The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue At issue is whether Petitioner’s foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in social work from Florida International University. Since his graduation in December 1995 he has been steadily employed in a variety of positions which involve dealing with foster children and special education students. Davis' employment included work for the Department as a foster care counselor and a protective investigator. In addition, he has a long history of involvement in his church, including teaching Sunday school and volunteer work with youth in the community. Relatives, including a mother and sister, live in the area and are supportive of his desire to continue as a foster parent. For all these reasons, the Department held high hopes for Davis as a foster parent when he sought and received a foster home license in the fall of 2001. Notwithstanding his extensive experience with exceptionally needy children Davis was required to and did attend the 30-hour training course required of all new foster parents. Davis, like all foster parents, entered into a detailed contractual agreement with DCF which sets forth the obligations of foster parents and states that non-compliance will lead to revocation of the license. The contract is lengthy, but for purposes of this case it suffices to say that it obligates foster parents to provide adequate, age-appropriate supervision at all times. In order to assist the foster parents in fulfilling this and other obligations, DCF is contractually obligated to support foster parents in a number of ways. The foster parent must be informed in as much detail as is available to DCF of a child's special needs or limitations. If the child is taking prescribed medication, DCF is obliged to provide the medication when the child is brought to the foster home, along with instructions for administering the drug. DCF is also required to exercise professional judgment when placing a child in a foster home to assure, to the extent possible, that the foster parent is capable of managing the child. Shortly after Davis was licensed, DCF assigned to him a particularly difficult child, K.N. At the time K.N. was brought to Davis on December 4, 2001, the child, a boy, was 12 years old. Davis was informed that K.N. was on medication, but DCF did not provide the medication. Davis made several efforts to secure the medication for K.N., but he was not successful. At the time K.N. was placed in Davis' home, Davis already had one foster child, D.L. Davis had previously committed to D.L. and to other neighborhood teenagers to take them in his van to the Soul Bowl high school football game in Tallahassee on December 9, 2001. The trip was uneventful until the return drive. During the trip back from Tallahassee, K.N.’s difficult behavior irritated the other children. In the ensuing horseplay, K.N. ended up with his pants down for approximately the final hour of the return trip. Details of the incident are impossible to state with certainty. The Department presented no testimony of any individual with personal knowledge of the incident. Davis and a teenage girl who was on the trip testified to their recollections. The undersigned, having carefully viewed their demeanor under oath, credits their testimony as candid; they were clear and precise with regard to elements of the day that they did recall, and honest in stating where their recollections were imprecise. The Department repeatedly asserts that K.N. was "naked" but the use of this word, as it is commonly understood, is unsupported by any competent evidence. It cannot be ascertained from the record, for example, whether K.N. was wearing underwear as well as pants, and if so, were the underwear pulled down as well? The only direct testimony regarding whether or not K.N.'s genitals were exposed to the other children was offered by Davis, who believes that K.N.'s genitals were always covered. K.N. and D.L. denied any improper touching to DCF's investigator, according to his written report. After years of driving youth from his church and community on field trips, Davis, like anyone who drives carloads of children, had learned to filter out background noise in order to focus on safe driving. Yet, like anyone responsible for a vanload of kids, he also had to remain cognizant of behaviors in the back seat(s). At some point, Davis became aware that there was an issue concerning K.N.'s pants. Davis, as well as the teenage passengers in the car, acting on Davis' instructions, made efforts to convince K.N. to get his pants back up. K.N. refused. It was raining for at least a portion of the time while Davis was attempting to deal with the situation from the driver's seat. The testimony offered by Davis on his behalf establishes that the situation among the children, particularly K.N., could have been dealt with more aggressively and with better results. The wiser course would have been for Davis to pull over, rearrange seating, verbally re-direct K.N. and the other passengers, and, as a last resort, summon the police. It is equally clear that Davis was the only adult in the car and responsible to deliver the children home safely on a rainy day. He had tuned out the back seat noises to focus on driving when it seemed reasonable to do so, and, once aware of the situation with K.N.'s pants, decided to manage it as best he could from the driver's seat and get everyone back home as quickly as possible. The situation was resolved when Davis drove his van to the north Dade home of Davis’ sister, who had a good rapport with K.N. K.N. complied promptly with her instruction that he get himself properly dressed. Soon after the trip, K.N. related a lurid and untruthful version of events to a third party. A complaint against Davis to the state's child abuse hotline resulted. Davis felt mistreated by the DCF investigator who was dispatched to look into the allegations. Davis perceived that the investigator had prejudged the complaint and deemed Davis to be guilty of participating in and/or allowing sexual abuse of K.N. Rather than complain to the supervisor of the investigator who offended him, Davis made another bad decision---he refused to honor the investigator's request that he provide the names and whereabouts of the other passengers in the van. Davis' failure to provide this information immediately was not deemed by DCF as a serious enough offense to warrant immediate removal of the foster children. Nor did it prejudice DCF in these proceedings, for Davis did provide the names to DCF well in advance of the final hearing. Davis' refusal to provide the names when first asked to do so was self-defeating in the extreme, for the passengers were in a position to corroborate what the investigator was told by both foster children: that Davis had not provoked the removal of K.N.'s pants, and had made efforts to ameliorate the situation as soon as he became aware of it, and was successful to the extent that the other children cooperated with his request to encourage K.N. to pull his pants up, which K.N. was fully capable of doing. The Department contends that "there is no amount of additional training or any other remedial action (short of license revocation) that would alleviate the Department's concern about [Davis'] ability to provide proper care and supervision to foster children." This contention is rejected for two reasons: First, although the substance of DCF's investigation was completed by December 12, K.N. remained in Davis' home until December 17, at which time Davis realized that he was not capable of handling K.N.'s behaviors and returned him to the custody of his foster care counselor. Second, Davis requested and received DCF's permission to keep his other foster child, D.L. "through the holidays." That time frame was generously interpreted by DCF staff; they did not take D.L. from Davis' care until February 8, 2001. Davis is appropriately regretful that he was not adequate to the task at hand on December 9. He also understands the inappropriateness of failing to fully cooperate with DCF's investigation in a timely fashion. Although the future is impossible to predict, it is reasonable to credit Davis' word that he has learned from these mistakes. Davis is willing to unconditionally accept additional training, supervision, and assistance from DCF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the April 1, 2002, charges against Davis. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Travis Davis 2922 Northwest 92nd Street Miami, Florida 33147 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josefina Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondents were first licensed as a family foster home in April 1994. As a result of Respondents' obtaining a foster home license, the Department put in their care: M.A1.A and M.Au.A, brother and sister; and, J.H. and L.H., brother and sister. M.Au.A was nine years old and her brother M.A1.A was eight years old. J.H. was eight years old and his sister, L.H., was five years old. J.H. and L.H. were later adopted by their foster parents, Robert and Irene Holmes. J.H. was born September 2, 1991. He was, and is, a very troubled young man. Schizophrenia runs in his biological family and his mother abused chemicals during her pregnancy. He is diagnosed with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and has episodes of violence, aggression, unpredictability, poor impulse control, and agitation. He is likely to be pre-schizophrenic and, given his behavior, could develop full schizophrenia in the future. Even though only diagnosed with ADHD and in addition to stimulant medication prescribed for his ADHD, J.H. takes several psychotropic medications generally prescribed for manic and depressive behavior and other mood disorders. However, these drugs do not seem to fully control his behavior. Because of his aggression and severe behavior problems, J.H. has been involuntarily committed multiple times and has been repeatedly recommended for a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Department has not provided J.H. a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. On October 7, 1999, the Department received an allegation of abuse against Respondents. The allegation involved J.H. The allegations involved alleged favoritism of L.H. over J.H., abandoning J.H. with teachers, emotional abuse, and not wanting him in their home. The Department's investigation, on very tenuous evidence, verified abuse for neglect - abandonment; neglect - failure to protect; abuse - other mental injury; neglect - inadequate supervision; and abuse - confinement/bizarre punishment. The report further found some indication of medical neglect and other physical injury-threatened harm. Because of the abuse report, the Department took L.H. and J.H. into shelter care on October 8, 1999, and filed a dependency action regarding J.H., Case No. 99-628-CJ. Additionally, based on the verified findings of the abuse report, the Department revoked Respondents' foster home license. By Order of the Circuit Court dated July 12, 2000, the dependency action was dismissed for lack of evidence and an utter lack of co-operation by Department's personnel and witnesses during the dependency action. J.H. was returned to Respondents' home and has remained with them to date. L.H. was returned to Respondents' home sometime before her brother's dependency action was concluded. Put simply, at the hearing, none of the allegations of the abuse report or facts supporting the verified findings were supported by the evidence since only uncorroborated hearsay was introduced at the hearing. Moreover, even though the evidence was hearsay, many of the allegations appeared from all the testimony to have been taken out of context and given meanings which were not warranted when their context was known. Significantly, the Department did not call J.H. to testify about any of these allegations. To the contrary, the testimony of various witnesses indicated that Respondents did, in fact, keep a very neat, tidy, and orderly foster household and that J.H. was not abused or neglected. The evidence presented by Respondents and the testimony of their witnesses indicate that J.H. was provided a safe environment. The teachers provided temporary care during the period of time alleged to be when Respondents were neglecting J.H. by being out of town. The witnesses, including the teachers, stated that the plan was that they would care for J.H. until the return of Respondents. Furthermore, there was never any indication that the child was mistreated or neglected or left without care by Mrs. Holmes after returning from a wedding out-of-state. Finally, there was no evidence of noncompliance with any treatment plan, that the multiple involuntary commitments were in any way mentally abusive of J.H., or that the quiet times J.H. needed to calm himself were intended to be time-out punishment or were inappropriate or bizarre punishments of J.H. Because the allegations of abuse were not established, there is no basis on which to revoke Respondents' foster home license. Therefore, Respondents are entitled to their foster home license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order not revoking Robert and Irene Holmes' family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith J. Ganobsik, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Charles P. Vaughn, Esquire 120 North Seminole Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4125 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondents' foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondents operated a foster home in Broward County, Florida, pursuant to a license that was issued by the Department in January, 1994. In March, 1994, the Department placed a foster child, M.A.G., in the Respondents' home. This child, M.A.G., was an extremely troubled girl whose interfering biological family kept her in an emotional state of constant turmoil. The "Visitation Reports" introduced into evidence by the Department reflect that the child's adjustment to placement with the Respondents went from "good" to "fair." As the contacts with her family continued, the child's progress with the Respondents deteriorated. The evaluation reflects that the placement went from meeting the child's needs to not meeting the child's needs as of a December 14, 1994 visit. In fact, Respondents asked the Department to remove M.A.G. from their home. Ms. Suppa described the family relationship between M.A.G. and the Respondents as "tumultuous." The contacts between M.A.G. and her biological family caused severe unrest within the home as M.A.G. was torn between her biological family and her growing interest in the Respondents. M.A.G.'s emotional problems were not unusual for children in the custody of the Department. In fact, many foster children in the custody of the Department have emotional problems. Ms. Suppa was involved in family therapy with the Respondents and M.A.G. from October, 1994, to the time M.A.G. was removed from the Respondents' home on January 6, 1995. Ms. Suppa verified that the Respondents did not abuse M.A.G. Ms. Suppa acknowledged that Respondents did not provide the necessary emotional support that M.A.G. needed, and recommended to the Department that the placement be changed. Ms. Suppa could not state what the Respondents could have done, which they did not try, to avoid the incident complained of by the Department. M.A.G. spoke of suicide on occasions but Respondents did everything asked of them to assist the girl. On December 18, 1994, M.A.G. was voluntarily admitted to the Florida Medical Center for psychological testing following an incident that occurred in the Respondents' home. On this occasion, M.A.G. had a knife in her hands and threatened to kill herself. The Respondents called the police to assist them. On release, M.A.G.'s emotional state continued to deteriorate despite Respondents' best efforts. Respondents took M.A.G. to counseling. They never missed a counseling session and willingly agreed to explore any options that were suggested. When M.A.G. chose to spend the 1994 holidays with Respondents, she was cursed by her sister and ignored by her grandmother. This caused a serious depression. M.A.G.'s biological mother did not attend her appointed counseling sessions. M.A.G. was disappointed since she had hoped to see her mother. On December 28, 1994, M.A.G. missed one dose of her medication. No conclusion is reached that this omission led to, or caused, the incident of January 3, 1995. On January 3, 1995, M.A.G. had to be Baker Acted. She was again admitted to the Florida Medical Center for psychological testing and treatment following an incident that occurred in the Respondents' home. Once again M.A.G. had threatened to kill herself with a knife. Since being moved from Respondents' home M.A.G. has progressed and is no longer on medication. No conclusion is reached from this progress, however, since M.A.G.'s biological family's contact with her is unknown. M.A.G. had a strong loyalty to her biological family. Respondents have been foster parents for many years in New York. This was the first incident wherein a foster child could not adjust to the Respondents' home. The Respondents tried everything within their control to make the foster relationship with M.A.G. work out.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order approving Respondents' request for licensure renewal. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1556 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 are accepted. Paragraphs 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 are rejected as irrelevant or not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondents: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9 are accepted. Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 are rejected as irrelevant or comment. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Carole C. Wilhelm Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 W. Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Carole A. and Alex Lezdey 9711 N.W. 20th Street Coral Springs, Florida 33701
The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeanette Dilligard, is licensed to operate the Dilligard Foster Home for children located at 1751 N.W. 76th Street in Miami, Florida. In the summer of 1985, W. T., age 11, L. I., age 9 and P. F., age 8, were placed in Ms. Dilligard's care by DHRS. While the children were in Ms. Dilligard's care, they were frequently and consistently given physical punishments and beatings. Each child would receive some form of physical punishment at least once a week. Ms. Dilligard used an electrical extension cord and a white belt when administering the beatings. The beatings would last about 5 minutes, sometimes leaving cuts and bruises on the children. The punishments were usually administered for fairly insignificant transgressions by the children. On one occasion, Ms. Dilligard had taken the children with her to a laundromat and L. I. accepted a piece of chewing gum from another person that was there. When Ms. Dilligard and the children returned home, L. I. was given a beating for "accepting food from a stranger." On another occasion, P. F. was eating sunflower seeds and left some of the empty shells on the floor. Ms. Dilligard administered a beating to P. F. for that offense. On yet another occasion, P. F. received a beating when she brought home a bad school report card. On November 19, 1985, W. T. lost a key to the house which he was given by Ms. Dilligard. Ms. Dilligard had previously told W. T. that if he lost the key, he could be given a beating. That evening, W. T. and his two sisters planned that they would run away from Ms. Dilligard's home the next day. On the morning of November 20, 1985, the three children ran away and went to their aunt's house. After the children left Ms. Dilligard's home, they were interviewed by the child protection team in Dade County and taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital for a medical examination. The physician's report indicated that both P. F. and L. I. had multiple bruises, scratches and abrasions on their legs and back which were non- accidental type injuries consistent with their allegations of physical beatings. Prior to receiving her license to operate a foster home, Ms. Dilligard was specifically advised, during a Foster Parent Training Program, of DHRS' policy that any form of physical punishment in the foster home setting was prohibited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Jeanette Dilligard's license to operate a family foster home be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of January, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1907 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in finding of fact 3. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Rejected as subordinate. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 5. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 5. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent (None Submitted) COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite 790 Miami, Florida 33128 Jeanette Dilligard 1751 Northwest 76th Street Miami, Florida 33147 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners' foster home license should be denied on the basis that the abuse registry examined during the re-licensure process disclosed a verified finding of abandonment of a child, recorded against the Petitioners as perpetrators, under authority of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners were licensed as a foster home and sometime in the latter part of 1999, their licensure came due for renewal. They were advised by a denial letter dated October 8, 1999, from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), that their home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. The initial agency decision to this effect was because the Petitioners, or at least Mr. Barnes, had an entry on the Department's abuse registry indicating a verified finding of abandonment against the Petitioners. The finding of abandonment involved the Petitioners' adopted son, D.B., being left at the office of the Department's foster care staff. Apparently the Barnes had had a great deal of trouble with D.B.'s behavior and had been unable to constructively discipline him and improve his behavior. This apparently made them very frustrated such that on March 26, 1999, Mr. Barnes called the Department regarding D.B., to inform the Department that they were simply unable to handle the child. Mr. Barnes talked to James Grant, supervisor of the foster care unit in the Department's Ocala office, and a witness for the Department in this case. Mr. Grant offered to provide assistance to the family to help resolve the issues between the Petitioners and their child. That offer of assistance was refused, however. Later that day, Mr. Barnes took D.B. to the Ocala offices of the Department's foster care unit and apparently left him sitting in the lobby of the building which houses the foster care staff. Mr. Barnes did not speak to Mr. Grant or anyone else in a responsible position before leaving the building and permanently abandoning the child. He only informed the receptionist that he was leaving the child. Because of the Petitioners' actions in leaving the child sitting in the lobby, a call was placed to the abuse hotline that same day. Joanne Hunter was assigned as the investigator of the abuse report. According to the final report of the investigation that was admitted into evidence, the case was closed with a verified indication of abandonment and neglect, the result of D.B. being abandoned in the Department's lobby. On March 27, 1999, a shelter hearing was held before a circuit judge and D.B. was placed in the custody of the Department due to the Petitioner's act of abandonment at the Department's office. Subsequently, the child was adjudicated dependent and placed in a long-term foster care placement. The child remained in that foster care placement at the time of the instant hearing. Certified copies of the judge's shelter order and the order of adjudication and disposition have been entered into evidence in this case. Prior to their adoption by the Petitioners, D.B. and his two siblings had been abused and neglected by their natural parents. They had, therefore, been placed in foster care by the Department. D.B.'s natural parents' parental rights had been terminated because of the uncorrected and continuing abuse and neglect of D.B. and his two siblings. The Petitioners had adopted D.B. and his two siblings. Children who have been abused and neglected or abandoned by their parents are especially vulnerable and require the greatest degree of stability in their home life that is possible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the re-licensure of the Petitioners as a licensed family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Billie and Willie Mae Barnes 15606 Southwest 27th Avenue Road Ocala, Florida 34473 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 43785 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to operate a foster home for dependent children should be suspended or revoked for lack of cooperation, and violation of the Petitioner's discipline policy, and licensing standards as outlined in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an elderly woman who has operated a foster home since October 1989, at 7018 Ironwood Drive, Orlando, Orange County, Florida. Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license in October, 1989. Foster home licenses are valid for one year and must be renewed annually. Respondent has annually renewed her license and presently holds license number 1093-11, issued October 18, 1993. In a licensing visit on April 6, 1990 Respondent admitted that she had been using some physical discipline with the children. She stated that she had been tapping the children's hands and had threatened one of the kids with a comb. Respondent was counselled by the Petitioner's licensing representative in regard to the agency's disciplinary guidelines. As a follow-up to the counseling session, a letter was sent to Respondent, dated April 6, 1990, by Licensing Representative Barbara Wavell, which advised Respondent that physically disciplining a foster child in her home was a violation of HRS policy. Respondent received the letter, and although she now believes that it contains misstatements of facts, she did not dispute its contents at the time. Respondent was made aware of the discipline policy of HRS on various occasions and during the required foster parent training, and agreed to abide by it. On April 10, 1992, Respondent expressed to Ms. Wavell that she believed "schools should be allowed to spank" and that "children need discipline and there is nothing wrong with appropriate spanking". In late 1993, Respondent hit at least one foster child who was placed in her home, because the child wet the bed. During 1993 and early 1994, Respondent allowed older foster children to discipline younger foster children with corporal punishment. On occasion, Respondent has restricted children from having access to their family members. Respondent has made derogatory remarks about some of the foster children's biological family members while in the presence of the foster children. Respondent had problems working with some of the children's caseworkers, most notably Jodi Peterson, on various occasions. Respondent expressed her concern that the caseworker visited her home too much, and she preferred that Ms. Peterson not have much contact with her foster children. Respondent felt that she should be included in the conversations between the children and their foster care counselors and would get upset that she was not included in these discussions. Respondent did not recognize the need for the children to have privacy and that it impinged on their right to have a proper relationship with their counselors. Respondent had on-going communications problems with the caseworkers. Respondent was specifically instructed concerning monetary allowances for the children, and the fact that the money given to Respondent was to be used for the children for clothing and incidentals. Respondent had difficulty accepting the fact that the children were entitled to monetary allowances to be used for clothing and incidentals. Respondent refused to allow the foster children placed in her home to participate in school activities, she refused to give them their allowance money to pay for school field trips. Respondent did not allow the foster children to have friends visit or to go places for fun. She encouraged them to stay home and watch television in their free time. Respondent on occasion made derogatory marks to some of the foster children placed in her home. Respondent did not show appropriate concern for the safety of a four- year-old foster child who was sharing a bedroom with two twelve-year-old foster children. Respondent was aware that they were hitting her, however, Respondent did not remove the child from that bedroom, although she had three empty bedrooms in the home. Although many visits have been made to the Respondent's home in an attempt to work with her to assist her in bringing the quality of care in her home up to an acceptable level, Respondent has failed to comply. On April 5, 1994, Petitioner's representative visited the Respondent to discuss the reasons that the Petitioner would be seeking a revocation of her license to operate a foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's license to operate a foster home. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1 (in part), 2, 4 (in part), 7 (in part), 8 (in part), 10 (in part), 11 (in part), 13 (in part), 14, 15, 16 (in part), 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), 31, 33, 34. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence: 1 (in part), 10 (in part), 19, 24. Rejected as subsumed, irrelevant or immaterial: paragraphs 3, 6 (in part), 7 (in part), 8 (in part), 9, 11 (in part), 12, 13 (in part), 16 (in part), 17, 23, 27, 28 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), 32. Rejected as a conclusion of law: paragraph 5 Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 7 Legal Office 400 W. Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jane Carey, Esquire 905 W. Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Bouelvard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Bouelvard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to renewal of a foster care license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Betty Stewart, was licensed by the Department to operate a foster care home on August 5, 1991. Thereafter, until the instant matter arose, Petitioner received a renewal of this license. On August 18, 1997, the Department notified Petitioner that her license would not be renewed. The decision was based upon Petitioner's alleged failure to meet the minimum standards for foster parenting. More specifically, the denial alleged concerns with Petitioner which included: Standard housekeeping standards. Counselors have reported that your home was not kept clean. They noted a stale odor, and observed clothes piled up and roach infestations. Lack of stability in housing. The licensing record indicates that you have had at least five different residences since you were licensed in 1991. Constant moving does not provide stability for the children placed with you. Inadequate medical care for a child in our home. The counselor for a child who had been in your home indicated that you failed to get timely dental care for a child in your home that resulted in the child needing to have a tooth extracted. Additionally it was reported that you did not follow-up with getting a dermatologist's prescription filled for this same child. Concerns that your son was dealing in illegal drugs. While your son did not live with you, he was in and out of your home and having contact with the foster children in your home, which in fact could have a potentially negative impact on them. You did admit to Laura Williams, the foster parent liaison, that you were aware that he was dealing drugs. During the time of Petitioner's licensure, she was licensed at five different locations. That is, she moved from one property to another and relicensed the new location, five times in six years. Additionally, during the time of licensure, Petitioner received a "provisional license" on four occasions. A provisional license is issued when the applicant must take additional measures to comply with all licensure requirements. On four occasions the Department worked with the Petitioner so that she would obtain licensure. For each license, Petitioner executed an agreement to provide substitute care for dependent children as prescribed by the Department. This agreement required Petitioner to comply with all rules implemented for foster care homes and specifically required Petitioner to report any illness of a child to the Department. In one instance, the Petitioner failed to seek immediate dental care for a child placed in her home. The dental problem was made known to the Department when the child was caught shoplifting Oragel, an over-the-counter product used to relieve toothache. Petitioner also did not compel a child to attend counseling sessions with a licensed therapist. Petitioner was responsible for assuring that the child be given transportation to and from such sessions. Although limited to two children by license restriction, Petitioner typically had more than two children placed in her home. Given the shortage for foster care homes, the Department routinely waived the limit and placed additional children with Petitioner even though she was ill-equipped to deal with the extra children. The Petitioner's son, who is now deceased, did not reside with Petitioner during the final licensure period. Although he resided in the community near her home, there is no evidence to support a finding that he was dealing drugs from the licensed premises.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for license renewal as a foster care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Colleen Farmsworth Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 111 South Sapodilla Avenue Suite 201 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Betty Stewart, pro se 812 Foresteria Drive Lake Park, Florida 33403
