The Issue Whether the Petitioner received a salary overpayment from the Respondent for leave usage to which she was not entitled, as set forth in amended correspondence dated October 2, 2009, and, if so, the amount of any overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ms. Anderson was employed by the Department as a full- time Career Service employee until her separation on August 11, 2009. She had one year and four months' service with the State of Florida. As an employee of the Department, Ms. Anderson was paid biweekly. Based on her years of service, Ms. Anderson accrued four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave each biweekly pay period. Ms. Anderson used the People First System to complete her timesheets, request approval of leave, and review her leave balances. At issue is the amount of annual and sick leave used by Ms. Anderson during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009 and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson entered her time in the computerized People First timesheet as follows: February 6, 2009 8 hours' worked February 9, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 10, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 11, 2009 3.25 hours' sick leave 4.75 hours' annual leave February 12, 2009 8 hours' personal holiday February 13, 2009 8 hours' annual leave February 16, 2009 7.25 hours' annual leave February 17, 2009 8 hours' worked February 18, 2009 8.75 hours' worked February 19, 2009 4 hours' sick leave 4 hours' annual leave The Pay Period Overview in the People First System for the pertinent time period reflected the following: Beginning balance 2/06/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Accrual 2/19/09: 4 hours' annual leave 4 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Used N/A : (24.00) hours' annual leave (23.25) hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Ending Balance 2/19/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday The Department's Policies and Procedures for Attendance and Leave provides in pertinent part: III. Standards and Procedures * * * Annual Leave Method of Earning Annual Leave * * * Bureau of Personnel 1. Annual leave earned during any period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period or, in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Annual Leave Employee 1. Use of annual leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited and shall only be used with the prior approval of the proper authority. * * * Sick Leave Method of Earning Sick Leave * * * Employee * * * 4. Sick leave earned during any pay period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period, or in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Sick Leave Employee 1. Use of sick leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited to the employee and shall only be used with the approval of the proper authority. The Department keeps an official record of an employee's leave balances and accruals for each pay period, and it conducts audits of an employee's leave upon separation. The Department performed an audit of Ms. Anderson's leave and created an Employee Leave Record setting out annual and sick leave earned and used by Ms. Anderson up to her date of separation in August 2009. The audit revealed that Ms. Anderson had 20 hours of annual leave and 19.25 of sick leave available as of January 6, 2009, and that she accrued 4 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave on February 19, 2009, which could be used beginning February 20, 2009. As shown on the People's First timesheet prepared by Ms. Anderson and set out above, Ms. Anderson used 24 hours of annual leave and 23.25 hours of sick leave during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009, and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson, therefore, used four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave to which she was not entitled during the pay period extending from February 6, 2009, to February 19, 2009, and she was paid for these hours in the salary warrant issued February 27, 2009. In calculating the amount of the salary overpayment to Ms. Anderson, the Department made allowance for the one hour's annual leave balance Ms. Anderson had when she separated from the Department. The Department, therefore, calculated the salary overpayment based on seven non-compensable hours, and the balance owed by Ms. Anderson to the Department for the salary overpayment is $66.65.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order requiring Lillian Anderson to remit to the Department of Juvenile Justice the amount of $66.65. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lillian Anderson 3617 Carambola Circle North Coconut, Florida 33066 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact From July 1946 until his retirement from the state career service system on June 30, 1983, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security or its predecessor agencies (the Florida Industrial Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the War Manpower Commission), hereinafter collectively referred to as the Department. The Department, at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, established and administered its own leave policies. Subsequently, the Florida Merit System was expanded to cover all state agencies, including the Department, and uniform personnel policies and practices, including the accumulation of annual leave, were established. Effective July 1, 1957 the accumulation of annual leave for employees of the Department, as with employees of all state agencies, was limited to 240 hours. Initially, Merit System leave regulations provided that leave accumulated by employees of agencies with existing leave regulations, such as the Department, would be credited to their accounts as of July 1, 1957, but any accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours would become void after December 31, 1959. At the behest of the Department, the deadline within which excess accumulated leave had to be utilized was extended to December 31, 1961. Essentially employees were afforded four and one-half years within which to utilize their excess accumulated annual leave or forfeit it. Upon his retirement June 30, 1983, Petitioner was paid for, and had computed as part of his Average Final compensation; the annual leave he had accumulated up to a maximum of 240 hours in accordance with Rule 22A-8.10, F.A.C. That rule, or its predecessor, has contained the same 240-hour limitation since December 31, 1961. Petitioner asserts that he had accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours on December 31, 1961. While the evidence does establish Petitioner had excess leave on that date, there was no competent evidence presented from which his actual leave balance could be established. The actual amount of Petitioner's excess leave is not, however, significant since any annual leave he had in excess of 240 hours was void after December 31, 1961. Notwithstanding the voiding of his excess annual leave, Petitioner asserts that his entitlement to such leave still exists because of certain assurances he received from his supervisors. According to Petitioner, he was unable to utilize his excess leave between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1961, because he was on "special assignments" for the Department which precluded his absence from work. Consequently, Petitioner says, `his supervisors "assured" him that they would see to it that he "got his excess leave." It is worthy of note that the supervisors who purportedly gave such assurances have been dead for over a decade, that there exists no corroborating evidence of Petitioner's assertions, and that at no time during the ensuing 23 years did Petitioner raise any issue concerning, or attempt to use, the leave which had been forfeited. It is further worthy of note that while purportedly assured he would "get his excess leave," Petitioner received no assurance he would be paid for it upon retirement. It is unnecessary to decide whether such assurances were in fact given. The evidence is clear that the supervisors in question had no authority, real or apparent, to bind the State by such assurances. Further, any reliance Petitioner may have placed on such assurances would not have been reasonable, since such assurances were contrary to existing regulations.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Anthony McFarlane, was overpaid in the amount of $978.69 as a result of utilizing more administrative leave than that to which he was entitled.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an employee of the Agency's Central Office during the pay periods of February 14, 2014, to February 27, 2014; February 28, 2014, to March 13, 2014; and March 14, 2014, to March 27, 2014. Although the exact dates of Petitioner's employment by the Agency are unknown, he was also employed by the Agency and its predecessor entities prior to, and subsequent to, those dates for a total of approximately eighteen years. Petitioner retired from the Agency on April 4, 2014. Petitioner, prior to his retirement, attempted to use the surplusage of leave time he had accumulated for which he would not be compensated upon retiring. The Agency uses the People First system for the submittal of employee time sheets and tracking of individual employees' accrued paid leave time. The system maintains the amount of Annual Leave, Sick Leave, and Special Compensation Leave available to each individual employee. Further, although Sick Leave can be used at any time, Annual Leave cannot be used until Special Compensation Leave is depleted. Administrative Leave--Other is not maintained on an individual level and employees are not automatically prohibited from using more Administrative Leave--Other than that to which they are entitled nor are they required to deplete their Special Compensation Leave prior to using Administrative Leave. Administrative Leave--Other is made available to employees only in special circumstances such as an office closure due to a hurricane, plumbing leak, or air conditioner failure, or an unscheduled paid holiday authorized by the Governor. During the pay period of February 14, 2014, to February 27, 2014, Petitioner used sixteen hours of Special Compensation Leave (Code 0055) and sixteen hours of Sick Leave (Code 0052). During the pay period of February 28, 2014, to March 13, 2014, Petitioner used seventy-two hours of Administrative Leave-- Other (Code 0056). No special circumstances entitling Petitioner to take Administrative Leave--Other hours occurred during this pay period. During the pay period of March 14, 2014, to March 27, 2014, Petitioner used five hours of Special Compensation Leave (Code 0055) and seventy-five hours of Annual Leave (Code 0051). In February of 2015, the Office of the Inspector General published an audit of the Agency's human resources practices at its Central Office. The audit showed that seventy-two hours of Annual Leave were miscoded as Administrative Leave--Other, resulting in a $1,059.84 leave balance overpayment. The Agency then determined that Petitioner was the individual whose Annual Leave time had been miscoded as Administrative Leave--Other and had therefore been overpaid $1,059.84. After adjusting the amount for taxes and benefits withheld, the Agency concluded that the amount overpaid directly to Petitioner was $978.69. During the hearing, Petitioner for the first time realized and admitted that in his attempt to deplete his Special Compensation Leave before using his Annual Leave, he made an error in using Code 0056 (Administrative Leave--Other) when he intended to use Code 0055 (Special Compensation Leave).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner repay $100.00 per month to the Agency until the $978.69 balance is repaid in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Kurt Eric Ahrendt, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Anthony McFarlane 7971 Northwest 11th Street Plantation, Florida 33322-5158 David De La Paz, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Executive Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner was employed by Respondent beginning in 1985 and, at all times material hereto, was supervised by Dr. Frank A. Coliazzi. Petitioner had been made aware of the rules and policy of the Respondent in regard to unauthorized leave of absence. Specifically, Petitioner was counselled in this regard on March 26, 1986, by Dr. Frank A. Colliazzi for his unauthorized leave of absence on March 25, 1986. Petitioner knew, or should have known, that un-authorized leave of absences could result in disciplinary action or the loss of employment through abandonment. Prior to April 14, 1986, Petitioner had a history of unauthorized leave of absences. In fact, Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 9 & 11, 1986, after being counselled as late as March 26, 1986 in this regard. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 14, 15 & 16, 1986. Petitioner appeared briefly at the work place on April 15, 1986 but did not go to work and left immediately when requested to work by Dr. Colliazzi, with a promise to return to work the next morning, April 16; 1986, at 8:00 a.m. The Petitioner did not request a leave of absence at this time and did not return to work on April 16, 1986 as promised. Respondent's certified letter of April 16, 1986, informing Petitioner that Respondent considered him to have abandoned his position because of his three (3) consecutive days of unauthorized leave was not received by Petitioner until April 24, 1986 due to Petitioner's failure to notify Respondent of his change of address. However, Petitioner was made aware of the letter and its contents by Maxine Fields on April 21, 1986. Petitioner's failure to return to work on April 17 & 18, 1986, lends support to Respondent's contention that Petitioner had abandoned his job since Petitioner was not aware of Respondent's position on his abandonment until April 21, 1986. At no time relevant to this proceeding was leave requested by Petitioner or granted by Respondent. Although Petitioner received notice of the hearings, he failed to appear at either one and present evidence in rebuttal to Respondent's position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the action of the Respondent in deeming the Petitioner to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service was correct and affirming such action. RESPECTFULLY ENTERED and SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2604 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(1), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Petitioner did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 & 8. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 & 7. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Judy Waldman, Esquire General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Barbara Wingo, Esquire Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 James H. Foster 3216 Lancastor Lane Tampa, Florida 33619 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a salary overpayment from Respondent for leave usage to which he was not entitled, as set forth in correspondence dated April 26, 2013; and, if so, whether Respondent is entitled to a repayment for the salary overpayment made to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bruce Deterding, was an employee of the Department of Health, having served as an executive director of a medical practice board, making him a Select Exempt Service (SES) employee. Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with the Department on December 19, 2012. The agreement required Petitioner to resign his position with the Department effective February 28, 2013, and included the following conditions: Petitioner's last day in the office would be December 18, 2012, one day preceding the signed settlement agreement; and Petitioner was required to utilize 384 hours of accrued annual leave beginning on December 19, 2012, and ending on February 27, 2013. Petitioner did not participate in the preparation of the settlement agreement, but agreed to its terms by his signature. The agreement was signed by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance Director Lucy C. Gee on behalf of the Department. From December 19, 2012, through February 28, 2013, Petitioner performed as obligated under the agreement. The Department paid Petitioner for the 384 hours of leave as required by the agreement. Petitioner relied on the Department's representations that he would be able to purchase his former military service time from the State Retirement System and retire with 30 years of state service on the resignation date set forth in the agreement. Petitioner demonstrated through a screen shot of his personnel records in the "PeopleFirst" system that he had an available balance of 428 hours of annual leave at the time he entered into the settlement agreement with the Department. The Department's employee verified through PeopleFirst that sufficient hours of leave were available prior to presenting the settlement agreement offering to pay 384 hours of leave to Petitioner. The Department notified Petitioner by a letter dated April 26, 2013, that he had received salary overpayments. Specifically, the letter stated that two payments in the amounts of $1,262.48 and $1,717.56, dated February 22, 2013, and March 8, 2013, respectively, had been erroneously made to him. Petitioner, as an SES employee, received 176 hours of annual leave on his leave accrual anniversary date of July 1 each year. In 2010, Petitioner received an annual leave accrual of 176 hours on June 18, 2010, and a second annual leave accrual on July 1, 2010. On April 26, 2013, Petitioner had a telephone conversation with Meshelle Bradford, one of the Department's payroll employees, concerning potential salary overpayments. During that conversation, Petitioner acknowledged he had received the two salary accruals totaling 352 hours on June 18 and July 1, 2010. Petitioner testified that he assumed he was the beneficiary of an "extraordinarily good hire date" which entitled him to receive leave on his former (from his previous state employment) and new leave accrual dates. The Department conducted a payroll and leave audit after the date of Petitioner's resignation and separation from the agency. The audit revealed that Petitioner had been overpaid for annual leave hours that he had accrued in 2010 by mistake. Petitioner had been paid for annual leave he used in February 2013, when he had exhausted all of his accrued leave. During the two-week pay period of February 1 through 14, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 58.5 hours of leave he did not have available, and for the two-week pay period of February 15 through 28, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 80 hours of leave he did not have available, resulting from the double accrual of leave in June and July 2010. The Department's position is that Petitioner should have been in leave without pay status for the 58.5 and 80 hours of leave for which he was paid in February 2013. The calculated overpayment for the unavailable leave is $2,980.04. The Department seeks reimbursement from Petitioner for that amount. Petitioner disputes that he owes any amount due to the fact he entered into a settlement agreement that delineated the payments to be made by the Department to him as a condition of his resignation. The Department's Agency Attendance and Leave Policy, in section VI.D.3, states: "It is the employee's responsibility to maintain an accurate accounting of their leave balances."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health requiring Petitioner to repay the overpayment of salary in the amount of $2,980.04. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark John Henderson, Esquire Department of Health 2585 Merchants Row, Room 110J Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Bruce Milton Deterding 4841 Old Bainbridge Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Althea Gaines, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S. State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Basil Glinton (Glinton), was employed full time by the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) as a Public Assistance Specialist II. On September 14, 1984, as a result of a transfer, Glinton was scheduled to start work at the Department's Food Stamp Office, Unit 61, in Miami, Florida. At 9:15 a.m., September 14, 1984, a Friday, Glinton reported to Unit He requested and received his paycheck, and advised the acting supervisor that he had a doctor's appointment which would require his absence from the office for about one hour. Glinton did not return to the office that day. On Monday, September 17, 1984, Glinton reported to Unit 61 and worked from 8:12 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On that date, the office supervisor, Raquel Tima, met with Glinton and spoke with him about his absence of September 14, 1984. Ms. Lima advised Glinton that she needed a doctor's statement to authorize that absence. No doctor's statement has been produced. Glinton failed to report for work the remainder of that workweek-- September 18-21, 1984. On September 21, 1984, Ms. Lima sent a warning letter, certified mail, to Glinton. The postal claim check reflects that Glinton was notified of the letter on September 24, 1984, September 29, 1984, and October 9, 1984, but failed to claim it. Glinton likewise failed to report for work the following week-- September 24-28, 1984. He did, however, appear at the office on Friday, September 28, 1984, to request his paycheck. On October 1, 1984, Glinton was personally delivered a letter dated September 28, 1984, which advised him that his absence from work since September 18, 1984 was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), F.A.C., he was deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised Glinton of his right to petition the Department of administration for a review of the facts and whether they constitute abandonment. By letter dated October 4, 1984, Glinton timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review. In his letter, and at final hearing, Glinton claimed he was ill and under a doctor's care for the period of September 18-28, 1984, and that he had routinely called, or had someone else call, the office to advise them of his illness. While professing "illness" for a two-week period, Glinton failed to offer any evidence of the nature of his illness. He further failed to offer the testimony of his physician, or any other evidence supportive of his claim. While Glinton acknowledges familiarity with the Department's rule which requires that the supervisor be notified of absence due to illness, he made no attempt to contact his supervisor. The only time the office was notified of his absence was on September 19, 1984 when an unknown female telephoned and advised the switchboard operator, without explanation, that Glinton would not be coming to work on that date. Glinton's testimony that his absence from work during the period of September 18-28, 1984 was due to illness, and that he telephoned the office every day during his absence, is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order that: Petitioner, Basil Glinton, abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective October 1, 1984. Dismisses the petition of Basil Glinton with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Dniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Suite 1070, 410 N.W. 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Robert L. McKinney, Esquire Suite 1107 Jackson Medical Tower 1500 N.W. 12th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1321 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a full-time career service employee. On July 13, 1984, he was ranked as a Correctional Officer I at Florida State Prison (FSP). On March 2, 1990, Petitioner had been placed on workers' compensation due to a back injury. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, Dr. W. David Sikes of the Bradford Chiropractic Center signed a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to light duty on Monday, April 9, 1990. Dr. Sikes was apparently the authorized treating physician to whom the agency had currently obligated itself pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. [The Florida Workers' Compensation Act]. A previous physician had released Petitioner for full-duty work on April 3, 1990. Petitioner was present in the office of Personnel Manager Marion Bronson on Friday, April 6, 1990. At that time, Mr. Bronson told Petitioner to report for work on the first shift (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) on Monday, April 9, 1990. This meant Petitioner would be doing mail room duty during the day instead of his regular duties on his regular shift of midnight to 8:00 a.m. Petitioner told Mr. Bronson he could not work the first shift due to his needing to be home to take of his invalid wife. To this, Mr. Bronson replied that the first shift was the only light duty available. On Friday, April 6, 1990 Petitioner did not refuse to come in to work the first shift on Monday, April 9, and he did not tell Mr. Bronson that he was already signed out on annual leave for that date. Nonetheless, Mr. Bronson was left with the impression at the end of their meeting that Petitioner would not come back to light-duty work on Monday. Petitioner did not report for work on the first shift on April 9, 10, or 11, 1990 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). On Wednesday, April 11, 1990, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: You have been carried in unauthorized leave without pay status since April 9, 1990. You were also carried on unauthorized leave without pay on April 3, 1990. You are hereby instructed to return to duty at 8:00 a.m. the day after you receive this letter. If you do not return to duty on that date it will be deemed that you have abandoned your position at Florida State Prison and you will be dismissed. In the past, the FSP personnel office usually made further efforts to contact missing employees after such a letter had been sent, but no such attempts were made in this instance. Normally, FSP gives employees an opportunity to call in and rectify absentee problems but deems it abandonment if the employee does not respond. At no time subsequent to April 6, 1990 did Petitioner contact anyone at FSP regarding his absence. Petitioner did not actually receive the April 11 letter until Friday, April 13. Petitioner did not report for work on Saturday, April 14, Sunday, April 15, or Monday, April 16. Saturday would have been a regular workday for Petitioner. However, Petitioner's usual days off were Sunday and Monday, and nothing had been said by Mr. Bronson about altering Petitioner's workdays. On Monday, April 16, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: This is to inform you that in accordance with Section 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., you have been deemed to have abandoned your position as Correctional Officer I and resigned from the Career Service System effective April 14, 1990. A copy of Section 22A-7.010(2) is enclosed for your information. You have been absent from duty for at least three consecutive workdays without authorized leave as follows: April 10, 11, and 12, 1990. Please be advised that you have been dropped from the payroll effective the close of business April 14, 1990. Unbeknownst to Mr. Bronson, Petitioner had exercised preapproved annual leave for the period of April 10-14, 1990. None of Petitioner's superiors advised Mr. Bronson of this fact. There was no notation to this effect in Petitioner's personnel file in Mr. Bronson's office. It was Mr. Bronson's testimony that it was better personnel management and he would have preferred to have Petitioner drawing annual leave during this period than to be paying him full pay for makeshift light duty. If Petitioner had requested annual leave on April 6, 1990, Mr. Bronson would have granted it. As of April 14, 1990, Petitioner had "banked" 119.75 hours of annual leave time which would have been sufficient to cover his April 10-14, 1990 vacation or "no show" days. Additionally, he also had available 26.5 hours of sick leave but this sick leave was subject to certain deductions and adjustments which had allowed the agency to keep Petitioner on at full pay the previous week while technically he was only eligible for a reduced amount based on workers' compensation. In accord with standard FSP policy, Petitioner had previously submitted an annual leave request form on October 16, 1989 to request leave for the week of April 10 through April 14, 1990. This form had been approved by his immediate superior, who at that time was his shift supervisor, Officer Gaskin. Officer Gaskin was the correct superior to make such approval. Mr. Bronson has nothing to do with the approval of leave under such circumstances. Harry Tison, who became Petitioner's shift supervisor in April 1990 while Petitioner was still out on workers' compensation leave, was not aware of Petitioner's preapproved annual leave until Mr. Bronson's office began making inquiries after the April 16 letter, but at that time, Tison was able to refer to a leave calendar posted in his area which showed that Petitioner was expected to be out on annual leave on those days. From that information, Officer Tison, by reason of his familiarity with the FSP system and hierarchy, could infer that Petitioner's leave had been approved by FSP's highest command figure, "the Colonel." Some witnesses alluded to FSP policy that even preapproved annual leave requests constituted only tentative approval unless the employee checked with his supervisor a week before actually exercising his leave so as to be sure that the preapproved leave had not been revoked due to an employee crunch, but there is no such rule or printed policy of the Department of Corrections or FSP, and the evidence is insufficient to establish such a vague policy as uniform or binding on Petitioner. Also, in this instance, the week before, Petitioner was away from work most of that week on workers' compensation disability, and there is no evidence of any employee crunch which would have altered the prior annual leave approval.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner has not abandoned his position and returning him to the appropriate position with back pay and emoluments, subject to any appropriate setoffs under the Workers' Compensation Act and any mitigation from other employment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner has filed only a "Final Argument" and that is essentially legal argument and proposed conclusions of law as opposed to proposed findings of fact which are entitled to a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. Moreover, the format does not lend itself to intelligible rulings since no sentence is numbered. Respondent's PFOF: 1-6 Accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence, which does not comport with the testimony heard. Accepted. Rejected in FOF 13, which reflects the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted but subordinate. - 15 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Gloria W. Fletcher, Esquire 515 North Main Street, Suite 300 Post Office Box 1208 Gainesville, Florida 32602 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department"), was overpaid in the amount of $826.82 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On June 5, 1995, Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with Respondent to resolve certain disciplinary matters not directly relevant to this case. For purposes of this proceeding, the key element of the settlement agreement was that Petitioner would accept a voluntary demotion. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Petitioner would retain his current salary status for a period not to exceed five years, though it would exceed the maximum for his new pay grade. On June 7, 1995, the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") entered a final order approving the settlement agreement in disposition of Petitioner's complaint. Petitioner did not appeal the final order. Rule 60K-2.004(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a demoted state employee's base rate of pay may exceed the maximum of the salary range to which the employee has been demoted for a maximum of five years. Petitioner's base rate of pay was allowed to exceed the maximum of his new pay grade for the full five years. During this period, Petitioner benefited from pay grade increases, received a reclassification of his position, and was not promoted. The five-year period ended in June 2000. Respondent's main office in Tallahassee twice per year issues a computer-generated list of employees receiving pay over the maximum of their pay grades. Human resources employees in Respondent's branch offices then examine the list to determine whether these employees' base rate of pay should continue to exceed the maximum. Respondent issued an "Employees Over Maximum" list in September 2000. Rex Duley of the District 8 human resources office examined the approximately 15 listed names of persons working in District 8. Mr. Duley determined that the applicable five-year period for Petitioner's receipt of pay above his grade had expired in June 2000. Mr. Duley prepared a letter, dated September 11, 2000, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,316.11 in gross overpayments since June 2000. Respondent subsequently completed the full computation through the Bureau of State Payroll's automated system, and determined that the net overpayment to Petitioner was $826.82. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the net overpayment. Petitioner testified that he would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. Instead, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence calling into question the validity of the 1995 settlement agreement. This evidence was deemed irrelevant and was not admitted. The evidence established that Petitioner voluntarily entered the settlement agreement, did not appeal from the PERC final order adopting the settlement agreement, and accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement for a period of five years. The time for contesting that agreement has long passed. Petitioner also questioned Respondent's diligence in discovering the overpayments. Petitioner was well aware of the five-year limitation on the salary arrangement established by the settlement agreement, and was in at least as good a position as Respondent to know that he was being overpaid between June and September 2000. Petitioner accepted the overpayments without questioning them or calling Respondent's attention to them. Petitioner's contention that he is being penalized for Respondent's lax bookkeeping is thus without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Robert J. Richmond 5411 Loyloa Lane Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John C. Scott, has been a Career Service employee with the Department of Transportation for approximately ten years, assigned to the Centerline Maintenance Office in Pompano Beach, Florida. During all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Allen Thomas. Robert Lucas, Highway Maintenance Supervisor in charge of the District III Centerline Crew, is the Petitioner's second-level supervisor. Thomas and Lucas are the only individuals at the Centerline Maintenance Office authorized to approve leave for Petitioner. On May 23, 1987, the Petitioner was arrested for D.U.I. and placed in jail for fifteen days. After the Petitioner was arrested, he called his mother and asked her to inform his supervisor at work that he had some personal business to attend to and would need annual leave. On May 26, 1987, the Petitioner failed to report to work and had not previously requested leave from any of his supervisors. On the morning of May 26, 1987, Ms. Scott, the Petitioner's mother, called Mr. Lucas and told him that her son would need a couple of days off from work because of personal business. Mr. Lucas informed Mrs. Scott that annual leave could not be authorized over the telephone for personal business but that leave could be granted for an emergency situation. Ms. Scott reiterated that the Petitioner had some personal business to take care of. Mr. Lucas advised her that annual leave could not be authorized over the telephone under those circumstances. On June 1, 1987, Mr. Lucas was informed by Mr. Oshesky, the District Personnel Supervisor, that Petitioner's attorney had called and told him that Petitioner was in jail. The Petitioner was absent from work on May 26, 27, 28, and June 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1987. May 29, 30 and 31, 1987 were non-work days for Petitioner. At the time, the Petitioner's work week consisted of four ten hour days from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. The last day that Petitioner actually reported for work was Wednesday, May 20, 1987. However, on Thursday, May 21, 1987, the Petitioner was absent from work on authorized annual leave, May 22-24, 1987, were non-work days and on Monday, May 25, 1987, the Petitioner was absent from work due to an official holiday (8 hours) and authorized annual leave (2 hours). On June 5, 1987, the Respondent advised Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested, that he was being terminated effective May 20, 1987, (Petitioner's last day at work) for abandonment of his position. The Petitioner's absence from work and involvement with civilian authorities were related to an admitted alcohol problem. Since the Petitioner was released from jail, he has participated in a twenty-day in-patient substance abuse program at John F. Kennedy Hospital and is presently involved with a Fort Lauderdale after-care program. The Petitioner had been provided with a Department of Transportation Employee Handbook by his employers. The Handbook outlined the requirements for annual leave and leave of absences without pay. The Handbook provides in part as follows: Annual Leave - Get your supervisor's approval before taking leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work complete the leave request form, as appropriate. Leaves of Absence Without Pay - Upon request, you may be granted leave without pay ... for a period not to exceed twelve calendar months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, John C. Scott, has abandoned his Career Service position with the Department of Transportation. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2750 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Partially adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 5, and 6. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Hon. Kaye N. Henderson Department of Transportation Secretary Room 562 Burns Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Patrick J. Curry, Esquire Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, 200 Southeast Sixth Street M.S. 58 Suite 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 32301 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire 435 Carlton Building General Counsel Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Petitioner failed to report to work as scheduled on April 8, 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1988. Petitioner was absent from work without authorized leave for more than three consecutive work days. Petitioner was aware that after an unauthorized absence from work for three consecutive work days Respondent would consider her to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the career service employment system of the State of Florida. Petitioner was duly notified by Respondent that she had been deemed to have abandoned her position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Administration concluding that Petitioner abandoned her position in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave for the period of April 8-14, 1988. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Adopted in finding 1. Addressed in finding 2. Addressed in finding 3. 4.-5. Addressed in findings 3-5. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kimberly L. Thomas 15025 Southwest 106th Avenue Miami, Florida 33176 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Adis Vila Secretary Department of Administation 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kaye N. Henderson, P.E. Secretary Department of Transportation (Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58) Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450