Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners owe the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed by the Department of Revenue based upon Petitioners’ alleged rental of their real property to a related corporation from June 2000 through August 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: In July 1997, Petitioners acquired the real property located at 640 North Semoran Boulevard in Orlando, Florida (hereafter “the Property”). The Property was acquired in Petitioners’ individual capacities, and they financed the purchase of the Property through a loan secured by a mortgage on the Property. The documents relating to the 1997 loan and mortgage were not introduced at the hearing. At the time the Property was acquired, Petitioner Paul Solano was engaged in the practice of accounting through a sole proprietorship known as P. Solano and Associates. Mr. Solano has been practicing accounting in Florida since 1969 and he is familiar with Florida's sales tax laws. The Property was treated as an asset of Mr. Solano’s sole proprietorship even though he was not using it as his place of business at the time. For example, depreciation expense related to the Property was itemized on Petitioners’ tax returns as a business expense. The mortgage payments made by Petitioners were also treated as business expenses of the sole proprietorship. In October 1999, Mr. Solano incorporated his accounting practice into an entity known as Solano & Associates Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter “the Corporation”). The sole business of the Corporation is providing accounting services. At the time of its formation, the Corporation was owned in equal 20 percent shares by Mr. Solano, his wife (Petitioner Diane Solano), their two daughters, and their son-in-law. There has been no change in the ownership of the Corporation since its inception. Mr. Solano is the president of the Corporation. The other owners/family members are also officers in the Corporation. Once the Corporation was formed, the depreciation expense related to the Property was included on the Corporation's tax returns, not Petitioners' tax return. At the time the Property was purchased, it was zoned for residential use. Between 1997 and 1999, Petitioners took the necessary steps to get the Property rezoned for commercial use so that the Corporation could conduct its accounting practice from that location. In November 1999, after the property had been rezoned, the Corporation and its owners applied for a loan from First Union National Bank (First Union) to obtain the funds necessary to renovate the existing building on the Property. Although unclear from the documentation in the record, Petitioners both testified that the 1999 loan was effectively a refinancing of the 1997 loan. The Corporation was not able to obtain a loan in its own name because it had only been in existence for a short period of time. The owners of the Corporation were not able to obtain a loan at a favorable interest rate, primarily because of the lack of credit history of Petitioners’ daughters and son-in- law. As a result, the loan was obtained by Petitioners in their individual capacities. Petitioners gave a mortgage on the Property as collateral for the 1999 loan. The mortgage document, entitled “Mortgage and Absolute Assignment of Leases” (hereafter "the 1999 mortgage"), was signed by Petitioners in their individual capacities on November 18, 1999; the Corporation was not identified in the 1999 mortgage in any way. The 1999 mortgage includes boiler-plate language referring to Petitioners’ obligation to maintain and enforce any leases on the Property and requiring the assignment of rents from any such leases to First Union. That language cannot be construed to mean that a lease actually existed at the time; in fact, the Property was still undergoing renovations at the time. The Corporation began doing business from the Property in February 2000 after the renovation work was complete and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The 1999 loan was refinanced in May 2000 with First Union. The loan amount was increased from $145,000 to $200,000 and the term of the loan was extended through a document entitled “Mortgage and Loan Modification and Extension Agreement” (hereafter "the 2000 mortgage"). The 2000 mortgage refers to the Corporation as the borrower and refers to Petitioners as the guarantors. Petitioners signed the 2000 mortgage in their individual capacities (to bind themselves as guarantors) as well as their capacities as corporate officers (to bind the Corporation as borrower). The related promissory note, dated May 5, 2000, also refers to the Corporation as the borrower, and it is signed by Petitioners in their capacity as officers of the Corporation. As part of the documentation for the refinancing in 2000, Petitioners executed an “Affidavit of Business Use” in which they attested they were the owners of the Property and that the loan proceeds would be “utilized exclusively for business or commercial purposes and not for personal use.” Petitioners also executed a “Mortgagors" Affidavit” in which they attested that they were in sole possession of the Property and that no other persons have claims or rights to possession of the property “except Solano & Associates Enterprises by virtue of a written lease which does not have an option to purposes or right of first refusal.” The monthly mortgage payment for the refinanced loan was $2,044.91. That amount was due on the fifth day of each month beginning on June 5, 2000, and it was automatically deducted from the Corporation’s bank account with First Union. In addition to making the mortgage payment for the Property, the Corporation paid the ad valorem taxes, insurance, and related expenses. The amount of those payments is not quantified in the record. Petitioners formally deeded the Property to the Corporation in October 2003. Mrs. Solano testified that the failure to do so earlier was simply an “oversight.” When the Property was formally deeded to the Corporation, Petitioners did not report any income or loss on the transaction for tax purposes. Any equity that had accumulated in the Property was simply “given” to the Corporation. The First Union mortgages were satisfied in October 2003 as part of a refinancing done by the Corporation with SunTrust bank after it became the owner of the Property.1 At that point, the Corporation had been in existence long enough to establish a credit history and obtain financing in its own name. The record does not include any documentation related to the 2003 refinancing transaction. Despite the representation in the “Mortgagors’ Affidavit” quoted above, there has never been any written or oral lease between Petitioners and the Corporation with respect to the use of the Property. Petitioners have always considered the Property to be a business asset, initially an asset of Mr. Solano’s sole proprietorship and then an asset of the Corporation. Petitioners never collected any sales tax from the Corporation on the mortgage payments made by the Corporation. Petitioners did not consider those payments to be rental payments. In late-June or early-July 2003, the Department sent a letter to Petitioners stating that the Property “appears to be subject to sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212.031, Florida Statutes.” The letter was sent as part of the Department’s “Corporation Rent Project” through which the Department compares records in various databases to identify commercial properties whose owner of record is different from the business operating at that location. Included with the letter was a questionnaire soliciting information from Petitioners regarding the Property and its use. The questionnaire was completed by Mr. Solano and returned to the Department in a timely manner. Mr. Solano marked a box on the questionnaire indicating that the Property is “[o]ccupied by a corporation in which a corporate officer is the property owner,” and he identified the Corporation as the entity occupying the Property. In response to the question as to “which of the following considerations are received by you,” Mr. Solano marked the following boxes: “The corporation remits payment for the mortgage loan”; “I do not receive rental income, but the related entity pays the mortgage payments”; and “No consideration is received from this related entity.” In response to the questions regarding the “monthly gross rental income of the property” and the “amount of real estate taxes . . . paid on the property by the lessee” for 2000 through 2003, Mr. Solano answered $0 for all periods. Terry Milligan, a tax specialist with the Department, determined based upon Mr. Solano’s responses on the questionnaire that the Corporation’s use of the Property was subject to the sales tax on rentals. Mr. Milligan advised Petitioners of that determination by letter dated July 29, 2003. The letter requested that Petitioners provide “a detailed month by month breakdown of rent (or mortgage payment) amounts, any other consideration, and property taxes that you received from the tenant (or tenant paid on your behalf) for the last thirty-six (36) months).” (Emphasis in original). Petitioners responded to Mr. Milligan’s request through a letter dated August 11, 2003. The letter explained that the reason that the title to the Property appeared under Petitioners’ name rather than the Corporation's name is “due to credit history.” More specifically, the letter stated that “[i]t was decided by the Board members, my wife and our [] children, to put it under our name since we have a long history of good credit.” Included with the letter was a bank statement showing the monthly mortgage payment of $2,044.91 and a notice of the proposed property tax assessment from Orange County for the Property, which was addressed to the Corporation. In addition to providing the requested documentation to Mr. Milligan, one of Petitioners’ daughters, Joylynn Aviles, spoke with Mr. Milligan to explain the circumstances relating to the financing and use of the Property. Ms. Aviles is the Secretary of the Corporation. Ms. Aviles also spoke with Mr. Milligan’s supervisor and an individual in the Department’s legal division. When it became apparent that the matter could not be resolved informally, Ms. Aviles requested that Mr. Milligan issue a final assessment so that Petitioners could bring a formal protest. In response, the Department issued the NOFA on September 11, 2003. The NOFA was preceded by a spreadsheet dated September 3, 2003, which showed how Mr. Milligan calculated the tax, penalties, and interest amounts set forth in the NOFA. As described in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet and his testimony at the hearing, the tax was computed based upon the monthly mortgage payments of $2044.91 made by the Corporation from June 2000 to August 2003. The June 2000 start-date for the assessment corresponds to the 36-month period referred to in Mr. Milligan’s July 29, 2003, letter; it also happens to correspond to the date that Corporation began making the mortgage payments. The August 2003 end-date for the assessment was used because it was the month preceding the date of the NOFA. The Department has not sought to expand the assessment to include the period between August 2003 and October 2003 when the Property was formally deeded to the Corporation. The NOFA does not include any assessment for the property taxes, insurance or other expenses paid by the Corporation on the Property. The Department has not sought to expand the assessment to include those amounts. The sales tax rate in effect in Orange County during the assessment period was six percent from June 2000 through December 2002, and it was 6.5 percent from January 2003 through August 2003. The 0.5 percent increase resulted from the imposition of a county surtax of some kind. The NOFA calculated a total tax due of $4,784.91. As shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet, that amount was calculated by multiplying the monthly mortgage payment by the tax rate in effect at the time of the payment and then totaling those monthly amounts. The NOFA calculated $465.79 in interest due on the unpaid tax through September 13, 2003. As shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet, that amount was calculated at the applicable statutory rates. Interest continues to accrue at 53 cents per day. The NOFA calculated a penalty due of $2,233.97. That amount was calculated based upon the applicable statutory rate as shown in Mr. Milligan’s spreadsheet and explained in the NOFA. In total, the NOFA imposed an assessment of $7,566.43. That amount includes the taxes, interest, and penalties described above. The NOFA informed Petitioners of the procedure by which they could protest the Department's assessment. On November 10, 2003, the Department received Petitioners' timely protest of the assessment. This proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order rescinding the Notice of Final Assessment issued to Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March 2004.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Integra Corporation, had a dispute with the Florida Department of Revenue with respect to sales or use tax allegedly due in the amount of $605,305.70 on lease payments made on its rental of hotels from their owners. An assessment for taxes due was processed in the normal manner by the Department of Revenue. Integra Corporation filed a Protest of the assessment, and after the Department's Notice of Decision denied the Protest, Integra filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration. Ultimately the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration which rejected the arguments of Integra Corporation. Integra Corporation agrees that the Notice of Reconsideration was transmitted on April 24, 1990, for it alleges that fact in paragraph 3 of its Petition. The Department's final rejection of the arguments made by Integra Corporation against the assessment of sales and use tax made in the Notice of Reconsideration dated April 24, 1990, prompted Integra Corporation to mail by certified mail, return receipt #P796 304 819, to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 21, 1990, an original Petition challenging the Department's tax assessment. That petition was captioned Integra Corporation, Petitioner v. Department of Revenue, Respondent, and was filed by the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 25, 1990. No copy of the original Petition was served on the Department of Revenue, or its counsel. The opening paragraph states that Integra Corporation "hereby petitions the Department of Revenue for administrative proceedings. . ." The Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings realized that the Petition should not have been addressed to or filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings, and on that same day forwarded the Petition to the appropriate agency, the Department of Revenue, which received the Petition on June 27, 1990.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by Integra Corporation be dismissed as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1990.
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner is required to pay taxes under the authority of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, which are set forth in the assessment by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, dated May 18, 1977.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, performed an audit of the business which is the Taj Apartments, for purposes of determining if sales and use taxes were owed by that operation. At the time of the initial contact by the Respondent, the Taj Apartments were owned by individuals other than the Petitioner, Robert Hartley. However, in the process of the audit, it was determined that Hartley would be responsible for paying some of the assessments which were being alleged against the operation located on the premises which constitutes the Taj Apartments. Further liability for the audit period was established when Robert Hartley foreclosed a mortgage which he held from the owners of record who were the owners when the tax audit was first commenced. By his action of foreclosure, he became responsible for any tax assessments under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, which were mete and proper during the audit period, which dated from September 1, 1973, through May 31, 1975. Those dates include the time that Robert Hartley d/b/a Taj Apartments was still in control of the premises. The assessment of the property from September 1, 1973, through May 31, 1975, was made upon the basis of a consideration of the rents collected as reflected in Hartley's ledger cards and receipts. The taxation was based upon a consideration of the number of units, in contrast to a consideration of the number of tenants found in the apartment building. The distinction of taxation on units and not tenants is significant because Hartley, in his petition, challenges the right of the Respondent to tax on a formula which pertains to units and not tenants. The language of the applicable section of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, specifically, Section (7)(c), Florida Statutes, states the following: The rental of facilities, including trailer lots, which are intended primarily for rental as a principal or permanent place of residence is exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter. The rental of facilities that primarily serve transient guests is not exempt by this subsection. In the application of this law, or in making any determination against the exemption, the department shall consider and be guided by, among other things: Whether or not a facility caters primarily to the traveling public; Whether less than half of its tenants have a continuous residence in excess of 3 months; and The nature of the advertising of the facility involved. It can be seen that the language of that provision clearly invisions that permanent residents are exempt from consideration of the tax, and transient guests are not exempt. Discussion of tenants is used only in describing some of the matters that the Respondent shall consider and be guided by, and is not the only determination which the Respondent must look to in determining whether an exemption from the provisions of this subsection has been established. Furthermore, the fact that Rule 12A-1.61, Florida Administrative Code, which implements Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in this particular taxing theory speaks in terms of units and not tenants is not inconsistent or in violation of the above quoted statutory provision, because that statutory provision allows the Respondent to look at other things in making its determination of an exemption. The language of Rule 12A-1.61, Florida Administrative Code, spoken of, states the following: Rental of living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations. (1) Every person, except housing authorities which are specifically exempt from provisions hereof by Section 212.08(10), F.S., is exercising a taxable privilege when he engages in the business of renting, leasing or letting any living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in connection with any hotel, motel, apartment house, duplex, rooming house, tourist or mobile home court subject to the provisions of Chapter 212, F.S. Notwithstanding the aforesaid provisions of this paragraph, effective March 1, 1972, the tax shall not apply to the rental of living accommodations which are rented primarily to persons as their principal or permanent place of residence but the tax shall apply to the rental of such facilities at hotels, motels, and seasonal lodging facilities that primarily serve transient guests. (See paragraph 9 of this rule.) When a lodging facility does not primarily cater or advertise that it primarily caters to seasonal or transient guests, or to the traveling public, and when fifty percent or more of its total units are rented to persons who have resided thereat continuously for the three months immediately preceding March 1, 1972, the facility shall have an exempt status until a redetermination has been made. Landlords beginning business after March 1, 1972 shall determine the taxable status of their lodging facility as of the commencing of business. In making their determination, the above guidelines will be applied except that the three months prior residence requirement will be waived in those instances where leases or other records of the facility clearly reflect that the facility does not primarily cater to or advertise that it caters to seasonal or transient guests or the traveling public. All landlords are required to make a redetermination of the taxable status of their businesses on July 1 of each year and in the event that his taxable status has changed, he shall notify the Department of such change. Therefore, the Petitioner's challenge to the Respondent's utilization of rental units, as opposed to tenants residing in the apartment building of the Petitioner during the pendancy of the audit period, to decide the issue whether less than half of the tenants (units) have a continuous residence in excess of three months must fail. Moreover, when an assessment is made under the theory of Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, it is incumbent on the taxpayer to establish an exemption and the petitioner offered no evidence to establish an exemption. In view of the fact that the information for the assessment was taken from the books and records of the Petitioner, and their being no testimony to establish an exemption from the tax imposed on the rentals of the Taj Apartments which was serving transient guests in the time period at issue; the tax together with penalties and interest as set forth in the assessment document (Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence) should stand. The audit brought about a further assessment for use tax due and owing during the period of the audit. The use tax pertains to Robert Hartley's rental of television sets to the guests in his rental facility and the rental of parking spaces to the guests in the rental facility. The determination of taxes owed for those rentals was also premised upon an examination of Mr. Hartley's books and records. No reason was established for not using the figures found in the hooks and records, in assessing any tax that might be owed for the rental of television sets and parking spaces. Consequently, the portion of the assessment of May 18, 1977, pertaining to a use tax on the rentals of the television sets and parking spaces should be upheld. The imposition of the assessment of May 18, 1977, is a revision of a prior assessment which was rendered before Mr. Hartley provided his books and records. This revised assessment reduced the initial assessment, premised upon an examination of Mr. Hartley's books and records and certain credits for exemptions in the year 1974. The revised assessment reflects this in its provision entitled "Abatements:" The revised assessment then becomes an assessment of $15,960.92. This assessment is constituted of a tax on the transient rentals, parking spaces and television sets; together with penalties on that tax amount and interest through May 8, 1977. The facts show that the revised assessment of May 18, 1977, is correct.
Recommendation It is recommended that the assessment of May 18, 1977, which has been placed against the Petitioner, Robert F. Hartley, d/b/a Taj Apartments, be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Robert F. Hartley Post Office Box 82 Middletown, California 95461 and Mr. Robert F. Hartley 33 Southwest 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Edwin Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent abused its discretion in failing to settle or compromise the outstanding tax assessment against Petitioner, based on Petitioner's inability to pay, pursuant to Section 213.21, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation, engaged in the business of painting and repairing damaged automobiles and other vehicles. Petitioner's principal place of business and home office is located at 100 Northwest 9th Terrace, Hallandale, Florida. Respondent is the agency charged with administering the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to, among other provisions, Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. Respondent is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers. It is further authorized to request information to ascertain the tax liability of taxpayers, if any, pursuant to Section 213.34, Florida Statutes. It is undisputed that Petitioner is a taxpayer. From September 2, 1997 through March 12, 1999, Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner to determine whether Petitioner had been properly collecting and remitting sales and use tax and whether any additional sales and use tax amounts were due. On September 2, 1997, Respondent forwarded its form DR-840, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, to Petitioner. The period of time being audited was from August 1, 1992 through July 31, 1997. For part of the audit period, Petitioner's records were inadequate. Petitioner's record keeping was poor. For the remainder of the audit period, Petitioner's records were voluminous. A higher amount of gross sales were reported on Petitioner's federal tax return than on Florida's tax return. Petitioner could not document 95 percent of its exempt sales reported to the State of Florida. Petitioner reported a ratio of 35 percent for exempt sales on its filed Florida sales and use tax returns. Because of the two factors of inadequate and voluminous records, sampling was required by Respondent. On January 12, 1998, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written audit sampling agreement. On June 5, 1998, Respondent provided its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes to Petitioner. On July 21, 1998, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (revised), which was the first revision, to Petitioner. On January 12, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (revised), which was the second revision, to Petitioner. On March 12, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner. This notice indicated that Petitioner owed additional sales and use tax in the amount of $166,306.93, penalty in the amount of $81,443.38, and interest through March 12, 1999, in the amount of $77,468.37. Consequently, the notice further indicated that the total amount of the assessment against Petitioner was $325,218.68. A compromise of the assessed tax, interest, or penalty can be performed at Respondent's field level after an audit is completed and the case is still in Respondent's field office. However, the field office's authority is limited in that affected taxpayer must agree to the amount of the tax assessed. In the present case, Petitioner did not agree to the amount of the tax assessed and, therefore, Respondent's field office could not compromise the assessed tax, interest, or penalty against Petitioner. On September 17, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision. Respondent notified Petitioner that the assessment would not be changed. Petitioner requested a reconsideration as to whether Respondent should compromise the tax, interest, and penalty, based on grounds of doubt of collectibility. By Notice of Reconsideration issued January 7, 2000, Respondent notified Petitioner of Petitioner's failure to establish an inability to pay the assessment in full. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's determination of Petitioner's inability to pay the assessment and requested a hearing. It is undisputed that Respondent has the discretion to compromise an assessment. Respondent may compromise tax or interest based on doubt of collectibility of the tax or interest. The taxpayer bears the burden of providing documentation to support the taxpayer's position that it cannot pay the tax or interest. Respondent examines whether a compromise is in the best interests of the State of Florida in determining whether to compromise an assessment. Respondent considers a compromise to be in the best interests of the State and may compromise the assessment under the following circumstances: (1) on the basis of the taxpayer providing documentation of the taxpayer's inability to pay the assessment in full but having the cash flow to make payments in installments; or (2) when a taxpayer's business or the taxpayer-corporation is insolvent and the taxpayer's or corporation's assets were used to satisfy legitimate liabilities and not used to enrich any person closely related to the taxpayer or corporation; or (3) when a taxpayer is gravely ill and the cash flow of the taxpayer's business is poor. When it considers compromising any tax, interest, or penalty, Respondent reviews several factors, including the audit file, financial information, and any other factors or circumstances which may affect collectibility. The financial information considered includes positive and negative sales trends, cost of goods sold, profitability, and net worth. Additionally, any changes in assets, in particular fixed assets, and liabilities are taken into account. Other factors or circumstances considered include the fair market value of a taxpayer's assets, the future prospects of a taxpayer's business, and the solvency or insolvency of a taxpayer's business. Respondent does not consider the liquidation value of a taxpayer's business. Petitioner was, and is, not familiar with the State of Florida's sales and use tax law, as the law relates to Petitioner's business. Petitioner's president has no prior experience in maintaining the books and records of a company or in completing financial statements of a company. Petitioner's president never attended a seminar, presented or sponsored by Respondent, on Florida's sales and use tax, or read any of Respondent's pamphlets on sales and use tax. Petitioner has a New York accountant, who never provided Petitioner's president or treasurer with any instructions regarding Florida's sales and use tax. During the audit period, Petitioner never requested written advice from Respondent regarding the application of Florida's sales and use tax to its business. For the last three years, Petitioner's sales have been a little less than $1,000,000. For the years 1996 and 1997, Petitioner's federal tax returns showed cash balances at the beginning of each year even though the cash balance for 1997, $51,431, was less than for 1996, $93,497. Petitioner's federal tax returns for 1996 through 1998 indicate a loss for each year during that time period. However, a comparison between Petitioner's sales income in its federal tax returns and its state tax returns shows that Petitioner's sales income was grossly underreported. Respondent's analysis worksheet, referred to as Doubt as to Collectibility Analysis Worksheet, indicated a negative dollar figure as to cash available by Petitioner to pay Respondent. Inconsistencies existed between the information reported in Petitioner's tax returns and information provided by Petitioner during the protest period. Petitioner's sales figure as of August 31, 1999, an eight-month sales period for 1999, stated in its Petition for Reconsideration, dated October 6, 1999, was substantially less than the sales figure reported on Petitioner's sales and use tax returns filed during the same time period. Additionally, Petitioner overstated the cost of goods sold in one of its federal tax returns, which resulted in an overstated net loss. The fair market value of Petitioner's assets indicated in its Petition for Reconsideration, $30,000, was more than 100 percent of the value reflected on Petitioner's county tangible personal property return, $13,000. Also, further areas of inconsistencies existed between the information provided by Petitioner and the information reported on Petitioner's tax returns. Petitioner indicated that its former treasurer received a deferred compensation payment of $60,000, but neither Petitioner's tax returns nor financial statements reflected a payment for the expense. Petitioner showed a loss on its 1996 federal tax return, which, according to Petitioner, was a result of moving expenses and expenses in the construction business; however, no expense unique to moving or the construction business was reflected on Petitioner's tax return or financial statement. Petitioner's financial data, including federal tax returns and state wage reports, showed trends and deficiencies. A trend of an increase in gross sales for Petitioner was shown for the years 1997 through 1999, in Petitioner's federal tax returns for the same years and in Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration, regarding its gross sales as of August 31, 1999. Additionally, the same federal tax returns showed a trend of an increase in net income for the same years in that deductions in relation to sales were less than the previous years. For the years 1994 through 1997, as reported on Petitioner's federal tax returns, Petitioner's depreciable assets increased each year. Respondent's analysis worksheet also showed a negative dollar figure as to Petitioner's adjusted net worth. As of August 31, 1999, the first eight months of 1999, Petitioner's total assets were $40,814 and its total loans, payable to banks, were $90,000. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with adequate and complete documentation and information in order for Respondent to make a determination of collectibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against Copo Paint and Body Shop, Inc., and sustaining the refusal to compromise the tax, penalty, or interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Moffa, Esquire Moffa & Moffa, P.A. One Financial Plaza, Suite 2202 100 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Nicholas Bykowsky, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, St. Joe Paper Company, is a taxpayer subject to the requirements of the Florida Corporate Income Tax. Its principal offices are located at 803 Florida National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner filed its 1976 calendar year tax return with respondent, Department of Revenue (Department), on September 23, 1977. Although filings are normally due on April 1, the filing was made pursuant to an extension of time to and including October 1, 1977 which was granted by the Department. Petitioner was subsequently audited by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) for calendar years 1972 through 1977. Thereafter, petitioner and IRS entered into a settlement in 1982 wherein they agreed that certain adjustments were required for each of the audited tax years. The adjustments resulted in an overpayment of the Florida Income Tax for 1976. Subsection 220.23(2) , Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer notify the Department whenever an IRS audit results in adjustments to the taxpayer's net income subject to the Florida corporate income tax for any taxable year. Because the IRS sett1enent affected the years 1972 through 1977, petitioner filed amended returns for those years with the Department on October 8, 1982. According to the amended returns, petitioner owed additional taxes for all years except 1976, when it had made an overpayment. It added these deficiencies, totaling $82,003.03, and subtracted the overpayment for 1976 ($18,174.10), resulting in a net tax owed the Department of $63,828.94. Petitioner also computed interest owed on its deficiencies for the years 1972-1975 and 1977 to be $39,956.58 and offset this amount with a $12,067.40 credit which it claimed was interest owed it by the Department for its overpayment of taxes for calendar year 1976. When the interest was added to the $63,828.94, the total liability was $91,718.42. The record is unclear whether petitioner calculated its 1976 interest using a 12 percent or 6 percent rate. The proper rate to be used is 6 percent. On August 5, 1983 the Department directed petitioner to appear at its Jacksonville office on August 11 to pay $12,067.40 and if it failed to do so, a tax warrant would be issued. Thereafter, on August 9 petitioner paid the deficiency. On August 15, 1983 petitioner filed an Application for Refund Form DR- 26 requesting a refund of its August 9 payment. In its application, it stated chat "(i)nterest computed on the tax refund for 1976 was offset against interest due for other years", and that the Department's refusal to allow this offset was error. On August 19, 1983 the Department's classification officer, audit classification, issued a letter denying the application on the following grounds: Florida Statutes 214.14 requires that interest be paid should the Department take longer than nine (9) months to refund an overpayment of tax. When computing interest, the Department does so under the theory that each year stands alone. Consequently, offsetting of deficiencies and overpayments is not recognized when computing interest. Your letter of October 8, 1982, shows that check number 2400 was sent, with the Amended Florida returns, to pay the net additional tax and interest. Consequently, the 1976 refund would be deemed to have been made within the nine-month period required under Florida Statute 214.14. This letter prompted the instant proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: that petitioner's application for a refund be GRANTED and that it be computed at a 6 percent rate to run from October 1, 1977. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. W. W. Carlson Assistant Vice-President St. Joe Paper Co. 803 Florida National Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 3220 Barbara Staros Harmon, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue Carlton Building, Room 102 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is qualified to be licensed as a Florida real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting from Florida State University. After receiving a Florida license as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) in 1974, Petitioner worked as a CPA in private practice until 1978. He then returned to school at Trinity University, where he earned a Master of Science degree in Health Care Administration. Petitioner worked for the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) for approximately 20 years. In the early 1980's, Petitioner's job with HCA involved the management of physician clinics. One of the physicians requested Petitioner to prepare some financial statements and to assist with the preparations of some federal income tax returns for a private client. At that time, Petitioner was living and working in two locations: Atlanta, Georgia, and Dothan, Alabama. Petitioner was not licensed to practice as a CPA in any state except Florida. For approximately two and one-half years, Petitioner helped the private client maintain her books. During this time, Petitioner corresponded with the client, sending her letters with CPA after his name. In 1986, Petitioner decided to discontinue his business relationship with the private client. The private client, who was upset, filed a complaint against Petitioner. In 1987, the private client's complaint resulted in Petitioner’s pleading no contest to the offense of identifying himself as a CPA when he was not a licensed CPA in Georgia. Petitioner subsequently satisfied all sanctions related to the Georgia offense. The Florida Board of Accountancy has not disciplined Petitioner's CPA license. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner's Florida CAP license was inactive. In 1991, Petitioner received a stock bonus from his employer, HCA, when it purchased a private hospital. The bonus consisted of stock certificates in a spin-off company known as Quorum Health Care. The stock was restricted and could not be sold for five years. Petitioner never received a Federal Income Tax Form 1099 related to the stock bonus. Petitioner placed the stock certificates in his safe. He did not include the stock bonus on his personal federal income tax return. In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service audited Petitioner's personal tax returns. During the audit, Petitioner disclosed the stock bonus and immediately filed an amended income tax return, paying all tax and interest due and all penalties. In 1996, Petitioner filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his employer for Medicare fraud. Because the lawsuit was filed in Alabama, the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, intervened in the case. The lawsuit resulted in the recovery of $180,000,000 from Quorum Health Care. Petitioner was entitled to a whistleblower award in the amount of $5,000,000. In 1999, before Petitioner received his financial reward from the lawsuit, the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, advised Petitioner that he would be charged with failure to file a correct federal income tax return for the years 1991 and 1992. Petitioner granted the government's request to extend the statute of limitations while the government investigated the tax fraud allegations against him. In 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to income tax fraud and agreed to forego any reward for his participation in the whistleblower lawsuit. Petitioner was sentenced to serve two years in a federal prison, followed by one year of supervised probation. Petitioner also paid a $50,000 fine. Petitioner was incarcerated for 367 days. He was released from federal prison in August 2002. His supervised probation terminated February 2004. In January 2006, Petitioner's civil rights were restored. In an effort to prove rehabilitation, Petitioner presented evidence to show his involvement and/or active participation with the following: (a) his church; (b) children's sports programs; (c) Habitat for Humanity; (d) neighborhood hurricane recovery; (e) and other activities beneficial to his friends and family. The following three witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf at the hearing: (a) Mike Papantonio, an attorney and Petitioner's brother-in-law; (b) Randal Spencer, a Florida licensed real estate broker who, along with his partners, sold a commercial building to Petitioner's wife; and (c) Carl Collins, Petitioner's neighbor since 2000. Each witness testified that Petitioner is honest, trustworthy, and of good character. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was owner/manager of CommStructure, a company that manufactures and installs cellular towers. Petitioner oversees all financial aspects of the company. Petitioner's wife owns a real estate brokerage company, Spencer Realty. If Petitioner becomes licensed as a real estate sales associate, he would assist his wife in her business. A real estate sales associate, like a CPA, is responsible for important financial transactions where accuracy is important. Therefore, a real estate sales associate must be trustworthy regarding financial matters.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner a license as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel R. Biggins, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1020 Verona Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1-5, below. Zurich is an insurer domiciled in the State of New York. Zurich is authorized to do insurance business in the State of Florida. Zurich pays insurance premium taxes to the State of Florida. As a foreign insurer doing business in Florida, Zurich is subject to the provisions of Florida's retaliatory tax, Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes. Respondent Department of Revenue (Revenue) is the state agency charged with the duty to implement and enforce Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes. Zurich's interests are substantially affected by Revenue's Rule 12B- 8.016(3)(a)(4), Florida Administrative Code, by virtue of the tax assessment made against Zurich pursuant to the rule. OTHER FACTS Prior to 1989, the Department of Insurance administered insurance taxation. Now, Revenue has that responsibility. Section 213.05, Florida Statutes, directs Revenue to administer provisions of Sections 624.509 through 624.514, Florida Statutes. Section 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes Revenue to promulgate rules to implement those responsibilities. Rule 12B-8.016 was first promulgated by Revenue in December of 1989 to implement statutory authority of Section 624.429 (currently renumbered as 624.5091). This statute authorized retaliatory taxation against non-domiciled insurers in the amount by which their state of domicile would tax Florida insurers in excess of Florida's comparable tax. The statute provides in pertinent part: When by or pursuant to the laws of any other state or foreign country any taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements, or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions are or would be imposed upon Florida insurers or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, which are in excess of such taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, or other obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions directly imposed upon similar insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country under the statutes of this state, so long as such laws of such other state or country continue in force or are so applied, the same taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, or fines, penalties, deposit requirements, or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions of whatever kind shall be imposed by the department upon the insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country doing business or seeking to do business in this state. As it existed in 1989 and currently, the statute contains an exclusionary provision expressly excluding from the retaliatory tax any special purpose assessments in connection with insurance other than property insurance. This exclusionary provision is part of Subsection 3 of the current statute, 624.5091, and reads as follows: (3)This section does not apply as to personal income taxes, nor as to sales or use taxes, nor as to ad valorem taxes on real or personal property, nor as to reimbursement premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, nor as to emergency assessments paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, nor as to special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance, except that deductions, from premium taxes or other taxes otherwise payable, allowed on account of real estate or personal property taxes paid shall be taken into consideration by the department in determining the propriety and extent of retaliatory action under this section. The parties concede that Revenue's Rule 12B-8.016 accurately tracts the first part of the retaliatory taxation statute. But a subpart of the Rule, 12B- 8.016(3)(a)(4), is challenged by Zurich in this proceeding because that subpart provides for inclusion of the assessment for administration of workers compensation in Florida and comparable assessments in other states. The rule subpart states: (3)(a) Other items which shall be included in the retaliatory calculations are: * * * 4. The workers compensation administrative assessment imposed by s. 440.51, F.S., as well as comparable assessments in other states. The State of Florida imposes assessment on workers compensation carriers such as Zurich in accordance with authority contained in Section 440.51, Florida Statutes, which is entitled "Expenses of Administration." Section 440.51 provides for the pro-rata assessment of all insurers and self- insurers of workers compensation to cover expenses of administering the workers compensation program. The assessment is a "special fund" that does not involve appropriated funds or general state revenues. Zurich's home state of New York imposes a comparable assessment. In accordance with Rule 12B-8.016(3)(a)(4), Florida Administrative Code, Revenue includes calculations for the Worker's Compensation Board Administrative Fund in the state of New York in Zurich's retaliatory tax calculation. In drafting the rule in 1989, Revenue relied upon Attorney General Opinion 057-173, which advised that Florida's Worker's Compensation Administrative Assessment should be considered a "tax" for purposes of retaliatory tax calculation. On this basis, Revenue's rule requires that such assessments be considered as "taxes" and included in the retaliatory tax calculation. However, following the issuance of Attorney General Opinion 057-173, the Florida legislature in 1959 enacted the present Subsection 624.5091(3), Florida Statutes, specifically excluding the consideration of "special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance" in retaliatory tax calculations. Following the 1959 enactment of the exclusionary language contained in Subsection 624.5091(3), Florida Statutes, the Department of Insurance did not include comparable worker compensation assessments of other states. The Department of Insurance administered insurance taxation until 1989. Department of Insurance forms introduced into evidence for 1986 showed that the Florida assessment, pursuant to Section 440.51 Florida Statutes, was treated as a deduction against Florida's premium tax and added back in on the Florida side of the retaliatory tax calculation. But the assessment was not included in a manner to inflate the calculation of the domiciliary state's comparative tax base. When Revenue assumed administration of insurance taxation in 1989, a proposed rule and an emergency rule were promulgated. Neither provided for inclusion of foreign states' special purpose administrative assessments in retaliatory tax calculation. In the course of the promulgation process, the determination to treat the worker compensation administrative assessment as a tax became a part of the rule. The purpose of Florida's retaliatory statute is to influence other states' legislative discretion to lower the tax burden on Florida insurers doing business in those other states. The items to be compared for retaliatory purposes are determined by the legislature and not by Revenue, Revenue auditors, or other states.
Findings Of Fact In 1962, the Corporation decided to relocate its corporate offices from Newark, New Jersey, to the State of Florida. Implementing this decision, the Corporation secured a twenty year leasehold interest of an entire floor in the Universal Marion Building in Jacksonville, Florida, under which it was obligated to pay an annual rental of $52,000.00. Within a few months during the year 1962, the decision to relocate was rescinded. During the tax year in question, the Corporation retained a part-time employee in Florida for the sole purpose of attempting to either locate a purchaser of the leasehold interest or to avoid further obligations under the lease by negotiations and settlement with the landlord. This part-time employee received his directions from the corporate offices in Newark, New Jersey. Other than these efforts to relieve the burden of the unused leased premises, the Corporation conducted no commercial activities in the State of Florida during the tax year 1973. Although the Corporation's headquarters were ultimately moved to Jacksonville, in January 1976, the Corporation has never occupied the leased premises in question. In fact, in 1974, the Corporation entered into a sublease with the State of Florida for the duration of the lease. Pursuant to audit, DOR assessed the Corporation an additional $12,616.89 in income tax for the year ended December 31, 1973, using the three-factor formula method of apportionment.
The Issue The issue presented is what is Peaches' basis in the Sterling stock?
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute as to the material facts in the instant case, Exhibit 1 presented at the hearing is a composite exhibit which is comprised of the Petitioner's U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return and Florida Corporate Income Tax Return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. Exhibit 3 is the Respondent's document entitled "Income Tax Audit Changes" which reflects the adjustments made by the Respondent based upon a review of the Petitioner's return and the reasons for assessing the deficiency. Exhibit 2 is a composite exhibit comprised of the Petitioner's Amended Protest of the proposed deficiency and the Respondent's letter denying the same. Petitioner's federal return (Exhibit 1) Schedule D, Part II, reflects the 31,500 shares were acquired in 1958 at a cost basis of $10,191.00. These shares were subsequently sold by Peaches in 1972 for $1,160,131.00 or a gain of $1,149,940.00. This gain was reported on line 9(a) of the federal tax return as a portion of the "net capital gains." On its 1973 Florida Corporate Income Tax Return, Petitioner computed the income using the basis for the stock as of January 2, 1972, thereby reducing its reported income by $1,013,040.00 from the federal tax. The $1,013,040.00 reflects the amount of appreciation in the value of the stock between the transferrer's acquisition and January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1971 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petitioner's petition be denied and that the assessment against the Petitioner in the amount of $29,435.00 together with interest be assessed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin J. Stacker Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire Trinkle and Redman, P.A. 306 West Reynolds Street Plant City, Florida 33566 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA PEACHES OF FLORIDA, INC. Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1433 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. / NOTICE TO: JAMES S. MOODY, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER TRINKLE AND REDMAN, P. A. 306 WEST REYNOLDS STREET PLANT CITY, FLORIDA 33566 E. WILSON CRUMP, II, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 5557 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, acting as head of the Department of Revenue, at its meeting on the 5th day of April, 1979, approved the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer dated January 22, 1979, with paragraph 3 of the "Findings of Fact" therein amended to read as follows: "The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1972 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation", in accordance with Stipulation of the Petitioner and Respondent filed in the case on March 1, 1979. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire, Trinkle and Redman, P. A., 306 West Reynolds Street, Plant City, Florida 33566, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Wilson Crump, II, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Post Office fox 5557, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondent and Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings; Room 530, Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida this 5th day of April, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY
