The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Carter Signs is in the business of outdoor advertising which includes the installation, repair and maintenance of signs, billboards, or displays on real property. Pursuant to a twenty-year term lease that began on March 1, 1988, the Petitioner has leased the real property described as: Strap No. 344525-00- 00002.000 lying east of 1-75, in Lee County, Florida. The lease describes the specific intended use of the real property under the lease. The lessee has agreed to use and occupy the premises solely for the purpose of outdoor advertising. The real property is located in Lee County, Florida, within 660 feet of Interstate Highway 75, a highway in the interstate highway system. The property is approximately 1.5 miles south of the Daniel Road interchange on the east side of the highway. The Lee County Comprehensive Plan, which has been enacted by the county, designates the area in which real property is located as "Airport Commerce." Under the plan, this land is approved for "mixed use developments consisting of light manufacturing or assembly, warehousing and distribution facilities; offices; ground transportation and airport related interconnection activity; and hotels/motels, meeting facilities and other hospitality services." The Petitioner's application to Lee County for a permit to erect the proposed sign on the property was approved. The county permit shows that the property is zoned "agricultural." If the "agricultural" zoning classification is violated, the county permit becomes void. The application for permit to the Department was denied because Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, allows signs within a controlled portion of an interstate highway only if the sign is within a commercial-zoned area, an industrial-zoned area, a commercial-unzoned area or industrial-unzoned area. In this case, the proposed sign was to be placed in an agriculturally zoned area.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's predecessor in interest leased property along the I-275 in October 1973 (Exhibit 3) and erected an outdoor advertising sign thereon. One witness testified that at the time this sign was erected in 1973 there was no other sign within 500 feet of this sign. The sign was erected within the city limits of Tampa, Florida and no permit other than a city building permit was required for this sign. In 1974 DOT required permits for all signs including those located within city limits, but no fee was collected for the permits issued for signs within the city limits. This regulation was not enforced by DOT until 1976- 1978, although in 1974 DOT had advised sign owners that permits were required for all signs and how they were to apply for permits for those signs located within the city limits (Exhibit 4). In 1975 National Advertising Company, in accordance with DOT instructions for obtaining permits for signs located in incorporated areas, submitted a renewal application in which it listed the sign located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign (Exhibit 5). When no permit was issued by DOT, National Advertising Company, by letter dated September 1, 1977 (Exhibit 6), called to DOT's attention that they had not been issued permits for signs within city limits for which they had applied. Application for a sign permit for their sign along the I-275 located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign was submitted by National Advertising Company on 31 March 1980 (Exhibit 7) and approved by DOT. This application showed the sign to have been erected prior to 1972. At this hearing Petitioner introduced as Exhibit 1 a copy of an Advertising Sign Permit application dated 9-1-76 executed by its predecessor in title, Martin Outdoor Advertising Company. The only indication on this application that it was received by Respondent is a received stamp dated April 15, 1980. During the period 1976-1979 considerable confusion existed in the outdoor sign industry respecting permits for signs and particularly for those signs located within city limits despite notification to sign companies (Exhibit 4). In an effort to clarify the situation, Respondent sent out circulars with the annual renewal notices advising all sign owners that signs along Interstate and Federal Aid Primary Highways within incorporated towns and cities required permits. In the circular dated December 18, 1978 (Exhibit 8), sign owners were told to submit applications for all unpermitted signs prior to February 17, 1979, and that failure to do so could result in the removal of the unpermitted signs. This was followed up by another circular dated October 31, 1979 (Exhibit 9) in which the deadline for applying for permits for those unpermitted signs was extended to January 1, 1980. Neither of these circulars which were enclosed with renewal notices were delivered by Petitioner's mail room to Petitioner's real estate section. Instead, they were forwarded to accounting with renewal notices. Upon an inspection of signs along the I-275 in March 1980, Petitioner's sign was observed without a permit and in violation of the spacing requirements. Notice of alleged violation dated 3 April 1980 was forwarded to Petitioner (Exhibit 10). Petitioner then applied for a permit for the sign which was disapproved and request for this hearing followed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Federal Highway Beautification Act, as amended, which pertains to lighting, design and spacing of signs on the interstate, federal and primary highway systems. Respondent, First Coast Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (First Coast), is an outdoor advertising firm located in St. Augustine Beach, Florida, and is the owner of a sign erected on State Road A1A in Flagler County, Florida. Respondent, Motel Delores, is a motel located at 5992 Oceanside Boulevard (State Road A1A) in Flagler County and has a sign erected near its place of business. Both signs are located on the same side of the highway and are subject to DOT's regulatory jurisdiction. The underpinnings of this controversy began in 1966 when Motel Delores decided it would erect a sign with a message reading "Delores Motel & Restaurant". The actual location of the sign is 385 feet south of the intersection of Malacompra Road and State Road A1A, or 10.2 miles north of the intersection of State Roads 100 and A1A, in Flagler County, Florida. At that time, the property on which the sign was erected was owned by Malcolm Johnson. According to Jerrald D. Schatz, who is one of the motel owners, Motel Delores was given permission by Johnson for the sign to be erected on Johnson's property. In 1970, ITT Development Corporation (ITT) purchased Johnson's land. There is no indication in the record that ITT initially lodged any objections to Motel Delores continuing to have its sign located on ITT's property. The date on which DOT began regulating outdoor advertising signs is not of record. However, Motel Delores first learned of the need to obtain a sign permit in early 1977 when a DOT representative advised it that a permit was necessary. Accordingly, respondent made application with DOT for a permit on March 9, 1977, and was issued tag number 5697-02 on March 16, 1977. Thereafter, the tagged sign remained at the same location until March 1990. In 1984, ITT and DOT became embroiled in a civil action over ownership of land on and near State Road A1A where the two signs are now located. In 1986, the lawsuit was settled when DOT and ITT agreed to exchange land in the immediate area. As a result of that settlement, the land on which Motel Delores' sign was located was deeded from ITT to DOT and now constitutes right- of-way on State Road A1A. Without DOT's written permission, the placement of a sign on state right-of-way is prohibited. In March 1990, Motel Delores' sign and tag were stolen by unknown individuals. Within a few days, Schatz began erecting a new sign a few feet closer to A1A. By chance, a DOT sign inspector, William Terry, happened to be traveling on A1A and observed the new sign. After a preliminary investigation was conducted, including contact by DOT with ITT, Terry concluded that the sign was within fifteen feet of DOT right-of-way on a federal primary highway and the sign owner did not have ITT's written permission to have the sign at that location. The inspector was unaware of the fact that DOT and ITT had exchanged land some four years earlier and was under the impression that the land on which the sign was located belonged to ITT. Accordingly, on March 29, 1990, Terry posted a cease work order on the sign and recommended that a notice of violation be issued. The recommendation was accepted by the district administrator of outdoor advertising and a notice to show cause was issued on April 6, 1990. On April 23, 1990, Schatz filed a request for hearing with the DOT district office. In late February 1990 First Coast began erecting an outdoor advertising sign approximately 523 feet north of where the Motel Delores sign was located. In conjunction with this activity, on March 14, 1990, First Coast filed an application with DOT for a sign permit. However, A1A is designated as a part of the federal-aid primary highway system and state law prohibits two permitted signs from being located within 1,000 feet of one another on such a road. Because the DOT "inventory book" for permitted signs carried the tag number for the sign owned by Motel Delores, which was 523 feet south of First Coast's sign, the application was returned to First Coast on March 21, 1990, with a notation by the district administrator that it was "Dis-Approved" (sic). A short time later, Terry posted a cease work order on First Coast's uncompleted sign, and a notice to show cause was issued on April 6, 1990, on the ground the sign did not meet spacing requirements. However, because at that time Motel Delores' sign was on DOT right-of-way without DOT's permission, there was no lawful, permitted sign on the same side of the road within 1,000 feet of First Coast's sign and thus the notice was improvidently issued. Indeed, a DOT representative acknowledged at hearing that Motel Delores' sign was "illegal" at the time the notice to show cause was issued against First Coast. In view of this, First Coast's application for a sign permit should have been approved. On April 19, 1990, First Coast requested a hearing to contest DOT's preliminary decision. Among other things, First Coast contended that the Motel Delores sign was illegally erected and thus its sign met all spacing requirements. For reasons not of record, DOT did not forward this and Motel Delores' first request for hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings until more than a year later. During this period of time, both respondents completed construction of their new signs and have continued to use them pending the outcome of these proceedings. Even so, DOT agreed at hearing that respondents should not be charged with violating the cease work orders posted on the two signs. On October 17, 1991, DOT advised Schatz by letter that it was "rescinding all violations issued under the (April 6, 1990) notice" because the notice had incorrectly identified the location of the sign as 385 feet north of Malacompra Road when in fact the actual location was 385 feet south of Malacompra Road. Schatz's happiness was short-lived, however, because DOT then issued another notice to show cause on November 1, 1991, alleging that the sign did not have a valid permit tag and was located on DOT's right-of-way. Motel Delores thereafter requested a hearing on November 8, 1991. On November 20, 1991, Motel Delores filed with DOT an outdoor advertising permit affidavit form in which it represented that its sign tag had been stolen and a replacement tag was necessary. The request was approved by DOT on January 14, 1992, and replacement tag number BF 209-25 was issued. On February 1, 1992, or less than a week prior to final hearing, DOT and Motel Delores executed a five year lease agreement whereby DOT agreed that the motel could keep its sign on DOT's property for $200 per year. According to Schatz, he had requested such a lease from DOT in late 1990 and it took more than a year for DOT to formalize the agreement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the notices to show cause issued against respondents on April 6, 1990, and November 1, 1991, be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that a sign permit be issued to First Coast Outdoor Advertising, Inc. for its sign erected on State Road A1A in Flagler County. DONE and ORDERED this 30 day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30 day of March, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Suite 1150 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801 Jerrald D. Schatz 5992 North Oceanside Boulevard Hammock, FL 32137-2601 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, Agency Clerk 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact On or about May 8, 1981, the Department issued permit number AE316-10 to Henderson Signs. This permit authorized the erection of a sign to be located approximately 1.9 miles west of SR 267 in Gadsden County, Florida. This location is in an unzoned area, and the permit was granted because of its proximity to a nearby commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries. Subsequently, the Respondent, Tri-State Systems, Inc., purchased the subject permit from Henderson Signs, and thereafter the sign in question was erected by the Respondent. The area where this sign was placed is rural in nature and generally suitable for agricultural activities. However, the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1981 was the growing of ornamental evergreens primarily for wholesale distribution in Northern markets. These ornamental evergreens were grown in containers on top of the ground, and shipped by refrigerated trucks. A view of the area in 1981 would show evergreen plants in containers sitting on top of dry sod. Imperial Nurseries produces three to four million evergreens, does two to three million dollars in business, and employs approximately 130 employees. Although the only structure now situated within 660 feet of the interstate is a weather shed, in 1981 there was a loading dock located within 660 feet of the interstate from which the loading and shipping took place, there was a portable toilet, low bed trucks, semi-trailers, and tractors working near this loading dock, and men working in the area. Prior to the Department's issuance of the subject permit, one of the its inspectors whose duty is to observe a proposed sign site and determine if it is as represented in the application and if it meets the requirements of the statutes and rules, field inspected the proposed site of the subject sign. Based on this inspection he recommended the issuance of the permit upon his determination that this area was unzoned commercial, that the sign site was within 800 feet of a commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries, and that this commercial activity was within 660 feet of the right of way of I- 10, and visible from the main-traveled way of I-10. There is sufficient credible evidence in the record of this proceeding to support a finding of fact that the subject area was as the field inspector found it to be. The field inspector's recommendation to approve the site as a permittable location was joined in by his supervisor after the supervisor had also conducted a field inspection of the area. Both of them based their approvals on their observations in 1981 of commercial activities being conducted within 660 feet from I- 10. The site where the Respondent erected its sign was within 800 feet of the place where the loading dock was situated in 1981. The assertion of Henderson Signs on its sign permit application that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business was not false or misleading. The Department's inspector and his supervisor concurred in this characterization of the area. Neither has the Respondent violated any of the provisions of chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All of the facts were set forth on the permit application submitted by Henderson Signs, and these facts were verified by the Department after the area was inspected to determine their accuracy. The policy of the Department leaves the determination of what is and what is not an unzoned commercial area to the field inspector, with the approval of his supervisors. In this case, the determination was made that the activities of Imperial Nurseries were commercial in nature, and the permit was granted on the basis of this determination, not on the representation of Henderson Signs or the Respondent. In the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1984 was agricultural, and not commercial in nature. Although Imperial Nurseries now has an agricultural exemption on its property, there is no evidence that it had this in 1981, and the facts support a finding that Imperial Nurseries is a commercial activity and was such in 1981. There is no statutory definition of "agricultural" 1/ and the Department has not defined the term by rule. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines "agricultural" as the cultivation of the ground, the art of preparing the soil, the tillage or the culture of the earth. These are not the activities of Imperial Nurseries now, and were not in 1981.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's violation notice seeking removal of the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.9 miles west of S.R. 267 in Gadsden County, Florida, be dismissed; and that permit number AE 316-10 remain in effect as a permit for a nonconforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 1st day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Emerald applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for a location approximately 778 feet west of the location for which a permit had previously been issued to Lamar. If the permit previously issued to Lamar were not in spatial conflict with the permit site sought to be used by the Petitioner, the Petitioner's permit could be granted. The Petitioner's proposed site, however, is in statutorily prohibited proximity to Lamar's site, if Lamar's permit is deemed valid. The Department denied Emerald's application because its proposed application was, in the view of the Department, in spacing conflict with the site related to Lamar's permit. The controversy at issue relates to a parcel of land in Destin, Florida, owned by members of the family of Kathleen Jones. Herman Jones owned a portion of the property, and Mildred Castro owned a portion of the property. Kathleen Jones held a life estate to Mildred Castro's portion of the property. Permits were issued to Lamar on June 25, 1981 for a sign at the Jones/Castro site. The sign was erected in August of 1981 and was supported by leases of the real estate involved between Lamar and the Joneses. That sign was maintained continuously until May of 1992. Herman Jones sold his portion of the property in 1992 to Frank J. Roberts and Destin Renaissance, Inc. A survey in conjunction with that sale revealed that the sign was partially on the parcel sold to Roberts and partially on the parcel retained by the Jones family. Lamar, accordingly, moved its sign, since it encroached on the Roberts parcel and executed a release of its lease as to the real estate which Herman Jones had sold to Roberts. Ever since the 1981 erection of the sign, the lease for the site had been between Lamar and Kathleen Jones. It was a written lease and provided for annual renewals. The annual lease payment had been increased in 1985 and again in 1987. On July 27, 1990, the lease was again re-written to increase the annual rental payment. On March 11, 1992, Mr. Roberts sent a letter to the Department's Chipley office stating that he and his corporation had purchased the property from Herman Jones and that he did not have a lease with Lamar. Acting upon that letter, the Department sent a letter to Lamar on April 6, 1993 which stated: This office has received information to the effect that you no longer have permission from the land owner to erect or maintain signs on the South side of US 98, 6.3 miles East of SR 85. The permits numbers are AE678-06 and AE679-06. If, in fact, this information is true and correct the permits issued for these sites are invalid pursuant to Section 479.07(7) Florida Statutes. You are hereby notified that the Department's determination of invalidity will become con- clusive and the subject permit(s) will be revoked unless you elect to challenge this action by requesting an Administrative Hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this letter. The request should be addressed to: Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 In the interim, if you can furnish documentary evidence of current permission from the present property owner to refute this information, it may be possible to resolve this matter to mutual satisfaction. Lamar replied to that letter on April 15, 1993 stating: We do have landowner permission for the referenced site as evidenced by our recorded lease of 8/07/90 and our amended lease for the same site dated 12/16/92. In addition the referenced tags were replaced by tags BG796-35 and BG797-35 on 2/15/93. This should be substantial evidence to refute any claim that we do not have landowner permission. Please indicate to me in writing the effect this will have on the need for an administrative hearing. In conjunction with the submittal of that letter of April 15, 1993, Lamar submitted a copy of its recorded lease with Herman Jones dated August 7, 1990 and a copy of its lease with Kathleen Jones dated December 16, 1992. Upon receipt of those documents, the Department concluded that Lamar did have written permission from the landowner to erect a sign at a location for which the permits described in paragraph three above were issued. The Department took no further action to revoke Lamar's permit, and Lamar, therefore, did not apply for an administrative hearing. The Department rejected Emerald's application by letter dated February 9, 1993, and Emerald requested an administrative hearing to contest that initial decision. The rejection of Emerald's permit application was due to the fact that the proposed permit was located less than 1,000 feet (778 feet) from Lamar's permit location. The Department took the position that Lamar's permits were still valid because it had provided satisfactory evidence to the Department that it still had landowner permission for the subject Lamar sign, by presenting a valid lease for the property in question, the Jones/Castro parcel.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Transportation finding that the applications of Emerald Outdoor Advertising, Inc. for outdoor advertising permits in Destin, Florida, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2668T Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, and as constituting a conclusion of law instead of a proposed finding of fact. Respondent Department's Findings of Fact The Respondent, Department of Transportation, adopts the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company of Ft. Walton Beach, Inc. Thus, those proposed findings of fact are accepted. Proposed finding of fact number nine submitted by the Department, in addition to those submitted by Lamar, is rejected as being unnecessary and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent Lamar's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company of Ft. Walton Beach, Inc.'s proposed findings of fact are accepted in their entirety as are the facts stipulated to by the parties. COPIES FURNISHED: Martin B. Daniel, Esq. 47 North Third Street Memphis, TN 38103 Robert P. Gaines, Esq. BEGGS & LANE Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576 Paul Sexton, Esq. Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an outdoor advertising sign permit to be located in an unzoned commercial/industrial area and whether the sign site qualified as an unzoned commercial/industrial area.
Findings Of Fact Lamar is in the business of erecting, operating and maintaining outdoor advertising signs in Northwest Florida. The proposed sign’s location was in Walton County along US Highway 331, .1 mile south of Bay Grove Road, a collector road. U.S. Highway 331 is a federal aid primary highway and therefore, a state permit is required for signs placed along its path. According to a Walton County zoning plan, the proposed sign’s location was in an area zoned Rural Village on both the Future Land Use Map and Land Development Regulations. The June 2006 version of the Walton County Land Development Code provides: F. Rural Village (RV): This district is a mixed use district which permits predominately residential development up to a maximum of two units per acre. Residential uses shall account for approximately 95 percent of the total land area within any area designated on the FLUM for this District. The remaining area may be utilized for related and compatible commercial uses. Commercial uses may occupy up to five percent of the total land area designated on the FLUM for this District. Commercial land uses shall be limited to collector and arterial road intersections, intersections of subdivision collectors and arterial or collector road, and areas that are specifically designated Commercial on the FLUM. Not more than 15 percent of the total frontage on both sides of a collector or arterial road shall be occupied by commercial uses within this district. The Walton County Land Development Code also defined general commercial activity as including inventory storage. The proposed sign’s location met the requirements for commercial use under the RV designation. Walton County certified to the Department that the designated parcel for the proposed outdoor advertising sign was Rural Village and that the primary use of the area under the current comprehensive plan was agriculture, general agriculture, residential, civic uses, and residential subdivision. Walton County also confirmed that the proposed outdoor advertising sign would be in compliance with all duly adopted local ordinances and would be issued the necessary County permit for such sign. The Walton County Property Appraiser’s website listed the usage of the proposed outdoor advertising sign location as a “service station.” The service station building was still on the property, but had not been used as such for a number of years. Billy Wayne Strickland, the state outdoor advertising administrator of the Department, processed the outdoor advertising permit applications submitted by Lamar. Mr. Strickland determined after a review of Lamar’s applications that the site, being designated as Rural Village with mixed uses allowed, met the need for evaluation under the use test for unzoned commercial or industrial areas contained in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The use test is set forth in Florida Statutes 479.02. Under the test, the Department examines a proposed sign’s location under the applicable current land use designation and future land use designation to determine if the outdoor advertising site meets the use criteria set forth in the statute for unzoned commercial and industrial areas. The use criteria for such unzoned property require that three commercial or industrial activities be located within 1600 feet of each other, with one of those activities located on the same side of the road and within 800 feet of the proposed sign’s location. Distances are measured from building to building. Additionally, the commercial or industrial activity must be visible from the highway. Mr. Strickland visited the property in order to determine if the proposed sign location met the requirements of the use test. He observed that the proposed sign’s site holds an abandoned-looking gas station and a house with a large fenced in area. Leaking fuel tanks made it unlikely the service station would be restored. There were several small, boarded-up, “fishing style cabins” associated with the fenced property. The fenced area had a sign posted for North Florida Development, Inc., a construction company. There was a number for the company listed on the sign. On a tree to the right of the fence was a sign that read “Private Road Keep Out.” In general, the area behind the fence appeared to be used for storage of building materials and equipment such as trucks and trailers. Except for the area behind the fence, the North Florida Development property was clearly visible from the highway. Mr. Strickland called the phone number on the sign and was informed that North Florida Development, Inc., that he was calling, was in Miramar Beach, Florida, and that North Florida Development was storing equipment and trucks at the U.S. Highway 331 location for a job they were doing in Destin. There was no one present at the house or the adjacent buildings. The North Florida Development buildings and fenced area were within 800 feet of the proposed sign’s location and were on the same side of the road as the proposed sign’s location. Because of the lack of activity, Mr. Strickland concluded that the North Florida Development property was not a commercial activity which was visible from the highway. On the opposite side of the Highway, Mr. Strickland observed two businesses within a 1600-foot zone that met the criteria of the use test. Additionally, while at the site, Mr. Strickland issued a Notice of Violation for the on-premises sign of North Florida Development. The Notice required the sign to be removed. Later, after the hearing in this matter, this action was dismissed by the Department. On November 29, 2006, the Department issued a written denial of the outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign site was not permitted under the local land use designation of site per Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, and (2) the sign site did not qualify as an unzoned commercial/industrial area per Section 479.01(23), Florida Statutes. On the morning of April 5, 2007, Mr. Strickland, again visited the proposed sign’s site. He observed essentially the same things he observed during his first visit to the location, except the large North Florida Development sign that had been on the entrance to the fenced area had been removed. Andrew White, a regional inspector with the Department, inspected the North Florida Development site on May 17, 2007, and photographed the area. The sign for North Florida Development had been removed, but the keep-out signs were still in place. Photographs taken from the street revealed a partial view of a storage trailer through the open fence. On the morning of June 6, 2007, just prior to the hearing, Mr. Strickland again visited the proposed sign’s location and observed no activity at the location. He could only see a trailer partially visible beyond the privacy fence. Larry Wayne Adkinson, vice president of North Florida Development and a general contractor licensed in Mississippi, lives and works on the property of the proposed sign’s location. Mr. Adkinson testified that the property totaled five and a-half or six acres and consisted of his home, his office, the service station and five fishing cabins. He and his business have been at this location for at least 12 years. Work has been delayed on repairing the service station based, in part, upon the fact that the state was seeking to condemn a portion of the property where the service station was located for the expansion of U.S. Highway 331. Mr. Adkinson uses the property as an inventory site, storing construction materials, heavy equipment, landscaping materials, and other bulk material related to his business. The site contained three semi-tractor trailers that were utilized to store construction materials, including doors, windows, and heavy equipment and equipment and materials for a landscape business owned by Mr. Adkinson. The landscape business stored tractor-trailers, small-equipment trailers, plants, brick pavers, scaffolding and rock molds. The site’s storage of inventory and business activity was very visible to people who lived in the neighborhood around the North Florida Development property. The visibility was such that, in 2006, the neighbors complained about the view to the County. The County, in turn, asked Mr. Adkinson to place a fence around the area to block the view of people passing through the area. Mr. Adkinson complied with the County’s request and built the privacy fence that Mr. Strickland observed. Mr. Adkinson also placed the company’s business sign on the fence to identify the property as North Florida Development’s business property. Most of the loading and unloading of material and equipment occurs in the early morning and evening hours. At those times, there is considerable activity at the site with trucks and equipment entering and leaving the property. Mr. Adkinson’s testimony was confirmed by the testimony of Chad Pickens, who routinely drives by the site during those hours. Mr. Strickland never visited the property during those busy hours, and therefore, did not observe the business activity associated with the site. Mr. Adkinson uses two of the fishing cabins as machine shops for his company’s equipment and tools. The shops contain drill presses, welding and repair equipment. Entry is gained through the rear doors of the cabins. He left the front of the cabins boarded up to prevent theft and storm damage. Mr. Adkinson also receives business mail at the U.S. Highway 331 location and has employees and job applicants report to that location. Clearly, the North Florida Development property is a viable and on-going business that conducts one of its business activities on the property on which the proposed sign is to be located. The activity is visible from the highway, although such activity ebbs and flows through the day. The property, therefore, meets the land use test requirements of Florida Statutes, and the Petitioner’s applications should be granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Transportation enter a Final Order granting the applications for outdoor advertising sign permits filed by Lamar Advertising of Fort Walton Beach. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2007. COMPLETE COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James E. Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 1622 Crestview, Florida 32536 David M. Littlejohn, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Meyers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation (hereinafter "Petitioner") properly issued Notices of Violation to Respondent as alleged in Notice Numbers 09 BU720, 09 BU721, 09 BU723, 09 BU724, 09 BU726, and 09 BQ032 for outdoor advertising billboard structures located adjacent to US 1 and I-95 in Brevard County, Florida. Specifically at issue is whether Respondent's outdoor advertising signs: (1) were removed from the locations for which they were permitted and re-erected at the same locations; (2) are nonconforming and cannot be relocated; were destroyed by an act of God; and (4) are destroyed nonconforming signs which cannot be re-erected (the signs have been re-erected), all in violation of Rule 14-10.007, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Whiteco Metrocom, now known as Chancellor Media Whiteco Outdoor Corporation ("Respondent"), owns and maintains four off- premise outdoor advertising signs located along Interstate 95 in Brevard County, Florida. Respondent also owns and maintains two off-premise outdoor advertising signs located along U.S. Highway 1 in Brevard County, Florida. These six off-premise outdoor advertising signs are generally hereinafter referred to as the "signs." Outdoor advertising is a lawfully recognized business which is regulated under the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, by Petitioner. Respondent is licensed by Petitioner in the business of outdoor advertising. The Division of Forestry of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("DOF") is governed by Chapter 590, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for fire protection, fire control, and land management. DOF is charged with the protection of life, property, and natural resources. Petitioner classified the signs as "non-conforming" outdoor advertising signs at all times relevant to this proceeding. The six signs were maintained under the following Department of Transportation ("Department") sign permit tag numbers and were located as follows at all times relevant to this proceeding, each within 660 feet of the first named highway or interstate and each within Brevard County, Florida. Sign Permit # Location BQ 032-55 West of Interstate 95, 3.725 miles north of NEB700136/060 State Road 46 BU 726-55 West of Interstate 95, 1.572 miles north of NEB700138/066 Aurantia Road BU 723-55 West of U.S. Highway 1, 0.324 miles north of County Road 5A BU 724-55 West of U.S. Highway 1, 0.339 miles north of County Road 5A BU 721-55 West of Interstate 95, 3.601 miles north of NEB700136/060 State Road 46 BU 720-55 West of Interstate 95, 3.667 miles north of NEB700136/060 State Road Each of the signs was lawfully permitted by Petitioner at the described location during the relevant time period. Each of the six signs was used for leasing advertising space to third parties and each individually generated income to Respondent. The signs located along Interstate 95 were erected in 1971 and the signs located along U.S. Highway 1 were erected in 1964. The signs located along Interstate 95 were located less than 1,000 feet from another outdoor advertising sign on the same side of the highway maintained under a sign permit granted by the Department. Each of the signs located along U.S. Highway 1 was located less than 500 feet from another outdoor advertising sign on the same side of the highway maintained under a sign permit granted by the Department. None of the signs were located in an area designated for commercial or industrial use. Interstate 95 is an interstate highway and U.S. Highway 1 is a federal primary highway. The upright supports of each of the six signs were wood, and such signs are structures. In June and July of 1998, an extensive wildfire burned in the area of Brevard County located generally north of State Road 46. During the evening of June 26, 1998, a thunderstorm passed through the area of Brevard County west of the signs. The weather conditions at that time were extremely dry. An event constituting an act of God is any sudden manifestation of the forces of nature without human intervention. The best evidence for the cause of the fire is that lightning during the storm started two wildfires in remote areas west of the signs. The fires were identified by DOF as the Freshwater and Break 5 (or Break 10) fires. Each fire initially spread west. DOF began efforts to combat the Freshwater Fire and the Break 5 fire on June 27, 1998. However, the fires expanded as a result of weather conditions. Because of the hot, dry weather conditions and erratic winds, and despite the continuing efforts of DOF, the fires continued to expand and burned together on June 29, 1998. The combined fires were referred to as the Farmington Fire. On the evening of June 30, 1998, rapid winds from the west caused the Farmington Fire to expand and travel to the east and northeast. As the fire continued to rapidly expand on July 1, 1998, DOF determined that it was unsafe to locate firefighting equipment in the path of the fire. On or about July 1, 1998, the Farmington Fire burned through the area where the signs that Respondent maintained under sign numbers BQ 032-55, BU 720-55, BU 721-55, BU 723-55, and BU 724-55 were located. On or about July 2, 1998, the Farmington Fire burned through the area where the sign that Respondent maintained under sign permit number BU 726-55 was located. On or about July 1, 1998, the Farmington Fire substantially burned all of the upright supports of each of the signs that Respondent maintained under sign permit numbers BQ 032-55, BU 720-55, BU 721-55, BU 723-55, and BU 724-55. On or about July 2, 1998, the Farmington Fire substantially burned all of the upright supports of the sign that Respondent maintained under sign permit number BU 726-55. None of the six signs was struck by lightning prior to their destruction. The Farmington Fire spread through the areas where the six signs were located as a result of drought conditions and weather factors. Interstate 95 and U.S. Highway 1 were closed to the public before the signs were destroyed. Respondents attempted to access each of the six signs but could not reach the signs because of road closures by governmental authorities. A burnout is a way of fighting a fire wherein fire is deliberately set and used in a countering measure to burn the fuel in front of a wildfire. The purpose of a burnout is to establish control over a wildfire by eliminating fuel in the existing fire's path. If a burnout is unsuccessful, more strength is added to the wildfire because the wildfire has gained momentum. It is possible for a prescribed burn to become a wildfire. DOF set a fire to "burn out" an area of land involved in the Farmington Farm on the evening of June 28, 1998. This "burnout" fire was set by Ranger Weis in his capacity as an employee of DOF. The fire continued to travel after the burnouts were conducted. The burnout did not contribute to the spread of the Farmington Fire, but temporarily helped to impede the it. The Farmington Fire spread over 5,000 to 6,000 acres. Approximately 200 firefighters were involved in fighting the Farmington Fire. Bulldozers, fire engines, helicopters, retardant, and tankers were used in the firefighting efforts. Many homes, businesses, and other property in the area of the Farmington Fire were saved from fire damage. Some were not saved. The only fire in the area of the Farmington Fire that was set by someone other than Ranger Weis did not contribute to the spread of the Farmington Fire or burn the signs. The Farmington Fire was contained on July 2, 1998. If the same measures that had been used to protect other property from damage had been used on the billboards, the billboards could possibly have been saved from fire damage. The measures that were taken on homes, businesses, and other structures to protect them from fire damage were not used around the subject signs. The steps taken by DOF and firefighting crews to save homes and businesses included creating defensible space around the structures by clearing vegetation and spraying the structures with water. House Bill 1535, which contains amendments to Chapter 590, Florida Statutes, allows for nonconforming buildings, houses, businesses, or other appurtenances to property destroyed by the wildfires of June and July 1998 to be re-erected in kind. House Bill 1535 (Section 24 to revised Chapter 590, Florida Statutes) is applicable to Respondent's signs because each sign constitutes a business which, on its own, would require a state license under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and which individually generates advertising revenue. Nonconforming signs destroyed by vandalism or tortious acts may be re-erected in kind. The term "tortious acts" is not defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, or in Chapter 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. After the signs were destroyed, Respondent re-erected each of the six signs with substantially the same type of materials as had previously composed the structure of each sign, and at the same location as the destroyed signs. The materials used to re-erect the signs were not part of the sign structures immediately before the signs were destroyed by the Farmington Fire. Respondent's signs were re- erected in kind. Respondent does not own the property where any of the six signs are located. Under the terms of each agreement with the property owners under which Respondent has the right to maintain the signs, upon expiration or termination of the agreement, Respondent may remove all of its sign materials from the property, and may, unless otherwise agreed, no longer maintain the signs. Excluding the signs, Respondent conducts no other business activities on the property upon which the signs are located. Petitioner's witness, Ronald Weis, a Senior Forest Ranger with the Division of Forestry, had personal knowledge of the wildfires that occurred in Brevard County during June and July 1998 and participated in the investigation, management, and fighting of the wildfires in Brevard County in the areas where the subject signs are located. Respondent's witness, Dennis R. Dewar, based upon his years of experience and education in various fire fighting and teaching capacities, is qualified as an expert to testify in the areas of fire fighting training, fire fighting operations, the spread of fires, and the cause and origin of fires. The opinion testimony of Mr. Dewar, concerning the cause of the damage to the signs and the cause, origin, and spread of the Farmington Fire, was not persuasive. DOF regulates prescribed burns. However, it cannot mandate prescribed burns on private property. A prescribed burn is the controlled application of fire to property. One of the primary purposes of prescribed burning is to reduce the fuel load and, therefore, reduce fire hazard. The failure to prescribe burn increases the possibility of a wildfire. It is foreseeable that if prescribed burns are not done in an area over time the possibility of the spread of wildfire is foreseeable. A wildfire is any fire over which DOF has no control. Typically, a fire started by lightning can be controlled and contained. When a lightning strike starts a fire, the spread of that fire is influenced by human intervention. Property usually can be protected from damage as a result of a fire started by lightning.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order that the outdoor advertising signs maintained by Whiteco Metrocom, now known as Chancellor Media Whiteco Outdoor Corporation, under outdoor advertising sign permit numbers BQ 032-55, BU 720-55, BU 721-55, BU 723-55, BU 724-55, and BU 726-55 are illegal and must be removed pursuant to law. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. 612 East Colonial Drive, Suite 350 Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary ATTN: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact In 1968, the Respondent constructed a V-type outdoor advertising structure adjacent to 1-95, 1.66 miles north of SR 50 in Brevard County, Florida. This sign was permitted by the Department as a non- conforming sign in 1971 when the Department issued permit number 4410-10. When permit number 4410-10 was issued for this sign, the copy on the sign advertised Texaco. The sign has carried a Texaco advertisement continuously since 1971. In September of 1985, as a result of Hurricane Elena, the subject sign sustained wind damage which required repairs to be made to the sign. The wind damage caused by Hurricane Elena required the Respondent to expend the sum of $308.25 to repair the subject sign. This sum covered the cost of three replacement poles, nine bags of Sackcrete cement, and six replacement boards. The total depreciated value of the structural materials in the subject sign immediately prior to the wind damage inflicted by Hurricane Elena was $1,055.00. The sign which is the subject of this proceeding now stands at the location in question (adjacent to I-95, 1.66 miles north SR 50 in Brevard County). It displays the same sign permit that was issued by the Department in 1971 for this location. With the exception of the other face of the V-type structure, the nearest sign to the subject structure is 1,100 feet away.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Violation Notice issued on December 16, 1985, seeking removal of the Respondent's sign adjacent to I-95, 1.66 miles north of SR 50 in Brevard County, Florida, be DISMISSED; and it is further RECOMMENDED that the Notice of Intent to Revoke sign permit number 4410-10 be DISMISSED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 16th day of October, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 86-0371T 86-0452T Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as the sign retains its status as nonconforming sign. Second sentence is not a finding of fact. Ruling on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: 1.- 8. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 A. J Spalla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that respondent, Department of Transportation, enter a final order denying the application of petitioner, Lamar Advertising Company, for a sign permit. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of March, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1985.
