The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Around September 4, 2001, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. Petitioner successfully completed all the requirements for licensure mandated by the Department. In fact, the Department’s family services counselor supervisor recommended Petitioner for licensure. However, prior to finalization of her recommendation, she was asked to review the application again based on information in the central abuse hotline. From 1997 until June 2000, Petitioner operated a registered day care. During the time the day care was operated, Petitioner cared for approximately 25 children ranging in ages from infant and up. Prior to May 14, 2000, A.N. was enrolled at Petitioner’s day care. His mother visited the facility at least twice and was introduced to Petitioner's pet boxer, a medium size dog who lived in the house with Petitioner. The mother registered no objections to the presence of the dog and knew the dog would be around the children at the daycare. In fact, the dog was very friendly and was very gentle with the children at the daycare. Additionally, the children at the daycare liked to play with the dog. The dog was not mean or vicious and had never been so. On May 11, 2000, A.N. was dropped off at the day care by his mother. He stayed for approximately four hours. He was picked up by his mother. During his stay at the day care, he was fed as instructed and was supervised appropriately by Petitioner. He did have a difficult time being separated from his mother. At no time was he left alone with Petitioner’s dog. On May 12, 2000, A.N. was again dropped off by his mother. He stayed approximately seven hours. He was fed appropriately and adequately supervised during his stay. He was crying due to separation from his mother. Petitioner saw A.N.’s grandmother pull into the driveway and met her when she entered the daycare. Petitioner’s dog licked A.N. in the face. The dog’s tongue did not go into the child’s mouth. The dog never snapped at the child and was never left alone with the child. Petitioner gave the grandmother A.N.’s bottles and his teddy bear. There was no dog feces on any of A.N.’s things when he left with his grandmother. A.N. did not return to the daycare. On May 14, 2000, the Department received a report on the central abuse hotline, Abuse Report No. 2000-076224. The report alleged that Petitioner was inadequately supervising A.N. because a large dog was alone with A.N., snapping at him and licking the inside of his mouth, A.N.’s teddy bear had dog feces on it, A.N.’s bottles were not refrigerated, A.N. was not fed his food, and had physical injuries. On May 15, 2000, the Department’s child protective investigator along with a Sheriff’s deputy visited Petitioner’s home unannounced. She found the home to be neat and clean. The dog was friendly and did not show any signs of viciousness. In fact, the visit did not yield any information which would support the allegations of the abuse report. Later, the Department’s investigator interviewed A.N.’s mother and grandmother. The bear had been washed. Based on interviews with the mother and grandmother, the Department closed the report finding some indications of neglect in the areas of inadequate supervision, inadequate food, and exposing a child to dangerous conditions (the dog). However, neither the grandmother nor the mother testified at the hearing and no independent evidence was offered at the hearing to support the allegations of the abuse report. Therefore, for purposes of this licensure hearing there is no credible, non-hearsay evidence to support the allegations made in the abuse report and the report offers no basis to deny Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home. Moreover, the presence of a dog in a home does not preclude licensure as a family foster home. The Department’s own licensing standards checklist reflects that a dog in a foster home must be currently vaccinated and access to potentially dangerous animals must be restricted. Petitioner met these criteria.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Gregory Paules, Esquire 12421 North Florida Avenue Tampa Law Center, Suite B-122 Tampa, Florida 33612 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' application for relicensing as a foster home should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this licensing dispute, Petitioners, Leo and Connie Smith (the Smiths), seek to have their foster care license renewed. In a preliminary decision rendered on October 8, 1999, Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), denied the request on the ground that Petitioners improperly used corporal punishment on a child under their care, and that the Department "cannot [be] assured that [Petitioners] will not lose control again and use excessive corporal punishment." The underlying facts are relatively brief. Petitioners were first issued a therapeutic foster care license in September 1998. Thereafter, and until their application for renewal was denied, they used the license to care for two therapeutic foster children, a type of foster child that has far more severe emotional problems than a regular foster child. On July 25, 1998, or before the license was issued, Connie Smith (Connie) was babysitting a two-year-old child in her home. When the child "messed in its pants" a second time after being previously warned not to do it again, Connie struck the child with a ruler which left bruises on the child's buttocks. The incident was investigated by the Department and culminated in the issuance of an abuse report on October 9, 1998, which is identified as abuse report number 98-084291. Apparently, that report was not contested, for it remains a confirmed report in the abuse registry. Because the Department's background screening on the Smiths was completed in May 1998, or before the abuse incident occurred, the Department was unaware of the matter when it issued the license in September 1998. The abuse report contains an admission by Connie to the mother of the child that "she had lost her temper with the baby" and struck him. At hearing, however, she denied that she "lost control" and maintained instead that the spanking was simply a form of discipline for the child. Even if Connie's version of events is accepted, the fact remains that the child was struck so hard that he suffered bruises on his buttocks. Through accepted testimony presented at hearing, the Department expressed the concern that if Connie lost control supervising a normal two-year-old child, she would have far more difficulty with older children having severe emotional problems, such as therapeutic foster children. This is a legitimate concern, and Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this concern was not well-founded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioners' request for renewal of their foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Leo and Connie Smith 12134 County Road 684 Webster, Florida 33597 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should have granted Petitioner a license to operate a family day care home.
Findings Of Fact In January 1992, Petitioner operated a foster home for dependent children. The foster home was licensed by Respondent's predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as Respondent). In January 1992, Respondent received a report that Petitioner and her husband, Jim Shell, had meted out bizarre and excessive punishments to the children in their foster home. The report also alleged that Petitioner tied the younger foster children into their cribs at night. This report resulted in an investigation by Respondent. In the year prior to the initiation of the investigation, the following children stayed in Petitioner's foster home: H.S. (d.o.b. 4-6-89); S.S. (d.o.b. 10-1-86); T.H. (d.o.b. 5-3-89); S.A.C. (d.o.b. 9-18-88); B.Y. (d.o.b. 11-2-80) and G.Y. (d.o.b. 12-2-82. H.S. and S.S. were sisters. S.A.C., B.Y. and G.Y. were siblings. T.H. was mentally retarded. Petitioner gave B.Y. more household duties in the home than would be expected as chores for a child of her age. These responsibilities included housecleaning, laundry and child care. Additionally, Petitioner often kept B.Y. home from school to do housework. To excuse B.Y.'s absence, Petitioner would write notes to the school, falsely stating that B.Y. had a doctor's note and stayed home sick. B.Y. and G.Y. were forced to do push-ups as punishment for minor infractions. Petitioner's testimony that the children were required to do these push-ups as a joke or game is not persuasive. Mr. Shell spanked G.Y. for mis-reciting spelling words. This occurred once a week. On one occasion, B.Y. observed Mr. Shell hit G.Y. on the buttocks with a two by four. On another occasion, Mr. Shell jerked S.A.C. off a trampoline in the backyard, spanked her and threw her onto the ground. As a result of this rough treatment, S.A.C.'s head struck a tree. Petitioner regularly tied H.S.; S.S.; T.H.; and S.A.C. into their cribs at night because they would get up after being put down for the night. When B.Y. untied the children, Petitioner told her that when the children are tied up, they are supposed to remain that way. There was great strife in the Shell household. Petitioner and her husband often argued. For example, on B.Y's first night in the home, Petitioner hit Mr. Shell on the head with a frying pan. It is contrary to Department policy to physically restrain or punish children in foster care. Foster parents learn this in the training they receive before receiving their foster care licenses. Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim that she is separated from her husband, they continue to live under one roof. The house they live in is on the same property where Petitioner intends to operate a family day care home. The foregoing facts, among others, were set forth in the Respondent's final investigative report, Florida Protective Services System Abuse Report Number 92-007405. On April 22, 1992, the Respondent sent a certified letter to Petitioner informing her that the investigative report had been classified as proposed confirmed, that she had the right to request that Respondent amend or expunge the report, and that any such request would be considered only if received by Respondent within sixty days of her receipt of the April 22, 1992 letter. The letter contained the following language: If you do nothing, your right to appeal the classification of the report will be completely barred. By not choosing [to ask for amendment or expungement], this report will automatically be classified as CONFIRMED. This means that you do not contest the department's right to maintain the report findings as stated, including your identification as a perpetrator. A perpetrator in a confirmed report of abuse, neglect or exploitation may be disqualified from working in certain positions of trust, including working with children, disabled adults or aged persons. (Emphasis supplied). Petitioner signed the acknowledgment of receipt for the April 22, 1992, letter on April 27, 1992. She never requested amendment or expungement of the investigative report. Because neither amendment nor expungement of the report was sought, the confirmed classification became final agency action sixty days after Petitioner's receipt of the letter on April 27, 1992. In other words, the agency action became final on June 26, 1992. No appeal was taken from this action.1 In 1994, the Agency for Health Care Administration granted Petitioner an exemption from disqualification from employment in positions covered by Section 400.512, Florida Statutes. That section discusses the requirement for employment screening, using level 1 standards, for home health agency personnel, persons referred for employment by nurse registries, and persons employed by sitter, companion, or homemaker services registered under Section 400.509, Florida Statutes. The record does not indicate whether the Agency for Health Care Administration conducted an evidentiary hearing before making its decision to grant Petitioner the exemption.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the application of Petitioner Patricia Shell to operate a registered family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a child care facility operating under a probation-status license, violated the terms of probation by committing three Class II Violations, as Petitioner alleges, and if so, whether the license should be suspended or revoked; and, alternatively, whether, if Respondent committed the alleged Class II Violations (or any of them), Petitioner should deny Respondent's application for renewal of license.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Wiz Kidz Learning 2, Inc. ("Wiz Kidz"), holds a probation-status Certificate of License, numbered C11MD1914, which authorizes the company to operate a child care facility in Palmetto Bay, Florida, for six months, from September 2, 2017, through March 1, 2018. The licensee does business under the name Wiz Kidz Learning 2. As the operator of a licensed child care facility, Wiz Kidz falls under the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). At the time of the final hearing, Wiz Kidz had been a probation-status licensee for more than six months. DCF had converted Wiz Kidz' license to probation status effective June 29, 2017, after finding Wiz Kidz guilty of violating the staff-to-child ratio rules four times in a two-year period, as charged in an Amended Administrative Complaint dated May 25, 2017, which Wiz Kidz had not contested. The conditions of probation were that Wiz Kidz would pay all outstanding fines, not violate the staff-to-child ratio rules again, not commit any other Class I or Class II Violations while on probation, and submit to biweekly inspections. Wiz Kidz' initial probation-status license had been due to expire on September 1, 2017. Shortly before that date, however, Wiz Kidz had submitted a renewal application, which meant that, by operation of law, the probation-status license would not expire until DCF had finally acted upon Wiz Kidz' application for renewal.2/ Instead of simply allowing Wiz Kidz to operate on the "unexpired" license, however, DCF issued a new probationary license to Wiz Kidz effective from September 2, 2017, to March 1, 2018, which essentially renewed the initial probation-status license for another six-month period of probation.3/ On August 17, 2017, DCF employees Claudia Alvarado Campagnola and Quendra Gomez conducted an inspection of the Wiz Kidz facility between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., during which they observed three alleged incidents of noncompliance with "Class II" (mid-level) licensing standards, namely: (1) storing a toxic substance in a place accessible to children; (2) failing to provide adequate direct supervision; and (3) failing to possess a current attendance record during a fire drill. On September 26, 2017, DCF issued to Wiz Kidz a Notice of Intent to Deny Child Care Facility Licensure, which gave notice that DCF planned to deny Wiz Kidz' pending application for renewal of license because, on August 17, 2017, Wiz Kidz had been "cited for 3 class II violations and 7 class III violations in direct violation of [its] probationary license terms." The "toxic substance" seen on August 17, 2017, was an alcoholic beverage. Upon entering the facility, Ms. Gomez noticed two unopened bottles of champagne at the back of a shelf, behind (and partially obscured by) a large plastic toy and other items. There is no photograph of the shelf in evidence, and the descriptive testimony lacked precision; as near as the undersigned can tell, this shelf was several feet long, about one foot deep, and mounted about five feet high on one of the classroom walls. One detail is not disputed: the shelf was above the heads of even the oldest children in care (between the ages of six and seven years). Thus, even if a child could have seen the bottles, he would not have been able to take possession of them without deliberate effort; because the bottles were well out of reach, the child would have needed to stand on a stepladder or its equivalent (e.g., a suitable chair) to get his hands on them. There is no evidence that a stepladder was available. Ms. Gomez testified that a child could have pulled over a chair and climbed on it to reach the champagne bottles. Perhaps so. On the other hand, while the undersigned can reasonably infer that there were chairs in the classroom, he cannot reasonably infer that any of them would have been fit to enable a child to access the bottles. To establish the element of "accessibility" based on the theory that a chair could be used as a stepladder, DCF needed to prove that a suitable chair was actually there for a child present in the classroom to use. This it failed to do. There is no evidence regarding the dimensions of the available chairs, nor any evidence concerning the heights of the children. The witnesses provided only a rough idea of the height of the shelf; their reasonably consistent accounts constitute clear and convincing evidence of the general fact that the shelf was higher than the kids' heads, but not of the actual measurement. Absent proof of these material facts, Ms. Gomez's testimony regarding the way a child could have gotten hold of the champagne bottles is too speculative to support a finding that these items were, in fact, physically accessible to the children. In addition, there is no evidence suggesting that a child could have dragged a chair over to the shelf and clambered up without attracting the attention of an adult. Given that the shelf was located in the classroom, the undersigned infers that no child reasonably could have pulled this off, unless the adult in the room were asleep at the switch. Finally, it is worth mentioning that if a child were able to stand on a chair and grab a champagne bottle without being caught, he still would not have access to the "toxic substance" in the bottle unless he could somehow pour it out. There is no evidence in the record concerning how one opens a champagne bottle, but common experience teaches the undersigned that a young child (the children in care were less than eight years old) likely would have difficulty twisting out the cork. In any event, DCF failed to prove that any of the children at Wiz Kidz reasonably could have popped the cork on the champagne, and therefore it failed to prove that the champagne was accessible to a child. The other two alleged violations occurred during a fire drill, which the inspectors required Wiz Kidz to conduct, in their presence, during the children's nap time. Three children exited the facility in their bare feet. The area where the children were assembled after evacuating the "burning building" was near a dumpster; some litter and tree branches were on the ground. From these facts, which were not seriously disputed, DCF infers that the children were not adequately supervised. The undersigned rejects this inference, which does not reasonably and logically follow from the basic facts. To begin, there is no rule that requires children always to wear shoes. Thus, that some of the children had removed their footwear before taking a nap is of no concern. When the alarm went off, staff evidently did not make these children pause to put their shoes back on, which would have protected their feet——but delayed their exit. To be sure, it is probably a good practice, generally speaking, to prevent young children from going outside barefoot. Clearly, however, it is best not to let them perish in a fire; in an emergency, getting to safety is the highest priority. Because the purpose of a fire drill is to simulate an actual emergency, the fact of the barefoot children prompts undersigned to infer, not that staff failed to provide adequate supervision, but that staff facilitated the speediest escape under the circumstances. During the fire drill, one of the teachers failed to take along a current attendance record when leaving the building, which (unlike the wearing of shoes) is mandated by rule. Ultimate Factual Determinations Wiz Kidz is not guilty of storing a toxic substance in a place accessible to children because the evidence failed to establish an incident of noncompliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.002(1)(f). Wiz Kidz is not guilty of failing to provide adequate direct supervision because the evidence failed to establish an incident of noncompliance with rule 65C-22.001(5)(a). The undersigned determines, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a staff member failed to possess a current attendance record during a fire drill, which constitutes an incident of noncompliance with licensing standard No. 33-12, which implements rule 65C-22.002(7)(e). This was Wiz Kidz' first occasion of noncompliance with licensing standard No. 33-12.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding Wiz Kidz not in violation of the terms of probation. It is further RECOMMENDED that Wiz Kidz' application for renewal of license not be denied based on the commission of a Technical Support Violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2018.
The Issue The issues in this case, which arises from Petitioner's application for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes, are whether Petitioner was a prevailing small business party in a disciplinary proceeding that Respondent initiated, and, if so, whether Respondent's decision to prosecute Petitioner was substantially justified or whether special circumstances exist that would make an award unjust.
Findings Of Fact On August 15, 2014, Respondent Department of Children and Families ("DCF") issued an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner Children's Hour Day School (the "School"), a licensed child care facility, charging the School with two disciplinable offenses, namely denial of food as form of punishment (Violation 1) and misrepresentation (Violation 2). The allegations of material fact in support of Violation 1 were as follows: During a complaint inspection on 8/6/14, the child care facility was cited for a Class I violation of Standard #12, Child Discipline, [because] a child, to wit, S.B., was denied a snack as a form of punishment when the child allegedly hit her sister, L.B. who is also enrolled at the child care facility. The allegations of material fact in support of Violation 2 were as follows: During a complaint inspection on 8/6/14, the child care facility was cited for a Class I violation of Standard #63, Misrepresentation, when it came to the Family Safety Counselor's attention that child care personnel, K.L. misrepresented and forged information, related to the child care facility when he utilized a notary stamp belonging to a former employee, namely Albarran and submitted the 2014 application for licensure to the Department with the forged notarization. The School, which requested a hearing, was found not guilty of the charges. See Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. Child.'s Hour Day Sch., Case No. 14-4539, 2015 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 8 (Fla. DOAH Jan. 9, 2015; Fla. DCF Feb. 18, 2015). The Administrative Law Judge made the following findings of material fact with respect to Violation 1: S.B. and L.B. are young sisters who stayed at Respondent's day-care center in July 2014. On July 9, 2014, one of Respondent's employees gave S.B. and L.B. a small cup of Cheez-Its as a snack. [Kevin] Lennon was present when the two girls were sharing the cup of Cheez-Its. After S.B., who is the older and bigger child, finished her share of the Cheez-Its, S.B. began to hit her sister to take her sister's share of the Cheez-Its. Mr. Lennon separated the two girls and permitted L.B. to eat her share of the Cheez-Its. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he did not take the Cheez-Its from S.B. to punish S.B. Id. at 3-4 (paragraph number omitted). The Administrative Law Judge made the following findings of material fact with respect to Violation 2: On March 25, 2014, Petitioner received from Respondent an "Application for a License to Operate a Child Care Facility" (the application). Mr. Lennon completed the application on behalf of Respondent. The application contained an attestation section that required Mr. Lennon's signature to be notarized. On March 25, 2014, Petitioner received an attestation section (first attestation section) signed by Kevin Lennon on February 28, 2014. The first attestation section contains Ivanne Albarran's notary seal and a signature dated February 28, 2014. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he signed the first attestation section as Kevin Lennon. Mr. Albarran testified, credibly, that he signed the first attestation section as the notary public. The application package contains a second attestation section that was received by Petitioner on March 28, 2014. The second attestation section contains Mr. Lennon's signature and a date of March 26, 2014. The second attestation section contains Mr. Albarran's notary seal and a signature dated March 28, 2014. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he signed the second attestation section as "Kevin Lennon." Mr. Albarran testified, credibly, that he signed the second attestation section as the notary public. Id. at 4-5 (paragraph numbers omitted). The School's owner is a corporation, Hamilton-Smith, Inc. ("HSI"), whose principal office is located in the state of Florida.1/ Kevin Lennon, who was referred to as "K.L." in the Administrative Complaint and is mentioned in the findings of fact quoted above, is HSI's sole shareholder. HSI employed fewer than 25 persons at the time DCF initiated the underlying disciplinary proceeding, and at all relevant times thereafter. Thus, HSI is a "small business party" as that term is defined in section 57.111(3)(d)1.b., Florida Statutes.2/ DCF agrees that HSI is a "prevailing" party as that term is defined in section 57.111(3)(c)1., inasmuch as a final order dismissing the charges against the School was entered in DOAH Case No. 14-4539. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that HSI is a "prevailing small business party" entitled to recover its reasonable attorney's fees and costs from DCF "unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust." § 57.111(4)(a), Fla. Stat. In defending against the administrative charges, HSI incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $4,515.00 and costs totaling $434.50, for which it now seeks to be reimbursed. DCF does not contest the amount or reasonableness of either sum. DCF contends, however, that an award of attorney's fees and costs is unwarranted because its actions were substantially justified. It is therefore necessary to examine the grounds upon which DCF made its decision to charge the School with the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The disciplinary action had its genesis in an anonymous complaint that, on August 6, 2014, was phoned in to the local DCF licensing office in the School's vicinity. DCF counselor Michaelyn Radcliff went out that same day to investigate, and she met Tajah Brown at the School. Ms. Brown, an employee of the School, revealed to Ms. Radcliff that she had made the complaint, which involved the ratio of staff to children. Mr. Lennon, who was Ms. Brown's boss, happened to be out of town at the time and hence was not present for Ms. Radcliff's inspection. For the next six hours or so, Ms. Brown described for Ms. Radcliff every regulatory violation or offense she could think of, which she believed the School might have committed. One such offense was the alleged withholding of S.B.'s snack. Ms. Brown had not witnessed this incident, but she knew the child's mother, E.B., and offered to ask the mother to give a statement about it, which Ms. Radcliff agreed was a good idea. E.B. met Ms. Radcliff at the School, accompanied by her daughter S.B., who was then two years old. E.B. did not have personal knowledge of the alleged denial-of-snack incident, but she had been told about the event by her sister (S.B.'s aunt) who had picked S.B. and L.B. up from day care the evening of its alleged occurrence. The aunt did not have personal knowledge of the matter either, having arrived afterward. Rather, according to E.B., the aunt had told E.B. that Mr. Lennon had told her (the aunt) that S.B. had hit L.B. and thrown a tantrum. Ms. Radcliff did not speak to the aunt, however, whose testimony about what Mr. Lennon told her actually might have been admissible at hearing under an exception to the hearsay rule3/; instead, she accepted E.B.'s statement about the incident, which was based on hearsay (Mr. Lennon's declaration) within hearsay (the aunt's declaration) and had no evidential value on its own. Ms. Radcliff did question one eyewitness: two-year- old S.B., who denied hitting her sister, complained that Mr. Lennon would not give her a snack, and accused Mr. Lennon of hitting her. S.B.'s statement, such as it was, was the only independently admissible evidence Ms. Radcliff had. She never spoke with Mr. Lennon, who was the only adult eyewitness to the alleged denial-of-snack incident.4/ As for the alleged misrepresentation, Ms. Brown informed Ms. Radcliff that she (Ms. Brown) had observed Mr. Lennon using a notary stamp belonging to Ivanne Albarran, a former employee of the School, to "notarize" signatures in Mr. Albarran's name when he was not around. Ms. Brown did not, however, identify any specific documents that she claimed to have seen Mr. Lennon fraudulently notarize in this fashion.5/ Nor, apparently, was she asked whether she was familiar with either Mr. Albarran's or Mr. Lennon's signature or if she could identify anyone's signature on any document. Ms. Radcliff herself compared the signatures on documents purportedly signed by Mr. Albarran during the time when Mr. Albarran was an employee of the School with some of his purported signatures on documents executed after his employment had ended. She concluded that the signatures looked different. Ms. Radcliff is not a forensic document examiner, however, and she has no discernable expertise in handwriting analysis. Based on her layperson's opinion about the signatures, Ms. Radcliff determined that Mr. Albarran had not executed some notarized documents that the School had submitted with its recent application for renewal licensure, even though his stamp, seal, and purported signatures appeared on them. Based on Ms. Brown's claim to have seen Mr. Lennon use Mr. Albarran's notary stamp, Ms. Radcliff concluded that Mr. Lennon had forged these signatures. Ms. Radcliff never asked Mr. Albarran whether he had signed the documents in question, nor did she speak with Mr. Lennon about the matter.
