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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. KEVIN DENIS COX, 82-003540 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003540 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Petitioner held a license issued by the Florida Department of Insurance as a general lines insurance agent. On or about April 3, 1979, Steven B. Atkinson entered the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in West Palm Beach, Florida, from whom he had purchased his auto insurance for approximately three years. His intention at this time was to purchase only that insurance necessary to procure the license tags for his automobile, a seven-year-old Vega. He told the person he dealt with at that time at the insurance agency that this was all he wanted. He did not ask for auto club membership, did not need it, and did not want it. He asked only for what he needed to get his tags. However, he was told by a representative of the agency that he needed not only "PIP" insurance, but also auto club membership and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. Of the $144 premium, $31 was for the required "PIP" coverage, $75 was for auto club membership (not required), and $38 was for accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) (not required). Representatives of the agency told him that he needed all three to get the tags and, though he knew what he was getting and knew he was purchasing all three, he agreed because he was told by the agency representatives that he needed to have all three in order to get his tags. 3 Diane Phillipy McDonald contacted the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because she had heard on the radio that their prices were inexpensive. All she wanted was personal injury protection (PIP), which was what she thought the law required to get tags on her automobile. When she first called the agency and asked how much the coverage she wanted would be, she was told she could pay a percentage down and finance the rest. When she entered the agency, she was waited on by a man whose name she cannot remember. However, she did not ask for auto club coverage or accidental death and dismemberment coverage, nor did those subjects ever come up in the conversation. She asked only for PIP, and she paid a $50 deposit on her coverage. In return for her deposit, she was given a slip of paper that reflected that she had purchased PIP coverage. She was not told she was charged for auto club membership or accidental death and dismemberment. The forms that she signed, including those which reflect a premium for all three coverages in the total amount of $137, bear her signature, and though she admits signing the papers, she denies having read them or having them explained to her before she signed them. In fact, she cannot recall whether they were even filled out when she signed them. In regard to the papers, the premium finance agreement signed by the witness on April 3, 1979, reflects in the breakdown of coverage total premium of $137. However, immediately below, the total cash premium is listed as $158, $21 more than the total of the individual premiums for the three coverages, and the financing charge is based on that amount1 less the down payment. Marvin W. Niemi purchased his auto insurance from the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in March, 1979, after he heard their advertisement on the radio and went in to get the insurance required by the State in order to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he asked personnel there for the minimum insurance required to qualify for tags because he was strapped for money at the time and could not afford anything else. He definitely did not want auto club membership. In fact, discussion of that did not even arise, nor did he want the accidental death policy. When he left the agency, he thought he was only getting what he had asked for; to wit, the PIP minimum coverage. All the forms that he signed were blank when he signed them. This application process took place very quickly during his lunch hour from work. He admits giving his son's (David Robert) name as the beneficiary on his insurance, but did not realize at the time that he was purchasing coverage other than the minimum coverage required. His rationale for giving his son's name as beneficiary was that agency personnel asked and the witness felt if there was any money involved, it should go to his son. In fact, Mr. Niemi was sold not only the PIP, but membership in an auto club and PIP coverage with an $8,000 deductible. Again, the total premium was $137, when the actual premium for the coverage he asked for was only $24. Frank Johnson purchased his insurance from Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because he had heard and seen their advertisement on radio and television and it appeared to be reasonable. He wanted only PIP coverage as required by law sufficient to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he spoke with a man whose name he does not know, who after consulting the books came up with the premium for the coverage to be purchased. During this meeting, the question of motor club or AD&D coverage was not mentioned. His signature does not appear on the statement of understanding, which outlines the coverage and the premium therefor. In this case, because Mr. Johnson had had some prior traffic tickets, his total premium came to $243. His coverage, however, included bodily injury liability, property damage liability, PIP, and auto club. After paying a $50 down payment, he made two additional payments which totaled approximately $50, but thereafter failed to make any additional payments. On August 1, 1980, Marguerite and Steven von Poppel entered the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth, Florida, to purchase their automobile insurance coverage. They purchased policies which included bodily injury and property damage liability, PIP coverage, and comprehensive and collision coverage. The PIP coverage had a deductible of $8,000, and the comprehensive and collision coverage both had $200 deductibles. Mrs. von Poppel indicates that it was not their intention to have such large deductibles on their coverage. In any event, on that day, they gave a check for down payment in the amount of $320 and advised the employee of the agency that upon billing for the balance due of the $915 total premium, they would send the check. Neither Mrs. von Poppel nor Mr. von Poppel desired to finance the balance due of $595, and Mrs. von Poppel did not affix her signature to an application for premium financing with Devco Premium Finance Company dated the same day which bears the signature of Kevin D. Cox as agent. This premium finance agreement lists a cash premium of $966, as opposed to $915. The receipt given to the von Poppels initially reflects a down payment of $320, which is consistent with the receipt, and an amount financed of $646, as opposed to $595, which would have been the balance due under the cash payment intended and desired by the von Poppels. Somewhat later, Mrs. von Poppel received a premium payment booklet from Devco in the mail. When she received it, she immediately went to the Federal Insurance Agency, told them she did not desire to finance the payments, and that day1 September 3, 1980, gave them a check in the amount of $595, which was the balance due on their insurance coverage. This check was subsequently deposited to the account of Federal Insurance Agency and was cashed. This did not end the von Poppel saga, however, as subsequently the von Poppels were billed for an additional amount of $116.18, which reflects the interest on the amount ostensibly financed. When the von Poppels received this statement, they contacted the Federal Insurance Agency and were told that there was some mistake and that the matter would be taken care of. They therefore did not make any further payments, except a total payment of $20, which they were told was still owing. This $20 payment was made on May 29, 1981, after their insurance had been cancelled for nonpayment of the balance due on the finance agreement. The policy was, however, subsequently reinstated, back-dated to the date of cancellation, after the von Poppels complained. Their complaints, however, did nothing to forestall a series of dunning letters from a collection agency to which Devco had referred the von Poppels' account. It is obvious, therefore, that Federal Insurance Agency did not notify Devco of the fact that the amount due and payable had been paid, and did not clear the von Poppels with Devco or with the collection agency thereafter. As a result, the von Poppels filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner's office. That terminated their difficulty on this policy. On September 15, 1980, Federal Insurance Agency submitted a check in the amount $595, the amount paid to them by the von Poppels in full settlement of their account, to Devco. There appears to have been no additional letter of explanation, and though Devco credited this amount to the von Poppel account, it did not know to cancel the finance charges since the von Poppels' decline to finance their premium. Of the total amount of the von Poppel premium, the majority, $636, was attributable to the basic insurance in the amount of $10,000-$20,000 liability written by American Risk Assurance Company of Miami, Florida. The supplemental liability carrying a premium of $180 and covering $40,000-$80,000 liability was written by Hull and Company, Inc., out of Fort Lauderdale for Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The third portion of the coverage carrying a charged premium in the amount of $150 covered the AD&D covered by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (RSLIC) of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This coverage, in the principal sum of $10,000 in the case of Mr. von Poppel and $5,000 in the case of Mrs. von Poppel, was included without the knowledge or the cosnet of the von Poppels. The policies, numbered 10753 R and 10754 R, were never delivered to the von Poppels as, according to an officer of RSLIC, they should have been, but are in the files of the Federal Insurance Agency. Further, the von Poppels were overcharged for the coverage. Respondent, however, did not remit any of the premium to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company Instead, on August 1, 1980, the same day the von Poppels were in to purchase their insurance, he issued a sight draft drawn on Devco Premium Finance Company to Reliance Standard Life in the amount of $150. Reliance Standard Life was not the same company as Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, was not controlled by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, and in fact had no relation to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Reliance Standard Life was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida in which Kevin D. Cox was president and Howard I. Vogel was vice president-secretary. Of the $150 premium, 90 percent was retained by Respondent or his company as commission and 10 percent was transmitted to Nation Motor Club along with a 10 percent commission on policies written for other individuals. Nation Motor Club would then transmit the bona fide premium of 24 cents per $1,000 coverage to RSLIC. More than a year later, on October 16, 1981, Federal Insurance Agency reimbursed the von Poppels with a check for $42.50, representing the unearned portion of the unordered AD&D coverage. Clifford A. Ragsdale went to the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth on April 19, 1982, to purchase his auto insurance because after calling several agencies by phone and advising them of the coverage he wanted, this was the least expensive. To do this, he would read off the coverage from his old policy and get a quote for the identical coverage. After getting this agency's quote, he went to the office where, after talking with two different ladies to whom he described the coverage he desired, he got to the person with whom he had talked on the phone and read his current coverage, and who already had some of the paperwork prepared. During all his discussions with the agency's employees on the phone and in person, he did not speak of, request, or desire auto club membership. He has been a member of AAA since 1977, and his membership there covers all the contingencies he is concerned with. Additional auto club membership in another club would be redundant. He gave the agency representative a check for $247 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance due through Premium Service Company. Though he was given a receipt for the $247 deposit, the premium finance agreement he signed that day at the Federal Insurance Agency reflected a cash down payment of only $147, thus falsely inflating the balance due to be paid by the client. The $100 difference was refunded to Mr. Ragsdale by Federal Insurance Agency on October 25, 1982, some six months later after he complained to the Insurance Commissioner's office and was told that the $100 difference was for membership in a motor club that he did not desire or agree to. As late as December 29, 1982, over eight months later, the agency had still not remitted the $147 to Premium Service Company, who then added this deposit already paid by the client back to the account balance. Mr. Ragsdale did not read all the documents he signed at the agency, and he never received the policy he ordered. He was told he was signing an application for insurance and signed several instruments in blank at the request of the personnel at Federal Insurance Agency. He was told they would later fill in what wad needed. Respondent was the general lines agent of record for the Okeechobee Insurance Agency, located at 1874 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida, during March and April, 1979, and at the Federal Insurance Agency, 3551 South Military Trail, Lake Worth, Florida, during the period which included August, 1980, and April, 1982. In each agency, he had instructed his' personnel how to serve and handle customers who came to the agency requesting the lowest minimum required insurance in which the agency specialized and which the agency, through its advertising program, purported to offer. As testified to by Linda Holly, an employee of Federal Insurance Agency, and as admitted by Respondent, when a prospective customer entered the agency requesting the minimum required coverage, the agent was to ask if the customer knew what the minimum was. The agent would then explain what was required and quote a premium which included not only the minimum required insurance, but also some additional service which, depending on the time, could be AD&D, towing, motor club, or the like, none of which was required by the State of Florida. Respondent instructed his employees to do this on the rationale that the premiums and commissions on the minimum required insurance were so low that the agency could not make sufficient profit on the sale of it, alone, to stay in business.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license as a general lines agent in the State of Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1983 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance Legal Division 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Kevin Denis Cox 1483 S.W. 25th Way Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441 The Honorable Bill Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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DANIEL BRUCE CAUGHEY vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 90-004473F (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 19, 1990 Number: 90-004473F Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1990

Findings Of Fact On September 8, 1987, the Department of Insurance received a letter dated September 1, 1987, from Joseph F. Kinman, Jr., which stated: Another insurance agent (Daniel Bruce Caughey) from Pensacola, Florida and his incorporated agency (Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc.) are refusing to forward premium payments on to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite a final judgment for such amounts here in Hillsborough County Circuit Court. Enclosed is a copy of the Final Judgment entered August 13, 1987, as well as a copy of the Complaint. We represent Jordan Roberts & Company, as well as Poe & Associates, Inc. here in Tampa, Florida. In approximately August of 1982, Daniel Bruce Caughey and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. wherein Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to collect premiums on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and in turn, Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to receive commissions. Mr. Caughey signed an Individual Guarantee Agreement on October 21, 1983, guaranteeing that Brokerage Agreement with Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Mr. Caughey and the Agency failed to forward the insurance premiums collected on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite repeated demands and inquiries. Finally, a lawsuit was filed against Mr. Caughey and the Agency in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Hillsborough County in December of 1986. Final judgment for Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. against Mr. Caughey and the Agency was entered on August 13, 1987, for an amount of $6,595.94. Mr. Caughey and his Agency have unlawfully withheld monies belonging to an insurer, Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and, accordingly, appear to be in violation of Florida Statutes 626 et seq. Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. has a judgment for unpaid insurance premiums against Mr. Caughey and the Agency, however, Mr. Caughey and the Agency refuse or fail to pay over to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. premium funds rightfully belonging to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. Accordingly, we would respectfully request that your office conduct an investigation of Mr. Caughey and the Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Enclosed with this letter were copies of the complaint and final judgment in the circuit court case, Case No. 86-21454. As found in the main administrative case, Case No. 89-2651: In Count 1, JORO's complaint [in Case No. 86-21454] alleges the existence of a brokerage agreement between JORO and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc., entered into "[o]n or about April 27, 1982"; execution and delivery of respondent's guarantee "[o]n or about October 21, 1983"; and the agency's indebtedness "for premiums on policies underwritten by [JORO] for the sum of $20,975.36." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In Count II, the complaint also alleges execution and delivery of a promissory note "[o]n or about October 21, 1983," without, however, explicitly indicating its relationship (if any) with the guarantee executed the same date. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The final judgment does not specify which count(s) JORO recovered on. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Attached to the complaint are copies of the promissory note, executed by "CAUGHEY INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., By: D B Caughey Vice President"; the guarantee, executed in the same way; and the brokerage agreement, executed on behalf of Caughey Insurance Agency by "William C. Caughey, President." Although the Individual Guarantee Agreement names respondent as guarantor in the opening paragraph, the corporation is shown as guarantor on the signature line. The complaint does not allege and the judgment does not recite that respondent personally failed to remit premiums but says he is responsible as an officer of the agency. Without any further investigation, as far as the record shows, the Department of Insurance filed a complaint amended on April 24, 1989, to allege, inter alia, that "[o]n or about August 19, 1982 Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. . . . requir[ing] Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. to remit premiums, unearned commissions and additional premiums to Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc."; and that respondent "personally guaranteed the [agency's] obligation under this agreement in" writing, but "failed to remit five thousand five dollars and forty-four cents due under th[e] agreement" for which sum Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. obtained judgment. After a formal administrative hearing, a recommended order was entered on April 2, 1990, recommending dismissal of the administrative complaint, because "ambiguities in the court papers do not clearly and convincingly rule out the possibility that the court's judgment rests on the dishonored promissory note . . . [rather than] a breach of respondent's [here petitioner's] fiduciary responsibilities." In its final order, the Department dismissed the administrative complaint; Daniel Bruce Caughey was the prevailing party in that case. The parties have stipulated that "Daniel B. Caughey qualifies as a small business party as defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes." The parties also stipulated that the "total value of the reasonable attorney's fees and costs at issue is $2,830."

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6857.111
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. JAMES H. BOWLING AND PREMIUM BUDGET SERVICE, INC., 79-000501 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000501 Latest Update: Sep. 05, 1979

The Issue This case involves an Administrative Complaint filed by the petitioner, State of Florida, Office of Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner, against James H. Bowling and Premium Budget Service, Inc., Respondents. The action is brought under the authority of Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes. The petitioner is attempting to take disciplinary action against the licenses of the Respondents pertaining to their performance in insurance business transactions conducted in the State of Florida. Originally, the Administrative Complaint contained eight counts. At the commencement of the hearing, Count IV of the Administrative Complaint was dismissed. The remaining Counts I through VII accuse Respondent Bowling with a series of substantive violations related to his business transactions with individual customers with whom be allegedly was involved in the selling of insurance in the State of Florida. Specifically, Respondent Bowling is charged with: Receiving premiums or other funds belonging to insurers or others in transactions under his license which were trust funds received by him in a fiduciary capacity, which funds he failed to account for or pay to the insurer, insured or other persons entitled thereto in violation of Subsection 626.561(1), Florida Statutes. Willfully, under his license, circumventing the prohibitions of the Insurance Code, in violating of Sub section 626.611(4), Florida Statutes. Demonstrating a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, in violation of Subsection 626.611 (7), Florida Statutes. Demonstrating a lack of reasonable and adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by the license or permit, in violation of Subsection 626.611(8), Florida Statutes. Engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in violation of Subsection 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. Misappropriating, converting or unlawfully withholding moneys belonging to insurers, insureds, beneficiaries or others received in the conduct of his business pursuant to license, in violation of Subsection 626.6II(10), Florida Statutes. In connection with the purported violation set forth in the aforementioned issue a., willfully violating an order, rule or regulation of the Insurance Department, or willfully violating provisions of the Insurance Code, contrary to Subsection 626.611(13), Florida Statutes. In connection with the purported violation set forth in the aforementioned issue a, violating provisions of the Insurance Code by an act contrary to Subsection 626.621(2), Florida Statutes. The Respondent, James H. Bowling, is accused through Count VIII of a violation of all those provisions set out in the accusations found in the statements a. through h. set out herein, related to remaining Counts I through VII and is an accusation that encompasses the cumulative effect of the violations in remaining Counts I through VII. If the Respondent, James H Bowling, is found to be guilty of the offenses set out in the Administrative Complaint, it is the petitioner's intention to revoke his license and eligibility for future licenses and/or to refuse the issuance of additional licenses as an insurance agent, or to impose as many lesser penalties as may be proper under the provisions of Sections 626.611, 626.621 and 626.681, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code. Count VIII, related to the Respondent, Premium Budget Service, Inc., seeks to suspend or revoke its license as a premium finance company, and the basis for such action is premised upon the evidential facts alleged in remaining Counts I through VII and under authority of Subsection 627.832(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration based upon the Administrative Complaint of petitioner, State of Florida, Office of Treasurer/ Insurance Commissioner, filed against James H. Bowling and Premium Budget Service, Inc., Respondents. The general details of the nature of the allegations may be found in the issues statement of this Recommended Order, and the particular allegations in each count will be discussed in the course of these findings of fact and the conclusions of law. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Office of Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner, is an agency of the State of Florida charged by statute with the duty to regulate the insurance industry in this state. The authority for such regulation, related to the case sub judice, is established in Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, James H. Bowling, is a licensed 2-20 insurance agent in the State of Florida, who holds such license with the permission of the Petitioner. Premium Budget Service, Inc., is licensed by the Petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes. For the period January, 1975, to December, 1978, the Respondent, James H. Bowling, owned and operated as a licensed 2-20 insurance agent in the State of Florida, a company known as Atlas Insurance Agency, Inc. During that time, Bowling was the president of that corporation and was a 50 percent shareholder of its stock issue. Atlas had eight offices throughout Duva1 County, Florida, in which Bowling was transacting the business of the company. His specific function in connection with Atlas was that of the overall responsibility for the operation of Atlas insurance Agency, Inc., in managerial terms. In addition, Respondent Bowling served as the president of Premium Budget Service, Inc., during the period January, 1975, through December, 1978. This company was owned by Sandra R. Bowling, Respondent Bowling's wife. The business of Premium Budget Service, Inc., in the years in question was that of financing premium accounts to be paid by customers of Atlas Insurance Agency, Inc. to the company offering the insurance coverage. Under this arrangement, Premium Budget Service, Inc., financed the amount of the premium for insurance which was being handled by Atlas, and the customer agreed to pay back the amount of premium financed on an installment basis under terms and conditions of an installment contract. Some of the contracts which Premium Budget Service, Inc., had received from Atlas insurance Agency, Inc., for financing were subsequently assigned by Premium Budget to Devco Premium Finance Company. Devco, as a condition of the assignment, paid Premium Budget the amount of principal financed together with a transfer fee and was then reimbursed by the customer who made Installment payments of principal and interest to Devco on the amount of policy premium financed. This arrangement commenced in September, 1975, and was in operation during the pendency of some of the contracts which are at issue in this Administrative Complaint. The contracts which the Administrative Complaint focuses on were contracts involving customers through the Joint Underwriters Association program in Florida. The Joint Underwriters Association Is an organization made up of insurance companies who do business in the State of Florida in which members of the association have as their principal purpose the writing of insurance for high risk automobile drivers who operate automobiles in the State of Florida. Under this plan, Atlas insurance Agency, Inc., used United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, hereinafter referred to as "U.S.F.&G.", as its servicing carrier in the time sequence relevant to this complaint. The first allegation in the Administrative Complaint concerns an insurance policy which Atlas sold to one Daniel Lashley. Lashley paid the full amount of the insurance premium by money order No. 1306407044 made out in the amount of $307. U.S.F.&G. issued policy No. 8-90-104607. This policy was issued after Atlas had mailed a down payment of $100 to U.S.F.&G. The check from Atlas was written on Bowling's signature. Lashley had paid the money order on April 4, 1977, and U.S.F.&G. had received the $100 deposit on April 28, 1977. The policy was mailed by U.S.F.&G. to Atlas on May 12, 1977, and the down payment check was deposited in the bank account of U.S.F.&G. on May 15, 1977. The effective date of the policy was April 8, 1977, to April 8, 1978. In addition, there was a premium billing requirement of $1.00 which Lashley paid on June 4, 1977. Apparently, this $1.00 payment was made to Atlas, because on November 23, 1977, a notice of termination was sent to Atlas and to David Lashley indicating an outstanding balance of $208. This notice was sent because U.S.F.&G. was unable to locate any payment other than the initial down payment of $100 which had been submitted with the application for policy; notwithstanding the fact that the total policy amount called for $308, which full amount should have been paid within thirty days of the date of issue of the policy. Final cancellation notice was mailed on December 21, 1977. This final cancellation notice was only forwarded to the agent, Atlas; however, on January 5, 1978, a notice was sent to Lashley indicating $103 earned premium due on the policy to keep the policy in effect until the end of the term. Lashley contacted the Florida Department of Insurance to determine why the policy had been cancelled and at that time he furnished proof of payment for the full amount of premium. An investigator with the Florida Department of Insurance contacted U.S.F. &G. who reinstated the policy on April 19, 1978, to be effective December 4, 1977. This reinstatement was made in spite of U.S.F.&G.'s records which showed no payment of the outstanding $208, nor contact from anyone connected with Atlas insurance Agency on the issue of why the policy had been cancelled. The Respondent, James H. Bowling, contended in the course of the hearing that a second check in connection with the Lashley premium had been forwarded to U.S.F.&G. on the Atlas account, check No. 19837, dated May 31, 1977. He also stated that his files indicated a notice of cancellation of November, 1977, to be effective December 4, 1977, but he took no action because a review of the file indicated that full payment had been received by U.S.F.&G., as evidenced by a memorandum from U.S.F.&G., indicating reinstatement and a note from an unnamed Atlas employee to the effect that the policy was to be reinstated, which led him to believe that someone in the Atlas office conferred with the U.S.F.&G. office and believed that the money on the second check of $208 had been found. Bowling's further explanation for the delayed payment of the balance of the policy was to the effect that normally on policies which were financed, only the initial installment was paid down and the balance paid at a later date, and he felt that one of his employees had treated the cash premium payment in Lashley's case in the same manner, by mistake. Testimony in the hearing established that certain checks forwarded to U.S.F. &G. had been mishandled, and those occurrences were happening around the time Lashley's's policy was purchased. Therefore, it has not been satisfactorily shown that the additional amount of $208 was not forwarded by a check dated May 31, 1977. Nonetheless, this does not excuse Atlas nor its managing agent, Bowling, from the necessity to forward all moneys received from Lashley on April 4, 1977, when it was received, and in one lump sum. Nor does It excuse the fact that even though Atlas knew of the cancellation in November/December of 1977, it left it to Lashley to take the initiative to rectify the problem, which was not accomplished until April, 1978; instead of immediately inquiring of U.S.F.&G. about the missing money when they were told of the problem. Accepting Bowling's representations that contacts were made with U.S.F.&G. on the subject of the Lashley account, it is apparent that those contacts took place after Lashley had set matters in motion. leading to the April, 1978, reinstatement. Count II of the Administrative Complaint involves a transaction between Atlas and a Bobby R. McGowan, Sr., to sell McGowan insurance policies. One of the policies was an automobile policy through U.S.F. &G. and a second was a personal effects policy through Parliament Insurance Company. The automobile policy was No. 8-90-056330 and the personal effects policy was No. PIM-18643. The premium on the automobile policy was $546 and the premium on the personal effects policy was $20. The terms of the policies ran from January 13, 1976, through January 13, 1977. There was a contract which McGowan entered into with Premium Budget Service, Inc. to finance the premiums due in the two policies. The total premium of both policies was $566, with a down payment of $198 from McGowan and an amount financed of $368. This contract was assigned to Devco Premium Finance Company in January, 1976. Devco paid for the assignment by having Respondent Bowling execute a sight draft which contained the amount due to Premium Budget on the McGowan account. This execution of the sight draft was on January 14, 1976, and it was honored by Devco on January 16, 1976. The proceeds pertaining to McGowan which were received by Premium Budget Service, Inc., were then transmitted by check to Atlas and Atlas at that point had the total premium amounts of $566. Atlas in turn forwarded $150 to U.S.F.&G by a check bearing Bowling's signature, which was deposited in the U.S.F.&G. account on June 2, 1976. In the interim, Devco requested a cancellation of U.S.F.&G.'s policy on McGowan and that request was made on March 10, 1976. The policy was cancelled and U.S.F. &G. returned $42 of unearned premiums to Devco. A notice of the cancellation was forwarded to Atlas and to McGowan. The reason for the cancellation action by Devco was related to McGowan's nonpayment on the installment contract to Devco. Devco claims to be short $361 in what should have been returned to them as unearned premiums. U.S.F. &G. did not forward that amount because they never received it from Atlas. Respondent, James H. Bowling, sent $366.63 to Devco on the McGowan account under check No. 18779 dated April 7, 1977, by his signature. Devco never received that amount and the cancelled check cannot be found, and Devco has never received its money. The reason for the delay in repaying Devco, according to the Respondent, was because he had an agreement with Devco in the person of their former owner, Doyle E. Varnes, to the effect that the premium money other than the necessary down payment would be held by Atlas, and if a policy was cancelled before it was issued, that the money other than the down payment would be sent by Atlas to Devco and not to U.S.F.&G.; otherwise, after issue the balance could go to the insurer. Varnes testified and did not acknowledge that agreement; additionally, any such agreement would be contrary to the requirement that the full amount of the premium be submitted by Atlas and, more importantly, Bowling's explanation about withholding moneys on this or any other case in which Devco paid Premium Budget for an assigned contract is not believable. Count III deals with a transaction in which Atlas sold Dorothy G. Morgan a policy from U.S.F.&G. This transpired in December, 1975. Dorothy G. Morgan made the down payment of $95, leaving an amount to be financed of $175 of the total premium of $270. This was an instance in which Premium Budget Service, Inc., assigned the contract to Devco under the same arrangement described in the transaction involving the customer, McGowan. On December 25, 1975, Bowling signed the draft for payment to Premium Budget. The term of the policy was December 15, 1975, to December 15, 1976, and the automobile insurance policy number was 8-90-49673. Atlas received the full amount of premium of $270, including the amount to be financed and paid $100 to U.S.F.&G. as a down payment deposited by U.S.F.&G. on May 20, 1976. After the down payment was mailed by a check drawn by Bowling on an Atlas bank account, Devco asked U.S.F.&G. to cancel the policy and a notice of cancellation was forwarded to Atlas and Morgan. This notice of cancellation, as all notices of cancellation involved in a transaction with U.S.F.&G. alluded to in this Administrative Complaint, contained a statement of the down payment amount and the outstanding premium amount. At that point of the notice of cancellation, U.S.F.&G. had not received the balance of the premium payments beyond the $100, the initial installment, and it did not return any moneys to Devco after the policy was cancelled because the amount of the earned premium was $109 which exceeded the amount of down payment by $9, leaving a negative balance. Devco was eventually paid the amount of money that it had outstanding, to-wit, the $170; by a check dated March 21, 1979, drawn on the account of The insurance Store, Inc. The draft on The Insurance Store, Inc., carries Respondent Bowling's signature and may be found as the Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. (Count IV had been dismissed prior to the hearing.) Count V involves the transaction between Atlas Insurance Agency, Inc., and one Willard I. Rader. This transaction involved the sale of an automobile policy through U.S.F.&G. with the premium amount of $370 which was subsequently adjusted to $428, policy No. 8-90-49616, and a personal effects policy through Parliament Insurance Company, No. PIM-232l3, with a premium of $20 produced by Atlas. The terms of the two policies were January 12, 1976, to January 12, 1977. The policies were assigned by Premium Budget Service, Inc., to Devco under the arrangement described above and on Bowling's signature to a draft dated January 14, 1976, which draft was honored by Devco on January 16, 1976. Premium Budget having received the proceeds from the assignment of the contract to Devco, paid Atlas moneys sufficient to leave Atlas with the full amount of the premium. In the beginning, the total premium for both policies was $390, with the down payment of $137, leaving $253 to be financed. Atlas forwarded $100 to U.S.F.&G.`s representative as a minimum down payment and U.S.F.&G. deposited that amount of money on June 21, 1976. U.S.F.&G. did not receive any further moneys from Atlas. Devco subsequently requested that the policy be cancelled and the policy was cancelled and Atlas and Radar were notified of the cancellation. U.S.F.&G. returned no money to Devco, in view of the fact that the earned premium was $177 and the amount of down payment was $100. On April 25, 1978, Atlas Insurance Agency, Inc., wrote a check under the signature of the Respondent, Bowling, in the amount of $270 which was paid to Devco. This $270 represented the balance of the premium down payment which should have been forwarded to U.S.F.&G. with the $100 down payment. The check may be found as the Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. Count VI involves the sale of an automobile policy by Atlas to Gerda M.Weidman. This policy was issued by U.S.F.&G. under No. 8-90-49695. The amount of premium was $184 which was later adjusted to the amount of $211. The term of the policy was from December 8, 1975, to December 8, 1976. The Weidman policy was financed to the extent of $120 of the original $184, the down payment being $64. The finance agreement was arranged by Premium Budget Service, Inc., who assigned the contract to Devco under terms described above. The sight draft was executed under Bowling's signature on December 9, 1975, and was honored by Devco, which assignment proceeds were transmitted through Premium Budget to Atlas, leaving Atlas with $184. Atlas transmitted $50 of that $184 as a down payment, instead of the proper amount of $184. This $50 amount was deposited by U.S.F.&G. on March 30, 1976. Devco had in February, 1976, requested the cancellation of the policy and the policy was cancelled with Atlas and Weidman being notified of the cancellation. U.S.F.&G. returned $9 of unearned premium to Devco. On April 25, 1978, a check was issued from Atlas Insurance Agency, Inc., to Devco in the amount of $134 under signature of James H. Bowling. This $134 represented the balance of the moneys due to Devco on the premium amount financed by Devco. The check in the amount of $134 may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. Count VII of the Administrative Complaint charges this Respondent, James H. Bowling, with violations connected with the sale of an automobile insurance policy by Atlas to one John K. Detmer. On May 5, 1977, John K. Detmer paid Atlas $210 as a down payment. An additional $428.08 was financed by Premium Budget Service, Inc., which amount reflected interest and other charges. The payment was for the purchase of a policy from U.S.F.&G., which issued policy No. 8-90-104724 effective May 8, 1977. The policy was issued after they received only $200 as a down payment, compared to the full amount of premium required, which would have been the $210 Detmer paid together with that portion of the $428.08 balance related to the premium. Detmer subsequently paid the entire amount required under the finance contract with Premium Budget Service, Inc. On November 21, 1977, U.S.F.&G. cancelled the policy after notifying Atlas and Detmer of the cancellation, in view of the fact that they had only received the $200 deposit and other moneys were due and owing on the premium. This policy has never been reinstated by U.S.F. &G. The Respondent claims that the additional amount of $399 was mailed to U.S.F.&G. under check No. 20512 from the account of Atlas drawn on July 13, 1977; however, U.S.F.&G. claims that they never received the additional payment. The Respondent's files indicate the cancellation notice and the effective date of that notice to be December 4, 1977, and a note that the policy was to be reinstated. There are no notes in the files with U.S.F.&G. of any conversation pertaining to the subject of reinstatement. Accepting the representation that the second check was forwarded on July 13, 1977; the Respondent, Bowling, as the managing agent of Atlas and Premium Budget, acted inappropriately in not forwarding the full amount of premium as one lump sum payment and in the task of following up the cancellation of the policy. Furthermore, even if it is assumed that there was some conversation between employees of Respondent Bowling's office and U.S.F.&G. and a note placed in the Atlas file to the effect that there would be reinstatement, there should have been a follow-up with Detmer to make certain that the policy had been reinstated, particularly since the cancelled check in the amount of $399 has never been returned and, had the policy been reinstated, it is reasonable to expect some notification memorandum would have been given such as was given in the Lashley matter. (Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, allows the parties to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations. The Respondents have availed themselves of that opportunity and those proposals have been reviewed prior to the rendition of this Recommended Order. To the extent that the proposals are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order, they have been taken into account and utilized in rendering the Recommended Order. To the extent that the proposals by the Respondents are inconsistent with this Recommended Order, they are hereby specifically rejected.)

Recommendation It is recommended that the license of the Respondent, James H. Bowling, to operate as a 2-20 insurance agent in the State of Florida be REVOKED. It is further recommended that the action against the license of Premium Budget Service, Inc., be DISMISSED DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire Office of Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John London Arnold, Esquire 919 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 =================================================================

Florida Laws (6) 120.57626.561626.611626.621626.681627.832
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AIU INSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SOUTH INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION, 04-001540RP (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 22, 2004 Number: 04-001540RP Latest Update: May 15, 2006

The Issue Whether proposed Rule 69O-170.013(7), Florida Administrative Code, involving insurance coverage by property and casualty insurers under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, meets all procedural and substantive requirements so as to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are property and casualty insurance companies licensed by Respondent to write various commercial insurance lines in the State of Florida. On November 26, 2002, the United States Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Public Law 101-297, 116 U.S.C. 2322 (TRIA). The stated purpose of TRIA is to establish a temporary federal program that provides for a transparent system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of terrorism, in order accomplish the following: (a) to protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk; and (b) to allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses, while preserving state insurance regulation and consumer protections. TRIA provides a federal reinsurance backstop for three years and gives the federal government authority to recoup federal payments made through policy-holder surcharges up to a maximum annual limit in the event of a "certified loss." As a condition for any federal payment, clear and conspicuous disclosures must be provided to policyholders for the premium charged for insured losses covered by TRIA and the federal share of compensation for insured losses under TRIA. TRIA expressly preempts any state requirement for insurers to seek prior approval before using a terrorism coverage rate. However, TRIA does not affect the ability of a state to invalidate a rate filing that is determined to be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. On November 27, 2002, the Florida Department of Insurance (Respondent's predecessor) issued a bulletin discussing TRIA and its impact on the state regulatory scheme. The bulletin made it clear that TRIA "preserved the Department's authority to disapprove any rates pertaining to such losses if it finds them to be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory." Effective January 7, 2003, Section 20.121(3), Florida Statutes, created the Financial Services Commission (FSC), composed of the Governor, the Attorney General, the Chief Financial Officer, and the Commissioner of Agriculture. Respondent is one of the major structural units of the FSC. The only other major structural unit is the Office of Financial Regulation (OFR). The FSC has no employees aside from persons employed directly by the individually elected officials and those employed directly by the respective structural units. On February 25, 2003, the newly created FSC met to discuss the proposed delegation or authorization of preliminary rulemaking authority to Respondent and OFR. The discussion was set forth in Agenda Item 2 of that meeting. At the February 25, 2003, meeting, the FSC approved the proposed delegation for the Directors of Respondent and OFR, or their respective designees, to act on behalf of FSC, within their respective jurisdictions, with regard to all aspects of the rulemaking process, with the exceptions of the following: final adoption of rules pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; (b) emergency rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; (c) denials of petitions to initiate rulemaking filed by a person regulated by Respondent or OFR or having a substantial interest in an agency rule, pursuant to Section 120.54(7), Florida Statutes; and (d) denials of written proposals for lower cost regulatory alternatives submitted by substantially affected persons, pursuant to Section 120.541, Florida Statutes. On May 13, 2003, the FSC approved the minutes of the February 25, 2003, FSC meeting. It is undisputed that the FSC did not specifically approve the proposed rule at any time before or after Respondent published its intent to develop the proposed rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On February 4, 2004, Respondent forwarded a "Notice of Proposed Rule Development Pursuant to Section 120.56(4)(e)2." to the Florida Administrative Weekly. On February 13, 2004, this notice, along with the preliminary text of the proposed rule, was published in Section I of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The title of the proposed rule was "Filing Procedures for Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, Rules, Underwriting Guidelines, and Forms." The stated purpose was "[t]o develop rules to adopt procedures and standards for the review and approval of rates for terrorism insurance coverage in accordance with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002." During the hearing, Respondent presented another purpose for the development of the proposed rule. That purpose was to respond to an alleged non-rule policy in DOAH Case No.03- 4486RU in accordance with Section 120.56(4)(e)2., Florida Statutes. The announced subject to be addressed by the proposed rule was "[t]errorism insurance endorsements and rates." The specific authority cited for the proposed rule was Section 624.308, Florida Statutes. The laws to be implemented by the proposed rule included Sections 624.307(1), 624.604, 624.605, 627.062, 627.0645, and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. The rule development notice also indicated that a rule development workshop would be held on March 2, 2004, if requested in writing. The February 13, 2004, iteration of the rule stated as follows: (7) This rule applies to that portion of a rate filing relating to terrorism coverage required under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. The Office recognizes the difficulty facing an individual insurer in demonstrating that its rates related to terrorism are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. An insurer is free to use any generally accepted and reasonable actuarial technique in its filing which it believes demonstrates that the rates requested or implemented are in compliance with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes. If an insurer is unable to demonstrate through its own methodology that the rate requested or implemented complies with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, then the insurer may, at its option, adopt the methodology, data, and rates of another insurer, as appropriate, that have been previously approved by the Office. By letter dated February 24, 2004, Petitioners requested that Respondent conduct a workshop on the date and time specified in the notice. That workshop was conducted as scheduled. March 12, 2004, was the deadline for submitting written comments with respect to the February 13, 2004, iteration of the proposed rule. On that date, Respondent received a written comment from Stephen Zielezienski, Vice President and General Counsel for the American Insurance Association (AIA). AIA is a national trade association that represents over 400 property and casualty insurers. On behalf of AIA, Mr. Zielezienski commented that allowing an individual insurer to adopt previously approved terrorism risk methodologies, data, and rates of other companies, such as rating/advisory organizations, would be an improvement over the language in the text of the proposed rule. In consideration of the comments made at the workshop and in subsequent written comments, Respondent forwarded a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" to the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 24, 2004. The notice, along with an amended text of the proposed rule was published in Section II of the Florida Administrative Weekly on April 2, 2004. The text of the second iteration of the proposed rule, as published on April 2, 2004, states as follows: (7) This rule applies to that portion of a rate filing relating to terrorism coverage required under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. The Office recognizes the difficulty facing an individual insurer in demonstrating that its rates related to terrorism are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. An insurer is free to use any generally accepted and reasonable actuarial technique in its filing which it believes demonstrates that the rates requested or implemented are in compliance with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes. If an insurer is unable to demonstrate through its own methodology that the rate requested or implemented complies with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, then the insurer may, at its option, adopt the methodology, data, and rates of another insurer or rating or advisory organization, as appropriate, that have been previously approved by the Office. In addition to the notice, Respondent provided the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) with copies of documents required by Section 120.54(3)(a)4., Florida Statutes. The documents included, inter alia, the text of the proposed rule, a "Statement Relating to Federal Standards or Rule With Reference to Rule Chapter 69O-170 Property and Casualty Insurance Rating," and a "Summary of the Proposed Rule." On April 26, 2004, Respondent received a letter from John Rosner, Chief Attorney for JAPC. Mr. Rosner's letter stated as follows in relevant part: The proposed change provides in part that an insurer may adopt "the methodology, data, and rates of another insurer or rating or advisory organization, as appropriate, that have been previously approved by the Office." Has such approval been memorialized by rule? If not, the rule should be amended to disclose the criteria pursuant to which the Office renders approval of "the methodology, data, and rates of another insurer or rating or advisory organization." In a letter dated August 2, 2004, Steve Fredrickson, Respondent's Assistant General Counsel, responded to Mr. Rosner's letter as follows in relevant part: Specifically, the rule language "methodology, data, and rates of another insurer or rating or advisory organization, as appropriate, that have been approved by the Office" is a reference to other approved filings which have been submitted by other insurers. Section 627.062 and 627.065, Florida Statutes, provide the specific criteria that the Office uses to approve or disapprove a rate filing. The reference above acknowledges that if the specific methodology, data, and rates have previously been approved, we will accept them in another insurer's rate filings. Although the April 2, 2004, notice reflected a possible second public hearing to be held on April 27, 2004, Respondent did not receive a request for another workshop. Nevertheless, in response to issues raised by Petitioners in this case, Respondent reviewed the April 2, 2004, iteration of the proposed rule and ultimately made changes to its text. Specifically, the term "generally accepted and reasonable actuarial technique" in the proposed rule appeared to place an impermissible burden on insurers that was not required by statute. Additionally, the term "as appropriate" was removed and "similar risks" was inserted in the third iteration of the proposed rule. On February 2, 2005, Respondent provided Petitioners with a copy of a Notice of Change. On February 3, 2005, Respondent advised JAPC that it was changing the text of the proposed rule. On February 18, 2005, a Notice of Change was published in Section III of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The text of the third iteration of the proposed rule, and the version that is at issue here, states as follows: (7) This rule applies to that portion of a rate filing relating to terrorism coverage required under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. The Office recognizes the difficulty facing an individual insurer in demonstrating that its rates related to terrorism are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. An insurer is free to use any methodology the insurer believes demonstrates that the rates requested or implemented are in compliance with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes. If an insurer is unable to demonstrate through its own methodology that the rate requested or implemented complies with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, then the insurer may, at its option, adopt the methodology, data, and/or rates or loss costs of another insurer or rating or advisory organization that have been previously approved by the Office for similar risks. Petitioners have three (3) terrorism rate filings pending before Respondent in the following lines of business: commercial property, general liability, and surety. Petitioners also have several cases involving terrorism rate filings for other property and casualty lines of business pending before DOAH because Respondent has issued notices of its intent to disapprove each filing. Petitioners are free to make any additional rate filings for terrorism rates in any line of insurance covered by TRIA. Therefore, Petitioners have standing in this case. As stated above, the proposed rule was drafted, at least in part, in response to Petitioners' allegations that Respondent had implemented an invalid non-rule policy in regard to approval or disapproval of terrorism rate filings under TRIA. Respondent was also concerned that others might believe that it was using a non-rule policy. The alleged non-rule policy consisted of Respondent's applying a one percent rate cap for commercial property and casualty terrorism rate filings based upon the terrorism rate filings Respondent approved for use by the Insurance Services Offices (ISO) and the American Association of Insurance Services (AAIS). The record as a whole indicates that Respondent did not draft the February 18, 2005, iteration of the proposed rule to codify the substance of the alleged non-rule policy. In fact, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the so- called non-rule policy played no role in the development of the proposed rule other than to provide some motivation to initiate the rulemaking process. Instead of imposing a cap on rates, the proposed rule provides Petitioners with several options: (a) an insurer may utilize any methodology, data and/or rates that the insurer believes will demonstrate compliance with Section 626.062, Florida Statutes; (b) an insurer may adopt the previously approved methodology, data, and/or rates or loss costs of another insurer for similar risks; (c) an insurer may adopt the previously approved methodology, data, and/or rates or loss costs of a rating organization for similar risks; and (d) an insurer may adopt the previously approved methodology, data, and/or rates or loss costs of an advisory organization for similar risks. The proposed rule makes it clear to Petitioners and Respondent's staff that an insurer is not required to adopt the previously approved TRIA rate for any rating organization or any other entity. Neither the plain meaning nor the effect of the proposed rule imposes a cap for terrorism rates. Respondent presented testimony at hearing that it intends for insurers to use the term "methodology" in the third sentence of the proposed rule in its broadest sense. As an indication of how broadly Respondent construes the term "methodology" in the proposed rule, Steve Parton, Respondent's General Counsel and the principal author of the proposed rule, testified that an insurer's use of "no methodology" would be considered a methodology. Respondent presented testimony that there is no actuarial component associated with the term "methodology." Despite this testimony, the proposed rule refers to Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, which is the only guide that insurers have in making a decision regarding their terrorism rate methodology. Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, provides as follows in relevant part: 627.062 Rate Standards.-- The rates for all classes of insurance to which the provisions of this part are applicable shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. As to all such classes of insurance: * * * Upon receiving a rate filing, the office shall review the rate filing to determine if a rate is excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. In making that determination, the office shall, in accordance with generally accepted and reasonable actuarial techniques, consider the following factors: Past and prospective loss experience within and without this state. Past and prospective expenses. The degree of competition among insurers for the risk insured. Investment income reasonably expected by the insurer, consistent with the insurer's investment practices, from investable premiums anticipated in the filing, plus any other expected income from currently invested assets representing the amount expected on unearned premium reserves and loss reserves. . . . The reasonableness of the judgment reflected in the filing. Dividends, savings, or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned to Florida policyholders, members, or subscribers. The adequacy of loss reserves. The cost of reinsurance. Trend factors, including trends in actual losses per insured unit for the insurer making the filing. Conflagration and catastrophe hazards, if applicable. A reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies. The cost of medical services, if applicable. Other relevant factors which impact upon the frequency or severity of claims or upon expenses. * * * The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to workers' compensation and employer's liability insurance and to motor vehicle insurance. According to Mr. Parton, Respondent considered TRIA and other publications and documentation, indicating that data for terrorism risks is not as predominate as data for other insurance risks. One such publication is a March 4, 2003, report, prepared by the Property/Casualty Extreme Events Committee of the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA) for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), entitled Report to NAIC Terrorism Insurance Implementation Working Group on Ratemaking Issues Related to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which states as follows in relevant part: Introduction For the vast majority of U.S. insurance policy holders, the risk of foreign terrorism first became a real concern with the disastrous events of Sept. 11, 2002. Before that date, insurers in the United States had little or no historical information on losses from acts of foreign terrorism. That lack of information has precluded the use of traditional ratemaking methodology. Catastrophe modeling firms have responded to the information gap by developing computer models that help quantify the financial effect of terrorism on policyholders, insurers, and reinsurers. The development of those terrorism models is comparable to the development of natural catastrophe models in the late 1980s. But a major difference between the terrorism models and the natural catastrophe models is the substantial role that the judgment of experts plays in terrorism models. Such judgment is necessary because of the inherent differences between the risks of terrorism and natural catastrophes. Perhaps the most important of those differences is the human element of terrorism. Because the losses result from intentionally destructive human behavior, and because that behavior can vary with changing human motivations, measurement of expected losses, particularly claim frequency--is difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) requires insurers to offer coverage for acts of foreign terrorism to all commercial risks. As part of the offer, insurers must provide a premium quote if there is any additional charge for the coverage. Therefore, insurers must develop rates regardless of the lack of experience and the inherent uncertainly of the peril. The law requires insurers to provide the coverage when accepted by the policyholder. * * * Claim Frequency Issues There is minimal historical data on the frequency of incidents of foreign terrorism in the United States. And the risk of foreign terrorism probably fluctuates with changing world politics. The possibility of war with Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli situation, tensions with North Korea, and other world crisis may influence the frequency of terrorist attacks. The judgment of experts plays a major role in forecasting the frequency of terrorism. While various techniques (the Delphi method, game theory, and others) can put a structure around the reliance on expert opinion, the fundamentals of modeling are subjective. Because of the high level of uncertainty, insurers may develop many different estimates of the frequency of foreign terrorism. As a result, the range of reasonable estimates may be broad. Claim Severity Issues Like claim frequency, claim severity for foreign terrorism, is difficult to forecast. Again, there is minimal historical data. Modeling for terrorism severity can build on existing modeling and data developed for governments and others in response to the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The possible severity of a nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological event dwarfs the severity of even the World Trade Center losses. Again, because of the high level of uncertainty, insurers may develop many different estimates for the severity of losses for terrorist attacks. As a result, the range of reasonable estimates may be broad. Ratemaking The lack of historical experience and the unpredictable nature of terrorism losses preclude traditional experience-based methods of determining rates. Insurers generally make rates separately by state and line. However, under the TRIA, an insurer's retentions (exposures) will depend upon its nationwide commercial lines premium. For purposes of ratemaking, insurers will have to allocate their retentions by line or develop an all-lines rate for each policy. Some insurers may consider nontraditional ratemaking approaches, such of the following: Develop an appropriate rate for risk of foreign terrorism through a probability-of-ruin approach or some similar technique Analyze terrorism-related exposures to determine a Probable Maximum Loss (PML), concentration of exposures, or other relevant quantifications Use the cost of funding terrorism exposures through reinsurance or other mechanisms These are also generally accepted approaches for pricing low frequency, high severity exposures, such as catastrophes. Net vs. Direct Insurers generally make rates on a direct basis, before reinsurance consideration. However, the TRIA presents a unique situation because its reinsurance provisions apply to all foreign terrorism coverage provided by insurers. Consequently, many insurers may make rates net of expected recoveries under the TRIA. Some insurers may provide coverage for domestic terrorism, which the TRIA does not address. . . . Modeling Hurricanes Hugo in 1989 and Andrew and Iniki in 1992 convinced most property insurers of the importance of using computer models in ratemaking and in managing the risk of natural catastrophes in the insurance portfolios. Insurers came to realize that historical data on hurricane losses is not sufficient for ratemaking. The number of historical losses for foreign terrorism in the United States is even smaller. With exception of the disastrous events of September 11, 2001, and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, there have been no other significant foreign terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. The terrorism models provide a way of quantifying the terrorism exposure for purposes of ratemaking and risk management. Because the models are relatively new, it is likely that they (like other catastrophe models) will evolve by responding to a growing knowledge base (future events, better intelligence of terrorist organizations, and the like). Refinements will likely lead to significant changes in the modeling results. The likelihood that results will change in the future does not mean that a new model is inappropriate. The comparison is not between a future version of a model and the current versions, but between the available models and no model at all. Multiple Models The existence of multiple terrorism models generates competition in the market place to develop the best possible models. Because of the lack of terrorism data, modelers have had to access alternative information sources for their models. With different data sources and different methodology, the various models may generate substantially different results. The unusually broad range of reasonable estimates of expected terrorism losses suggests that many terrorism models may be valid even though they generate a broad range of results. Confidentiality/Proprietary Modeling The capital expenditure to develop a new computer model may be substantial. Without protection of their intellectual property, modelers would not make such investments. While insures and regulators need to review the results of the models for reasonableness, the modelers must be able to protect the details of their methodologies and data as trade secrets. * * * Judgment Since traditional ratemaking methods will not work for developing rates for the risk of foreign terrorism, insurers must rely on their own judgment and that of terrorism experts to develop rates. In fact, judgment, including judgment about the selection of historical data, is a critical part of all ratemaking. But because of the limited amount of data available for terrorism ratemaking, judgment becomes the overriding factor. . . . Underwriters, engineers, general insurance practitioners, attorneys, accountants, financial analysts, actuaries, security agents, and state and federal regulators will all need to contribute their knowledge and creativity. Other Rating/Classification Issues Individual Risk Rating Plans Some insurers and/or policyholders may want to use individual risk rating (IRR) in pricing and/or underwriting an insurance contract providing terrorism coverage. The provisions of these plans can include deductibles, experience rating, retrospective rating, claims-free bonuses, reinstatement premium, premium modification plans, and the like. The actuarial issues involved in designing and implementing such provisions include: Effects on Experience Rating Any large single loss - such as a loss from a terrorist attack that affects a policyholder can significantly change the premium for any policy that uses the policyholder's experience. Underwriting Judgment Insureds' exposure to terrorism risk varies across many coverages - property, business interruption, liability, workers compensation, life, and accident and health. In addition, individual insureds may employ a variety of security measures to guard against terrorist attacks. Any single rating and classification structure may not have sufficient data or model credibility to reflect completely all variables affecting exposure to loss. As a result, the rating structure may need to provide relatively wide ranges for underwriting judgment. Territories The specific attributes of a building, its location and the nature of neighboring buildings (such as major landmarks, government holdings, monuments, and the like) can have a substantial effect on the exposure to risk of terrorism. Therefore, territory is an important classification factor for pricing terrorism coverage. Territory is also important in measuring and monitoring an insurer's concentration of exposures. However, the unique nature of the terrorism exposure may mean that none of the existing territorial rating factors used in property/casualty lines of insurance apply to pricing terrorism coverage. Insurers may need to develop new territory definitions and/or employ significant underwriting judgment to modify existing territory definitions. * * * Identification of Relevant ASOPS Three Actuarial Standards of Practice (ASOPs) directly address issues related to the rating of terrorism exposures. . . . They are ASOP No. 9, Documentation and Disclosure in Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking, Loss Reserving, and Valuations (Doc. No. 027), especially Appendix 1 - Statement of Principles Regarding Property and Casualty Ratemaking. The purpose of the Statement of Principles is to "identify and describe principles applicable to the determination and review of property and casualty insurance rates." ASOP No. 39, Treatment of Catastrophe Losses in Property/Casualty Insurance Ratemaking (Doc. No. 072). This standard refers to the Statement of Principles in ASOP No. 9 and provides guidance in evaluating catastrophe exposure and in determining a provision for catastrophe losses and loss adjustment expenses in property/casualty insurance ratemaking. ASOP No. 38, Using Models Outside the Actuary's Area of Expertise (Property and Casualty)(Doc. No. 071). This standard provides guidance in reviewing and using models as well as requiring documentation when an actuary uses models outside his or her area of expertise. The Actuarial Standards Board adopted all three of these standards before terrorism became a significant component of insurance rates. The Casualty Committee of the Actuarial Standards Board is determining the need for revision in ASOP No. 9 and may develop proposals for consideration in 2003. It is unlikely that the Actuarial Standards Board will review the other two standards for any necessary revision. It is also possible that the Board could develop a new standard or that the profession may address the issue through another mechanism. During the hearing, Michael L. Toothman, Petitioner's expert in actuarial science, confirmed that computer simulation modeling to predict terrorism losses is in its infancy. Unlike the modeling used to predict the frequency and severity of natural catastrophes like hurricanes and earthquakes, terrorism modeling has no historic experience base. Therefore, terrorism modeling, which is based in large part on the subjective judgment of various experts, cannot be validated or tested for reasonableness using traditional methods. According to Mr. Toothman, catastrophe modeling for terrorism events may be a useful tool making damage estimates if one knows the location and the nature of a terror attack, i.e. a biological attack involving anthrax in downtown Manhattan. However, such modeling is not as useful in determining the likelihood or frequency of a particular attack occurring, both in terms of location and nature. Mr. Toothman testified that the companies that create and own the terrorism computer models consider them to be intellectual property. The companies do not provide insurers with all the details underlying the model. For example, the models reveal very little information about the experts who provide input for the models, and little or no information about the way the experts arrive at their individual or collective opinions. Therefore, an insurer has no way to evaluate the reasonableness of the process used to generate the models' predictive output. Mr. Toothman was familiar with three companies that have developed catastrophe models for terrorism since 2001: (a) Applied Insurance Research; (b) Risk Management Solutions; and EQECAT. The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and the ISO, both of which are rating/advisory organizations, made terrorism rate filings with Respondent based in part on one of these catastrophe models. The proposed rule does not refer to any of the actuarial literature, like the AAA's March 4, 2003, NAIC report. The report itself discusses several methodologies that insurers might use, and repeatedly emphasizes the judgment that insurers must exercise, in developing terrorism rates. Therefore, actuarial publications like the report do not provide a source of guidance for insurers to consider in deciding on a specific methodology that Respondent's staff will accept in reviewing terrorism rate filings. In developing the third sentence in the proposed rule, Respondent considered the Actuarial Standards Board's (ASB) Actuarial Standards of Practice (ASOP) Nos. 9 and 38. These ASOPs relate to the methods used for property and casualty insurance ratemaking that the actuarial community approved before September 11, 2001. The proposed rule does not mention or cite to the ASOPs or the methods described therein. The ASOPs do not on their face discuss terrorism ratemaking. Thus, even if the ASOPs "directly address issues related to the rating of terrorism exposures," they provide little if any guidance to insurers in determining the methodology to use in developing terrorism rates pursuant to the proposed rule. As stated above, the proposed rule refers insurers to Section 627.062, Florida Statutes. Section 627.062(2)(b), Florida Statutes, requires Respondent's staff to review rate filings in accordance with undefined "generally accepted and reasonable actuarial techniques" with regard to 13 factors. The problem is that there is no consensus in the actuarial community regarding generally-accepted actuarial techniques for terrorism ratemaking that an insurer could apply to the statutory factors, including but not limited to the following: (a) past and prospective loss experience within and without the State of Florida; (b) investment income reasonably expected by the insurer; (c) the degree of competition among insurers for the risk insured; and (d) the reasonableness of the judgment reflected in the filing. An insurer cannot predict the frequency and severity of future terrorism events using traditional actuarial techniques because there is no historical data or credible experience base. It follows that insurers cannot predict the associated terrorism losses for ratemaking purposes using generally accepted actuarial techniques. The inability to predict past and prospective terrorism losses makes it difficult, if not impossible, for insurers to show compliance with other factors set forth in Section 627.062(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Under these new and exceptional circumstances, simply stating that insurers may use any methodology they believe complies with Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, provides no standards or criteria for insurers to derive a terrorism rate that Respondent will consider reasonable and appropriate. Finally, Mr. Toothman provided persuasive testimony that the term "methodology" is unclear from the rule. His testimony demonstrated that a "methodology," as contemplated by the rule, consisted of more than merely selecting a rate, multiplying the rate by the underlying premium, and adding the resulting product to the premium. Such a mathematical process is a methodology on how to "calculate" the total premium, but does nothing to explain or justify the rate itself. Mr. Toothman's testimony undermines Respondent's assertion that an insurer could comply with the proposed rule's broad grant of discretion to use "any methodology" by using "no methodology." The fourth sentence in the proposed rule allows insurers to adopt previously approved "methodology, data, and/or rates or loss costs" of other entities "for similar risks." During the hearing, Frank Dino, Respondent's Chief Actuary, testified that he suggested the substitution of the term "similar risks" in the proposed rule for the term "as appropriate" to provide guidance to Respondent's actuary in reviewing the filing. Mr. Dino testified at hearing that the term "similar risks" means a risk that has similar expectation of loss and is a phrase used throughout the insurance industry and actuarial profession. To Mr. Dino, the term "similar risks" as used by the general insurance industry relates to insurance coverage that is substantially similar to another insurance coverage where the expectations of losses are reasonably similar. Mr. Dino also testified that the term "similar risks" in the actuarial community has a similar but more technical definition. According to Mr. Dino, the proposed rule's option to adopt the previously approved rate of another entity for similar risks may or may not mean that an insurer in one line of business can merely adopt the previously approved rate of another insurer in the same line of business. Rather, it is the burden of an insurer to justify its decision that its terrorism risks are similar to the other company's risks. Mr. Dino also admitted that it might be important to compare the concentration of risks and/or the limits of coverage between two entities in order to determine whether they have "similar risks." Mr. Dino did not know whether the size of two companies and the amount of premium they write is necessary to determine the similarity of risks. Mr. Dino considered ASOP Nos. 9 and 12 when he suggested the term "similar risks" for the proposed rule. ASOP No. 9, adopted by ASB in January 1991, discusses documentation and disclosure in property and casualty insurance ratemaking, loss reserving, and valuation. Specifically, Mr. Dino considered Appendix 1 to ASOP No. 9, which provides as follows in relevant part: II Principles Ratemaking is prospective because the property and casualty insurance rate must be developed prior to the transfer of risk. * * * Principle 2: A rate provides for all costs associated with the transfer of risk. Ratemaking should provide for the costs of an individual risk transfer so that equity among insureds is maintained. When the experience of an individual risk does not provide a credible basis for estimating these costs, it is appropriate to consider the aggregate experience of similar risks. A rate estimated from such experience is an estimate of the costs of the risk transfer for each individual in the class. (Emphasis added) ASOP No. 9 does not provide a definition of the term "similar risks" in any context, including terrorism ratemaking. ASOP No. 12, adopted by the ASB in October 1989, discusses risk classification. ASOP No. 12 states as follows in pertinent part: 2.8 Risk Classification--The process of grouping risks with similar risk characteristics so that differences in costs may be recognized. ASOP No. 12 does not define the term "similar risk characteristics" in the context of terrorism ratemaking or otherwise. The AAA's Committee on Risk Classification has published a booklet entitled Risk Classification Statement of Principles. The booklet is attached to ASOP No. 12 as an appendix. The Summary of the of the booklet states that "[t]he grouping of risks with similar risk characteristics for the purpose of setting prices is a fundamental precept of any workable private, voluntary insurance system." The booklet does not define "similar risk characteristics." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes, defines insurance as "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another, or pay or allow a specified amount for a determinable benefit upon determinable contingencies." Record evidence indicates that one element of insurance is a general scheme to distribute the loss among a larger group of person bearing similar risks. However, there is no definition of the term "similar risks" in the statutes, in the existing administrative rules, or in any other publication. The proposed rule does not provide any guidance as to the meaning of the term "similar risks." Mr. Toothman provided persuasive testimony that the term is not a term of art in the actuarial industry and that its meaning as used in the proposed rule is not clear. According to Mr. Toothman, the term "similar risk" does not have a defined meaning, but rather is left to the judgment of the actuary in terms of what is appropriate for a particular situation. He provided credible testimony that the meaning of the term "similar risks" in the context of the proposed rule did not have a standard interpretation and could mean different things to different people. Thus, when Respondent's staff reviews a terrorism rate filing, they are free to chose any meaning or connotation of the phrase in deciding whether an insurer may adopt the rates or rate methodology of another entity.

USC (1) 6 U.S.C 2322 Florida Laws (30) 120.52120.536120.54120.541120.56120.565120.57120.595120.6820.0520.05220.121624.02624.05624.307624.308624.604624.605627.031627.041627.062627.0625627.0645627.0651627.072627.091627.151627.211627.314627.351
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AMERISURE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 13-000865 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 14, 2013 Number: 13-000865 Latest Update: May 12, 2015

The Issue The issues to be decided are: 1) whether Petitioner, Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (Amerisure), is entitled to a credit or refund due to the elimination of credits by Respondent, Department of Financial Services (Respondent or the Department), that Amerisure claims accrued in the calendar year 2009 and should apply to future assessments owed to the Special Disability Trust Fund (SDTF) and the Workers? Compensation Administration Trust Fund (WCATF)(collectively the Trust Funds); 2) whether the elimination of these credits was accomplished by the Department?s application of a policy meeting the definition of a rule that has not been adopted through the chapter 120 rulemaking process; and 3) whether any refund or credit is barred by the statute of limitations in section 215.26, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Amerisure is a carrier as defined in section 440.02(4), Florida Statutes, authorized to transact the workers? compensation line of business in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to the Department?s Notice of Intent, Amerisure was authorized to transact the workers? compensation line of business in Florida, and required to pay assessments to both the SDTF and WCATF. Pursuant to section 440.49(9)(b), Florida Statutes, the SDTF is maintained by annual assessments, paid quarterly, upon the insurance companies writing compensation insurance in Florida; the commercial self-insurers under sections 624.462 and 624.4621, Florida Statutes; the assessable mutuals as defined in section 628.6011, Florida Statutes; and the self-insurers under chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Section 440.49(9)(b) requires the Department to determine the rate each year for the next calendar year, based on the Department?s estimate of the amount of money necessary to administer section 440.49, and to maintain the SDTF for that next calendar year. In addition, the total amount to be assessed against all entities subject to assessment is prorated among those entities. Similarly, pursuant to section 440.51(1), the WCATF is maintained by annual assessments, paid quarterly, upon the carriers writing compensation insurance in Florida and self- insurers. Section 440.51(1) provides that the rate is determined each year for the next calendar year based on the anticipated expenses of the administration of chapter 440 for the next calendar year. In addition, the total amount to be assessed against all entities subject to assessment is prorated among those entities. Workers? compensation policies are unique insurance policies in that they provide statutorily mandated coverage that must be purchased by most employers; they provide “no fault” coverage and have no maximum dollar amount limit in the primary coverage of medical benefits. To make such coverage affordable, the market has developed various types of policies which allow an employer, based upon its size and financial wherewithal, to limit its exposure for a possible reduction in premium. For example, there are standard policies that provide coverage from the first dollar of loss, there are large deductible policies where the employer shares in a greater amount of risk, there are retrospective policies where final premium amount is determined on the basis of loss development during the policy, and there are dividend plans which also take into account loss experience. Most workers? compensation policies are annual policies which can incept at any given day within a calendar year. It is not unusual for a workers? compensation policy to run between two calendar years. Regardless of the kind of workers? compensation policy issued to an employer, the initial premium at the time of policy inception is referred to as an “estimated premium.” This is because the “estimated premium” is based on the actual number of employees in a company?s payroll and the payroll classifications as to each employee?s particular job -- e.g., executive supervisor, window cleaner, etc. Because the final exposure is unknown until the last day of coverage, the “estimated premium” is always subject to change. Most workers? compensation policies have standard language copyrighted by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), a statistical and rating organization which files rates and forms in Florida for use by carriers, which address this very point. Under the “Part Five Premium” section of a standard NCCI policy, “Section E” states that the premium shown on the information page, schedules, and endorsement is an “estimate.” Section E further states that the final premium will be determined by an audit after the policy ends by using the actual and not the estimated premium base, and the proper calculations and rates that lawfully apply to the business and work covered by the policy. Finally, Section E provides that if the actual premium is more than what the policyholder paid as an estimated premium, the insured must pay the balance. Conversely, if it is less than what was paid, the insurance company will refund premium. When audits are performed either at the end of the policy year or later, premiums may be refunded to a policyholder. Dividend plans are a kind of workers? compensation policy which allows for a dividend payment back to the policyholder if the actual loss experience observed is more favorable than anticipated. The payment of a dividend is not guaranteed, but is subject to the approval of an insurer?s Board of Directors. Significantly, the earliest that a dividend can be paid out under a dividend plan is six months after the policy has ended. As such, dividends are never paid in the same calendar year as a policy incepts. All workers? compensation carriers writing business in Florida pay an assessment on every premium dollar to fund the SDTF and WCATF. When the NCCI files for rates in Florida, it takes into account the assessments paid by carriers to the Trust Funds, and the charge for the assessments is included in the rates developed by the NCCI. The rate is the amount applied to the payroll, and the product of the payroll and rate equals the premium for a particular payroll classification. Reporting and Collection of Assessments The Department provides pre-printed forms entitled “Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Report” to workers? compensation carriers, such as Amerisure, to self-report “net premium” amounts on a quarterly basis. The Department also provides a “spreadsheet” form that the carriers may utilize to indicate how they are calculating the net premium amount for each of the trust funds. After calculating the net premium amount for each trust fund on the spreadsheet, the carrier writes in that net premium amount on the quarterly report and multiplies that amount by the assessment rate set by the Department (which is reflected on the quarterly report form). If a carrier returns more premium and/or pays more in dividends than it has written in one quarter, it has a “negative net premium” and owes no assessment for that quarter. The quarterly report form provides empty circles, referred to on the form as “buttons,” for the carrier to fill in indicating whether the net premium amount is negative or positive. When a carrier has negative net premium for a quarter, a credit amount is reflected on the next quarterly report form to be applied toward future assessments. This credit amount is pre-printed by the Department on the next quarter?s form. This amount appears in the “debit/credit box” on the quarterly report form or in the “balance carried forward” on the spreadsheet. The direct written premium in the insurance industry is the summation of all premiums for a given period less any returns made during that period. Amerisure subtracts any premium returned during the calendar year from its gross number to determine direct written premium, regardless of what year the policy, for which premium is returned, incepted. In order to calculate the net premium amount for assessment purposes, Amerisure deducts the amount of dividends paid or credited to policyholders from their direct written premium amount, regardless of the fact that the policy year for the dividend being paid is a different calendar year than the year that the dividend is paid or credited. By statute, workers? compensation insurance companies, such as Amerisure, are assessed by the Department for contributions to the SDTF based on the amount of “net premiums written,” and companies are assessed for contributions to the WCATF based on the amount of “net premiums earned” or “net premiums collected.” Since at least 2004, Amerisure has been utilizing “direct written premium” to calculate the “net premium” or “net premium collected” amount listed in its quarterly reports for both the SDTF and WCATF Funds. The Department utilizes annual reports filed with the NAIC by carriers to perform their audits and determine if an insurer has accurately reported the amount of net premium subject to assessments for the Trust Funds. Assessments to the Trust Funds are paid by Amerisure during the quarter that premium is written. Premium is considered written when a policy first incepts or when additional premium is charged on a policy. Because Amerisure utilizes net written premium as a “proxy” for net collected premium, it pays more in trust fund assessments up front than it would if it were able to report the company?s actual collected premium. Amerisure?s 2009 Credits In the last two quarters of 2008, Amerisure began to experience negative net premium. This continued through all of calendar year 2009 until Amerisure once again experienced positive premium in calendar year 2010. Amerisure?s negative premium was a result of the economic downturn, which gravely impacted a large portion of Amerisure?s Florida customer base in the construction industry. Due to so many employers downsizing their workforce, Amerisure returned 12 million dollars in premium in calendar year 2009. The majority of the 12 million dollars of premium returned to policyholders was for approximately 1200 policies which had incepted prior to 2009 and for which assessments had been paid into the trust funds prior to 2009. Amerisure?s payment to the trust funds of the original assessment amounts on the policies that incepted prior to 2009 was based on “estimated premium,” on what Amerisure believed the premium to be at that point in time, prior to the calculation of the final premium. According to Raymond Neff, who was accepted as an expert in the field of workers? compensation insurance, Amerisure?s experience of negative net premium in late 2008 and 2009 was not unique in the workers? compensation construction sector as verified by NCCI data showing similar impacts to other carriers due to the recession and reductions in payroll during this time frame. The Department did not rebut his testimony in any meaningful way. Reporting and Payments for the SDTF For the time periods in 2008, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the SDTF based upon reported net premiums written, or did not pay assessments due to reported negative net premiums written, as follows: for the quarter ending March 31, 2008, Amerisure reported $27,651,422 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $1,249,844; for the quarter ending June 30, 2008, Amerisure reported $5,282,751 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $238,780; for the quarter ending September 30, 2008, Amerisure reported negative net premiums of $923,570, and no assessment was due or paid; and for the quarter ending December 31, 2008, Amerisure reported negative net premiums of $1,269,343, and no assessment was due or paid. Because of premium refunds made to policyholders in the quarters ending September 30, 2008, and December 31, 2008, resulting in an overpayment, Amerisure received a credit against future SDTF assessment payments in the amount of $99,119.66. For the time periods in 2009, Amerisure did not owe or pay assessments to the SDTF due to reported negative net premiums written, resulting from reported payment of premium refunds to policyholders, as detailed below. For the quarter ending March 31, 2009, Amerisure reported negative net premiums of $1,422,158, and no assessment was due or paid. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self-Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending March 31, 2009, it included a $99,119.66 "Debit/Credit" carried over from 2008 for the SDTF on the report form. For the quarter ending June 30, 2009, Amerisure reported negative net premiums of $2,382,484, and no assessment was due or paid. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self-Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending June 30, 2009, it included a $163,401.20 "Debit/Credit" for the SDTF on the report form. This amount was the sum of $99,119.66 carried over from 2008, plus a $64,281.54 credit from the quarter ending March 31, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $1,422,158 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending March 31, 2009. For the quarter ending September 30, 2009, Amerisure reported negative net premiums of $2,392,606, and no assessment was due or paid. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self-Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending September 30, 2009, it included a $271,089.48 "Debit/Credit" for the SDTF on the report form. This amount was the sum of $99,119.66 carried over from 2008; plus a $64,281.54 credit from the quarter ending March 31, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $1,422,158 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending March 31, 2009; plus a $107,688.28 credit from the quarter ending June 30, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $2,382,484 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending June 30, 2009. For the quarter ending December 31, 2009, Amerisure reported negative net premiums of $3,237,419, and no assessment was due or paid. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self-Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending December 31, 2009, it included a $379,235.27 "Debit/Credit" for the SDTF on the report form. This amount was the sum of $99,119.66 carried over from 2008; plus a $64,281.54 credit from the quarter ending March 31, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $1,422,158 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending March 31, 2009; plus a $107,688.28 credit from the quarter ending June 30, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $2,382,484 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending June 30, 2009; plus a $108,145.79 credit from the quarter ending September 30, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $2,392,606 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. For the time periods in 2010, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the SDTF based upon reported net premiums, as detailed below. For the quarter ending March 31, 2010, Amerisure reported net premiums of $828,566, and paid an assessment of $37,451.18. The assessment was paid by application of $37,451.18 of the $99,119.66 credit carried over from 2008. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self-Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, it included a $99,119.66 "Debit/Credit" carried over from 2008 for the SDTF on the report form. The credits of $64,281.54, $107,688.28, and $108,145.79 recognized in the reports for the quarters ending June 30, September 30, and December 31, 2009, were deleted. However, the Department did not otherwise notify Amerisure that it was deleting the credits or why it was deleting the credits. It also did not provide a point of entry for Amerisure to challenge the deletion of the credits. For the quarter ending June 30, 2010, Amerisure reported net premiums of $1,282,179. It paid an assessment of $57,954.49 by application of $57,954.49 of the $99,119.66 credit carried over from 2008. For the quarter ending September 30, 2010, Amerisure reported net premiums of $937,504. It paid an assessment of $13,687.56 in part by application of the remainder of the $99,119.66 credit carried over from 2008, along with a payment of $9,974.01. For the quarter ending December 31, 2010, Amerisure reported net premiums of $657,457, and paid an assessment of $9,597.41. For the time periods in 2011, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the SDTF based upon reported net premiums, as follows: for the quarter ending March 31, 2011, Amerisure reported $2,455,230 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $35,846.36; for the quarter ending June 30, 2011, Amerisure reported $1,741,790 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $25,430.13; for the quarter ending September 30, 2011, Amerisure reported $2,054,805 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $30,000.15; and for the quarter ending December 31, 2011, Amerisure reported $1,823,063 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $26,616.72. For the time periods in 2012, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the SDTF based upon reported net premiums, as follows: for the quarter ending March 31, 2012, Amerisure reported $4,816,098 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $69,351.81; and for the quarter ending June 30, 2012, Amerisure reported $2,072,685 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $29,846.66. Reporting and Payments for the WCATF For the time periods in 2008, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the WCATF based upon reported net premiums, or did not pay assessments due to reported negative net premiums, as follows: for the quarter ending March 31, 2008, Amerisure reported $30,353,820 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $75,885; for the quarter ending June 30, 2008, Amerisure reported $6,696,958 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $16,742; for the quarter ending September 30, 2008, Amerisure reported $874,225 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $2,186; and for the quarter ending December 31, 2008, Amerisure reported $1,271,387 in negative net premiums, and no assessment was due or paid. Because of premium refunds made to policyholders in the quarters ending September 30, 2008, and December 31, 2008, resulting in an overpayment, Amerisure received a credit against future WCATF assessment payments in the amount of $3,178.47. For the time periods in 2009, Amerisure did not owe or pay assessments to the WCATF due to reported negative net premiums resulting from reported payment of premium refunds to policyholders, as detailed below. For the quarter ending March 31, 2009, Amerisure reported $1,321,194 in negative net premiums. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self- Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending March 31, 2009, it included a $3,178.47 "Debit/Credit" carried over from 2008 for the WCATF on the report. For the quarter ending June 30, 2009, Amerisure reported $2,990,876 of negative net premiums. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self- Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending June 30, 2009, it included a $6,481.46 "Debit/Credit" for the WCATF on the report, which is the sum of $3,178.47 carried over from 2008, plus a $3,302.99 credit from the quarter ending March 31, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $1,321,194 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending March 31, 2009. For the quarter ending September 30, 2009, Amerisure reported $2,176,521 in negative net premiums.2/ When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self- Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending September 30, 2009, it included a $13,958.65 "Debit/Credit" for the WCATF on the report. This amount was the sum of $3,178.47 carried over from 2008; plus a $3,302.99 credit from the quarter ending March 31, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $1,321,194 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending March 31, 2009; plus a $7,477.19 credit from the quarter ending June 30, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $2,990,876 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending June 30, 2009. For the quarter ending December 31, 2009, Amerisure reported $3,549,615 in negative net premiums. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self- Insurance Quarterly Premium Report to complete for the quarter ending December 31, 2009, it included a $19,399.95 "Debit/Credit" for the WCATF on the report. This amount was the sum of $3,178.47 carried over from 2008; plus a $3,302.99 credit from the quarter ending March 31, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $1,321,194 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending March 31, 2009; plus a $7,477.19 credit from the quarter ending June 30, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $2,990,876 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending June 30, 2009; plus a $5,441.30 credit from the quarter ending September 30, 2009, calculated by application of the 2009 assessment rate to the $2,176,521 reported negative net premium for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. For the quarters in 2010, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the WCATF based upon reported net premiums, as detailed below. For the quarter ending March 31, 2010, Amerisure reported $225,027 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $1,800.22 by applying $1,800.22 of the $3,178.47 credit carried over from 2008. When the Department provided Amerisure with its Carrier and Self-Insurance Quarterly Premium Report for the quarter ending March 31, 2010, it included a $3,178.47 "Debit/Credit" carried over from 2008 for the WCATF on the report. The credits of $3,302.99, $7,477.19, and $5,441.30 recognized in the reports for the quarters ending June 30, September 30, and December 31, 2009, were deleted. The Department did not otherwise notify Amerisure that it was deleting the credits or why it was deleting the credits. The Department also did not provide an opportunity for Amerisure to challenge the deletion of the credits. For the quarter ending June 30, 2010, Amerisure reported $2,011,533 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $16,092.26, which was paid in part by application of the remainder of the $3,178.47 credit carried over from 2008. For the quarter ending September 30, 2010, Amerisure reported $1,094,027 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $23,466.23. This payment included $14,714.01 due for an assessment owed for the quarter ending June 30, 2010. For the quarter ending December 31, 2010, Amerisure reported $656,608 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $5,252.86. For the time periods in 2011, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the WCATF based upon reported net premiums, as follows: for the quarter ending March 31, 2011, Amerisure reported $2,456,006 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $24,068.86; for the quarter ending June 30, 2011, Amerisure reported $1,864,571 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $18,272.80; for the quarter ending September 30, 2011, Amerisure reported $2,539,405 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $24,866.17; and for the quarter ending December 31, 2011, Amerisure reported $1,782,608 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $17,469.56. For the time periods in 2012, Amerisure paid quarterly assessments to the WCATF based upon reported net premiums, as follows: for the quarter ending March 31, 2012, Amerisure reported $4,837,632 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $84,658.56; and for the quarter ending June 30, 2012, Amerisure reported $2,348,810 in net premiums, and paid an assessment of $41,104.18. For its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to Respondent for the quarters ending March 31, 2008; June 30, 2008; September 30, 2008; and December 31, 2008, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect premium refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure in the calendar year 2008. For its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to the Department for the quarters ending March 31, 2009; June 30, 2009; September 30, 2009; and December 31, 2009, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect premium refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure in the calendar year 2009. For its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to the Department for the quarters ending March 31, 2010; June 30, 2010; September 30, 2010; and December 31, 2010, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect premium refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure in the calendar year 2010. For its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to the Department for the quarters ending March 31, 2011; June 30, 2011; September 30, 2011; and December 31, 2011, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect premium refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure in the calendar year 2011. For its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to the Department for the quarters ending March 31, 2012, and June 30, 2012, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect premium refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure in the calendar year 2012. For its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to the Department for the quarters ending March 31, 2008; June 30, 2008; September 30, 2008; and December 31, 2008, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure for policies where assessments for premium for those policies were paid in calendar years prior to 2008. Likewise, for its Carrier and Self-Insurance Fund Quarterly Premium Reports submitted to the Department for the quarters ending March 31, 2009; June 30, 2009; September 30, 2009; and December 31, 2009, premium refunds made to policyholders included in the calculation of "net premiums" and "net premiums written" reflect refunds made to policyholders by Amerisure for policies where assessments for premium for those policies were paid in calendar years prior to 2009. Events Following the Deletion of 2009 Credits Gene Smith, Assessments Coordinator for the Division of Workers? Compensation of the Department, has the responsibility to calculate the assessment rate for the Trust Funds. Evelyn Vlasak was Mr. Smith?s predecessor as Assessments Coordinator. On September 13, 2010, Gene Smith sent an e-mail requesting that Amerisure provide for each quarter in 2008 and 2009 “[a]n original computer generated run showing the written premium for all Line of Business 160 (workers? compensation) in Florida by policy number with totals at the end.” Amerisure provided the requested information via Excel spreadsheet on October 1, 2010. By letter dated December 9, 2010 (received on December 14, 2010), Mr. Smith stated, in pertinent part: We received the excel spreadsheet of Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company?s 2008- 2009 Policy Level Details. To complete our audit we also need the detailed documentation for dividends and large deductibles. Please review the list below, and provide the requested documentation by December 20, 2010. The same Policy Level Detail spreadsheets for each quarter from January 1, 1999, through the current quarter 2010. There is no need to provide 2008 and 2009 as you have already provided these. Detail of annual dividends declared and paid from January 1, 1999, through the current quarter 2010. Detail of quarterly large deductible “add backs” from January 1, 1999, through the current quarter 2010. In response, Amerisure?s counsel contacted Mr. Smith via e-mail on December 14, 2010, to ask why the Department needed this information. Mr. Smith responded by e-mail on January 2, 2011, stating that the Department would respond very soon. On January 4, 2011, David Hershel, an attorney for the Department, contacted Amerisure?s counsel and advised that the additional data requested in the December 9, 2010, letter was needed to review the credit amounts claimed by Amerisure. Mr. Hershel stated that the Department would send a revised letter, paring down its information request. On January 10, 2011, Mr. Smith sent a letter, which stated: We received the excel spreadsheet of Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company?s 2008- 2009 Policy Level Details. To complete our audit we also need the detailed documentation for dividends and large deductibles, as well as the payments for the second and third quarters of 2010. Please review the list below. Detail of annual dividends declared and paid from January 1, 2008, through the 4th quarter 2010. Detail of quarterly large deductible “add backs” from January 1, 2008, through the 4th quarter 2010. Payments for the second and third quarters of 2010 for the WCATF as required by Florida law. Please provide the requested documentation by January 21st, 2011. Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. On January 17, 2011, Amerisure agreed to send in the requested payments as a sign of good faith. In this transmittal, Amerisure reserved its rights to withhold against further assessments. On January 27, 2011, Amerisure provided Gene Smith with Excel spreadsheets containing the information sought in items 1 and 2 of the January 10, 2011, letter. On July 1, 2012, some 17 months later, Gene Smith responded by letter, directing that the appropriate procedure and remedy to request a refund of monies paid into the State Treasury is set forth in section 215.26, Florida Statutes, and providing the forms developed for this request. On September 26, 2012, Amerisure submitted its applications for credit or refund pursuant to section 215.26. Amerisure requested a credit or refund of $25,095.70 paid into WCATF and $236,663.25 paid into SDTF from October 26, 2010, through July 26, 2012, which Amerisure alleges it should not have been required to pay in light of the amount of credit it had accrued in 2008 and 2009. For example, the request for refund with respect to the SDTF states: Through the reporting period of June 30, 2012, Amerisure has paid $236,663.25 in assessments to the SDTF that the company should not have been required to pay since it had credits that should have been applied against its assessment liability. As such, Amerisure requests a refund of the total amount of $236,663.25 paid into the SDTF between September 30, 2010, and June 30, 2012. Furthermore, Amerisure asserts its right to apply, and requests the SDTF to facilitate, the application of the remaining credit balance of $189,783.75 against future assessment liability. The Department denied Amerisure?s request for refund of the overpayment of assessments paid into the SDTF and WCATF from January 2011 onward in its NOI dated January 28, 2013. The Department states in its NOI that Amerisure is “seeking to be paid in cash for supposed credits which it never accrued.” The denial letter also informed Amerisure of its right to an administrative hearing. Amerisure timely filed a Request for Administrative Hearing, which gave rise to this proceeding. The statement that the credits never accrued is inconsistent with the Department?s prior calculation of the credits on the reporting forms that the Department sent to Amerisure each quarter to complete. The forms for 2009 clearly indicated accrued credits and Department staff acknowledged eliminating those credits. The Department?s Treatment of “Excess Credits” Maya Brown is a government analyst with the Department?s Division of Workers? Compensation. Her duties include creating manuals, performing audits on insurance carriers, and processing refunds for carriers. According to Ms. Brown, she was instructed in 2009 by Ms. Vlasak that at the end of a year, if a company has negative premiums and does not owe any assessments or has not paid any assessments, that balance, which she described as “excess credits,” is then removed. Based upon this understanding, Ms. Brown removed $451,532 (which Amerisure refers to as the 2009 credits) from Amerisure?s rolling calculations when the 2010 quarterly report forms were sent to Amerisure. She did not call Amerisure and notify them that she was deleting the credits or of the reason for doing so, and does not know of anyone else providing that information to Amerisure. The quarterly report form for the first quarter of 2010, however, carried forward the 2008 credits that Amerisure had accumulated in 2008. Ms. Brown first learned about the concept of “excess credits” in 2004 when she was trained to perform audits by Ms. Vlasak. Since 2004, the only other Assessment Unit employee performing audits besides Ms. Brown was Ms. Vicki Griffin. Ms. Griffin was also trained by Ms. Vlasak and utilized the same procedures with regard to “excess credits.” Sometime before May 2009, Ms. Vlasak drafted proposed rules for the Assessment Unit that addressed “excess credits” based on negative “net premium”. An early version of the draft rules was prepared as early as March 29, 2006. The July 26, 2008, draft of proposed rule 69L-4.003, entitled “Completion of Quarterly Reports and Payment of Assessment by Carriers,” included the following in subsection (e)(5): If as a result of premium offsets for dividends paid or credited and premium refunds, a Carrier will owe no assessments for any of the four calendar year quarters, the Carrier will be able to apply the unused premium offset to reduce assessments owed in any of the other three quarters of the same calendar year. However, after the Quarterly Report is filed for the period ending December 31, the Division will adjust the Carrier?s records to remove any credits due to these premium offsets that were not used in that year. Therefore the (credit) debit pre-printed on the upcoming March 31st Quarterly Premium and Assessment Report will reflect only overpayment of assessment(s) owed for the previous calendar year. If this adjustment is necessary, the Carrier will be [sic] receive written notification. Section (h) of the draft proposed rule addressed the Department?s procedure for “overpayments”: When a Carrier has computed its net assessable premiums and assessments according to this rule and later determines that either the WCATF or SDTF assessment has been overpaid, the company may elect to apply the overpayment against future assessments owed to the same fund or may submit an [sic] refund request under Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. Written notification of an overpayment must be accompanied by detailed documentation of the computation of the alleged overpayment, a copy of the State Page of the Annual Report for the referenced year, and as needed, revised Quarterly Reports. Written notification that a refund has been requested must meet the requirements of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, including the submission of the approved form. The refund request must be received within three years of the date the alleged overpaid amount was initially deposited into the state treasury. Written notification of the election to apply the overpayment against future assessment payments must be received within three years of the date the overpaid amount was initially deposited into the state treasury. Upon verification of an overpayment, future assessments may be offset until the verified overpayment is fully utilized, with no time limitations. Each Carrier shall bear the responsibility to notify the Division in written format, that an overpayment may have occurred and to provide documentation that will allow the Department to verify the amount of the alleged overpayment. If an overpayment has occurred, and revised Quarterly Reports are submitted, the Carrier does not submit an Application for Refund on an approved form, the Carrier will be allowed to offset future assessments to the extent of the overpayment. However, after the end of the three-year window, in the absence of a written refund application, the unused portion of the overpayment, if any, will no longer be available as an offset against future assessments, or for the issuance of a refund pursuant to Section 215.26(2). The Division shall bear the responsibility to acknowledge receipt of this notification and to verify the amount of overpayment, if any, as well as respond to the request for credit or refund. The Department acknowledges that these draft proposed rules were never promulgated or published in a notice of proposed rule development. In 2011, Mr. Jenkins, the new Bureau Chief, revived attempts to promulgate rules for the Assessment Unit. That is, he circulated Ms. Vlasak?s draft proposed rules to members of his staff for their consideration. However, other office priorities took precedence, and as of 2013, no further attempts at rule development have been undertaken by the Department in this regard. Ms. Brown understood that the language in Ms. Vlasak?s draft rules is consistent with what occurred in 2009 regarding Amerisure?s reporting of negative premium. Despite the failure of the Department to adopt the draft rules, or some other version of them, the policy reflected in these proposed rules has been applied by the Department to eliminate Amerisure?s 2009 credits. Ms. Vlasak based her procedures on section 624.5094, Florida Statutes. However, the Department has since acknowledged that the statute does not speak to or define “excess credits.” The elimination of “excess credits” at the end of the year is currently the policy of the Division of Workers? Compensation and is how its employees process quarterly reports and assessment payments. This procedure is also reflected in a draft policy and procedures manual put together by Gene Smith at the direction of Greg Jenkins to capture the policies and procedures of the Assessment Unit. Under the caption “Prior Balance Carried Forward,” the manual provides: . . . a company may report (in very rare circumstances) negative net premium on Line 1 of the Quarterly Premium Report for either the WCATF or SDTF which would otherwise result in a negative assessment amount. This will carry over the following quarter. Should the company continue to reflect a negative amount by calendar year end, these negative amounts are removed per Section 624.5094, F.S. Mr. Jenkins wrote and compiled these policies and procedures when he was the Assessment Unit coordinator, a position he held until about a year and a half ago. If, on the other hand, a carrier only experiences negative net premium during some quarters but not all, these credits may be deemed an “official overpayment” and be allowed to carry forward. The process to determine if an overpayment is “official” has not been written into any policy or procedure, proposed rule, rule, or statute. Determining whether credits for a given calendar year are “excess” or “official overpayments” is a process that occurs only after a company has filed its annual report with the NAIC. This never occurs before March of the year following the year in question. Pursuant to current Department policy, a company cannot request a refund for an overpayment until after it is deemed an “official overpayment.” Mr. Smith testified that he agreed with the Department?s position that section 624.5094 required credits accumulated to be eliminated if the company continued to reflect a negative amount of net premium by the end of the calendar year, despite the fact that the statute does not include or define the term “excess credits.” Mr. Smith acknowledged that his interpretation of section 624.5094 stems from his belief that a carrier can experience negative net written premium for all four quarters of a year, which he believes is a violation of section 624.5094. This, in turn, is based on Mr. Smith?s definition of net written premium. To determine the net premium amount for assessment purposes, Mr. Smith took the position that carriers can only deduct return premium for a policy that incepts in the same calendar year that the premium is returned. Mr. Smith believed that additional premiums collected in a calendar year subsequent to the policy year for which the premium is collected would likewise not be included in the direct written premium or net premium number. Mr. Smith could point to no statute, rule, or bulletin which defines net premium in this fashion. Mr. Jenkins, the Bureau Chief, agreed with Mr. Smith?s interpretation, deferring to his judgment. Mr. Jenkins acknowledged that the determination made with regard to Amerisure?s 2009 credits was based on Mr. Smith?s definition of net premium, because Amerisure could not offset refunds or dividends from prior policy years in determining the amount of net premium. Mr. Jenkins also agreed with Mr. Smith that section 624.5094 “tied the Department?s hands” with regard to Amerisure. The Department?s determination that its “excess credits” policy prevents Amerisure from utilizing the 2009 credits against future assessments is further outlined in a June 9, 2011, email from Victoria Griffin to Gene Smith which states: Gene, You had asked me about my recall of the unit?s procedure for dealing with negative premium and section 624.5094 FS in the past. Since I have been here it has been common practice to accept all reporting at face value to include negative premiums till such time that we received the report from NAIC which reflected the written, earned and dividends the carriers reported, which may include negative amounts. In regards to your question regarding 624.5094, we have not ever reviewed individual policy holder information for any insurance company. My understanding of what happened with the Amerisure Mutual file is that they reported negative premiums for all four (4) quarters of 2009, (stating verbally that they took a loss for that year and wanted to recoup) and they believed that they were entitled to the credit amount reflected for 2009. Regardless of the fact that no assessment amounts had been paid in to the funds for that time frame. When we completed the audit for 2009, those negative amounts were removed; leaving a credit balance reflected from actual overpayments of 2008 to both funds. These overpayments were used towards future assessments and as of 4th quarter 2010 were exhausted. Let me know if you need any more information. Thanks, Vicki If Amerisure and other carriers were to use the Department?s definition of “net premium” and not include additional premium written for policies that incepted in prior calendar years, the Department would most likely experience a substantial drop in the amount of assessments collected for either Trust Fund. This represents the most probable scenario because it is more likely for an insurer to charge additional premium after a year-end or subsequent audit than to return premium. In fact, for the last 12 years that Andrea Koehler has worked at Amerisure, other than the period at issue in 2008-2009, the company consistently wrote more premium than it returned. Most importantly, this interpretation of the definition of net premium is inconsistent with using the amounts listed in a company?s NAIC reports as an audit method to insure proper reporting by the insurance companies. In order for the numbers to be comparable, the amount reported must be consistent with industry practice in reporting to the NAIC.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order incorporating the findings of this Recommended Order and reinstating Amerisure?s 2009 credits as credits toward future assessments due to the Trust Funds. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2013.

Florida Laws (21) 104.18120.52120.536120.54120.56120.569120.57120.595120.68215.26252.86440.02440.49440.50440.5157.105624.462624.4621624.5094628.601172.011
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. JOHN ROGER PASCALE, 80-001504 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001504 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, John Roger Pascale, currently holds an insurance license issued by the Florida Department of Insurance (Petitioner), and is eligible for the issuance of further licenses. It is admitted that Respondent was a licensed general lines agent during times material to the Complaint allegations herein. Respondent, however, has voluntarily elected not to renew his license since September, 1980. By its five count Administrative Complaint dated June 13, 1980, Petitioner advised Respondent that it intended to revoke, refuse to issue or renew, or to impose lesser penalties as may be proper under the provisions of Sections 626.611 and 626.621, Florida Statutes. The main thrust of Count I is that Respondent committed the following violations: Received premiums or other funds belonging to insurers or others in transactions under his license which were trust funds received by him in a fiduciary capacity, which funds he failed to account for or pay to the insurer, insured or other persons entitled thereto in violation of Chapter 626.561(1), Florida Statutes. Lacked one or more of the qualifications for the license or permit as specified in the Insurance code in violation of Chapter 626.611(1), Florida Statutes. Willfully, under his license, circumvented the prohibitions of the insurance code. Chapter 626.611(4), Florida Statutes. Was willfully deceptive with regard to an insurance policy in violation of Section 626.611(5), Florida Statutes. Demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance contrary to the requirements contained in Chapter 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. Demonstrated a lack of reasonable and adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by the license or permit. Chapter 626.611(8), Florida Statutes. Engaged in fraudulent or dishonest practices in violation of Chapter 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. Misappropriated, converted, or unlawfully withheld monies belonging to insurers, insureds, beneficiaries, or others and received in the conduct of business under his license. Chapter 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. Willfully violated an order, rule or regulation of the insurance department, or willfully violated a provision or provisions of the insurance code. Chapter 626.611(13), Florida Statutes. Withheld information from which the issuance of a license or permit could have been refused had it then existed and been known to the department contrary to the requirements of Chapter 626.621(1), Florida Statutes. Violated a provision of the insurance code contrary to Chapter 626.621(2), Florida Statutes. Violated a lawful order, rule, or regulation of the department in violation of Chapter 626.621(3), Florida Statutes. Has shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest in violation of Chapter 626.621(6), Florida Statutes. In support of the above allegations, Petitioner produced as its primary witness, Delores V. Cardet, who first purchased insurance from Respondent in November of 1977. The agent employed by Respondent with whom Ms. Cardet transacted business was Rigo Avila (Avila). (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Ms. Cardet's insurance application was transmitted to Lumberman's Insurance Company to effect the appropriate coverage. Her complaint against Respondent is that the wrong address was placed on her insurance application and that she was overcharged for insurance based on the premiums quoted by agent Avila. Respecting the allegation that agent Avila placed the wrong address on her insurance application, evidence indicates that when this matter was called to Respondent's attention, the matter was taken care of and Ms. Cardet subsequently received billing notices at the correct address. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). During the time in which Ms. Cardet purchased insurance through Respondent's agency, she was employed as a manager for Beneficial Finance Company of Florida. As part of her employment duties, Ms. Cardet is involved in collections and has received management training from her employer. During the period in question Ms. Cardet had one address change. This change was properly brought to Respondent's attention and the change was effected without incident. Respondent quoted Ms. Cardet a total premium during 1978 of $699.00 whereas the insurer, Lumberman's Insurance Company, charged Ms. Cardet an annual premium of $677.00. The $22.00 overcharge represented the difference between the premium quoted by agent Avila and the actual premium charged. The excess was referred to the premium finance company (Sonny Financial Services) where it was handled as a credit toward the balance owed by Ms. Cardet. During 1979, Ms. Cardet was quoted a total annual premium of $797.00 for renewal of her insurance policy. Her policy reflects a premium of $662.00 plus two (2) motor club memberships for her two (2) vehicles at the rate of $50.00 each. The remaining difference of $35.00 was refunded from Kemper Insurance Company and forwarded to Sonny Financial Services as a credit toward the remaining balance of Ms. Cardet's premiums. 2/ Linda Manning, the underwriting service manager for Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company, a subsidiary of the Kemper Insurance Group, acknowledged that in the insurance business, mistakes regarding insurance print-outs occur on a frequent basis. Ms. Manning services several hundred premium changes daily and testified that there are numerous reasons for an agency to give a prospective insured an improper quote. Among the reasons listed by Ms. Manning is the fact that drivers' records are not always available for a prospective insured and rate adjustments occur for various reasons. COUNT TWO The gravamen of Count Two is that Respondent's employees used an incorrect address when insurance was placed by Respondent's agency for Mr. Jeffrey Brown which resulted in the insured not getting a premium notice from the insurance company. It is also alleged that Respondent willfully listed an incorrect address for Mr. Brown in a lower rate territory which gave the insured the advantage of a lower premium. In support of the above allegations in Count Two, Petitioner introduced the testimony of Respondent's former spouse, Robin LaPlante. Ms. LaPlante's husband, Jeffrey Brown, purchased insurance through Respondent's agency on February 26, 1978. It is alleged that Respondent falsely indicated on the Brown application for automobile liability coverage with Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company that Mr. Brown's address was in Lauderhill, Florida, whereas he actually resided in Miami, Florida. Ms. LaPlante's complaint with Respondent is that they sold a van, which was one of the two vehicles covered under the policy, and it took approximately nine (9) months before the van was deleted and a refund check was issued for termination of that coverage. Ms. LaPlante had no direct dealings with Respondent and/or his agents during the time in question. Respondent's dealings were with Ms. LaPlante's former husband, Jeffrey Brown, who did not appear to testify in these proceedings. COUNT THREE As amended by Order dated December 31, 1980, Count Three alleges that Respondent employed the services of someone other than his employees or himself to complete a portion of an insurance application; that the insured was sold membership in a motor club without his knowledge and consent and that the Respondent unlawfully endorsed a check payable to the insured from the insurance carrier to reinstate the insured's policy which had been cancelled by the insurance carrier. In support of Count Three, Petitioner presented the testimony of Stanley Friehofer. Friehofer went to Houston Motors in Dade County, Florida, for the purpose of purchasing a Subaru Brat. To do so, it was necessary for Friehofer to provide evidence of insurance on the vehicle in order to obtain financing through the dealership. Sam Houston, the salesman involved, arranged the financing on behalf of the automobile dealership. Friehofer had obtained an insurance quote from his stepmother who was also in the insurance business. After discussing the possibility of the stepmother's agency issuing a policy, Mr. Houston called Respondent, John Pascale, who was at the dealership on other matters, Respondent quoted a rate less than that quoted by Friehofer's stepmother. Friehofer paid Houston Motors $440.00 and was given an insurance binder by Sam Houston. (Petitioner's Exhibit 20). Friehofer was accompanied by his brother at Houston Motors. Also present at the time was Sam Houston. Friehofer testified that Sam Houston completed the entire insurance application and issued him the insurance binder 3/ Friehofer never received a policy for his insurance although he received a bill from Kemper Insurance Company of Orlando, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 22). Friehofer noted three errors on his insurance application. Those errors were (1) his marital status (Friehofer is single), (2) the use of the vehicle was incorrectly noted, and (3) the premium quoted was the wrong amount. Friehofer also complained that he was incorrectly enrolled for membership in a motor club contrary to his consent. When Friehofer purchased the vehicle from Houston Motors, he was in the process of transferring from the Virgin Islands. Friehofer therefore used his brother's address on his insurance application. According to Friehofer, his first acquaintance with Respondent was during the taking of a deposition in this matter. Linda Manning confirmed the fact that Lumberman's Mutual charged Richard Friehofer a premium of $410.00 for insurance coverage to his vehicle. Friehofer received a cancellation notice dated April 30, 1979, from Kemper Insurance Company (Kemper) and was instructed by a Mr. Bell of Kemper to obtain "dual coverage" until Kemper could investigate the matter and refund the premiums expended by him to maintain dual coverage when the situation was resolved. Friehofer received an agency check from Respondent dated June 28, 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibit 23). Friehofer initiated the call to Kemper to advise that he intended to cancel his insurance which was effected by Respondent's agency. After Friehofer advised Kemper that he planned to cancel his coverage, he notified Respondent approximately four (4) days later. Respondent received a refund from Kemper and was unable to contact Friehofer. Respondent therefore endorsed the check and returned it to Kemper to reinstate the coverage. Respondent later learned of Friehofer's intention to, in fact, cancel the coverage and Respondent stopped payment on the check to Kemper. (See Respondent's Exhibit 1). Thereafter, Respondent refunded the premium paid from Kemper to Friehofer on June 28, 1979. (Respondent's Exhibit 13). COUNT FIVE 4/ Count Five charges Respondent with the sale of membership in a motor club to an insured and accuses the Respondent of misappropriating $38.00 of the insured's money. In support of this allegation, Petitioner introduced the deposition of Betty Monette. The thrust of this allegation is that Ms. Monette was quoted a renewal premium for her Personal Injury Protection (PIP) insurance coverage of $142.00. Thereafter, Respondent's employees determined that they could provide the same coverage through another carrier for $104.00. As a consequence, Respondent refunded the difference of $38.00 to Ms. Monette, however, the refund was accompanied by a transmittal which erroneously stated that the refund resulted from a cancellation of a motor club membership. Ms. Monette acknowledged having received the $38.00 refund, and the difference i.e. $104.00, coincides with the premium charged by Banker's Insurance for the PIP coverage. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Sam Houston is an official affiliated with Houston Motors. Houston contacted Respondent, who happened to be at the dealership attending to an unrelated business matter at the time the Friehofers were at the dealership to purchase a Subaru vehicle. Houston has not participated or otherwise benefited from insurance commissions derived by Respondent. Houston Motors has a policy of not being affiliated with insurance salesmen or other brokers based on legal requirements imposed upon the automobile dealerships. Houston was in charge of handling financing and insurance arrangements for purchasers of vehicles at the dealership when Stanley Friehofer purchased his vehicle from Houston Motors. Houston recalled copying basic pertinent data from a financing application onto an insurance application due to the rush that Respondent found himself in after he had quoted Friehofer a premium for coverage. Houston is not licensed to sell automobile or property insurance and is unfamiliar with the procedure of quoting premiums. When shown a copy of the insurance application executed on behalf of Friehofer, Houston recalled completing the name, address, company, telephone number, state, car information and lienholder on the insurance application. Houston was certain that he did not complete any item listed on page 2 of Petitioner's Exhibit 21 which was received in evidence herein. Houston is only licensed to sell credit life, accident and health insurance in connection with financing agreements. Houston finally recalled giving Friehofer a receipt for the $440.00 tendered for insurance premiums. Houston remembered that the Friehofer transaction was unique and to the best of his recollection, had not been previously handled by him in that fashion. Respondent, John R. Pascale, is, as stated herein, a licensed casualty, property agent who holds what is designated as a "220" license. Respondent received a bachelors degree in Business Administration from Pace University and has been involved in the insurance business since he was approximately nineteen (19) years old. Respondent started his first insurance agency in Florida during 1971, and the agency grew to five (5) offices employing approximately sixteen (16) to twenty (20) employees, presently. In response to the specific charges, Respondent had no personal dealing with Ms. Cardet on her purchase of insurance from the Pascale agency. The agent involved was Rigo Avila who was dismissed from Respondents employ on August 6, 1980. Respondent's agency files reflect that Ms. Cardet had several address changes during the three-year period in which she was insured with the assistance of Respondent's agency. Respondent countered the allegations that he incorrectly listed the wrong address for Ms. Cardet by assigning her to an area which charges lower premiums by asserting that there was no economic advantage to do this since the agency collects a commission on the amount of premiums charged. Thus, a lower premium nets the agency a lower commission. Therefore, during 1977, when Ms. Cardet was quoted a premium of $699.00, Kemper Insurance determined that the premium was approximately $677.00. A refund check was sent to Respondent which was forwarded to Segral Premium Finance Company for credit to Ms. Cardet's premium finance balance. Likewise, during 1978, Ms. Cardet was quoted a premium of $797.00 with a down payment of $300.00, with the balance financed over three (3) installments through a premium finance agency. Respondent was paid directly by the agency and the overcharge (alleged) represented a $100.00 motor club membership and a $35.00 refund which was remitted by the carrier. The refund was transferred to the premium finance agency for credit to Ms. Cardet's premium balance account. Sonny Financial Service received the $35.00 check in question. (See Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 3) Respondent acknowledged that it is an agency responsibility to correct an error once the agent learns of the error or through diligence, it is otherwise brought to the agent's attention. To correct errors, Respondent's agency usually amends the policy by means of a "declaration." Finally, Respondent acknowledged that the bookkeeping errors relative to the Cardet account had been the subject of a civil claim which was amicably settled in Ms. Cardet's behalf. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5 and 6) The insurance rates of residents in Lauderhill are generally less than the rates charged residents in Dade County. The producing agency has no control over a carrier's billing procedures. Respecting the allegations surrounding the Jeffrey Brown/Robin LaPlante matter, evidence reveals that Respondent sent policy changes per Jeffrey Brown's request to the carrier during April and September of 1978. (See Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 6) As to the allegations surrounding the Betty Monette incident, evidence revealed that Respondent was able to obtain the identical coverage through another carrier for Ms. Monette at a lower rate and thus was refunded $38.00 of a quoted $142.00 premium. The transmittal letter which accompanied the refund check, however, incorrectly stated that the $38.00 refund represented a credit for cancellation of a motor club membership. (Respondent's Exhibit 10) When all of these charges surfaced, Respondent attempted to get an understanding from his employee, Mr. Avila, who abandoned his employment with Respondent. However, Respondent did all that he could to effectively resolve the difficulties and terminated Avila's employment relationship by sending him a mailgram on August 6, 1980. (See Respondent's Exhibits 11 and 12) As to the allegations surrounding the Friehofer incident, Respondent was at Houston Motors in an effort to canvass and otherwise "drum up' additional business through the dealership. Respondent met Mr. Friehofer, quoted the insurance premium, explained the various coverages available, asked if there were questions and solicited Mr. Houston to complete the necessary basic data. Respondent acknowledged that it was not a good business practice for him to leave the insurance forms with Mr. Houston to complete, however, he considered the situation rare and unusual. He also felt that it was both an accommodation for Messrs. Houston and Friehofer. Respondent admitted that he benefited from the transaction by receiving the commission from the Friehofer insurance contract. Respondent completed the second sheet of the insurance application with the exception of the signature. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 21) Respondent did not leave any blank forms at the Houston agency or any other business enterprise. Respondent has not shared commissions received with any unlicensed or unemployed person who is not authorized to complete insurance forms. Respondent received the refund check from the Friehofer insurance application on June 20, 1979. He reviewed his file, and noted that there was no file notation regarding any intent by Mr. Friehofer to cancel his insurance coverage. He made an effort to contact Mr. Friehofer and learned that he was living with his brother-in-law in Miramar, Florida, and commuted on weekends to the Virgin Islands. He, therefore, redeposited the refund check to Kemper thinking that the policy had been erroneously cancelled. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 25 and Respondent's Exhibit 13)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be issued a letter of written reprimand cautioning him against the practice of allowing unlicensed or unauthorized persons to assist in completing forms which may be used to effect insurance coverage. In all other respects, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint allegations filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1981.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57626.561626.611626.621
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs WILLIAM FRANKLIN OUTLAND, III, 03-002758PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Reddick, Florida Jul. 30, 2003 Number: 03-002758PL Latest Update: Jan. 27, 2004

The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against the licenses held by Respondent as a Life (2-16), Life and Health (2-18), General Lines, Property and Casualty Insurance (2-20), Health (2-40) and Legal Expense (2-56) agent pursuant to provisions within Chapter 626, Florida Statutes?

Recommendation Based on the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Counts I through V pertaining to his obligations as a fiduciary set forth in Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes, his violation of Section 626.611(7), (9) and (10), Florida Statutes, and his violation of Section 626.621(4), Florida Statutes, in effect when the violations transpired and that the various licenses held by Respondent be suspended for six months as suggested by counsel for Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 William Franklin Outland, III 10840 Northwest 100th Street Reddick, Florida 32686 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Lower Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57626.561626.611626.621
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BROOKWOOD-WALTON COUNTY CONVALESCENT CENTER AND BROOKWOOD-WASHINGTON COUNTY CONVALESCENT CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 00-003580 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 30, 2000 Number: 00-003580 Latest Update: Mar. 01, 2002

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's denial of Petitioners', Brookwood- Walton County Convalescent Center and Brookwood-Washington County Convalescent Center (Brookwood), interim rate request for general and professional liability insurance was proper and in keeping with state and federal laws and the rules and regulations governing Florida's Medicaid program.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Brookwood-Washington County Convalescent Center and Walton County Convalescent Center (Brookwood) are licensed nursing homes in the State of Florida. The Brookwood facilities have historically been high Medicaid providers. Both participate in the Florida Medicaid program. Washington County Convalescent Center is currently 90 percent Medicaid and Walton County Convalescent Center is 85 percent Medicaid. The statewide average for all nursing homes in Florida is 50-55 percent Medicaid. Such high Medicaid participation makes Brookwood extremely sensitive to changes in its allowable costs and its ability to recover those costs. Florida's Medicaid program is needs-based, providing nursing home care to persons eligible for such care who fall below a certain level of income and assets. Medicaid is a "prospective" reimbursement program in that reimbursement to a nursing home is based on the facility's cost history adjusted or inflated to approximate future costs. Adjustments are made and reimbursement rates are set based on a nursing home's cost report for allowable costs it has incurred in the past year. In determining allowable reimbursable costs, AHCA utilizes the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan, Version XIX, dated November 27, 1995 (Reimbursement Plan), the reimbursement principles of the Federal Medicare Program's Health Insurance Manual (also known as the Provider Reimbursement Manual, PRM, or HIM-15), and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or accepted industry practice. In making determinations as to allowable reimbursable costs, one first looks to the Plan, then HIM-15 and finally, GAAP. With certain exceptions not relevant here, The Florida Medicaid program reimburses all allowable costs, as those costs are defined in the Reimbursement Plan and HIM-15. Premiums paid by a nursing home for liability insurance are an allowable cost under the Reimbursement Plan. Allowable costs are broken out in the categories of property, patient care, and operating expenses. As indicated, in determining the prospective rate, AHCA inflates the reported allowable costs in each category forward subject to various class ceiling limitations and target limitations. A class ceiling is an upper limit on the cost that will be reimbursed. A target limitation is a limit on the rate of increase of costs from year to year. In short, a nursing home provider may be under its class ceilings; however, any increase in its costs that exceeds a certain percentage amount will not be recognized for reimbursement purposes. After applying the inflation factor, the class ceilings and the target limitations to allowable costs, AHCA arrives at a per-patient, per-day rate that the nursing home will be paid during the next year. Because nursing home reimbursement is prospective and subject to target limits, a nursing facility might be unable to recover its allowable costs of providing services if it experiences unanticipated expenses that cause its allowable costs to unexpectedly rise. In such cases, the Plan has provisions that allow, under very limited circumstances, an interim rate adjustment for an unexpected increase in costs. Such interim rate increases are covered in Section IV.J. of the Plan. In 1999, Brookwood's liability insurance premium cost was $400,000 for its six Florida facilities and one North Carolina facility. In the year 2000, Brookwood's liability insurance premium cost increased to $4,000,000. Of that amount, the premium cost for Walton County Convalescent Center increased from $56,000 to $546,000 and the premium cost for Washington County Convalescent Center increased from $84,000 to $819,000. The premium increase occurred after Brookwood's rates had been set based on its 1999 insurance costs. Additionally, in September of 2000, Brookwood's liability insurer left the state. Brookwood has since been unable to obtain liability insurance for its Florida facilities. It was possible for Brookwood to self-insure, but it did not. Self-insurance is generally only feasible for facilities larger than Brookwood. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Brookwood could not self-insure. On May 30, 2000, faced with this unforeseen increase in liability insurance premiums, Brookwood applied to AHCA for an interim rate effective retroactively to January 1, 2000. This was necessary because the large increase in costs would not be covered by the normal rate of inflation allowed by the department and the cost of the increase would not be recoverable through the normal prospective reimbursement methodology due to the lag time between the cost increase and the filing of the cost report. In addition, without an interim rate Brookwood would not receive an adjustment to its target rate, thereby, limiting reimbursement for any increased costs it did report on its cost reports. Brookwood only requested interim rates for these two facilities because its other four facilities were at or above the cost ceilings and could get no relief from an interim rate. In other words, for those four facilities, Medicaid will not participate in payment for the extra costs incurred by the increased liability insurance premiums. Even for the two facilities at issue here, if an interim rate is granted, AHCA will not reimburse for any costs that exceed the cost ceilings. The increase of premiums and subsequent pull out by several insurance companies were part of a reaction to increased loss in the area of nursing home liability. The crisis was, in part, due to an increase in civil litigation against nursing homes being brought under Sections 400.022 and 400.023, Florida Statutes. Indeed, Florida's rate of nursing home liability litigation is significantly above the national average. However, Florida's nursing home population is also significantly larger than the national average. However, the crisis was also due to many other factors which impact liability and rates in Florida. While there may be some debate about the causes of the increased litigation, there is no debate that the cost of liability insurance increased significantly over a short period of time with some insurance companies ceasing to write liability insurance for nursing homes in Florida. The Agency denied Brookwood's request because no new interpretation of law by the state or federal government pertaining to liability insurance had occurred which caused Brookwood's costs to increase. As indicated earlier, the Plan contains provisions that allow a nursing home participating in the Medicaid program to request an interim change in its reimbursement rate when it incurs costs resulting from patient care or operating changes made to comply with existing state regulations and such costs are at least $5,000 or one percent of its per diem. The language of Section IV.J.2 of the Estate's Long- Term Care Reimbursement Plan states that: J. The following provisions apply to interim changes in component reimbursement rates, other than through the routine semi- annual rate setting process. * * * 2. Interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of patient care or operating changes shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing State or Federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the provider's current total per diem rate. Other subsections of Section J of the Reimbursement Plan deal with new requirements or new interpretation of old requirements. Those subsections do not apply in this case. The term standards as used in Section J refers to standards in the Reimbursement Plan, Section IV titled "Standards," the standards of care and operation detailed by the Medicaid program in its provider handbooks and such standards as are detailed in the Code of Federal Regulations, and HCFA/HHS guidelines, as well as state statutes and rules. These standards are the usual or customary method or practice used by the nursing home industry to gain reimbursement from Medicaid. The term standards include reimbursement standards, methods or principles for medicaid providers. In essence, a nursing home would have to incur additional or new costs to receive an interim rate adjustment. Brookwood's increase in insurance premiums was such an increase in costs, which would be allowable subject to ceiling and target limitations. At the time of Brookwood's request, there was no specific requirement in the state Reimbursement Plan, state or federal law requiring that liability insurance be carried by a nursing home. Additionally, there was no change to the Reimbursement Plan, state, or federal law or regulation requiring that liability insurance be carried by a nursing home. On the other hand, the reimbursement standards or requirements set forth in HIM-15 make it clear that a prudent Medicaid provider is expected to carry liability insurance or self-insurance in order to be reimbursed for any uninsured losses. Specifically, Section 2160.2 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual states: Liability damages paid by the provider, either imposed by law or assumed by contract, which should reasonably have been covered by liability insurance, are not allowable. Section 2161 of HIM-15 states that the reasonable costs of such insurance are allowable. Section 2162.1 of HIM-15 states that losses in excess of the deductible or co-insurance are allowable costs so long as the amount of insurance was consistent with sound management practices. Section 2162.5 of HIM-15 recognizes the allowability of deductibles, so long as they do not exceed 10 percent of the entity's net worth or $100,000 per provider. It also states that if you set a deductible higher than those amounts (or assume all the risk), any losses exceeding the 10 percent or $100,000 will not be allowable as recognized costs. The general implication of these and other related sections of HIM-15 is that a prudent provider is expected to carry liability insurance or be self-insured. Thus, a provider will be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of liability insurance, any reasonable deductible, and any losses in excess of reasonable insurance coverage. These limitations on loss recovery or reimbursement are standards for purposes of determining whether a interim rate increase is allowable. These standards were in effect at the time Brookwood's premiums increased. Thus, in order to comply with Medicaid's reimbursement standards, Brookwood had to remain insured or self-insured. The choice of which type of insurance to utilize to meet the reimbursement standard is left to the provider. Brookwood reasonably chose to insure through an insurance company. Since Brookwood was required to make such a choice in order to comply or conform to Medicaid's reimbursement standards, Brookwood is entitled to an interim rate increase. However, the interim rate provisions of the Plan only recognize such rates submitted within 60 days prior to the date of the interim rate request. Based on this limitation, Petitioners' rate increase is limited to the increase in premium incurred 60 days prior to its interim rate request around May 30, 2000.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that A final order be entered granting Brookwood's interim rate request limited to the 60 days prior to the initial rate request. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Grigas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (2) 400.022400.023 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59G-6.040
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs CLYDE JANNER HOLLIDAY, III, 09-004714PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Aug. 27, 2009 Number: 09-004714PL Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2011

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents violated Subsections 626.611(7), 626.611(9), 626.611(10), and 626.611(13), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints, Mr. Holliday, III, was a licensed Florida surplus lines (1-20) agent, a life and health (2-18) agent, a general lines (property and casualty) (2-20) agent, an independent adjuster (5-20), and agent in charge at International Brokerage and Surplus Lines, Inc. (IBSL). Mr. Holliday, III, had been associated with IBSL since its inception in 1993. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Holliday, IV, was licensed in Florida as a general lines (2-20) agent. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Holliday, III, and Mr. Holliday, IV, were officers and owners of IBSL. Most recently, Mr. Holliday, III, was the secretary of IBSL. He handled the underwriting and risk placement for the agency. From approximately March 1993 to April 2009, Mr. Holliday, IV, was the president of IBSL. As president of IBSL, Mr. Holliday, IV's, duties included signing agreements which established IBSL's business function as that of a general managing agent and signing agreements which empowered IBSL to collect premiums on behalf of insureds. IBSL ceased doing business on May 1, 2009. In the insurance industry, a common method of procuring insurance involves a retail producer, a wholesale broker, and a program manager. A customer desiring insurance contacts its local insurance agent, which is known as a retail producer, and applies for insurance. The retail producer has a producer agreement with a wholesale broker, who has a producer agreement with a program manager. The program manager represents insurance companies. The retail producer sends the customer's application to the wholesale broker, and the wholesale broker contacts the program manager and forwards the application to the program manager. The program manager will provide a quote if the insurance company is willing to insure the customer. The quote is passed back to the customer via the wholesale broker and the retail producer. If the customer decides to take the insurance, the program manager will issue a binder to the wholesale broker, who will submit the binder to the retail producer. The wholesale broker will issue an invoice for the premium to the retail producer. The program manager pays a commission to the wholesale broker pursuant to its producer agreement with the wholesale broker, and the wholesale broker pays a commission to the retail producer pursuant to its producer agreement with the retail producer. When the retail producer sends the premium payment to the wholesale broker, the retail producer will deduct its commission. The wholesale broker sends the premium amount to the program manager less the wholesale broker's commission. If the customer is unable to pay the entire amount of the premium, part of the premium may be financed through a premium finance company. The premium finance company may pay the premium to the retail producer or to the wholesale broker. International Transportation & Marine Agency, Inc. (ITMA), is a program manager and is engaged in the business of selling, brokering, and servicing certain lines of policies of insurance written or issued by insurance companies. ITMA is a program manager for Pennsylvania Manufacturers Insurance Association (Pennsylvania Manufacturers), an insurance company. IBSL, a wholesale broker, entered into a producer's contract with ITMA on January 4, 2008. Wimberly Agency, Incorporated (Wimberly), is a retail producer located in Ringgold, Louisiana. In 2008, Wimberly had a producer's agreement with IBSL. Carla Jinks (Ms. Jinks) is the administrative manager for Wimberly. In October 2008, R.L. Carter Trucking (Carter) was a customer of Wimberly and applied for motor truck cargo insurance with Wimberly. Wimberly submitted an application to IBSL and requested that coverage be bound effective October 28, 2008, for Carter. IBSL contacted ITMA and received a binder for a policy with Pennsylvania Manufacturers. The cost of the policy was $9,500.00 plus a policy fee of $135.00 for a total of $9,635.00. Carter paid Wimberly $2,500.00 as a down payment and financed the remainder of the cost with Southern Premium Finance, LLC, who paid the financed portion directly to Wimberly. Wimberly deducted a ten percent commission of $950.00 and sent the remainder, $8,635.00 to IBSL. The check was deposited to IBSL's clearing account. On January 22, 2009, Carter contacted Ms. Jinks and advised that he had received a notice of cancellation effective January 22, 2009, due to non-payment to Pennsylvania Manufacturers. On the same date, Ms. Jinks received a facsimile transmission from IBSL, attaching the notice of cancellation and stating: "There was some confusion with the payment we send [sic] and we are working on getting it reinstated." There were some e-mails between Wimberly and Mr. Holliday, III, concerning the placement of coverage with another company. IBSL was unable to place coverage for Carter. By e-mail dated January 30, 2009, Ms. Jinks advised Mr. Holliday, III, that she had been able to place coverage for Carter and requested a return of the premium paid on a pro rata basis. She advised Mr. Holliday, III, that the return premium should be $7,651.35. By e-mail dated January 30, 2009, Mr. Holliday, III, stated: We will tender the return as quickly as it is processed by accounting. I do sorely regret the loss of this account, and our inability to get the Travelers quote agreed on a timely basis. By February 19, 2009, Wimberly had not received the return premium from IBSL. Ms. Jinks sent an e-mail to Mr. Holliday, III, on February 19, 2009, asking that the return premium be rushed to Wimberly so that it could be used to pay for the replacement policy. As of the date of Ms. Jinks' deposition on November 16, 2009, neither Mr. Holliday, III; Mr. Holliday, IV; nor IBSL had given the return premium to Wimberly. K.V. Carrier Services, Inc. (K.V.), is a retail producer located in Medley, Florida. In 2007, K.V. and IBSL entered into a business arrangement with IBSL. Under the arrangement, K.V. was the retailer, IBSL was the wholesale broker, ITMA was the program manager, and Pennsylvania Manufacturers was the insurance company. K.V. collected the down payments for the policy premiums from its customers and sent the down payments to IBSL. The remainder of the premiums were financed by financing companies, who sent the remainder of the premiums to IBSL. IBSL was supposed to send the monies paid for the premiums to ITMA. The following customers made down payments to K.V. and financed the remainder of their premiums with a financing company. E & E Trucking Service OD Transport, Inc. Fermin Balzaldua Eduardo Bravo Carlos Ramirez Edwin Bello Janet Rodriguez UTL, Inc. Prestige Transport USA JNL Transportation, Inc. Valdir Santos DJ Express PL Fast Carrier Ysis Transport K.V. sent the down payments for these customers to IBSL. The financing company sent the remainder of the premiums for these customers to IBSL. The total amount of premiums sent to IBSL for these customers was $19,768.45. IBSL did not send the premium payments for these customers to ITMA. The policies for these customers were cancelled for non-payment. K.V. found another company that was willing to insure K.V.'s customers. K.V. paid the down payments for the new policies from its own funds, hoping that IBSL would repay the finance company with any unearned premiums that would be returned to IBSL as a result of the cancellations. ITMA sent an invoice called an Account Current Statement to IBSL for the business conducted in the month of November 2008. The total amount owed to ITMA was listed as $55,116.32. The invoice included the premium for the policy issued for Carter, less IBSL's commission. The premiums for the policies issued to Eduardo Bravo; Fermin Bazaldua; JNL Transportation, Inc.; Janet Rodriguez; OD Transport, Inc.; and Prestige Transport USA were also included in the Account Current Statement for the business that IBSL conducted in November. IBSL was required to pay the $55,116.32 by December 15, 2008, but did not do so. ITMA received a check from IBSL dated December 31, 2008, for $25,000.00. A notation on the check indicated that it was a partial payment for the November business. The check was unallocated, meaning IBSL did not state to which premiums the partial payment should be applied. Mr. Holliday, III, claimed that IBSL had sent a bordereaux along with the check showing to which policies the payment applied. Mr. Holliday, III's, testimony is not credited. Donald Kaitz (Mr. Kaitz), the president of ITMA, communicated with one of the Respondents, who advised Mr. Kaitz that he needed another week or so to collect some premiums from his retail producers. On January 12, 2009, ITMA received a telephone call from IBSL, stating that IBSL could not pay the balance owed to ITMA and that ITMA should take whatever action it felt necessary. As a result of the communication from IBSL, ITMA issued notices of policy cancellation on all applicable policies listed in the Account Current Statement which was to be paid on December 15, 2008. Copies of the cancellation notices were sent to the insureds and IBSL. ITMA issued pro rata return premiums based on the number of days that each policy had been in effect. The return premiums were sent to IBSL by a check for $18,790.06. Additionally, ITMA sent IBSL a list of the policies that had been cancelled, showing the earned premiums which had been deducted from the $25,000.00. IBSL received and retained a net of $30,116.32, which was owed to ITMA. This amount is derived by deducting the $25,000.00, which IBSL sent to ITMA, from the $55,116.32, which was owed to ITMA. By letter dated April 2, 2009, IBSL sent K.V. a check for $524.80, which stated: We have totaled all amounts owing to IBSL by KV Carrier Service, and we have totaled all pro rated commissions owing by IBSL to KV Carrier Services for the benefit of your clients and have included our check # 1025 in the final amount of $524.80 to settle the account. All net unearned premiums for other than unearned commissions which are funded herein you must contact the insurance carriers involved and request payment under the provisions of Florida Statutes #627.7283. Federal Motor Carriers Risk Retention Group, Incorporated (FMC), is an insurance company, which sells commercial auto liability insurance, specifically targeted to intermediate and long-haul trucking companies. CBIP Management, Incorporated (CBIP), is a managing general underwriter for FMC. FMC had an agreement effective June 1, 2008, with IBSL, allowing IBSL to act as a general agent for FMC. As a general agent for FMC, IBSL was given the authority to accept risk on behalf of FMC. IBSL was given a fiduciary responsibility to accept insurance applications, provide quotes, and bind coverage. Once IBSL binds a policy for FMC, FMC issues a policy and is responsible for the risk. IBSL would receive the down payment from the retail agency, and, in most cases, the finance company would pay the balance of the premium directly to IBSL. The agreement between FMC and IBSL provided that IBSL was to provide FMC a monthly report of premiums billed and collected, less the agreed commission. The report was due by the 15th of the month following the reported month. In turn, FMC was to issue a statement for the balance due, and IBSL was required to pay the balance due within 15 days of the mailing of the statement following the month in which the policy was written. In August 2008, FMC began to notice that IBSL was selling premiums lower than FMC's rating guidelines. IBSL owed FMC approximately $186,000.00, which was due on August 15, 2008. IBSL sent FMC a check, which was returned for insufficient funds. FMC contacted IBSL and was assured that the check was returned due to a clerical error and an error by the bank. Assurances were given to FMC that funds would be transferred to FMC the following day; however, FMC did not receive payment until five days later. In September 2008, Joseph Valuntas (Mr. Valuntas), the chief operating officer for FMC, paid a visit to Mr. Holliday, III, and Mr. Holliday, IV. Mr. Valuntas expressed his concerns about the delay in receiving payment in August. He also pointed out that IBSL had taken some risks which were not rated properly and that there were some risks in which IBSL was not following the underwriting guidelines. After his visit with the Hollidays, Mr. Valuntas wrote a letter to IBSL, restricting IBSL to writing in Florida and limiting the amount of gross written premium to no more than $100,000.00 per month. IBSL did not adhere to Mr. Valuntas' instructions. An example of IBSL's conduct involved the writing of a policy for Miami Sunshine Transfer, which is a risk category designated as public delivery. Public delivery was not a standard that FMC insured and, as such, was not covered by FMC's reinsurance. Beginning on or about September 21, 2008, FMC began getting complaints from policyholders and retail agents about cancellations of policies that had been paid timely and in full. Although the retail agents had paid the premiums in full to IBSL, IBSL had not forwarded the premiums to FMC. By October 2008, IBSL owed FMC approximately $120,000.00 in past due premiums. FMC officially terminated the IBSL agreement in October 2008. IBSL sued FMC for breach of contract. On December 22, 2008, FMC received a check from IBSL in the amount of $25,122.80, but IBSL did not specify what premiums were being paid by the check. From February 1, 2006, through November 20, 2008, IBSL had a business relationship with Markel International Insurance Company Limited (Markel), an entity for which IBSL was writing insurance. IBSL was a coverholder for Markel, meaning that IBSL could produce insurance business for Markel and had the authority to collect and process premiums and bind insurance on Markel's behalf. Once the premiums were collected by IBSL, they were to be reported to Markel, and, within a maximum of 45 days, IBSL was to remit to Markel the aggregate gross written premiums less IBSL's commission. T. Scott Garner (Mr. Garner) is an expert auditor and financial analyst who currently works for Northshore International Insurance Services (Northshore), an insurance and reinsurance consulting firm. Markel retained Mr. Garner to determine the amount of money that IBSL should have sent to Markel for business transacted by IBSL for the period between February 1, 2006, and November 20, 2008. In doing his analysis, Mr. Garner used the bordereauxs which IBSL prepared and provided to Markel. Bordereauxs are monthly billing reports or accounts receivable reports. Mr. Garner also used data from Omni, which is a software system that was used by IBSL. Mr. Garner used the following procedure to determine what IBSL owed Markel. He determined how much risk IBSL wrote during the time period, that is, the gross written premium. He identified the amount of money that Markel had received from IBSL for the time period. Next he determined the amount that should have been received from IBSL, the gross written premiums minus IBSL's commissions. He compared what should have been remitted to Markel with the amount that was actually received by Markel. Based on his analysis, Mr. Garner calculated that IBSL owed Markel $1,208,656.61. Mr. Garner's analysis is credited. Respondent submitted a FSLSO Compliance Review Summary, which was done by the Florida Surplus Lines Office. At the final hearing, Mr. Holliday, III, viewed the report to mean that Markel was incorrect in the amount of money that was owed to it by IBSL. The report does not indicate that the policies on which the premium variances were noted were policies issued by Markel. Additionally, in his review, Mr. Garner eliminated duplicate transactions in determining the amount owed to Markel. The report did give a long list of policies, which should have been reported to Florida Surplus Lines Office, but IBSL had failed to report the policies.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondents committed the violations alleged in Counts I through V of the Administrative Complaints, dismissing Count VI of the Administrative Complaints, and revoking the licenses of Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2010.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57626.611626.621626.734790.06
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs. JAMES EDWARD SNAPP, 82-000108 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000108 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact James Edward Snapp is licensed by the Department of Insurance as an Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent, Dental Agent and Disability Agent and was so licensed at all times in 1981 and 1982 in his dealings with Mrs. Mabel McCarthy and Mr. George Guertin. In July 1981 Respondent went to the apartment of Mabel McCarthy, a 79- year-old widow, and talked to her about insurance. His visit was unsolicited and Mrs. McCarthy initially told him she had adequate coverage with her Medicare, Medicaid and Blue Cross. Respondent discussed the issuance of a "gold" card which provided better coverage than she was presently receiving. They also discussed her $1,000 life insurance policy for which she had designated the Haven School in Miami as beneficiary. When she indicated she would also like to leave something to another school in Palm Beach County, Respondent suggested she cancel the $1,000 policy and take out two $5,000 policies and make each school beneficiary of one policy. Following Respondent's assertions to Mrs. McCarthy regarding her taking out different insurance policies, Mrs. McCarthy gave Respondent her check on 26 July 1981 in the amount of $1,100 made payable to Accident & Health Agency, the agent for whom Respondent worked. Mrs. McCarthy understood this to be the premium payment for the life insurance and hospitalization insurance policies. Respondent told Mrs. McCarthy the cash surrender value of her life insurance policy should be about $900. When she wrote Mutual of Omaha about the cash surrender value, she was advised it was nearer $700 and the company questioned her reasons for cancelling the policy. This aroused Mrs. McCarthy's suspicions and she called the Insurance Commissioner's branch office to inquire about Respondent. Up until this time she had full confidence in Respondent. In the application for health insurance for Mrs. McCarthy which Respondent subsequently submitted 12 July 1981 to American Sun Life Insurance Company, he checked the "no" square to the question "Is the insurance applied for intended to replace any insurance presently in force?" knowing he had suggested to Mrs. McCarthy this policy would replace her Blue Cross insurance policy. The total premium on these policies, one providing for medical expenses and the other providing for nursing home care, is $530. American Sun Life Insurance Company does not sell life insurance. On 28 July 1981 Respondent again visited Mrs. McCarthy, obtained her check in the amount of $380 made payable to Accident & Health Agency, and submitted an application to American Sun Life Insurance Company on behalf of Mrs. McCarthy which provides hospital and medical benefits. On this application he also checked the "no" square to the question about replacing existing insurance. The annual premium for this policy was $370. Mrs. McCarthy also gave Respondent a check in the amount of $500 payable to Accident & Health Agency for additional policies. Before this check had been cleared, Mrs. McCarthy received the first policies Respondent had sold her and realized they were no different from her prior coverage, no "gold" card was included and neither was a life insurance policy. Upon receipt of these policies on 11 August 1981 Mrs. McCarthy stopped payment on the $500 check and again called the Insurance Commissioner's office. When the Insurance Commissioner contacted American Sun Life Insurance Company with Mrs. McCarthy's complaint, they refunded $900 to Mrs. McCarthy for the policies they had issued. Those policies were for the maximum coverage Sun Life provides. The three policies issued by Orange State Life Insurance for various health care benefits were those applied for when the $500 check was written by Mrs. McCarthy and these policies were cancelled when payment was stopped on that check. The total premium for these policies was $449.99 plus a $26 policy fee. Respondent obtained the name of George Guertin as a potential client and called him for an appointment to discuss insurance. Upon arrival 18 January 1982 shortly after the phone call, Respondent looked at two policies Guertin showed him covering Medicare Supplemental payments on Guertin and his wife. These policies were issued by Tara Life Insurance Company. Respondent told Guertin that the agent who sold him these policies had charged top price and he could get these policies for him at a lower premium. The premium paid on the policy issued to George Guertin was $482 and the premium on the policy issued to Alma Guertin was $445. Respondent was not authorized to solicit policies for Tara. Guertin gave Respondent his check payable to J. Snapp in the amount of $540 to renew the two policies with Tara Life Insurance Company. Guertin also gave Respondent his life insurance policy issued on John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company to inquire about the cash surrender value. This policy was later returned to Guertin without change. Respondent's testimony that the $540 was for services he was to provide the Guertins in preparing Medicare claims and that the Guertins understood this at the time the check was signed, is not credible. George Guertin was born in Canada in 1903 but has lived in the United States for 65 years. Although he went to school in Canada through the eighth grade, he does not read English. George's brother Eme apparently lived with the Guertins and was disabled. Respondent offered to take Eme to the Veteran's Administration to get his disability pension increased. He was paid $250 for this service and for taking Eme to the VA on other occasions. Guertin testified that the signature on Exhibit 12 was not his signature and that on Exhibit 13 was not his wife's signature. Respondent testified that these "contracts" were signed by George Guertin and Alma Guertin in his presence. Regardless of the validity of the signatures, these "contracts" provide that compensation [of Respondent] shall be determined by mutual agreement. There was no mutuality of agreement that the $540 paid by Guertin to Respondent was for services to be rendered by Respondent in completing Medicare forms. When Guertin was advised by Tara Life Insurance Company that his policies were about to lapse for nonpayment of premiums, he realized Respondent had not renewed these policies as he was told Respondent would do, he complained to the Insurance Commissioner's office, and he sent premium payments to Tara. Respondent suffered injuries while serving in the Marine Corps in Korea. He was discharged with a 35 percent disability rating in 1955 and since that time he has been treated from time to time in VA facilities. He has had several heart attacks, five according to Respondent's testimony, and takes a wide variety of medication. In his testimony Respondent admitted that he only sold insurance and left the doing of the paperwork associated with these policies to the agency for whom he works. He does not keep records of his insurance transactions because he has a "real tough time" doing so. He leaves those chores to the agency.

Florida Laws (3) 626.611626.621626.9521
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