The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner committed the alleged violations and, if so, should her paramedic license be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed as a paramedic by the City of Gulfport and worked as a paramedic for the Gulfport Fire Department. In this capacity, Petitioner worked under the auspices of the medical director for Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services (Pinellas County EMS). Petitioner was a paramedic from 1997 until March 2003. Prior to that time, from 1991 until 1997, she worked as an emergency medical technician (EMT). On February 20, 2003, Petitioner, along with Lt. Brian Campbell and Firefighter/EMT Dennis Jackson, were called to respond to the scene of a shooting. Petitioner was the only paramedic on the scene and, therefore, the only person on the scene certified by the Office of the Medical Director (OMD) to provide advanced cardiac life-saving treatment. Petitioner received the call at 12:22 a.m., and arrived at the patient's side at 12:30 a.m. When Petitioner arrived at the patient's side, she observed a white male, approximately 20 years old, lying on his back in the street. His skin color was ashen, his mouth and eyes were wide open, and his pupils were fixed and dilated. Upon physical examination, Petitioner could not detect a pulse and observed two small holes in the patient's trunk. At that point, Petitioner did not know whether the two holes represented two separate entry wounds or one entry and one exit wound. Petitioner observed a trail of blood, at least a block long, leading to the patient, but there was not a lot of blood around the patient. Petitioner attached an electrocardiogram (ECG) monitor to the patient to monitor the electrical activity of his heart. When Petitioner first turned on the ECG monitor, she observed four ticks of electrical activity within a 14-second span. Petitioner testified that based on her observation and physical examination of the patient, she believed that the electrical activity exhibited on the ECG monitor was not pulseless electrical activity (PEA), but rather "artifact" caused by her manipulation of the patient. Petitioner further testified that, thereupon, she stopped touching the patient and observed that the ECG read-out went mostly flat, showing only occasional ticks. Petitioner testified that these occasional ticks, as observed on the ECG monitor, indicated to her that the patient was in asystole. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner declared the patient dead. After Petitioner declared the patient dead, she prepared a Patient Care Report (Report or Patient Care Report) while still on the scene. In the Report, Petitioner wrote that she found a white male laying on the ground with an apparent small entrance wound in his upper chest and a possible small exit wound near his back rib. She further noted that the patient's temperature was normal, that his eyes were fixed and dilated, that he was not breathing (apneic), and that he had no discernible pulse. Petitioner also noted in the Report that the patient was in asystole within one minute after the ECG pads were attached, but she failed to note the initial four ticks she observed, which may have represented PEA. In the Report, Petitioner noted that at 12:30 p.m., the patient was hooked up to the monitor; at 12:31 p.m., he was asystolic; and at 12:32, she confirmed the patient dead. Upon completing the Report at the fire station, Petitioner attached to the Report the last of several ECG strips she had intermittently printed while at the patient's side. The ECG printout that Petitioner attached to the Report depicted a classic "flat line" indicative of asystole or no electrical activity. Petitioner discarded each of the ECG strips that contained some indicia of electrical activity. A Patient Care Report is a legal document that Petitioner is required to complete by law. By signing the Report, Petitioner acknowledged that the information contained in the Report was true and accurate. Later, on the morning of February 20, 2003, when the employees' shifts at the fire station were changing, Petitioner and Toni Lanahan (Lanahan), a firefighter/paramedic coming on duty, talked about the shooting incident. That such conversation occurred is undisputed. However, there was conflicting testimony as to what Petitioner told Lanahan during that conversation. According to Lanahan, Petitioner told her that when she (Petitioner) arrived at the scene, the patient looked dead but she hooked him up to the ECG monitor, that he had a rhythm but she did not work him, and that she turned off the monitor. Petitioner testified that she did not tell Lanahan that the patient had a heart rhythm, but only that the patient "was dead" and that she did not work him.1 About two hours after her conversation with Petitioner, Lanahan retrieved stored ECG code summary data of the patient described above.2 When Lanahan reviewed the ECG code summary, she saw that the patient had a presenting ECG rhythm showing approximately 40 beats per minute of PEA with gradually slowing PEA for the entire seven minutes depicted in intervals on the ECG summary. Based on her review of the ECG record of the gunshot wound patient, Lanahan believed that in this situation, the OMD protocols mandated that immediate resuscitative treatment be administered. Lanahan then reported these concerns to her emergency medical services (EMS) Coordinator, Lt. Marenkovic, who in turn, reported the incident to Gulfport Fire Chief Brian Brooks. Chief Brooks notified the OMD of the possible violations of its protocols by Petitioner. The OMD initiated an investigation, which included reviewing the written statements of Petitioner, Lt. Campbell, and EMT Jackson; the ECG code summary for the incident; Petitioner's Report; and the transcripts of the sworn interviews of Petitioner, Lt. Campbell, and EMT Jackson taken by the Gulfport Fire Department. After reviewing the above-referenced documents, Dr. Laurie Romig (Dr. Romig), the medical director of the Pinellas County EMS, decided to revoke Petitioner's certification. This decision was based on Dr. Romig's determination of the following: (1) Petitioner violated numerous protocols in the Medical Operations Manual, both administrative and direct patient care protocols; and (2) Petitioner attempted to make the situation appear differently from what it turned out to be, and that, apparently, she did that on purpose. Specifically, Dr. Romig charged Petitioner with violating Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services Protocol 2.3, Sections 5 and 6, and Protocol 10.8 and the following Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services Rules and Regulations: Sections XIII-3-b, related to falsification or inappropriate alteration of emergency medical services records; XIII-3-e, related to theft or dishonesty in performance of duty; XIII-3-i, related to demonstrated ability, failure or refusal to adhere to established protocols and standards as established by the authority; and XIII-3-k, related to just cause, including unbecoming behavior or unprofessional conduct reflecting a poor system image. The Pinellas County emergency protocols are written requirements that paramedics must follow when administering emergency treatment to patients. The protocols are published in a document entitled Pinellas County Medical Operations Manual, which is approved by the medical director and distributed to all Pinellas County EMS paramedics. Petitioner received a copy of the most recent medical operations manual in January 2003. EMS Protocol 5.10 prescribes treatment for patients presenting with PEA. As defined in Protocol 5.10, PEA is "any semi-organized electrical activity that can be seen on a monitor screen although the patient lacks a palpable, radial, brachial, or carotid pulse." When PEA is present in a patient, Protocol 5.10 mandates that immediate life-saving treatment be implemented. The patient initially had electrical activity. Nonetheless, Petitioner did not follow Protocol 5.10. According to Petitioner's testimony, she believed that the patient was asystolic and, thus, the protocol related to PEA was inapplicable to the shooting victim. Petitioner's belief was not supported by the ECG report. Protocol 5.4 delineates the procedures to be followed in the treatment of asystole. In the book utilized for Pinellas County EMS paramedic training, "asystole" is defined as a cardiac arrest rhythm associated with no discernible electrical activity on the ECG ("flat line"). Significantly, Protocol 5.4 and Protocol 5.10, discussed in paragraph 21, require that resuscitative efforts be started immediately and that such resuscitative efforts and treatment be terminated by the paramedic only "after 10 minutes of continuous asystolic arrest with appropriate interventions." Even if Petitioner's assertion that the patient was asystolic is accepted, she failed to provide the required resuscitative efforts and/or treatments prescribed by Protocol 5.4. Petitioner did not prematurely terminate resuscitative efforts, she never implemented them. Protocol 5.15 prescribes the treatment and transport considerations for "patients with cardiac arrest secondary to trauma, regardless of presenting cardiac rhythm." The protocol provides that such patients should be transported to the closest hospital emergency facility. Contrary to the requirements in Protocol 5.15, the patient was not transported to a hospital emergency facility. Protocol 2.3 requires paramedics, when possible, to contact and consult with On-line Medical Control (OLMC) in any case in "which a deviation from protocol has been made intentional or otherwise." The OLMC is a system which allows paramedics to contact the OMD and consult with a medical doctor regarding a situation in the field. Petitioner clearly deviated from Protocols 5.4 and/or 5.10, by failing to initiate and implement the resuscitation procedures required by both protocols, and Protocol 5.15, by failing to have the patient transported to a hospital emergency facility, yet she never contacted the OLMC as mandated by Protocol 2.3. Petitioner acknowledged that she did not follow either Protocols 5.4 or 5.10, both of which required immediate resuscitative efforts. Petitioner testified that instead, she followed Protocol 10.8, which provides an exception to the protocols that require initiation of resuscitative efforts. Petitioner contends that Protocol 10.8 provided the basis for her withholding resuscitation from the patient. Protocol 10.8 requires that cardiopulmonary cerebral resuscitation (CPCR) be initiated "in all cases when the patient is found in cardiopulmonary arrest unless one of the exclusion or special situation criteria applies." The exclusion criteria provides that CPCR may be withheld if the patient has, "in conjunction with apnea, pulselessness and asystole on the ECG," an "obviously unsurvivable trauma." If CPCR is withheld, Protocol 10.8 requires that exclusion criteria be fully documented and described. Protocol 10.8 does not define "obviously unsurvivable trauma." However, according to Dr. Romig, the term connotes catastrophic injuries observable by an untrained eye. Dr. Romig, an expert in emergency medicine and traumatic cardiac arrest, testified that nothing about this patient, based on her review of the records and documents, indicated that the patient had suffered an "obviously unsurvivable trauma." Also, Lt. Campbell, an EMT certified for 12 years, who was at the scene, testified that although the patient "looked dead," he could not say that the patient suffered an "obviously unsurvivable trauma" because the patient showed only a small bullet wound to the chest and a "little bit" of blood on his (the patient's) clothing. The weight of the evidence showed that the patient had not suffered an obviously unsurvivable trauma. However, even accepting Petitioner's testimony that she believed that the patient had suffered an obviously unsurvivable trauma, she failed to comply with Protocol 10.8. If Petitioner, in fact, relied on Protocol 10.8 in deciding to not administer CPCR, she was required to document and describe the exclusionary criteria, which was the basis of her decision to withhold CPCR. Petitioner failed to provide any such documentation and, thus, violated Protocol 10.8. In addition to violating the above-noted protocols, Petitioner was dishonest in the performance of her duties as a paramedic and also falsified EMS records. The ECG summary showed that despite the patient's having electrical cardiac activity of at least 40 beats, Petitioner turned off the ECG machine and pronounced the patient dead. After pronouncing the patient dead, she then turned the ECG machine on again, and intermittently printed activity on four separate occasions until reaching a reading showing no electrical cardiac activity. By engaging in this conduct, Petitioner was dishonest in the performance of her duties. Paramedics are required to truthfully and accurately complete the Patient Care Records of patients for whom they provide emergency medical services. Here, the ECG summary showed PEA of over 40 beats per minute initially and diminished electrical activity for over eight minutes total, six minutes of which were after Petitioner had already pronounced the patient dead. Petitioner initially saw a rhythm of four beats or ticks in a 14-second period, which was a beat rate of 40 and showed on the ECG strip as 42. Although the initial reading of approximately 40 beats and PEA was clearly visible during the entire nearly eight minutes depicted on the six-second intervals shown on the ECG code summary, this was omitted from Petitioner's Report. Petitioner omitted from the patient's Record the ECG readings that showed electrical activity. Instead, Petitioner reported that at the time she declared the patient dead, he was in "asystole" when, in fact, the ECG summary showed PEA. Moreover, Petitioner documented the Report with an asystole ECG strip reflecting a "flat line" reading printed some six or seven minutes after the reported time of death.3 Petitioner admitted during her sworn statement and at this proceeding that she deliberately did not attach to the Report any part of the ECG strip that reflected the interim electrical activity. Petitioner testified that the ECG strips showing interim electrical activity could raise doubts about the propriety of the treatment she gave this patient in a future criminal trial or other investigation.4 The medical director is required by law to ensure that Pinellas County EMS personnel provide quality care and are not a danger to the safety of the county's citizens, residents, or visitors. Here, Petitioner violated the protocols related to the standard of care for patients and completion of reports and rules and regulations related to dishonesty in the performance of duties and to falsification of records. These infractions are a possible threat to public health and safety of residents of and visitors to Pinellas County. As such, they constitute just cause to conditionally revoke Petitioner's Pinellas County Paramedic Certificate. The conditional revocation allows Petitioner to reapply for a paramedic certificate in two years. Such recertification may include a one-year probationary period, with monitoring by the medical director to include a review of all trauma-run reports. Petitioner's Pinellas County Emergency Medical Technician Certification was not revoked and she retains that certification.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice of Revocation dated March 28, 2003, and upholding revocation of Petitioner's Pinellas County Paramedic Certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner's facility opened in January of 1976 as the Hubert Rutland Hospital. Its name was subsequently changed to Gateway Community Hospital and, after purchase by petitioner, it became Humana Hospital Northside. Dr. D. K. Mukherjee, Board-certified in internal medicine and cardiology, came to petitioner's facility in 1976 for the prime purpose of developing a cardiac catheterization laboratory, and assisted in preparing a list of equipment necessary to begin operation of such a laboratory. On December 31, 1976, petitioner's predecessor entered into a medical equipment service agreement for cardiac catheterization and monitoring equipment. That equipment, costing less than $100,000.00, was delivered to the hospital on or before June 17, 1977. Since that time, cardiac catheterization procedures, as defined in Rule 10-5.11(15), Florida Administrative Code, have been performed on a continuous and regular basis at petitioner's facility in Special Procedures Room No. 3. Over the past eight to nine years, the longest interval between the performance of such procedures has been approximately one or two weeks. Special Procedures Room No. 3, while also utilized for other purposes, has the equipment, staff and support services necessary for providing the studies and procedures associated with cardiac catheterization. The hospital itself is capable of providing the ancillary diagnostic services, such as hematology studies, electrocardiography, chest x-rays, blood-gas studies, pathology, blood chemistry analysis and nuclear studies pertaining to cardiology. Prior to July 1, 1977, Certificate of Need review was not required for the purchase of cardiac catheterization equipment by a hospital unless it involved a capital expenditure of more than $100,000.00. Commencing on July 1, 1977, Certificate of Need review was required when a health care facility sought to provide a substantial change in service, defined as a service which was not offered on a regular basis within the prior twelve-month period. Section 381.494(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10-5.02(19), Florida Administrative Code. Because of technological and scientific advances, petitioner desired to replace and update the equipment purchased in 1976 for the performance of special procedures. Accordingly, in April of 1984, it submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to replace special procedures equipment at a project cost of $1,269,000.00. The application, in Section 3 stating the need and justification for the project, noted that: "Our existing equipment is totally inadequate to perform state-of-the-art cardiac catheter- ization and coronary angioplasty. When we began performing cardiac catheterization in 1977 this equipment was adequate, but today it is totally unacceptable. This proposed equipment will not only provide state-of-the- art equipment for these procedures, but will do so in a cost-effective manner since combined utilization of such high cost equip- ment contributes to the reduction of the cost of medical care." HRS issued petitioner Certificate of Need number 3261 for the replacement of special procedures equipment at a total project cost of $1,269,000.00, as requested. However, in a cover letter transmitting the issued Certificate of Need to the petitioner, HRS noted: "Please be advised that neither this office, the Office of Licensure and Certification nor the Local Health Council has documen- tation to support the performance of cardiac catheterization procedures at this hospital." Local Health Councils are private nonprofit corporations which contract with HRS to conduct local planning activities, including the collection of data, the publication of various utilization reports and the development of Local Health Plans. When HRS reviews proposed health care projects which require a Certificate of Need, it utilizes the data submitted to it by the various Local Health Councils, particularly in those instances where its rules contain a methodology or formula which includes as a factor an accounting of existing facilities or services. Application of the methodology contained in HRS's rule for determining the need for additional cardiac catheterization laboratories requires a knowledge of the number of procedures performed per year by existing and approved laboratories. Rule 10-5.11(15), Florida Administrative Code. The Health Council of Pasco/Pinellas, Inc. collects data from hospitals within Pasco and Pinellas Counties regarding bed utilization and service information. Hospitals in the district are requested to complete and submit certain information on a "Monthly Hospital Utilization Form." Among the items of information requested is the number of cardiac catheterization procedures performed during the reporting period. The Health Council also publishes and distributes annual and semi-annual utilization reports for the district. There is no provision in the statutes or rules which require hospitals to report utilization or service data to the various Local Health Councils, and HRS itself does not require that such information be reported to it. It is not unusual for hospitals to report inaccurate, incomplete or inconsistent data to Local Health Councils. Indeed, it is recognized in the "1984 Annual Hospital Utilization Report for District V Pasco/Pinellas Health Council, Inc." that, while all hospitals in the District submitted monthly hospital utilization information, "One limitation to this report involves those institutions who did not, for various reasons, submit data for beds by service categories and/or data pertaining to specialty services." HRS Exhibit F, p. 1. The form utilized by the Pasco/Pinellas Health Council contains no definition of cardiac catheterization procedures and no directions as to how to complete the form. While it has regularly submitted a monthly utilization form to the Local Health Council, petitioner has never reported the performance of cardiac catheterizations at its facility. The various reports published by the Local Health Council do not list petitioner as performing cardiac catheterization procedures. While a health care facility may obtain a written determination from HRS that a given service is exempt from Certificate of Need review due to its "grandfathered" status, there is no agency rule or policy which requires a facility to obtain such a written exemption. It has generally been the agency policy that equipment and services acquired by a facility prior to the date that such acquisition became reviewable under the Certificate of Need law are not reviewable on a retroactive basis.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), in DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL; Subsections 456.072(1)(l), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003), in DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL; and Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), in DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relating to the three Administrative Complaints at issue, Dr. Kachinas was a licensed medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 65595. He is board-certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4678PL In 2002, Dr. Kachinas was working at several clinics that were owned by the same individual. He received payment from Sarasota Women’s Health Center and Tampa Women’s Health Center. His primary office was located in Sarasota, but he rotated through the offices located in Clearwater and Tampa. He was advised that he would be attending a patient in the Tampa office. One of the medications that he used in his method of sedating patients, Propofol, was not available in the Tampa office. He took a vial of the Propofol and took it to the Tampa office, holding the vial in his hand. While at the Tampa office, Dr. Kachinas drew the Propofol into a syringe. He did not have to use the Propofol for the patient. He placed the syringe filled with Propofol inside the sock that he was wearing. Dr. Kachinas transported the syringe back to the Tampa office. He used this method of transport so that the office manager in the Tampa office would not know that he was transporting the drug. When he got back to the Tampa office, he placed the filled syringe in a secure place. Propofol must be used within 24 hours after being drawn into a syringe. The next day it was decided that the drug would not be used on another patient, and Dr. Kachinas wasted the syringe filled with Propofol. At the clinics where Dr. Kachinas worked, there were no logs to keep track of the drugs, except for the drug Fentanyl. Dr. Kachinas acknowledged in a letter dated January 30, 2007, to the Department of Health that his method of transporting Propofol was “unorthodox.” In the same letter, Dr. Kachinas acknowledged that “a reasonable and prudent doctor would not generally transport medication in that manner, but foolishness seemed reasonable in that aberrant environment.” DOAH CASE NO. 09-4679PL On March 26, 2004, B.S. presented to Premier Institute for Women’s Health (Premier) for an elective termination of pregnancy. Dr. Kachinas was the physician who handled the procedure. Dr. Kachinas maintained records relating to B.S. at Premier. In 2004, Petitioner subpoenaed B.S.’s records from Dr. Kachinas’ office. Petitioner received a packet of documents, which purported to be B.S.’s medical records. In July 2006, Lori Jacobs, an employee of Premier, sent Petitioner another copy of the documents sent in 2004. Neither the records provided in 2004 nor the records provided in 2006 contain progress notes for B.S.’s treatment on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. For the first time on November 5, 2009, Dr. Kachinas produced a three-page document, which he claimed was part of B.S.’s medical records that had been misplaced in B.S.’s insurance file. Two of the pages purported to be progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004. The third page, which is also labeled as a progress note, is dated June 29, 2004, and appears to relate to insurance claims. The two pages relating to March 26 and 27 are on paper which is a different color from the progress note relating to insurance claims and the progress notes which were previously furnished in 2004 and 2006.1 Additionally, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, contain a break in each of the ruled lines on the sheets on both the right and left sides of the sheets. The insurance progress note and the progress notes furnished in 2004 and 2006 do not have such breaks in the ruled lines. Dr. Kachinas completed a Laminaria Insertion report documenting procedures done on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. The March 26, 2004, report documents the insertion of Laminaria and administration of medications. The comment section of the report documents the removal of the Laminaria and administration of medications on March 27, 2004. The comment section continues to document the administration of medications and the taking of vital signs after the removal of the Laminaria and also the transfer of the patient to Doctors Hospital. The detail on the comment sections suggests that Dr. Kachinas was making his progress notes in the Laminaria Insertion report. The failure to produce the purported progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, until November 5, 2009; the difference in the color of the paper of the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress notes and the other progress notes in Dr. Kachinas’ records; the presence of breaks in the ruled lines on the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress reports, which do not appear on the other progress notes; and the detail of the comments on the Laminaria Insertion report support the conclusion that the progress notes submitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 were not done contemporaneously with the treatment given to B.S. on March 26 and 27, 2004, but were prepared for this proceeding. Thus, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, are not credited. Dr. Kachinas determined B.S.’s pregnancy to be at approximately 23½-to-24 weeks’ gestation, the last week of the second trimester. He confirmed by sonogram that the gestation period was 24 weeks. On March 26, 2004, Dr. Kachinas began the induction of labor ordering the insertion of ten Laminaria, which are osomotic cervical dilators which cause the cervix to open and allow easier emptying of the uterus. Dr. Kachinas’ records do not show that B.S.’s medical history was taken prior to the insertion of the Laminaria. However, Dr. Kachinas did take a medical history of B.S. at the time of her admission to Doctors Hospital, and the history is recorded in the medical records. Prior to the insertion of the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas’ records do show that a limited physical examination of B.S. was done. The Laminaria Insertion report shows that B.S.’s baseline blood pressure, temperature, and pulse were taken and recorded. There was no expert testimony of what other physical examination should have been done. Dr. Kachinas injected the fetus with Digoxin, which is injected directly into the fetus to stop the fetal heartbeat, causing an Intrauterine Fetal Demise (IUFD). The injection of the Digoxin was not documented in B.S.’s medical records. B.S. was then released from Premier. On March 27, 2004, B.S. returned to Premier. Prior to removing the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas did an ultrasound and determined that there was still fetal heart activity and fetal movements. Dr. Kachinas continued the labor induction procedure by removing the Laminaria and administering Cytotec and high dosages of Pitocin. When the Laminaria were removed, there was a rupture of membranes with a loss of essentially all the amniotic fluid. Sometime during the afternoon of March 27, 2004, Dr. Kachinas did another ultrasound and determined that there was no fetal heart activity. Based on the length of time from the Digoxin injection to the ultrasound showing no fetal heart activity, the loss of amniotic fluid, and the administering of medication to cause contractions, Dr. Kachinas determined that the Digoxin injection was not the cause of death. On March 27, 2004, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Dr. Kachinas transferred B.S. to Doctors Hospital and had her admitted to the hospital for failure to progress with the induction of labor procedure. While at the hospital, B.S. continued to experience pain. On March 28, 2004, Dr. Kachinas performed the following procedures on B.S.: mini-laparotomy, hysterotomy, removal of products of conception, and a modified Pomeroy bilateral tubal ligation. In his description of the procedures, he stated that the fetal demise was at least of 48 hours duration. However, Dr. Kachinas’ records do not reflect the time of the fetal demise. Jorge Gomez, M.D., Petitioner’s expert witness, credibly testified that a physician is required to document the time of the fetal demise. In the hospital records following B.S.’s surgery, Dr. Kachinas listed the post-operative diagnosis as a failure to induce labor, an intrauterine fetal demise, a thin umbilical cord, and asymmetric intrauterine growth retardation, a condition in which the fetus is smaller than expected for the number of weeks of pregnancy. An autopsy was performed on the fetus. A surgical pathology report was also issued. The pathology report showed mild infarcts on the maternal side. On the fetal death certificate, Dr. Kachinas listed the immediate causes for the IUFD as a possible cord incident and multiple placental infarctions. Dr. Kachinas did not document the elective termination or the Digoxin injection on the fetal death certificate. Dr. Gomez disagrees with the reasons for IUFD given on the death certificate. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that the infarcts were severe enough to have contributed to the fetal demise. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that there was any evidence of a cord incident. Dr. Gomez is of the opinion that the cause of death should have been listed as elective termination. Dr. Gomez’ opinion is credited. However, Dr. Gomez did not give an opinion on whether the fetal demise was caused by the injection of Digoxin. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4680PL On December 13, 2005, K.M. was seen by Walter J. Morales, M.D., at Florida Perinatal Associates, which specializes in internal fetal medicine. Dr. Morales performed an ultrasound on K.M., who was pregnant with twins as a result of in vitro fertilization. The ultrasound revealed that the twins were fraternal, meaning that each twin had a separate placenta and a separate sac. One of the twins, Twin A, had an anomaly called a cystic hygroma, which results from an obstruction, causing the lymphatic fluid, which normally drains into the juglar vein, to accumulate in the neck area. Approximately 50 percent of the fetuses which have this anomaly in the first trimester also have a chromosomal anomaly, such as Down syndrome. The decision was made to have K.M. return to Florida Perinatal Associates in three weeks for further evaluation. On January 3, 2006, Edgard Ramos-Santos, M.D., a partner of Dr. Morales, performed another ultrasound on K.M. Dr. Ramos-Santos found that Twin A, a male, had a cystic hydroma, a thickening of the nuchal fold2, and shortened femur and humerus. These findings are soft markers for abnormal chromosomes. The ultrasound also revealed a possible heart defect. At the time of the ultrasound, Twin A was cephalic bottom, meaning that Twin A was positioned lowest in the uterus. Dr. Ramos-Santos also performed an amniocentesis on Twin A on the same date as the ultrasound. The amniocentesis showed that Twin A had an abnormal chromosome pattern compatible with trisomy 21 or Down syndrome. Both ultrasounds showed that Twin B, a female, appeared to be normal. At the request of K.M., no amniocentesis was performed on Twin B on January 3, 2006. At the time of the ultrasound performed on January 3, 2006, the presentation of Twin B was cephalic right. The findings of the January 3, 2006, ultrasound were discussed with K.M. and her husband. On January 9, 2006, Dr. Ramos-Santos discussed the results of the amniocentesis with K.M.’s husband. It was decided that a selective feticide would be performed on Twin A. Selective feticide is a procedure in which a solution of potassium hydroxide is injected into the fetus’ heart to make the heart stop beating. K.M. was referred to Dr. Kachinas at Premier for the selective feticide. On January 10, 2006, Roberta Bruce, a nurse at Florida Perinatal Associates, sent to Premier by facsimile transmission the January 3, 2006, ultrasound report for K.M. and K.M.’s insurance information. The cover page for the facsimile transmission included a note from Ms. Bruce, which stated: “* FYI Fetus have different gender. The male is the affected one.” The standard of care as specified in Section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2005), requires a physician performing a selective feticide to correctly identify the affected fetus. Dr. Kachinas did not correctly identify Twin A prior to performing the selective feticide and performed the procedure on Twin B, the normal fetus. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound on K.M., but failed to identify the correct position of Twin A in relation to K.M. The ultrasound done on January 3, 2006, by Dr. Ramos-Santos showed that Twin A was located at the bottom and Twin B was located to the right of K.M. In his progress notes, Dr. Kachinas placed Twin A on the right and Twin B on the left. Although it is possible for twins to shift positions, it is not probable that the twins shifted from left to right. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound, but failed to identify that Twin A was the fetus with multiple anomalies. Although the standard of care required Dr. Kachinas to do a Level 2 ultrasound evaluation, a Level 1 ultrasound evaluation would have identified the cystic hygroma, the shortened long bones, and the sex of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas failed to perform an adequate ultrasound evaluation by failing to identify the anomalies and the gender of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas’ notes do not show whether Twin A or Twin B had anomalies. His notes did not identify the sex of each of the twins. His notes did not document the attempts that Dr. Kachinas made to identify the anomalies such as a recording of the length of the long bones or any examination made to identify the sex of each of the twins. On January 24, 2006, K.M. returned to Florida Perinatal Associates for another consultation. Dr. Morales performed another ultrasound, which revealed that Twin A, who had the anomalies, was still viable. The ultrasound revealed the continued presence of a cystic hygroma, the thickening of the nuchal fold, shortened extremities, and a congenital heart defect. The ultrasound also showed that the viable twin was male. The presentation of Twin A was shown by the ultrasound as cephalic bottom.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2002); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsections 456.072(1)(l) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003); imposing an administrative fine of $1,000; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), by committing gross medical malpractice; finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 and placing him on probation for one year for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); and revoking his license for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005). DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license as a veterinarian based on alleged violations of Section 474.214, Florida Statutes (1997), as charged in the Administrative Complaints filed against Respondent in this proceeding. Count I of the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 00-2357 charged Respondent with a violation of Section 474.214(1)(r), Florida Statutes (1997): being guilty of incompetence or negligence by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent veterinarian as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Count II of the Administrative Complaint charged Respondent with a violation of Section 474.214(1)(ee), Florida Statutes (1997): failing to keep contemporaneously written medical records as prescribed by Rule 61G18-18.002(3), Florida Administrative Code. The Administrative Complaint in Case No. 00-2358 charged Respondent with a violation of Section 474.214(1)(r), Florida Statutes (1997): being guilty of incompetence or negligence by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent veterinarian as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following facts are found: At all times material, Respondent was a licensed veterinarian, having been issued license number VM 0003822. Facts relating to Case No. 00-2357 On or about March 5, 1998, Respondent performed a spay on "Midnight," a dog owned by Maryjane Greene and her husband. On or about March 8, 1998, "Midnight" expired at the Greene's home. When Mrs. Greene dropped off "Midnight," she was not sufficiently informed by Respondent about her option to have a pre-anesthesia lab work-up performed. There is no indication of an offer to perform a pre- anesthesia lab work-up, nor an indication that Mr. or Mrs. Greene declined such an offer, nor a consent form declining such a work-up, noted in the medical records kept by Respondent for "Midnight." It is a deviation from the standard of care to fail to offer a pre-anesthesia lab work-up. The anesthetic protocol used by Respondent during the spay of "Midnight" included Xylzine (a.k.a. Rompun) a drug with a profound and potentially deleterious effect on the heart which may cause a first degree or second degree heart block. The anesthetic protocol used by Respondent during the spay of "Midnight" also included Ketamine, which is not approved for use in dogs. When used as an anesthetic protocol, it is considered an extra-label use of the drug. An extra-label use of a drug means that there have been no safety studies completed, and it cannot be adequately predicted what effects the medication will have on an animal on a consistent basis. There is no indication in Respondent's records for "Midnight" that Mrs. Greene was informed regarding the use of Ketamine in her dog's procedure. It is a deviation from the standard of care not to make a client aware of the use of an extra-label drug and not to have the client sign a consent form. Xylazine and Ketamine are both cardiac depressants. When used in combination they each make the other more of a cardiac depressant, thus requiring the administration of another drug, such as Atropine, to minimize the cardiac depressant effect. There is no indication in Respondent's medical records for "Midnight" that Atropine or any other drug was administered, other that the Xylazine and Ketamine. Respondent's failure to administer Atropine or any other drug to minimize the cardiac depressant effects of Xylazine and Ketamine was a deviation from the standard of care. Respondent's failure to administer Atropine or any other drug to minimize the cardiac depressant effects of Xyalzine and Ketamine played a substantial role in "Midnight's" demise. Upon picking up "Midnight," Mrs. Greene was given limited post-operative instructions. She was told not to give "Midnight" water until he could walk a straight line; not to give food until he could hold water down; only leash walks for 10 days; and no baths for 7-10 days. Respondent's post-operative discharge instructions given to Mrs. Greene did not comply with the standard of care in veterinary medicine. Facts relating to Case No. 00-2358 On or about August 25, 1998, Respondent performed surgery to remove a mass from the perineal area of "Snoopy," a nine-year-old obese Beagle belonging to Juan Ferras. There is no indication in Respondent's records for "Snoopy" that the surgery was performed due to an emergency, although the credible testimony indicated that it was an emergency. Given "Snoopy's" age (nine years) and weight (60 lbs.), it would be in the dog's best interest to perform a pre- anesthesia lab work-up, or to at least offer one to the owner. Respondent did not indicate in his medical records that he offered to perform a pre-anesthesia lab work-up on "Snoopy." In view of the emergency nature of the surgery, it was not a deviation from the standard of care to fail to offer a pre-anesthesia lab work-up. The anesthetic protocol used by Respondent during the procedure on "Snoopy" included Ketamine, which is not approved for use in dogs. When used, it is considered an extra-label use of the drug. Ketamine should be used with extreme caution in dogs for which the veterinarian is unaware of the renal function or the liver function of the dog. It is a deviation from the standard of care not to make a client aware of the use of an extra-label drug, and not to have the client sign a consent form. There is no indication in Respondent's records for "Snoopy" that Juan Ferras was informed regarding the use of Ketamine in his dog's procedure. Upon picking up "Snoopy," Mr. Ferras was given limited post-operative instructions. Respondent's failure to give specific post-operative discharge instructions to Mr. Ferras constituted a deviation from the standard of care. After discharge, "Snoopy" began vomiting and was readmitted to Respondent's facility on or about August 27, 1998. On or about August 28, 1998, "Snoopy" expired at Respondent's facility. There is no indication in Respondent's records on "Snoopy" that upon "Snoopy's" readmission to Respondent's facility, on or about August 27, 1998, Juan Ferras refused to pay or was only willing to pay a small portion of any treatment rendered to "Snoopy." Because of this finding it is unnecessary to address whether refusal to pay a fee is an appropriate defense by Respondent. Upon "Snoopy's" readmission to Respondent's facility, on or about August 27, 1998, "Snoopy" was determined to be approximately 11 percent dehydrated and in a state of shock. In order to correct the dehydration and maintain "Snoopy," it would have been required to administer approximately 4300-4400 ccs of fluid. Respondent's records indicate that only 800 ccs of fluids were administered to "Snoopy." This left "Snoopy" with a tremendous deficit of fluids. Respondent's explanation as to the reason for the small amount of fluid shown on "Snoopy's" chart is not credible. Respondent's failure to administer the correct amount of fluids constitutes a deviation from the standard of care. Upon readmission to Respondent's clinic, Respondnet did not draw blood or perform any type of bloodwork on "Snoopy." Respondent's failure to draw blood or perform any type of bloodwork on "Snoopy" after being readmitted for dehydration and vomiting and shock constitutes a deviation from the standard of care. The fluids which were administered to "Snoopy" were administered sub-cutaneously. The failure to insert an IV catheter to administer the fluids, rather than administering them sub-cutaneously, constitutes a deviation from the standard of care. One way of re-hydrating a dehydrated patient is by weighing the dog and then adding enough fluids to get the patient to its normal weight. There is no indication in Respondent's records that "Snoopy" was weighed at the end of the day on or about August 27, 1998, or that "Snoopy" weighed approximately 60 pounds late in the day on or about August 27, 1998. Respondent's records for "Snoopy" contain a notation at 10:00 p.m. August 27, 1998, of "ADR" which means "ain't doing right." A patient whose records indicate "ADR" should be continuously monitored or transferred to an emergency facility. "Snoopy" was not monitored overnight and through the early hours of the next morning. Had Respondent taken appropriate steps with regards to fluid resuscitation upon "Snoopy's" readmission to Respondent's facility, "Snoopy's" chance of survival would have been much higher.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be render by the Board of Veterinary Medicine, as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 474.214(1)(r), Florida Statutes (1997), as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint for DOAH Case No. 00-2357 (DBPR Case NO. 98-11323). Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 474.214(1)(ee), Florida Statutes (1997), as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint for DOAH Case No. 00-2357 (DBPR Case No. 98-11323). Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 474.214(1)(r), Florida Statues (1997), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint for DOAH Case No. 00-2358 (DBPR Case No. 98-21230). In light of these findings of guilt and aggravating circumstances, the following penalties are recommended: A thirty-day suspension of licensure. An administrative fine in the amount of four-thousand dollars ($4000.00). Assessing costs of investigation and prosecution, in the amount of $973.24 for Case No. 00-2357 and $684.29 for Case No. 00-2358. Five years of monitored probation upon such terms and conditions as the Board finds necessary and reasonable. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter H. Dornbusch, D.V.M. 1117 Malabar Road, Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32907 Robert H. Hosay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Sherry Landrum, Director Board of Veterinary Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, as a child day-care facility operator, committed the violations of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, of failing to obtain or maintain proof that at least one staff member physically has a valid certificate of training in first-aid and infant and child cardiopulmonary resuscitation procedures and that such staff member is physically present at the facility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed day-care facility licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services (Department). On May 11, 2001, Susan Kipen, Family Services Counselor, Day-Care Licensure, of the Department, conducted an inspection of the Petitioner's facility. During the May 2001 inspection, Kipen discovered that no member of the facility's staff had the required training in first-aid and infant and child cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and that no evidence of such training was contained in the facility's records. The Department cited the facility for noncompliance. On May 29, 2001, a warning letter was issued regarding the lack of training. The letter established a correction date of June 8, 2001. On August 28, 2001, the Department again inspected Petitioner's facility. The inspection revealed that no staff present at the facility had the required first-aid or CPR training and no certificate of such training was maintained in the facilities records. At least one staff person had completed the training, however, that person was not physically present at the facility. The Department again cited Petitioner for noncompliance.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witness, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered confirming the imposition of an administrative fine against Petitioner in the amount of $50.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Temple DePlato Head Start at Green Cove Springs 100 Bel Tel Way, Suite 100 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint December 19, 2005, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. See § 455.225, Fla. Stat. (2009). The Board is the entity responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Florida and for imposing penalties on physicians found to have violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes. See § 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Achong was a physician licensed by the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME38304, and his medical office was located at 690 East 49th Street, Hialeah, Florida. Dr. Achong specialized in obstetrics and gynecology, although he was not board-certified in these areas of practice. Dr. Achong has not previously been the subject of disciplinary action by the Board of Medicine, and he is not currently practicing medicine, having retired with a disability in 2006. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Achong had hospital privileges at Hialeah Hospital and at North Shore Medical Center ("Medical Center"). Both facilities had his home telephone number and his beeper number. It was his practice to keep his beeper close to him at all times. When he was in the delivery room, it was his practice to give his beeper to the circulating nurse, who would be responsible for alerting him whenever someone tried to reach him on his beeper. The beeper he used in 2004 gave only the telephone number of the person trying to reach him, but he was able to recognize the number of Hialeah Hospital and the Medical Center. On February 12, 2004, Patient L.H. went to her gynecologist, Ramon Hechavarria, M.D., for a routine examination. Patient L.H. was, at the time, a 27-year-old who was 32 weeks' pregnant, and she had previously had one live birth. Dr. Hechavarria's examination revealed that Patient L.H.'s blood pressure was elevated, and Dr. Hechavarria admitted her to Medical Center for 24 hours for observation. On February 12, 2004, Dr. Hechavarria ordered blood and laboratory tests done in the Medical Center. The blood tests included a Disseminated Intravascular Coagulopathy ("DIC") profile and a Fibrinogen Degradation Profile ("FDP"); the results of these blood tests were normal. Patient L.H.'s hemoglobin and her platelet count were normal, and, although there was a slight trace of protein in her urine, that is considered normal. On February 13, 2004, Dr. Hechavarria discharged Patient L.H. with a diagnosis of chronic hypertension and a prescription for 250 milligram tablets of Aldomet, to be taken three times per day. Aldomet is a medication that treats hypertension by lowering the blood pressure. Patient L.H. was in good, stable condition when she was discharged on February 13, 2004. Readings from a fetal heart monitor taken during the time Patient L.H. was in the Medical Center indicated that the fetus was alive. Dr. Hechavarria considered Patient L.H.'s to be a high risk pregnancy in part because of her hypertension but also because she came in late for prenatal care, missed two appointments, and was overweight. Dr. Hechavarria left town for a vacation on February 13, 2004, and Dr. Achong was to cover his patients during his absence under an arrangement whereby Dr. Hechavarria and Dr. Achong provided coverage for each other when one or the other was out of town or otherwise unavailable to see patients. Under the arrangement, Dr. Achong was expected to go to the hospital if one of Dr. Hechavarria's patients were in labor or if a patient were to go to the emergency room complaining of vaginal bleeding or any other obstetrical or gynecological condition. Whenever coverage of patients was passing from one physician to the other, Dr. Hechavarria and Dr. Achong advised each other of any patient that was in the hospital for gynecological, obstetrical, or any other medical reason. They did not advise each other of patients that had recently been discharged from the hospital, and, therefore, Dr. Hechavarria did not discuss Patient L.H. with Dr. Achong because she had been discharged from the Medical Center before Dr. Achong began covering Dr. Hechavarria's patients. Patient L.H. presented at the Medical Center at approximately 2:00 a.m. on February 15, 2004, complaining of abdominal pains. She was seen by labor and delivery nurse Jennifer Williams, a registered nurse with 20 years' nursing experience, with 13 years' experience in the Medical Center's labor room, and with training as a mid-wife. Nurse Williams had worked with Dr. Achong at the Medical Center since 1991. Subsequent to Patient L.H.'s arrival at the Medical Center, Nurse Williams interviewed her, took her medical history, examined her, and entered the pertinent information on the Medical Center's Admission Assessment. The Admission Assessment form was dated February 15, 2004, and the time was noted as 2:45 a.m. The time written by Nurse Williams' signature on the Admission Assessment form was 3:00 a.m., and it appears that the information was obtained and entered on the form between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. Pertinent to this matter, Nurse Williams maintained several other documents recording Patient L.H.'s condition and observations and actions taken by Nurse Williams relating to Patient L.H. Nurse Williams began maintaining a Labor Flow Record at 2:07 a.m. and she made periodic entries on the Labor Flow Record related to, among other things, Patient L.H.'s vital signs, the results of vaginal examinations and fetal monitoring, uterine activity, and pain intensity at different times during the night and morning. In addition, Nurse Williams entered on the Labor Flow Record the time and content of her communications with Dr. Achong; the first recorded contact between Dr. Achong and Nurse Williams was recorded on the Labor Flow Record as 2:30 a.m. Nurse Williams also maintained Progress Notes in which she recorded her observations of Patient L.H. and her conversations with Patient L.H. The first entry in the Progress Notes was at 2:35 a.m.2 Nurse Williams' Progress Notes reflect that, at 2:35 a.m., Patient L.H. advised Nurse Williams that she had contractions and believed she had been in labor since 6:00 p.m. the previous evening but had waited to come to the Medical Center until she was certain she was in labor. Patient L.H. also reported abdominal pain in her upper abdomen that did "not go away," and Nurse Williams observed that Patient L.H. was distressed by the pain in her abdomen. Patient L.H. also told Nurse Williams that she had no ruptured membranes or vaginal bleeding. Nurse Williams noted that she examined Patient L.H. and felt contractions but was unable to detect a fetal heart tone. Nurse Williams reported in the Admission Assessment form that Patient L.H. was having uterine contractions of moderate intensity and 60 seconds' duration, that her cervix was dilated 1-to-2 centimeters, that she had vaginal bleeding that was bright red, that her blood pressure was 159/118, which she described as "elevated," and that Patient L.H.'s abdominal pain was the "worse" pain on a pain scale ranging from 1 to 10; there is, however, no indication on the Admission Assessment form that the pain was constant. Nurse Williams also noted on the Admission Assessment form that she heard no fetal heart rate. Although the time noted on the Admission Assessment form was 2:45 a.m., it is apparent from a review of the relevant records that the information included on the Admission Assessment form was obtained by Nurse Williams over a period of time extending from the time Patient L.H. presented to her until 3:00 a.m., the time on the Admission Assessment form beside Nurse Williams' signature. Nurse Williams reported in the "Physician /CNM in/Called Report" section of the Labor Flow Record that she contacted Dr. Achong at 2:30 a.m. and conveyed to him the following information: "[P]atient arrived in ER c/o contractions since 6 pm last night & observation that no FHT [fetal heart tone] and contractions palpated." Nurse Williams telephoned Dr. Achong using his home telephone, even though his beeper number was also on file at the Medical Center. There is nothing in the report Nurse Williams gave to Dr. Achong at 2:30 a.m. that would require that he proceed to the Medical Center and examine Patient L.H., and he did not violate the standard of care by failing to do so. Because Dr. Achong did not know Patient L.H., Nurse Williams' normal procedure would have been to advise Dr. Achong of Patient L.H.'s history, including the medications she was taking, and her vital signs, including her blood pressure. No notation appears in the Labor Flow Record to confirm that she gave Dr. Achong this information during her conversation with him at 2:30 a.m., nor is there a notation in the 2:30 a.m. entry in the Labor Flow Record that Nurse Williams told Dr. Achong about the results of her examination of Patient L.H.'s cervix, Patient L.H.'s complaint of abdominal pain, or the presence of vaginal bleeding of bright red blood.3 Nurse Williams indicated in her entry in the "Physician/CNM in/Called Report" section of the Labor Flow Record that Dr. Achong ordered a "stat," or expedited, obstetrical sonogram during the 2:30 a.m. contact with Nurse Williams. The purpose of the obstetrical sonogram was to determine if the fetus was alive. Although not noted in the Labor Flow Record, the Labor and Delivery Orders form completed by Nurse Williams indicates that, at 2:30 a.m., Dr. Achong ordered a complete blood count, which is routine with a patient in labor; a DIC profile; and a Comprehensive Metabolic Panel ("CMP"). The Labor and Delivery Orders form contains standard orders for a woman in labor, but the DIC profile and the CMP tests were not included on the form but were ordered specifically by Dr. Achong. A DIC profile is used to determine if a patient has a problem with blood clotting. The DIC includes an assessment of prothrombin time and partial thromboplastin time, both of which indicate different levels at which a patient's blood is able to clot. It is important to know whether a woman in labor and delivery has a clotting problem, or coagulopathy, because of the danger of bleeding, and the classic situation in which DIC profiles are ordered is when there is fetal demise. Because Patient L.H. had the high risk factors of overweight and hypertension and because Nurse Williams could detect no fetal heart tone, Dr. Achong's order for the DIC profile was appropriate and met the standard of care. It is also appropriate to order a DIC profile when there is a concern about placental abruption, which is the separation of the placenta from the walls of the vagina. A placental abruption causes a great deal of bleeding, and can cause death when not treated, because the fetus is still in the womb and the uterus is not able to contract and constrict the large blood vessels that attach to the placenta. Although hypertension is one risk factor for placental abruption, the symptoms of placental abruption also include fetal demise, bleeding, constant pain, a decrease in hematocrit, and a number of other conditions. There is no indication in Patient L.H.'s medical records that Dr. Achong had sufficient information at 2:30 a.m. that would indicate that Patient L.H. had a possible placental abruption, and he ordered the DIC profile because of the lack of fetal heart tones.4 The CMP includes tests for kidney and liver function and for uric acid. It is used to determine if a woman has pre-eclampsia, or pregnancy-induced hypertension. Given Patient L.H.'s history of hypertension and the level of her blood pressure as reflected in the Admission Assessment form, Dr. Achong's order for the CMP was appropriate and met the standard of care in ordering the CMP. All orders for blood tests for women in labor and delivery are treated as "stat" orders and are processed ahead of all other test orders except those from the emergency room. When the situation warrants, a physician may order that the tests be performed more quickly than the usual "stat" order would require, and it would be possible to obtain blood-test results within 45 minutes. There is, however, no indication in Patient L.H.'s medical records that Dr. Achong had any information at 2:30 a.m. that might indicate that he should further expedite Patient L.H.'s blood tests. Nurse Williams reported in her Progress Notes that, at 2:40 a.m., Patient L.H. reported a "gush of something down there," and Nurse Williams noted that she observed a large amount of blood; there is, however, no notation in the Progress Notes regarding the color of the blood. Nurse Williams also included a notation in the Progress Notes that Patient L.H.'s cervix was "3cm dilated, 50% effaced, -3 station" to describe the progress of Patient L.H.'s labor. Nurse Williams reported in the Labor Flow Record that she contacted Dr. Achong at 2:45 a.m. and conveyed to him the following information: "Dr. Achong notified of gush of vaginal bleeding. VE [vaginal examination] 2-3, 50% effaced, -3 station and that we are awaiting sonogram." The results of Nurse Williams' vaginal examination of Patient L.H. showed that Patient L.H. was in active labor. The information that Patient L.H. experienced a "gush of vaginal bleeding" did not indicate to Dr. Achong that there was anything more than one episode of bleeding, which he attributed to an especially heavy "bloody show," which is the bleeding that occurs when the cervix is dilating. The notation indicates that Dr. Achong told Nurse Williams to call him if Patient L.H. went to delivery. The information conveyed to Dr. Achong at 2:45 a.m., as reflected in the notation in the Labor Flow Record, was not sufficient to indicate that Patient L.H. was not proceeding through labor normally to a vaginal delivery of the dead fetus, which is preferred over delivery by a Cesarean Section. Nurse Williams did not include in her records a notation that she advised Dr. Achong that the "gush of vaginal bleeding" consisted of a large amount of bright red blood, which would have been an indication of a possible placental abruption. Some bleeding is normal during labor, but it is usually a dark color from having been in the uterus and in a small amount or tickle, although there could be a "gush of blood" during normal labor. When Dr. Achong was advised by Nurse Williams that Patient L.H. had a "gush of blood," however, it was his responsibility to inquire into the amount of blood, the color of the blood, and the persistency of the bleeding to determine if Patient L.H. was proceeding with normal labor or if she was experiencing a hemorrhage or other abnormal condition. Nurse Williams made no entries in the Progress Notes for Patient L.H. between 2:40 a.m. and 3:40 a.m., when she reported that the ultrasound had been completed. She further noted in her Progress Notes: "Report of no fetal heart tones to Dr. Achong. Orders given." Nurse Williams additionally made a notation in the Labor Flow Record that, at 3:40 a.m., she contacted Dr. Achong and reported to him the following: "Ultrasound report No FHT's given to Dr. Achong. Orders received." Nurse Williams did not, however, indicate in her notations what orders were given. Nurse Williams contacted Dr. Achong through his home telephone number, which was normal procedure during the nighttime hours. When the sonographer, that is, the person performing the sonogram, entered Patient L.H.'s room to perform the sonogram, he noted that Patient L.H. was sitting upright in bed, was combative, and was in a lot of pain. He also noted that there was a fair amount of blood on the bed sheets. The sonographer was able to get Patient L.H. to lie on the bed, and he performed "a very short ultrasound,"5 and pulled the machine out of the room and into the hall. He powered the machine back up and read the numbers off the worksheet on the machine. He confirmed that the fetus was dead and that the placenta appeared to be balled up rather than lying smoothly against the uterine wall, as is normal. While he was writing down the information from the worksheet on the machine, Nurse Williams approached him and told him that she had Dr. Achong on the telephone. He told her that he had "a placental abruption and fetal demise."6 He then wrote up his report, left a copy for Nurse Williams, and went downstairs to process the sonogram images.7 The results of the sonogram were reported on a form headed "Obstetrical Preliminary Report," which was completed by the sonographer. A radiologist is usually present at the Medical Center during daytime hours to read sonograms, but on the off-hours, it is the practice of the sonographer to present a sonographer's impression of what was seen during the sonogram. The sonographer who performed the sonogram on Patient L.H. noted on the report that her history included obesity, hypertension, heavy vaginal bleeding, and contractions. He included the following comments in the report: "Ant/Rt [unintelligible] placenta appears to be 'balled up[.]' Suggestion of placental abruption," and, on a separate line, "NO FETAL HEART MOTION SEEN PT IS COMBATIVE." Finally, at the bottom of the report, the sonographer noted that a copy of the report was given to Nurse Williams. There was no notation as to the time the sonographer gave the report to Nurse Williams, but, even if she had the report, she did not read it to Dr. Achong; rather, she put the copy of the report in Patient L.H.'s chart for Dr. Achong to review when he came to the hospital and gave him only a verbal report. Nurse Williams did not tell Dr. Achong during the 3:40 a.m. telephone conversation that the sonographer had reported a possible placental abruption.8 Dr. Achong was familiar with and had treated placental abruptions prior to February 15, 2004, and he always treated patients with placental abruptions on an emergency basis because both the mother and the baby could die if treatment was not received as soon as possible. Had Nurse Williams advised Dr. Achong that the sonographer had told her that he found a placental abruption or that the sonogram report included a reference to a possible placental abruption, he would have gone to the Medical Center immediately. At 3:45 a.m., Nurse Williams noted in her Progress Notes that she gave Patient L.H. Nubain and Phenergan for her painful contractions. There is no mention of continued vaginal bleeding in this entry in the Progress Notes. At 4:15 a.m., Nurse Williams noted in her progress notes that Patient L.H. was sleeping quietly and was relaxed and that Pitocin had been administered in accordance with Dr. Achong's orders. Pitocin is used to induce labor, augment labor, or to stop bleeding. In this case, Dr. Achong ordered the Pitocin to regulate Patient L.H.'s contractions. There is no mention in the 4:15 a.m. entry in the Progress Notes of continued vaginal bleeding. The next entry in Nurse Williams' Progress Notes was made at 5:15 a.m., when Nurse Williams reported that she had observed vaginal bleeding, that a vaginal examination showed dilation of four centimeters, and that Patient L.H. was very restless and moving around the bed. Nurse Williams received the laboratory report showing the results of the blood tests ordered by Dr. Achong at or around 5:00 a.m. According to the laboratory report, the blood for these tests was drawn at or about 3:20 a.m.; the report did not show any critical values in the blood sample. Nurse Williams attempted to contact Dr. Achong to convey these results to him. She noted on the Labor Flow Record that, at 5:15 a.m. "Dr. Achong beeped re lab results. Phone message left on home phone to call LR [Labor Room]." Nurse Williams made another entry on the Labor Flow Record that, at 6:55 a.m., she left a "message to Dr. Achong answering machine at home re labor progress update and labs." Dr. Achong was not, however, at home to receive the telephone calls or the messages. At or about 5:00 a.m. on February 15, 2004, Dr. Achong received a telephone call on his home telephone from Hialeah Hospital advising him that one of his patients or one of Dr. Hechavarria's patients was in active labor and about to deliver. Shortly after receiving the telephone call, Dr. Achong left his home to travel to Hialeah Hospital. He carried his beeper with him, but he did not receive any calls on the beeper. When he arrived at Hialeah Hospital and prepared to go into the delivery room, he gave it to the circulating nurse in case he should receive a beeper call while he was in the delivery room. Nurse Hayes, who had replaced Nurse Williams when Nurse Williams' shift had ended at 7:00 a.m., made a notation on the Labor Flow Record that, at 7:15 a.m., she called Dr. Achong and left a message. At 7:25 a.m., while he was in the delivery room, Nurse Hayes called his beeper. The circulating nurse had his beeper, and she notified him that he had received a call and told him the number. He recognized the number of the Medical Center, and he told the nurse to call the Medical Center and let them know that he was in the delivery room at Hialeah Hospital. Nurse Hayes asked that he call back as soon as possible. Blood for additional blood tests was drawn at or about 7:30 a.m., and the results, which were available within 15 minutes, showed several critical values that indicated that Patient L.H. was entering coagulopathy. At 7:38 a.m., as soon as he finished the delivery, he called the Medical Center and spoke with Nurse Hayes, who gave him a report on the status of Patient L.H. She told him that Patient L.H. had heavy bleeding and that the vaginal examination showed no change in the cervix. Dr. Achong ordered the Pitocin turned off. When Dr. Achong arrived at the Medical Center at 7:56 a.m., he found Patient L.H. very combative, bleeding, and with very bad vital signs. He ordered a "stat" Cesarean Section and ordered a blood transfusion. Patient L.H. died at 8:38 a.m., before any of the measures ordered by Dr. Achong could be implemented. The cause of death was recorded as placental abruption. Summary In summary, the evidence presented by the Department is not of sufficient weight to establish that Nurse Williams conveyed to Dr. Achong the information necessary for him to conclude that he should personally conduct a clinical evaluation of Patient L.H.; that he should consider the possibility that Patient L.H. had placental abruption; or that he should have provided medical assistance to Patient L.H. prior to his contact with Nurse Hayes at 7:38 a.m. Nurse Williams' Progress Notes report only two remarkable items: There were no fetal heart tones detected by physical examination or by sonogram; and, at 2:40 a.m., Patient L.H. reported a "gush of something" and Nurse Williams observed a large amount of blood. Neither Nurse Williams' entries in the Labor Flow Record regarding her contacts with Dr. Achong nor her testimony, to the extent that it has been found persuasive, is sufficient to establish that she advised Dr. Achong that she had observed a large amount of red blood at 2:40 a.m. or that the sonographer detected a possible placental abruption in the sonogram. Finally, Nurse Williams did not follow the protocol that required her to contact Dr. Achong through his beeper when she did not get an answer on his home telephone; she tried his beeper only once, at 5:15 a.m., and when she failed to reach him, left three messages on his home telephone. The Department presented no evidence to establish that Nurse Williams attempted to reach Dr. Achong by beeper between 5:15 a.m. and 7:55 a.m., the time of her last call to Dr. Achong's home telephone. Furthermore, the Department did not present evidence of sufficient weight to establish that Dr. Achong failed to initiate the appropriate procedures after he arrived at the Medical Center and examined Patient L.H. at or around 8:00 a.m. The evidence presented by the Department is, however, of sufficient weight to establish that Dr. Achong should have questioned Nurse Williams further when she advised him at 2:45 a.m. that she had observed a "gush" of vaginal bleeding. Even though vaginal bleeding may not be not unusual during labor, a report of a "gush" of blood should have alerted Dr. Achong to a potential problem. Although a physician practicing obstetrics is meeting the standard of care when relying on labor room nurses to advise him or her of the clinical status of labor and delivery patients and of any unusual symptoms exhibited by the patients, it is also incumbent on the physician to inquire further if a patient is presenting unusual symptoms. The persuasive evidence establishes that Dr. Achong violated the standard of care when he failed to ask Nurse Williams for additional information on Patient L.H.'s status during their 2:45 a.m. telephone conversation. Had he inquired further, Dr. Achong would have been alerted to the possibility that Patient L.H. had a placental abruption and would have gone to the hospital to provide appropriate care for Patient L.H.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, enter a final order finding that Dr. Achong violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by failing to elicit further information from Nurse Williams regarding the gush of blood she observed in Patient L.H and imposing the following penalties: Issuance of a letter of reprimand; Imposition of administrative fine in the amount of $2,500.00; and Six months' probation under such conditions as the Board of Medicine determines appropriate, should Dr. Achong ever resume the practice of medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a lay midwife licensed by the state of Florida. She has practiced as a licensed lay midwife in Florida since 1981. Respondent began her training in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1975 when she began participating in an apprenticeship program under the supervision of two Board-certified obstetricians. That training lasted for three years and included self-study, seminars, and workshops. As part of that apprenticeship program, Respondent delivered one hundred babies under the supervision of those physicians. After moving to Florida, Respondent obtained her license as a lay midwife after attending fifteen births under the supervision of a physician and after taking a written and oral examination. Since being licensed in Florida, Respondent has attended and graduated from the South Florida School of Midwifery. She has subsequently been a preceptor and instructor at that School and is on the Board for the School. At the time of the final hearing in this cause, Respondent was only two months away from receiving her nursing degree. Respondent is a member of the Midwives Association of Florida. During the course of her licensure in Florida, Respondent has attended all types of continuing education programs, particularly in the field of maternal and child health. While licensed in the state of Florida, she has attended between five hundred and seven hundred births, sometimes as the primary caregiver, sometimes assisting other midwives, and sometimes assisting physicians during hospital births. At all times material hereto, Respondent has maintained an ongoing relationship with Dr. Atilla Eagleman, an obstetrician and gynecologist. She frequently consulted with Dr. Eagleman, and he performed risk assessments on Respondent's patients. In other words, Dr. Eagleman was Respondent's "back-up" physician. Dr. Eagleman became Board-certified in December, 1990. When patient Sandy Freireich first consulted with Respondent on May 11, 1989, Freireich was seventeen to eighteen weeks pregnant with her fourth child. Respondent told Freireich that in order for her to be accepted as one of Respondent's patients, she needed to provide Respondent with proof that she had obtained an initial risk assessment by a physician. Freireich told Respondent that she had obtained that examination from her regular doctor who was an obstetrician and that she would bring Respondent a copy of her medical records documenting that examination on her next visit. Since Respondent performs an initial risk assessment on her patients, she did so with Freireich and determined that she was a low-risk patient. On at least seven occasions, Respondent told Freireich that Freireich had to provide Respondent with a copy of the initial risk assessment records from Freireich's physician. On each occasion Freireich promised to provide such a record. Respondent also strongly encouraged Freireich to see Dr. Eagleman and have him perform an initial risk assessment. Freireich agreed to do so. Respondent also requested permission from Freireich to allow Respondent to obtain Freireich's records directly from Freireich's doctor by having Freireich sign a medical records release form. Freireich insisted that she wanted to speak to her physician to make sure her doctor understood rather than simply sending him a form to release her records. Along the way Freireich missed several appointments with Respondent. For those appointments which she kept, she failed to bring with her the promised documents. On September 6, 1989, when Freireich was 32.4 weeks pregnant, she signed a medical release form authorizing Respondent to obtain her medical records directly from her doctor. On that visit, Respondent recommended to Freireich that she obtain her third trimester risk assessment from Dr. Eagleman. On September 14, 1989, Respondent received records directly from Freireich's obstetrician. Those records did not contain an initial risk assessment for Freireich's current pregnancy. On September 20, 1989, when Freireich was 34.4 weeks pregnant, Respondent caused Freireich to receive a risk assessment and a physical and prenatal examination by a certified nurse midwife in Respondent's office. That risk assessment also revealed that Freireich was a low-risk patient. It is unknown whether Freireich ever obtained an initial risk assessment during her first twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy. It is uncontroverted, however, that Respondent never received proof of such an initial risk assessment by a physician or by a certified nurse midwife. Furthermore, it is clear that Respondent consistently encouraged Freireich to obtain an initial risk assessment by a physician, and that it was Freireich who failed or refused to provide proof that such had been performed. In 1987 the Department proposed a number of changes to the rules regulating the practice of midwifery. The Florida Midwives Association challenged the proposed rules, and the Association and the Department engaged in a long-term dialog thereafter. New rules did not become effective until 1991. Although there were existing rules in place during that interim period, it became a common practice for midwives to contact Anne Richter, a consultant for the Department's midwife program. Based upon the information provided to her by a midwife, Richter would tell the midwife to care for a particular patient pursuant to the existing rules or pursuant to the proposed rules. It was common knowledge among the midwives in the state of Florida that the Department was informally allowing midwives to practice under the proposed rules rather than the existing rules and that one could call Anne Richter to obtain a "waiver" of rule requirements. On one occasion, Respondent had telephoned Richter regarding a patient who had come to Respondent when she was thirty weeks pregnant and had not obtained an initial risk assessment during her first twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy. Richter told Respondent that it was permissible for Respondent to accept that patient whose only risk factor was starting care after twenty-eight weeks. Respondent did not accept that patient. Although Respondent had intended to telephone Richter to seek permission to continue providing care to Freireich, Respondent neglected to do so. On October 30, 1989, Freireich left a message cancelling her appointment for that day. Later that afternoon she contacted Respondent to advise Respondent that she was in labor. She declined to allow Respondent to come to Freireich's home until after 8:30 p.m. because she wanted her other children to be asleep before Respondent got there. Respondent arrived at the Freireich home at 8:50 p.m. She assessed Freireich's labor, performed a physical examination, and began attending to Freireich's needs during labor. At 11:30 p.m., the fetal heart rate was 150. The patient took a shower. When she finished her shower at 11:50 p.m., Respondent checked the fetal heart rate and found that it had decreased to 90. Respondent appropriately instructed the patient to lay on her left side and gave her oxygen at six liters since the deceleration in the heart rate may have been indicative of a problem that needed to be rectified. At 11:53 p.m., Respondent appropriately checked the fetal heart rate and again found that it was 90. Respondent then assessed the patient and found the patient to be fully dilated with the baby at between 0 and +1 stations. Since the patient was fully dilated, Respondent instructed her to push. Respondent again checked the fetal heart rate and found that it had decelerated to 60. That the patient had a history of having rapid deliveries and was a multipara (had previously had one or more viable births) was significant in that it was very likely that with good expulsive efforts the baby would be delivered in a short time. Respondent was concerned when she got the decelerated fetal heart rate but believed birth to be imminent. An experienced birth practitioner can judge whether delivery will be expeditious. At 11:58 p.m. the baby was at the +2 station (half the way down the birth canal, i.e., half way out). The fetal heart rate was 60 when Respondent again checked. Respondent's extensive training and experience had made her aware that it was not unusual to encounter a decelerated fetal heart rate directly prior to birth. A deceleration of the fetal heart rate at the final stage of labor can result from "head molding," and the rotation of the baby. In other words, it is very common to have a fetal heart rate drop due to head compression and the transverse lie of the head during the final stages of delivery. In 98% of those cases, the decelerated fetal heart rate will return to base line. In Respondent's previous experience, babies who had similar deceleration in their heart rate came out vigorous and robust, or may have needed a little tactile stimulation or warmth to be resuscitated, but always came out normal. Her training dictated that the proper procedure was to assess whether delivery was imminent. Respondent knew that a heart rate of 60 sustained for a few moments with no progress would be considered an emergency situation necessitating physician consultation or contacting emergency medical services for transportation to a hospital. On the other hand, a fetal heart rate of 60 sustained for a few moments with progress was not unusual, and the best course of action was to facilitate delivery of the baby. Since her patient was having strong contractions, was making good expulsive efforts, and the baby was descending rapidly down the birth canal, Respondent knew that birth was imminent. Exactly twelve minutes after the patient came out of the shower, the baby was delivered. The baby was stillborn. Respondent had no indication prior to the delivery of the baby that the baby would be severely compromised or dead. Respondent is fully trained in resuscitation of babies. She is certified in medical CPR, has taken many continuing education courses in emergency procedures, and is certified in and carries with her the equipment necessary for neonatal resuscitation: neosuctioning, an Ambu Bag, and oxygen. When the baby was delivered at 12:02 a.m., Respondent caused one of the adults present to contact fire rescue. Respondent immediately began resuscitation efforts and continuously attempted to resuscitate the baby until the fire rescue unit arrived, which was fifteen minutes after fire rescue was called the first time. Between the first decelerated fetal heart rate and delivery of the baby twelve minutes later, Respondent did not refer the patient to a physician or consult with Dr. Eagleman because to do so would have taken time away from managing a potentially dangerous situation and because she knew that Dr. Eagleman would merely tell her to get the baby delivered. Further, Respondent did not consider the drop in the heart tones to be abnormal requiring her to refer the patient to a physician since there was rapid progress and birth was imminent. Dr. Eagleman verified during the final hearing in this cause that had Respondent contacted him during the twelve minutes in question to report the decelerated heart rate, he would have told her to get off the telephone, go back to her patient, and "get the baby out." Respondent had never previously delivered a stillborn. There is no suggestion made in this record either that Respondent should have known that the baby would be stillborn or that Respondent contributed in any way to cause that unfortunate outcome. Respondent contacted Anne Richter to advise her what had happened and subsequently sent written reports to Richter detailing her care of patient Freireich. Petitioner has never before taken disciplinary action against Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered Finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule 10D-36.042(1), Florida Administrative Code (1989); Finding Respondent not guilty of violating Rule 10D-36.46(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code (1989); Finding that no disciplinary action should be imposed because the violation was neither willful nor repeated; and Dismissing the Notice of Formal Reprimand filed in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 31 day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 91-1953 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 7, 8, 15 and 16 are adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 3-6, and 9-14 are rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-9, 12, 13, 15, 19-33, and 35-39 are adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 10 is rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 18 is rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 14, 16, 17, 34, and 40 are rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Miller, Esquire District IX Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Thomas G. Sherman, Esquire 218 Almeria Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's license to operate a family day care home should be denied based upon the reasons asserted in the denial letter.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, until denial of licensure, owned and operated a licensed day care facility, licensed under Chapter 402, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with administering and regulating the statutory and regulatory provisions governing entry into and licensure of the business of operating day care facilities and with regulating the practice of day care facilities and operators such as the Petitioner. Witness Tamika McConner is the mother of a child who was placed by Ms. McConner in the Petitioner's day care facility under Petitioner's care at the time pertinent hereto. Ms. McConner maintains that the Petitioner struck her child with a sandal while they were in the Petitioner's car or van on one occasion and that the Petitioner did not see to it that the child ate properly or at the proper times while in her facility. The Petitioner denies these occurrences or indications of improper child care. The evidence show that there is a hostile relationship between Ms. McConner and the Petitioner, apparently stemming from a check written by Ms. McConner for services to the Petitioner which was returned for insufficient funds and concerning which they apparently had a dispute. Under these circumstances, it is not found that Ms. McConner's testimony is preponderant evidence to establish that the occurrences she related actually happened. Moreover, as near as can be gleaned from the paucity of concise pleadings of the agency's allegations, this incident or incidents was not the subject of the report which led to license denial. On or shortly before October 3, 1996, an abuse report was received by the above-named agency concerning a child T.S. T.S. was enrolled in the care of the Petitioner in her day care center. An incident occurred that day when the Petitioner was taking the children in her charge to the Regency Mall for shopping. While at the mall, when the Petitioner was in a store shopping with the children, the child T.S. got to close to her and almost knocked something over on a shelf in the store. The Petitioner maintained that the child was so close to her that she contacted him when she turned around and it caused her to lose her balance and start to fall with the result that she reached out, accidentally knocking the child to the floor. Instead, however, witness Quinones testified and at least one witness in the store verified to the Department's investigator (see Respondent's exhibit 5 in evidence and the testimony of Mr. Gore) that the Petitioner struck the child in anger and knocked him to the floor. Ms. Quinones testified that the child didn't cry but was visibly shaken and Ms. Quinones was concerned that the Petitioner appeared to lose control of her temper on that occasion. Witness David Gore of the Department of Children and Family Services is in the business of inspecting and licensing child care facilities and has owned and operated a child care facility himself. He inspected the Petitioner's facility and found deficiency problems involving immunization records, some sanitary conditions, inoperative smoke detectors and hazardous household products left in reach of children, an incomplete first aid kit and paint and lumber left in the play area. The paint and lumber was there temporarily for the purpose of building a swing set for the children. The deficiencies were promptly corrected by the Petitioner. These deficiencies, however, were not the basis for the notice of licensure denial to the Petitioner however. Witness Roxanne Jordan testified on behalf of the Petitioner. The Petitioner cares for her child or did before the licensure problem arose and said she never had a problem with the Petitioner's care for her child nor did she observe any deficiencies or improprieties in the care of other children she observed at the Petitioner's facility. Ms. Jordan's describes the Petitioner as an excellent caregiver for children. This testimony is corroborated by substantial number of "testimonial letters" from people who have experience with her child care activities, in evidence as "corroborative hearsay." These served to establish that indeed the Petitioner is a caring, compassionate keeper of children in the operation of her day care facility and in the course of her duties baby-sitting for friends' children before she was licensed as a day care facility operator. The Petitioner is in earnest about pursuing the profession of child care and becoming re-licensed to do that. The Petitioner has demonstrated a long-standing interest and aptitude for caring for children. Indeed, in the last two years, she has earned approximately 55 hours of educational training at Florida Community College in Jacksonville in courses generally applicable to the profession of child care. The direct, competent evidence of record and the corroborative hearsay evidence in the form of testimonial letters, from people who have experience with her child care skills and her personality, establish that she has been, in most ways, a competent child care facility operator and caregiver for children and has the capability of becoming more so. In order to justify her re- licensure, however, she must demonstrate a willingness to and a capability of controlling her anger and enhancing her positive child discipline skills.
Recommendation Accordingly, in consideration of the greater weight of the evidence, supportive of the above findings of fact and these conclusions of law, it is
