Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulated facts, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Joseph Aloysius Von Waldner has been licensed as a limited surety agent. He has been in the bail bond business for nine years and has had no previous or subsequent complaints issued against him. On five occasions during January and February of 1979, respondent did authorize, hire and remunerate Delbert Leroy Sams to pick up principals or skips and surrender them to the Orange County Jail. Delbert Leroy Sams was not and has not been previously licensed in any capacity by the Department of Insurance. On March 2, 1979, Mr. Sams was denied a license by the Department of Insurance. At the time respondent engaged the services of Mr. Sams, respondent believed that Mr. Sams was working as a bail bond runner for another bail bondsman. Respondent did not inquire of Sams as to whether Sams was or was not licensed by the Department of Insurance. Respondent knew that other bail bondsmen had used Sams as a runner, and Sams showed respondent some business cards and forms which Sams used when picking up principals. Respondent admits that he was negligent for not inquiring into Mr. Sams' licensure. Respondent was called in for an investigation by the petitioner's chief investigator, Melvin R. Thayer, on February 28, 1979. After talking with Mr. Thayer and becoming aware that Mr. Sams was not licensed, respondent no longer used Sams as a runner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding that respondent violated the provisions of Florida Statutes, s648.45(1)(j) and imposing an administrative penalty against respondent in the amount of $100.00, said penalty to be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of the final order. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Room 428-A, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard L. Wilson, Esquire 100 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of unlawfully employing a felon in the conduct of the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.44(8)(b) and 648.45(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 4-221.001, Florida Administrative Code. If so, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed limited surety agent, holding license number A025071. At all material times, Respondent has been the president and owner of Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds, Inc. (Dolly Bolding), which is located at 108 South Armenia Avenue in Tampa. In July 1999, Carver Taitt visited the office of Dolly Bolding to obtain a bail bond for his son, who had been arrested on drug charges. The judge had set bond at $20,000, so the bail bond premium was $2000. Mr. Taitt spoke with Respondent and said that he did not have the entire $2000; he had only $1000. Respondent declined to extend Mr. Taitt credit for the $1000 balance. Mr. Taitt then offered $1500, and Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Taitt to owe Dolly Bolding the remaining $500. At this time, Mr. Taitt saw Frank Cueto, Sr., also known as “Paunch,” in the office of Dolly Bolding. Mr. Taitt also told Mr. Cueto that Mr. Taitt would pay the remaining $500. Mr. Taitt had obtained bonds in the past five years from Dolly Bolding. During this time, he had often seen Respondent and Mr. Cueto in the office, and Mr. Taitt was acquainted with both of them from these past purchases of bonds. Mr. Cueto contacted Mr. Taitt several times and asked him to pay the remaining $500. At one point, Mr. Cueto threatened that Dolly Bolding would revoke the bond if Mr. Taitt did not immediately pay the remaining $500, especially because he was about to take a trip whose cost would approximate the outstanding balance. Mr. Taitt paid the $500 on the day prior to his son’s court appearance. When he complained to Mr. Cueto that he should have trusted Mr. Taitt based on their past relationship, Mr. Cueto replied that money is money. Mr. Taitt’s son missed his court appearance, and the judge ordered the forfeiture of the bond. The judge later entered an order reinstating bail, but this order did not reinstate the obligation previously undertaken under the bond by Dolly Bonding or its principal. Consequently, Mr. Taitt telephoned Dolly Bonding and requested a reissuance of the bond. Told that Respondent was unavailable, Mr. Taitt spoke with Mr. Cueto. Mr. Cueto told Mr. Taitt that no surety company would agree to reissue the bond. In the meantime, the assistant public defender obtained an order from the judge for the administrative release of Mr. Taitt’s son. By this means, the jail released Mr. Taitt’s son immediately without posting any bond. The facts contained in paragraphs 4-8 above are derived from Mr. Taitt’s testimony. This constitutes some, but not all, of Mr. Taitt’s testimony. The Administrative Law Judge has not credited much of the remainder of the testimony, including, most significantly, Mr. Taitt’s testimony that Mr. Cueto was always in the office of Dolly Bolding and that he seemed to run the bonding business. Mr. Taitt was angered by Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this transaction. Much of his uncredited testimony lacked the detail of his credited testimony. As for the credited testimony, Respondent, who was not always present in the office, was not able to rebut the more-detailed portion of Mr. Taitt’s description of Mr. Cueto’s handling of the transaction. Mr. Cueto did not testify, although he is engaged to be married to Respondent and lives with her. However, Respondent’s testimony is credited over Mr. Taitt’s vague, conclusory testimony as to the business relationship between Respondent and Mr. Cueto. Thus, consistent with Respondent’s testimony, the Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Cueto has not exercised any dominion over Dolly Bolding or Respondent. Respondent is an articulate, intelligent individual, who is a college graduate. She makes all bonding decisions for Dolly Bolding. Mr. Cueto is not an employee, officer, or shareholder of Dolly Bolding, and Respondent is not an employee, officer, or shareholder in any company owned by Mr. Cueto. He maintains an office in the same building as Dolly Bolding’s office, and he is present in the Dolly Bolding office on a frequent basis. At least in the case of the bond for Mr. Taitt’s son, Mr. Cueto has involved himself to some extent in Respondent’s bonding business. It is entirely possible that Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this bonding transaction is isolated, as he may have been inclined to involve himself to an unusual degree in a bonding matter due to the number of years that Mr. Cueto has known Mr. Taitt. It is even more likely that Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this bonding transaction was without the knowledge of Respondent. Mr. Cueto is a felon. He was convicted in 1994 of unlawful engaging in the bail bond business and misleading advertising. Mr. Cueto was formerly a licensed limited surety agent, but Petitioner suspended his license sometime ago. Respondent was at all times aware of these aspects of Mr. Cueto's background. In November 1991, Petitioner commenced an administrative proceeding against Respondent, as a licensed limited surety agent, for allowing an unlicensed person to participate in the bail bond business. By Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order and Consent Order, both signed in April 1992, Respondent agreed, and was ordered, to pay an administrative fine of $2000.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance dismiss the Second Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Anoush A. Arakalian Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph R. Fritz Joseph R. Fritz, P.A. 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33602
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him in the instant case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent Respondent is now, and has been for the past seven years, a Florida-licensed bail bond agent (license number A134458). He is the owner of Big Larry's Bail Bonds (Agency), a bail bond agency located in Broward County, Florida, with which two other Florida-licensed bail bond agents, James Jones (who is Respondent's brother) and Ron Striggles, are affiliated. Count I On April 23, 2002, Hugh Clarke went to the Agency, where he obtained from Respondent a $4,500.00 bail bond for a friend, Richard Dyke, who had been arrested in Palm Beach County, Florida, on a theft charge. To obtain the bail bond, Mr. Clarke had to pay a bail bond premium fee of $450.00 and provide collateral in the amount of $1,050.00. Payment was made by a single check (check number 611) for $1,500.00 made out to the Agency. Mr. Clarke also signed a promissory note, which read as follows: On Demand Hugh McGrath Clarke after date, for value received, I Promise to pay to the order of CONTINENTAL HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY Four Thousand Five Hundred DOLLARS, at Big Larry's Bail Bonds, 1310 Sistrunk Blvd., Ft. Laud., Florida[,] [w]ith interest thereon at the rate of 20 percent, per annum[,] from Call Date until fully paid. Interest payable semi-annually. The maker and endorser of this note agrees to waive demand, notice of non payment and protest; and in case suit shall be brought for the collection hereof, or the same has to be collected upon demand of an attorney, to pay reasonable attorney's fees and assessable cost, for making such collection. Deferred interest payment to bear interest from maturity at 20 percent, per annum, payable semi-annually. It is further agreed and specifically understood that this note shall become null and void in the event the said defendant Richard Dyke shall appear in the proper court at the time or times so directed by the Judge or Judges of competent jurisdiction until the obligations under the appearance bond or bonds posted on behalf of the defendant have been fulfilled and the surety discharged of all liability thereunder, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Respondent provided Mr. Clarke a signed Receipt and Statement of Charges, acknowledging that he had received from Mr. Clarke payment in full for the $450.00 bail bond premium fee. Respondent also presented Mr. Clarke with a pre-printed form entitled "Collateral Receipt and Informational Notice" (Collateral Receipt) that Respondent had filled out and signed (on the appropriate signature line), acknowledging that, on behalf of the surety, Continental Heritage Insurance Company, he had received from Mr. Clarke $1,050.00 as collateral to secure the bail bond that Mr. Clarke had obtained for Mr. Dyke. The Collateral Receipt contained the following "note," "informational notice," and "indemnitor information": NOTE: Unless a properly drawn, executed, and notarized legal assignment is accepted and acknowledged by the surety agent and the surety company named above, the collateral listed above will be returned only to the person(s) named on line (1) above [Mr. Clarke]. Collateral, except for those documents the surety must retain as directed by the law, will be returned within 21 days after the bail bond(s) has been discharged in writing by the court. The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of all collateral documents indicated above, and the Informational Notice printed below. * * * INFORMATIONAL NOTICE CONDITIONS OF BOND: The SURETY, as bail, shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest, and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearance, and for reason other than as enumerated below in paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the SURETY hereunder, and the SURETY shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal and principal shall have no right of any refund whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the SURETY or its Agent. If principal shall move from one address to another without notifying SURETY or his agent in writing prior to said move. If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. If principal is arrested and incarcerated for any other offense other than a minor traffic violation. If principal shall make any material false statement in the application. * * * INDEMNITOR INFORMATION In addition to the terms and conditions of any Indemnity Agreement or other collateral documents which you have executed, this is to notify you that: The Indemnitor(s) will have the defendant(s) forthcoming before the court named in the bond, at the time therein fixed, and as may be further ordered by the court. The Indemnitor(s) is responsible [for] any and all losses or costs of any kind whatsoever which the surety may incur as a result of this undertaking. There should not be any costs or losses provided the defendant(s) does not violate the conditions of the bond and appears at all required court hearings. Collateral will be returned to the person(s) named in the collateral receipt, or their legal assigns, within 21 days after the surety has received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court. It may take several weeks after the case(s) is disposed of before the court discharges the surety bonds. Respondent read to Mr. Clarke that portion of the Collateral Receipt that explained that the collateral would be returned "within 21 days after the surety ha[d] received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court." Nonetheless, for some reason, Mr. Clarke was under the impression that he would be receiving his collateral back within 30 days of April 23, 2002, the date of the transaction, even in the absence of a discharge. In late May 2002, sometime after the 23rd of the month, Mr. Clarke began telephoning the Agency to inquire about the return of his collateral. On each occasion he called, he asked to speak with Respondent, but was told by the person who answered the phone that Respondent was not available. He left messages, but Respondent never returned his calls.2 Mr. Clarke telephoned the Agency approximately twice a month until November 2002, when, frustrated by his inability to reach Respondent by telephone,3 he sent, by facsimile transmission, a letter to the Department of Insurance requesting that it help him in his efforts to gain the return of his collateral. Although Mr. Clarke had been advised in September 2002 by Mr. Dyke that Mr. Dyke's criminal case "was over," Mr. Clarke never got to directly communicate this information to Respondent and to personally ask Respondent to give him back his collateral. Any information Mr. Clarke may have provided about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case and any demands Mr. Clarke may have made for the return of his collateral were provided and made to a person or persons at the Agency other than Respondent, who did not communicate them to Respondent. Pat Anthony, a Special Investigator with the Department of Insurance,4 was assigned the task of looking into the allegations Mr. Clarke had made in his letter. Ms. Anthony met with Mr. Clarke on December 6, 2002, and took his statement. The statement was reduced to writing (by Ms. Anthony, who wrote down what she understood Mr. Clarke to have said), and it then was "subscribed and sworn to" by Mr. Clarke. Mr. Clarke's statement read as follows: On 4/23/02, I went to Larry Jones' office to put up bail for Richard Dyke. I gave him a $450 check and a $1,050 check.[5] Richard told me the case was over with in 9/02.[6] I started calling Larry about a week later.[7] He had told me the $450 was his premium and I would get the $1,050 when the case was completed.[8] I have called several times. The man who answered the phone tells me Larry is not there. In January 2003, Ms. Anthony telephoned the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County (Clerk's Office) to inquire about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case. She was told by the person who answered the telephone that the case had concluded and that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged, but that there was "no way to know" whether Respondent had been notified of this information inasmuch as the Clerk's Office did not "always notify the out of town bondsman." Ms. Anthony subsequently advised Respondent as to what she had been told and suggested that he go to the Palm Beach County Courthouse to confirm the information she had been provided. Respondent followed Ms. Anthony's suggestion and went to the Palm Beach County Courthouse on January 21, 2003 (which was "within a week" of his conversation with Ms. Anthony). There, he obtained a certified copy (under seal of the Clerk's Office) of a summary or disposition sheet reflecting that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged. That same day, when Respondent returned to the Agency, he telephoned Mr. Clarke and made arrangements to have Mr. Clarke come by the Agency on January 27, 2003, to sign paperwork and pick up a check from Respondent for $1,050.00 (the amount of the collateral Mr. Clarke had given Respondent). Mr. Clarke picked up the check on January 27, 2003, as scheduled. It was not until March 2004 that Respondent received from the Clerk's Office a copy of the actual court order discharging Mr. Dyke's bond. Count II On or about September 1, 2002, the Department of Insurance filed a one-count Administrative Complaint (in Department of Insurance Case No. 43742-02-AG) against Respondent, alleging that "he [had] failed to return collateral and charged an amount in excess of the bond premium." On November 13, 2002, the Department of Insurance issued a Consent Order in Case No. 43742-02-AG, which provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on for consideration and final agency action. Upon consideration of the record including the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Insurance Commissioner hereby finds: The Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, as head of the Department of Insurance, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and parties hereto. The entry of this Consent Order and compliance herewith by the Licensee, LARRY LORENZO JONES, shall conclude the administrative proceeding of Case No. 43742- 02-AG before the Department of Insurance of the State of Florida. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: The Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, is hereby approved and fully incorporated herein by reference; Within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.387, Florida Statutes, Licensee shall file[9] notice with the Department of the designated primary agent for each location of all bail bond agencies owned by the Licensee. Failure to file said notice will result in immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure. Licensee shall be placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months. As a condition of probation, Licensee shall strictly adhere to the Florida Insurance Code, Rules of the Department and the terms of this agreement. If during the period of probation period [sic] the Department has good cause to believe that Licensee has violated a term or condition of probation, it shall suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue, renew or continue the license of appointment of Licensee. Licensee shall pay a fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500.00) within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.52, Florida Statutes. Failure of Licensee to pay the fine within the specified time limit shall result in the immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure in this state without further proceeding for a period of sixty (60) days. Reinstatement shall be conditioned upon Licensee's compliance with all terms of the Consent Order, including payment of the administrative fine.[10] Sometime in December 2002, Sally Burke, who was then a Bail Bond Coordinator with the Department of Insurance, visited the Agency for purposes of conducting an audit of the Agency's records. Ms. Anthony accompanied her on the visit. During the audit, Ms. Burke asked Respondent if he had completed and "turned in [the] designation form" required by Section 648.387, Florida Statutes. Respondent replied that he had "never received" a blank form to fill out. At Ms. Burke's request, Ms. Anthony handed Respondent a blank designation form. Respondent proceeded to complete it in Ms. Burke's and Ms. Anthony's presence. When he was finished, he attempted to give the completed form to Ms. Burke, but she told him, "Larry, you have to mail it in yourself, but make me a copy for my file." As requested, Respondent made a copy and gave it to Ms. Burke, who, in turn, handed it to Ms. Anthony. He then left the Agency and mailed the original to the Department of Insurance. When he returned to the Agency, Ms. Burke and Ms. Anthony were still there. Months later, in September 2003 at around the time of the issuance of the instant Administrative Complaint, Respondent received a telephone call from Greg Marr, an attorney with Petitioner, who told Respondent that Petitioner had never received his completed designation form.11 Respondent informed Mr. Marr that the completed form had been mailed in December 2002. Mr. Marr responded, "[O]ur records show that it's not in,"12 and asked Respondent to "send in another one," which Respondent did (on or around September 19, 2003). Petitioner received this completed designation form on September 26, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order dismissing, in its entirety, the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004.
The Issue Did Respondent knowingly permit a person who had been convicted of or who had pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under law of any state, territory or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, to engage in the bail bond business as an employee of Respondent's bail bond agency? If yes, should Respondent have her limited surety agent license disciplined?
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety agent, license no. 224404483. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over that license. For that reason Petitioner may impose discipline should Respondent violate laws pertaining to Respondent's activities associated with the license. Respondent is President and Director of Crews Bonding Agency, Inc., 24 North Liberty Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32222, through which business she performs insurance-related activities concerning bail bonds. Crews Bonding Agency, Inc. was incorporated in Florida on March 31, 1988. The corporation is organized for the purpose of transacting any or all lawful business. The corporation provides bail bonds at the Liberty Street premises. The corporation also runs a parking lot concession at that location. Both businesses were operated at times relevant to the inquiry. On August 28, 1995, Star Legal Research, Inc. was incorporated to operate at 350 East Forsyth Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. That street address is the street adjacent to the Liberty Street address. The Star Legal Research business works out of the same building that Crews Bonding Agency uses. The difference being that the entrance to Crews Bonding Agency is on Liberty Street and the Star Legal Research entrance is on Forsyth Street. A 1995-96 occupational license was issued to Star Legal Research c/o Jack I. Etheridge, Jr., Respondent's son, for the period October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. owns Star Legal Research. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. stated that the purpose for incorporating Star Legal Research was to provide work for Jack I. Etheridge, his father and Respondent's husband, in a setting in which Mr. Jack Etheridge, Jr. contends would be unassociated with Crews Bonding Agency. The attempt to disassociate Mr. Jack Etheridge from Crews Bonding Agency will be subsequently explained. When the hearing was convened Jack I. Etheridge had been working in an office in the building where Crews Bonding Agency has its business. That employment was under the guise of Star Legal Research. The office where Jack I. Etheridge works in the building is separated from the office associated with Crews Bonding Agency by a door. Jack I. Etheridge uses a separate entrance into the office where he works. That entrance is from Forsyth Street rather than the Bonding agency entrance from Liberty Street. The business done by Star Legal Research, according to Jack Etheridge, Jr., is one where "you can research any type of legal matters . . . that's pretty much it". Again, Jack Etheridge, Jr. states that his father, Jack Etheridge, ". . . researches legal, you know, business". Under this arrangement, Jack Etheridge is supposedly no longer affiliated with the Crews Bonding Agency in operating its parking lot or otherwise. From the record, it is unclear exactly what is meant by Jack Etheridge's performance of legal research. At present, the bail bond business is done in the front office to the building that houses Crews Bonding Agency and Star Legal Research. That office faces Liberty Street. In addition to the office where bail bond activities are conducted and the back office which faces Forsyth Street, where Star Legal Research is housed, there is a kitchen in the building. That constitutes the rooms in that building. Contrary to the claim by his son that Jack Etheridge is no longer affiliated with Crews Bonding Agency, Respondent identified that the present circumstances are such that Jack Etheridge helps with the Crews Bonding Agency parking lot business "if he sees a car and I don't, he will go there . . .". Respondent identified that she principally handles the parking lot when she is there at the business premises, but that on one occasion, she was in the hospital and was not available to do that work. Further, she stated that her physician did not really want her "running back and forth to the parking lot". Respondent intends to transfer the parking lot business from Crews Bonding Agency to Star Legal Research by January 1997. At one time, Jack Etheridge had been licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent entitled to participate in bail bond activities. Prior to the passage of Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), he had been convicted of a felony in Florida. Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), stated: No person who has been convicted of or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to any felony, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of any bail bond agency or office thereof or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business. Having a concern that Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), might disqualify him from continuing to act as an insurance agent in the bail bond business, Jack Etheridge brought suit in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In and For Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Petitioner was named defendant in that suit. As a result, an order was entered stating: The provisions of Florida Statutes 648.44(3), Fla. Stat. (1983), or its successor(s) do not and cannot be determined to effect the status of plaintiff, Jack I. Etheridge, in his individual capacity as an officer and director of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation nor his ability to continue to maintain stock ownership of shares of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. The provisions of this paragraph shall serve as notice to all interested parties that said statute does not apply to Jack I. Etheridge, individually, nor in his capacity as an officer, director and stockholder in F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. Subsequently, in a case in the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1, Jack Etheridge pled guilty and was found guilty and convicted of the offense of mail fraud, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1341-2. For this offense, he was imprisoned for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $237,393.83. The sentence was imposed on April 6, 1990. At that time, Jack Etheridge was not licensed by Petitioner. Respondent had separated from Mr. Jack Etheridge in 1986. She was reunited with her husband in 1989. Respondent was aware that her husband had been convicted in Florida in state court, the offense for which he sought relief in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and that he had committed the federal offense in Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1. In August or September, 1992, federal probation officers came to the Crews Bonding Agency and spoke to Respondent about her husband's pending release from federal prison. In particular, those persons indicated that Mr. Jack Etheridge was going to be released in December of 1992. In this conversation, the probation officers told Respondent that they expected the husband to work for Crews Bonding Agency in a capacity that did not involve the handling of bail. Respondent told them that her husband could not work at the agency because she did not wish to jeopardize her Florida insurance license and livelihood. This is taken to mean that she was concerned about having a convicted felon working for her at the bail bond agency. In the conversation with the probation officers, Respondent was persuaded that the probation officers had the authority to place her husband with the bail bond agency to give the husband employment in some capacity, other than dealing with bail bond activities. The probation officers did not indicate the specific authority for requiring this placement. Respondent replied to the probation officers that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. In offering that arrangement, Respondent operated on the assumption that the probation officers were familiar with the requirements in the Florida Insurance Regulations and Statutes. In the conversation between Respondent and the federal probation officers, Respondent made no mention of the ruling in the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, concerning her husband's exemption from Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and its effects, or any subsequent law. After the conversation with the probation officers, and prior to her husband's release from prison, Respondent sought advice of counsel concerning the propriety of having her husband employed by Crews Bonding Agency. Robert Persons, Esquire is corporate counsel for Crews Bonding Agency. He incorporated the business. He has done work for the business as corporate counsel, beginning in 1988. He was aware that Mr. Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in the federal corrections system. Before Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Persons reviewed the previously-quoted language in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, in response to Respondent's request for legal advice. Respondent had told Mr. Persons that it was possible that she was going to hire her husband to run the parking lot for the Crews Bonding Agency. She wanted to know if there would be a problem with Petitioner's statutes that prohibited a bonding agency from operating with a felon working for it. Specifically, Respondent asked Mr. Persons if her husband could work in the parking lot. Mr. Persons told Respondent that his interpretation of the order was that the statutory prohibition against felons working for a bonding agency did not apply to her husband. For that reason, he did not believe that there would be a problem having the husband work at the parking lot. Moreover, he told Respondent that he did not believe that it presented a problem, in that the activities by the husband, when running the parking lot business, did not involve employment with the bail bonding operation. When he gave this advice, Mr. Persons was familiar with the parking lot concessions operation, having used the parking lot himself. He was also familiar with the bail bond business conducted by Crews Bonding Agency. John Gary Baker, Esquire was retained to assist Mr. Jack Etheridge in meeting the terms of the federal parole granted the client. This included correspondence with the probation office in an attempt to obtain early release. Once Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Baker went with the client and spoke to probation officer, Diane Thomas. This conversation took place sometime in late August or early September, 1993. Ms. Thomas told Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to obtain a job as a means to meet requirements for restitution. In this conversation, Ms. Thomas inquired concerning Respondent's income in an attempt to determine the amount that Mr. Etheridge should pay in the way of restitution. Mr. Baker tried to impress Ms. Thomas with the fact that Respondent's income and business were separate from Mr. Etheridge's circumstance. In the conversation, Mr. Etheridge told Ms. Thomas that he wished to be a bus driver. That was his profession prior to being involved in the insurance business in Louisiana, which led to his incarceration. Ms. Thomas would not agree to that arrangement. She indicated that Mr. Etheridge had to be located in a place where the probation officers could come and see him at anytime, day or night. Ms. Thomas asked the question about whether Mr. Etheridge could work for his wife at Crews Bonding Agency, and Mr. Etheridge stated that he did not wish to work for his wife. Ms. Thomas responded to these remarks by saying that she had an order that indicated that Mr. Etheridge could work at the Crews Bonding Agency. This refers to the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Ms. Thomas further told Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to work at Crews Bonding Agency. Before the date upon which the meeting was held with Ms. Thomas, Mr. Baker had not been acquainted with the circuit court order. When Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge left the meeting with Ms. Thomas, they went to the Crews Bonding Agency office; and Mr. Etheridge produced a copy of the circuit court order. Respondent was there at that time. Mr. Baker reviewed the order and expressed an opinion to Respondent and her husband that the husband could work at Crews Bonding Agency in any capacity, other than giving out forms or advice about bail bonds. At that point, there was conversation about the husband running the parking lot. That arrangement was one which Mr. Baker stated would be acceptable and would satisfy the terms of Mr. Etheridge's probation. Moreover, Mr. Baker offered the advice that the circuit court order would allow the husband to attend to clerical matters, such as answering the telephones. David R. Fletcher, Esquire was acquainted with Respondent. Mr. Fletcher was aware that Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in a federal facility. Mr. Fletcher was approached by Respondent, who asked Mr. Fletcher about the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and the meaning of the order. In particular, Respondent made Mr. Fletcher aware that she was concerned about the federal probation office's instructions or the condition upon which Mr. Etheridge's probation would be served as an employee at Crews Bonding Agency. Respondent told Mr. Fletcher that she was concerned that this would create a problem because of the husband's prior record, taken to mean felony record. When Mr. Fletcher read the order, he expressed the opinion that the husband was exempt from the disqualifying provisions for felons working in a bail bond agency. At the time the conversation was held between Mr. Fletcher and Respondent concerning the husband's status as a felon, Mr. Fletcher understood that the husband would be returning from incarceration and working at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. Respondent relied upon advice of counsel in deciding to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency. His duties included running the parking lot, vacuuming the building where the bond agency was located, and answering the telephone at the bail bond agency. When he would answer the telephone, Respondent noted that Jack Etheridge would state that he was not a bail bond agent and that the person who was calling would need to speak to the "bonds man". At times, Respondent received calls that had been patched through from the bail bond agency to another location, through efforts by Jack Etheridge. Respondent is aware that her husband took messages for the bail bond agency, as well. Respondent observed that Jack Etheridge principally stayed in the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, when he worked for the Crews Bonding Agency as parking lot attendant. Specific remarks made by Jack Etheridge in receiving calls for the bonding agency would be "Crews Bonding, would you hold please". If someone needed to speak to Respondent immediately, Mr. Etheridge would state "she is busy, hold please, if you will give me your number, I will have her call you back". Once while Jack Etheridge was employed at the Crews Bonding Agency, following release from federal prison, Ms. Thomas came to the agency to check on his status. Upon that occasion, Respondent spoke to Ms. Thomas and asked if her husband could drive a bus, instead of being employed by the bail bond agency. Ms. Thomas replied in the negative and stated that the husband had to stay with the agency and work with Respondent. Ms. Thomas told Respondent that Mr. Jack Etheridge had to be paid a check from the bonding agency. Respondent honored that request. The reason given for requiring that Mr. Jack Etheridge be paid a check was based upon the statement by Ms. Thomas that the husband had to take evidence of the check being issued and present that to the probation office. According to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Jack Etheridge was paid $800.00 for four weeks worked in the third quarter of 1993; $2,800.00 for 13 weeks worked in the fourth quarter of 1993; $2,419.23 for 12 weeks worked in the first quarter of 1994; $2,854.61 for 13 weeks worked in the second quarter of 1994; and $3,080.00 for 13 weeks worked in the third quarter of 1994. Jack Etheridge, Jr. observed that his father, upon taking the position as parking lot attendant, worked in the kitchen area of the premises most of the time for a period and then moved into the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, later on. The kitchen area is separated from the room where the bail bonding business is conducted. The room on Liberty Street is where Respondent has traditionally conducted her bail bond business. Jack Etheridge, Jr. never observed his father work in a bail bond capacity once the father returned from incarceration. He did observe that when a car came into the parking lot, his father would direct the driver where to park the car and then return to the building. Jack Etheridge, Jr. made these observations while working in the front office, where bail bond business was conducted, and never noted his father being in that front office. Jack Etheridge, Jr. was at the premises most every day before attending the police academy. After attending the police academy, he spends most of his time at the bail bond agency, pending employment as a policeman. Mr. Persons goes to the location of the bail bond agency two to three times per week and uses a parking space in the parking lot. On those occasions, he sees Jack Etheridge in the parking lot. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge at the location of the Crews Bonding Agency numerous times, following Jack Etheridge's release from prison. Mr. Persons has gone to that location 150 times within two and one-half years, and it would be uncommon for Jack Etheridge not to have been at the location when Mr. Persons came by. On some visits Mr. Persons has spent as much as 15 or 20 minutes with Respondent and her son at the bail bond agency. On occasions when he visited the bail bond agency, he has never observed Mr. Jack Etheridge do anything related to the bail bond business, unless one considers that answering the telephone at the bail bond agency, when Respondent is unable to, constitutes bail bond business. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge put a caller on hold and then refer the call to Respondent. The observation by Mr. Persons, where Mr. Jack Etheridge was involved with answering the telephone in the bail bond office, was not the usual circumstance. In the past, when Mr. Persons observed the operation at the bail bond agency, the door separating the room that faces Liberty Street and the room that faces Forsyth Street was open. More recently, that door has been closed between the two rooms. Mr. Persons observed that in the more recent circumstances, Jack Etheridge was using the office that fronts Forsyth Street. Mr. Persons observed that at the time the hearing was conducted, Jack Etheridge was still maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Persons observed that prior to the creation of the Star Legal Research business, Jack Etheridge, when not located in the parking lot, would be found in the office which fronts Forsyth Street. In summary, under the present circumstances, it is unclear what Mr. Jack Etheridge is principally involved with at the premises primarily associated with Crews Bonding Agency and its businesses. Following advice by Mr. Baker that it would be acceptable for Mr. Jack Etheridge to work at the bail bond agency, he has been in the Crews Bonding Agency office approximately 100 times. On almost every occasion, Jack Etheridge would be in the back room on Forsyth Street. Nine out of ten times, Jack Etheridge would be in that location when observed by Mr. Baker. The only times that Mr. Baker would observe Jack Etheridge in the front office, where the bail bonding business was being conducted, would be if other bail bond agency employees were out making a bond or something of that nature. In that instance, Jack Etheridge would be sitting in the front office, where the bail bond business is conducted; and if someone came to park their car, he would take care of that business. If someone came into the office and asked about a bail bond, Jack Etheridge would remark, "Look, Anne (Respondent) is going to be back in a half hour, she is making a bond, or Clara will be back. Come back, or you can sit over there and wait". Clara refers to another employee of the bail bond agency. Mr. Baker also observed that on the occasion on which Jack Etheridge was in the front office, he would refuse to give information about bail bonds and limit himself to handling parking duties and answering the telephone if no one else was available to answer the telephone. Mr. Fletcher has seen Jack Etheridge at the bail bond agency location approximately twice per week, following Mr. Etheridge's release from incarceration. On these occasions, Mr. Fletcher would give Jack Etheridge keys to Mr. Fletcher's car and seek assistance in parking. In these visits to the agency, Mr. Fletcher never observed Jack Etheridge perform work as a bail bond agent. In fact, he never observed Jack Etheridge work anywhere other than in the parking lot. Respondent and her husband brought further action in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, assigned to Division CV-F. At that time, the previous judge, who had issued the aforementioned order on March 27, 1984, was not presiding in the case. That refers to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., who now serves as a federal district judge. The judge who presided in the reopening of the circuit court case was the Honorable Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Judge. On October 30, 1995, Judge Fay entered an order in Case No. 82- 10537CA, Division CV-F, enjoining consideration of Count I to the present administrative complaint, in which he ordered: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by GRANTED with respect to Count I of the Administrative Complaint and First Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Defendant against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, and Defendant shall be enjoined from proceeding against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, as to Count I of same in DOAH Case No. 95-3964. Judge Fay also ruled: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by DENIED with respect to the filing of any complaints under Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, relative to convictions, guilty pleas, or no contest pleas by Jack I. Ethe- ridge entered subsequent to March 27, 1984. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust adminis- trative remedies. Based upon the orders by Judge Fay, administrative prosecution has proceeded to resolve Count II to the administrative complaint addressed in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3964 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties. Petitioner's Findings: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 constitutes legal argument. Respondent's Findings: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is established through the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found, with the exception that several other local attorneys were not contacted for advice. One additional attorney was sought out for advice, Mr. Baker. Paragraph 8, the first sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 9 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15-16 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, FL 33166 Judy Groover, Esquire 24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provision of the Florida Insurance Code by employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business. Whether Respondent violated the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code by failing to report a change of address to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in this matter, Respondent Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., was licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. Pursuant to Florida law, Petitioner has jurisdiction over the bail bond licensure and appointments of Respondent. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on March 28, 1975, in case number 75-239 CF, of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on October 22, 1975, in case number 75-2390 CF, of violation of drug abuse law, a felony. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 4 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violations. On or about March 7, 1980, the State of Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored the civil rights of Pamela Jean Coleman, relative to Coleman's criminal convictions in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 1975. Records of the FDLE show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, plead nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, and convicted of retail theft in Polk County, Florida, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, in case number CF91-1923, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and convicted of petit theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed against Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in the County of Polk and State of Florida, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business contrary to Section 648.44, Florida Statutes. Further, the records of said court show that on or about January 31, 2002, Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, was tried, found guilty and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Said conviction is presently on appeal before the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent knew or should have known the foregoing information. Documents under Seal from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, pertaining to Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., Bailbonds, Ltd., Inc., show that Pamela Jean Coleman filed original documents on behalf of Respondent's corporation and corresponded with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of the said corporation. She was listed as both the registered agent of the corporation and also a vice-president and director of the said corporation as set forth on a document filed over the signature of Respondent. Other filed documentation show Pamela Jean Coleman as the president, secretary, and as director of said corporation. These documents are accurate and valid. The original license application form, Florida Insurance Temporary License Application, under Section 11, Screening Question Information, contains the following language: "If you were adjudged guilty or convicted of a felony crime and your civil rights were lost, provide evidence that your civil rights have been restored." There is no evidence in the record that Coleman provided that information to Petitioner at the time the original application was filed or at any time subsequent to that period, and Coleman signed the application. Respondent gave a statement, under oath, before Luis Rivera, Special Investigator for Petitioner's predecessor (Department of Insurance), on November 27, 2000, wherein he stated: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She had a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an office of the corporation. Respondent had a business address-of-record with Petitioner of B & B Bail Bonds, 580 North Broadway Avenue, Bartow, Florida 33830-3918, when in fact his business address was 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of a change of address for his corporation as required by law. In November 2000 during an interview, Luis Rivera and another Special Investigator from his office advised Respondent that Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance) considered him to be in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights granted to Pamela Jean Coleman. Luis Rivera visited the home office of Respondent, on March 7 and 21, 2000, at 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710, and knew of no other office location for that agent after that date. Constance Castro, a Special Investigator with the Tampa Office, Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, during September 2001, made an undercover visit to the bail bond office of Respondent, and pretended to be in need of a bail bond for a fictitious relative. She dealt directly with Pamela Jean Coleman who proceeded from the home living area of the house where Respondent was also located, to the office area of the home where Coleman conducted bail bond business with Castro. Special Agent Michael Kreis, Drug Enforcement Agency, in early 2001, had business with Cephas Bail Bonds. He went to the office thereof where he observed Pamela Jean Coleman sitting behind the desk. Coleman told him that she had posted bond the night before for the people he was asking about, and was very familiar with the street names of the people that were being sought. Coleman helped to arrange what was supposed to be a meeting between her and one of the suspects using the ruse that she needed the suspect to sign some bail bond paperwork. Kreis observed Respondent in the office but Coleman seemed to be in charge. Kreis observed her on the phone and dealing with people who came into the Cephas' bail bond office, and noted that by her actions and conduct, she was acting as a bail bond agent. On or about June 19, 2001, Noel Elizabeth "Nikki" Collier was working as a paralegal in her husband's law office when Pamela Jean Coleman visited their office with paperwork for one of their mutual clients to fill out. Coleman left her business card which read "Pamela J. Coleman, President, Clarence L. Cephas, Sr. Bail Bonds." Coleman was dressed in a black outfit with a badge attached to her belt. Coleman told her that if the mutual client did not sign the paperwork then the bail bonds would be revoked. When in the law office, Coleman identified herself as an agent for Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 was indeed a sworn statement made by him during a visit to Petitioner (then Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, at its offices in Tampa, Florida, in November 2000, and that he was indeed warned by Petitioner's personnel that he was in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes. He was subsequently warned by the filing of an Administrative Complaint in June 2001, an Amended Administrative Complaint in December 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint in March 2003. Respondent acknowledged that Pamela Jean Coleman was indeed listed as an officer and as a registered agent as well as the filer of various corporation documents, regarding his corporation and on file with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, and that he did sign the paperwork indicating that she was a corporate officer. Respondent further acknowledged that Coleman did participate in his bail bond business and that he did make payments to her as an employee, which included filing of a W-2 Form indicating said payments. During the pendency of this action, the State of Florida, by and through Jerry Hill, State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Respondent for criminal violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2003), in the case styled State of Florida v Clarence Luther Cephas, Florida Tenth Circuit Court, Case Number CF02-00598A-XX (the "criminal case"). The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit conducted a jury trial in the criminal case. On December 17, 2003, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty," and the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit rendered a judgment of not guilty in the criminal case. The allegations contained in the criminal case were identical to the allegation contained in Count one of Petitioner's Second Amended Administrative Complaint. During the approximate period of time March 1997 to at least December 2001, Respondent did employ and/or did otherwise allow Pamela Jean Coleman to participate in the bail bond business. Respondent did fail to notify the Department of Financial Services of a change of address as required by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.30, 348.44(8)(b), 648.45(2)(e) and (j), and 648.45(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes; Finding Respondent guilty of failing to report a change of address; and Revoking the bail bond agent license and eligibility for licensure of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Franklin, Esquire The Franklin & Carmichael Law Firm, P.A. 301 East Main Street Post Office Box 50 Bartow, Florida 33806 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Did Respondent plead nolo contendere to aggravated stalking, a felony, in violation of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, so as to be subject to discipline by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Sections 648.45(1); 648.45(2)(a), (e), (j), (k); 648.45(3)(a), (c), and/or (e), and if so, what penalties may be imposed, pursuant to Sections 648.45, 648.46, 648.49, 648.50, , and/or 648.53, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida by Petitioner Agency as a limited surety agent, License No. 265986204. At the time of formal hearing, Respondent's license was suspended, pursuant to a Second Amended Emergency Order of Suspension entered by the Agency on March 11, 1997. Certified Court documents reveal that on February 10, 1997, Lesley Charles Corbin entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the charge of "aggravated stalking," in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in Case No. 96-9760-CF. The particulars of the charge pled to allege that Respondent "did knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass . . . [name] . . . after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to Section 784.046, to-wit: 92-1772-DV, contrary to the provisions of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes." The Court documents also reveal repetitive previous similar or related criminal charges against Respondent. Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in Sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996). Under the plea bargain, Count I, alleging aggravated assault pursuant to Section 784.021, Florida Statutes, was dropped, and adjudication was withheld on Respondent's nolo contendere plea to Count II. Respondent was required to enter into nine months of community control followed by one year probation with special conditions to protect the person he had stalked. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that third degree felonies may be punished by up to 5 years' imprisonment. Section 775.083(1)(c) provides for third degree felonies to be punished by up to a $5,000 fine. Section 775.084(1)(c)1.b. applies to habitual felony offenders/stalkers and is not relevant here. The foregoing establishes prima facie facts in evidence, which facts Respondent did not overcome. Ms. Sarah Burt is the Bail Bond Coordinator for Petitioner Department of Insurance. In that capacity, she is responsible for administrative coordination of all bail bond related matters for the Agency. She is knowledgeable of the practices and procedures of the Agency regarding bail bondsmen and limited surety agency licensure and discipline, pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Based on her education, training, experience, and actual knowledge, Ms. Burt related that a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge has always resulted in the Agency denying a licensure application or revoking of an existing license. To the best of Ms. Burt's knowledge and belief, this has been the Agency's consistent procedure in all similar circumstances. She did not know of any licensee who had retained his or her licenses after the Agency became aware the licensee had pled nolo contendere to a felony.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 648.45(2)(a) and (k), and 648.45(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dick E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Cash Barlow, Esquire Post Office Box 492 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, applied for a Bail Bond Runner's License, which application was sworn to and subscribed on the 11th day of June, 1978. Petitioner had previously, on July 9, 1976, submitted an application for professional Bail Bondsman. The Respondent, by letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Licensing, Mrs. Onez O'Neal, dated August 31, 1978, informed Mr. LaFratta that his application for Bail Bond Runner's License was denied and stated that "the investigation conducted by this Department reflects that you do not meet the qualifications as set forth in Sections 648.27(2)(4), and 648.34(2)(f), Florida Statutes." The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. A deposition of Howard Paul Sabin, who was at the time imprisoned for bribery, was entered into the evidence without objection. The deposition was taken at the Hendry Correctional Institute in Immokalee, Florida, on December 20, 1978, by counsel for the Respondent after Respondent had denied Petitioner's application for licensure. Counsel for the Petitioner, Herb Fried, Esquire, 1461 NW 17th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125, and the Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, were present. Sabin's testimony was that the Petitioner, whom he identified at the taking of the deposition, shared commissions in performing bail bond activities and that Petitioner acquiesced and participated in bribing a police officer. Mr. Sabin testified that Mr. LaFratta used LaFratta's apartment as an office. Telephone calls were made from the apartment to call the jail and speak to people to see if Sabin could help them make bond while only Sabin, not Mr. LaFratta, was licensed. Sabin testified that the name of the agency was AABBEE Bail Bonds and that LaFratta paid Sabin a percentage of bonds solicited by Mr. Sabin and referred to Mr. LaFratta. The time frame Sabin testified about was approximately from September of 1975, to December of 1975. The Petitioner's attorney questioned Sabin about any promises made to him for his testimony and about other bondsmen, but there were no questions or contradictions by Petitioner or his attorney as to testimony concerning the subject of this hearing. A yellow page from a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Directory, dated 1976, was submitted into evidence in which there was an advertisement "Bail Bonds, 24-Hour Service Any Court - State, Federal, Criminal, Narcotic - Pat LaFratta, Manager - AABBEE Bail Bonds" and a telephone number. Also submitted into evidence was a copy of a business card "AABBEE Bail Bonds - Pat LaFratta - 24-Hour Service" with the same telephone number as advertised in the yellow pages of the 1976 telephone directory. It is obvious upon examination that the telephone advertisement and card were advising the public using the directory that Petitioner LaFratta was in the bail bond business. Petitioner was not then licensed. On the application for Bail Bond Runner's License of June 11, 1978, Question 14: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" was answered "Yes." The remainder of the question stated: "If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet." This was answered: "1970 - Broward Cty. Ct. - Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. - Poss. Stolen Prop. - 23 counts, 1 yr. cty. jail 2-5 yrs. probation conc." Petitioner listed no other charges or convictions on the application or on a separate sheet. Respondent submitted in defense of its denial a number of exhibits which were entered into evidence as follows: Exhibit 3(a) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 20, 1969. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(b) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 23, 1967. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. Petitioner was released from custody. Exhibit 3(c) concerns the offense of auto theft and is dated April 4, 1969. The solicitor announced "No Information," and the Respondent was released from custody. Exhibit 3(d) concerns the offense of uttering a forged instrument and is dated June 30, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(e) concerns the offense of two counts of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. The Judge released the Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(f) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated January 22, 1969. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(g) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(h) concerns the offense of receiving or aiding in the concealment of parts of a 1968 Chevrolet Impala and is dated October 31, 1969. The State was allowed 30 days to amend because of the vagueness of the charge. Exhibit 3(i) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(j) concerns the offense of aggravated assault and is dated October 27, 1967. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was not the defendant in said case. Exhibit 3(k) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated December 13, 1968. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(l) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property arid is dated October 1, 1969. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court and released from custody. Exhibit 3(m) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated June 25, 1968. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court arid released from custody. Exhibit 3(n) concerns the offense of assault and battery, a misdemeanor, and is dated October 30, 1967. Exhibit 3(o) is a judgment and sentence for the crime of receiving stolen property and is dated October 5, 1971. Petitioner was placed on probation for five years. Exhibit (p) is a judgment and sentence dated April 5, 1971. Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison and an assessment. Exhibit 3(q) concerns the violation of parole. Respondent's Exhibit 3(e), (g), (i), (o), and (p), supra, are part of a 23-count information which was submitted as Petitioner's Exhibit #6 in Case No. 70-25492, an information for Receiving Stolen property. Respondent's Exhibit 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h), (k), (l), and (m), supra, refer to felony charges of receiving stolen property, uttering a forged instrument and auto theft, which were not listed on the Petitioner's application and were not part of the 23-count information, which information concerned receiving stolen property. Exhibit 3(a), (b), (f), (k), (l), and (m), supra, concern stolen property preceding the dates of the offenses mentioned in the 23-count information. The failure to list the foregoing felony charges shows the Petitioner made material misstatements on his application. Petitioner LaFratta testified that he sent a package regarding the 23 counts mentioned in Findings of Fact No. 3, supra, with both application for Professional Bail Bondsman and for subject license to the Respondent. His testimony was not backed by evidence that he in fact sent the materials to the Respondent, which were required to have been sent at the time the application was made and listed on his application. His testimony that he had requested the clerk to "make out a whole booklet on everything that pertains to me," if true, was not adequate to truthfully answer Question 14, Findings of Fact No. 3, supra. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner did not furnished a full and detailed report and information as required by Question 14. It is the finding of the Hearing Officer that Petitioner did not intend to furnish the required information. Petitioner testified that he did not think that he had ever been arrested for assault, but the Respondent presented evidence showing that Petitioner had in fact been arrested for assault and battery. On subject application the Petitioner also failed to fully answer the question as to his employment history for the past five years. He failed to disclose that he had worked for Abel Bail Bonds. On the question as to his residence for the past five years, Mr. LaFratta failed to show that he had been incarcerated at Florida State Prison during that period of time. The herein mentioned 23-count information and the Restoration of Civil Rights were certified in June of 1976, and application for Professional Bail Bondsman was submitted in July of 1976. It is the finding of this Hearing Officer that these instruments were the only information submitted by the Petitioner to the Respondent as to his charges and convictions, despite his testimony. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights to Pat LaFratta, dated June 8, 1976, was previous to the application for Bail Bond Runner's License sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on June 11, 1978, and to the application for Bail Bondsman sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on July 9, 1976. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights is dated June 8, 1976, and within a few weeks thereafter Petitioner failed to truthfully answer questions under oath on his application on July 9, 1976, and failed to fully and truthfully answer the question on his application for Bail Bond Runner's License of July 11, 1978.
Recommendation Reject the application of Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, for a license as a Ball Bond Runner. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire Florida Department of Insurance Legal Division 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Max P. Engel, Esquire 1461 North West 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125
