92-0126, are hereby adopted to the extent relevant to this proceeding. On September 19, 1993, the Department entered a Final Order. The Department accepted and incorporated into its Final Order the findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton. The Department, however, rejected Hearing Officer Benton's conclusions of law to the extent that he not had concluded that Conval-Care lacked authority to reject the demand for its records which was the subject of the proceedings. The Department concluded that, in light of the fact that Conval-Care had acted on the advice of counsel, it would reduce the fine from $25,000.00 to $5,000.00. The Department's decision was appealed by Conval-Care. On December 16, 1994, the District Court of Appeal, First District, filed an opinion reversing the Department's Final Order. Mandate from the First District was entered January 3, 1995. On February 14, 1995, Conval-Care filed a Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs in this case. Conval-Care requested an award of $15,000.00 as a small business party pursuant to the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Attached to the Petition were the Final Order entered by the Department, the Recommended Order, the First District's Opinion and Mandate, an Attorney's Affidavit stating the nature, extent and monetary value of the services rendered and costs incurred in the proceedings, the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Conval-Care in 1991 and the Department's November 4, 1991 sanctions letter. On March 2, 1995, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest of the Department (hereinafter referred to as "AHCA"), filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 10 In its Response, AHCA admitted all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 and 8 through 9 of the Petition. AHCA denied the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Petition. Paragraph 7 of the Petition alleged the following: 7. The action of DHRS, in filing the admini- strative complaint against CCI, was not sub- stantially justified because there was no reasonable basis in law or fact to support the issuance of its letter seeking to impose an administrative fine upon CCI. Attached to the Response was an Affidavit from John M. Whiddon in support of its position that its actions were substantially justified. The Affidavit does not add any alleged credible justification not presented to Hearing Officer Benton or the First District Court of Appeal. AHCA did not assert in it Response the following: that the costs and attorney's fees claimed in Conval-Care's affidavit were unreasonable; that Conval-Care is not a prevailing small business party; that circumstances exist that would make an award unjust; or that AHCA was a nominal party only. AHCA also did not "either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs claimed or file a counter affidavit [specifying each item of costs and fee in dispute] along with its response." Finally, AHCA did not request an evidentiary hearing in its Response. The only issue which AHCA asserted in its Response was at issue in this proceeding is whether AHCA's actions were substantially justified. On April 6, 1995, an Order to Provide Information was entered. Although the parties had not requested an evidentiary hearing, the undersigned entered the Order soliciting input from the parties before the undersigned decided whether a hearing was necessary on the one issue raised by the Department. In the Order, the parties were given an opportunity to provide input concerning the procedures they believed should be followed to resolve this matter. The parties were specifically requested to answer certain specified questions, including the following: 1. Do the parties believe that an [sic] hearing is necessary to resolve any factual disputes and/or for purposes of oral argument before a decision is rendered? * * * 5. Do the parties agree that the documents attached to the Petition and the Response should be considered in rendering a decision in this case? . . ." Conval-Care filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that there was no need for a hearing. Conval-Care asserted that a hearing would be improper unless Conval-Care consents to one. Conval-Care also asserted that all of the documents attached to petition should be considered. AHCA filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that "[t]he Respondent feels a hearing in this matter is essential." AHCA did not provide any explanation of why it believed a hearing was necessary or any discussion of whether a hearing was authorized under the applicable statutes and rules. AHCA also indicated in its response that it "agrees that the documents attached to the Petition and Response should be considered in this case " On May 19, 1995, an Order Concerning Final Order was entered. Based upon a review of the pleadings and the lack of explanation from either party to justify an evidentiary hearing, it was concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary. Therefore, the parties were informed in the May 19, 1995 Order that a hearing would not be held in this case. The parties were also informed that they could file proposed final orders on or before May 30, 1995. Conval-Care filed a proposed order. AHCA did not. Neither Conval-Care nor AHCA timely requested an evidentiary hearing in this case. Both parties agreed that the documentation filed with Conval- Care's Petition and AHCA's Response could be relied upon in reaching a decision in this case. Based upon AHCA's failure to contest most of the relevant issues in this proceeding, the only issue which requires a decision if whether the Department's actions against Conval-Care were substantially justified. The documents, including the Mr. Whiddon's Affidavit filed by AHCA with its Response, sufficiently explain why the Department took the actions it took against Conval-Care which led to this proceeding. No evidentiary hearing was, therefore, necessary. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in this matter were substantially justified. The Department could have sought the information it wanted by pursuing available discovery. Counsel for Conval-Care even remained the Department of the availability of discovery. The Department, however, rather than pursuing the information which it indicated it needed, elected to pursue a punitive action against Conval-Care rather than obtaining the information through discovery. The Department's reason for pursuing punitive actions against Conval-Care was not convincing to Hearing Officer Benton. Despite this fact, the Department entered a Final Order upholding its actions and imposing a fine of $5,000.00 for refusing to provide it with information which it could have obtained through other means. The First District Court reversed the Department's Final Order opining that the Department "lacked a legitimate investigatory purpose for demanding the records" which gave rise to its action against Conval-Care. Finally, the entire record in this case failed to indicate that there was any basis in law or fact to substantially justify the actions of the Department.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to certification as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) pursuant to Section 339.0805, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-78, Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Adnan Alghita, a licensed general contractor in the State of Florida, is the president and sole owner of Adnan Investment and Development, Inc. (Adnan's). Alghita is a United States citizen2 of Iraqi origin. He came to the United States from Iraq in 1969 and settled in Atlanta, Georgia, where he attended Georgia Tech. He graduated from Georgia Tech after only 15 months. After graduation, Alghita started his own construction company (Adnan's) in Atlanta. For a number of years, Alghita was a very successful businessman. His company evolved into a multi-million dollar business. He and his company suffered a serious setback, however, when the lending institution he had been dealing with on a regular basis terminated his line of credit and severed its relationship with him.3 In 1984, Alghita filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Hoping that a change in location would revive his business, Alghita moved (both his residence and business) from Atlanta to Florida in 1990. At the time, he had very little capital. The change has not produced the results Alghita had hoped it would. Like other owners of businesses of marginal financial status, he has continued to have difficulty obtaining bonding and credit for his business and expanding its customer base.4 Recently, Alghita, on behalf of Adnan's, submitted a bid in response to a request for bids to undertake a construction project for the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD). Adnan's bid was the lowest priced bid submitted, but it was rejected by SFWMD as non-responsive. There is no indication that Alghita's national origin played any role in SFWMD's decision to reject the bid. On May 2, 1996, Alghita filed an application requesting that the Department certify Adnan's as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise. On the application, Alghita indicated that the "approximate value of the firm" was $300,000.00 and that its inventory (which included two homes) was worth $460,000.00. In a follow-up letter that he wrote to the Department, Alghita advised that in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1995, his "personal income" was "below the minimum income to file an Income Tax return." In further support of the application, Alghita submitted to the Department a statement of credit denial, dated June 7, 1994, that he had received from the First Bank of Indiantown. The statement indicated that he had been denied a "$5,940 Letter of Credit to Bankers Insurance Co." because of past "bankruptcy" and "lack of collateral." By letter dated August 7, 1996, the Department notified Alghita of its intent to deny the application for DBE certification that he had filed on behalf of Adnan's. Such proposed action (which Alghita has challenged) is the subject of the instant administrative proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for certification as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise DONE AND ENTERED IN Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of April, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1997.
