Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this cause, Robert W. Pope has been the holder of license no. 62-600, series 4-COP, SRX, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to trade as The Wedgewood Inn, located at 1701, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. When the Respondent, Pope, began to operate the licensed premises he was given a registration sales tax number by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This number was provided in accordance with 212, F.S. That law required the remittance of the collected sales tax on a month to month basis, the period beginning with the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. The remittance was due on the first day of the following month and payable by the 20th day of the following month. Failure to pay by the 20th would result in a 5 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month. The sales tax remittance due from the licensed premises for December, 1975 through August, 1976 was not made, and a lien was filed to aid collection of the tax. In mid 1976, the Respondent, contacted the State of Florida, Department of Revenue to discuss term payments of the sales tax remittance. The Respondent in October, 1976 tried to effect a partial release of the tax claim by paying $2,900. In keeping with their policy the Department of Revenue rejected these efforts. Subsequently, in February, 1977, the Respondent made a $10,000 initial payment and three monthly installments to satisfy the lien on this licensed premises and another licensed premises which the Respondent owned. At present all taxes due and owing under 212, F.S. are current. The above facts establish that the Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of 212, F.S. pertaining to the remittance of sales tax from the Respondent to the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This violation, thereby subjects the Respondent to the possible penalties of 561.29, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Robert W. Pope, be required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250.00 or have the license no. 62-600, series 4- COP, SRX, suspended for a period of 10 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 611 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner owes unpaid sales and use tax, interest, and penalties for the period of February 1, 1994 through June 30, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings are made. Petitioner, Macfarlane, Ferguson, & McMullen, P.A., ("Macfarlane"), is a law firm located in Tampa, Florida. In May 1993, Macfarlane entered into a Copy Control Services Agreement ("1993 Contract") with Copy Control Center ("CCC"). The 1993 Contract, which was effective for three years, called for CCC to provide copying services within the physical confines of the MacFarlane law firm. CCC provided the personnel and MacFarlane provided the equipment and space for copying. The 1993 Contract called for a flat rate charge to Macfarlane. This stated flat rate charge covered a maximum number of copies each month. Pursuant to the terms of the 1993 Contract, so long as MacFarlane did not make more than 160,000 copies per month, it was charged a flat rate of $10,000 per month. Additional copy-related work over the flat rate charge for the maximum of 160,000 copies was at additional cost. An appendix to the 1993 Contract set forth the additional costs not covered by the flat monthly fee. If no copies were made under the contract, the base fee of the $10,000 would still have to be paid by Macfarlane. Paragraph 4 of the 1993 Contract required CCC to bill Macfarlane "monthly for the preceding month's copies." That paragraph of the 1993 Contract also provides that, "[i]ncluded with the invoice will be a detailed monthly usage report." The invoices issued under the 1993 Contract listed all costs for the month or preceding month. At the bottom of each invoice, CCC listed a total "sale amount" which consisted of the total of the copying facilities management charge and the additional charges. Between May 1993 and January 1994, Macfarlane paid sales tax on the total amount invoiced under the 1993 Contract (i.e. for all goods (copies) and services). In 1993 and 1994, the Department audited CCC. The audit was conducted by Elizabeth Sanchez, an auditor employed by the Department. Based on the 1993 and 1994 audit of CCC, the Department, through its auditor, Ms. Sanchez, alleged that CCC was not properly collecting sales tax from its clients, such as Macfarlane. Specifically, Ms. Sanchez determined that CCC should not have been taxing the entire cost of the 1993 Contract since a portion of the contract was related to services. Instead, the auditor represented that CCC should only tax the direct materials for the photocopy process (paper, toner, developer, and other supplies). Ultimately, CCC was assessed $16,000 in back taxes because it failed to pay sales tax on direct materials. During the aforementioned audit of CCC, Ms. Sanchez developed a formula which CCC could use in charging sales and use taxes to its clients. The formula was discussed with CCC personnel. CCC believed that the formula devised by Ms. Sanchez required or allowed the allocation of tax between nontaxable services and taxable photocopy consumables. Based on its understanding of the formula, CCC quit taxing Macfarlane for the entire amount of the monthly invoices issued under the 1993 Contract. Rather, consistent with its understanding of what was allowed under Ms. Sanchez's formula, CCC modified its billing to allocate tax between what CCC considered to be the facilities management services rendered under the 1993 Contract and the photocopy consumables used under that contract. The Department does not dispute that Ms. Sanchez developed a formula during the 1993 and 1994 audit of CCC. In fact, in the Department's Response to Petitioner's Request for Admissions, the Department admits that "Ms. Sanchez did audit Copy Control Center . . . and did develop a formula during that audit." However, the Department contends that the formula developed by Ms. Sanchez has no basis in law and fact and her actions are contrary to Rule 12A-1.0161(7)(a), Florida Administrative Code. According to the Department, that Rule requires both a statement of the actual cost of the taxable sales and the nontaxable services and the separation of taxable sales from non-taxable services in a contract or invoice for the service to be untaxed. In 1996, Macfarlane executed a new Copy Control Services Agreement with CCC (the "1996 Contract"). The 1996 Contract, dated May 22, 1996, was in effect from May 1996 through April 30, 2000. The 1996 Contract contained similar terms and conditions as the 1993 Contract, including a flat-rate charge and a maximum number of copies before additional charges were imposed. The flat-rate charge in the 1996 contract was $10,200 and the maximum number of copies before additional charges were imposed increased to 170,000. Additional copy- related work over the flat rate charge was at additional cost. The additional costs not covered by the flat monthly fee were set forth in an appendix to the 1996 Contract. Paragraph 6 of the 1996 Contract was entitled "Invoices." That section provides in pertinent part the following: A summary invoice for all Customer Locations shall be sent by Copy Control to the bill-to address and contact person of the Customer set forth hereinbelow, on a monthly basis. The monthly minimum base charge will be invoiced on the first day of each month. Additional charges for copies in excess of target volume or additional services from the previous month will be included with this invoice. In addition, Copy Control specifically agrees to provide to such Customer contact person, on a monthly in arrears basis, a summary report of the C.C.M. [Copy Control Management] Services transaction activity at, (A) all Customer Locations; and, (B) the Copy Control back-up facility, if any ("Summary Report"). Each Summary Report will contain, at a minimum, the following information: The total volume of Copies rendered; The number of Copies rendered per Customer location; The number of Copies above the Targeted Copy Volume, if any, and total Excess Copy Charge therefor by Customer Location and Copy Control back-up facility; The volume of Copies and associated dollar amount rendered at Copy Control's back-up facility, if any; The number of Copies "short" of Targeted Copy Volume; Additional Supplies procured, if any; Amount of overtime paid, if any, for Copy Control Personnel and dates therefor; A description of the Related Services, if any provided by Copy Control and the charge(s) therefore, if any; (emphasis supplied) Consistent with the terms of the 1996 Contract, CCC rendered an invoice to Macfarlane each month during the term of the contract and during the remainder of the audit period covered by that contract. Each invoice listed charges for making copies and off-site copies and other copy-related work and/or materials and products. Under the line for "Copying Facilities Mgt. Billing" were the additional charges made according to the appendix to the contract. The following invoice, dated June 30, 1995, is representative of the monthly invoices issued by CCC to Macfarlane during the period covered by the Department's audit of Macfarlane. That invoice provides in material part the following: COPY CONTROL CENTER INVOICE NO. 131611 3907 W. Osborne Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 SOLD TO: MacFarlane Ausley & et al 23rd Floor LeeAnn Conley 111 E. Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 INVOICE DATE 6/30/95 QYT. ORDERED 1 QTY. SHIPPED 1 ITEM NO. COPIES DESCRIPTION COPIES UNIT PRICE 10000.00 Copying Facilities Mgt.Billing for June 23913 23913 Copies Copies Overage 0.04 1 1 TAX Tax on CCM Material 106.39 1 1 Copies Off Site Services 349.36 1 1 TONER 90 TONER 174.25 9 9 STOCK 8 1/2 x 11 White Paper 2.85 SALE AMOUNT 11612.17 MISC. CHARGES 6.500% SALES TAX 35.70 FREIGHT TOTAL 11647.87 For all the invoices generated under the 1996 Contract, CCC taxed Macfarlane in accordance with its understanding of the formula devised and recommended by Ms. Sanchez. Based on application of this formula, Macfarlane was charged and remitted only sales tax for the consumable goods portion of the contract. During the audit period which is the subject of this proceeding, February 1, 1994 through June 30, 1998, the sales tax was either 6.5 percent or 7 percent, whichever was in effect at the time of the invoice. The sales tax listed on the invoices do not reflect tax on the total amount of the invoice. A multiplication of the total amount by either 6.5 or 7 percent reveals that the amount of sales taxes paid by Macfarlane for the audit period in question, February 1, 1994 through June 30, 1998, was only on a small portion of the total invoice billing. The 1993 Contract and the 1996 Contract between Macfarlane and CCC do not address, contain language, or speak directly to any "facilities management services." Neither do the contracts define the terms "service," "related services," or "other related services." Although the terms listed in paragraph 22 above are not defined in the 1993 Contract and the 1996 Contract, Mr. Cayo, the regional operations manager of Lanier Professional Services (LPS), formerly CCC, testified that other services included facilities management services. According to Mr. Cayo, "facilities management" at Macfarlane included making deliveries and rounds, key-oping equipment, filing, supporting, and cleaning and setting up conference rooms. Diane Garner, an employee of CCC, was assigned to work at Macfarlane during the time of the audit period which is the subject of this proceeding. Ms. Garner testified that facilities management services or other services provided by CCC included providing coffee service, sorting mail, sending and delivering faxes, sending and delivering Federal Express packages, moving boxes, ordering and delivering office supplies, and making interoffice mail runs. If the above-described facilities management services were provided, none of the invoices sent by CCC to Macfarlane separately listed any charges to Macfarlane for those services. Moreover, CCC did not separately list on its invoices to Macfarlane a charge for "mail delivery," "filing," "charge-back accounting," or "clerical services," or any other such services. If these services were deemed "related services," the provisions of the 1996 Contract quoted in paragraph 16 required that a description of such services be provided on the invoice or summary report. No description of the foregoing services appears on any of the invoices prepared by CCC and issued to Macfarlane. No other contracts existed between CCC and Macfarlane during the audit periods which reflect that the services described in paragraphs 23 and 24 above would be offered or provided by CCC to Macfarlane. The Department audited Macfarlane in 1999. The audit was conducted by Darlene Bebbington, an auditor with the Department. During this audit, contrary to the position of Ms. Sanchez during the aforementioned audit of CCC, the Department stated that Macfarlane was required to pay tax on the full amount of the invoices. This conclusion was reached by Ms. Bebbington based on the information contained on each invoice. The invoices did not itemize or otherwise separately list or detail products, materials, and/or services that were exempt from tax. To address issues raised by Ms. Bebbington during the audit, Macfarlane sought information from CCC regarding the sales tax amounts that were listed on the invoices. In response, CCC provided two letters to Macfarlane, one dated April 29, 1999, and the second one dated September 22, 1999. In the April 29, 1999, letter to Macfarlane, Mr. Cayo explained how the company handled the sales tax issue for Facilities Management customers and the rationale for doing so. Mr. Cayo stated that during the Department's audit of CCC, Ms. Sanchez indicated that "Facilities Management" was a service and it "was not subject to be taxed." In the letter, Mr. Cayo also stated that all equipment and material used in the performance of these services needed to be taxed, but not the total "Facilities Management" charge. The September 22, 1999, letter was from Andrew Schutte, Finance Manager of LPS, formerly CCC, to Macfarlane and was in response to a specific inquiry from Macfarlane. In that letter, Mr. Schutte stated that the two full-time CCC employees working at the Macfarlane office assigned 87 percent of their collective time performing various facilities management services and spent approximately 13 percent of their collective time making photocopies. However, the letter did not indicate how Mr. Schutte arrived at the quoted percentages or the time period for which those percentages applied. Based on CCC's claim that the formula devised by Ms. Sanchez was used to calculate the amount of sales tax it should charge Macfarlane, Ms. Bebbington pulled CCC's audit file from the Department's records. The Department contends that any agreement to use a formula such as the one described in paragraph 10, should have, by Department policy, been in writing, signed by the auditor and the supervisors, and placed in the audit file. However, upon a review of the Department's records, no such written agreement or documentation was in the CCC audit file. In light of the Department's admission noted in paragraph 13 above, Ms. Sanchez devised a formula which was shared with CCC, but she apparently did not include this formula or her discussions with CCC in the audit file. After Ms. Bebbington completed the audit of Macfarlane and based on the results thereof, the Department notified Macfarlane that it intended to impose additional sales and use tax, interest, and penalties. After the audit report was issued Macfarlane objected to the findings and requested that the Department reconsider the assessment. On or about April 10, 2001, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration ("Notice") based on Macfarlane's protest of the Department's audit findings for the period of February 1, 1994 through June 30, 1998. The Notice showed that Macfarlane owed additional sales and use tax of $35,958.27, a penalty of $17,979.37, and interest through April 6, 2000, of $16,701.32, and additional interest through April 12, 2000, of $3,606.12. The notice also indicated that interest would continue to accrue at $9.72 per day from April 12, 2001. According to the Notice, Macfarlane made a payment of $6,407.65 to the Department on April 6, 2000, leaving an unpaid balance of $67,837.43. Macfarlane asserts that it should not have to pay sales and use tax on the full amount of the invoice because a portion of that amount is for services that are exempt from sales and use tax. Contrary to this assertion, the auditor found that the invoices and other documentary evidence provided to the Department did not provide substantial competent evidence that any portion of the invoice amounts were attributable to products, materials, or services that were exempt from tax. Accordingly, based on the information provided by Macfarlane, the Department properly concluded that the total amount of each invoice was subject to sales and use tax. Because there is no substantial competent written documentation evidencing what tax exempt services were performed by CCC for Macfarlane and what specified portion of the monthly costs invoiced to Macfarlane were for those "claimed" tax exempt services, Macfarlane is liable for the entire amount on the invoices for the audit period. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Macfarlane did not timely pay the total amount of the invoices, including the amount attributable by CCC to sales and use tax. But for CCC's changing the manner in which it calculated the sales and use tax for its customers in early 1994, Macfarlane would have continued paying the tax on all goods and services as it did prior to January 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a final order be entered sustaining the assessment for sales and use tax against Petitioner, but compromising the entire interest and penalty amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Goodwin, Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson & McMullen, P.A. 400 North Tampa Street, Suite 2300 Tampa, Florida 33602 Bruce Hoffman, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 David Adams, Esquire Charles Moore, Esquire Macfarlane, Ferguson & McMullen, P.A. 400 North Tampa Street, Suite 2300 Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Department of Revenue (Department) has properly issued an assessment against Mitchell's Grocery and Seafood (Mitchell's) for additional sales and use tax, interest and penalty; local government infrastructure surtax, interest and penalty; and school capital outlay surtax, interest and penalty; purportedly due in connection with business operations of Mitchell's relating to underreported taxable sales.
Findings Of Fact Mitchell's Grocery and Seafood is located at 8221 North Century Boulevard, Century, Florida. Mr. Harold Mitchell is the sole proprietor of that business and it is a retail sales business meeting the definition of the term "dealer" as defined in Section 212.06(2)(c)(d), Florida Statutes (2001). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing the tax laws of the State of Florida in accordance with Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. Mitchell's is engaged in the business of operating a "general store," selling fresh seafood, fishing tackle, fish bait, animal feed and general grocery items during times relevant to the audit period. On June 7, 2001 the Department sent Mitchell's a Form DR-840, being a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records. The audit was conducted between June 2001 and July 20, 2001. The purpose of the audit was to determine whether Mitchell's was properly collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to the State of Florida through the Department. The audit period with which the audit effort was concerned relates to May 1, 1996 through April 30, 2001 (audit period). On September 4, 2001, as a result of its audit, the Department sent a "Notice of Proposed Assessment" (Assessment) to Mitchell's indicating that it believed Mitchell's owed additional sales and use taxes in the amount of $50,864.13 with a related penalty of $25,138.96, with interest through September 4, 2001 in the amount of $15,950.65, for a total amount of $91,953.74. It also assessed a local government infrastructure surtax amount allegedly due of $8,477.43, with related penalty of $4,126.79, with interest through September 4, 2001, of $2,658.39, as well as additional school capital outlay tax allegedly due $2,934.02, with related penalty of $1,505.55, with interest through September 4, 2001 of $637.96. The taxpayer, the Petitioner chose to contest this assessment and filed a protest letter, dated August 18, 2001. The Petitioner submitted financial information in an additional letter submitted to by the Department during its informal protest. Mitchell's filed a formal protest by letter dated April 23, 2002. The Petitioner availed itself of the reconsideration process by the Department and a Notice of Reconsideration dated October 16, 2002, was issued by the Department. This was done after the Department's representatives visited the Petitioner's place of business on July 9, 2002, reviewed the taxable "markup" percentages and the exempt markups and elected to reduce its total tax assessment from $62,275.58 to $58,371.47 and, concomitantly, the related penalty and interest sought as to the amount of the reduction. The Department conducted the audit of the books and records of Mitchell's from June 5, 2001 through July 10, 2001. The necessary documentation was provided by the Petitioner for the Department to make its assessment. With Mitchell's concurrence, the Department's auditor determined that Mitchell's records were voluminous and on June 21, 2001, due to the voluminous nature and substance of the records, the Department and Mitchell's agreed to a two-month sale sampling period, representing the months of July 1999 and March 2001, being used for purposes of the audit. The Department followed a regular audit program it has developed for convenience stores similar to Mitchell's which it used in conducting the audit. Upon concluding the audit, the auditor determined a proper ratio of taxable sales to gross sales should be 53 percent. He used invoices from the two months representing the Petitioner's purchases for re-sale, as a sample in determining the ratio of taxable sales to gross sales. The auditor found that during the audit period the reported taxable sales were an average of 26 percent of the invoice-supported purchases for re- sale and that after the audit period Mitchell's reported taxable sales rose to approximately 43 percent of taxable sales in ratio to the total purchases for re-sale. The auditor found that during the audit period Mitchell's purchased between $20,000.00 to $27,000.00 of taxable items to sell at retail while reporting, on a monthly basis to the Department, taxable sales of between $12,000.00 to $15,000.00. The Department's auditor found the taxpayer to be knowledgeable about the items that were taxable that he carried in inventory for sale in his store. The Department's auditor used the Petitioner's purchases supported by purchase invoices in the sample months, to determine the tax liability because of the inherent inability to determine what Mitchell's actually sold, since the cash register tapes do not show the items sold; they only show the amount and the category of the item sold. Moreover, the cash register tapes would not reflect what happened to inventory that was not sold (for instance the owner "eating out of the store"), would not show cash sales which were not "rung up" on a cash register and would not reflect items stolen. This is the procedure that the Department has determined from long practice to be the most effective in ascertaining tax liability resulting from an audit. The auditor's determination of the amount of tax actually owed by Mitchell's was not based upon what Mitchell's purchased. Rather, the auditor used the purchases to determine the proper taxable ratio of taxable items purchased for re-sale to apply in determining Mitchell's proper tax remittance to the Department. The most reliable records used by the Department to determine the tax liability were the taxpayer's own invoices of purchased inventory. Because the taxpayer's records are voluminous the Department exercised its discretion under the law and entered into a sampling agreement with Mitchell's, wherein it made a good faith effort to reach an agreement on a sampling procedure, as required by law. The records shows that Mitchell's provided documentation during the protest period which the Department also considered and analyzed, resulting in a small reduction to the assessment. The Department's assessment is based upon the average, initially 53 percent, of Mitchell's taxable purchases for re-sale. Through the Department's Notice of Reconsideration process this percentage was reduced to 51 percent. The Petitioner contends that the auditor's approach of using invoices of purchased inventory to determine the proper taxable ratio of the taxable items purchased for resale, fails to take into account that just because items come into inventory does not mean they are sold or does not mean they are sold during the period the auditor is sampling. In this regard, however, the auditor found that Mitchell's has sold essentially the same inventory mix of items, over the time period since the audit period, as was typically sold during the audit period (i.e. the mix of nontaxable to taxable items). Moreover, the auditor examined and compared Mitchell's federal tax returns and concluded that the taxpayer's inventory did not radically change during the audit period. He also determined that the inventory did not build up and remain unsold over several months, but rather tended to turn over and be completely sold on a monthly basis. He determined this by examination of the taxpayer's own yearly inventory records. Mr. Mitchell testified that his sales had not increased since the end of the audit period. The auditor for the Department testified that he determined the mark-up ratio from each invoice provided to him from the taxpayer or after talking with the taxpayer concerning his practice on determining mark-up. Based upon this determination of information by the auditor, the mark-up ratio or percentage was entered into the Department's computer program to calculate the retail price of the taxable items purchased. The mark-up is the difference between the cost of the item when purchased and the price of the item when sold by the Petitioner at retail. For each transaction reflected in the invoices provided by the Petitioner to the Department, the auditor calculated the average taxable ratio for the Petitioner. The taxable ratio is based upon an analysis of Mitchell's gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales, tax collected and the tax rate. The taxable ratio is determined by dividing the gross purchases for re-sale at retail made by Mitchell's in a particular month, divided by the taxable purchases for re-sale at retail. The taxable amount owed by the Petitioner is calculated by a computer program. The retail mark-up for each transaction is examined to derive the taxpayer's taxable ratio for each transaction. The computer program then calculates the average taxable ratio for all of the transactions. The taxable amount owed by the Petitioner is then calculated by multiplying the taxable ratio by the amount of gross sales. At the end of each day the taxpayer finalizes the total number of sales by "zeeing it off" at the cash register. This procedure allows the taxpayer to ascertain the taxable merchandise sold and the total income. The "zee tapes" break down the transactions into the various categories of the items sold by the taxpayer, including sales of non-taxable items. The taxpayer records the total taxable sales in a journal at the end of each day. This journal and the sales invoices are sent to the taxpayer's accountant who figures out the taxpayer's monthly remittance of tax to the Department. Mr. Mitchell did not submit into evidence the journals used by the accountant to ascertain Mitchell's monthly tax liability. Mr. Mitchell contends that "to meet Mr. Statum's (the Department's auditor) expectations of the assessment, I would have to have approximately nine hundred dollars a day in taxable sales 30 days a month." The taxpayer stated that $900.00 in taxable sales is achieved only a "few days." The Petitioner retained the summary tapes that break down each category of items sold by the Petitioner. The summary tapes were not made available to the auditor during the audit period, nor placed into evidence. The Petitioner contends that the sampling period did not account for changes in inventory. He noted that inventory fluctuations occurred, especially with respect to fish bait and tackle. Records of spoiled inventory (fish bait) during the audit period were provided to Mitchell's accountant. The spoilage was taken into account by Mitchell's as a tax deduction. Mitchell's accountant prepared the federal income tax returns based upon journals provided by Mitchell's. The Petitioner signed those tax returns prepared by his accountant and found them to be acceptable. Mr. Mitchell testified that his accountant prepared his personal tax returns for the years 1996 through 2001 during the audit period. He testified that the inventory figures on the "Schedule C's" for the years 1996 through 2001 during the audit period, were accurate. The taxpayer's accountant, Better Business Services, also prepares a monthly income statement which shows Mitchell's gross sales, purchases, expenses, gross profit and net profit. Mr. Mitchell testified that his accountant provided him with accurate information on the income statements for the years 1996 through 2001. The Petitioner accounted for the fact that purchases of inventory on a monthly basis are greater than the taxable sales reported to the Department by stating that he has unsold inventory in his store including a lot of nails, wine, cigarettes, fishing tackle, fishing rods and reels, high powered rifle cartridges, and shotgun shells, as reflected in the inventory figures shown on his Schedule C's of his federal tax returns for the years 1996-1998. The Petitioner also contended that the auditor's mark- up prices for soda pop, potato chips (which are delivered pre- priced) and animal feed were not correct. He also contends that the auditor's mark-up prices do not reflect inflation and thus that the auditor's wrongly assessed the cost value of his inventory at 2001 prices when he bought some of it as far back as 1996 at cheaper prices. For the two months that the auditor sampled, July 1999 and March 2001, the tax liability was computed by applying the taxable ratio of 53 percent to Mitchell's gross sales. The auditor then input over 100 transactions of items sold by Mitchell in June, 2001 into a computer program in order to compute the "effective rate" of tax, taking into account the statutorily mandated "bracket" rates for taxable transactions in accordance with Section 212.12, Florida Statutes. Concerning the auditor-sampled month of July 1999, the Petitioner agreed with the "mark-up" figures as reflected in "Exhibit A01, Sales Exhibit" with regard to cigarettes, fishing tackle, and Baldwin Snacks. The taxpayer agreed with the cost figures put forth by the auditor as reflected in that exhibit. The Department's auditor determined that for the month of July 1999 the Petitioner would have more taxable merchandise sold than he reported. Concerning the sample month of March 2001, the auditor determined that the Petitioner would have more taxable merchandise sold than he reported. The Petitioner agreed that the total figure for the inventory purchases reflected in the above referenced exhibit, was accurate. The auditor examined the taxpayer's exhibits (see exhibit volume II pages 160-327) and found that purchases for the months represented in those exhibits, May, June, August, September and October, 1999, were well in excess of taxable sales reported to the Department. The auditor found that Mitchell's reported taxable sales to the Department increased by approximately 75 percent after the audit period. The records of the two sample months from the audit period show a taxable sales amount reported that is comparable to the taxable sales reported to the Department after the audit period, specifically during the month of July 2003. The Department's Exhibit, pages 335-336, shows that during months after conclusion of the audit, beginning in September 2001 through December 2002 the Petitioner had more taxable sales reported to the Department than before the audit, showing an average increase of almost 75 percent after the audit period. Indeed, for several days examined for July of 2003 (immediately prior to the hearing) the taxable sales ratio was running in the range of approximately 50 percent of gross sales. The Petitioner contends that the difference in the taxable sales ratio as reported during the audit period, with the taxable sales ratio reported after the audit period, was because, as to the months of July 2002 and July 2003, he sells more fish bait, ice and beer in the month of July. He also stated that the more outdoor-oriented workforce in the area depends on good weather to achieve a steady income, which results in his July sales being inordinately high compared to other months. The Petitioner contends that July sales do not represent an average month. In summary, the Department's audit and the method it employed in its audit was shown to be reasonable under the circumstances and in accord with the statutory authority cited below. The result of that audit, culminating in the testimony and evidence adduced by the Department, shows that the Petitioner under-reported taxable sales to the Department during the audit period. The testimony of the Petitioner concerning such matters as inventory spoilage, climatic and seasonal weather changes and their effect on the local economy and therefore sales, and discrepancies with the Department's auditor over the mark-up prices of certain items sold in the store does not constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the preponderant showing that the Department's assessment is correct.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witness, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue sustaining the revised assessment at issue in the amount of $58,371.47 plus concomitant penalty and interest and subject to any discretionary negotiated settlement of tax, penalty and interest amounts. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Mitchell Post Office Box 13 Century, Florida 32535 Robert F. Langford Assistant General Counsel Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's final assessment of sales and use tax plus interest against Petitioner Karsten Enterprises FL, Inc., is correct.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation headquartered in Dothan, Alabama, doing business in Florida. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During the audit period in controversy, from October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2007, Petitioner was a dealer in manufactured or modular homes and did business at one or more Florida locations. During the pertinent period, Petitioner entered into various contracts to provide manufactured or modular homes to its customers for delivery at locations in Florida. At a Karsten Sales Center, models of residential factory-built buildings are displayed. These residential factory-built buildings are produced by manufacturers that Karsten uses for that purpose. In most of the transactions during the audit period, Petitioner's customers would contract with Petitioner for the sale and installation of a factory built building on property owned by the customer. In the remainder of the contracts during the audit period, Petitioner would either purchase the property or enter into a contract for the sale of the property to the customer, and Petitioner would install a home that Petitioner had purchased from a manufacturer and then sell the home and land package to the customer. The contract prices were a lump sum, which included not only the manufactured or modular home, but also installation of the home at a Florida location. Petitioner’s contracts with its customers did not itemize individual components of the modular or manufactured homes, such as individual nuts, bolts, and shingles, but instead agreed to deliver the entire modular or manufactured home on an installed basis. The contracts between Petitioner and its customers specify the type of home that the customer wanted to have erected or installed on the property. Upon selection of a floor plan, options, and other customization, the customer would agree to order a specific home from a manufacturer. Petitioner purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. The manufacturer would produce the home upon receiving an order from Petitioner. The manufacturer shipped the completed home to Petitioner, delivering the home to the property where the home would ultimately be erected and installed. Once shipped to the site, the factory-built buildings were placed on a foundation constructed for that purpose. Petitioner would either directly, through the manufacturer, or through subcontractors, construct the foundations, place the homes on the foundations, and connect the homes to required utilities. All of these activities were done as part of Petitioner's contracts with its customers for real property improvement. In many instances, the manufacturer both delivered the homes to the sites and provided post-delivery services to the homes. Additional services provided by the manufacturer after it installed the homes on the foundations included trim work, repair work, and fit and finish work. Petitioner paid the manufactures directly for these post-delivery services. During the audit period at issue, Petitioner sold, erected and installed approximately 30 residential modular or factory-built buildings in the state of Florida. If the home was built by a Florida factory, the factory would include sales tax in its invoice to Petitioner, based upon the cost of materials, but not including labor, that the manufacturer used in the construction of the home prior to its delivery to the site. If an out-of-state manufacturer built the home, the manufacturer would not include a sales tax amount in its invoices to Petitioner. Rather, the out-of-state manufacturers indicated that the cost of materials for construction of the homes at the factory was approximately 60% of the purchase price Petitioner paid for the homes. When Petitioner closed its contracts with its customers, if the manufacturer was an out-of-state manufacturer that had not previously included a sales or use tax in its invoice to Petitioner, Petitioner would remit a use tax directly to the Department, based upon 60% of Petitioner’s purchase price of the manufactured or modular homes. In either case, whether paying sales tax directly to a Florida manufacturer based only on the Florida manufacturer's cost of materials, or remitting use tax on 60% of its purchase price of manufactured or modular homes from out-of-state manufacturers, rather than paying tax on 100% of the price it paid for the homes, Petitioner did not pay sales or use tax on the manufacturer’s labor or fabrication costs. In remitting use tax, or paying sales tax to the Florida manufacturers, Petitioner was seeking to pay tax only on the manufacturer’s cost of materials used in the manufacturing process. There is no dispute concerning the Department’s math calculations. Rather, Petitioner disputes that the labor costs were taxable. Petitioner has no proof that the Department has ever received payment of tax from any person on the manufacturer’s labor costs at issue in this proceeding. Drenea York, who testified for the Department, is an accountant and auditor with twenty years of experience, all in sales and use taxation. Tammy Miller, who testified for the Department, is an attorney who has worked with the Department for eight years within the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution section (Department's Dispute Resolution Section). The Department's Dispute Resolution Section employs “Tax Conferees,” such as Ms. Miller, who hear informal taxpayer protests, issue the Department's notices of decisions regarding final assessments, and provide guidance to the public upon request. Her practice has focused principally upon sales and use taxation, and she has handled several cases involving taxation of modular home contractors. Tammy Miller signed the notice of decision regarding the Final Assessment at issue. She also wrote the article for the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which Petitioner introduced into evidence as P1. She testified as the Department’s corporate representative. Douglas Uhler testified as a former employee of Petitioner and also as an expert witness for the Petitioner. He is a CPA with some tax experience, who was not shown to be a specialist in taxation or in Florida sales and use taxation. He practices in Birmingham, Alabama, where he is licensed. He has knowledge and expertise in valuation and other areas, but was not qualified as an expert to testify as to the tax determinations at issue in this controversy. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Uhler applied for a TAA. Mr. Uhler was permitted to testify, over the Department’s hearsay and relevancy objections, that he relied on an oral statement from an alleged Department employee, concerning how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During his testimony, however, Mr. Uhler did not know the name of the person to whom he allegedly spoke and he was not sure that the person he spoke to was an employee of the Department of Revenue. Therefore, no weight was given to his testimony regarding his recollection of a conversation with an alleged Department employee on the issue of how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During the audit period at issue, the Department made four revisions to its original audit report in response to additional information provided by the Petitioner. During this period, the Petitioner paid the uncontested portion of the Department's assessment, leaving only one issue in dispute: whether additional tax and interest is due on Petitioner’s purchase of the modular homes. The Department’s audit and resulting tax assessment considered Petitioner, and not the manufacturer, to be the “real property contractor” responsible for the payment of the tax, within the meaning of the aforementioned rule provisions. The Department’s determination that Petitioner was the responsible “real property contractor” is consistent with the fact that the real property improvement contracts at issue were entered directly between Petitioner and its customers, and not between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. In its contracts with its customers, Petitioner directly arranged installation work, either providing the installation itself or through the manufacturer or a subcontractor on behalf of Petitioner's customers. The issue of whether Petitioner or the manufacturer performed the installation work, however, was not considered by the Department to be a determinative factor, in and of itself, in making the Final Assessment. According to the Department, it would not consider a manufacturer to be the responsible “real property contractor” unless the contracts for real property improvement were directly between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's customers had direct contracts for real property improvements with the manufacturers of the homes. The Department also considered Petitioner to be the “end user” under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3) and (4), which, according to the Department, imposes tax on the “end user.” The Department considered Petitioner, as opposed to Petitioner's customers, to be the end user based upon the reasoning that Petitioner was the last party to purchase the modular units as “tangible personal property,” before the modular homes became affixed to real property. Ms. York and Ms. Miller explained that the Department did not consider Petitioner’s customers to be the “end users” because Petitioner's customers did not purchase resold items of “tangible personal property,” itemized in detail under Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3)(d). Rather, they explained that Petitioner’s customers, who purchased under lump- sum contracts, were considered to have purchased an improvement to real property, and improvements to real property fall outside the scope of the Florida sales and use tax chapter. In its audit, the Department examined Petitioner’s contracts with its customers solely to determine that the Petitioner was the end user or the “real property contractor.” The Department’s assessment did not seek to impose tax or interest liability on Petitioner’s transactions with its customers. Instead, the Department taxed Petitioner on Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing modular homes, giving Petitioner full credit for any partial tax that Petitioner had paid. As noted above, during the audit period, when it was dealing with a Florida manufacturer, Petitioner generally remitted sales or use tax directly to the manufacturer, at the time of purchase. More often, however, Petitioner paid sales or use tax on a monthly basis, by direct accrual or remittance to the Department on approximately 60% of the amount Petitioner paid for homes manufactured by out-of-state manufacturers. The invoices to Petitioner frequently included other itemized charges, which the Department did not consider part of Petitioner’s “cost price” of the purchased modular units. For example, if an invoice included sales or use tax, the Department excluded charges for tax when calculating Petitioner’s “cost price,” so as to avoid imposing tax on the itemized tax. Likewise, no charges for installation of the modular units onto real property were included in the Department’s calculation of “cost price.” The Department instead determined “cost price” by adding up the “Base Price” for purchasing the modular homes, together with itemized home “Options,” as they appeared on the manufacturer's invoices to Petitioner for the modular homes. Examples of several “Options” would be such things as better carpeting, a sliding glass door, or a plywood floor. The combined total of “Base Price” and “Options” were used by the Department in determining Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing the units as items of tangible personal property from the manufacturer’s factory. Petitioner's "cost price" as determined by the Department reflected the seller’s (in this case the manufacturer’s) material and labor costs. The Department's Final Assessment, however, did not include costs related to the installation of the modular homes onto real property, as those were considered by the Department as costs arising subsequent to the sale of the product as tangible personal property. The Final Assessment only sought tax on Petitioner’s purchase cost of the modular homes as tangible personal property leaving the factory. Because Petitioner had already paid tax on approximately 60% of its cost price, the Department’s assessment sought to capture the 40% of sales and use tax that Petitioner never paid. The Department's assessment determined that Petitioner owed tax on its own “cost price” as invoiced by the manufacturer. The Department determined that the Petitioner’s “cost price” was a different “cost price” than the manufacturer’s “cost price.” According to the Department, the manufacturer’s cost price excluded labor on its factory floor but Petitioner’s “cost price” included all materials and labor costs that were necessarily a component of Petitioner's actual purchase price. The Department’s auditor gave Petitioner full credit for all taxes paid, whether Petitioner had paid the tax by direct remittance or at the time that it paid an invoice, with one exception: credit was generally not given for payments made by Petitioner to a company named Cavalier because during the audit period at issue, Petitioner remitted certain amounts of sales tax to a manufacturer named Cavalier, but Cavalier refunded these amounts to Petitioner.3/ The Department’s audit and assessment did not treat Petitioner as a “manufacturer” nor give Petitioner the benefit of the special exemption, under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which is available to manufacturers of a “factory- built building.” This is because the Department did not consider Petitioner to be a manufacturer. Although Petitioner argued that it qualified for the special exemption under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, under the theory that it was a "manufacturer," Petitioner failed to show that it is a “manufacturer” entitled to such exemption. In accordance with Petitioner's Application for Registration with the Department, Petitioner was registered as a “Manufactured (Mobile) Home Dealer” rather than as a manufacturer. In response to audit interview questions, Petitioner advised the auditor that it was in the business of “Retail Sale” of “Mobile and Modular Homes.” Petitioner made this same representation again in its response to a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. The first time that Petitioner ever asserted that it was a "manufacturer" was after Petitioner received the Department’s Notice of Intent to make Audit Changes, and became aware that, as a “real property contractor,” it would be assessed tax on 100% of its “cost price.” Petitioner then changed its self-description of its business model, asserting that it was a “manufacturer.” When Petitioner protested the Department’s assessment, however, it abandoned, at least at the informal protest stage, the argument that it was a manufacturer. Petitioner instead argued that it should be treated like a real property contractor engaged in the business of stick built homes. According to Tammy Miller, Petitioner's president, Mr. Copeland, told Ms. Miller during the informal protest process, that Petitioner was not a manufacturer. The Final Assessment corroborates Tammy Miller’s recollection because it addressed Petitioner’s various legal arguments but did not address Petitioner’s argument that it is a manufacturer, because that argument apparently was not made during the informal protest. The Amended Petition does not allege that Petitioner was a manufacturer or that it should be treated like one. Petitioner instead asserts that it is a modular home dealer who purchases from “the factory” and that it should be treated like a stick-built contractor. Petitioner stipulated that it is a modular home “dealer” and that it purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. No evidence was introduced that Petitioner owns or operates factories or an assembly line. Rather, the evidence showed that Petitioner operated out of an office building in Alabama. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has been licensed or certified as a “manufacturer” by the Department of Community Affairs, which is the agency that regulates manufacturers of factory-built buildings. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-1.002(15) and 1.007(1). Petitioner’s representative repeatedly referred to Petitioner, throughout opening statement, argument and testimony, as a dealer purchasing from the factory. The Department’s witnesses testified that the sales and use tax applies to “real property contractors” in a way that taxes all real property contractors (stick-built or modular) on their full “cost price” of purchased materials, regardless of whether the purchased materials are lumber, shingles, nails, finished kitchen cabinetry, or assembled modular home modules. The Department's witnesses explained that the cost price of each item purchased will vary because the item purchased in each instance is different and some items will include greater material and labor costs than others. The Final Assessment reflects the unpaid balance assessed, after all revisions and payments made, and provides a per diem amount so that accrued interest may be readily calculated. The Final Assessment determined that the unpaid balance of tax and interest for the audit period (after crediting Petitioner with all payments made) was as follows: $41,446.31 combined tax and interest through 1/26/09, with $7.57 per day for each day thereafter until the postmark date of payment. The Final Assessment waived all penalties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Final Assessment and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due as of January 26, 2009, in the amount of $41,446.39, with interest thereafter accruing at $7.57 per day, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, as the managing member of PNC, LLC (PNC), is personally liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by PNC to the State of Florida.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes. PNC is a now-dissolved Florida limited liability company that did business under the name "CHEAP" at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida. PNC was registered as a business and filed its Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on June 16, 2010. Until the company was dissolved by the Secretary of State in 2018 for failure to pay the 2017 annual filing fees, Mr. Scott served as its managing member and had administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes. Verna Bartlett was PNC's controller. PNC was registered with the Department as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18, Florida Statutes, and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration 39-8015401140-8. A certificate of registration requires the taxpayer to file sales and use tax returns and pay to the Department all taxes owed as they are received. After making numerous attempts to collect delinquent sales tax owed by PNC for tax reporting periods in 2013 and 2014, the Department filed this action seeking to impose a personal penalty assessment against Mr. Scott, the managing member of the company. Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, provides that any person who has administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes and who willfully fails to pay the tax or evades the payment of the tax shall be liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax not paid. The penalty is based only on the taxes owed, and not the interest and fees that have accrued. The statute provides that if the business liability is fully paid, the personal liability assessment will be considered satisfied. On January 18, 2018, the Department issued a NAPL against Mr. Scott after PNC failed to pay the sales and use taxes owed the State for the reporting periods from February 2013 through October 2014. The outstanding taxes, exclusive of interest or penalties, total $79,325.75. The NAPL imposes a total penalty of $158,647.50, or twice the amount of sales tax owed by PNC. No payments have been made on the account since the issuance of the NAPL, and, PNC, now closed, currently has a total liability in excess of $200,000.00. During the relevant time period, Mr. Scott was personally responsible for collecting PNC's sales tax and remitting it to the Department; he had the authority to sign checks on behalf of PNC; he made financial decisions as to which creditors should be paid; he made the decision to use the sales tax collected for the business and for stipulation payments; and he made the decision not to remit the sales tax that was collected. This was confirmed by PNC's controller, Ms. Bartlett, who responded to the Department's Requests for Admissions. Mr. Scott also confirmed to a Department tax specialist that the admissions provided by Ms. Bartlett were accurate. Mr. Scott either never remitted payment or did not remit payment timely on behalf of PNC for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January through October 2014. Tax warrants were issued and judgment liens were recorded for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January, February, and April through October 2014. Resp. Ex. 5 and 6. All warrants and liens relate to reporting periods that fall within the personal liability assessment period. A Notice of Jeopardy Finding and Notice of Final Assessment (Notice of Jeopardy) dated June 18, 2014, was issued to PNC pertaining to the April 2014 reporting period. Resp. Ex. This notice was issued after Mr. Scott ceased making regular tax payments, the estimated deficiency was substantial, and the Department determined that collection of the tax would be jeopardized by further delay. A Notice of Jeopardy and Notice of Final Assessment dated August 7, 2014, also was issued to PNC pertaining to the April, May, and June 2014 reporting periods. Resp. Ex. 12. Because PNC reported more than $20,000.00 in sales tax each year, unless a waiver was obtained, Mr. Scott was required to file and pay PNC's sales tax electronically for all reporting periods within the personal liability period. See § 213.755(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.003. Despite having obtained no waiver, Mr. Scott never filed returns or paid PNC's sales tax electronically. And even though he never remitted a payment electronically, Mr. Scott indicated on at least six sales tax returns during the relevant time period that sales tax for the reporting period was remitted electronically. The only conclusion to draw from this action is that Mr. Scott filed or directed the filing of these returns knowing them to be false. The record shows that, dating back to 2011, Mr. Scott has a long-standing history of failing to abide by the tax laws of the state as it relates to PNC. For example, on September 15, 2011, Mr. Scott was referred for criminal investigation by the state attorney for his failure to pay taxes. Also, numerous returns were filed without a payment. This is prima facie evidence of conversion of the money due. § 212.14(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent's Exhibit 1 summarizes numerous contacts by the Department's Tampa District Office with Mr. Scott regarding collection notices, telephone calls, emails, assessment letters, warrant letters, and the like in an effort to secure compliance with tax laws. It is fair to find that Mr. Scott willfully attempted to evade or avoid paying sales and reemployment taxes during the relevant period. To prevent its Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration from being revoked, PNC entered into a compliance agreement on July 10, 2013, to pay past due sales tax and reemployment tax totaling $65,789.25. The agreement required PNC to: (a) accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports no later than July 10, 2013; (b) remit all past due payments in accordance with the attached schedule, which required 11 monthly payments of $4,000.00 beginning on August 10, 2013, and a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014; (c) accurately complete and file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months; and (d) timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months. A $15,000.00 down payment also was required to be paid on or before July 10, 2013. An addendum to the agreement (added by Mr. Scott) provided that "[a]ll payments, including the $15,000.00 down payment, shall first be applied to Sales and Use Tax." Although the down payment was made timely, the agreement was breached the first month (August) because Mr. Scott did not make the payment electronically. However, the agreement was not voided by the Department until October 12, 2013. Therefore, any payments made on or after October 12, 2013, were not considered compliance payments and are not subject to the addendum in the agreement. A somewhat confusing aspect of this dispute concerns Mr. Scott's contention, by way of cross-examination, that contrary to the addendum, the Department incorrectly applied his $15,000.00 down payment and subsequent compliance payments to the reemployment tax account, rather than the sales tax account, and that his sales tax liability should be reduced by that amount. As noted above, the addendum governs only the payments that predate October 12, 2013, which are the down payment ($15,000.00) and the August and September payments -- $4,000.00 each month. This issue was not raised by Mr. Scott until the Department issued a NAPL on April 13, 2017. The NAPL issued on April 13, 2017, indicated that the outstanding tax owed by PNC through October 31, 2014, was $90,808.17, and the personal assessment was twice that amount. In response to Mr. Scott's request, the Department acknowledged that it incorrectly applied the down payment to the reemployment account. Also, it took a second look at the two payments made in August and September, which predate the voiding of the agreement. The August installment payment consisted of two separate checks: $3,390.00 for sales tax and $610.00 for reemployment tax, and these amounts were applied in that manner. The September payment, $4,000.00, submitted in one check, was applied in the same manner as the August payment, with $610.00 going to the reemployment tax and the remainder to sales tax. Therefore, only $1,220.00 was incorrectly applied to the reemployment tax during those two months. On July 3, 2017, the Department reapplied a total of $16,551.00 from the reemployment tax account to the sales tax account for the relevant reporting periods. Mr. Scott contends the reapplication of the $16,551.00 to sales tax should reduce the amount of sales tax due by that amount. However, section 213.75(2) dictates that if a lien or warrant has been filed against the taxpayer, as is true here, the payment shall be applied in a priority order spelled out in the statute. Thus, the Department applied that amount in the following order: against the costs to record the liens against PNC; against the administration collection processing fee, if any; against any accrued interest; against any accrued penalty; and against any tax due. Under this priority order, the penalty/interest/fees categories totaled $5,066.58, while the tax liability category totaled $11,484.42. A detailed breakdown of this allocation is found in Respondent's Exhibit 29. Therefore, the total tax liability on the 2017 NAPL ($90,808.17) is reduced by $11,484.42, resulting in a total tax liability of $79,323.75, as shown on the updated 2018 NAPL. In the same vein, in his PRO, Mr. Scott argues that he was not given credit for payments of $9,110.24, $2,688.53, $178.28, and $1,321.80, which reduce his sales tax liability to $66,024.90 and the personal assessment to $132,049.80. See Pet'r Ex. 10. However, all of these payments (some of which are bank levies) were made after the compliance agreement was voided and do not apply to the reporting periods in this case. By way of cross-examination, Mr. Scott also contends that he was never given an accounting of what PNC owes despite "multiple requests" for the same. The record shows otherwise. On April 13, 2017, the 2017 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09, a computer-generated form which lists, in detail, a taxpayer's outstanding taxes owed by reporting period. A second copy of a ZT09 was faxed to him the following day. In his May 3, 2017, letter protesting the 2017 NAPL, Mr. Scott alleges that payments were not applied properly. In response, the Department sent a fax to Mr. Scott on May 10, 2017, listing checks that were not honored by the bank and requesting information concerning which payments PNC contends were not applied properly. In his response on May 12, 2017, Mr. Scott did not provide the requested information. On January 17, 2018, the 2018 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09. Finally, on April 12, 2018, per Ms. Bartlett's request, the Department mailed a ZT09 with the outstanding amounts due. Finally, in its PRO, the Department points out that after the hearing ended, it discovered that it made an error, in Mr. Scott's favor, in calculating his sales tax liability for the relevant reporting periods. Had it correctly calculated the amount of payments made by PNC, the sales tax liability for the relevant period would be increased from $79,323.75 to $84,444.35, which in turn would increase the personal assessment. However, the Department consents to the lower tax and assessed penalty amount, as reflected on the 2018 NAPL.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, is liable to the Department for a penalty of $158,647.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the Palm Beach El Cid Bar and the Fifty-One-O-One Bar in West Palm Beach. Mixed drinks are sold at these establishments. In both bars, the cash registers record each item rung up but do not state the prices of the drinks separately from the sales taxes incurred on account of their sale. When James A. Blalock acquired petitioner approximately five years ago, he computed the sales tax owing on a day's sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar by examining a cash register tape which reflected the sales. For the day Mr. Blalock made his item by item calculations, he computed sales tax at 4 percent on each item, which yielded a figure slightly in excess of 4.2 percent on aggregate sales. Mr. Blalock then "made a supposition" that multiplying gross receipts (the sum of aggregate sales and aggregate sales taxes) by one twenty- fifth (4 percent) would yield a figure which would approximate 4.2 percent of aggregate sales. This supposition is well founded, as reflected by the equation .042 = X(1 + .042), where X equals the number by which gross receipts are to be multiplied. After Mr. Blalock had done his calculations, he made the assumption that the results for that day would hold true generally for both bars, and instructed petitioner's employees to multiply gross receipts by one twenty-fifth (4 percent) in order to compute petitioner's sales taxes. Petitioner's employees did in fact calculate and pay sales taxes monthly on this basis from August 1, 1974, through September 30, 1976, on sales at the Fifty-One-O-One Bar, and from October 1, 1979, through September 30, 1976, on sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar. Since Mr. Blalock's calculations, however, the "price structure" at the bars has changed three times. Nobody now remembers what day of the week was chosen as the basis for the original calculations. Gross sales at the Fifty-One-O-One Bar from August 1, 1974, through September 30, 1976, amounted to two hundred twenty thousand four hundred ninety- one dollars and thirty cents ($220,491.30). On these sales, petitioner paid sales taxes of eight thousand seven hundred forty-three dollars and twenty-eight cents ($8,743.28). Gross sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar from October 1, 1973, through September 30, 1976, amounted to four hundred ninety-two thousand six hundred forty-one dollars. and sixty-four cents ($492,641.64). On these sales, petitioner paid sales taxes of nineteen thousand six hundred sixty-five dollars and ninety-one cents ($19,665.91). At both of petitioner's bars, a price list which sated, for each item, its cost without tax, the amount of sales tax, and its cost with sales tax, was kept next to the cash register, for employees' use. Ordinarily, these price lists were not visible patrons. At least since the fall of 1971, respondent has permitted dealers in mixed alcoholic beverages to pay a sales tax equal to their gross sales less the quotient. of gross sales divided by 1.045, whenever it is impractical to record the sales price of each drink separately from the tax collected on account of the sale of the drink, but only if the dealer displays a price list on which the dealer "indicate[s]. . . the cost of each item, the applicable amount of sales tax to each and the total price of the item." Petitioner's exhibit No. 2.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, and in keeping with the teachings of McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977), it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent cease and desist from applying the policy set forth in petitioner's exhibit No. 2 until and unless the same shall be duly adopted as a rule, in the manner provided by law. That petitioner pay respondent twenty-two thousand one hundred sixty- eight dollars and eighty-seven cents ($22,168.87) on account of sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar and nine thousand nine hundred twenty-two dollars and eleven cents ($9,922.11) on account of sales at the Fifty-One-O-One Bar, together with applicable penalties and interest, less sales taxes petitioner has already paid on account of the Palm Beach El Cid Bar for the period October 1, 1973, to September 30, 1976, and on account of the Fifty-One-O-One Bar for the period August 1, 1974, to September 30, 1976. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John E. Woodbery, Esquire Woodbery and Sapp 217 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Petitioner is a joint venturer with two foreign corporations who subcontracted to perform the dredging portion of the contract to develop the port of Dammam in Saudi Arabia. The joint venture is called GLABVO and the joint venture agreement was admitted as Exhibit 1. The parties contributed capital and leased equipment to the joint venture while the latter paid for all supplies used by the parties in carrying out the subcontract. All of the equipment and materials purchased and which is the subject of the tax assessment here involved is personal property of a nature subject to sales and use tax, was ordered by Petitioner for GLABVO and shipped to Miami where it was loaded for shipment to Saudi Arabia. The property was purchased from both within and without the state. The nature of the operation, the urgency of the contract with respect to time of completion, and the lack of existing port facilities necessitated special shipping arrangements which involved a contract carrier in lieu of a common carrier. Accordingly the various dredges, workboats, barges and related equipment here loaded on a large barge which was towed from Ft. Lauderdale to Saudi Arabia. Lack of port facilities at Dammam necessitated the capability to unload being carried with the equipment so the larger elements transported wore floated onto the barge, and off the barge upon arrival, by sinking the barge. Most of the supplies were packaged for overseas shipment before being shipped to Miami where this material and equipment was marshalled at Petitioner's facility on Dodge Island at Miami, Florida. At this marshalling yard, which was the Florida shipping destination for materials purchased, the supplies were inventoried, repackaged, if necessary, for the barge shipment by placing in containers that could be floated off the barge and segregated into the three shipments that would be needed to move the equipment and supplies to Dammam. Petitioner used its tax registration number in purchasing the supplies on behalf of GLABVO and the vendors were relieved from collecting the sales tax. At the time the supplies were shipped to Petitioner there were no export declarations in connection with these items but much of the equipment was packaged for export and the shipping documents represented the material was shipped "for export". The contract carrier that had been engaged to provide the transportation had no facility that could be used as a marshalling yard and Petitioner did have such a facility. Due to the nature of the operation it was essential to assemble the supplies and equipment at a marshalling point for inventory and checking against the list of needed supplies before continuing the transportation to Saudi Arabia. Bills of lading and export declarations were made up where the material was placed on board the contract carrier's barge. On those items shipped from outside Florida Respondent assessed a use tax and on those items purchased in Florida Respondent assessed a sales tax. It is undisputed that all property on which the tax was assessed was purchased for use in Saudi Arabia and was shipped to Saudi Arabia; that the property had an initial Florida destination at Dodge Island, Florida; that the property was shipped from Florida to Saudi Arabia on bills of lading; and that export declarations were executed. For the purpose of this case no distinction exists with respect to the export nature of those shipments purchased from a supplier in Florida and those purchased from a source outside of Florida.
Findings Of Fact On August 27, 1976, the Respondent, State of Florida Department of Revenue, notified the Petitioner of its intention to assess sales tax, penalties and interest against the Respondent for business transactions in the period August 1, 1973 through July 31, 1976. This Notice of Proposed Assessment was revised on May 27, 1977, and the Petitioner was notified of that revision. By his letter of June 19, 1977, the Petitioner has challenged the assessment, as revised. Upon receipt of the June 19, 1977 petition, the Respondent moved for a more definite statement and the Petitioner was afforded fifteen (15) days from the date of the Order within which time to amend his petition. Petitioner took advantage of that opportunity to amend and by an undated document did make such an amendment. The Respondent subsequently moved to strike certain portions of the amended petition and filed its answer to the petition. A pre-hearing conference was held to consider the Motion To Strike and after that pre-hearing conference was concluded an Order was issued which struck certain portions of the amended Petition and allowed copies of the proposed notices of assessments of August 27, 1976 and the revision of May 27, 1977 to be made a part of the complaint/petition as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. After the pre-hearing Order had been issued by the undersigned, the case was noticed for hearing for December 5, 1977. At the December 5, 1977 hearing date a Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes was tendered. This revision dated from December 5, 1977, was allowed to be introduced as the final position of the Respondent on the question of the assessment. It was also allowed to be attached as Exhibit 3 to the amended petition. (Under cover of a separate correspondence the original petition, amended petition, exhibits to the amended petition, an Order which was entered after consideration of the Motion To Strike, are being submitted as a part of the record herein). In the ordinary course of his duties a tax examiner employed by the Respondent went to the business premises of the Petitioner to perform an audit to determine whether or not the Petitioner was collecting and remitting sales tax for the category of sales which the Petitioner was making, that required the payment of sales tax. These requirements spoken of are those set forth in Chapter 212, F.S. Mr. DeCico, the tax examiner, allowed Mr. Farhud to pick three (3) months in the year 1976 as being the period to be audited. DeCico then returned to Farhud's place of business and showed him the details of the three (3) month audit. Farhud was dissatisfied wish this audit and indicated that he preferred to have the audit sample expended for a full three (3) years. DeCico replied that he would be willing to expand the audit period. but cautioned Farhud that expansion of the audit period might promote an increased liability. Nonetheless, at Farhud's request, the audit period was expanded to one for thirty-six (36) months. The new audit period dated from August 1, 1973, through July 1, 1976. The work papers on that audit may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. This audit which is depicted in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, left out invoices pertaining to stamps, electric bills, wrapping paper, grocery bags, etc., since they were not retail items for sale. The audit was rendered on August 27, 1976. Before the Notice of Assessment was filed, Farhud had expressed his displeasure with the outcome of the second audit process because he felt that certain amounts depicted in the gross sales were not accurate; to wit, the inclusion of certain so-called "service fees", namely income tax preparation, notary fees, etc. DeCico tried to get a reasonable statement of the amounts of the categories which Farhud desired to have excluded. Farhud did not have records of the matters and was unable to provide an estimate as to the amount of income which had been derived from the aforementioned "service fees". The August 27, 1976, proposed assessment was computed on the basis of the proposition that the gross sales are equivalent to actual sales and are subject to sales tax in the taxable categories. As indicated before, this audit did not take into consideration any "service fees", nor did it grant any allowance for pilferage. No allowance was made for the latter category, because Farhud had not provided any estimate and/or police records to indicate the amount which would be lost to pilferage, and cause a reduction of the sales tax liability. Farhud formally challenged the audit of August 27, 1976, by his correspondence of September 8, 1976 in which he rejects the amount claimed and asks for a hearing. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. An informal conference was held between the parties on October 12, 1976 to see if a resolution of the dispute could be achieved. Mr. Farhud was represented at the informal conference by Michael J. Burman, Esquire, an attorney in Jacksonville, Florida. By a letter of October 14, 1976, Farhud's attorney requested the Respondent to utilize the figures for the three (3) month audit period, as opposed to the thirty-six (36) month period. The letter concluded by stating that Mr. Burman was unaware of any intention Mr. Farhud had to appeal the assessment of August 27, 1976. This letter was followed by a series of letters in which the various parties were indicating the desire to determine whether or not Mr. Farhud intended to accept the August 27, 1976 assessment or to appeal it. In the course of his correspondence Mr. Farhud continued to insist that he did not accept the amount of assessment as accurate. Mr. Farhud failed to indicate to Mr. Burman whether he was going to appeal the assessment or not and Mr. Burman withdrew as his attorney, as shown in the January 31, 1977 correspondence addressed to one of the employees of the Respondent. This correspondence is Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On February 2, 1977, the audit supervisor in the Jacksonville district of the Respondent wrote Mr. Farhud indicating the intention of the Respondent to collect the taxes pursuant to the August 27, 1976 audit. A copy of this correspondence is Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. It should be indicated at this point, that the Respondent's representative had continued to request documentation from Farhud on the items requested for exemption which have been referred to as "service fee". The subject of pilferage had also been discussed at the October 12, 1976 informal conference and a request made for some form of records of police reports which would verify pilferage allowances. No documentation had been provided at the time the February 2, 1977 letter was written to Farhud. Subsequent to the February 2, 1977 letter another informal conference was held on April 4, 1977. As a result of that conference it was determined that certain items would be deleted from the audit assessment of August 27, 1976. This is evidenced in Respondents Exhibit No. 9 which is a copy of a letter dated May 27, 1977, from the audit supervisor, Mr. McCrone, to Mr. Farhud. At the April 4, 1977, discussion the subject of pilferage allowance as brought up in the deletion of 4 percent of the purchase price of taxable goods, as to soft drinks, paper and said products, pet foods and miscellaneous sundries were allowed. No allowance was given for beer, wine and tobacco products because these were felt to be out of reach of prospective pilferers. Again, this deletion is found in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 9. The 4 percent figure was arrived at as an industry estimate. Farhud still was not satisfied after the April 4, 1977, conference had been held and adjustments to the assessment had been mode. In view of this dissatisfaction, the Respondent elected to make a new type of audit, which was performed and was premised upon an analysis of the taxable purchases by the Petitioner for the three (3) year period. These purchases were divided into taxable categories and these categories were then marked up in price using an industry average to arrive at the actual taxable sales. The industry average was based upon an examination of the United Food Stores, Inc.'s sales catalog, which had suggested retail prices for low volume and high volume stores. The Respondent gave the Petitioner the benefit of the range of high volume stores, although the Petitioner's store was a neighborhood convenience store and therefore a low volume operation. The effect of allowing the average retail price for the high volume stores was that it made the differential between his purchase price and the retail price less than that for a low volume neighborhood store, causing lesser tax liability. As stated before, this alternative method was elected for the reason that the Respondent had objected that the gross sales figures reported in the monthly tax returns were incorrect, due to the fact that the Petitioner was unable to document his claim for entitlement to certain exemptions due to pilferage and "service fees", and due to the belief that the more correct approach to the audit was the second method. The work sheet on the alternative method may be found on Respondent's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence. The utilization of this method led to the revised assessment of May 27, 1977, which is the subject of the appeal by petition, and amended petition of the Petitioner. This revision was superceded by the second revision of December 5, 1977, which was allowed to be entered without objection from the Petitioner. The second revision reduces the amount of tax liability claimed by the Respondent. An analysis of the documents offered in this cause and the testimony, leads to the conclusion that the Petitioner/taxpayer owed sales tax during the audit period August 1, 1973 through July 31, 1976. Furthermore, the more correct form of audit procedure under the circumstances, was the alternate method employed in arriving at the May 27, 1977 revised Notice of Assessment as further revised by the December 5, 1977 Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment. This conclusion is grounded on the requirements of Section 212.05(1), F.S., which requires persons in the Petitioner's category for the exercise of the privilege of doing business, to assist in levying a tax in the amount of 4 percent in the categories covered. Furthermore, Sections 212.06(3) and 212.07(2), F.S., places the duty on the Petitioner to collect this 4 percent sales tax. The Petitioner failed to act in accordance with the provision of Chapter 212, F.S. and the Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment is correct and in keeping with the authority of Section 212.12(6), F.S.
Recommendation Therefore, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest found as Exhibit 3 to the amended petition which total is $2,238.92 be allowed with such adjustments as may be necessary for a computation of interest prior to the rendition of a final order. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Nathan Weil, Esquire 203 Washington Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Patricia Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Attorney, Division of Administration Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the agency has an unpromulgated statement of general applicability that imposed a requirement not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule, and which has been utilized against Petitioners to their detriment.
Findings Of Fact On March 24, 1994, the Department of Revenue (Department) issued a Notice of Reconsideration (NOR) that claimed the Petitioners, Terry and Donna Ernst, had willfully failed to collect sales tax. Petitioners' assertion of an exemption in connection with the sales tax assessment was denied. The NOR provided that the Petitioners are the president and vice- president of Hussh, Inc., a retail apparel store in Palm Beach, Florida and that such company made sales to customers for delivery in the store and for shipment outside of the State of Florida. At issue were the alleged shipments to out of state destinations. Pertinent to this case is the language in the NOR found at page two which provided: Due to the inadequacy and volume of Hussh's records, the auditor sampled the available records, and assessed Hussh for asserted out of state sales that were improperly documented. According to the auditor, many of the sales receipts or invoices of asserted out of state shipments were missing the top portion of the invoice. Significantly, this portion of the invoice would contain the names, addresses, and asserted export destination information on each sale. Other invoices were stamped, "out of state shipped," but no destination information was present on the invoice. [Emphasis added.] The Petitioners maintain that the portions of the NOR emphasized in the foregoing paragraph constitute an agency statement of general applicability and is, therefore, an unpromulgated rule. The Department does not have a rule which lists all documentation which might establish an exemption for sales tax assessment. Similarly, the Department does not have a rule that lists the type of documentation which would be inadequate to establish an exemption for sales taxes. The Department's existing rule, Rule 12A-1.064, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part: (1)(a) Sales tax is imposed on the sales price of each item or article of tangible personal property, unless otherwise exempt, when the property is delivered to the purchaser or his representative in this state. However, the tax does not apply to tangible personal property irrevocably committed to the exportation process at the time of sale, when such process has been continuous or unbroken. (b) Intent of the seller and the purchaser that the property will be exported is not sufficient to establish the exemption; nor does delivery of the property to a point in Florida for subsequent transportation outside Florida necessarily constitute placing the property irrevocably in the exportation process. Tangible personal property shall be deemed committed to the exportation process if: The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods outside this state using his own mode of transportation. The dealer must retain in his records trip tickets, truck log records, or other documentation reflecting the specific items and export destination; The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods to a common carrier for final and certain movement of such property to its out of state destination. Sales by a Florida dealer are exempt when the dealer delivers the merchandise to the transportation terminal for shipment outside this state and secures a dock or warehouse receipt and a copy of the bill of lading. On shipments to points outside the United States, a shipper's export declaration shall also be obtained; [Emphasis added.] Rule 12A-1.093, Florida Administrative Code, requires taxpayers to maintain and preserve records. This rule provides, in part: (2) Each dealer defined in Chapter 212, F.S., each licensed wholesaler, and any other person subject to the tax imposed by Chapter 212, F.S., shall keep and preserve a complete record of all transactions, together with invoices, bills of lading, gross receipts from sales, RESALE CERTIFICATES, CONSUMER EXEMPTION CERTIFICATES and other pertinent records and papers as may be required by the Department of Revenue for the reasonable administration of Chapter 212, F.S., and such books of account as may be necessary to determine the amount of tax due thereunder. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are common terms used in the business community. Each connotes that, at the minimum, certain information will be retained on the face of the document. For example, according to Petitioners' witness, the minimum information expected on a bill of lading would be: the name of the person that the item is being shipped to, the item being shipped, the cost of the shipment, and the terms of the shipment with the value of the item being shipped. Similarly, the minimum information which is expected on an "invoice" would be: a description of the item sold, the amount of the sale, and the name of the person to whom the item was sold. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are not defined by rule. The Department determined whether an exemption was documented based upon the results of this audit.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner owes the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed by the Department of Revenue based upon its audit of Petitioner for the period of August 1, 1996, through July 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of selling and installing floor covering materials, such as carpet and tile. Petitioner's business is located in Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner sales fall into two basic categories: "cash and carry sales" and "installation sales." The "cash and carry sales" are retail sales of floor covering materials to customers that come into Petitioner's store. These sales do not involve any installation work by Petitioner. The "installation sales" are sales in which Petitioner installs the floor covering material in the customer's home or business. These sales are performed pursuant to a lump-sum contract which incorporates the price of the installation and the price of the floor covering materials being installed. Petitioner purchases the floor covering materials from suppliers and distributors. Those purchases become part of the inventory from which Petitioner makes its "installation sales." Petitioner also makes general purchases of goods and services necessary for the day-to-day operation of its business. These purchases include items such as cleaning supplies and vehicle repairs. Petitioner made several fixed-assets purchases during the audit period for use in its business. It purchased a word processor in August 1996, and it purchased equipment and fixtures in December 1996. On those occasions that Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers on the "cash and carry sales" or paid sales tax on its inventory purchases and general purchases, it remitted or reported those amounts to the Department. However, as discussed below, Petitioner did not collect the full amount of sales tax due on each sale, nor did it pay the full amount of sales tax due on each purchase. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws. The Department is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers to determine their compliance with the sales tax laws. By letter dated September 10, 2001, the Department notified Petitioner of its intent to conduct a sales tax audit of Petitioner's records for the period of August 1, 1996, through July 31, 2001. The audit was conducted by David Coleman, a tax auditor with seven years of experience with the Department. Petitioner designated its certified public accountant, P.J. Testa, as its representative for purposes of the Department's audit. That designation was memorialized through a power of attorney form executed by Petitioner on March 5, 2002. Mr. Coleman communicated with Mr. Testa throughout the course of the audit. Mr. Coleman conducted the audit using a sampling methodology agreed to by Mr. Testa on behalf of Petitioner. Pursuant to that methodology, Mr. Coleman conducted a comprehensive review of Petitioner's year-2000 purchase and sales invoices and extrapolated the results of that review to the other years in the audit period. The sampling methodology was used because of the volume of records and transactions during the audit period and because of the unavailability of all of the records for the audit period. The year 2000 was chosen as the sample period because Petitioner's records for the other years in the audit period were incomplete or unavailable. Mr. Coleman's audit of the year-2000 invoices focused on three broad types of transactions. First, he reviewed invoices of Petitioner's retail "cash and carry sales." Second, he reviewed the invoices through which Petitioner purchased the floor covering materials that it later sold as part of its "installation sales." Third, he reviewed the invoices through which Petitioner made general purchases of tangible personal property used in the day-to-day operation of its business. The sampling methodology was used for the audit of Petitioner's "cash and carry sales," the inventory purchases related to the "installation sales," and the general purchases. The methodology was not used for the audit of Petitioner's fixed-asset purchases; Mr. Coleman reviewed all of the available records for the fixed-asset purchases during each year of the audit period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's retail "cash and carry sales" identified 29 invoices during year-2000 on which no sales tax or less than the full sales tax was paid by the customer. Those invoices amounted to $17,451.30, on which $1,178.11 in total sales tax was due, but only $552.97 was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $625.14 for the retail sales during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's purchases of floor covering that was later sold in the "installation sales" identified a considerable number of purchases during year-2000 on which no sales tax or less than the full sales tax was paid by Petitioner to the supplier or distributor of the materials. Those purchases amounted to $123,398.52, but only $123,397.80 of that amount was taxable. On the taxable amount, $8,330.07 in total sales tax was due, but only $6,810.68 was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $1,519.41 for Petitioner's inventory purchases during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's "general purchases" identified 10 sales during year-2000 on which sales tax was not paid. Those invoices amounted to $2,914.76, on which $196.77 in sales tax was due, but none of which was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $196.77 for the general purchases during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's fixed-asset purchases identified only two transactions during the entire audit period on which Petitioner did not pay the full sales tax. Those transactions amounted to $5,078.92, on which $330.14 in total sales tax was due, but none of which was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $330.14 for the fixed-asset purchases during the audit period. The tax deficiencies calculated by Mr. Coleman for year-2000 for each category described above take into account any sales tax collected by Petitioner from its customers or paid by Petitioner to its vendors. After Mr. Coleman computed the tax deficiencies based upon his audit of the year-2000 records, he calculated a "percentage of error" for each category of sales/purchases. The percentage of error is the ratio used to extrapolate the results of the audit of the year-2000 records over the remainder of the audit period. No percentage of error was calculated for the fixed-asset purchases because Mr. Coleman reviewed the available records for those purchases over the entire audit period, not just year-2000. The percentage of error was calculated by dividing the sales tax deficiency identified in a particular category for the year-2000 by the total sales/purchases in that category for the year-2000. For the year-2000, Petitioner had retail sales of $1,143,182.45; general purchases of $21,254.88; and inventory purchases of $1,214,016.24. As a result, the applicable percentages of error were 0.000547 ($625.14 divided by $1,143,182.45) for the retail sales; 0.009258 ($196.77 divided by $21,254.88) for the general purchases; and 0.001252 ($1,519.41 divided by $1,214,016.24) for the inventory purchases. The percentages of error were then multiplied by the total sales in the applicable category for the entire audit period to calculate a total tax deficiency in each category. Petitioner's total retail sales over the audit period were $4,455,373.40. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $2,437.12 (i.e., $4,455,373.40 multiplied by 0.000547). Petitioner's total general purchases over the audit period were $110,741.49. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $1,025.25 (i.e., $110,741.49 multiplied by 0.009258). Petitioner's total inventory sales over the audit period were $3,130,882.10. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $3,919.86 (i.e., $3,130,882.10 multiplied by 0.001252). Petitioner's total tax deficiency was computed by adding the deficiencies in each category, as follows: Retail Sales $2,437.12 General Purchases 1,025.25 Inventory Purchases 3,919.86 Fixed-asset purchases 330.14 TOTAL $7,712.37 Of that total, $6,863.02 reflects the state sales tax deficiency; $313.77 reflects the indigent care surtax deficiency; and $535.58 reflects the local government infrastructure surtax deficiency. The sales tax rate in effect in Hillsborough County during the audit period was 6.75 percent. The state sales tax was six percent; the remaining 0.75 percent was for county surtaxes, namely the local government infrastructure surtax and the indigent care surtax. That rate was used by Mr. Coleman in calculating the tax deficiencies described above. On October 4, 2002, Mr. Coleman hand-delivered the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Change (NOI) to Petitioner. The NOI is the end-product of Mr. Coleman's audit. The NOI identified the total tax deficiency set forth above, as well as a penalty of $3,856.26, which is the standard 50 percent of the tax deficiency amount, and interest of $2,561.63, which is calculated at a statutory rate. The NOI included copies of Mr. Coleman's audit work- papers which showed how the taxes, penalties, and interest were calculated. The NOI also included a copy of the "Taxpayers' Bill of Rights" which informed Petitioner of the procedure by which it could protest the audit results reflected on the NOI. On October 29, 2002, the Department issued three NOPAs to Petitioner. A separate NOPA was issued for each type of tax -- i.e., sales tax, indigent care surtax, and local government infrastructure surtax. The cumulative amounts reflected on the NOPAs were the same as that reflected on the NOI, except that the interest due had been updated through the date of the NOPAs. Interest continues to accrue on assessed deficiencies at a cumulative statutory rate of $1.81 per day. The NOPAs were sent to Petitioner by certified mail, and were received by Petitioner on November 1, 2002. By letter dated November 5, 2002, Petitioner protested the full amount of the taxes assessed on the NOPAs and requested a formal administrative hearing. The letter was signed by Mr. Testa on Petitioner's behalf. The protest letter does not allege that the methodology used by Mr. Coleman was improper or that the results of the audit were factually or legally erroneous. Instead, the protest letter states that Petitioner was disputing the results of the audit because it was "following procedures set forth by an agent from a previous audit who established the manner in which [Petitioner was] to compute sales tax on the items being questioned by the current auditor." Mr. Testa made similar comments to Mr. Coleman during the audit. When Mr. Coleman requested documentation from Mr. Testa to corroborate those comments about the procedures allegedly established by the prior auditor, Mr. Testa was unable to provide any such documentation. The record of this proceeding is similarly devoid of evidence to support Petitioner's allegation on this point. The record does not contain any evidence to suggest that Petitioner ever modified or revoked Mr. Testa's authority to represent it in connection with the audit or this protest, which Mr. Testa initiated on Petitioner's behalf. Petitioner, through Mr. Testa, had due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing in these cases. Neither Mr. Testa, nor anyone else on Petitioner's behalf, appeared at the final hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order imposing the taxes, interest, and penalties against Petitioner in the full amounts set forth in the three Notices of Proposed Assessment dated October 28, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2003.
