Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a registered nurse holding License No. 0936792 issued by the Florida State Board of Nursing. The Respondent was employed as a registered nurse at Shands Teaching Hospital in Gainesville, Florida, from August of 1978, until April, 1979. Her duties were as a nursing team leader and medication nurse on the fourth floor. The fourth floor unit to which the Respondent was assigned was a 52-to-56- bed unit. Staff on this floor consisted of a charge nurse in charge of the floor and two to four registered nurses. Patient census on this unit ran from 40 to 56 patients. This was a general medical ward whose patients included the chronically ill. (a) Regarding the allegations of Count 1 of the Administrative Complaint related to the patient Gussie Sims Gardner, the hospital records reveal the patient was not admitted to the hospital until 2225 hours on March 24, 1979. The individual responsible for initial preparation of the medication administration record (MAR) did not cross through the times prior to the administration of the patient's first medications as required by the hospital's protocols. See Exhibit 1, Medication Record (Form No. 15-02-41-2), page 2, paragraph 5. Because of this failure, the initial entries for medication administered to the patient on March 25 were transposed to the date of March 24, and the entries for March 26 were placed in the column far March 25. After two days this error was apparently discovered, and no entries were made in the column for March 26. The Respondent cannot be held responsible for this error, because she was not on duty when the patient was admitted. Under the hospital's standard operating procedures (SOP), the first individual administering medication should have crossed out the dates and times in such a manner that this error could not occur. (b) Regarding Counts 1 and 2 of the Administrative Complaint, the Control Substance Form (CSF) does reflect that the Respondent withdrew two Darvon 65, a Class IV controlled substance, on March 25, 1979. The Respondent recorded the administration of the Darvon at the appropriate time but under the date of March 24, 1979. Only the administration of this medication at 0830 hours on March 25 was noted by the Respondent in the nurses' notes. (c) Regarding the allegations of Count 4, recording of the entries for March 25 and 26 under the dates of March 24 and 25 resulted in no entries being made on the MAR on March 26 by any of the nursing staff. (d) Regarding the allegations of Counts 6 and 8 that the physician's order entered March 24 for Oarvom 65 was no longer effective on March 28, Exhibit 1, the Formulary, page VIII, provides that stop orders occur automatically at the end of 48 hours for narcotics and at the end of seven days for all other drugs unless renewed. The Formulary differentiates on page IX between narcotics and other controlled substances. Darvon, while a controlled substance, is not a narcotic and therefore would not be terminated at the end of 48 hours, but at the end of seven days. The administration of this drug by the Respondent on March 28 was not precluded by the hospital's regulations. (e) Regarding the allegations contained in Counts 3, 5, 7 and 9, there is no substantial evidence that the Respondent possessed any controlled substance for any purpose other than the administration of the substance to the patient. No substantial and competent evidence was presented that the medications were not administered to the patient as recorded in the written records of the hospital. (a) Regarding the allegations concerning the patient Mary Lee Love Graham contained in Count 10 of the administrative Complaint, the CSF reflects two doses of Codeine were signed out by the Respondent for this patient on March 25, 1979. The appropriate entries were made on the MAR by the Respondent. Although the 1200 hour administration of medication was charted in the nurses' notes, the administration of the medication at 0830 hours was not charted by the Respondent. Similarly, the administration of Codeine 60 to this patient at 2200 hours was not charted by Nurse Wigginton on March 24, 1979. (b) Regarding Count 12 of the Administrative Complaint, the MAR reflects that Graham received Codeine 60 at 0400 hours from Wigginton and at 0800 hours from the Respondent on march 26, 1979. The nursing notes do not reflect the administration of Codeine 60 at either time. On March 27, 1979, the Respondent apparently administered no medications to this patient; however, the administration of Codeine 60 to this patient at 1600 hours on March 27, 1979, was not charted in the nursing notes. (c) Regarding the allegations of Count 14 in the Administrative Complaint, the MAR and CSF agree regarding the administration of Codeine 60 to Graham on March 26, 1979, at 0800 and 1400 hours by the Respondent. The administration of the medication at 0800 hours was not charted in the nursing notes, as was the administration of the same medication at 2300 hours on the same date by another nurse. Although the physician's orders were not renewed and therefore terminated at the end of 48 hours as discussed above, the MAR was not changed to reflect discontinuation of this medication, and all staff nurses, to include the Respondent, continued to administer Codeine 60 to this patient after the physician's orders ceased. (d) Regarding the allegations contained in Counts 11, 13 and 15, there is no substantial and competent evidence that the Respondent possessed any controlled substance for any purpose other than its administration to a patient. There is no substantial and competent evidence that the medications were not administered as charted. (a) Regarding the allegations contained in Count 16 concerning the patient Marshal Rex Burk, the MAR and CSF records reflect administration of Darvon 65 by the Respondent to this patient at 1000 hours on March 24, 1979. This was not charted by the Respondent in the nursing notes. As stated above, the drug Darvon 65 is not a narcotic drug and not subject to automatic termination at the end of 48 hours. Thee administration of Darvon 65 on March 24, 1979, was pursuant to a physician's order entered on March 19, 1979. (b) Regarding the allegations of Count 18, the CSF and MAR reflect administration of Darvon 65 to Burk at 1000 hours on March 25, 1979, by the Respondent. The Respondent did not chart this in the nurses notes. The physician's order for Darvon remained valid on March 25, 1979. (c) Regarding the patient Burk, the MAR reflects that Dalmane, a Class IV controlled substance, was administered March 21, 22, 23 arid 25 by a staff nurse. The administration of this medication was not charted in the nursing notes, and a review of the physician's orders for this patient does not reflect an order for Dalmane being entered until March 29, 1979. A review of the nursing notes for this patient reveals no charting for March 27, 1979. The SOP for charting provides a minimum of one charting for each patient per shift. (d) The allegations contained in Counts 17 and 19 are not proven. The records reflect the Respondent signed out for Darvon 65 and administered it to the patient. (a) Regarding the allegations contained in Count 20 of the Administrative Complaint concerning the patient Willie Mae Bender Tison, the CSF shows the Respondent signed out for two doses of Darvon 65 on March 24, 1979, for this patient. The MAR reflects administration at 0330 hours on March 24, 1979. The nursing notes do not reflect administration of Darvon 65 to his patient on March 24, 1979. One Darvon 65 was not accounted for in the records. (b) Regarding this patient, his MAR indicates the patient started receiving drugs on March 17, 1979; however, the admitting data and nursing notes reflect that this patient was not admitted until 1450 hours on March 21, 1979. The data contained in the MAR from March 17 until March 24 is clearly in error. (c) Regarding Count 21, although the facts indicate the Respondent did not chart the administration of one Darvon 65 to the patient Tison, no evidence was introduced that the Respondent took the medication herself or retained the medication for sale or distribution. (a) Regarding the allegations in the Administrative Complaint contained in Count 22 relating to the patient Frances Louise Blocker Medina, the MAR reveals that Percodan was administered to this patient on March 24, 1979, at 0530 hours, 0930 hours by the Respondent, 1300 hours by the Respondent and 2200 hours. The CSF reflects that the Respondent withdrew two doses of Percodan for the Respondent on March 24, 1979. The Respondent recorded the administration of the medication to this patient at 1300 hours in the nursing notes. No entries were made in the nursing notes for March 24, 1979, reflecting the administration of Percodan at 0530 hours, 0930 hours and 2200 hours by the Respondent and others. (b) Regarding the allegations of Count 24, the MAR reflects that the Respondent administered Percodan to this patient at 0700 hours and 1100 hours on March 25, 1979. The Respondent charted the administration of this medication to this patient in the nursing notes at 0730 hours and 1030 hours. The CSF shows the Respondent signed out for two Percodan for this patient on March 25, 1979. The MAR also reveals that this patient received Percodan at 1830 hours on March 25, 1979, from another nurse. The nursing notes do not reflect charting of this medication. (c) Regarding the allegations in Count 26, the CSF reflects that the Respondent signed out for two doses of Percodan for this patient on March 26, 1979. The MAR reflects administration of Percodan to this patient at 0200 hours, 0800 hours by the Respondent, 1400 hours by the Respondent and 2000 hours on March 26, 1979. The nursing notes reflect only the administration of this medication for 2000 hours. (d) Regarding the allegations of Count 28, the medical records of this patient reflect that staff nurses, to include the Respondent, continued to give the patient Percodan, a narcotic, although the physician's order for this medication automatically terminated. (e) Regarding the allegations of Count 30, the MAR and CSF reflect that the Respondent administered one Percodan to this patient on March 28, 1979. The Respondent failed to chart the administration of this medication to this patient in the nursing notes. (f) Regarding Counts 23, 25, 27, 29 and 31, no substantial and competent evidence was presented that the Respondent maintained possession of any drug. The records reflect that all drugs signed out by the Respondent were administered to the patient. (a) Regarding allegations contained in Count 32 of the Administrative Complaint concerning the patient Ruby Lee Denson Standback Woodburne, the times on the exhibit copies of the CSF are illegible. However, the MAR and CSF do reflect that the Darvon 65 checked out for this patient by the Respondent on Marcy 24, 1979, was administered to the patient. The nursing notes reflect administration of the medication to the patient. (b) Regarding the allegations in Count 34, the CSF shows the Respondent signed out for Darvon 65 two times on March 25, 1979, for this patient. The MAR reflects the Respondent administered Darvon 65 to the patient at 0830 hours and 1200 hours. The nursing notes reflect that Darvon 65 was administered at 1200 hours but not at 0830 hours. (c) Regarding the allegations of Count 36, the MAR and CSF records show the Respondent medicated the patient at 0800 hours and 1200 hours on March 26, 1979, with Darvon 65. The Respondent charted the administration at 1200 hours in the nursing notes but failed to chart the administration at 0800 hours. (d) Regarding the allegations of Count 38, the CSF reflects the Respondent withdraw one Darvon 65 for this patient on March 27, 1979. The MAR does not reflect administration of this medication; however, the nursing notes reflect the administration of Darvon at 0830 hours on March 27, 1979. (e) The medical service orders for this patient were renewed March 22, 1979, after Use patient's surgery. Presumably, this would have renewed the Darvon 65 order of March 17, 1979, and it would have been effective through March 29, 1970. (f) Regarding Counts 33, 35, 37 and 39, there is no evidence that any medication was net administered to the patient as reflected in the records. Although the MAR entry was not made on March 27, 1979, a nursing note does reflect administration of Darvon 65 on that date by the Respondent. (a) Regarding the allegation contained In Count 40 of the Administrative Complaint concerning the patient Willie Mae Hair, the CSF and MAR records reflect the Respondent administered Darvon 65 to this patient at 0830 hours on March 24, 1979. No entry was made in the nursing notes by the Respondent for this date. Although the patient was discharged on March 24, she was medicated for pain in the evening of March 23, and the nursing note for 0145 hours of March 24 reflects that the nursing staff apparently expected her to experience pain. (b) There is no substantial and competent evidence to support the allegation of Count 41. All medications checked out by the Respondent for this patient were administered according to the records. Regarding Count 42 of the Administrative Complaint, Exhibit 11 reveals that on several occasions the Respondent wasted medications without the required countersignatures of another staff member. There was no substantial and competent evidence presented that the Respondent converted any of the drugs wasted to her own use. To the contrary, although improperly witnessed, the records reflect that the medications were wasted. Review of Exhibit 1, containing extracts of the hospital's SOP's for controlled substances and charting, does not reveal any requirement that the specific time of withdrawal of a controlled substance be entered on the CSF. Exhibit 1 does reflect that medication may be prepared and placed upon a lockable medicine cart. The nature of the entries on the MAR reflect that medications were drawn at one time from the controlled substance container for administration to patients during a shift. The SOP for charting nursing notes does not require that the administration of medication be noted. However, the SOP for administration of medication would require noting the patient's complaint and the patient's response to medication in the nursing notes if a prn medication were administered. Gross departures from the hospital's SOP's regarding controlled substances and charting of nursing notes occurred among staff nurses employed on the fourth floor at the time in question due to staffing shortages.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that no action be taken against the Respondent. DONE and ORDERED this day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael I. Schwartz, Esquire Suite 201, Ellis Building 1311 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Irving J. Whitman, Esquire 9595 North Kendall Drive, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33176 Geraldine B. Johnson, R. N. State Board of Nursing 111 Coastline Drive East, Suite 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact George F. Graves is a Doctor of Osteopathy, licensed by the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, holding License No. 2972. The participants stipulated that dilaudid is a Class II controlled substance as defined by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The basic theory of the Board's case, as revealed in the Original Complaint and First Amended Complaint, was that George F. Graves did conspire to obtain and did in fact obtain narcotic drugs under false and fraudulent pretenses and did sell prescriptions for such narcotic drugs in violation of 459.14 (2)(c)(h)(m)(n), F.S. and Rule 21R-3.21 F.A.C. Although Count I of the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any conspiracy, the evidence presented at the hearing was intended to prove a conspiracy existing between George F. Graves and Marian Mullins involving the sale of prescriptions for the drug dilaudid, and to prove that Dr. Graves had prescribed dilaudid in the names of individuals who were not his patients or who he was not at the time treating. The Board's evidence against Dr. Graves relating to the proof of his conspiring to sell prescriptions for dilaudid was based solely upon the testimony of Marian Mullins, who was Dr. Graves' co-conspirator or accomplice. The law in Florida is very clear that the testimony of a co-conspirator or accomplice shall be received with great caution. See Weiss v. State, 120 So 2d 528. The Hearing Officer, having carefully considered the testimony of Marian Mullins, finds several matters which relate adversely to her credibility as a witness in this cause, as follows: Marian Mullins testified that she had never sold drugs. Marcie Loomas, who was a witness for the prosecution and close associate of Marian Mullins, testified that from the very first time that Marian Mullins shared her dilaudid with her, that Marian Mullins had invited Loomas to sell drugs for her. Further Marcie Loomas testified that she had had prescriptions filled in her name which she had received from Marian Mullins, that for having these prescriptions filled she received $50.00 in cash and that for selling a 36 pill prescription on the street she had received an additional $55.00 to $60.00 from Marian Mullins. Marian Mullins testified that she began to acquire dilaudid from Dr. Graves in the spring of 1974. The record of Class II prescriptions issued by Dr. Graves introduced at the hearing and prepared by the police department from a survey of pharmacies in the Pinellas County area indicate that the earliest prescription for dilaudid issued by Dr. Graves from which Marian Mullins received dilaudid was issued on August 29, 1974. Marian Mullins testified that she learned of her impending arrest from Marcie Loomas, after Marcie Loomas had been arrested. Marcie Loomas testified that she did not contact Mullins between the time of her arrest and the time Marian Mullins was arrested. Marian Mullins, upon her first interview by the authorities in February, indicated that she was under Dr. Graves care for heroin addiction. It was only after her arrest in July that she implicated Dr. Graves in any sale of prescriptions for narcotics. Marian Mullins was unable to provide information concerning specific dates, amounts of money and other matters which could be independently verified. She stated that she had difficulty remembering the particulars of the year 1974 because of the level of her narcotic addiction. The Hearing Officer finds no creditable proof of the sale of prescriptions for controlled substances by Dr. George F. Graves. The record of prescriptions for Class II controlled substances by Dr. Graves referred to above indicated that prescriptions for approximately 1,750 four mg dilaudid pills were delivered by Dr. Graves to Marian Mullins in the name of Marian Mullins, Margaret Schreffler, and Sherry Zauner. Dr. Graves admitted having written these prescriptions and having delivered them to Marian Mullins. Except for the first prescription for dilaudid dated August 29, 1974 in the name of Sherry Zauner, Dr. Graves could provide no explanation of why he had prescribed drugs for Marian Mullins in the names of other individuals beyond the fact that Marian Mullins had asked him to do so. Dr. Graves did state that the reason he prescribed dilaudid for Marian Mullins was to treat her addiction by maintaining her on the drug dilaudid until she entered a drug treatment program as she had indicated to him that she would do. Dr. Graves further testified that be had developed a treatment program for Marian Mullins to reduce her dependency on dilaudid in the interim. The record of prescriptions referred to above indicates that Dr. Graves delivered to Marian Mullins prescriptions for 385 four mg dilaudid pills in September, 576 four mg dilaudid pills in October, and 864 four mg dilaudid pills in November. Marian Mullins testified that her level of addiction was between 10-15 four mg dilaudid pills per day. Dr. Graves provided Mullins with an average of thirteen pills per day in September, nineteen pills per day in October, and twenty-nine pills per day in November. This shows a steady increase, not a reduction, in her supply of dilaudid. If one assumes that Dr. Graves was treating Marian Mullins for narcotics addiction and that such treatment falls within the professional practice of osteopathy, the record of prescription and Dr. Graves' testimony indicate that he did not control his patient and institute his treatment plan. Dr. Graves knew or should have known that the quantity of drugs that he was prescribing for Marian Mullins was in excess of that needed to maintain or reduce her level of addiction. Section 893.05, F.S., requires that a practitioner not only prescribe drugs in the course of his professional practice but also in good faith. Good faith is an honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put an individual upon notice to inquire. Under the circumstances, Dr. Graves did not exercise good faith in prescribing quantities of dilaudid in excess of what was indicated as necessary for treatment of Marian Mullins' addiction, and did so in violation of 893.05, F.S. Section 459.14(2)(m), F.S., provides that the State Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners may suspend a license to practice upon a finding by the Board that the individual is guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional conduct is defined to include any departure from or failure to conform to the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing osteopathic medical practice, without regard to the injury of a patient or the committing of any act contrary to honesty, whether the same is committed in the course of practice or not. Dr. Gravest prescription of gross quantities of dilaudid to Marian Mullins and his failure to require her adherence to his treatment plan does not conform to the minimal accepted standards of osteopathic medical practice. Based upon the evidence presented by the Board and the evidence presented by Dr. Graves relating to his professional and personal character, the Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Graves did not violate 823.05 and 459.14(2)(m) for his personal gain or profit. The Hearing Officer further finds that, except for the findings above, Dr. Graves is a knowledgeable osteopathic physician who has a fine reputation both personally and professionally within his community.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the license of Dr. George F. Graves to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida be revoked but that the Board in its discretion consider the reinstatement of Dr. George F. Graves restricting his practice of osteopathic medicine in such a manner that he may not prescribe any drug which is listed or may be listed in Schedules I through V of section 893.03 of the Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of August, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire LaFace and Baggett, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida David Rein, Esquire Forer and Rein 400 Woodward Building 733 15th Street N.W. Washington, D.C. Crockett Farnell, Esquire Nixon and Farnell 521 Oak Avenue Clearwater, Florida
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of assisted living facilities in Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Northpointe was licensed as an assisted living facility with a capacity of 100 beds. Northpointe is located in Pensacola, Florida. Count I As the result of a complaint received by AHCA, Norma Endress, a registered nurse and agency surveyor employed by AHCA, conducted a survey inspection of Northpointe on March 1 and 2, 2002. According to Nurse Endress, the nature of the complaint was an allegation regarding failure to prevent falls. Upon arriving at Northpointe, Ms. Endress spoke with Rochelle Pitt, a Licensed Practical Nurse who is Director of Nursing at Northpointe, made a quick tour of the facility and then asked for the records of five residents. These records included those of Resident 1 and four others chosen randomly. Included within Resident 1's records was an Outcome Planning Discharge Sheet (discharge sheet) from Sacred Heart Hospital dated January 31, 2002. The discharge sheet noted that Resident 1 had a wound on his left heel. The discharge sheet included a section entitled "Post Discharge Medical Appointments" which included the following hand written notation: "Dr Matthew Ethridge (Podiatrist) (illegible telephone number). Date + time to be arranged within the week by daughter." The discharge sheet also included a section entitled "Medications Dose Frequency" which contained the following hand written notation: "Resume pre-hospital meds. Clean and dress left heel (illegible) everyday with antibiotic ointment and dress with gauze." Also included within Resident 1's records was another document from Sacred Heart Hospital which indicates that Resident 1 subsequently was treated in the Emergency Room on February 2, 2002. This document includes a section entitled "Triage," which indicates that Resident 1 was seen in the Emergency Room because of a fall and that Resident 1's chest hurt. The section of the February 2, 2002, Emergency Room document entitled "Physical Exam" indicates that Resident 1 was awake and alert and was accompanied by his daughter. This section also includes the following: "EXTREMITIES: no clubbing, cyanosis, WITH2+ edema, perpipheral pulses intact, motor and sensation intact. BANDAGE ON FOOT NOT CHANGED AS HOME HEALTH NURSING CHANGING REGULARLY." (emphasis in original) During the survey inspection, Nurse Endress also reviewed Resident 1's medication record. According to Nurse Endress, the medication record did not reference the discharge instructions of the physician from the January 31, 2002, discharge from the hospital.1/ Also included in Resident 1's records was a fax cover sheet dated February 1, 2002, from Rochelle Pitt of Northpointe to Dr. Retzloff. The fax cover sheet contained the following hand written notation: "Returned from hospital 1-31-02, needs new health assessment (with) orders for home health to open area L heel. (see discharge instructions) Thanks, Rochelle Pitt." According to Nurse Endress, there was nothing in Resident 1's medication administration record or medical chart to reflect the physician's discharge instructions of January 31, 2002 nor to indicate that Resident 1 received any treatment to his left foot after his discharge from the hospital on January 31, 2002. Mr. M. H. Mikhchi is the administrator of Northpointe. According to Mr. Mikhchi, the type of license held by Respondent does not permit it to do the dressing changes on Resident 1's foot referenced in the doctor's hospital discharge instructions. That is, Respondent asserts that it holds a standard license, not a mental health license or a limited nursing license. According to Mr. Mikhchi, Respondent received a call from the hospital prior to Resident 1's discharge on Thursday, January 31, 2002, informing them that Resident 1 was being discharged. The following day, Friday, February 1, 2002, Nurse Pitt sent a fax to Dr. Retzloff, requesting a new health assessment with orders for home health care to treat Resident 1's heel. The time of day that this request was faxed is not reflected on the fax cover sheet, although Mr. Mikhchi indicated that it was Friday afternoon. The request was necessary because Resident 1's insurance required a physician's order for home health services. According to Mr. Mikhchi, Respondent did not hear back from Dr. Retzloff's office on Friday, February 1, 2002. As a result, the weekend passed without Resident 1 receiving home health care for his heel wound. Mr. Mikhchi acknowledges that Nurse Pitt viewed the heel wound over the weekend although the record is unclear as to whether or not she changed the dressing or applied ointment. Nurse Pitt's actions in this regard were not recorded in Resident 1's record because of the limitation of Respondent's license. Upon Resident 1's return to the facility, Nurse Pitt noted that Resident 1's discharge order stated that Resident 1's daughter would set up an appointment with Dr. Ethridge. As far as Nurse Pitt or Respondent knew, Resident 1's daughter had not set up an appointment with the doctor as of Monday, February 4, 2002. Accordingly, Nurse Pitt called the office of Dr. Ethridge, a podiatrist, on Monday, February 4, 2002, to set up an appointment which was then scheduled for the following day. Count II Shawn Bolander is a registered nurse and a surveyor for AHCA. According to Nurse Bolander, she went to Respondent's facility on April 5, 2002, to conduct a survey visit as a follow-up to a complaint investigation. However, the record contains no evidence as to the nature or subject matter of the complaint investigation to which this was a follow-up survey visit. There is nothing in Nurse Bolander's testimony to indicate that her visit of April 5, 2002, was related in any way to the events discussed above regarding Count 1 or Resident 1. Upon arriving, Nurse Bolander took a tour of the facility and requested a list of residents to select a sample of records for chart review. She reviewed the records of Resident 22/ and found that there was a missing page to Resident 2's medication administration record. She determined that there was a missing page by comparing the physician's orders to the medication administration record for the month of April. That is, Resident 2's resident health assessment mentioned two medications that were not found on Resident 2's medication administration record. Upon discovering that some medications were not listed on the medication administration record, Nurse Bolander spoke to Nurse Pitt. Nurse Bolander requested that Nurse Pitt recopy the second page of Resident 2's medication administration record and provide her with a copy of it prior to Nurse Bolander's departure from Respondent's facility. Nurse Pitt did provide Nurse Bolander with a second page to Resident 2's medication administration record prior to Nurse Bolander's departure from the facility on April 5, 2002. At the top of the second page of the medication administration record appears the following hand written notations: "Re-written 4-5-02 2:15pm RP." This was followed by a notation made by Nurse Bolander which read, "Received 4/5/02 SB @2:35." Page two of Resident 2's medication administration record listed six medications, three of which were designated "PRN." Based upon her review of the medication administration record, Nurse Bolander determined that there was no evidence that Resident 2 actually received any of the medications listed on page two from April 1, 2002 to April 5, 2002. There is nothing in the record to support the allegation in Count II that Respondent's alleged failure to maintain an up to date medication observation record is a repeat violation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent, Northpointe Retirement Community. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2002.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant thereto, respondent, Manuel M. Maralit, held medical doctor license number ME 0033337 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners. Maralit has been licensed as a medical doctor by the State of Florida since September 13, 1978. He has been a medical doctor since graduation from medical school in May, 1967. From January 1, 1983 through September 30, 1983, Maralit practiced medicine in Alachua County, Florida. During that period of time, he filed two unauthorized claims under the Florida Medicaid Program, each having an aggregate value of $200 or more in violation of Subsection 409.325(4)(a), Florida Statutes. He also received one unauthorized payment under the same program having an aggregate value of more than $200.00 in violation of Subsection 409.325(4)(c), Florida Statutes. After an information was filed by the State Attorney on December 13, 1983, Maralit pled guilty to the above three violations, and to a fourth charge of grand larceny. For this, he received twenty years probation, 2,000 hours of community service, a $15,000.00 fine to be paid within 12 months, and was required to make restitution of $2,398.51 to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and $921.00 to the Florida National Bank. According to the official records of petitioner introduced into evidence, Dr. Maralit was subject to prior disciplinary action by the Medical Board in 1982 (DOAH Case No. 81-1367, Final Order entered January 4, 1982). At that time his license was suspended for thirty days, and was placed on probation for one year. The probationary period has long since expired. The violations in that proceeding are not similar in any respect to those charged in this case. There is no evidence as to any damage, physical or otherwise, to specific patients caused by respondent's conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in Counts I and II of the administrative Complaint, and that his medical license be suspended for one year with six months' suspension stayed and his license be placed on three years probation. Count III should be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1985.
The Issue The ultimate issues for determination are whether Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(f) and (w), Florida Statutes (2000), by allowing or directing a nurse to fill out two separate written prescriptions for Keflex and Vicodin and to sign Respondent's name and the nurse's initials on each prescription; and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed against Respondent's license to practice medicine. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (2000) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Florida pursuant to Sections 20.165 and 20.43 and Chapters 455 and 458. Respondent is licensed as a medical physician in Florida pursuant to license number ME0054804. Respondent has been a board-certified plastic surgeon since 1992. After graduating from the University of Virginia Medical School in 1983, Respondent completed a three-year residency in general surgery at the University of Alabama, a two-year residency in plastic surgery at the University of Tennessee, and a one-year fellowship in breast reconstructive surgery at Vanderbilt University. Respondent completed his fellowship at Vanderbilt University in 1989 and began the private practice of medicine in the same year as a plastic surgeon in West Palm Beach, Florida. In 1997, Respondent moved to Naples, Florida, and joined the practice of Dr. Richard Maloney. Dr. Maloney operates a freestanding facility for plastic surgery known as the Aesthetic Surgery Center (the "Center"). Dr. Maloney has exclusive authority over the daily operation and policy of the Center. Respondent has authority over the medical care of Respondent's individual patients. On or about July 8, 1998, Ms. Deborah Puhl, LPN, was a nurse at the Center. Nurse Puhl completed two written prescriptions for patient C.R. and signed Respondent's name to each prescription. Nurse Puhl wrote her initials beside the signature of Respondent's name on each prescription. One of the written prescriptions was a prescription for Keflex 500 mg. The other written prescription was for Vicodin 7.5 mg. Keflex is an antibiotic. Vicodin is the brand name for hydrocodone bitartrate. Hydrocodone bitartrate is an opiod analgesic similar to codeine and a controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893. When C.R. presented the two prescriptions to a pharmacist on duty at a local K-Mart, the pharmacist filled the written prescription for Keflex but correctly determined that the pharmacist has no legal authority to fill a written prescription for a controlled substance unless the prescription is signed by the physician. The pharmacist never filled the written prescription for Vicodin that was signed by Nurse Puhl. The pharmacist telephoned the Center and verified the written prescription for Vicodin with a nurse at the Center. Once verified by telephone, the Pharmacist determined that there was a valid verbal prescription for Vicodin, and the pharmacist filled the verbal prescription for Vicodin. The pharmacy then filed a complaint with Petitioner complaining of the procedure at the Center that allowed nurses to sign written prescriptions for a controlled substance. Petitioner investigated the complaint and determined there was probable cause to bring this action. By letter dated October 28, 1998, Petitioner notified the Center that it was illegal for nurses to sign written prescriptions. Dr. Maloney immediately terminated the office procedure. Neither Dr. Maloney, Nurse Puhl, nor Respondent had actual knowledge prior to the letter from Petitioner that a pharmacist has no legal authority to fill a written prescription for a controlled substance unless the prescription is signed by the prescribing practitioner. Petitioner argues in this case that Respondent violated an express provision in Section 893.04(1)(b). Petitioner construes the requirement in Section 893.04(1)(b) for a physician to sign a written prescription for a controlled substance as being enforceable against the physician. For reasons discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner's statutory construction of Section 893.04(1)(b) may be misplaced. Even if Petitioner's statutory construction of Section 893.04(1)(b) were correct, Petitioner did not charge in the Administrative Complaint that Respondent violated Section 893.04(1)(b). Petitioner expressly limited the Administrative Complaint to allegations that Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(f) and (w). Petitioner cited no legal authority at the hearing or in its PRO that authorizes Petitioner to prove that Respondent is guilty of charges that are not alleged in the Administrative Complaint. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, such a procedure would clearly violate fundamental principles of due process, deprive Respondent of adequate notice of the charges against him, and deprive Respondent of a fair opportunity to prepare a defense to allegations not included in the Administrative Complaint. Thus, matters relevant to the allegation that Respondent violated Section 893.04(1)(b) are beyond the scope of the Administrative Complaint and irrelevant to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint that Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(f) and (w). Section 458.331(1)(f) and (w) contains no express requirement for written prescriptions to be signed a physician or prescribing practitioner. In relevant part, Section 458.331(1) prohibits a physician from: (f) Aiding, assisting, procuring, or advising any unlicensed person to practice medicine contrary to this chapter or to a rule of the department or board. (emphasis supplied) * * * (w) Delegating professional responsibilities to a person when the licensee delegating such responsibilities knows or has reason to know that such person is not qualified by training, experience, or licensure to perform them. Petitioner cited no provision in Chapter 458 or in any rule promulgated pursuant to Chapter 458 that expressly makes the signature of a nurse on a written prescription a violation of either Section 458.331(f) or (w). A determination of whether a nurse's signature on a written prescription violates either Section 458.331(f) or (w), or both, must be made based on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances established by clear and convincing evidence. Nurse Puhl's signature on the written prescription for Keflex did not violate either Section 458.331(1)(f) or (w). The procedure used for the Keflex prescription involved neither the practice of medicine nor the performance of any professional responsibilities by an unqualified person. In response to questions about a nurse calling in a prescription for Keflex, Respondent's expert explained: . . . I would say, [Nurse] Penny, would you please call in a prescription for Keflex 500 milligrams 14, directions take one twice a day and start the day before surgery . . . . Q. . . . you are not delegating to her any medical judgment? . . . . A. I'm simply using her as an extended agent of myself for the patient's benefit. Respondent's Exhibit 1, at 24-25. The substance of the testimony of the pharmacist called as a witness by Petitioner was consistent with the testimony of Petitioner's expert. The pharmacist determined that he was authorized to fill a written prescription for Keflex that was signed by a nurse. The signature of Nurse Puhl on the written prescription for Vicodin involved neither the practice of medicine nor the performance of any professional responsibilities within the meaning of Section 458.331(1)(f) or (w). Respondent did not delegate to Nurse Puhl any medical discretion concerning the care of Respondent's patient. Nor did Respondent aid, assist, procure, or advise Nurse Puhl in the exercise of any medical discretion or similar professional responsibility concerning the care of Respondent's patient. Respondent alone determined the type of medication, dosage, administration, strength, and other particulars of the prescription for Vicodin. Nurse Puhl merely acted as an "extended agent" or scribe for Respondent. The testimony of Respondent's expert elucidates the issue of whether a nurse practices medicine or performs professional responsibilities when she effectuates a physician's orders. Respondent's expert explained, in relevant part: Q. And you don't give your nurse the option of what kind of medication to prescribe or the dosage or how often it should be taken, do you? A. . . . here's where the rub is, if there is anything to do with narcotics . . ., it's been my understanding that I need to write a prescription for it. And in fact when I've called to the pharmacy, for example, for Percocet, I have been told by the pharmacist that I cannot prescribe this over the phone and that there has to be a written prescription from me for the patient. That's the pharmacists that are here and that has been my experience here. . . . (emphasis supplied) * * * . . . with anything that I'm asking my nurse to do, it's something that I've thought through that is my responsibility that I have asked her simply as a convenience to take care of as an agent for me, as a go- between for me that I'm not asking her to think about. Respondent's Exhibit 1, at 25-26. The prescriptions for Keflex and Vicodin were part of the routine standing orders in place at the Center. They were written on preprinted prescription forms. There was no opportunity for Nurse Puhl to change either prescription. Respondent did not direct or allow Nurse Puhl to sign his name to the written prescriptions for Keflex and Vicodin. Nurse Puhl signed Respondent's name to the written prescriptions pursuant to the direction of Dr. Maloney. Dr. Maloney had exclusive authority to direct matters concerning office procedure. The signature of written prescriptions by nurses was part of the office procedure at the Center and within the sole and exclusive authority of Dr. Maloney. The signature of written prescriptions was not a matter of patient care over which Respondent had exclusive authority. The signature of Nurse Puhl on the written prescription for Vicodin caused no harm to the public. The pharmacist did not fill the written prescription. The amount of Vicodin prescribed in both the written and verbal prescriptions was a reasonable post-surgical prescription for pain. Pain management is part of all medical practices, including plastic surgery. Petitioner has no prior disciplinary history.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(f) and (w) and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ephraim D. Livingston, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Bruce M. Stanley, Esquire Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was overpaid for Medicaid prescriptions. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA, Agency or Respondent) asserts the Petitioner, Compscript, Inc., d/b/a Compscript (Petitioner or Compscript) failed to maintain proper records to support and document the Medicaid prescription claims paid by the Agency for the audit period. According to the Agency, the audit findings must be extrapolated to the universe of all claims for the audit period. If so, the Agency maintains the Petitioner should reimburse AHCA for a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $216,974.07 (this is the “recoupment” amount). The Petitioner denies it was overpaid any amount, asserts it kept records in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing pharmacy records, and maintains that the Agency may not apply the extrapolation accounting procedure in this case.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was a licensed pharmacy authorized to do business in the State of Florida; its pharmacy license number is PH0016271. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner’s Medicaid provider number is 106629300. The terms of the provider agreement govern the contractual relationship between this provider and the Agency. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement together with the pertinent laws or regulations controls the relationship between the provider and the Agency. The provider agreement pertinent to this case is a voluntary agreement between AHCA and the Petitioner. Pursuant to the provider agreement, the Petitioner was to “keep, maintain, and make available in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid-related records as AHCA requires for a period of at least five (5) years.” In addition to the foregoing, a Medicaid provider must maintain a patient record for each recipient for whom new or refill prescriptions are dispensed. Any Medicaid providers not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. A Medicaid provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. The records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. However, in order to qualify for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensive. Specific to the issues of this case, a Medicaid provider must also retain prescription records for five years. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority to administer the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to this authority AHCA conducts audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These “integrity” audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Medicaid program in Florida was governed by a “pay and chase” procedure. Under this procedure, the Agency paid Medicaid claims submitted by Medicaid providers and then, after-the-fact, audited such providers for accuracy and quality control. These “integrity” audits are to assure that the provider maintains records to support the paid claims. In this case, the audit period is May 28, 1999 through July 18, 2000. The pertinent audit has been designated AHCA audit no. 01-0514-000-3/H/KNH and was initiated on October 23, 2000. The Petitioner does not dispute the Agency’s authority to perform audits such as the one at issue. The Petitioner maintains its records are sufficient to support the paid claims and that the Agency has unreasonably imposed its interpretation of the requirements. The Medicaid provider agreement that governs this case required that the Petitioner comply with all Medicaid handbooks in effect during the audit period. Essentially, this standard dictates the records that must be kept for quality control so that the after-the-fact audit can verify the integrity of the Medicaid claims that were paid by the Agency. During the audit period the Petitioner sold or dispensed drugs to Medicaid recipients. Equally undisputed is the fact that Medicaid claims were paid by the Agency during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this cause was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the Petitioner’s provider agreement and the pertinent regulations. The Agency required that each and every claim submitted by the Petitioner during the audit period under the Medicaid program be filed electronically. Each claim submitted was filed electronically. Nevertheless, the Agency also required the Petitioner to retain records supporting the claim. Additionally, the Petitioner was to make such supporting records available to the Agency upon request. The Agency asked the Petitioner to present its records to support the claims for the audit period. The disclosure of the records proved difficult for this Medicaid provider because it does not operate in a conventional pharmacy setting. More specifically, it operates solely to serve a nursing home population. All of the patients whose prescriptions were filled were nursing home residents. Compscript maintains its manner of doing business is slightly different from the conventional pharmacy. Rather than the walk-in patient who presents a written prescription to be filled, this Petitioner receives its pharmacy orders by telephone or facsimile transmission from nursing homes. Typically, the staff at Compscript takes the call, writes down the pertinent information, enters the data into the pharmacy’s computer system, and the item is dispensed and routed to the nursing home via the delivery driver. All drugs are dispensed in sealed containers and are delivered with a manifest listing all the medications by name and patient. Given the volume of prescriptions being prepared and delivered, for the audit period at issue in this case, the Petitioner made 2-3 trips to the nursing home per day. Once the information for the prescription was entered into the Petitioner’s computer system, Compscript had little interest in maintaining the written telephone message or the facsimile sheet that generated the request. In some instances the Compscript employee did not make a written record of the prescription request. In those instances the employee entered the request directly into the Petitioner’s computer system and bypassed the written step altogether. The Compscript computer system tracks the initials of the pharmacist who entered the prescription information and cannot be altered without such alteration being tracked and noted. Since the pharmacy fills “over the counter” items, as well as controlled and non-controlled pharmacy products, the computer record denotes that information along with the patient information. When the Respondent’s audit agents went into the Compscript facility to audit the Medicaid claims, the Petitioner could not readily produce the written documentation to support the dispensed drugs. In fact, many of the records that verified the prescriptions dispensed were found on the nursing home records. The nursing home patient’s physician order sheet specified the item or items requested for the patient. This “physician order sheet” (POS) should theoretically always support the dispensing of the product from the Petitioner. In this case there were instances when the POS did not corroborate the claim. When the auditors from the Agency presented at Compscript, the Petitioner did not have the POS records to produce. Obviously, those records were maintained within the nursing home. Additionally, Compscript did not have the telephone notes or the facsimile transmission sheets to support items dispensed during the audit period. When the hearing in this cause proceeded it was also discovered that records that were generated daily by the Petitioner’s computer system that would have corroborated the claims (and which were allegedly maintained in storage) were not produced or available to support Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period. During the audit the Agency’s auditors requested records from a random sample of the claims submitted during the audit period. The results from that sample where then applied to the universe of claims for the audit period. When this mathematical calculation was performed the audit produced a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $1,341,466.27. Afterwards, when the Petitioner was able to locate additional records to correspond to and support the prescriptions dispensed, the amount of overpayment was reduced to $217,715.28 (the amount set forth in the parties’ Pre-hearing Stipulation). At hearing, the Agency maintained that the amount of overpayment was $216,974.07 for which the Petitioner could produce no adequate documentation. At hearing, the Petitioner continued to dispute the procedure of applying the audit sample overpayment to the population of claims to mathematically compute the overpayment for the audit period. This “extrapolation” process was admitted into evidence and has been fully considered in the findings reached in this case. The Petitioner was required to maintain Medicaid- related records for a period of 5 years. Thus, for the audit period in this case, any record supporting the claims should have been maintained and made available for the Agency. Such records would have been within the five-year period. The Agency designates Medicaid compliance to its office of Medicaid Program Integrity. In turn, that office contracted with Heritage Information Systems, Inc. (Heritage) to perform and report pharmacy audits of the numerous pharmacy providers within the state. Auditors from Heritage were assigned the Compscript audit. At the time of the audit the Heritage auditors were not privy to any of the POS documents later produced in the case. Ken Yon is the Agency’s administrator who was responsible for managing the instant case and who worked with the Heritage auditors to assure the policies and practices of the Agency were met. In this case, the Heritage auditors presented at Compscript unannounced on October 23, 2000, and sought 250 randomly selected claims for review. By limiting the number of claims, the auditors were not required to sift through the records of 46,000+ claims (the approximate number of claims that the Petitioner submitted during the audit period). For the universe of 46,000+ claims, 250 randomly selected claims is a reasonable sample to audit. The adequacy of the sample number as well as the manner in which it was generated is supported by the weight of credible evidence presented in this matter. Also, the results of a sample of 250 from the universe of 46,000+ would be statistically valid if randomly chosen as they were in this case. In this regard the testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson, an expert in statistical sampling and analysis, has been deemed credible and persuasive as to the issues of the appropriateness of the sample (as to size and how it was generated), the use of the sample overpayment to calculate an overall payment, and the statistical trustworthiness of the amounts claimed in this cause. If anything, as Dr. Johnson asserted, the actual overpayment would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. The Agency has used a statistical extrapolation method to compute overpayments for years. The statistical concept and process of applying a sample to a universe to mathematically compute an overpayment is not novel to this case. After the auditors completed their review of the records at the Compscript pharmacy, Kathryn Holland, a licensed pharmacist (who is also a consulting pharmacist) prepared the Respondent’s Final Agency Audit Report. Prior to completing the report, Ms. Holland received and reviewed the information provided by the Petitioner through the auditors. As a result of the review, a number of “can’t find” conclusions were reached. By “can’t find” the auditors and Ms. Holland meant that the original prescription or refill documentation could not be located for the paid Medicaid claim. These “can’t find” claims were reported to the Petitioner, who was given additional time to locate and produce documents to support the claims. In fact, the Agency continued to accept documentation for claims up through the time of hearing. Consequently, the amount sought for overpayment has been substantially reduced. Whether the Agency had the authority to accept documents outside the prescription records maintained by the pharmacy is not an issue. In fact, the Agency did reduce the overpayment amount when subsequent supporting documents were located. A second error in the documentation for the Petitioner’s prescriptions was noted as “no doctor’s address on the prescription.” That expression meant that pursuant to state and federal law the physician’s address is required for a controlled substance and when it was not provided the auditor deemed the documentation incomplete. Although the Petitioner maintained doctor addresses in its computer system, the records did not correspond to the specific prescriptions that were filled for the audited claims. In order to stand as a sufficient prescription form, a writing must be created contemporaneous to the order (phone requests that are transcribed are acceptable), must contain specific information (type of drug, strength, dose, patient, doctor, DEA number, refill, etc.), and it must be kept for the requisite time. It would be acceptable for the prescription to be computer generated so long as it was written contemporaneous to the order and preserved as required by law. In this case, at the conclusion of the audit, the Agency identified 194 discrepant claims within the random sample of 250. The vast majority of those discrepancies were noted as “can’t find.” Had the Agency not accepted other documentation to support the dispensing of the drugs, the calculated overpayment would have been $1,575,707.44. Applying a lower confidence limit of 95 percent to that amount generated the calculated overpayment of $1,341,466.27. The audit findings set forth in the Agency’s Final Agency Audit Report (dated April 6, 2001) is supported by the weight of credible evidence in this case. Nevertheless, the Agency did allow the provider here to supplement the documentation disclosed during the audit. And, to that end, the calculated overpayment was reduced to $216,974.07 (this amount is 95% of the calculated overpayment). In reality, the amount owed by this Petitioner for failure to maintain proper documentation for this audit would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. Had the Agency held the Petitioner to a standard of “no prescription, no payment” standard arguably 194 of the 250 audited claims could have been disallowed. That is not the standard applied by the Agency. A “patient record” may include information regarding the patient’s prescription history. The terms “patient record” and “prescription” are not synonymous. For example, while a prescription would contain information such as patient's name, doctor, DEA number, doctor's address, dosage, drug, and whether it may be refilled, it would be expected that the “patient record” would contain additional information not typically found on a prescription. For instance, a “patient record” might contain a historical track of past medications or known patient allergies. In this case, the computer records or “patient records” maintained by the Petitioner did not retain the prescriptions in the format dictated by rule. An electronic imaging recording system may be used when the system captures, stores, and can reproduce the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. An electronic system must be able to produce a daily hard-copy printout of all original prescriptions dispensed and refilled. If the Petitioner’s system could do that, it did not. An acceptable electronic system must generate the prescription contemporaneous to the dispensing order. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. The Agency has not alleged, and there is no evidence to suggest, fraud in the Petitioner’s failure to maintain its records. The Agency’s interpretation of the requirement that a prescription be reduced to writing is consistent with the rules and regulations in effect at the time of this audit. The last category of discrepant items was “UR” which stood for “unauthorized refills.” These were claims for refills on drugs for which the original prescription could not be located or documentation from the nursing home could not be found. Again, the Petitioner the maintained that within the nursing home setting a physician’s reorder for medications for the patient could be found on the POS. These refill requests were handled orally among the physician, the nursing home staff, and the pharmacy. Nevertheless, because they were not documented in writing the Agency disallowed this claims and included them among the discrepant list. If the Petitioner was able to produce a physician order to support the UR claims, it was removed from the recoupment list. In most instances, the Petitioner did not have the requisite paperwork to support the refill. Instead, the Petitioner relied on its computer records (again not kept in accordance with the applicable standards) to support the UR claims. The Agency has not claimed that the refills were not dispensed, merely that the paperwork to support the claim cannot be produced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order that accepts an amended Final Agency Action Report to support an overpayment and recoupment against the Petitioner in the amount of $216,974.07. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center III 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kenneth W. Sukhia, Esquire Fowler, White, Boggs, Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1090 Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ralph E. Breitfeller, Esquire McGrath & Breitfeller, LLP 140 East Town Street, Suite 1070 Columbus, Ohio 43215
