The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the proposed amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-555.360 of the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”), pertaining to cross-connection control for public water systems, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a natural person residing at 1805 Burlington Circle, Sun City Center, Hillsborough County, Florida. The Department is the state agency with powers and duties to protect public drinking water as set forth in the Florida Safe Drinking Water Act, section 403.850, et seq., Florida Statutes (2013). Background The term “cross-connection” is defined in rule 62-550.200(26) as: any physical arrangement whereby a public water supply is connected, directly or indirectly, with any other water supply system, sewer, drain, conduit, pool, storage reservoir, plumbing fixture, or other device which contains or may contain contaminated water, sewage or other waste, or liquid of unknown or unsafe quality which may be capable of imparting contamination to the public water supply as the result of backflow. Cross-connections are prohibited unless appropriate backflow protection is provided to prevent backflow through the cross-connection into the public water system. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-550.360(1). There are three types of backflow prevention devices germane to this proceeding: Reduced Pressure Principle Assembly ("RP"), Double Check Valve Assembly ("DC"), and Dual Check Device ("DuC”). Typically, but not in every case, the water customer is responsible for the costs of installation, inspection, and maintenance of a backflow prevention device. It is undisputed that the RP is the most expensive to purchase, install, and maintain; followed by the DC; and then the DuC.2/ The RP and DC are installed above-ground, usually near a street. Test ports on these assemblies allow them to be tested to determine whether they are still functioning to prevent backflow. The DuC is usually installed underground and has no test ports. The Department asserts that this difference makes the DuC less reliable than the RP and DC. The rule states, and Petitioner did not refute, that the RP and DC offer greater backflow protection than the DuC. Petitioner has an auxiliary water system at his residence, which he uses to pump untreated water from a nearby lake to irrigate his lawn. There is no cross-connection between the plumbing system in Petitioner’s residence and his auxiliary water system. Petitioner does not have a backflow prevention device installed at his property. Hillsborough County has an ordinance that requires the installation of an RP device for residential customers who have auxiliary water systems, but the County currently has a moratorium on the enforcement of its ordinance. Petitioner is on a local committee established to investigate and advise the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners regarding cross-connection control. He believes the County is likely to modify its ordinance and allow the DuC for residential customers who have auxiliary water systems. The Department Rule The Department stated its purposes for the rule in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: These rules are being amended to significantly reduce the overall regulatory burden of cross-connection control requirements on community water systems (CWSs) and their residential customers by: allowing a dual check device to be used as backflow protection at or for residential service connections from CWSs to premises where there is any type of auxiliary or reclaimed water system; and (2) allowing biennial instead of annual testing of backflow preventer assemblies required at or for residential service connections from CWSs. A community water system (“CWS”) is a public water system which serves at least 15 service connections or regularly serves at least 25 year-round residents. See § 403.852(3), Fla. Stat. The Department requires each CWS to have a cross- connection control program, and Table 62-555.360-2 in the rule establishes the “Minimum Backflow Protection” that must be provided at or for the service connection from the CWS to various types of water customers. The minimum backflow protection specified in the table for a residential service connection with an auxiliary water system is a DuC. All references hereafter to “residential service connection” shall mean one with an auxiliary water system. There is a footnote for the DuC at the bottom of the table, which explains: A DuC may be provided only if there is no known cross-connection between the plumbing system and the auxiliary or reclaimed water system on the customer's premises. Upon discovery of any cross•connection between the plumbing system and any reclaimed water system on the customer's premises, the CWS shall ensure that the cross-connection is eliminated. Upon discovery of any cross- connection between the plumbing system and any auxiliary water system other than a reclaimed water system on the customer's premises, the CWS shall ensure that the cross-connection is eliminated or shall ensure that the backflow protection provided at or for the service connection is equal to that required at or for a non•residential service connection. The SERC As part of the rulemaking process for the proposed amendments to rule 62-555.360, the Department prepared a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Cost ("SERC"). Section 120.541, Florida Statutes (2013), governs the preparation of SERCs and provides that a substantially affected person may submit a “good faith written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative that substantially accomplishes the objectives of the law being implemented.” See § 120.541(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The parties dispute whether Petitioner challenged the SERC. In his amended petition, Petitioner states no objection to any statement in the SERC. Petitioner did not challenge the SERC. The parties dispute whether Petitioner submitted a lower cost regulatory alternative. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stated: Any person who wishes to provide information regarding a statement of estimated regulatory costs or provide a proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative must do so in writing within 21 days of this notice. Within 21 days of the notice, the Department received Petitioner's written comments. In his comments, Petitioner cites section 120.52(8)(f), which provides that a rule is invalid if it imposes regulatory costs which could be reduced by adopting a less costly alternative. Petitioner recommends that the rule be changed to specify that the less costly DuC is the only acceptable backflow prevention device for residential service connections and “A CWS shall not impose a requirement for a more expensive type of backflow prevention valve.” The Department contends that Petitioner’s comments did not constitute a good faith lower cost regulatory alternative, citing pages 87-98 of the Transcript. Those pages contain some argument on the issue, but do not prove Petitioner did not submit a lower cost regulatory alternative. Petitioner’s timely written comments included a citation to the relevant statute and a plainly-worded proposal. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner’s comments were sufficient to constitute a lower cost regulatory alternative. Petitioner’s Objections Petitioner objects to rule 62-555.360 because (1) it specifies use of the RP and DC, which he contends are unreasonably dangerous to public health and safety; (2) it specifies the DuC for residential service connections as the “minimum” protection, which he contends allows a CWS to require the more expensive RP or DC; (3) it requires testing of backflow devices “at least biennially” (once every two years), which he believes is too frequent; (4) it makes biennial testing a “minimum” testing interval, which he contends allows a CWS to require more frequent inspection; and (5) it does not require the backflow prevention device to be attached to the CWS’s water meter where Petitioner believes it should always be located. Unreasonable Danger Petitioner contends that the RP and DC are unreasonably dangerous to public health and safety because a person could intentionally pump contaminants through a test port on one of these assemblies into a public water supply. The Department does not dispute that a person could introduce contaminants into a public water supply in this way. The flaw in Petitioner’s reasoning is his failure to see the danger in proper perspective. Department personnel and other persons with expertise in public water systems throughout the United States are well aware that there are many access points in potable water collection, treatment, and distribution systems and many methods to introduce contaminants into these systems. There are many access points other than RPs and DCs. For example, there are methods available that would allow contaminants to be pumped into a public water system from any building connected to the system that has no backflow prevention device installed. RPs and DCs are primarily designed to prevent accidental introduction of contaminants into a public water system. However, they also prevent a person from intentionally pumping contaminants into the public water system from inside a house or building, hidden from view. The danger described by Petitioner assumes that the criminal who is intentionally pumping contaminants through the RP or DC will do it while standing next to the device, in the open, near a street. It is a well-known fact officially recognized by the Administrative Law Judge that criminals prefer to conduct their criminal activities hidden from sight rather than in plain view. Therefore, a criminal planning to contaminate a public water supply is more likely to choose a means other than introducing contaminants through an RP or DC. RPs and DCs are already in wide use. There is no reported incident of intentional contamination of a public water supply by pumping contaminants through one of these devices. When these factors are taken into account, the rule’s specifications for the continued use of RPs and DCs do not create an unreasonable danger to the public health and safety. Minimum Backflow Protection Petitioner contends that Table 62-555.360-2 is invalid because it violates the Department’s duty under section 120.541 to adopt “less costly alternatives.” Petitioner asserts that by specifying the DuC as the “minimum” backflow protection required for residential service connections the rule allows a local government to require the more costly RP or DC. The Department cannot dispute that the DuC substantially accomplishes the statutory objectives. The RP and DC provide greater backflow protection than the DuC, but the Department specified the DuC for residential service connections, indicating that the lower protection provided by the DuC did not make it fall short of the statutory objectives. However, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, the rule imposes the least costly regulatory alternative for residential service connections because it only requires the DuC. Biennial Testing Schedule Petitioner contends that section III.D. of Table 62-555.360-1 also violates the Department’s duty to adopt less costly alternatives because the rule requires “backflow assemblies” to be tested biennially, which Petitioner believes is too frequent. The term “backflow preventer assemblies” refers only to the RP and DC. See footnote 1 of Table 62-555.360-1. Section III.E. of Table 62-555.360-1 indicates that the DuC must be refurbished or replaced “at least once every 5 to 10 years.” Petitioner did not object to this requirement. The preponderance of the evidence presented shows that biennial testing is reasonable. Furthermore, it is determined in the Conclusions of Law that Petitioner has no standing to object to the testing frequency specified for the RP and DC, because the rule does not require him to have an RP or DC. Location of the Backflow Preventer Petitioner objects to section III.B. of Table 62-555.360-1, which requires backflow prevention devices to be “installed as close as practical to the CWS’s meter or customer’s property line.” Petitioner contends that this is an unconstitutional interference with private property and is unreasonably dangerous because it provides a means for intentional contamination. Petitioner’s private property rights claim is based on his allegation that if he were required by Hillsborough County to have an RP and DC, the device could be placed on his private property. Petitioner did not allege or present evidence to show that placing an RP or DC on his property would deprive him of all reasonable uses of his property so as to cause a taking of his private property for a public purpose without full compensation. See Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. Furthermore, it is determined in the Conclusions of Law that Petitioner has no standing to raise this issue because the rule does not require him to have an RP or DC. Petitioner contends the rule should require that backflow prevention devices always be attached to the water meter because that reduces the opportunity for intentional contamination. Petitioner is not an expert in public water systems, generally, or the installation of backflow prevention devices, in particular. He is not competent to state the relevant factors and constraints associated with installation of the devices. He is not competent to express an opinion whether it is always possible or always appropriate to attach the devices directly to the water meter. Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim of unreasonable danger was refuted above.
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount to be reimbursed to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”), for medical expenses paid on behalf of Ashley Nunez pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2016),1/ from settlement proceeds received by Petitioners from third parties.
Findings Of Fact Facts Pertaining to the Underlying Personal Injury Litigation and the Medicaid Lien On February 13, 2010, Ashley Nunez (“Ashley”), who was three years old at the time, presented to a hospital emergency room with a fever. A chest X-ray indicated that Ashley had left lobe pneumonia. The hospital ordered no blood work or blood cultures and did not investigate the cause of Ashley’s pneumonia. The hospital discharged Ashley with a prescription for Azithromycin. By February 14, 2010, Ashley’s fever was 102.9 degrees, and Ashley’s mother took her to a pediatrician. Rather than attempting to discover the cause of the fever, the pediatrician instructed Ashley’s mother that the prescription needed time to work and instructed her to bring Ashley back if the fever persisted. On February 16, 2010, Ashley’s aunt returned her to the pediatrician because Ashley’s fever was persisting and she had developed abdominal pain. Due to a concern that Ashley was suffering from appendicitis, the pediatrician referred her to an emergency room. Later that day, Ashley’s mother returned her to the emergency room that had treated Ashley on February 13, 2010. A second chest x-ray revealed that Ashley’s pneumonia had gotten much worse, and the hospital admitted her. Ashley’s respiratory condition continued to deteriorate, and blood cultures confirmed that she had streptococcus pneumonia. Two days after her admission, the hospital decided to transfer Ashley to a hospital that could provide a higher level of care. On February 18, 2010, an ambulance transferred Ashley to a second hospital. Even though Ashley’s respiratory condition continued to deteriorate, the paramedics and hospital transport team did not intubate her. Upon her arrival at the second hospital, Ashley had suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest and had to be resuscitated with CPR and medication. The lack of oxygen to Ashley’s brain and other organs resulted in catastrophic harm leading Ashley to be intubated, placed on a ventilator, fed through a gastric feeding tube, and placed on dialysis. The second hospital discharged Ashley two and a half months later. While she no longer required a ventilator or dialysis, the hypoxic brain injury and cardiopulmonary arrest left Ashley in a severely compromised medical condition. Ashley was unable to perform any activities of daily living and was unable to stand, speak, walk, eat, or see. Following her discharge from the second hospital, Ashley required continuous care. She was under a nurse’s care for 12 hours a day, and Ashley’s mother (Anna Patricia Delgado) cared for her during the remaining 12 hours each day. On February 23, 2011, Ashley died due to complications resulting from the hypoxic brain injury. Ashley was survived by her parents, Ms. Delgado and John Nunez. Medicaid (through AHCA) paid $357,407.05 for the medical care related to Ashley’s injury. Ashley’s parents paid $5,805.00 for her funeral. As the Personal Representative of Ashley’s Estate, Ms. Delgado brought a wrongful death action against the first emergency room doctor who treated Ashley, the pediatrician, a pediatric critical care intensivist who treated Ashley after her admission to the first hospital, the two hospitals that treated Ashley, and the ambulance company that transported Ashley to the second hospital. AHCA received notice of the wrongful death action and asserted a Medicaid lien against Ashley’s Estate in order to recover the $357,407.05 paid for Ashley’s past medical expenses. See § 409.910(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[b]y applying for or accepting medical assistance, an applicant, recipient, or legal representative automatically assigns to [AHCA] any right, title, and interest such person has to any third party benefit ”). Ms. Delgado ultimately settled the wrongful death action through a series of confidential settlements totaling $2,250,000. No portion of that settlement represents reimbursements for future medical expenses. AHCA has not moved to set aside, void, or otherwise dispute those settlements. Section 409.910(11)(f) sets forth a formula for calculating the amount that AHCA shall recover in the event that a Medicaid recipient or his or her personal representative initiates a tort action against a third party that results in a judgment, award, or settlement from a third party. Applying the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to the $2,250,000 settlement, results in AHCA being owed $791,814.84 in order to satisfy its lien.2/ Because Ashley’s medical expenses of $357,407.05 were less than the amount produced by the section 409.910(11)(f) formula, AHCA is seeking to recover $357,407.05 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. See § 409.910(11)(f)4., Fla. Stat. (providing that “[n]otwithstanding any provision in this section to the contrary, [AHCA] shall be entitled to all medical coverage benefits up to the total amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid.”). Valuation of the Personal Injury Claim Tomas Gamba represented Petitioners during their wrongful death action. Mr. Gamba has practiced law since 1976 and is a partner with Gamba, Lombana and Herrera-Mezzanine, P.A., in Coral Gables, Florida. Mr. Gamba has been Board Certified in Civil Trial Law by the Florida Bar since 1986. Since the mid-1990s, 90 percent of Mr. Gamba’s practice has been devoted to medical malpractice. Over the course of his career, Mr. Gamba has handled 60 to 70 jury trials as first chair, including catastrophic injury cases involving children. In 2015, the Florida Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates named Mr. Gamba its Trial Lawyer of the Year. Mr. Gamba is a member of several professional organizations, such as the American Board of Trial Advocates, the American Association for Justice, the Florida Board of Trial Advocates, the Florida Justice Association, and the Miami-Dade County Justice Association. Mr. Gamba was accepted in this proceeding as an expert regarding the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties. Mr. Gamba testified that Petitioners elected against proceeding to a jury trial (in part) because of the family’s need for closure and the stress associated with a trial that could last up to three weeks. Mr. Gamba also noted that the two hospitals that treated Ashley had sovereign immunity, and (at the time pertinent to the instant case) their damages were capped at $200,000 each. In order to collect any damages above the statutory cap, Petitioners would have had to file a claims bill with the Florida Legislature, and Mr. Gamba testified that “the legislature would be very difficult.” As for the three treating physicians who were defendants in the suit, Mr. Gamba testified that Petitioners achieved a favorable settlement by agreeing to accept $2 million when the physicians’ combined insurance coverage was only $3 million. The decision to settle was also influenced by the fact that Ashley had a pre-existing condition known as hemolytic uremic syndrome, a blood disorder. During discovery, Mr. Gamba learned that the defense was prepared to present expert testimony that the aforementioned condition made it impossible for the defendants to save Ashley. Finally, Mr. Gamba testified that 75 percent of medical malpractice cases heard by juries result in defense verdicts. As for whether the $2,250,000 settlement fully compensated Ashley’s estate and her parents for the full value of their damages, Mr. Gamba was adamant that the aforementioned sum was “a small percentage of what we call the full measure of damages in this particular case.” Mr. Gamba opined that $8,857,407.05 was the total value of the damages that Ashley’s parents and her Estate could have reasonably expected to recover if the wrongful death action had proceeded to a jury trial. Mr. Gamba explained that Florida’s Wrongful Death Act enabled Ashley’s parents to recover for the death of their child and for the pain and suffering they incurred from the date of Ashley’s injury. According to Mr. Gamba, $4,250,000 represented a “conservative” estimate of each parent’s individual claim, and the sum of their claims would be $8,500,000. Mr. Gamba further explained that Ashley’s Estate’s claim would consist of the $357,407.05 in medical expenses paid by Medicaid, resulting in an estimate for total damages of $8,857,407.05. Mr. Gamba’s opinion regarding the value of Petitioners’ damages was based on “roundtable” discussions with members of his firm and discussions with several attorneys outside his firm who practice in the personal injury field. Mr. Gamba’s opinion was also based on 10 reported cases contained in Petitioners’ Exhibit 9. According to Mr. Gamba, each of those reported cases involve fact patterns similar to that of the instant case. Therefore, Gamba testified that the jury verdicts in those cases are instructive for formulating an expectation as to what a jury would have awarded if Ashley’s case had proceeded to trial. In sum, Mr. Gamba testified that the $2,250,000 settlement represents a 25.4 percent recovery of the $8,857.407.05 of damages that Ashley’s parents and Ashley’s Estate actually incurred. Therefore, only 25.4 percent (i.e, $90,781.30) of the $357,407.05 in Medicaid payments for Ashley’s care was recovered. Mr. Gamba opined that allocating $90,781.39 of the total settlement to compensate Medicaid for past medical expenses would be reasonable and rational. In doing so, he stated that, “And I think both – if the parents are not getting their full measure of damages, I don’t think the health care provider, in this case Medicaid, that made the payment should get, you know, every cent that they paid out, when mother and father are getting but a small percentage of the value of their claim.” Petitioners also presented the testimony of Herman J. Russomanno. Mr. Russomanno has practiced law since 1976 and is a senior partner with the Miami law firm of Russomanno and Borrello, P.A. Mr. Russomanno has been Board Certified in Civil Trial Law by the Florida Bar since 1986, and he has served as the Chairman of the Florida Bar’s Civil Trial Certification Committee. Mr. Russomanno is also certified in Civil Trial Practice by the National Board of Trial Advocates and has taught trial advocacy and ethics for 33 years as an adjunct professor at the St. Thomas University School of Law. Mr. Russomanno is a past president of the Florida Bar and belongs to several professional organizations, such as the Florida Board of Trial Advocates, the American Board of Trial Advocates, the Dade County Bar Association, and the Miami-Dade County Trial Lawyers Association. Since 1980, Mr. Russomanno’s practice has been focused on medical malpractice, and he has represented hundreds of children who suffered catastrophic injuries. Mr. Russomanno was accepted in the instant case as an expert in the evaluation of damages suffered by injured parties. Prior to his testimony at the final hearing, Mr. Russomanno reviewed Ashley’s medical records, the hospital discharge summaries, and the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed in this proceeding. He also discussed Ashley’s case with Mr. Gamba and reviewed Mr. Gamba’s file from the wrongful death action. Mr. Russomanno also viewed videos of Ashley taken before and after her injury so he could gain an understanding of the severity of Ashley’s injury and the suffering experienced by her parents. Mr. Russomanno credibly testified that the damages incurred by Ashley’s parents were between $4,250,000 and $7,500,000 for each parent. Mr. Russomanno echoed Mr. Gamba’s testimony by stating that the $2,250,000 settlement did not fully compensate Ashley’s parents and her Estate for their damages. AHCA presented the testimony of James H.K. Bruner. Mr. Bruner has practiced law since 1983 and is licensed to practice law in Florida, New York, Maine, and Massachusetts. Mr. Bruner is a member of professional organizations such as the American Health Lawyers Association and the Trial Lawyers Sections of the Florida Bar. Between 2003 and 2005, Mr. Bruner served as the Department of Children and Families’ risk attorney. That position required him to evaluate personal injury actions filed against the Department and assess the Department’s exposure to liability. Based on his experience in evaluating approximately 200 cases for the Department, Mr. Bruner authored the Department’s manual on risk management and provided training to Department employees on risk management issues. Mr. Bruner has served as the Director of AHCA’s Bureau of Strategy and Compliance. In that position, he dealt specifically with third-party liability collections and Medicaid liens. Beginning in 2008, Mr. Bruner worked for ACS (now known as Xerox Recovery Services) and was engaged in attempting to recover Medicaid liens from personal injury settlements. Over the last several years, Mr. Bruner has spoken at seminars about Medicaid lien resolution and authored publications on that topic. Since April of 2013, Mr. Bruner has been in private legal practice as a solo practitioner. He describes himself as a “jack of all trades” who engages in a “general practice.” Over the last 20 years, Mr. Bruner has not handled a jury trial involving personal injury; and, over the last four years, he has not negotiated a personal injury settlement. The undersigned accepted Mr. Bruner as an expert witness for evaluating the cases contained in Petitioners’ Exhibit 9 and pointing out distinctions between those cases and the instant case. Mr. Bruner did not offer testimony regarding the specific value of the damages suffered by Petitioners. Findings Regarding the Testimony Presented at the Final Hearing Regardless of whether the reported cases in Petitioners’ Exhibit 9 are analogous to or distinguishable from the instant case, the undersigned finds that the testimony from Mr. Gamba and Mr. Russomanno was compelling and persuasive. While attaching a value to the damages that a plaintiff could reasonably expect to receive from a jury is not an exact science, Mr. Gamba and Russomanno’s substantial credentials and their decades of experience with litigating personal injury lawsuits make them very compelling witnesses regarding the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties such as Petitioners. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that $90,781.39 constitutes a fair and reasonable recovery for past medical expenses actually paid by Medicaid. However, and as discussed below, AHCA (as a matter of law) is entitled to recover $357,407.05 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien.3/
Findings Of Fact Ed Smith is the President of Riverside Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., which in turn is the owner of the mobile home park in question in this case. The mobile home park is located in Ruskin, Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner was served with an Administrative Complaint alleging that the chlorine residual in the park water supply distribution system was inadequate and that this constituted a violation of Chapter 513 and Section 386.041(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as well as Rule 10D-26.67(1), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleges violations occurring between July 16, 1986 and July 29, 1986, and seeks the imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $500 per day which "shall be calculated when this complaint is received by the (Petitioner), and will run until the violation has been corrected." Petitioner requested a hearing to contest these allegations, and his request was filed with Respondent's Clerk on October 8, 1986. It was not established by competent substantial evidence when Petitioner "received" the Administrative Complaint which is the subject of this action. The only evidence of any violation occurring between July 16 and July 29, 1986 was the testimony of Harry Messick who signed an Official Notice and Notice of Intended Action which were both dated July 16, 1986, and which alleged that "chlorine reading found at time of inspection (was) between 0.1 ppm and (a) trace." However, Messick did not perform any test to either produce or confirm this result. He testified that someone else performed the field test, but there was no testimony from anyone else who may have actually conducted a test on Petitioner's water supply system on July 16, 1986. Therefore, it has not been established by competent substantial evidence that Petitioner's water supply system on July 16, 1986, was in violation of the requirement that .2 mg/1 of free chlorine residual be maintained. Testimony from Respondent's other witnesses, Norman Vik and Neil R. Schobert, indicates Vik was not even at Petitioner's mobile home park between July 16 and 29, 1986, and the only test conducted by Schobert found that Petitioner's water supply system was in compliance on July 24, 1986. Design modifications in Petitioner's water supply distribution system were approved by the Hillsborough County Health Department on July 9, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order DISMISSING the Administrative Complaint filed against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February 1987. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 86-4094) Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2-3. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 5. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sheehan, Esquire Florida Federal Building One Fourth Street North Suite 800 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Carol M. Dittmar, Esquire 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Suite 520 Tampa, Florida 33614 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Seminole Community Action, Inc. (SCA), is a community action agency serving Seminole County, Florida. The organization is a non- profit corporation located at 1101 Pine Avenue, Sanford, Florida and has been in operation since 1966. According to its by-laws, SCA administers the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) program in Seminole County. The general purpose of the agency is to plan and mobilize resources to help improve the quality of life for low income families throughout the community. Its primary source of funding has been from the federal and state governments although it does receive a small amount of private funding through contributions. Effective July, 1982 the responsibility for administering the CSBG program was shifted from the federal government to respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). This meant that applications for CSBG funding would thereafter be filed with respondent rather than the United States Department of Health and Human Services. After considerable difficulty in preparing its initial application, SCA filed an application with DCA on January 28, 1983 seeking a $95,435 CSBG grant retroactive to the period December 1, 1982 through September 30, 1983. The contract called for monthly payments to SCA of $9,543.50 and required SCA to serve an estimated 4,075 CSBG eligible low-income clients during the 10-month period. Prior to filing the application, DCA representatives spent two days with SCA officials assisting them in completing the application. At that time, SCA was told that its fiscal records and operations were inadequate, that certain changes would be necessary relative to recording liabilities on its books, that its purchasing procedures must be improved, and that its record- keeping in general was in poor condition. Because of these deficiencies, DCA advised SCA by letter dated February 18, 1983, that seven special conditions pertaining to fiscal accountability would attach to the grant of funds. These conditions are set forth in Attachment A to the contract. In addition, DCA advised SCA by letter dated February 24, 1983 of federal requirements pertaining to the composition of its board of directors. Information concerning SCA's compliance with the board requirements was requested no later than March 17, 1983. A contract was eventually signed by SCA on March 29, 1983 whereby it agreed to adhere to the seven special conditions. DCA representatives made two "monitoring visits" to SCA on May 18-20, 1983 and June 1-3, 1983 to determine if the organization's fiscal operation, board composition and program services were in compliance with state regulations and contract terms. Although SCA was given advance notice of the visits, and told to have appropriate records available to substantiate fiscal reports, client records, compliance with the seven special contract conditions, and other matters, the auditors found a "lack of compliance with the law for the structure of the Board," 1/ "lack of fiscal procedures and adequate controls for fiscal accountability," "no documentation that the agency (was) serving low income persons," and a "questionable effort" to provide services to that class of persons. A more detailed list of deficiencies is found in respondent's exhibit 8 received in evidence. As a result of the above deficiencies, SCA was advised by letter dated June 15, 1983 that "it (was) imperative that corrective measures be promptly undertaken to correct these problems." A deadline for compliance in eight specific areas was set for July 15, 1983, and if it did not do so, SCA was told the contract would be terminated. On July 15, 1983, SCA was notified by letter that its contract was being terminated effective June 30, 1983. Such action was appropriate because SCA failed (a) to comply with board of director structure requirements, (b) to resolve a carry-over debt from a prior year, (c) to justify a $9,544 budget amendment, (d) to resolve $3,700 in disallowed costs, and (e) to "demonstrate a continuing fiscal accountability to the satisfaction of the Department." Petitioner has also participated in the State Weatherization Assistance Program whereby it receives state funds for conservation purposes. These are federal grant monies funded under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981, and are granted for the purpose of providing information, services and technical assistance concerning weatherization and energy conservation to the low income community. It received $21,432 in grant funds during the fiscal year 1982-83, and was subjected to an audit by a state monitoring team in July, 1983 to insure compliance with program goals. The team found SCA had paid salaries from the grant funds in violation of federal regulations and had constructed a "cooler room" to store surplus food with grant monies in violation of federal law. Then, too, CA's administrative expenses totaled 34.9 percent of total funds which was far in excess of the norm of 5 percent for other agencies. Finally, it spent on the average over $1,300 to weatherize each home when the maximum allowed was only $1,000 per home. Because of these deficiencies, SCA's application for renewal of the program during 1983-84 was properly denied. Petitioner has also made application for CSBG funds for fiscal year 1983-84. Since the time its 1982-83 contract was terminated, SCA has failed to satisfy the concerns which were raised in the letter of July 15, 1983 which terminated the contract. Specifically, its Board of Directors still does not comply with federal or state requirements, and its fiscal irregularities have not been resolved. Until it does so, it is ineligible for grant funds and DCA is justified in refusing to approve SCA's applications. SCA contends all matters raised in the July 15, 1983 termination letter have been satisfactorily resolved. In making this contention it relies primarily upon a letter dated February 15, 1984 from the United States Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to SCA, and the adoption of amended by- laws which comply with federal guidelines pertaining to community action agency board of directors. However, neither the letter nor the amended by-laws satisfy the long-standing deficiencies cited by DCA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the relief requested in Seminole Community Action, Inc.'s petition be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a special taxing district providing fire protection and rescue services to the residents of the Estero area of Lee County. The fire station is located at 20241 Tamiami Trail, Estero, Florida. Petitioner employs 14 employees, including administrative staff and firefighters. The firefighters work 24 hours straight and then are off-duty for 48 hours. Two to four employees work each shift. Firefighting requires a fast response. Thus, Petitioner requires that on-duty firefighters remain at the station for their entire 24-hour shift, unless they are out fighting fires or performing rescue duties. The fire station contains an 8' x 13' bedroom with six mattresses located on three bunk beds. On-duty firefighters are allowed to bring pillows and sheets so they can sleep at the station while on duty. There are no dressers in the room, which contains small lockers that the firefighters may use to store a change of clothes. Petitioner provides kitchen facilities at the fire station and well water. The well water is used for washing equipment, taking showers, and flushing the toilet. The well water is not used for any other purposes, nor is it used by any other persons. Petitioner provides bottled water for drinking and cooking. All of the firefighters have residences apart from the fire station and within a reasonable commuting distance from the fire station. No firefighter has ever lived at the station. Petitioner does not charge, or reduce the pay of, the firefighters for their use of the limited sleeping facilities. Petitioner lawfully does not treat the use of the limited sleeping facilities by firefighters as gross income for the purposes of withholding federal income tax or making social security contributions. By letter dated July 18, 1995, Respondent informed Petitioner that the fire station's water system is a limited use community water system because the sleeping facilities constituted rental residences, as defined by Rule 10D- 4.024(21), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent advised Petitioner that it was therefore required to obtain a permit. As noted in the following section, the statute authorizes Respondent to regulate as limited use community public water systems those systems serving a certain number of "rental residences." The statute does not define "rental residence." In Rule 10D-4.024(21), Respondent defines a "rental residence" as follows: a dwelling unit, a structure or part of a structure that is rented for use, or furnished with or without rent as an incident of employ- ment, for use as a home, residence, sleeping place by one or more persons, a mobile home rented by a tenant. This term does not apply to facilities offering transient residency such as public lodging establishments. This term includes other facilities where residency or detention is incidental to the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar services. Respondent equated a "rental residence" with a "dwelling unit" when it based its definition of "rental residence" on the statutory definition of "dwelling unit" in Chapter 83, Part II, Florida Statutes, which is the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. A "dwelling unit" is a "residence." The American Heritage dictionary defines a "dwelling" as "a place to live in; residence; abode." Similarly, the same dictionary's first definition of "residence" is "the place in which one lives; a dwelling; an abode." But the statutory definition qualifies "residential" with "rental." The word "rental" requires consideration of the nature of the relationship of the occupant to the dwelling and its owner. Obviously, the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act addresses rental transactions, but it does not do so in the definition of "dwelling unit." Other provisions of the Act describe the kind of activity that must take place for a person to be considered a tenant renting a dwelling unit. Most importantly, Section 83.43(6) defines "rent" as "periodic payments due the landlord from the tenant for occupancy under a rental agreement " The facts of this case present a revealing illustration of the distinction between a "residence" or "dwelling unit," on the one hand, and a "rental residence," on the other hand. There is no rental relationship between the occupants of the sleeping quarters at the fire station and the residence or dwelling itself. The firefighters do not pay, directly or indirectly, for these beds or the rooms in which the beds are located. Their employer legitimately does not include the value of the use of these sleeping quarters in the compensation paid to the firefighters. The firefighters have residences within commuting distance of the fire station and use the meager sleeping quarters and kitchen facilities only because they are required to spend long hours continuously at the fire station.
Findings Of Fact The home of Hazel Philpot was licensed as a Shelter Home on 2 October 1979 for a maximum of seven children ages 2 through 12 (Exhibit 1). This license was to expire 6/15/80. to coincide with Sanitation Report On 21 November 1979, the day before Thanksgiving, a 6-months old girl (Melanie) was delivered to Mrs. Brenda Moore, a foster mother licensed by Petitioner. No records accompanied this child, who appeared to be in some discomfort. The baby was accompanied by a bottle full of whole milk with a nipple that had been previously used by an older baby and which did not appear sterile. Mrs. Moore called to find out what formula Melanie was on and was advised to call Respondent's home. Moore then called Philpot. During this phone conversation Mrs. Moore was told that Melanie did not sleep well but would eat anything put before her; that whole milk with vitamins was given to Melanie; that Mrs. Philpot didn't always have money for baby foods and fed mashed table scraps; and, regarding poor sleepers, that a little bit of booze sometimes worked wonders. When questioned about this conversation by a Single Intake Counsellor from Respondent, Mrs. Philpot denied the incident and stated she does not use home remedies (Exhibit 5). Melanie continued to cry all hours of the day and night over Thanksgiving and the weekend following. On Thanksgiving eve, Mrs. Moore called the pediatrician assigned for the children in her foster hone, but he would not come and told her to watch over Melanie and if she got worse to take her to the Emergency Room at the hospital. Melanie had no Medicaid card which would have allowed Mrs. Moore to take her to the clinic which was otherwise available. During this period Mrs. Moore found Melanie very constipated and after she did have a bowel movement her stool indicated unmashed food had been fed to her. When Barbara Rittner, Direct Services Supervisor for HRS, visited the Moore home on Monday, 26 September 1979, to check on the two children assigned to her and living at the Moore home, she found Mrs. Moore exhausted from lack of sleep caused by Melanie's crying for four days, and upset by the situation. Mrs. Moore reported what she knew and what she had been told to Mrs. Rittner, who submitted an Unusual Incident report (Exhibit 2) containing the information regarding Melanie and Mrs. Philpot's comments which had been told to her by Mrs. Moore. Shelter homes take children on an emergency basis while the child's situation is determined. Abused children are those normally placed in a shelter home, pending a judicial determination if the child is to be returned to its parents or placed elsewhere. Normally, children stay in a shelter home less than one month. Foster mothers take children and act as sub-parents until the child can be returned to its home or placed for adoption. Petitioner looks for similar qualities in the operators of both shelter and foster homes. Shelter homes are supervised by Single Intake and are licensed by Social and Economic Services, both units of DHRS. Normally, incidents involving shelter homes are investigated by Single Intake. The Unusual Incident report was referred to Single Intake but no written report of an investigation was submitted or presented at this hearing. The Unusual Incident follow-up report (Exhibit 5) appears based entirely on hearsay and no witness corroborated any information contained therein. Specifically, this follow-up report stated that Melanie had been fed hard liquor by Mrs. Philpot and the only evidence to support that conclusion is the information Moore received from the Philpot Home as noted above. Prior to the issuance of Mrs. Philpot's current license (Exhibit 1) her home had been licensed for several years as a shelter home, however, in 1978 it appears her relicensing was delayed because of a drinking problem of Mr. Philpot. He moved to North Carolina to live with a son and upon the condition that he not be allowed to return to live at the home Mrs. Philpot's license was renewed to certify her home as a shelter home for up to seven children, ages two through twelve. Prior to rescinding Mrs. Philpot's license information was received by HRS (Exhibit 3--not admitted) that Mr. Philpot had been observed at the home at Christmastime. No evidence in this regard was presented at the hearing and this incident was not given as a reason for rescinding the license in the January 18, 1980 letter (Exhibit 1). Those grounds are only that Respondent failed to provide proper nourishment to shelter children in her home. The only evidence respecting the nourishment provided children in the Philpot Shelter Home is the testimony of Mrs. Moore above noted. Most of Mrs. Moore's conclusions were obtained from a telephone conversation she had with the Philpot home and a person she assumed to be Mrs. Philpot. She did not say she knew Mrs. Philpot or had previously talked to her on the telephone. No evidence was presented that the bottle accompanying Melanie when she was deposited at the Moore home came from the Philpot home. If an effort was made to verify the information contained in the Unusual Incident Report, no competent evidence wad presented in this regard, nor was any corroborating evidence presented to verify the information contained in the Unusual Incident report other than the testimony of Mrs. Moore, the source of that information. There was only one shelter home in the Miami specifically approved to take babies in 1979. This home was frequently full and children under two years of age were routinely placed in shelter homes not licensed for them such as the Philpot home. Relicensing Summary (Exhibit 4) submitted on Philpot home prior to the issuance of this current license shows the home fully qualified for licensure as a shelter home. Respondent's objection to hearsay evidence was overruled subject to the caveat that no finding would or could be based upon such evidence not corroborated by competent evidence.
Findings Of Fact 1 In either April or May, 1983, HRS District III, Respondents in this case, advertised a request for proposals to operate a spouse abuse shelter in a subdistrict of HRS District III in accordance with the following schedule: The request for proposal (RFP) package was to be picked up by 5 p.m., May 20, 1983; the applicant was to notify HRS of its intent to submit a proposal by 5 p.m., May 20, 1983; and the proposal was to be filed with HRS no later than 5 p.m., June 3, 1983. The contract in question was for the period July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984. Linda Tucker, President of the Petitioner's Board of Directors, found out about the solicitation from her Vice President, Alice Mulrooney, who had received word of it through an administrative letter sent to her in her capacity of an officer on the County Rape Council. Ms. Tucker and Ms. Mulrooney both telephonically spoke with Carol Laxton, the HRS official in Gainesville who was stewarding this solicitation. It was not clear which of the two spoke with her first. Ms. Tucker spoke with Ms. Laxton on May 20, 1983, and requested to be furnished with a copy of the RFP. Both Tucker and Mulrooney indicated they told Ms. Laxton that Petitioner was not yet incorporated. Both agree Ms. Laxton advised them the requirement for incorporation could be waived and that the proposal should be submitted anyway, including a letter from Petitioner's lawyer to the effect that the incorporation papers had been forwarded to the office of the Secretary of State. On May 25, 1983, Petitioner contacted representatives of the Hernando County Commission relative to county funding of at least a portion of that local source of matching funds required to make up at least 25 percent or the overall proposed operating budget as required by Florida Statutes and as set out in the proposal. At that time, Petitioner was advised that while the Commission supported the Petitioner's proposal in concept and fully hoped to lend its financial support, it could not officially do so until after the county's budget hearings were completed and it was determined that the requested funds were in fact available. A letter to this effect was submitted to Ms. Laxton by the Chairman of the Commission on June 7, 1983. In the interim, before the proposal was submitted, both Ms. Tucker and Ms. Mulrooney discussed this possible defect, as well, with Ms. Laxton. Again, both ladies contend Ms. Laxton advised them this criterion could be waived, as well. Petitioner submitted its proposal on time. However, at the time of submittal, the Petitioner was not in fact incorporated. The proposed corporate charter was forwarded to the Secretary of State on June 2, 1983 (a letter to this effect was sent the same day to Ms. Laxton by Petitioner's attorney), and approved on June 13, 1983. Also, at the time of submission, the proposal listed as budgeted resources donated land and two homes having a rental value of $4,800 per year as an in-kind resource, $182 as cash client contributions and $3,750 as a cash contribution by the Hernando County Commission. It is this last funding source that was committed in theory only and was not firm. Taken together, the three sources totaled $8,732, which would be slightly over 28 percent of the total yearly budget of $31,052. However, since the commitment from the County Commission was not firm and was contingent on funds being available, it could not be considered; and the remaining sum of $4,982 is only 16 percent of the budget. Ms. Laxton admits talking with both Tucker and Mulrooney on several occasions about the proposal and the difficulties they were having. They indicated to her they were having problems getting incorporated, but that their attorney was working on it. She admits telling them to send whatever they had, which included a status letter from their attorney. She also admits stating to them that some requirements of the RFP could be waived, but does not think incorporation was one and is sure she did not tell them the matching funds requirement could be waived. After hearing the evidence presented and considering it along with its relative probabilities and improbabilities, it is found that the Petitioner's representatives may have reasonably inferred the incorporation requirement could be waived. However, it is unlikely that Ms. Laxton would have even inferred anything as significant and sensitive as a matching fund requirement could be waived. If Ms. Tucker and Ms. Mulrooney inferred that from Ms. Laxton's comments, it was unfortunate, but in error. In fact, the County Commission did ultimately approve a commitment to Petitioner in the amount of $3,750. They have also received additional cash contributions of $2,300 and additional in-kind contributions of $5,000. None of these latter resources were in hand or firmly committed by the June 3, 1983 proposal submission deadline, however. At the present time, Petitioner is operating a shelter without Respondent's funds. They have requested assistance from the successful bidder, but have been turned down. There is, however, substantial but non-financial community support for Petitioner's operation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's protest be rejected. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: LINDA TREIMAN, ESQUIRE 11 NORTH MAIN STREET BROOKSVILLE, FLORIDA 33512 JAMES A. SAWYER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 1000 N.E. 16TH AVENUE BUILDING H GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA 32601 MR. DAVID PINGREE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 1323 WINEWOOD BOULEVARD TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
Conclusions Having reviewed the Notice of Intent to Impose Fine, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Exhibit 1) , and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 2) with the parties to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Notice of Intent to Impose Fine, Exhibit 1, is withdrawn and deemed superseded. 3. The Respondent’s request for an Administrative proceeding is hereby withdrawn. Filed March 31, 2010 11:51 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. 4. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 5. The above-styled case is hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this day of _AAlaccA_ , 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Thomas W. Arnold, Secretary Agency for Hgalth Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Kelly Dumas, Administrator Thomas J. Walsh II, Senior Attorney TEHC, LLC Agency for Health Care Admin. 8525 Northwest 53” Terrace, Ste 200 | 525 Mirror Lake Drive N. #330G Miami, Florida 33166 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 (U.S. Mail) (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Administrative Law Judge Agency for Health Care Admin. Div. of Administrative Hearings 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (Interoffice Mail) (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the LA day of S arc, , 2010. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION OR RN ne T Better Health Care for all Floridians HOE ETRY ed a February 27, 2009 : KELLY MARIE DAMAS MAR C& 7909 TEHC, LLC ees LICENSE NUMBER: 201750961 8525 NW 53 TERRACE STE 200 oO MIAMI, FL 33166-4521 _ CASE #: 2009002202 NOTICE OF INTENT TO IMPOSE FINE Pursuant to Section 400.474 (6) (), Florida Statutes (F.S.), a fine of $5,000 is hereby imposed for failure to submit the home health agency quarterly report within 15 days after the quarter ending September 30. As required in section 400.474(6) (f), E.S., the agency shall impose a fine of $ 5,000. TO PAY NOW, PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN 21 DAYS AND MAILED WITH A eno een nn COPY OF THIS NOTICE OF INTENT TO: Agency for Health Care Administration Finance and Accounting, Revenue Section OMC Manager 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #14 Tallahassee, FL 32308 Include License Number: 201750961 and Case Number: 2009002202 in check memo field. EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120,569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION OF RIGHTS FORM. Agency for Health Care Administration LEE Tee By: Anne Menard, Manager Home Care Unit cc: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, MS#34 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 EXHIBIT Jj aman eestenin ‘ 2X00900P > QL . Certified Article Numbef " Pibo 340h 848 1380 0384 ; “SENDERS RECORD. STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, DOAH No: 10-975 vs. AGENCY No: 2009002202 TEHC, LLC, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Petitioner, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the “Agency”), through its undersigned representatives, and Respondent, TEHC , LLC (hereinafter “Respondent”), pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, each individually, a “party,” collectively as “parties,” hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, the Respondent was a Home Health Agency licensed pursuant to Chapters 400, Part III, and 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 59A-8, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction by virtue of being the regulatory and licensing authority over Respondent; and WHEREAS, the Agency served the Respondent with a Notice of Intent to Impose Fine notifying the party of its intent to impose a fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) for the alleged failure to timely file a mandatory report pursuant to Section 400.474(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2008); and SA NOI Dismiss EXHIBIT 2 WHEREAS, the Respondent requested formal administrative hearings by filing an election of rights form or by petition; and WHEREAS, a referenced report was not necessary for the referenced license number; and WHEREAS, the parties stipulate to the adequacy of considerations exchanged; and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated in good faith and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of this proceeding; and NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. All recitals are true and correct and are expressly incorporated herein. 2. Both parties agree that the “whereas” clauses incorporated herein are binding findings of the parties. 3. Upon full execution of this Agreement, Respondent agrees to a withdrawal of its request for an administrative proceeding; agrees to waive any and all proceedings and appeals under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court (DOAH) of competent jurisdiction; and further agrees to waive compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled as to this matter. Provided, however, that no agreement herein, shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 4. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the parties agree that the Notice of Intent to Impose Fine directed to Respondent and dated February 27, 2009 shall be deemed withdrawn and superseded. 5. Venue for any action brought to interpret, challenge or enforce the terms of this Agreement or the Final Order entered pursuant hereto shall lie solely in the Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. 6. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating the terms of this Agreement and closing the above-styled case(s). 7. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 8. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all the parties. 9. The Respondent for itself and for its related or resulting organizations, its successors or transferees, attorneys, heirs, and executors or administrators, does hereby discharge the Agency and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to the Notice of Intent referenced herein, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including claims arising out of the subject of this Agreement, by or on behalf of the Respondent or related or resulting organizations. 10. This Agreement is binding upon all parties herein and those identified in the aforementioned paragraph of this Agreement. 11. The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have authority to bind their respective principals to it. Respondent has the capacity to execute this Agreement. Respondent understands that it has the right to consult with counsel and has knowingly and freely entered into this Agreement without exercising its right to consult with counsel. Respondent affirms that Respondent understands counsel for the Agency represents solely the Agency and Agency counsel has not provided legal advice to or influenced Respondent in its decision to enter into this Agreement. 12. This Agreement contains the entire understandings and agreements of the parties. 13. This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written agreements between the parties. This Agreement may not be amended except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. 14. All parties agree that a facsimile signature suffices for an original signature. 15. The following representatives hereby acknowledge that they are duly authorized to enter into this Agreement. Elizabeth)Dudek Health Quality Assurance Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: L620 . Justuf M. Senigy/General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Florida Bar No. 79741 DATED: 3/25/70 Kelly D Administrator TEHC, LLC 8525 Northwest 53 Terrace, Suite 200 Miami, FL 33166 Thopfas J “a II, Senior Attorney Florida Bar No. 566365 Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive, Suite 330G St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 DATED:
