Findings Of Fact 1. On September 20, 2010, the staff of the Commission issued a Staff Recommendation, recommending to the Commission that there was probable cause to believe that The Florida Election Code was violated. 2. The Respondent was served by certified mail through his attorney with a copy of the Order of Probable Cause. 3. The Respondent and the staff stipulate to the following facts: a. The Respondent Darin Wade Mellinger, was a candidate for the Delray Beach City Commission in the March 10, 2010, general election. b. During his campaign, Respondent submitted reports of all contributions _ received and all expenditures made. Respondent’s 2010 G1, 2010 G2, and 2010 G3 reports were missing information. c. Respondent maintained a website during his campaign. Respondent’s C_o 045 (12/08) 1 website did not contain the required political disclaimer and did not contain the word “for” between his name and the office he sought.
Conclusions For Petitioners: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 323999-1050 For Respondent: Robin Gibson, Esquire Gibson, Valenti & Ashley 212 East Stuart Avenue Lake Wales, Florida 33853 THE FEC STAFF’S EXCEPTIONS 1. Staff Exception #1 is approved. As the FEC has consistently held, FEC v. Morroni, Case No. FEC 97-060; FEC v. Bosezar, Case No. FEC 95-053; Division of Elections v. 2the FEC has reviewed the entire record and heard arguments of counsel. De La Portilla, Case No. FEC 93-045; FEC v. Harris, Case No. FEC 98-087; FEC v. De La Portilla, Case No. FEC 00-006; FEC v. Proctor, Case No. FEC 99-065; the burden of proof in cases involving alleged violations of Chapter 106 is by a “preponderance of the evidence.” For this reason, the FEC rejects the ALJ's characterization (COL @ § 17) of the burden as being “clear and convincing.” That being said, the Commission finds that the facts as found by the ALJ support the conclusions in the Recommended Order as modified by the FEC’s conclusions herein under either burden. 2. The Commission rejects Staff Exception #2. The FEC fully supports the Division of Elections’ position that parties required to submit information to the Division should do so using the appropriate forms. However, the evidence as found by the ALJ showed that Respondents did notify the Division that a new Deputy Treasurer for the political committee involved had been appointed prior to the submission of the Quarterly Report at issue even though the form used was that designated for candidates not for committees. Given the facts of this case, the Commission cannot say that the Respondents’ use of the incorrect form made their Quarterly Report so inaccurate as to make their certification of the Report “inaccurate or untrue” in violation of Section 106.07(5), Fla. Stat. While the FEC does not agree with the ALJ’s conclusion (COL @ 4§ 23-25) that using an incorrect form cannot form the underlying basis of a finding that a report violates Section 106.07(5), it agrees with his conclusion that no violation occurred here. . WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and as amended by the Commission’s rulings on the exceptions filed herein, the FEC hereby accepts the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the ALJ and DISMISSES the charges against the Respondents. nd > DONE and ORDERED this Q2 day of Cgurt 2003. Chanee Qnroins Chance Irvine, Chairman Florida Elections Commission CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy hereof has been furnished to counsel for Respondents, Robin Gibson, Esquire, Gibson, Valenti & Ashley, 212 East Stuart Avenue, Lake Wales, Florida, 33853, by U.S. mail, and by hand delivery to Clerk, Florida Elections Commission, 107 West Gaines nd Street, Suite 224, Tallahassee mail this 22 day of — luge 2003. y; by
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Kay McGinn, willfully violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2001), when she certified the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete because it failed to disclose an in-kind contribution by Frank Furman for the use of telephones used by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers in offices that Mr. Furman owned.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the Mayor of Pompano Beach, Florida. She ran unsuccessfully for Pompano Beach City Commission in 1996. Her campaigns for the same office in 1998, 2000, and 2002 were successful. The alleged offense took place during the 2002 election campaign. Petitioner is an intelligent, conscientious public servant. She is familiar with the Florida election law and is sensitive to her obligation to follow the law and diligent in her attempt to do so. During the 2002 campaign, Frank Furman, a long-time Pompano Beach business man who enjoys an excellent reputation, offered the use of his business offices to Petitioner for campaign activities. Petitioner chose to use Furman's office on six to eight occasions to make campaign-related local telephone calls. Typically, Petitioner and five or six volunteers would spend about one hour in the early evening calling Pompano Beach voters encouraging them to vote for Petitioner. Mindful of the election law requiring the reporting of "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner asked Mr. Furman the value of the use of his telephones for reporting purposes. Furman advised Petitioner that the use of his telephones had "no value." In reporting "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner's practice was to ask the contributor to provide an invoice reflecting the "fair market value" of the "in-kind" contribution. Armed with the invoice, she would then report the "in-kind" contribution. "Fair market value" is an economic concept used most frequently in reported Florida cases when referring to the value of real property taken in condemnation actions or in determining restitution in criminal cases. Numerous definitions are found. Typically, the definitions involve "a willing buyer and a willing seller, fully informed as to the value of the object of the transaction, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell." Respondent's Statement of Findings, which was analyzed by Petitioner's expert witness, offers an amortized cost to Mr. Furman for use by Petitioner and her volunteers of the telephones. This amortized cost is apparently advanced as evidence of "fair market value" or "attributable monetary value." Mr. Furman pays a fixed-rate of slightly less than $1,500.00 per month for the use of 32 to 33 telephone lines. This means that each line costs approximately $46.87 per month. Assuming 30 days per month, the daily cost per line is $1.56. Assuming 24-hour days, the hourly cost per line is $0.065. Further assuming that six volunteers used one telephone for one hour on eight different days, the result is 48 hours of line use. The resulting amortized use cost, given the known use by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers, is $3.12. Amortized use cost is not fair market value. Neither an "attributable monetary value" nor a "fair market value" of Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones was established. To the contrary, it was established that there was no "market" for access to six to eight telephones for one hour, one night per week. While it is assumed that Petitioner would benefit from telephone calls made by her supporters, whether made from their individual homes or from some group setting, the evidence failed to established that Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones had any "attributable monetary value" or "fair market value." Given that the use of the telephones by Petitioner was during non-working hours when the telephones would normally be idle, it is not surprising that Mr. Furman advised Petitioner that there was no cost associated with the use of his telephones. His monthly telephone bill would be the same whether Petitioner used his telephones or not. Nor is Petitioner to be faulted for relying on the contributor's assessment of the value of the "in-kind" contribution of the use of the telephones. The real value to Petitioner's campaign was the use of Mr. Furman's office as a meeting place. As a practical matter, each volunteer could have taken a list of the telephone numbers of Pompano Beach voters to their respective homes and made the telephone calls from their homes. This was not a professional "phone bank," sometimes used in political campaigns where trained callers use scripted messages designed to elicit voter preferences and where the candidates receives "feed-back" on salient issues. A "fair market value" can be easily established for such services as they are common in the market place. The evidence suggests that campaign volunteers making telephone calls to registered voters from their homes or from someone's office is a common practice in political campaigns in Florida. It is also suggested that this common practice is not reported as a campaign contribution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Kay McGinn, did not violate Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, as alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stuart R. Michelson, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by Rules 9.110 and 9.190, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Attn: Ronda L. Bryan, Agency Clerk, 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 92, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 and a second copy, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Florida Appellate District where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Certified U.S. Mail to Oasis Cafe at Key Biscayne, c/o Carlos Flores, 19 Harbor Drive, Miami, Florida 33149; by regular U.S. Mail to the Honorable Darren A. Schwartz, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 3060; and by hand delivery to Marc Drexler, Chief Attorney, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, 1940 North Monroe Styeet, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202, this |@¥day of Yezember , 2013. msn For the Division of Hotels and Restaurants 7196 4008 G11) 4516 1240 | SENDERS, RECORD
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding and should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact At no time material to the allegations was Respondent licensed or certified as a contractor of any type by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On or about June 2000, Respondent entered into a written contractual agreement with Harold Knowles to construct a swimming pool at Mr. Knowles' residence located at 235 North Rosehill Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. The contract price for the swimming pool was $18,650.00. Mr. Knowles paid directly to Respondent $9,400.00. Respondent performed some work on the pool project and then stopped work on the project. Respondent failed to return to Mr. Knowles any monies received for the project. The homeowner was forced to pay out-of-pocket expenses to have a second, licensed pool contractor finish the pool that Respondent left unfinished. These expenses total in excess of $24,000.00. Respondent acknowledges that he had no license. Respondent testified at hearing along with his wife. It was clear that Respondent was sorry for his actions. He was unaware of the gravity of his acts. He does not have any financial resources, and a significant fine will not benefit Mr. Knowles. A substantial fine adversely impact Respondent's family more than Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be fined $500.00, together with the investigation and prosecution costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick Creehan, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32388-2202 Robert Footman 2702 Lake Mary Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Gail Scott-Hill, Esquire Lead Professions Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0771 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
