The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated section 478.52(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ by accepting and performing professional responsibilities that she knew or had reason to know she was not competent to perform; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed for the violations proven.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of electrolysis pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been licensed as an electrologist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number EO2650. Respondent is also licensed by the State of Florida as an acupuncturist, license number AP 1378. Respondent is a certified surgical assistant, having obtained certification through the American Board of Surgical Assistants. Documents in the record indicate that in 1998, Respondent completed medical school at Universidad Libre in Barranquilla, Columbia. However, Respondent is not a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. Respondent’s address of record is 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent owned and operated Orozco Medical Center (“OMC”), located at 8210 West Waters Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33615. Patient N.M. Patient N.M. is a female born in 1964. She testified that she was familiar with OMC because she had therapy there following a car accident in 2000. N.M. presented to OMC in early 2015 for consultation regarding a liposuction with fat transfer procedure, commonly called a “Brazilian Butt Lift” (“BBL”). Fat is taken from one part of the body and reinjected into the buttocks. N.M. testified that Blanca Cabrera, who performs massages at OMC, recommended a “doctor” at OMC named Marlon Barcelo to perform her BBL. Marlon Barcelo worked at OMC as a surgical assistant but was not a medical doctor. N.M. testified that she believed Mr. Barcelo would perform her BBL procedure and that she never knew that he was not a physician. Ms. Cabrera told her that Mr. Barcelo had been a very good doctor in Columbia. N.M. testified that at her initial consultation at OMC regarding the BBL, she met exclusively with Respondent, who showed her where the fat would be removed and where it would be injected. N.M. testified that she met with Respondent three times before her surgery. N.M. testified that, at the conclusion of the initial consultation, she was given an appointment card directing her to return to OMC on January 13, 2015, for an electrocardiogram, lab work, and the medication she would be expected to take before the procedure. The medical records indicate that N.M. was confused as to the dates. It appears from the records that her initial consultation was on January 13, 2015, that her EKG and lab work were performed on March 2, 2015, and the date of her surgery was March 13, 2015. N.M. testified that each time she visited OMC prior to the surgery, she met only with Respondent, who examined her and explained the procedure to her with no other persons present. N.M. testified that on the date of the surgery, her daughter drove her to OMC. After she checked in at the front desk, N.M. was taken to an exam room and told to change into a hospital gown. Respondent then marked her body to identify the locations where fat was to be removed. Respondent gave N.M. a medication to calm her prior to the procedure. The medical record indicates that N.M.’s pre- operative medications included Keflex (cephalexin, an antibiotic), lorazepam (a sedative and anti-anxiety medication), and Benadryl (diphenhydramine, an antihistamine with sedative properties). N.M. described the medication’s effect as “like a Xanax.” N.M. testified that the medication relaxed her but did not affect her recollection of the procedure. She testified that she was awake throughout the surgery and was allowed to use her cell phone during the procedure. N.M. did not recall meeting Dr. Mark Kantzler and denied ever meeting Dr. Amina Edathodu. She believed that Mr. Barcelo was going to perform the surgery, though up until the morning of the procedure she had not met him. N.M. was taken to the surgical room and placed on a table. She stated that there was a drape that blocked her view of the surgical area, but that it was low enough to allow her to see everyone in the room. She could see two men, Mr. Barcelo and someone identified as “Abel,” and Ms. Cabrera, the massage therapist, who appeared to be assisting. N.M. testified that Mr. Barcelo performed the liposuction. She testified that everyone in the room was wearing surgical gowns and gloves but no surgical masks. N.M. testified that during the liposuction procedure, Respondent told her that she would be performing the fat injections because she was very good at that procedure. N.M. testified that after the liposuction was completed, Mr. Barcelo called on Respondent to perform the fat injections into her buttocks. N.M. stated that she saw Respondent walk into the room carrying a syringe. During this portion of the procedure N.M was positioned on her stomach but stated that she knew from the conversation in the room that it was Respondent who was placing the injections into her buttocks. Upon conclusion of the procedure, Respondent gave N.M. pain medication for post-surgical pain. N.M. returned to OMC for a follow-up visit regarding the lack of drainage from her incision. During this visit, Respondent examined N.M. and gave her medication to reduce the swelling she was experiencing. Dr. Edathodu testified that she has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida for over 25 years. From 2015 through 2017, she worked as a contract physician at OMC and acted as medical director for the facility. Dr. Edathodu developed the protocols for OMC’s tumescent liposuction procedures and ensured they were followed. Dr. Edathodu remembered N.M. as a patient who had undergone previous surgeries and presented for further liposuction and fat transfer. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the liposuction procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu’s signature is on the cosmetic surgery consent form that was also signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015. The “Liposuction and Autologous Fat Transfer” consent form signed by N.M. on March 3, 2015, specifically names Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who will perform the procedure and was signed by Dr. Edathodu. Dr. Edathodu testified that she reviewed the procedure with N.M., discussing the risks and benefits. Dr. Edathodu does not speak Spanish and uses Respondent to translate with Spanish speakers such as N.M. She identified herself to N.M. as a surgeon through Respondent’s translation. Dr. Edathodu spoke to N.M. about having realistic expectations and cautioned her that she may not obtain an optimal result because of her previous procedures. Dr. Edathodu testified that, aside from her, the persons in the surgical theater were three surgical assistants: Respondent, Mr. Barcelo, and Pavel Cabanes. It is found that Mr. Cabanes must have been the “Abel” referred to by N.M. Dr. Edathodu testified that during the surgery, there is a drape between the surgical field and the patient’s face and head, to prevent the patient from being disturbed by the sight of the procedure. The drape is made of disposable paper and is about five feet high. When performing the surgery, Dr. Edathodu is unable to see the patient’s face and the patient is unable to see past the drape. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the entire surgical procedure on N.M. Dr. Edathodu made the site markings on N.M. while Respondent took photographs. Respondent did not perform any part of the surgical procedure. Respondent performed none of the fat transfer on N.M. Respondent did nothing other than what Dr. Edathodu specifically directed her to do. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with N.M. on four or five occasions after the surgery. Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. Perhaps because of her inability to speak English, N.M. appeared confused and inconsistent in her testimony, at least as it appeared in the Transcript. N.M.’s credibility was strained by her uncertainty as to dates and medications. She offered improbable details, such as the lack of coverage by the surgical drape and the failure of the surgical team to wear masks. N.M. was certain that Respondent was performing the fat injection, even though N.M. could not see what was happening. Though N.M. testified that she was awake and alert during the procedure, the undersigned cannot disregard that she had been given a medication that she likened to Xanax, most likely the lorazepam. The undersigned hesitates to rely upon N.M.’s disjointed testimony where it conflicts with the straightforward and credible testimony of Dr. Edathodu.3/ Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient N.M. Patient R.C. Patient R.C. is a female born in 1988. At the time of the hearing, she worked as a claims specialist. She testified that a friend from her previous job at HealthPlan Services referred her to OMC for a consultation. She first went to OMC on or about June 6, 2016. R.C. testified that this initial consultation was with Respondent. She told Respondent that she wanted liposuction on her back and waist and wanted the fat transferred to her buttocks. They discussed the procedure and pricing. From that point until the day of the surgery, R.C. went to OMC only to drop off periodic payments for the surgery. Her only contact was with the person at the front desk. She testified that she did not see Respondent again until the day of her surgery. R.C.’s surgery was scheduled for August 5, 2016. R.C. testified that she was dropped off at OMC by her children’s father. She went in and met Respondent and a few workers in the front of the facility. When she went to the back to prepare for the procedure, she met a man wearing scrubs whom she had never seen before. Two other staff persons were present, but R.C. stated she only talked with the one staff person who spoke English. R.C. testified that Respondent and the man in scrubs marked her body for the surgery. She believed that Respondent was going to perform the surgery. R.C. stated that she was not familiar with Dr. Edathodu. R.C. stated that she filled out the consent forms on August 5, 2016. An assistant gave her medication, saying it would calm her down. R.C. was not told the name of the medication, but testified that she took a blue pill and half of a white pill. The medical records indicate she was given Ativan (a brand name for lorazepam) and Benadryl. R.C. testified that the medications made her drowsy. R.C. was assisted to the room where the surgery would be performed. R.C. testified that she was placed on her stomach, face down. Everyone in the room was wearing a surgical mask. In the room were Respondent, the man in the scrubs, and two assistants. R.C. stated that she was awake during the procedure, but was drowsy and did not recall much about it. She could hear Respondent’s voice and the noise of the liposuction machine. She could not see who actually performed the procedure. After it was over, one of the assistants phoned R.C.’s driver and helped R.C. get up and walk. Respondent handed her a bag containing pills that R.C. believed were antibiotics. She received post-operative instructions. R.C. testified that she returned to OMC for a follow- up visit about a month after the surgery and met with Respondent. Dr. Edathodu testified that she performed the surgical procedure, called “tumescent liposuction,” on R.C. on August 5, 2016. On August 2, 2016, R.C. signed a “liposuction & autologous fat transfer consent” form that specifically named Dr. Edathodu as the surgeon who would perform the surgery. Dr. Edathodu ordered, reviewed, and signed R.C.’s lab results. Dr. Edathodu met with R.C. prior to the procedure and completed a “pre-operative clearance” form to document R.C.’s fitness and willingness to go through the surgery. Both R.C. and Dr. Edathodu signed the pre-operative clearance form. Dr. Edathodu testified that she met with R.C. three or four times post-surgery. As in the case of N.M., all of the medical records support the version of events described by Dr. Edathodu.4/ Dr. Edathodu’s testimony, as supported by the medical records, is credited. R.C. frankly conceded that she did not remember much about the surgery and could not see who performed it. Dr. Edathodu clearly and credibly recalled performing the procedure. The greater weight of evidence supports the finding that Dr. Edathodu performed the surgery, assisted by Respondent and Mr. Barcelo. The evidence could not sustain a finding that Respondent performed a surgical procedure on R.C. R.C. was a more credible witness than N.M., and her testimony on some of the details regarding her consultations and pre-operative events was persuasive. However, it must be kept in mind that the only relevant factual question is whether Respondent performed an “invasive/surgical medical procedure” on R.C. The evidence on this question is not persuasive. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is found that the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient R.C. Patient K.H. Patient K.H. is a female born in 1989. She learned of OMC from a friend at work. She first came into OMC for a consultation regarding a liposuction and fat transfer on November 29, 2016. K.H. testified that she met only with Respondent at this initial consultation. On November 29, 2016, K.H. signed an “information certification” form accepting Dr. Mark Kantzler as the physician who would be in charge of her liposuction procedure. K.H. came back to OMC on January 9, 2017, to make a $500 deposit and to schedule the surgery. The procedure was scheduled for February 11, 2017. Again, K.H. testified that she met alone with Respondent, who told her that she would need to come in a couple of days before the surgery to get medication and a list of things she would need for post-operative care. K.H. testified that she believed that Respondent was a physician and that she would be performing the liposuction procedure. The “liposuction and autologous fat transfer consent” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, authorized Dr. Kantzler to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedure. The “surgery certification” form that K.H. signed on February 9, 2017, indicated that Dr. Kantzler reviewed the entire medical file with her before performing the procedure. On February 11, 2017, K.H. was driven to OMC by her mother. Shortly after arriving, K.H. noted the presence of a tall man with white hair and blue eyes. An OMC assistant escorted K.H. to a room with a bed and a chair. Respondent came in to the room and marked K.H. for surgery. Respondent then called in the tall man with white hair and blue eyes, who looked at the surgical markings and then asked K.H. some questions about her stretch marks. During her direct examination, K.H. testified that she was not given the man’s name. During cross-examination, K.H. was forced to concede that during an August 2017 interview, she told Department investigators that she had been introduced to the tall man with white hair and blue eyes and that his name was Dr. Mark Kantzler. K.H. testified that Respondent gave her a pill to take before surgery. She was taken to the surgical suite and was placed on the table. K.H. testified that the surgical drape prevented her from seeing the surgical area. The only people she had noted in the room were Respondent and “Claudia,” a woman K.H. recognized as a massage therapist at OMC. She could not be certain whether or not Dr. Kantzler was in the room. K.H. testified that she was awake during the surgery. She stated that she was in pain during the surgery and complained, in Spanish, to Respondent. K.H. stated that Respondent told her she had “a little stubborn fat” and continued the procedure without doing anything to alleviate her pain. K.H. testified that all conversation during the procedure was in Spanish. She heard no English being spoken. K.H. confirmed that Dr. Kantzler was the physician who signed the letter requesting that she be excused from work immediately after her surgery. Dr. Kantzler testified that he had no specific recollection of K.H. or of her procedure. He stated that he worked on a contract basis with OMC for about three years. He came in about once a week to perform liposuction procedures, conforming to the protocols established by Dr. Edathodu. He saw the patients only briefly before their procedures, relying on Respondent to perform the patient consultations and Dr. Edathodu to prescribe the pre-operative tests in her role as medical director. He was paid by the procedure. Dr. Kantzler testified that he does not speak Spanish, but that his surgical assistants, Respondent and Mr. Barcelo, would often converse in Spanish during surgery. Dr. Kantzler reviewed the medical records and confirmed that he signed the documents and performed the surgery on K.H.: Q. Is there any doubt in your mind about whether or not you performed these procedures? A. Not when I’m looking at the files, no. Q. And if you had not done the procedures, would you have signed off on the documentation? A. I wouldn’t have had them to sign. No. Dr. Kantzler’s lack of a clear recollection distinguishes this procedure from those involving Dr. Edathodu. However, an offsetting distinguishing factor is that K.H. had a clear recollection of seeing and speaking with Dr. Kantzler at OMC on the morning of her surgery. She did not see him enter the surgical suite or hear him speak during the procedure, but she was unable to say that he was not in the room. The medical record is replete with indications that Dr. Kantzler performed the liposuction and fat transfer procedure on K.H. Dr. Kantzler testified that he voluntarily relinquished his Florida medical license in 2017 “for my own reasons not relevant to this [case].” The Department’s Proposed Recommended Order suggests that this relinquishment was “in response to or in anticipation of disciplinary proceedings.” There is no record evidence to support the Department’s suggestion, and it is disregarded here. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent performed an invasive/surgical medical procedure on Patient K.H.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Claudia Patricia Orozco-Fandino, E.O. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(d), 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(ll), and 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2001),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of licensed physicians pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Dr. Dangl, whose address of record is 3900 Clark Road, Suite E-1, Sarasota, Florida 34233, was issued Florida license number ME 71286 to practice medicine in Florida. During all relevant periods of time, he was not board-certified by the American Board of Medical Specialties or by any agency recognized by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Dangl is the holder of a D.M.D. degree from the Washington University School of Dental Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri. He is not licensed as a dentist in Florida, but he has previously held dental licenses in Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. He is specialty certified by the American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. This specialty is related to the practice of dentistry. During all relevant periods of time, Dr. Dangl's office was fully and properly registered as an office surgical facility. During all relevant periods of time, Dr. Dangl did not have hospital privileges. On August 17, 2001, C.S., a female who was at that time 63 years old, came to Dr. Dangl's office for a consultation regarding facial rejuvenation and body contouring. Dr. Dangl saw C.S. and recommended "that she consider cervicofacial rhytidectomy with full face carbon dioxide laser resurfacing and autogenous fat transfer to the facial area." He further determined that the "degree of liposity in the abdomen and flanks is minimal and this can also be treated at the same time with low-volume tumescent liposuction." Prior to her consultation with Dr. Dangl, C.S. had seen an advertisement for Dr. Dangl in the "Sarasota Herald-Tribune." The advertisement listed Dr. Dangl as "Kurt Dangl, M.D., FAACS" and underneath his name appeared the words "Board Certified." From reading the advertisement, C.S. assumed that Dr. Dangl was board-certified in cosmetic or plastic surgery. C.S. returned to Dr. Dangl's office on August 21, 2001, for preoperative counseling. She signed consent forms for the procedures to be performed. The consent forms listed potential risks and complications involved with the procedures. Complications included infection, wound breakdown, and skin necrosis. The consent forms stated that Dr. Dangl did not guarantee specific results and that wound healing was outside the control of the patient and Dr. Dangl. On the printed consent forms the abbreviation "D.M.D." followed Dr. Dangl's name. No evidence was presented that the consent forms were being used as advertisements. C.S.'s medical records in Dr. Dangl's files indicate a blood sample was taken from C.S. on August 21, 2001, and sent to AccuLab. An AccuLab report dated August 22, 2001, indicated that C.S. had a slightly lowered hemoglobin level of 35.5. Based on a notation on the report, it appeared that Dr. Dangl reviewed the report on August 23, 2001. There is a handwritten note on the AccuLab report that the hemoglobin count was "ok for planned procedure." Dr. Dangl did not advise C.S. prior to the surgical procedures that her hemoglobin count was low. Dr. Dangl's records indicate that C.S. gave a medical history prior to the surgery and that Dr. Dangl performed a physical examination of C.S. prior to the surgery. C.S. advised Dr. Dangl that she had had her coccyx removed about six weeks before her scheduled cosmetic surgery. On August 28, 2001, C.S. returned to Dr. Dangl's office to have Dr. Dangl perform a face and neck lift, laser resurfacing of the face, removing fat from her abdomen and flanks, and transferring some of the fat from the abdomen and flanks to specific areas in her face. Betsy Shecter, who is licensed as an advance registered nurse practitioner in Florida, was the nurse anesthetist for C.S.'s procedures. Ms. Shecter's first contact with C.S. on August 28, 2001, occurred at 13:05, when she interviewed C.S. and then escorted C.S. to the operating room. At 13:15, C.S. was given valium, and an IV infusion of propofol and Sufenta was placed in C.S.'s arm around 13:20. Propofol is an anesthetic and Sufenta is a synthetic narcotic. C.S. was prepped and draped around 13:30, and a local anesthesia was injected at 13:35. Because the local anesthesia required about 20 to 30 minutes to become active, Dr. Dangl did not make the first incision until 14:05. The liposuction procedure to harvest the fat for a fat transfer occurred between 14:05 and 15:00. After liposuction, a local anesthesia was injected in the areas where the face lift would be performed. At 15:20, a garment was applied to the areas where fat had been harvested to keep the swelling down. Sequential leg compressions were put in place to avoid blood clots. The actual face lift started around 15:30 and ended around 20:20, when Ms. Shecter put Opticane ointment and corneal shields in C.S.'s eyes for the laser procedure. The laser procedure began around 20:25. At around 21:00, Ms. Schecter turned off the propofol drip to which Demerol had been added. The actual laser surgery stopped at approximately 20:55. The eye shields were removed at 21:15. The recovery time in the operating room commenced at 21:00 when the drugs were stopped and ended around 21:45. The recovery time continued until C.S. was discharged at 22:30. At the time of her discharge, C.S.'s vital signs were stable, and she was alert and oriented. C.S. was told prior to the surgery that someone would have to stay with her overnight after the surgery. C.S. made arrangements for her daughter and C.S.'s sister to stay overnight with her. C.S.'s sister had training and experience as a certified nurse assistant. Prior to the surgery, Dr. Dangl told C.S. that she would probably be ready to go home around four or five o'clock (16:00 or 17:00). She made arrangements with her daughter to pick her up around 17:00. When her daughter inquired from Dr. Dangl's office at 17:00 whether her mother was ready to leave, she was advised that surgery had not been completed. C.S. was not discharged until over five hours after her daughter first contacted Dr. Dangl's office. C.S.'s daughter became visibly upset when she saw her mother after the surgery and wanted to have C.S. admitted to a hospital. Because of the daughter's agitation, arrangements were made for a licensed practical nurse, Ruth Schneider, to stay overnight with C.S. C.S.'s daughter and sister had some difficulty in getting C.S. into the car for the trip home because of the sequential leg compressions, which C.S. wore home. Dr. Dangl and Ms. Shecter put C.S. in the car. At the time that C.S. was put in the car, C.S. was able to stand on her own and able to walk with support. When C.S. arrived home, Ms. Schneider assisted C.S. into her home. At that time, C.S. was alert and oriented and could ambulate with assistance. When C.S. got in her home, she was able to drink and take nourishment. Ms. Schneider helped C.S. ambulate to the bathroom. C.S. sat in a recliner and slept some during the night. At the close of Ms. Schneider's eight- hour shift, she left C.S. in the care of C.S.'s sister. C.S. was scheduled for a follow-up visit with Dr. Dangl on August 29, 2001, but C.S.'s sister was unable to arouse C.S. and get C.S. up to go to the doctor's office. Dr. Dangl's office was advised that C.S. could not come to his office. Dr. Dangl came to C.S.'s home around nine or ten o'clock in the evening of August 29, 2001, for a follow-up visit. He removed the dressings from her wounds and applied an antibiotic ointment. Dr. Dangl apparently did not have bandages with him that he could place on the surface of the wounds because he asked the sister for sanitary napkins to use as a dressing. C.S.'s sister retrieved sanitary napkins from the bathroom, and Dr. Dangl, using scissors from a nearby basket, cut the napkins up and used them to dress the wounds. He reused the Ace-type bandages which he had removed and placed them over the sanitary pads. C.S. was instructed to come to Dr. Dangl's office on August 31, 2001, for her 72-hour postoperative evaluation. On August 31, 2001, C.S.'s sister took C.S. to Dr. Dangl's office. C.S.'s sister did not accompany C.S. into the treatment room. Dr. Dangl removed the dressings and inspected the wounds. There was no evidence of hematoma, seroma, or infection. He noted that there was a "small area of devascularization immediately anterior to the left tragus on the left side" and described the areas as "about the size of a quarter." His notes indicate that the area would be "followed expectantly and debrided as necessary." He was to follow up with C.S. in 48 or 72 hours. When Dr. Dangl came out of the treatment room, he saw C.S.'s sister and asked her what was wrong with her. She explained that she was tired from being up all night with C.S. Dr. Dangl asked the sister why she did not take one of the sleeping pills that he had prescribed for C.S. The sister replied, "What? Why would you tell me to do that, take someone else's medicine?" Prior to this conversation, Dr. Dangl had not examined the sister in any way, gotten her medical history, or asked her whether she was taking any other medications. Over the next several days, C.S. complained to her sister that she was burning, hurting all over, and was not able to sleep or rest. On September 3, 2001, C.S.'s daughter called Dr. Dangl's office and advised that C.S. had a foul smelling discharge in front of her left tragus. Dr. Dangl called in a prescription for antibiotics for C.S. and told C.S.'s daughter that he wanted to see C.S. the following day. Dr. Dangl saw C.S. in his office on September 4, 2001. His examination of C.S. revealed that the size of the devascularized area in front of her left tragus had increased four times. There was some foul smelling yellow-brown discharge coming from this area as well as from several areas under the mandible approximately following the locations of the previously placed drains. He debrided the devitalized area and irrigated the discharge areas with an antibiotic solution and hydrogen peroxide. An intravenous antibiotic was administered, and wound cultures were obtained from various sites. Dr. Dangl again saw C.S. in his office on the evening of September 4, 2005. There was a minimal amount of drainage and no foul smelling odor. On September 5, 2001, C.S. again presented to Dr. Dangl's office for postoperative infection evaluation and treatment. There was a mild purulent discharge in the left anterior neck and at the left post auricular area. Dr. Dangl debrided the wound area and irrigated the wound area with sterile saline. C.S.'s pain medication was increased. Dr. Dangl saw C.S. in his office on September 6, 2001, for further wound treatment. The laboratory results of the wound cultures indicated a light growth of E. coli. Dr. Dangl administered an antibiotic intravenously and removed necrotic tissue. C.S. returned to Dr. Dangl's office on September 7, 2001. Her temperature was 100.6 degrees Fahrenheit, and she was complaining of significant discomfort. Dr. Dangl debrided the wound area. He examined the abdomen and flank incisions and found no evidence of infection or other signs of untoward wound healing. C.S.'s daughter accompanied her mother to Dr. Dangl's office on September 7, 2001, and expressed her concerns about her mother's condition. The daughter felt that her mother might benefit from hospitalization. Dr. Dangl referred C.S. to Dr. Manual Gordillo for evaluation and determination of the need for hospitalization. Dr. Gordillo treated infectious diseases. Dr. Gordillo saw C.S. and advised C.S. and her daughter that the treatment for the infection could be done in the hospital or on an outpatient basis, but expressed his opinion that admission to the hospital was borderline. C.S. opted for hospitalization and was admitted to Doctors Hospital of Sarasota on September 7, 2001. After C.S. was admitted to the hospital, additional cultures were taken of the wound sites as well as the sites in the abdomen where fat had been harvested. Based on the laboratory results, C.S. had a scant growth of E. coli from her face wound culture and a moderate growth of staphylococcus aureus from abdominal wound culture. C.S. was placed in isolation because of the staph infection. C.S. was experiencing a great deal of pain from her wounds while she was in the hospital. Because of her difficulty with pain management, she was put on a PCP pump to help control the pain. While she was in the hospital, Dr. Dangl visited her several times to observe. He did not perform any treatment on C.S. while she was hospitalized. C.S. told Dr. Dangl that she wished that he would not visit her while she was in the hospital, but he continued to come. The evidence is not clear and convincing that C.S. conveyed to Dr. Dangl that she did not want his services any longer, particularly in light of C.S.'s paying office visits to Dr. Dangl for treatment after she was discharged from the hospital. However, the evidence is clear and convincing that C.S. did not want Dr. Dangl to visit her in the hospital and that she told him so. Dr. Dangl's medical records do not establish a medical basis for continuing to see C.S. in the hospital after she asked him not to do so. C.S. was discharged from the hospital on September 13, 2001. At that time, she was feeling much better, her wounds were stable, and her wounds were not clinically overtly infected. She was directed to follow up with Dr. Dangl as soon as the following day and to follow up with Dr. Gordillo within a week. After her discharge from the hospital, C.S. continued to see Dr. Dangl on September 15, 17, 19, and 21, 2001. Dr. Dangl changed the dressings and, on two of the visits, did some minimal debridement. C.S. discontinued seeing Dr. Dangl after her office visit on September 21, 2001. On September 24, 2001, C.S. began seeing Dr. John Leikensohn, a plastic and reconstructive surgeon, for wound treatment. He diagnosed C.S. as having massive skin necrosis. When C.S. began seeing Dr. Leikensohn, she was asked to sign a medical release for her medical records from Dr. Dangl, and she did so. Dr. Leikensohn's staff contacted Dr. Dangl's office by telephone to get C.S.'s records. The medical release was sent by facsimile transmission to Dr. Dangl's office with a request for C.S.'s records. By October 2, 2001, Dr. Leikensohn had not received the records from Dr. Dangl. Dr. Leikensohn asked C.S. and C.S.'s daughter to stop by Dr. Dangl's office and get a copy of the records. C.S. went to Dr. Dangl's office and personally asked his staff for her records, but was not given the records. She also submitted a written request for her records, but did not receive them pursuant to the written request. Barbie Beaver, Dr. Dangl's office coordinator, does not recall when or from whom she actually received a request for C.S.'s records, but she does remember sending C.S.'s medical records to Barbara Dame, Dr. Dangl's risk manager, for her review on September 27, 2001. When Dr. Dangl's office received a request for a patient's records, she would advise Dr. Dangl and he would decide what to do. She gave a request for C.S.'s medical records to Dr. Dangl, and he instructed her to send them to Ms. Dame for review prior to releasing the records. Ms. Beaver does not recall when she actually sent C.S.'s records to the person who requested them. During his treatment of C.S., Dr. Dangl wrote several prescriptions for C.S. The prescription scripts contained the abbreviation "D.M.D." after his name. No evidence was presented that the prescriptions were intended to be used for advertising purposes. Dr. John J. Obi, a board-certified plastic surgeon, testified as the Department's expert witness. It is Dr. Obi's opinion that it would have been good medical practice to have advised C.S. of her low hemoglobin prior to surgery, but that because the blood level was not dangerously low, he could not "say that's a complete deviation from the standard of care." Dr. Obi further opined that Dr. Dangl exceeded the eight-hour limitation on elective cosmetic surgery in a physician's office when he performed the procedures on C.S. on August 28, 2001. Dr. Obi's opinion is based on his incorrect understanding that the anesthesia was stopped at 22:00. Thus, even if the time for calculating surgical procedures ran from the time the anesthesia was first administered at 13:15 until it was stopped at 21:00, the length of time for the surgical procedures was seven hours and forty-five minutes. Dr. Obi opined that the recovery time for C.S. was insufficient. Again he based his opinion in part on his incorrect assumption that the anesthesia was discontinued at 22:00. Dr. Obi creditably testified that Dr. Dangl's continuing to see C.S. in the hospital after she told him that she did not want him to visit fell below the prevailing standard of care. Dr. William Frazier, the expert who testified on behalf of Dr. Dangl, gave no opinion on whether Dr. Dangl's continued hospital visits after being told not to visit by C.S. violated the standard of care. Dr. Obi opined that it was a violation of the standard of care for Dr. Dangl to tell C.S.'s sister to take some of C.S.'s prescription sleeping pills without examining or taking a medical history of the sister. Dr. Frazier was of the opinion that the conversation between Dr. Dangl and C.S.'s sister did not fall below the standard of care. Dr. Frazier's opinion was based on his misunderstanding that C.S.'s sister had asked Dr. Dangl if it was appropriate for her to take a sleeping medication that she already had.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Dangl violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(ll), and 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes; finding that Dr. Dangl did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $3,500 for violations of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(ll), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes; suspending his license for two years; and requiring Dr. Dangl to attend continuing medical education classes to be specified by the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent should be disciplined for allegedly practicing medicine below the generally accepted standard of care when he performed a laminectomy and discectomy at the incorrect level of a patient's lumbar spine.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, William O. DeWeese, is a Florida licensed physician, having been issued license number ME 0025687. Respondent is Board-certified in Neurological Surgery and is a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons. He has practiced medicine since graduating from medical school in 1968. He received his Florida license in 1975 and established his practice in Tampa where he has continuously practiced medicine ever since. In twenty-four years of practice, the Florida Board of Medicine has never disciplined Respondent. Respondent's Standard Practice Respondent conducts his practice primarily through two local hospitals, St. Joseph’s Hospital and University Community Hospital. He has a typical practice common to neurological surgery. On average, Respondent performs three to four laminectomy-discectomy procedures each week. Before performing surgery on the spine, Respondent’s protocol is to review available medical records and films (CT, MRI, X-ray), obtain an EKG, obtain chest X-rays, and blood work. During surgery, he routinely obtains "real time" radiological confirmation of the level of the spine where he intends to operate based on his initial pre-surgical work-up. Respondent does this by marking the level where surgery is to take place with radio-opaque material (usually a cottonoid sponge), and has an X-ray film of the patient's spine and the marker exposed and developed in the operatory (OR). Respondent reviews the X-ray in the OR before having the X-ray technician take it to the radiology department for review by a radiologist. The radiologist on duty reviews the X-ray and usually writes on the X-ray to label the location of the marker and has the technician bring the labeled X-ray back to the OR; he then calls the OR, usually on a speaker telephone, to inform the surgeon as to the radiologist's interpretation of the film. Any question as to the level of surgery is resolved at that time. If Respondent is not at the intended level of the spine, he makes the appropriate adjustment in the surgical procedure and completes the surgery at the correct level. The First Surgery S.D. first presented to Respondent in November 1989 with complaints and symptoms of intractable back and left leg pain. She had been seen previously by other physicians but had not experienced any relief. At the time she presented to Respondent, S.D. was 5 feet 5 inches tall and obese (at 175 pounds). Unbeknownst to Respondent at the time, the patient also had an anatomical anomaly of six lumbar vertebrae instead of the more common five. As a result of the patient's anatomical anomaly, physicians could easily be misled, fooled, or misunderstood in reporting the level of spine being evaluated or treated. Depending upon awareness of the patient's specific anomaly and terminology used, the same location on the spine could be referred to as L4-L5, as L5-S1, or as L5-L6. Usually, neurosurgeons can predict the location of nerve root pathology fairly accurately based solely on a patient's complaints, objective examination, and symptoms. Specific nerves innervate specific areas of the body, and a deficit in one area of the body can reasonably lead a physician to suspect nerve root pathology at a particular level of the spine. Because Respondent was unable to determine from initial review of the patient's prior MRI that she had a sixth vertebra, he expected to find nerve root pathology at the L5-S1 level of the spine based on S.D.'s complaints, objective examination, and symptoms. But on X-ray and re-review of the MRI with benefit of the radiologist’s report, Respondent noted the sixth vertebra. Following a complete examination of S.D., including review of a recent CT scan, her prior MRI study, and X-ray films, Respondent believed that S.D. had a "large disc protrusion" at the L5-L6 level of the spine and a "small disc bulge" at the L4- L5 level. The patient's extra lumbar vertebra helped explain the location of the patient's nerve root pathology in relation to her complaints, objective examination, and symptoms. Respondent recommended that S.D. undergo lumbar surgery to explore the disc spaces, remove extruded disc material, and free any entrapped nerves. He expected to have to remove disc material only at the L5-L6 level. His pre-operative diagnosis was: degenerative lumbar disc with lateral angle stenosis (narrowing) at L5-L6; and possible disc protrusion at the L4-L5 level on the left. Respondent performed surgery on S.D. on December 4, 1989. The operation consisted of: a left laminectomy, exploration and inspection of the L4-L5 disc; and a laminotomy, foraminotomy, and partial discectomy at L5-L6. To accomplish the surgery, Respondent dissected away the soft tissues above L4, L5, L6, and S1. He then followed his protocol by placing radio-opaque cotton underneath the ligament at the level he believed was L4-L5 for radiological confirmation. After "real time" radiological confirmation that he was at L4-L5, Respondent removed enough lamina at L4-L5 to inspect the disc and nerve root. He did not observe any entrapment of the nerve and did nothing further at L4-L5. He next proceeded to L5- L6, where he repeated the same procedure but noted entrapment at the posterior aspect of the nerve root. The majority of the pressure on the nerve came from the neural foramen, and this was removed with osteotomy. Some disc material also was removed to free the nerve root. While inspecting the disc space at L5-L6, Respondent observed that the disc space was so narrow that a spinal needle was the thickest instrument that the disc space would receive; a straight pituitary curet could not be placed into the disc space. Respondent recorded these observations in his surgical notes. Similarly, the radiologist's report noted "considerable narrowing of the interspace at the L5-L6 level." Respondent completed the operation by performing a foraminotomy (removal of bone surrounding the point of exit of the nerve from the vertebras of the spinal column). The operation in December 1989 was uneventful; S.D. did well post-operatively and was discharged from the hospital after a normal stay. The Second Surgery S.D. returned to Respondent in March 1993 because of recurrent severe back pain and left leg pain. Following appropriate diagnostic tests and examination of S.D., which revealed what was thought to be a herniated disc on the left side at L5-L6, Respondent planned to "re-do" a laminectomy and discectomy at L5-L6. By the time of the patient's second surgery on May 10, 1993, she had gained about 40 pounds (up to 215 pounds.) The planned surgery was made more difficult by S.D.'s weight gain, as well as by her previous surgery. Additional fatty tissue decreased the operative field of view, as well as the quality of the intra- operative X-ray. S.D.'s anatomical landmarks had been altered as a result of the December 1989 surgery, and there was considerable scaring in the area to be explored during surgery, which obscured the remaining landmarks. Without the presence of normal landmarks and with heavy scaring and weight gain, Respondent had fewer tools to locate the correct level, making the second surgery more difficult. One landmark still available to Respondent to aid in the second surgery was the very narrow interspace at the L5-L6 level. However, Respondent did not the read surgical notes from the first surgery carefully enough to recall the landmark; or, if he read them and recalled the landmark, he attached little significance to the notes and landmark, as compared with other factors influencing his decisions during surgery. One of the reasons Respondent and his expert gave for not attaching more significance to the December 1989 findings as to the remarkably narrow L5-L6 interspace was that a patient's position on the Wilson laminectomy holder and the operation of the holder can alter the apparent width of lumbar interspaces. The holder is a special, adjustable operating table that can be made to "bridge up" in a continuous arc to force the patient (lying on the stomach) to stretch over the "bridge" and make the vertebral interspaces widen for easier access during surgery. While theoretically position on and operation of the holder can affect the width of the interspaces, in practice the surgeon always positions the patient and operates the holder so as to maximize the interspaces. One would not expect the positioning and operation of the holder in two operations at the same level of the lumbar spine to significantly widen an interspace as narrow as the one described in the December 1989 surgical notes. But it might reduce the relative importance of the landmark, compared to other information available to the surgeon, such as radiological confirmation and visual examination of the site. Through answers to his attorney's questions on direct, Respondent also initially attempted to take the position that the patient's weight gain between the two surgeries was enough to warrant ignoring the December 1989 surgical note as to the narrow L5-L6 interspace. But the Department's expert opined that the added weight would not make a significant difference, and on cross- examination Respondent admitted that he actually did not have the patient's weight gain in mind as a reason to gloss over the December 1989 surgical note as to the narrow L5-L6 interspace. Indeed, consistent with Respondent's admission on cross- examination, both Respondent and his expert, Dr. Maniscalco, opined that, if anything, the added weight probably would tend to reduce the maximum flexion obtainable through use of the Wilson laminectomy holder and make the interspaces at the surgical site appear narrower, not wider. Nonetheless, depending on its distribution on the patient, weight gain could possibly alter the apparent width of the interspace during surgery on a Wilson laminectomy holder, and this could also reduce the relative importance of the landmark, compared to other information available to the surgeon, such as radiological confirmation and visual examination of the site. While conceding that he really did not pay much attention to the December 1989 findings as to the remarkable narrowing of the L5-L6 interspace, Respondent also attempted to take the position in testimony that the L4-L5 interspace was fairly narrow itself, as compared for example to the L3-4 interspace. But the L5-L6 interspace clearly was much narrower than L4-L5 and could have been used as a landmark. See Findings 25 and 29, infra. Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, the relatively narrow interspace at L-5-L6 was just one factor to be considered, along with radiological confirmation and visual examination. As Respondent wrote in his notes on May 10, 1993, he thought: "The previous laminectomy site was easily identified and confirmed with a lateral X-ray." The Department's expert took the use of the singular "previous laminectomy site" as evidence that Respondent was unaware of the previous laminectomy at L4-L5. But Respondent testified convincingly that he had reviewed the patient's medical records and was fully aware of both previous laminectomies--at both L5-L6 and L4-L5. (Respondent also testified that his use of the singular, "previous laminectomy site" was intended to mean the general site of both previous laminectomies. But it was the L5-L6 laminectomy site that he thought was "confirmed with a lateral X-ray," so it seems that the language used probably actually referred to the site of the intended surgery. In that respect, the wording of Respondent's surgical notes was ambiguous, if not erroneous.) As usual, an X-ray technician took the lateral X-ray, developed the film, and showed it to Respondent in the OR. Respondent testified that he then had the X-ray technician take the film to the radiology department, along with the pre-operative MRI, and that a radiologist on duty confirmed for him that he was at the "correct level" before he proceeded with the surgery. When Respondent proceeded with the surgery, he widened the laminectomy site and found a disc fragment (which he presumed to be recurrent) underneath and entrapping the nerve root. The nerve root was retracted medially, and the disc space was entered. A large fragment of disc was found in the subligamentous position. Respondent removed the large fragment; then more disc material was removed from the interspace, freeing the nerve. Respondent then performed a foraminotomy and completed the surgery. The pathology found during the second surgery was not inconsistent with the general kind of pathology Respondent expected to find at the L5-L6 level. Relying on visual examination and radiological confirmation, Respondent believed that he was operating at L5-L6. He did not notice, or attached no significance to, the ease of access to the disc space in May 1993, as compared to the narrow interspace encountered at L5-L6 in the first surgery. The Third Surgery After normal recuperation in the hospital, the patient noticed apparent improvement and began regular walking. However, approximately six to eight weeks after surgery, back and leg pain recurred, and the patient returned to Respondent for consultation. Respondent ordered another MRI and scheduled the patient for an appointment in August 1993. When Respondent reviewed the post- operative MRI with the patient, he realized that he had operated at L4-L5 instead of L5-L6. He asked the patient to go to the hospital and get the intra-operative X-ray to help him understand what had happened. It was his belief that the X-ray would show that he had radiological confirmation. With the patient's help, Respondent obtained the X-ray the same day. See Finding 35, infra. Instead of showing radiological confirmation, the X-ray's labeling showed someone's interpretation that the radio-opaque marker on the X-ray was at L4- L5. (There was no evidence as to who labeled the interpretation. Id.) When Respondent saw the writing on the X-ray, he immediately conceded that he had operated at the wrong level and began the process of scheduling a third surgery (the second at L5-L6). Respondent performed the patient's third surgery free-of- charge on September 17, 1993. He had three X-rays taken during the third surgery. The first one apparently was taken before any incision was made. The second was made to confirm that the Respondent was at L5-L6 this time. Instead, the X-ray showed that he was at L6-S1. Respondent tried again, and a third X-ray confirmed L5-L6. Respondent continued with the operation as planned. Findings during the third surgery supported the reasonableness of using the narrow L5-L6 interspace as a landmark during the second surgery. Once again, Respondent found cause to note significant narrowing at L5-L6, stating: "A needle was placed exactly in the interspace, which was small and tight." (The patient weighed 217 pounds at the time of the third surgery--two pounds more than for the second surgery.) The third surgery was otherwise uneventful and apparently successful. The patient discharged after a short stay. The Questionable X-ray Confirmation Although it appears in hindsight that Respondent should have attached more significance to the notes from the first surgery as to the remarkably narrow disc space at L5-L6, even the Department's expert conceded that Respondent should not be found to have practiced below the generally accepted standard of care if he received "real time" radiological confirmation before proceeding with the second surgery. (The Department's expert assumed from the medical records that there was no radiological confirmation. See Finding 33, infra.) Excepting the possibility of an obvious and clear error by the radiologist, the generally accepted standard of care entitles a surgeon to rely on a radiologist's "real time" reading of an intra-operative X-ray. The radiologist's specialty is interpreting X-rays, and the viewing equipment and lighting in the radiology department is far superior to what is available to the surgeon in OR. The question becomes the truth of Respondent's claim of having had "real time" radiological confirmation in the context of the other evidence presented in the case. The radiologist normally would have conveyed the "real time" confirmation of the correct level to the surgeon over a speaker telephone in the OR. But no one else present at the time of the surgery testified. (The patient testified by deposition, but she was under general anesthesia during surgery and could not testify as to radiological confirmation.) Respondent could not remember the name of the radiologist he says confirmed the correct level, and he was unable to show through any other means who confirmed the correct level for Respondent. Meanwhile, the Department did not present any direct evidence to dispute Respondent's claim of "real time" radiological confirmation in the OR. But there was circumstantial evidence that raised questions as to the veracity of the claim. In a hospital radiology report on the intra-operative X- ray, a radiologist named Robert G. Isbell, M.D., stated: "Film was not available for interpretation in the radiology department. The film will be read upon its return." This report was dated May 17, 1993; it was not clear from the evidence whether the report was dictated on that date, released on that date, or both. This could indicate that the X-ray was not taken to the radiology department during the surgery on May 10, 1993, since standard procedure would be for the radiologist to dictate the report immediately after calling down to the OR to confirm the correct level for the surgeon. (The Department's expert assumed from this report that there was no radiological confirmation.) However, it also is possible that an unknown radiologist confirmed the correct level for Respondent and then failed to follow the normal procedure, and either he forgot to dictate the report, or the dictation got lost or for some other reason did not result in a transcribed report to go in the patient's file "jacket" in the radiology department. If there was radiological confirmation in the OR, the radiologist apparently did not label the film and have it sent back to the OR, as usual, because the X-ray apparently was not labeled until later. See Findings 35-36, infra. When the patient went to St. Joseph’s Hospital in August 1993 at the Respondent's request to ask for her X-ray, she was told that a doctor had just asked for it to be sent over to the hospital (apparently from where it ordinarily would have been kept.) S.D. was surprised and somewhat suspicious that the hospital was familiar with her X-ray by name and that it coincidentally had just been requested by a doctor. There was no evidence as to the identity of the doctor who requested the X-ray. S.D. insisted on receiving her X-ray immediately and waited until it was returned to her. When she got it, there appeared to be fresh "grease pen" writing on it. As previously mentioned, the grease pen writing labeled the X-ray and clearly indicated someone's interpretation that the radio-opaque marker on the X-ray was at L4-L5. Respondent has maintained that he had never seen the grease pen writing before the X-ray was brought to him by the patient in August 1993. This is consistent with the patient's testimony that the grease pen writing appeared to her to be fresh, and it seems clear from the evidence that the writing was placed on the X-ray shortly before S.D. retrieved it, contrary to normal procedures. This evidence also makes it possible that the X-ray never was sent to the radiology department during surgery, again contrary to normal procedures. It is not clear from the evidence where the X-ray had been between the time of the May 1993 surgery and the time S.D. picked it up with the fresh grease pen writing. There was no evidence as to who put the markings on the X-ray, or at whose request. There was no evidence of any hospital radiology report recording the mysterious August 1993 "reading" of the X-ray as reflected by the new grease pen writing. It also is not clear from the evidence exactly what was written on the X-ray in August 1993 when S.D. retrieved the film from the hospital, or what that particular X-ray looked like. While S.D. retained the X-ray until some time during her subsequent civil action against Respondent and the hospital, she then gave it to the hospital's risk manager, who was supposed to make her a copy. When S.D. went to retrieve the X-ray for her deposition in this administrative proceeding, she found several X-rays apparently given to her by her lawyer after disposition of the civil action, including one labeled "original" and bearing writing in addition to, or other than, the writing S.D. recalled from August 1993. The writing on the X-ray used in this administrative proceeding may have been placed on the "original" X- ray by experts in the civil action. The other X-rays in S.D.'s possession were not produced for use in this administrative proceeding, and it is not clear which, if any of them, is the X-ray labeled as when S.D. retrieved it in August 1993. The X-ray used in this administrative was of poor quality and actually did not show what was below the marked interspace. (As the Respondent described the lower part of the film, "It looks like a snowstorm.") As a result, it actually would not have been possible to confirm the correct level using that particular X-ray. But X-rays can deteriorate over time, and there is no way of knowing if the intra-operative X-ray as it existed on May 10, 1993, or when seen again by Respondent in August 1993, also was of such poor quality as to be virtually useless. If an unknown radiologist in fact called the OR to confirm the correct level for Respondent, it also is possible that there was a miscommunication. Respondent in his testimony made a point of explaining that he only used the terminology "correct level" in talking to the radiologist "to avoid confusion." But if Respondent just asked if he was at the "correct" level, and the radiologist just said, "yes, you're at the correct level," the radiologist actually either would be simply assuming that the level marked on the X-ray was the "correct" level, or he would be saying that pathology visible on the MRI matched the marked location on the X-ray. If the latter, the radiologist may have thought there was enough pathology showing on the MRI matching the marked interspace in this case (actually L4-L5) to justify surgery there. Taking all of this evidence into consideration, it cannot be found that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not receive "real time" radiological confirmation on which he was entitled to rely in proceeding with the second surgery. Without such proof, it cannot be found that Respondent practiced below the generally accepted standard of care, notwithstanding the little attention he paid to his December 1993 surgical notes as to the remarkably narrow interspace at L5-L6.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Britt Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1580 Waldo Palmer Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Grover C. Freeman, Esquire Freeman, Hunter & Malloy 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1950 Tampa, Florida 33602 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Tayna Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Jose Rosado, M.D., (Respondent), violated Section 458.331(1)(t), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Florida law. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0068035. Respondent is board-certified in internal medicine and cardiovascular diseases. On March 10, 1997, Patient W.B.C., a 72-year-old man, arrived at the Leesburg Regional Medical Center (LRMC) emergency room. He complained of a sudden onset of weakness in his left hand and arm with numbness and tingling. Respondent was Patient W.B.C.'s primary care physician. Respondent admitted Patient W.B.C. with a diagnosis of cerebrovascular accident, mitral regurgitation, sick sinus syndrome and a history of myocardial infarction. Respondent ordered that Patient W.B.C. undergo a head CT scan, carotid Doppler, 2-D echocardiogram, an electroencephalogram, and a neurological consultation. Based on the test results and the consultation, Respondent diagnosed Patient W.B.C. with right cerebrovascular accident, mitral regurgitation, sick sinus syndrome, and history of myocardial infarction. Respondent then discharged the patient with Ticlid, a medication to prevent further cerebrovascular accidents and aspirin. On March 16, 1997, Patient W.B.C. was admitted to LRMC complaining of weakness, dizziness and a fever. His vital signs revealed a temperature of 103.0 F, a pulse of 118, and a blood pressure of 139/75. The emergency room physician ordered a chest x-ray, EKG, and urine and blood cultures. The chest x-ray revealed no acute cardiopulmonary abnormality. Urine tests revealed features consistent with the possibility of urosepsis. Blood work showed a white blood count of 9.15, elevated but within the normal range. Also on March 16, Respondent ordered that antibiotics be given prophylactically until the blood cultures came back from the laboratory. The cultures came back positive for staphylococcus aureus (staph). Staph is a notoriously “bad bug” and Staphylococci aureus bacteremia has a high mortality rate. Staph aureus can originate from several possible sources including infections through the urinary tract system, IV sites, aspiration into the lungs, and pneumonia (although not very common). Staphylococci in the bloodstream is known as bacteremia. Bacteremia can lead to endocarditis which is an infection of the inner lining of the heart and the heart valves. Endocarditis is a life-threatening condition that can quickly damage the heart valves and lead to heart failure or even death. Patients with certain cardiac conditions such as mitral valve regurgitation have a higher risk of developing endocarditis. Patient W.B.C. had such a history. On March 17, 1997, Patient W.B.C. was started on intravenous antibiotics by Respondent. Patient W.B.C. continued to receive the intravenous antibiotics for four days from March 17, 1997, through March 20, 1997. Respondent then switched Patient W.B.C. to oral antibiotics and kept the patient in the hospital one more day prior to discharging him with instruction to continue on the oral antibiotics for another ten days. Patient W.B.C. was discharged on March 21, 1997. He was not referred to an infectious disease specialist nor had Respondent obtained a consultation with any specialist to determine the length of time that the patient's infection should be treated. Respondent felt that he was adequately qualified to treat this patient, and the treatment appeared to work. Respondent thought the bacteria growing in the patient's blood "likely" originated from a lung infection. An infectious disease specialist should have been consulted to give guidance as to how long to treat the infection. The standard of care for treating a staph aureus infection where there is a known source of infection requires 14 days of intravenous antibiotics. Where the source is not known, then four to six weeks of antibiotics is recommended. In this case, the infection, a resistant staph infection found in the patient's blood, could have originated from several sources. While such staph could have sprung from a source in the lung, this is by no means likely and the infection could have originated from another source. The standard of care required that Respondent contact an infectious disease specialist for an evaluation and/or that he treat Patient W.B.C.’s staphylococcus with a minimum of 10 to days of intravenous antibiotics. On or about April 11, 1997, Patient W.B.C., presented to the emergency room at LRMC complaining of congestion, shortness of breath, fever of 100.3° F, and a cough. The emergency room physician performed a physical exam which revealed vital signs of a temperature of 101.3° F, a pulse of 104, and a blood pressure of 90/54. A chest x-ray, blood work and a urine culture were ordered. Patient W.B.C. was then admitted on April 11, 1997, with a diagnosis of pneumonia, an old cerebrovascular accident and coronary artery disease. The ER physician started Patient W.B.C. on a plan of treatment which included intravenous antibiotics, Vancomycin, IV fluids, and blood cultures. A physical examination on the patient revealed a temperature of 101.3° F, a pulse of 104 and blood pressure of 91/53. The attending physician diagnosed him with probable sepsis with pneumonia. On April 12, 1997, the blood cultures came back positive for Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia. On April 15, 1997, Patient W.B.C. was afebrile (without fever) and his white blood cell count was 10.23, which is within the normal range of 4.0 to 11.0. The patient continued in this condition through April 18, 1997, despite suffering from sepsis. On April 18, 1997, Respondent approved Patient W.B.C. for transfer to another institution for consideration for urgent mitral valve replacement. On April 19, 1997, Patient W.B.C. arrested and was pronounced dead at 5:53 a.m. Petitioner’s expert, Carlos Sotolongo, M.D., is board- certified in internal medicine, cardiovascular disease and nuclear cardiology. As established by Dr. Sotolongo's testimony, Respondent practiced below the standard of care by failing to treat Patient W.B.C. with a sufficient number of days of intravenous antibiotics and by failing to consult an infectious disease specialist. According to Dr. Sotolongo, there is a difference in the way that an uncomplicated pneumonia is treated as opposed to a pneumonia complicated by bacteremia. The latter must be treated more aggressively. Based on the foregoing, Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(t), by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(t), and imposing a penalty which includes a formal reprimand, payment of an Administrative Fine in the amount of $5,000.00 within 180 days, and eight hours of Continuing Medical Education (CME) to be completed within the next 12 months dealing with the diagnosis and treatment of infections and/or risk management. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Kim M. Kluck, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is qualified for licensure as a medical doctor in Florida by examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner graduated from the School of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania in 1955, following which he did a rotating internship at Abington Memorial Hospital before reporting for active duty in the U.S. Navy. Upon release from active duty in the Navy in 1959 he entered a residency program in general surgery at Hospital of University of Pennsylvania followed by thoracic surgery which he completed in 1965. Petitioner was certified by the American Board of Surgery in 1965 and by the Board of Thoracic Surgery in 1966. From 1965 to 1986 Petitioner was engaged in the practice of general, cardiac, thoracic and vascular surgery. In the latter part of this period, he headed a cardiothoracic surgery team at Lankenau Hospital, Philadelphia, which performed some 700-800 open-heart surgeries per year. It was during this period that most of the malpractice suits were filed against Petitioner, the hospital and other doctors on his team. As head of the surgical team Petitioner did the definitive surgery (bypass grafts) while other members of the team opened and closed the chest cavity. Petitioner is currently licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Arizona. At the time he first applied for licensure in Florida in 1988, he was licensed in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Arizona. No licensing agency has brought any charges against Petitioner's license. Petitioner took and passed the FLEX examination in 1988 scoring 84 and 83 on the two parts of the exam. In the past twenty years, 19 malpractice suits have been filed against Petitioner. Of those suits 9, have been dismissed by Plaintiffs without any recovery from Petitioner, and two were settled on behalf of Petitioner, one in 1979 for $50,000 and one in 1989 for $25,000. Those settlements represented little more than nuisance value. The hospital defendant settled one case for $225,000 and another for $2,500. Of the remaining eight suits the complete medical records of those cases were reviewed by another cardiothoracic and vascular surgeon who opined that five are without merit. For the remaining three, additional evidence is needed to fairly appraise the merits of those suits. This additional information will not be available until discovery is completed. Petitioner's testimony, that these remaining three cases did not involve a failure on his part to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, corroborates the Affidavit of the risk manager (Exhibit 3) and letters in the file (Exhibit 1) stating those cases are deemed to be without merit and will be vigorously defended. All of these suits were brought in Pennsylvania where the backlog of civil cases is such that civil cases are not scheduled for trial until approximately seven years after the suit is filed. Furthermore, the complaints filed in these cases contain general allegations that the Respondent's negligence, inattention, failure to adequately apprise the plaintiff of possible complications of the surgery, along with the negligence of the hospital and others involved with the surgery, directly resulted in the plaintiff's death, injury, etc. These are catch- all allegations and the specific nature of the malpractice claim cannot be discerned from these pleadings. Cardiothoracic and vascular surgery is a high risk field of medicine in that the patients are frequently very sick and elderly. Accordingly, the success rate for this type surgery is lower than for most surgeries, and this leads to a higher incidence of suits alleging malpractice. Many of these earlier suits were brought before the doctors began paying attention to documenting that they fully explained the risks of the surgery to the patient and thereafter the patient gave informed consent to the operation. Petitioner has been more assiduous in this regard in recent years than he was several years ago. This practice will have the effect of reducing the incidence of malpractice suits against surgeons. It is noted that several of the suits alleged the plaintiffs were not adequately advised regarding the risks involved and, therefore, they did not give informed consent to the surgery.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Horace MacVaugh III be granted a license to practice medicine in Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted, except: 8. Accepted only insofar as consistent with HO #5 and 6. 15. Rejected. No evidence was presented in this regard. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted except: 17. Second and third sentences rejected as not supported by any competent evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger Lutz, Esquire Robin Uricchio, Esquire HOLLAND & KNIGHT Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802 Allan Grossman, Esquire The Capitol, Suite 1602 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Florida Board of Medicine Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact HRS stipulated that the challenging parties, petitioners and intervenor, are substantially affected by, and so have standing to challenge, the memoranda in question. According to the pleadings, the challengers are existing providers of surgical services faced with the prospect of increased competition from competitors likely to receive certificates of need for ambulatory surgical centers under the HRS policy articulated in the challenged memoranda. On June 6, 1985, Robert Maryanski, administrator of HRS' Office of Community Medical Facilities, "issued to staff regarding the review of ambulatory surgical [c]ertificate of [n]eed applications," (T. 71) including applications for certificates of need for limited or specialty ambulatory surgical centers, Deposition of Marta Hardy, p. 23, the following: PDCF POLICY MEMORANDUM #7 JUNE 6, 1985 SUBJECT: Policy on CON review of ambulatory surgical center proposals TO: PDCF (Liz Dudek) PDCF (Paul Reilly) PDCF (Wayne McDaniel) PDCF (Joe Mitchell) The following policies will be employed by this office in the review of ambulatory surgical center CON applications: Based upon a review of available literature and outpatient surgical information obtained from the American Hospital Association Survey, a 30 percent factor will be used as the optimum number of surgeries to be performed on an outpatient basis. In all instances, the potential for outpatient surgeries will be determined at a county level. "Specialty" ambulatory surgical center (e.g., opthalmic) will not be given special consideration. The break even level of operations approach is considered adequate to assess the potential for such facilities. In those instances when the outpatient surgical potential in a county is calculated to be slightly below the applicant's projected break even level of operation and there is no existing and/or approved ambulatory surgical center in the county-consideration will be given to approving the application, assuring all other appropriate criteria are satisfied, to foster competition for outpatient surgery as an alternative to more costly inpatient surgery. Proposals which include a captive population (e.g., health maintenance organization) will be given additional consideration as required by appropriate statutory criteria (e.g., Chapter 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes.) If "pre-existing clinics, which have been performing surgical procedures similar to those approval of the project, after assuring that all other appropriate criteria are satisfied. An architectural review will be conducted to verify that the existing facility meets, or will be capable of meeting, licensure requirements. In those instances, in which a hospital makes application for outpatient surgical capabilities or an increase in its existing outpatient surgery capability via the establishment or expansion of operating rooms dedicated to outpatient surgery, the hospital's current level of outpatient surgical procedures will be subtracted from the total hospitals' outpatient surgical procedures. The hospitals' outpatient surgical rate (minus the applicant hospital) will be computed separately from the applicant's outpatient surgical rate. The county's projected population will be used to project hospitals' (minus the applicant hospital) outpatient volume, as well as existing ambulatory surgical facilities' volume. These figures will be subtracted from the total outpatient surgical "pool" projection. The 2nd year break even point number of procedures for approved ambulatory surgical facilities (which either are not in operation or have not operated a full year), is next subtracted from the total "pool." At this point, the projected number of outpatient procedures which would be performed at the applicant hospital, is compared to the remainder from the previous calculations. Should the projected outpatient level equal or exceed the calculated break even level of operation, consideration will be given to approving the application, assuring all other appropriate criteria are satisfied. In the case of hospital ambulatory Surgical projects which do not involve additional operating rooms dedicated to outpatient surgery, the above ambulatory surgery methodology will not be used. Licensed and existing ambulatory surgical centers which have been operational one year or more, will be surveyed to determine the number of procedures performed over one year. These procedures will be applied to the projected population and deducted from the total outpatient potential as described above. In the case of those approved but unlicensed ambulatory surgery methodology will not be used. Licensed and existing ambulatory surgical centers which have been operational one year or more, will be surveyed to determine the number of procedures performed over one year. These procedures will be applied to the projected population and deducted from the total outpatient potential as described above. In the case of those approved but unlicensed ambulatory surgical centers, the previously calculated break even level of operation will be deducted from the total outpatient potential. In all instances, the projected year of operation will be based on the time required for construction, if appropriate, as reflected in the application plus two years from the date of this office's review. "Procedures" include all diagnostic procedures (e.g., endoscopic and cystoscopic), as well as all other invasive procedures regularly construed of as surgeries. If you have any questions regarding this policy, please contact me upon receipt. This policy is effective on June 15, 1985. Petitioner's Exhibit A The June memorandum stated policy substantially similar to a memorandum authored by Mr. Maryanski's predecessor on February 21, 1985, which contained at least some of the elements of the policy that HRS applied earlier than October 9, 1983, Deposition of Nelson, p. 5, and even as early as December of 1982, Deposition of Porter, p. 11, and which reads: TO: PDCF STAFF SUBJECT: UPDATED POLICY ON CON REVIEW OF AMBULATORY SURGERY PROPOSALS At a meeting with Doug Mannheimer, members of PDCFR, and myself on February 14, the following guidelines for reviewing CON proposals for ambulatory surgery were agreed upon: Effective immediately, we will use 30 percent as the optimum number of surgeries to be performed on an outpatient basis as opposed to 29 percent. health maintenance organizations. The issue of how to deal with "pre-existing" unlicensed ambulatory surgery providers was also discussed. It was decided that if an applicant can demonstrate that it has been providing ambulatory surgical services historically in a facility which meets, or for a minor capital expenditure could meet, licensing requirements and that the provision of such services has been done profitably, this type of applicant should receive special consideration in CON reviews. However, in such cases, it will be necessary for the CON architect to verify that the existing facility meets, or almost meets, licensure requirements, and for the CON accountant to verify that the operation has historically been profitable. Data base issues were discussed. PDCFR was informed of the decision to remove the ambulatory surgery data collection burden from Nell Mitchem. The possibility of having PDCH and/or the local health councils collect such information on a semi-annual basis was discussed and will be explored further by Tom Porter. The method of counting procedures of existing ambulatory surgery centers was considered. The pros and cons of utilizing the center's break even point as described in its CON application versus its actual use was debated. It was decided that existing ambulatory surgery centers which have been in business one year or more will be surveyed to determine their actual use. In the case of those existing centers in business less than one year, the break even point will be used. The issue of counting dedicated hospital-based ambulatory surgery facilities was discussed. It was decided that in instances where a hospital applies for ambulatory surgical capabilities or an increase in that capability via the establishment or expansion of operating rooms solely dedicated to outpatient surgery, the hospital's current provision of outpatient surgery will be subtracted from the total of outpatient surgeries performed and then converted to an institution-specific rate and applied to projected population to determine the need. In the case of hospital ambulatory surgery projects not involving additional operating rooms or solely dedicated outpatient operating rooms, the ambulatory surgery methodology will not be employed. In these instances, the review will be primarily architectural. The definition of "procedures" was considered. It was determined that procedures should include all diagnostic procedures (e.g., endoscopic and cystoscopic), as well as all procedures regularly thought of as surgeries. establishment or expansion of operating rooms solely dedicated to outpatient surgery, the hospital's current provision of outpatient surgery will be subtracted from the total of outpatient surgeries performed and then converted to an institution-specific rate and applied to projected population to determine the need. In the case of hospital ambulatory surgery projects not involving additional operating rooms or solely dedicated outpatient operating rooms, the ambulatory surgery methodology will not be employed. In these instances, the review will be primarily architectural. The definition of "procedures" was considered. It was determined that procedures should include all diagnostic procedures (e.g., endoscopic and cystoscopic), as well as all procedures regularly thought of as surgeries. The method of computing the break even point was discussed. Tom Porter will work with Joe Mitchell to come up with an improved method for doing this. The issue of what year we project need to was discussed. It was decided that in all cases, the projection year would be based on the time shown in the application as required for construction and licensing of the facility plus two years from the date of the HRS review or date of administrative hearing, whichever is later. If you have any questions concerning this memorandum, please see me. /s/ Gene W. Eugene Nelson, Administrator COMMUNITY MEDICAL FACILITIES Petitioner's Exhibit B. The June memorandum supersedes the February memorandum but "not totally." Deposition of Marta Hardy, p. 10. The June memorandum made changes regarding the treatment of hospitals' applications. Deposition of Elizabeth Dudek, p. 23. On September 13, 1985, more than two weeks after the petitions had been filed in Cases Nos. 85-2962RX and 85-2963RX, Mr. Maryanski signed the following memorandum: SUBJECT: Policy Memorandums TO: PDCF (Liz Dudek) (Wayne McDaniel) (Paul Reilly) (Joe Mitchell) Policy memorandums are statements of the current policy of the Office of Community Medical Facilities, and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, regarding the subject to which it is addressed. The policy at issue is in a state of development, and should not be considered to have reached a level of general applicability to all cases. This memorandum is not intended to dictate the out-come of action being taken on any given case, but rather represents a momentary picture of this policy as it has developed through cases previously encountered. In order to provide for reasonably consistent actions taken in similar instances in this office, please utilize this policy memorandum as a guideline, subject to change and development on a case basis. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 At some point staff were told "if there are reasons to deviate [from the policy embodied in the June memorandum] that they should come and discuss those reasons with their supervisor or" (T. 73) Mr. Maryanski. At least some HRS staff adhere to the policy stated in the June memorandum. Deposition of Elizabeth Dudek, p. 28. But the only reasons for deviating from the policy set out in the Maryanski memorandum of June 6, 1985, are the very reasons that would justify deviation from duly promulgated administrative rules. (T. 77) Petitioner's Exhibit A, the June memorandum, has application statewide and is addressed to all applications for certificate of need for ambulatory surgical centers. (T. 77) Without this policy in effect, "the only means [HRS] would have available would be to review am-surg applications according to statutory criteria." (T. 73) HRS has assigned to its Office of Comprehensive Health Planning, not to its Office of Community Medical Facilities (headed by Mr. Maryanski and, before him, by Mr. Nelson), responsibility for promulgating administrative rules. On July 6, 1984, HRS published notice of intent to adopt a rule governing applications for certificates of need for ambulatory surgical centers, at 10 Florida Administrative Weekly No. 27, pp. 2064-2067. Petitioner's Exhibit C. Additional or amended notice was published on March 15, 1985, at 11 Florida Administrative Weekly No. 11. After petitions challenging HRS' proposed rule 10-5.11(30) were filed, HRS abandoned the effort formally to adopt a rule specifying the criteria for granting certificates of need for ambulatory surgical centers, by filing notice of withdrawal with the Department of State on June 20, 1985. On deposition, HRS' Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Planning testified that the June "memo was issued right after we withdrew the rule." At 6. Although in fact the notice of withdrawal of proposed rule 10-5.11(30) was not filed until after the June 6 memorandum was executed, the decision to withdraw the proposed rule, to judge from this testimony, antedated the memorandum which "in the absence of any kind of methodology, [HRS] decided to issue. . . to provide methodology guidelines to the staff within the office." Deposition of Marta Hardy, p. 6.
