The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license based on violations of section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes (2014), and provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-13 alleged in the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License dated April 16, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175.2/ Respondents are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed as Provider FSFN ID #100032652, the therapeutic foster home at issue in this proceeding.3/ A.A., an eight-year-old child, was placed into Respondent's foster home in April 2014.4/ On the afternoon of September 4, 2014, Respondent Cherie Iturriaga took A.A. and her two grandchildren to a shopping center. When they were ready to leave, A.A. refused to get into the family van. Mrs. Iturriaga testified that she tried, for approximately ten to 15 minutes, to persuade A.A. to get into the vehicle, but he refused. She became very frustrated, yelled at A.A. to get into the van, and began to back the van out of the parking space while A.A. was standing next to the van's open door.5/ A passerby called 911 to report that Mrs. Iturriaga—— who the passerby characterized as A.A.'s "grandmother"——was attempting to make A.A. get into the vehicle against his will. The passerby told A.A. "you don't have to get in the van if you don't want to." Mrs. Iturriaga also called 911 to report that A.A. would not get into her vehicle. She told the 911 dispatcher that she was not staying for him, and that she was "going home." The dispatcher told her that because the child was supposed to be in her care, she had to stay with him, and that officers already were on the way to that location. Nonetheless, Mrs. Iturriaga drove away and left A.A. in the parking lot with the passerby, who Mrs. Iturriaga characterized, in testimony at the hearing, as a "random person." The evidence does not clearly establish whether Mrs. Iturriaga left A.A. in the parking lot for "five to ten minutes," as she claimed, or for as much as 20 to 30 minutes, as indicated by other evidence in the record. Regardless, it is undisputed that she drove away from the parking lot and left A.A. in the company of a stranger. At some point, Mrs. Iturriaga returned to the parking lot to pick up A.A., but he was not there. She called 911, and the dispatcher confirmed that A.A. had been taken to the Pembroke Pines Police Department. Mrs. Iturriaga went to the police department to pick up A.A. There, she was arrested and charged with child neglect without great bodily harm, a third-degree felony; this charge ultimately was dropped. A.A. was not physically harmed as a result of being left in the parking lot. The evidence establishes that approximately 45 days before the September 4, 2014, incident, Mrs. Iturriaga requested that Citrus remove A.A. from Respondents' foster home within 30 days; however, he was not timely removed. When the incident giving rise to this proceeding occurred, A.A. was immediately removed from Respondents' foster home. Another child, J.O., who was approximately 14 years old at the time of the incident, was placed in Respondents' foster home approximately two and one-half years before the incident. Since then, J.O. has formed very close bonds with both Respondents, particularly Mr. Iturriaga. At the time of the hearing, J.O. had not been removed from Respondents' home and continued to reside with them. J.O. does not wish to be removed from Respondents' home. Eric Sami serves as the guardian ad litem for J.O., and has done so for the past three and one-half years. Mr. Sami testified, persuasively, that when he was assigned to J.O.'s case, J.O. was a very withdrawn, depressed, socially unstable child who had been moved through several different foster homes, and who was academically struggling. Since being placed in Respondents' home, J.O. has flourished. He has made friends, his academic performance has dramatically improved, and he is no longer depressed and socially unstable. According to Mr. Sami, Respondents have treated J.O. as if he were their own child, including taking him on family vacations and involving him in all holiday celebrations. Mr. Iturriaga participates in parent- teacher conferences for J.O. and has taken an interest in J.O.'s school work and in helping him improve his academic performance. Sami also testified, credibly, that in the short amount of time in which A.A. lived in Respondents' home, he was an extremely disruptive force, bullying J.O. and Respondents' grandchildren and killing ducks in front of Respondents' granddaughter——an event that was extremely traumatic for her to witness. Sami observed, and the undersigned agrees, that it is fundamentally unfair for J.O. to suffer the consequences of Respondents' license revocation due to an event that was precipitated by A.A.'s extreme, ongoing misbehavior before he was removed from the home. Because Sami and J.O.'s therapist, Fred Leon, believed so strongly that removing J.O. from Respondents' home would have very substantial negative consequences for J.O., they advocated to Petitioner and Citrus to allow Respondents to keep their foster home license and to keep J.O. in their home. However, that did not dissuade Citrus from recommending that Petitioner revoke Respondents' license. In October 2014, J.O.'s placement was changed from foster care in Respondents' home to non-relative placement in Respondents' home. Because revocation of Respondents' license would require J.O. to be removed from Respondents' foster home, this placement change was necessary in order for J.O. to remain in the home. However, this placement change is not without negative consequences. J.O. remains in Respondents' home but they do not receive any monetary allowance for his care,6/ so they are placed in the position of supporting him without receiving any financial assistance through the foster care system. Thus, the consequence of revoking Respondents' license is that if J.O. remained in the foster care system, he would have to be moved to a licensed foster home. If he were to stay in Respondents' home in a non-relative placement, Respondents would not receive any monetary assistance through the foster care system to help with his support. Respondents' fervently wish to keep J.O. in their home, even without financial assistance through the foster care system, due to the strong emotional bond they have with him and because of the remarkable social and academic strides he has made while in their care. However, Mr. Iturriaga testified, persuasively, that this situation imposes a financial hardship on them, which, in turn, penalizes J.O. That Respondents wish to continue to provide a nurturing home for J.O., despite the financial hardship, is strong evidence that they have J.O.'s best interests at heart and that they would continue to provide the same stable, nurturing environment for him that they have provided for more than two and one-half years. As noted above, the criminal charges against Mrs. Iturriaga were dropped. Nonetheless, employees of Citrus testified that because there was an open child abuse investigation with verified findings, they could not recommend that Respondents' foster home continue to be licensed. Petitioner presented the testimony of Sonia De Escobar, licensing manager of Petitioner's Circuit II foster care program. Ms. De Escobar testified that Petitioner is seeking to revoke Respondents' license in part due to concern for the safety of children who may be placed in Respondents' foster home in the future. De Escobar noted that it is not uncommon for children in the dependency system to "misbehave,"7/ and Petitioner is concerned about Respondents' ability to deal with child misbehavior in the future. However, the evidence establishes that Respondents successfully cared for eight foster children over a six-year period and never had any problems dealing with child misbehavior until the incident involving A.A. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that A.A. was extremely aggressive and engaged in behavior that seriously disrupted Respondents' home environment. Because of A.A.'s extreme behavior, Respondents previously had given Citrus the required 30-day notice. However, Citrus did not timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home and the incident giving rise to this proceeding thereafter ensued. As noted above, there is no dispute that Mrs. Iturriaga intentionally left A.A. with a complete stranger for some period of time. In doing so, she endangered his health and safety, in violation of section 409.175(9)(a)1. However, the undersigned finds that mitigating circumstances in this case militate against revoking Respondents' foster home license. Specifically, Respondents enjoyed a spotless record as foster parents before the incident involving A.A. Further——and very importantly——they have fostered a very successful, nurturing, long-term parental relationship with J.O. that will be jeopardized if their foster home license is revoked. Finally, it is undisputed that A.A.'s behavior was extremely aggressive, disrespectful, and disruptive throughout the time he was placed in Respondents' home. On September 4, 2014, his behavior finally caused Mrs. Iturriaga to "snap."8/ Although her actions unquestionably were inappropriate and affected A.A.'s health and safety, the evidence indisputably shows that this was a one-time incident that occurred while Mrs. Iturriaga was under significant duress, and that, under any circumstances, A.A. was not injured. The undersigned further notes Citrus' role in this incident. As the child placing agency, Citrus is charged with placing foster children in foster homes, and with removing them when circumstances warrant. As discussed above, in July 2014, Respondents gave Citrus the required 30-day notice for transitioning A.A. out of their home. However, Citrus failed to timely meet its obligation to remove A.A. from Respondents' home and this incident subsequently occurred. Had Citrus met its obligation to timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home, this incident would not have occurred. Thus, Citrus is not without blame in this matter. The undersigned further notes that if Respondents were allowed to keep their license, Citrus, as the child placing agency, is obligated under the Bilateral Agreement to consult with Respondent before placing children in their home. This consultation process presumably would help ensure that children having extreme behavioral problems are not placed in Respondents' home in the future. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that allowing Respondents to keep their foster home license would enable them to continue their close, nurturing relationship with J.O., and, further, likely would not result in any danger or other adverse effect on the health and safety of foster children who may be placed in their home in the future.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License issued on April 16, 2015, and imposing a corrective action plan on Respondents' foster home license to the extent deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to operate a foster home for dependent children should be suspended or revoked for lack of cooperation, and violation of the Petitioner's discipline policy, and licensing standards as outlined in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an elderly woman who has operated a foster home since October 1989, at 7018 Ironwood Drive, Orlando, Orange County, Florida. Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license in October, 1989. Foster home licenses are valid for one year and must be renewed annually. Respondent has annually renewed her license and presently holds license number 1093-11, issued October 18, 1993. In a licensing visit on April 6, 1990 Respondent admitted that she had been using some physical discipline with the children. She stated that she had been tapping the children's hands and had threatened one of the kids with a comb. Respondent was counselled by the Petitioner's licensing representative in regard to the agency's disciplinary guidelines. As a follow-up to the counseling session, a letter was sent to Respondent, dated April 6, 1990, by Licensing Representative Barbara Wavell, which advised Respondent that physically disciplining a foster child in her home was a violation of HRS policy. Respondent received the letter, and although she now believes that it contains misstatements of facts, she did not dispute its contents at the time. Respondent was made aware of the discipline policy of HRS on various occasions and during the required foster parent training, and agreed to abide by it. On April 10, 1992, Respondent expressed to Ms. Wavell that she believed "schools should be allowed to spank" and that "children need discipline and there is nothing wrong with appropriate spanking". In late 1993, Respondent hit at least one foster child who was placed in her home, because the child wet the bed. During 1993 and early 1994, Respondent allowed older foster children to discipline younger foster children with corporal punishment. On occasion, Respondent has restricted children from having access to their family members. Respondent has made derogatory remarks about some of the foster children's biological family members while in the presence of the foster children. Respondent had problems working with some of the children's caseworkers, most notably Jodi Peterson, on various occasions. Respondent expressed her concern that the caseworker visited her home too much, and she preferred that Ms. Peterson not have much contact with her foster children. Respondent felt that she should be included in the conversations between the children and their foster care counselors and would get upset that she was not included in these discussions. Respondent did not recognize the need for the children to have privacy and that it impinged on their right to have a proper relationship with their counselors. Respondent had on-going communications problems with the caseworkers. Respondent was specifically instructed concerning monetary allowances for the children, and the fact that the money given to Respondent was to be used for the children for clothing and incidentals. Respondent had difficulty accepting the fact that the children were entitled to monetary allowances to be used for clothing and incidentals. Respondent refused to allow the foster children placed in her home to participate in school activities, she refused to give them their allowance money to pay for school field trips. Respondent did not allow the foster children to have friends visit or to go places for fun. She encouraged them to stay home and watch television in their free time. Respondent on occasion made derogatory marks to some of the foster children placed in her home. Respondent did not show appropriate concern for the safety of a four- year-old foster child who was sharing a bedroom with two twelve-year-old foster children. Respondent was aware that they were hitting her, however, Respondent did not remove the child from that bedroom, although she had three empty bedrooms in the home. Although many visits have been made to the Respondent's home in an attempt to work with her to assist her in bringing the quality of care in her home up to an acceptable level, Respondent has failed to comply. On April 5, 1994, Petitioner's representative visited the Respondent to discuss the reasons that the Petitioner would be seeking a revocation of her license to operate a foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's license to operate a foster home. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1 (in part), 2, 4 (in part), 7 (in part), 8 (in part), 10 (in part), 11 (in part), 13 (in part), 14, 15, 16 (in part), 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), 31, 33, 34. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence: 1 (in part), 10 (in part), 19, 24. Rejected as subsumed, irrelevant or immaterial: paragraphs 3, 6 (in part), 7 (in part), 8 (in part), 9, 11 (in part), 12, 13 (in part), 16 (in part), 17, 23, 27, 28 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), 32. Rejected as a conclusion of law: paragraph 5 Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 7 Legal Office 400 W. Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jane Carey, Esquire 905 W. Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Bouelvard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Bouelvard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondent's license to operate a family foster home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating foster home licenses in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Geraldine H. Daniels, operated a licensed foster care home at 2625 Northwest Third Street, Pompano Beach, Florida, from November 1994 until September 1998. At all times during such period the Respondent held a valid foster care license that expired on or about November 7, 1998. The Respondent sought to renew the foster care license but was denied by the Petitioner. The denial was timely challenged and the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. Foster home parents receive a "board rate" for children placed in their homes. This rate is to provide financial assistance to the foster home parent so that the child's needs may be met. A minor child known in this record as W.S. was placed in the Respondent's care in January 1998. The Respondent was paid the board rate for W.S. for the months of January through June 1998. During the same period of time, the Respondent collected SSI benefits for the child W.S. from the Social Security Administration. Such payments totaled $2,964. A second minor, P.H., was placed in the Respondent's foster care home in January 1998. The Respondent was paid the Department board rate for P.H. for January through September 1998. The Respondent applied for and received SSI benefits for P.H. beginning in July 1998. Although the Department paid the Respondent the monthly board rate for the minor, she collected the additional sums from SSI through December 1998. In August 1998 the Department notified the Respondent that she was not allowed to collect SSI benefits for children in her care. Subsequent to the notice, the Respondent continued to accept SSI benefits for P.H. The Department serves as the legal custodian for the children within the foster care program. As such, it is entitled to the SSI benefits for children within the system. Foster parents are entitled to the board rate that is established by the Department's uniform rate for dependent children. The Respondent made reimbursements to the Department after her home was closed in September 1998 due to the alleged fraudulent activity and lack of interaction with the children placed in the home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the Respondent's request for renewal of the foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Geraldine H. Daniels 2625 Northwest Third Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioners were licensed to operate a family foster home. Their most current license was effective through April 7, 2004. Petitioners have served as foster parents for about five years. There has been no report of child neglect or child abuse in their foster home prior to the time period relevant here. A. H. is a 10-year-old male. At all times relevant here, A. H. was in the fourth grade. Sometime prior to October 3, 2003, Respondent removed A. H. from his mother's custody and placed him in an initial foster home. A. H.'s first foster home shall be referred to hereinafter as the Gs' foster home. Thomas Munkittrick worked for Respondent as a family service counselor. A.H. was one of Mr. Munkittrick's clients. A. H. had separate visitations with his mother and father on October 6, 2003. Mr. Munkittrick supervised both visits. During a visit to the Gs' foster home on October 14, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick noticed a rash on A. H.'s stomach. The rash appeared to be a ringworm. Mr. Munkittrick did not observe any bruises on A. H.'s arms. On or about October 15, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick spoke to Petitioners to determine whether they would accept A. H. in their home as a foster child. For reasons that are not clear, Respondent changed A. H.'s placement to Petitioners' foster home that same day. On October 16, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick took A. H. to see a medical doctor at Express Care of Belleview. Mr. Munkittrick and A. H.'s mother were present for the medical examination, during which A. H. removed his shirt. Mr. Munkittrick did not observe any bruises on A. H.'s arms. A. H.'s medical record dated October 16, 2003, indicates A. H. had a scratch/bruise on his nose, a ringworm on his stomach, and a rash on his wrist. According to the doctor's notes, A. H. reported that he accidentally injured his nose while playing football with Petitioners' dogs. The doctor's notes do not refer to any bruises on A. H.'s arms. On October 23, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick visited A. H. in Petitioners' home. Mr. Munkittrick saw no visible marks or bruises on A. H. Instead, Mr. Munkittrick observed what he believed was dirt on A. H.'s arms. Mr. Munkittrick also observed that A. H. was slightly flushed from playing outside with Petitioners' dogs, two large Doberman Pinchers. During a visit to Petitioners' home on October 30, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick observed multiple bruises on both of A. H.'s wrists and arms. The bruises were round and as large as quarters. There were no scratch or bite marks on A. H.'s arms. Prior to October 30, 2003, Petitioners had not advised Respondent about the bruises on A. H.'s arms. During the October 30, 2003, home visit, Petitioner R. B., the foster mother, indicated that she had never seen the bruises on A. H.'s arms before Mr. Munkittrick pointed them out. She relied on A. H. to explain how he was injured. During the hearing, Petitioner R. B. admitted that she saw blue/purple bruises on A. H.'s arms for the first time two or three days after his medical examination on October 16, 2003. Despite the inconsistency of Petitioner R. B.'s statements, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner R. B. had no first-hand knowledge as to the cause of the bruises. Her testimony that she did not cause the bruises on A. H.'s arms is credible. On October 31, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick went to A. H.'s school to photograph the bruises on his arms. He then took A. H. for an examination by Respondent's child protection team. The examination included an evaluation of the bruises by an advanced registered nurse practitioner. The nurse was qualified by training and experience to assess pediatric injuries resulting from physical and sexual child abuse. The nurse was unable to reach a conclusion as to the exact source of the bruises. She could not rule out that they were self-inflicted. However, the nurse's testimony provides competent evidence that the bruises on A. H.'s arms were consistent with being grabbed by another person and that they were inconsistent with injuries resulting from roughhousing with dogs. Bruises heal in stages identified by colors beginning with red and ending with brown before they disappear. The colors of bruises in order of healing are red, blue, purple, green, yellow, and brown. In general, a bruise is: (a) red within one to two days of infliction; (b) blue within one to four days of infliction; and (c) yellow/green from the fifth or sixth day up to the tenth day after infliction. A. H.'s bruises ranged in color from red to yellow/green to yellow. The yellow and yellow/green bruises were located on both of A. H.'s upper extremities. He had two forearm bruises with a red component. It is highly unlikely that A. H. received the bruises prior to October 6, 2003. It is more likely that the injuries causing the bruises were inflicted approximately one to two weeks prior to October 31, 2003, i.e., between October 18, 2003, and October 31, 2003. A. H. was living in Petitioners' home and attending public school during this period. On the evening of October 31, 2003, Respondent's staff decided to move A. H. to a third foster home. Respondent's child protective investigator took A. H. back to Petitioners' home to pick up his clothes and belongings. Petitioner R. B. became excited and increasingly emotional when she learned that Respondent was changing A. H.'s placement to another foster home. Petitioner R. B. began yelling, in A. H.'s presence, that he was a liar and a "schizo" just like his "schizophrenic mother." The child protective investigator had to ask A. H. to leave the room when Petitioner R. B. began calling him and his mother names. Petitioner R. B.'s behavior on the evening of October 31, 2003, was inappropriate. However, the deputy sheriff, who was assisting with the change in placement, did not make any arrests. On the evening of October 31, 2003, and during the hearing, Petitioner J. B., the foster father, admitted that he had seen the bruises on A. H.'s arms sometime during the week before October 31, 2003. On both occasions, Petitioner J. B. stated that A. H. was crazy. Petitioner J. B. had no first-hand knowledge as to the cause of the bruises. During the hearing, Petitioner J. B. provided credible testimony that neither he nor his dogs caused the injuries. In order to operate a foster home, foster parents must undergo training on an annual basis. The training includes knowing when to advise Respondent about injuries to their foster children. The requirement to report injuries is a part of the annual service agreement signed by Respondent's staff and foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioners' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: J. B. (Address of Record) R. B. (Address of record) Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioners, K.W. and L.A.W., should be granted a license to be foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Petitioners are a married couple who applied to Respondent for a foster home license. Petitioners have three children. The background investigation conducted by Respondent revealed reports of incidents of domestic violence and battery involving Petitioners and their children. On October 4, 1999, police officers responded to Petitioners' home after receiving a report of domestic violence. The officer's investigation revealed that one of the Petitioners, L.A.W., had been battered by her son. The child had been involved in pastoral counseling for his aggressive behavior. Petitioner, K.W., advised the police officer that the child, W.A.W., would be moving from the residence because of his continuing inappropriate behavior. On April 7, 2002, another incident of domestic violence was reported and investigated. On this occasion, the two younger children of Petitioners were involved in an altercation that resulted in Petitioner, K.W., being rendered unconscious by a blow to the head with an object delivered by one of the children, C.W. C.W. was arrested for aggravated battery. In February 2003, Petitioners desired to keep a six- month-old, unrelated child in their home. The child was placed in the home contingent on C.W.'s moving from the home and not residing in the home. Petitioners agreed to this contingency of placement, and the child was placed in Petitioners' home. On November 5, 2003, Petitioners applied to be licensed as foster parents. Ten days after Petitioners applied to be licensed, another incident of domestic violence occurred. On November 15, 2003, two of Petitioners' adult children got into a fistfight which resulted in one having a broken nose. As a result, W.A.W. was arrested. At the time of the altercation, W.A.W., 21 years old and the oldest child who had moved out at an earlier time as a result of his behavior, was residing at Petitioners' residence. Although the police report indicates that the incident occurred at Petitioners' residence, the testimony indicated that it occurred "down the street." All three of Petitioners' children continue to reside locally and frequent their parents' home. Petitioners are highly recommended by a representative of The Children's Home Society, a Guardian ad Litem, and their pastor. Respondent has the responsibility of placing foster children in a safe setting. But for the behavior of their children, Petitioners would qualify for licensure. As long as Petitioners' children frequent Petitioners' residence, any child placed in that residence is at risk. As a result, Petitioners are not qualified to be licensed as foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the foster care license application of Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Thompson, Esquire Thomas Thompson, P.A. 100 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780 Richard Cato, Esquire Department of children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the June 20, 1995, letter from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Respondent's predecessor, to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is (as was its predecessor, HRS) a state government licensing and regulatory agency. From September of 1989 to June 30, 1995, Petitioner was licensed by HRS (on a yearly basis) to operate a family foster home at her residence in Palm Beach County. In May of 1994, as part of the licensure renewal process, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (Agreement). In so doing, she agreed that she would, as a licensed foster parent, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department," "immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in [her] care," and "abide by the department's discipline policy." The previous day (May 23, 1994), Petitioner had received and signed a copy of HRS's "discipline policy," which provided as follows: FOSTER PARENT(S): You are aware that for some time, Health and Rehabilitative Services has discouraged the use of Physical punishment, including spanking, for children in foster care. Now, however, we have an Administrative Rule statewide which prohibits foster parents from using corporal punishment on foster children. This section of administrative Rule 10M- 6, which deals with discipline is reproduced in the following paragraph. "Licensing and relicensing procedure developed by the Department shall include the presentation of written foster care disciplinary policies to applicants and licensed foster parents to ensure that appropriate nonabusive disciplinary practices are used in dealing with foster children's behavior. Discipline is a training process through which the child develops the self- control, self-reliance and orderly conduct necessary for them to assume responsibilities, make daily living decisions and live according to accepted levels of social behaviors. The purpose of discipline is education and rational. It focuses on deterring unacceptable behavior by encouraging the child to develop internal controls. Foster parents are expected to define rules which establish limits and types of acceptable behavior. These rules must be clearly explained to each child and applied equally to all children. Prohibited disciplinary practices include group punishments for misbehavior of individuals; withholding of meals, mail or family visits; hitting a child with an object; spanking a child; physical, sexual, emotional and verbal abuse; humiliating or degrading punishment which subjects the child to ridicule; being placed in a locked room; and delegation of authority for punishment to other children or persons not known to the child. The use of isolation shall be used only for short periods of time as a therapeutic measure when a child's behavior is temporarily out of control. Such periods of isolation shall be observed and supervised by the foster parent to ensure the safety of the child." If you have problems with this new rule, please discuss this with your licensing counselors who will be able to help you work out alternative disciplinary techniques for each child, according to his/her needs. My signature acknowledges that I have read this statement, that I understand the content and agree to abide by it. A. G. is a 12 year-old foster child who currently resides in Boys Town in Tallahassee. Before entering the foster care system, he had been the victim of abuse. In 1994, A. G. lived in Petitioner's family foster home along with three other male foster children, J. W., M. M., and B. P., all of whom were teenagers with troubled pasts and juvenile records. On or about December 15, 1994, the day before A. G. was scheduled to leave Petitioner's home for another foster home, the other boys angrily reported to Petitioner that A. G. had misappropriated a gift certificate that belonged to M. M. and a watch that belonged to B. P. M. M. was particularly upset and angry about what A. G. had done. Upon receiving this report, Petitioner instructed the boys to "take care of" the matter. The boys then went to A. G.'s room and proceeded to hit A. G. with their hands and a belt. A. G. sustained a number of bruises on his buttocks and the back of his legs as a result of the attack. A. G. yelled and screamed as he was being hit. Petitioner was in her bedroom, which was adjacent to the room where the beating took place. At no time during the attack did she leave her bedroom to tell the boys to stop beating A. G., nor did she take any other action to stop the beating. Petitioner exercised extremely poor judgment in instructing the older boys to "take care of" the matter. She should have realized that the carte blanche she gave J. W., M. M., and B. P., who were upset and angry with A. G., placed A. G.'s physical safety at risk. She compounded her error by not carefully monitoring the older boys subsequent activities to make sure that they resolved the matter appropriately without harming A. G. The following morning, A. G. left Petitioner's home for another foster home, that of Janet Kerimoglu and her husband. A. G. arrived at the Kerimoglu home with very few belongings. Moreover, his physical appearance concerned Ms. Kerimoglu. A. G. appeared to be very thin. Furthermore, he had head lice and fresh bruises on his body. When asked about the bruises, A. G. explained that he had been beaten up by some teenagers the day before at Petitioner's home. A report that A. G. had been the victim of abuse while at Petitioner's home was made to HRS's abuse registry. The report was investigated by HRS's protective services investigative unit. On January 10, 1995, following the completion of the investigation, FPSS Report No. 94-117809 issued. The report classified as "proposed confirmed" the allegation that Respondent was guilty of neglect in connection with the beating that A. G. received at her home on or about December 15, 1994. According to the report, the beating occurred "because of [Petitioner's] lack of supervision and [her] failure to protect [A. G.]," a finding which is supported by the preponderance of the record evidence in the instant case. A request to expunge or amend the report was denied on June 6, 1995. By letter dated June 20, 1995, Petitioner was advised that her foster family home license would not renewed because of the finding of neglect made in FPSS Report No. 94-117809.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1998.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of acts and omissions to justify the revocation of his license to operate a family foster home, pursuant to Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a family foster home from June 22, 2000, until May 15, 2001, at which time Petitioner revoked Respondent's license. The only foster children placed with Petitioner were Ju. K. (Ju.) and J. K. (J.), who are brothers. During the majority of the period in question, Ju. was 16 years old and J. was 17 years old. The boys were adopted at infancy. However, their adoptive mother died when they were young. The adoptive father remarried, but died a few years later, in January 1999. The stepmother never adopted the children, and, shortly after the death of their adoptive father, she turned over the two children to foster care. Respondent had been a friend of the stepmother since the mid-1980s and, through her, had met the adoptive father. Respondent became close with the couple and their children, whom he often visited on holidays. Learning that at least one of the boys had had problems in foster care, Respondent decided to qualify to become their foster father. At the time, Respondent was 40 years old and single and had not raised any other children. However, Respondent took the training courses required for licensing as a foster parent. After Respondent obtained his foster parent license, Project Teamwork for Kids, which is the private entity in Brevard County that recruits, trains, and licenses foster parents and places foster children with these parents, placed Ju. and J. with Respondent. J. began to live with Respondent in January 2000, and Ju. joined him in June 2000. During the summer of 2000, relations among Respondent, J., and Ju. were good. They took vacations and settled into their new lives during a period relatively free of stressful demands. Respondent asked Project Teamwork 4 Kids representatives not to start any family therapy during the summer and, once school started, asked that they again defer the initiation of such services. Respondent was aware that Ju. had been diagnosed with dissociative personality disorder, but believed that a normal home life would ameliorate this condition. During the summer, Respondent was concerned with the high school to which Ju. had been assigned for ninth grade. Respondent convinced school officials to reassign Ju. to a different high school, but school officials warned Respondent that, due to the reassignment, they would not tolerate disruptive behavior from Ju. Respondent was satisfied with J.'s assignment for tenth grade because it was the same school from which he had earlier dropped out. At the start of the school year, Respondent required weekly progress reports from J.'s teachers. However, as J.'s grades improved, Respondent dropped this requirement. During the period covered by this case, Respondent's relationship with J. was better than Respondent's relationship with Ju. Respondent and J. had a major disagreement arise at the end of October when J. returned home drunk from a homecoming celebration. A day or two later, after giving the matter considerable thought, Respondent discussed the matter with J. and imposed the punishment that Respondent would not provide his written consent for J. to obtain his driving learner's permit for six months, although Respondent would reconsider at three months. When J. learned of his punishment, he became irate and telephoned his case manager with Project Teamwork 4 Kids, Karen McCalla. He demanded that she remove him from Respondent's home. Ms. McCalla visited the home and spoke with J. alone for several hours, then Respondent, and then J. again alone. This home visit provides an early, but typical, example of the difference in perspectives of Respondent and Petitioner's witnesses. According to Respondent, Ms. McCalla arrived at the home, spoke with J. alone for several hours, spoke with Respondent, and then spoke with J. alone again. She then announced that Respondent should sign for J.'s learner's permit, but not allow him to drive for three months. Although he disagreed with the recommendation and felt that Ms. McCalla's recommendation had undercut his authority, Respondent complied with the request. Ms. McCalla's version is considerably different. Agreeing that J. was demanding that she remove him from Respondent's home, Ms. McCalla noted that J. complained generally that Respondent was "overbearing, overpowering and does not give [J.] any privacy." Focusing on the larger issues than merely the proper punishment for J.'s recent misbehavior, Ms. McCalla recommended that the family undergo family therapy. Ms. McCalla's version is credited. By Respondent's own account, Ms. McCalla spent "several hours" speaking with J. initially. Although underage drinking is a serious matter that may necessitate serious discussions, it is unlikely that Ms. McCalla and J. could have spent "several hours" on this single transgression. It is more likely that J. broadened his complaints in the manner described by Ms. McCalla. Respondent's contrary version either undermines his credibility as a witness or, if sincere, his competence as a foster parent. During the fall, Respondent's relationship with Ju. deteriorated. In general, Respondent's nascent parental skills were insufficient to meet the needs of Ju. When a conventional menu of incentives and disincentives failed to produce the desired results, Respondent grew increasingly frustrated, but declined to take advantage of the support resources available to him through Project Teamwork 4 Kids and its contractors. Instead, Respondent, alone, proceeded with his own disciplinary scheme, intensifying his disciplinary measures each time that less intense measures failed. Eventually, conflict between Respondent and Ju. escalated, and the domestic situation became unbearable for both of them. For instance, at school, Respondent was legitimately concerned that Ju. not jeopardize his placement at the high school to which he had been assigned due to Respondent's efforts. Worried about Ju.'s associations at school, especially due to Ju.'s poor school associations in the past, Respondent required Ju. to sign into the library immediately after eating lunch, so he would not have the chance to socialize with his peers. If Ju. failed to sign in, a teacher was to telephone Respondent, who would go to school to find Ju. By Respondent's admission, he enforced this arrangement for four to six weeks. Respondent was adamant that Ju. not date until he was 16 years old. This was a legitimate concern due to sexual behaviors that Ju. had displayed prior to his arrival in Respondent's home. Early in the school year, while Ju. was still 15 years old, Respondent overheard him speaking on the telephone with a girl from school. Respondent interrupted the conversation and asked Ju. to ask the girl if her mother were home. Finding that she was, Respondent asked to speak to the mother. Explaining to the mother that Ju. was not allowed to go on one-on-one dates until he reached 16 years of age, Respondent, by his own testimony, managed to agitate and offend the mother. Respondent admitted that Ju. became upset because he had considered the girl his girlfriend. On another occasion, Respondent required that Ju. end a relationship with a girl at school. Without detailing any concerns about sexual activity, Respondent explained his intervention by noting that Ju. had taken another boy's girlfriend, who seems to have not been suitable for Ju.--in Respondent's opinion. At home, numerous times Respondent employed more intense strategies when conventional disciplinary interventions failed to produce the desired results. For instance, when Ju. persisted in viewing sexually unsuitable material on the television in his room, Respondent removed the bedroom door, thus depriving Ju. of all privacy. Also, when Ju. persisted in abusing and overusing the telephone, even after being placed on telephone restriction, Respondent removed the handsets when he left the home, leaving the boy without telephone service in the home, although he could walk outside the apartment to a neighbor or a pay phone. Gradually, frustration erupted into physical confrontations. Twice, Respondent ripped T-shirts off the back of the boy during angry exchanges. Once, Respondent lightly slapped the boy on the mouth when he swore at Respondent. Twice, Respondent intentionally damaged audio equipment used by Ju. For each of these actions, Respondent devised transparent stories to cover up his failure to handle Ju.'s transgressions in a positive, effective manner. As the above incidents suggest, Respondent sought to impose a level of control over Ju. that was unsuitable for Ju.'s age and the circumstances of the relationship that existed between Respondent and Ju. Lacking both experience and maturity, Respondent obstinately dug in deeper each time his discipline failed to produce the desired result. Never lacking in good motives, Respondent lacked the resources needed for the difficult parenting task that Ju. presented, and Respondent exacerbated the situation by refusing to accept the assistance of professionals who might have been able to help him with Ju. Over time, even Respondent's innocuous behavior- modification techniques became counterproductive. For instance, Respondent routinely insisted that he and a child not go to sleep without first resolving any conflicts that may have arisen. Although a salutary policy, if applied with discretion, Respondent's overbearing implementation of this policy intensified hostilities, rather than defused them. An example of the injudicious use of this policy took place in early February 2001 when Respondent and Ju. got into an argument over an uncompleted homework assignment. Respondent warned Ju. that Petitioner lacked sufficient beds to accommodate Ju. at the time and that, if Ju. did not compose himself, Respondent would call the police to have Ju. removed from Respondent's home. This was especially hurtful to a child who had already known the pain of abandonment and abuse. Trying to defuse the confrontation, Ju. demanded time to step outside and cool off, but Respondent, insistent on a resolution on his terms, ordered Ju. to remain inside until Respondent had finished talking to him. By March 2001, Project Teamwork 4 Kids representatives had tried to intervene on at least two occasions in recent weeks, but Respondent had become increasingly resistant to what he viewed as interference from caseworkers with Ju. and J. By this time, Ju. wanted out of the home, and Respondent wanted him out of the home. On March 28, 2001, Project Teamwork 4 Kids removed Ju. from Respondent's home. About six weeks later, Project Teamwork 4 Kids also removed J. from Respondent's home. Petitioner proved some of its specific allegations and failed to prove others, but, as the Administrative Law Judge noted at the final hearing, the basic issue in this case is whether Petitioner can prove that Respondent has committed an intentional or negligent act materially affected the health or safety of children in his home. Petitioner has met its burden with respect to Ju. Ju. would have been a considerable challenge to a person with considerable parenting experience and skills. Respondent lacked both, but, knowing Ju.'s special needs, nonetheless sought the responsibility of serving as Ju.'s foster father. As the situation worsened, Respondent lacked the insight to avail himself of the resources offered to him and Ju. Instead, Respondent resorted to ineffective disciplinary strategies that eventually deteriorated into angry outbursts, culminating in Respondent's angry and desperate threat to end the placement itself--a most injurious act, given Ju.'s circumstances and dissociative personality disorder. Although it is clear that Respondent assumed a very difficult undertaking, his incompetent discharge of these responsibilities, coupled with his obstinate refusal to accept readily available help from others with greater training and experience, justifies the revocation of his family foster home license.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order revoking Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen A. Kearney, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Deborah Guller Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Samuel D. Lopez Samuel D. Lopez, P.A. 629 Southeast Fifth Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Alan Siegel 500 Northwest 34th Street, Apartment #105 Pompano Beach, Florida 33064
