Findings Of Fact Petitioner is engaged in the cattle business and sells these cattle to in-state and out-of-state buyers who purchase the cattle at Clewiston, Florida, and have them transported either by the purchaser's own equipment or by a commercial carrier to their in-state or out-of-state destination. Those sales determined to be out-of-state sales are not included in the numerator of the fraction used to compute what percentage of Petitioner's income results from Florida sales and is therefore subject to Florida income tax. In making the determination respecting out-of-state sales Respondent applies the destination test if the cattle are shipped by common carrier but treats all other carriers as agents of the buyer to whom the cattle are delivered at Clewiston, thereby making such sales in-state sales. It is this policy determination which Petitioner contends is a rule. The policy has not been promulgated in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and, if this interpretation constitutes a rule, it is invalid because it was never promulgated as required. In determining whether certain sales are subject to the Florida sales tax, the Legislature in Section 212.06(5)(a), Florida Statutes, excluded from tax that tangible property imported or manufactured for export and provided such tangible property shall not be considered as being manufactured for export unless the manufacturer delivers the same to a licensed exporter for exporting or to a common carrier for shipment outside the State or mails the same by United States Mail to a destination outside the State. The rationale of the sales tax provision is used by Respondent in determining whether the sales are in-state sales for the purpose of computing Florida income tax. Respondent has promulgated, to its auditors, as a policy and as an interpretation of the statute, the directive to apply the destination test in determining out-of-state sales only when the merchandise sold is shipped by common carrier to a destination out of state. It is this policy determination or interpretation of the statutes that Petitioner contends is a rule and attacks in these proceedings. In the testimony Respondent acknowledged that this policy determination is uniformly applied. It also has application both within and outside the agency. Respondent further testified that if the merchandise (here cattle) had been delivered by Petitioner to the buyer outside the State of Florida by any means of transportation Petitioner chose, it would have treated the sale as an out-of-state sale.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Welding Services Corp., is a Florida corporation doing business in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue, is the agency charged with enforcing the taxing statutes of this State, including the Florida Income Tax Code, Chapter 220, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, the Petitioner is required to file a Florida Corporate Income Tax Return annually with the Respondent. The Return is due on the first day of the fourth month after the close of the tax year. The Petitioner's tax year for 1977 was April 1, 1976, through March 31, 1977. The Florida Corporation Income Tax Return for the 1977 tax year was due on July 1, 1977, and the Petitioner failed to file its Return by this date. The Petitioner's tax year for 1978 was April 1, 1977, through March 31, 1978. The Florida Corporation Income Tax Return for the 1978 tax year was due on July 1, 1978, and the Petitioner failed to file its Return by this date. In January 1977, all of the Petitioner's corporate records were seized, pursuant to a subpoena issued in the United States Federal District Court in and for the Southern District of Florida. (See Exhibit 1) The Petitioner's records were not returned to it for over a year. On September 15, 1978, the Petitioner filed a Tentative Income Tax Return and Application for Extension of Time to File Income Tax Return, wherein Petitioner requested an extension of time until November 15, 1978, in which to file its Florida income tax return for the 1977 and 1978 tax years. (See Exhibit 2) On October 5, 1978, the Department of Revenue denied the Petitioner's request for an extension of time on grounds that the request had been filed after the respective due dates of July 1, 1977, and July 1, 1978. (See Exhibit 2) On November 16, 1978, the Department of Revenue received Petitioner's Florida Corporation Income Tax Returns for the tax years 1977 and 1978. The Petitioner also remitted the tax it believed owing for each taxable year, $3,734.96 for 1977 and $6,803.56 for 1978. On February 2, 1979, the Department of Revenue, Corporate Income Tax Bureau, issued a Delinquent Notice of Tax Due to the Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the Petitioner had a balance due of $1,547.28 for the tax year ending March 31, 1977, which amount represented $933.74 penalty and $613.54 interest. (See Exhibit 3) On February 5, 1979, the Department of Revenue, Corporate Income Tax Bureau, issued a Delinquent Notice of Tax Due to the Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the Petitioner had a balance due of $1,986.43 for the tax year ending March 31, 1978, which amount represented $1,700.89 penalty and $285.54 interest. (See Exhibit 4) On March 15, 1979, Mr. Karl J. Leib, Jr., contacted the Department of Revenue on behalf of his client, the' Petitioner, requesting the Department to delay in issuing any tax warrants against the Petitioner until Mr. Leib had an opportunity to communicate with someone from the Department. (See Exhibit 5) A follow-up letter was sent by Mr. Leib to the Department on June 8, 1979. (See Exhibit 6) On April, 23, 1980, the Department of Revenue issued to the Petitioner a Final Notice and Demand for payment in the amount of $1,547.28. (See Exhibit 7) Although no Final Notice and Demand for payment in the amount of $1,986.43 was issued by the Department, the amount is still outstanding and the Department maintains that Petitioner owes this sum as well. It is the Petitioner's position that its inability to timely file its Florida Corporate Income Tax Returns was entirely due to factors beyond its control, i.e., the confiscation of its corporate records. The Petitioner maintains that it should not be assessed penalty and interest for late filing, as its failure to timely file was "due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect," as is provided for in Section 214.40(1), Florida Statutes. The Department's position is twofold. First, the Petitioner's failure to make a timely request for extension of time in which to file its return does constitute willful neglect. Second, that while Section 214.40(1), Florida Statutes, may provide the Department with some discretion in assessing penalties, there is no comparable provision for modifying interest payments and such amount is absolutely mandated by the statute for any late filed returns. In addition to the foregoing, along with the attached Exhibits, the undersigned hereby incorporate by reference and jointly offer as evidence those Exhibits attached to Petitioner's Request for Formal Proceedings. WHEREFORE, both parties respectfully request the Hearing Officer to consider the foregoing facts and exhibits, along with a Memoranda of Law to be filed by each party within 10 days of the filing of this Joint Stipulation, and to issue his Recommended Order, without the necessity of holding a formal hearing.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is liable for use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, to the Florida Department of Revenue for the use and storage of a vessel.
Findings Of Fact Camden Corporation (Petitioner) is a foreign corporation, incorporated in Delaware on August 7, 1990. Petitioner is a solely owned, closed corporation. Petitioner has two officers: a President, who is the sole owner, and a Treasurer. At all times material hereto, Petitioner's President and Treasurer were residents of Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner's business address is in Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner's officers handled its day-to-day activities and records from Jacksonville, Florida. Prior to the Petitioner's incorporation, its President wanted to purchase a vessel to take a world wide cruise. He obtained the services of a law firm to advise him on avoiding a state's sales and use tax on the purchase of a vessel, with Florida being one of the states. A lawyer in the firm contacted the Florida Department of Revenue (Respondent) and inquired, without relating any of Petitioner's factual circumstances, as to whether the case of Department of Revenue v. Yacht Futura, 510 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) was still good case law in Florida. Yacht Futura was a case in which the parameters of Florida's sales and use tax were interpreted regarding repairs and personal use of vessels while in Florida waters. Respondent's representative informed the firm's lawyer that Yacht Futura was still being followed by Respondent and that no exceptions existed; but Respondent's representative further cautioned that the factual circumstances must conform to Yacht Futura. The firm's lawyer prepared a memorandum advising Petitioner's President, among other things, that no liability for Florida's sales and use tax would be incurred for repairs and personal use of a vessel in Florida's waters, so long as the circumstances complied with Yacht Futura. After having received the firm's advice and advice from tax advisors, Petitioner's President created and incorporated Petitioner. On August 14, 1990, Petitioner purchased a used motor vessel in international waters for $5,618,000. The vessel was a 131' Feadship with Coast Guard documentation number 623589. Petitioner named the vessel "CAMDEN." The CAMDEN was the only assest owned by Petitioner. Petitioner did not pay any Florida sales tax at the time of CAMDEN's purchase. From August 14, 1990 through October 15, 1990, the CAMDEN was outside the State of Florida. Petitioner's President had taken the vessel on a cruise. During the time period that the vessel was on the cruise, Petitioner did not pay any sales or use tax in any jurisdiction in the United States. Also, during the time period that the vessel was on the cruise, Petitioner did not license, title, or register the CAMDEN in any jurisdiction in the United States. On October 15, 1990, relying on the law firm's advice, Petitioner imported the CAMDEN into Florida waters for major repairs, with the intention of departing after the repairs and not returning to Florida waters. Petitioner obtained the services of Huckins Yacht Corporation, a registered repair facility, in Jacksonville to perform repairs to the CAMDEN, which had a dock in Huckins Marina. However, the dock at Huckins Marina was unable to accommodate a vessel the size of the CAMDEN. The vessel was docked at Southbank Marina which could accommodate the vessel and which was the closest marina to Huckins Marina. Petitioner's President was not in the State of Florida when the CAMDEN arrived in Florida waters. He did not return to Florida until October 24, 1990. Petitioner did not have a written contract with Huckins Yacht Corporation (Huckins) to perform any repairs on the CAMDEN. However, Huckins did perform some minor repairs to the CAMDEN. Also, Huckins arranged for a major repair to the CAMDEN. It arranged for Petitioner to purchase a global position satellite electronic system as a nonwarranty repair. The electronic system was to be installed by someone who was not an employee of Huckins and who did not have a contractual agreement with Huckins for the installation. The electronic system was installed on the CAMDEN at the Southbank Marina. During the time that repairs were being made to the CAMDEN, its crew remained on board. Petitioner never received any bill from Huckins for any repairs made to the CAMDEN, including the installation of the electronic system. While the vessel was docked for repairs at the Southbank Marina, it was used for personal entertainment. On October 25, 1990, Petitioner's President and his friends had an open house type of party on the CAMDEN. On October 26, 1990, Petitioner had a luncheon cruise on the CAMDEN. On October 27, 1990, Petitioner had a dinner cruise and a birthday party for the daughter of Petitioner's President. On October 28, 1990, Petitioner took the CAMDEN from Jacksonville to St. Augustine for a pleasure trip. Leaving St. Augustine, the CAMDEN traveled to Miami, Florida and docked there on October 30, 1990, to get the vessel prepared for world travel. In Miami, the CAMDEN was docked at the Moorings Yacht Services, Inc. (Moorings), a registered repair facility. In November 1990, the Moorings began repairs to the CAMDEN, and in December 1990, the vessel departed the Moorings. In November 1990, Petitioner hired a tax consultant, who was a former employee of Respondent, for advice regarding Petitioner's liability for sales and use tax of the CAMDEN in Florida. The tax consultant advised Petitioner to register the CAMDEN as a charter for sales and use tax. Further, he advised Petitioner to late-file with Respondent an Exemption Affidavit for Boats Placed in a Registered Repair Facility, referred to as a Safe Harbor Affidavit, pursuant to Subsection 212.08(7)(t), Florida Statutes. On December 19, 1990, a Safe Harbor Affidavit was executed by both Huckins and Petitioner's President. The Safe Harbor Affidavit indicated, among other things, that Huckins was a registered repair facility in Jacksonville, Florida and that, from October 16, 1990 through October 25, 1990, the CAMDEN was under the care, custody, and control of Huckins for the purpose of installing electronics, which was the electronic system. Even though the Safe Harbor Affidavit does not provide that Huckins installed the electronic system on the CAMDEN, it does infer that Huckins had installed the electronic device. Respondent interprets "care, custody, and control" as the vessel being in the "physical" care, custody, and control of the registered repair facility. Clearly shown on the Safe Harbor Affidavit is that it is to be filed with the Respondent within 72 hours after the repair facility takes possession of the vessel. Additionally, clearly shown on the Safe Harbor Affidavit is that a copy of it is to be filed with Respondent within 72 hours after the work is completed and the vessel is released to the owner. On or about December 22, 1990, the CAMDEN departed Florida waters for a pleasure cruise to the Bahamas. In early January 1991, the vessel returned to Florida. The CAMDEN remained in Florida until mid-January 1991, when it traveled to the Caribbean. Around mid-May 1991, the vessel returned to Florida. In 1990, Petitioner was not issued a permit by any agency of the United States government to use the CAMDEN in Florida waters. In April 1991, one of Respondent's representatives discovered, during a routine examination of the records of the Miami Marina, that the CAMDEN was named as a boat docked in Florida with an out-of-state hailing port. On May 13, 1991, Respondent's representative sent a Declaration for Florida Sales and Use Tax (Declaration) to Petitioner for it to complete and return to Respondent. Instead of completing the Declaration, on December 10, 1991, Petitioner's tax consultant delivered the Safe Harbor Affidavit executed on December 19, 1990, to Respondent's representative. Additionally, Petitioner's tax consultant verbally supported the Safe Harbor Affidavit by stating that the CAMDEN was docked at Southbank Marina in Jacksonville while the repairs to the vessel were being completed by Huckins and the nonemployee. The Moorings filed a Safe Harbor Affidavit with Respondent, providing that the CAMDEN entered the facility in November 1990 and departed in December 1990. The Safe Harbor Affidavit was not submitted to Respondent within 72 hours of the CAMDEN either entering the facility for repairs or departing the facility after the repairs were completed. 1/ Respondent has a practice of accepting late-filed Safe Harbor Affidavits, with the condition that all documents supporting repairs are also to be submitted. A subsequent review of all the documents submitted would determine whether a person would be responsible for sales and use tax. On December 10, 1991, based on the Safe Harbor Affidavit and the representations by Petitioner's tax consultant, Respondent's representative closed her file regarding the sales and use tax, without assessing any sales or use tax against Petitioner. However, she forwarded neither a closing letter nor a closing agreement to Petitioner. Even though Petitioner had not received a closing letter or a closing agreement from Respondent, it believed that Respondent had terminated its inquiry of any assessment against it. In or around November 1991, another of Respondent's representative (Respondent's second representative) observed, while performing a routine marina check, the CAMDEN docked at the Palm Harbor Marina in West Palm Beach, Florida. Subsequently, he opened a new file on the CAMDEN. Petitioner was unaware that Respondent's second representative had opened a new file. Respondent's second representative performed an investigation of the vessel, including reviewing the Safe Harbor Affidavit submitted to the Respondent's other representative on December 10, 1991. His investigation led to the assessment at issue. The investigation by Respondent's second representative showed, and it is determined as a finding of fact here, that the CAMDEN was not in the physical care, custody, and control of Huckins during the repairs for the period October 16, 1990 through October 25, 1990. From October 15, 1990, when the CAMDEN entered in Florida waters for repairs, the vessel remained in Florida for more than a total of 10 days. Petitioner decided to sell the CAMDEN and listed it for $6.9 million. On February 14, 1992, Petitioner sold the CAMDEN for $5.3 million, which was $1.6 million less than it was originally listed. For 1991 and 1992, Petitioner's President treated the CAMDEN as his personal second home and took a home interest deduction for federal income tax purposes. On October 10, 1992, Respondent notified Petitioner that it was assessed, as of April 10, 1992, a tax of $337,080, representing: 6 percent of the CAMDEN's purchase price of $5,618,000; $84,270 in penalty; $168,540 in specific penalty; and $59,826.60 in interest. On October 26, 1992, Respondent issued a notice of final assessment to Petitioner which included the above assessment and the facts and reasons, including legal reasons, for the assessment. Petitioner contested the assessment. On January 14, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of reconsideration of the assessment and revised final assessment, withdrawing the $168,540 in specific penalty but sustaining the remaining assessment of $503,113.02, which represented: $337,080 tax; $84,270 penalty; and $81,763.02 interest. In its notice of reconsideration, Respondent determined, among other things, that Petitioner was issued an out-of-state registration, effective December 1, 1990, as a result of Petitioner submitting an application for sales and use tax registration, listing the major business activity as rental of tangible personal property. Additionally, Respondent determined, among other things, that Petitioner, as the corporation, maintained control and use of the CAMDEN during the period December 1990 through February 1992 when the CAMDEN was sold. No tax at issue was assessed for this period of time. Petitioner protested the revised assessment. Petitioner has not paid any Florida use tax.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of use tax against the Camden Corporation in the amount of $503,113.02, plus accrued interest. DONE AND ENTERED on this 30th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1996.
Findings Of Fact The parties have agreed that there are no issues of fact to be determined in this matter, and that the relevant facts are set out in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition which was received in evidence at the hearing as Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1. This matter involves a determination for Florida corporate income tax purposes of the net income derived by the Petitioner in connection with the purchase, development, and sale of certain property in Dade County, Florida. Petitioner purchased the property prior to January 1, 1972, the date upon which the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner expended, through a subsidiary corporation, $369,058 in developing the property. These expenditures also occurred prior to January 1, 1972. For Federal income tax purposes the Petitioner had deducted these expenditures as business expenses during the years that they were incurred. Petitioner sold the property during 1972. Because the Petitioner had deducted the expenditures as business expenses, the expenditures could not properly have been included in the base price of the property for Federal income tax purposes, and the net income for Federal tax purposes was computed by subtracting the original purchase price from the sale price. Since the Florida Income Tax Code was not in effect at the time the expenditures were made, the Petitioner received no Florida tax benefit for the expenditures. In computing the net income for Florida tax purposes derived from the sale, the Petitioner included the expenditures in the base price of the property, and calculated its net income by subtracting the sum of the purchase price of the property and the expenditures from the sale price. The Department, contending that the $369,058 should not have been included in the base price of the property, issued a deficiency assessment which reflected the net income from the sale of property as the difference between the sale price and the purchase price. Petitioner originally contended that it was entitled to add the amount that the property appreciated prior to January 1, 1972 to the base price of the property. Petitioner is no longer contesting the deficiency assessment based upon a disallowance of that addition to the base price of the property. The Department was originally contending that it was entitled to interest at 12 percent per annum calculated retrospectively from the due date of the alleged deficiency. The Department has agreed to abandon its effort to impose that rate of interest. The issue raised in this case is whether the development expenses incurred by the Petitioner and deducted for Federal income tax purposes as business expenses prior to 1972 can be subtracted from Federal taxable income for the purpose of determining taxable income derived from the sale for Florida tax purposes.
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to all facts in this proceeding. Those facts found relevant to a determination of the issue are as follows: Petitioner, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, is a New York corporation and is functionally divided into two divisions: the Long Lines Department and the General Department. Through its Long Lines Department, petitioner is a federally regulated public utility and common carrier which furnishes interstate and international telecommunications services. Long Lines is responsible generally for the construction, operation and maintenance of a nationwide system of interstate telecommunications facilities and related equipment which serve to interconnect the facilities of over 1700 operating telecommunications companies in the United States as well as telecommunications systems abroad. Some of these facilities extend into and through the State of Florida. In performing this interstate business, Long Lines operates, and thus has property or employees or both in 49 states, including Florida. Through its General Department, petitioner is the parent corporation of 21 operating telecommunications companies (known as "Associated Companies"), Western Electric Company, Inc. ("Western") and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. ("Bell Labs"). The General Department holds and manages the stock owned in these subsidiaries and two minority owned companies, and provides capital. advice and assistance to them. It conducts these activities principally in New York and New Jersey and conducts no business and has no property or employees in Florida. The only business activities in the State of Florida during 1972, 1973 and 1974 were conducted through petitioner's Long Lines Department in connection with the operation of the interstate and international long distance telecommunications network. None of the Associated Companies is organized under the laws of Florida or has its headquarters in Florida. The Only Associated Company which conducts business or has property or employees within Florida is the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereinafter "Southern Bell"), a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. Southern Bell files its own separate Florida income tax returns and during the period 1972-1974 paid approximately $10 million in income tax to Florida. The respondent concurs that petitioner is entitled to deduct 100 percent of the dividends paid by Southern Bell to petitioner. Western, also a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner, is a manufacturing corporation with its own Board of Directors and officers, doing business in all 50 states. During the period 1972-1974 Western paid approximately $1.7 million in income tax to Florida. The respondent concurs that petitioner is entitled to deduct 100 percent of the dividends paid by Western to petitioner. For each of the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years, petitioner has filed a federal consolidated income tax return, and has made a valid election under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code for each of those years. That provision of the federal tax law permits a domestic corporation to deduct 100 percent of the dividends received from its wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries. Petitioner's federal income tax returns were audited by the Internal Revenue Service and the respective tax liabilities were determined and paid for each of the years in question. The Internal Revenue Service did not tax dividends received by petitioner from its affiliates. Petitioner timely filed its Florida corporate income tax returns for the years ending December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974. Petitioner did not elect and was not required to file a Florida consolidated income tax return under Section 220.131, Florida Statutes. For each of the years in question, petitioner reported on line 1--"federal taxable income (line 30, Form 1120 or corresponding line on related form 1120 series, 990C or 990T)"- -of its Florida corporation income tax return (Form F-1120) its taxable income for federal income tax purposes computed as if petitioner had filed a separate federal income tax return for each of the years in question and for each preceding taxable year for which it was a member of an affiliated group. These amounts were: 1972 $ 94,020,281 1973 $213,364,165 1974 $110,770,402 On its Florida corporation income tax return for each of the years in question, petitioner made the additions and subtractions required by the form of the return in computing "adjusted federal income" and apportioned this amount by the prescribed three-factor formula to obtain "Florida net income." The Department of Revenue adjusted the amount of "federal taxable income" and hence "Florida net income" of petitioner for each of the years in question by adding thereto 15 percent of the dividends received from subsidiaries which were deductible for federal income tax purposes under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code. On April 10, 1978, the Department issued a notice of proposed deficiency for petitioner's tax years ended December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974. The total amount of the proposed deficiency was $1,131,158, computed as follows: YEAR AUDITED TAX TAX AS FILED DEFICIENCY 1972 $426,468 $122,365 $304,103 1973 668,597 281,168 387,429 1974 594,300 154,674 439,626 Total $1,689,365 $558,207 $1,131,158 After a timely protest to the proposed deficiencies was filed by the petitioner, correspondence and an informal conference between the parties was had. Finally, on April 16, 1981, the Department issued a letter denying the protest and petitioner petitioned for an administrative hearing. Through correspondence and discussions with the petitioner, the Department of Revenue has taken the position that it would allow only an 85 percent dividend deduction for the dividends received by petitioner from those affiliates which were not subject to the Florida corporate income tax code. Petitioner is seeking to take a 100 percent deduction of all dividends which it received from its subsidiaries, as it did on its federal income tax returns. The dividends received by petitioner which the Department is attempting to subject to Florida tax by its proposed deficiency assessment are derived from its equity investment in its subsidiaries and they represent to petitioner a return on such investment. Since the actual capital, however, for that investment is furnished primarily by public investors, the principal use of the dividends received by petitioner is to meet its obligation to its shareholders and bondholders for the payment of dividends and interest. For example, in 1974 petitioner received dividends from the Associated Companies, Western and other affiliates in the amount of $2,538,443,000 and paid dividends to shareholders in the amount of $2,039,800,000 and interest on its long and intermediate term debt of $475,670,000. Petitioner, therefore, serves as the investor interface between the investing public and its subsidiary companies, whereby the purchase of petitioner's stock or debt issues actually represents an investment in the earnings of the Bell System. Petitioner, acting through its General Department, thus provides the avenue by which the subsidiaries pass their net earnings to the investing public. The income which the Department seeks to tax is derived from dividends received by petitioner primarily from earnings generated by the property and employees of the Associated Companies which are devoted to furnishing intrastate and interstate telecommunications services in their operating territories in states other than the State of Florida. These earnings are subject to income taxes in all states in which the Associated Companies provide telecommunications services that impose income taxes on corporations. The dividends received by petitioner do not contribute to the funding of Long Lines since (1) the pervasive regulation under which petitioner's subsidiaries operate limits their earnings to that amount sufficient for the needs of their own operations and effectively prevents those earnings from being available for use in other businesses and (2) earnings paid out as dividends by petitioner's subsidiaries are principally required to be passed to the public investors in the Bell System, through petitioner's General Department, in order to meet dividend and interest obligations to these outside shareholders and bondholders. During the tax years in question, the Department of Revenue had not promulgated any rule with respect to the disallowance of a deduction for 100 percent of dividends received as provided for under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the Florida corporate income tax return forms did not require any such add-back or adjustment. During the 1980 legislative session, an amendment to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, was proposed which would have changed the definition of "affiliated group of corporations." Such proposed legislation was not passed and did not become law.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that that portion of the Department's proposed assessment of deficiencies for the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years as is based upon dividends received by the petitioner from its affiliates be withdrawn as being contrary to law and invalid. Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of April, 1982. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioners' request for a refund of corporate income taxes for the year ending January 31, 1975, be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of January, 1981. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1981.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) has properly issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales and use tax, interest, and penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida resident. In 1996, Petitioner began doing business as a sole proprietor under the name of "Duraline Industries" and registered with DOR as a sales tax dealer. Later, this entity was called "Dura Steel." Petitioner also operated as a corporation, Steel Engineered Design Systems, Inc. Petitioner's Florida sales tax numbers are 42-11-009271-63 and 40-00-003416- For purposes of these consolidated cases, Petitioner has been audited and charged individually as "Charles R. Bielinski," because the audit revealed that no checks were made out to the corporation(s) and that the monies received were received by Mr. Bielinski as a sole proprietor in one or more "doing business as" categories. Petitioner engaged in the business of fabricating items of tangible personal property, i.e., prefabricated steel buildings, many of which later became improvements to real property in Florida. Petitioner used some of the steel buildings in the performance of real property contracts by installing the buildings as improvements to real property. Petitioner also engaged in the business of selling buildings and steel component parts such as sheets and trim in Florida. Petitioner sold buildings and component parts in over- the-counter retail sales, also. On October 7, 2002, DOR issued Petitioner a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the period of September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2002. This audit was assigned number AO226920428. In 2002, Petitioner provided DOR's auditor with his sales activity records, such as contracts and job information. A telephone conversation/interview of Petitioner was conducted by the auditor. Over a period of several months, the auditor attempted to get Petitioner to provide additional records, but none were forthcoming. DOR deemed the contracts and job information provided by Petitioner to be an incomplete record of his sales activity for the audit period. Petitioner claimed that most of his sales activity records had been lost or destroyed. Due to the absence of complete records, DOR sampled Petitioner's available records and other information related to his sales in order to conduct and complete its audit. Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate his steel buildings. Petitioner sometimes would erect the buildings on real property. Petitioner fabricated main frames for smaller buildings at a shop that he maintained at the Bonifay Airport. Otherwise, Petitioner subcontracted with like companies to fabricate main frames for larger buildings. Petitioner made some sales to exempt buyers, such as religious institutions and government entities. When he purchased the materials he used to fabricate the buildings, Petitioner occasionally provided his vendors with his resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax. Petitioner did not pay sales tax on the materials he purchased to fabricate buildings when such buildings were being fabricated for exempt buyers such as churches and governmental entities. On June 23, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Form DR-840), for audit number AO226920428, covering the period of November 1, 1997 through August 31, 2002. DOR has assessed Petitioner sales tax on the buildings, sheets, and trim he sold over-the-counter in Florida. DOR has assessed Petitioner use tax on sales of the materials used in performing real property contracts in Florida. The auditor calculated a method of estimating taxes based on the limited documentation that had been provided by Petitioner. She used a sampling method based on Petitioner's contract numbering system; isolated the Florida contracts; and divided the Florida contracts between the actual sale of tangible property (sale of just the buildings themselves) and real property contracts (where Petitioner not only provided the building but also provided installation or erection services). The auditor scheduled the real property contracts and assessed only the material amounts as taxable in Florida. Since she had only 19 out of 47 probable contracts, or 40 percent, she projected up to what the taxable amount should be and applied the sales tax and surtax at the rate of seven percent, as provided by law. She then divided that tax for the entire audit period by the 58 months in the audit period, to arrive at a monthly tax amount. This monthly tax amount was broken out into sales and discretionary sales tax. Florida levies a six percent State sales tax. Each county has the discretion to levy a discretionary sales tax. Counties have similar discretion as to a surtax. The auditor determined that Petitioner collected roughly $22,000.00 dollars in tax from one of his sales tax registrations which had not been remitted to DOR. During the five-year audit period, Petitioner only remitted tax in May 1998. DOR gave Petitioner credit for the taxes he did remit to DOR during the audit period. The foregoing audit processes resulted in the initial assessment(s) of August 28, 2003, which are set out in Findings of Fact 25-31, infra. On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR-832/833), for additional discretionary surtax, in the sum of $2,582.19; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $782.55; and penalty, in the sum of $1,289.91; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.50 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0008) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional sales and use tax in the sum of $154,653.32; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $50,500.06; and penalty, in the sum of $77,324.54, plus additional interest that accrues at $31.54 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0009) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional local governmental infrastructure surtax, in the sum of $7,001.82; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $2,352.09; and penalty in the sum of $3,497.35; plus additional interest that accrues at $1.45 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0010) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional indigent care surtax, in the sum of $513.08; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $156.33; and penalty, in the sum of $256.24; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.10 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0011) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional school capital outlay surtax in the sum of $3,084.49; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $922.23; and penalty, in the sum of $1,540.98; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.60 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0012) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional charter transit system surtax, in the sum of $2,049.22; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $766.07; and penalty, in the sum of $1,023.27; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.46 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0013) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), additional small county surtax, in the sum of $10,544.51; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $3,437.85; and penalty in the sum of $5,282.30; plus additional interest that accrues at $2.15 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0014) However, the auditor testified at the May 13, 2004, hearing that she attended Petitioner's deposition on March 18, 2004. At that time, Petitioner provided additional documentation which permitted the auditor to recalculate the amount of tax due. The auditor further testified that she separated out the contracts newly provided at that time and any information which clarified the prior contracts she had received. She then isolated the contracts that would affect the Florida taxes due. Despite some of the new information increasing the tax on some of Petitioner's individual Florida contracts, the result of the auditor's new review was that overall, the contracts, now totaling 33, resulted in a reduction in total tax due from Petitioner. These changes were recorded in Revision No. 1 which was attached to the old June 23, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, which was sent by certified mail to Petitioner. The certified mail receipt was returned to DOR as unclaimed. The auditor's calculations reducing Petitioner's overall tax are set out in Respondent's Exhibit 16 (Revision No. 1). That exhibit appears to now show that taxes are owed by Petitioner as follows in Findings of Fact 34-40 infra. For DOAH Case No. 04-0008, discretionary surtax (tax code 013), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,937.37, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0009, sales and use tax (tax code 010), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $111,811.04, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0010, local governmental infrastructure surtax (tax code 016), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $5,211.00, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0011, indigent care surtax (tax code 230), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $317.39, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0012, school capital outlay tax (tax code 530), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $2,398.68, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0013, charter transit system surtax (tax code 015), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,558.66, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0014, small county surtax (tax code 270), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $7,211.83, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the amount of tax calculated against Petitioner in its June 21, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Revision No. 1, in the principal amounts as set forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 34-40, plus interest and penalty accruing per day as provided by law, until such time as the tax is paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, is subject to Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. STIPULATED FACTS Petitioner is a for-profit Florida corporation that sells perchloroethylene and other dry-cleaning supplies to the dry-cleaning industry. It is a "wholesale supply facility" as that term is defined in Section 376.301(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a member of the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition, a state-wide trade association whose members consist of the owners/operators of dry-cleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. In 1993 and prior to and during the 1994 Florida legislative session, the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition employed lawyers-lobbyists to suggest and seek passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Florida Dry-Cleaning Solvents Cleanup Program. In 1994, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 94- 355, Laws of Florida, which amended Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Chapter 94-355 created Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that: All penalties, judgments, recoveries, reimbursements, loans, and other fees and charges related to the implementation of this section and the tax revenues levied, collected, and credited pursuant to ss. 376.70 and 376.75, and registration fees collected pursuant to s. 376.303(1)(d), shall be deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, to be used upon appropriation as provided in this section. Charges against the funds for dry-cleaning facility or wholesale supply site rehabilitation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section. Chapter 94-355, Laws of Florida, also created Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, which provides, in part, as follows: Beginning October 1, 1994, a tax is levied on the privilege of producing in, importing into, or causing to be imported into the state perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene). A tax of $5.00 per gallon is levied on each gallon of perchloroethylene when first imported into or produced in the state. The tax is imposed when transfer of title or possession, or both, of the product occurs in this state or when the product commingles with the general mass of this state. Petitioner's corporate secretary and 50 percent shareholder is David J. Pilger. He contributed financially to the employment by the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition of lawyers- lobbyists charged with seeking passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and met several times with those lawyers- lobbyists in Tallahassee. He was assured during those meetings that it was the opinion of those lawyers-lobbyists that there was no danger of Florida sales tax being applied to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period of January 1, 1993, through January 31, 1998. At no time prior to the Department's audit of Petitioner's financial records did Petitioner receive from the Department materials of any kind indicating that Florida sales and use tax would apply to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department had, however, adopted emergency Rule 12BER94-2, effective October 1, 1994, and Rule 12B-12.003(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 19, 1995. The 1998 Florida Legislature amended Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, by enacting Chapter 98-189, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1998, which added a sentence regarding the $5.00 per gallon tax, as follows: "This tax is not subject to sales and use tax pursuant to ch. 212." The Department has assessed and/or collected from certain taxpayers Florida sales and use tax on the sales price of perchloroethylene and the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The sales and use taxes are deposited into the general revenue fund pursuant to Section 212.20(1), Florida Statutes. The $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene is deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, pursuant to Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing sales and use tax of $39,098.66, penalties of $19,549.64, and interest of $11,184.10 through October 22, 1998, with interest of $12.85 to accrue per day. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing indigent care surtax of $2,128.98, penalties of $1,064.48, and interest of $611.97 through October 22, 1998, and interest of $.70 to accrue per day. Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, but neither collected from the customer nor remitted to the Department sales and use tax on this $5.00 per gallon tax. The $5.00 per gallon tax collected by Petitioner from its customers was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "the ENVRN TAX." Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the excise tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes, but neither collected from its customers nor remitted to the Department sales and use taxes or indigent care surtax on this excise tax. This tax was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "PERC TAX." Petitioner does not contest the Department's assessment of sales and use taxes and indigent care surtax on the water quality tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not dispute that its sales to its customers during the audit period were paid for by its customers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the assessment against Petitioner, together with interest, but compromising the entire penalty amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire John Mika, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Fred McCormack, Esquire Landers & Parsons, P.A. 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Is the Respondent's assessment for corporate income tax and interest for the tax years ending 12/31/78, 12/31/79, and 12/31/80 appropriate, and may it be properly imposed upon Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The instant dispute between the parties arose out of how the substantial business interests of Petitioner Murray Kramer Corp. are to be defined and by what accounting method its corporate income tax assessments are to be made. Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A., is Petitioner's accountant and qualified representative for purposes of this proceeding. He is neither an internal bookkeeper for the corporation nor a corporate officer thereof. At all times material, Petitioner was conducting business, deriving income, or existing within the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 220, F.S. Petitioner invests primarily through partnerships. Among Petitioner's holdings and investments is ownership of an orange grove in the State of Florida from which it derived income by way of the sales of citrus fruit grown in Florida during the taxable years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. The orange grove constitutes real and tangible property in Florida for purposes of Florida's corporate income tax. Petitioner has consistently filed Florida corporate income tax returns on a "separate accounting" basis since the inception of Florida's Corporate Income Tax Law on January 1, 1972. Petitioner used this method for the years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. It did so without petitioning the Respondent Department of Revenue for permission at or before the filing of the returns to use the "separate accounting" method to determine the Florida tax base. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive prior written permission from the Department to use the "separate accounting" method for those years, and the Department did not require that the Petitioner use the "separate accounting" method in those years. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that its pattern of using the "separate accounting" method for six years put the Department on sufficient notice that the corporate taxpayer would continue to use that method indefinitely and further asserts that it was therefore entitled to use such a "separate accounting" method on the basis of its prior consistent usage. Petitioner's Florida corporate returns declare investment income from dividends, interest, gains from securities, partnership income, and income from its orange grove located in Florida. In each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner entered its federal taxable income on Line 1 of the Florida Corporation Income Tax Return, FORM F-1120. This amount is not at issue and is accepted as a "given" by both parties. However, in each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner did not complete the apportionment schedule on Page 3 of the respective returns. Instead of using the apportionment method, Petitioner computed what it characterized as "Florida Profit" or "Florida Income" on a schedule it attached, based totally on the profits it derived from the Florida orange grove and then inserted that amount on Line 6, Florida Portion of Adjusted Federal Income, of the "Computation of Florida Tax Liability" on the Florida return. This entry did not relate computationally to the amount of federal taxable income reported federally on Line 1. All gross receipts from the sale of citrus fruit by Petitioner were derived from sales made to Zellwood Fruit Distributors. This dollar amount is also undisputed. Petitioner received payment from its Florida orange grove operation in the form of checks drawn by Zellwood. Approximately June 20, 1983, Respondent Department of Revenue made an initial audit of Petitioner's books and records for the taxable years in question. Respondent's auditor assigned at that time had full and free access to Petitioner's books and records. He and his supervisor memorialized their view that the "separate accounting" method employed by Petitioner was proper, but this judgment call (by the auditor on June 29, 1983 and by his supervisor on July 1, 1983) was in the nature of free-form agency action and was neither accepted nor formalized by their superiors within the agency who ultimately determined that the Petitioner should have employed the "apportionment" method and that the burden was upon the Petitioner even under the apportionment method to establish that one hundred percent of its income was not derived in Florida. The Respondent Department therefore determined the tax owed by Petitioner upon the basis of 100% of Petitioner's income as opposed to the yearly percentages that Petitioner had unilaterally assigned to its orange grove, and issued its Revised Notice of Intent to Make Corporate Income Tax Audit Changes on November 7, 1983. Florida's apportionment formula is a three-factor function which takes selected business activities of the taxpayer and computes the portion of that activity attributable to Florida, divided by that activity everywhere. A composite of the subtotal of those three measures (payroll, sales, and property) of business activity are used to compute Florida's share of the "everywhere" base that would be available under the adjusted federal taxable income base. See, Section 214.71(1), F.S. The Department calculated the tax using the three statutorily recognized apportionment factors of payroll, sales, and property. Concerning the first apportionment factor, payroll, Petitioner had federally reported no amount of payroll, and therefore this factor was determined by the Department to be zero, and pursuant to Section 220.15, F.S., the payroll factor was eliminated and the other two factors were used exclusively. Concerning the sales factor, all gross receipts of the orange grove were considered to be derived within the State of Florida, and all gross income attributable to intangible personal property was excluded from the sales factor, pursuant to Section 220.15(1), F.S. Concerning the property factor, the Department determined that all real and tangible personal property was within the State of Florida. The situs of the intangible property was not established by the taxpayer. Therefore, because Section 214.71, F.S. limits the construction of the property factor to include only "real and tangible personal property," it was thus determined to exclude intangible property. The Respondent Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment on November 16, 1983, showing a balance of $10,596.00 ($7308.00 tax, $275.00 penalty, and $3,013.00 interest computed through October 31, 1983, plus notice of daily interest of $2.40 per day from November 1, 1983 until paid.) Petitioner timely availed itself of informal protest procedures, and the Department issued its Notice of Decision on March 15, 1985. By its June 21, 1988 Notice of Reconsideration, the Department concluded its informal proceedings and denied Petitioner's assertion of the right to use a "separate accounting" method and further denied Petitioner's challenge to the Department's assessment by the "apportionment" method, which in this instance had not made any apportionment for "outside Florida" activities. The situs of intangible personal property was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Petitioner at formal hearing. The Petitioner also did not establish that it owns real or tangible personal property outside Florida. Zellwood Fruit Distributors provided Petitioner Murray Kramer with letters attesting that, based upon information received from Winter Gardens Citrus Products Cooperative, Winter Gardens' sales percentages in the State of Florida were as follows: 1979 1980 18.60% 21.07% Zellwood provided no such figures to Petitioner for the year 1978. Petitioner contends, on the basis of the after the fact Zellwood letters, that Zellwood was a member of Winter Gardens, a cooperative, and Murray Kramer was an associate grower of Zellwood. At formal hearing, no one from Zellwood or Winter Gardens testified; no contract between Petitioner Murray Kramer and either Zellwood or Winter Gardens was introduced to prove agency; no bills of lading, sales slips, corporate documents, or other connective link among the three entities was offered in evidence; nor was any primary, direct, non-hearsay evidence of sales amounts or situs of Winter Gardens' sales offered by Petitioner. Milton Weiss, Petitioner's accountant, asserted that if a straight "apportionment" (not "separate accounting") calculation had been made for the income derived in Florida by Petitioner, percentages would be: 1978 1979 1980 24.03% 15.31% 15.01% These percentages rely in part on what are clearly the out-of-court statements of Zellwood's correspondent, relaying further out-of-court statements from Winter Gardens Citrus. (See the immediately preceding Finding of Fact). Neither of these out-of-court hearsay statements is such as may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence, since no direct, primary source evidence of these sales or income has been presented before the undersigned in this de novo proceeding. See, Section 120.58(1), F.S. Petitioner has not directly paid wages during the tax years at issue. Petitioner has not produced any federal partnership tax returns nor other persuasive proof to account for the return on its investments through partnership channels. During the tax years at issue, Petitioner was not a member of a Florida cooperative, as that term, "cooperative," is used in Section 214.71(3)(a)2, F.S. (See Finding of Fact 15). Petitioner was unable, by evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, to establish that all amounts other than the percentages of gross income Petitioner had assigned by either of the alternative accounting methods was generated outside of the State of Florida. In so finding, the undersigned specifically rejects Petitioner's assertion that the initial audit report of June 1983 could, by itself alone, legally or factually establish that only the orange grove income was Florida income, that Petitioner's Florida income was solely from the orange grove, that the interest, dividends, and gains on securities sales were not derived in Florida, that the Petitioner taxpayer received rent income from partnerships, that the partnership real estate which gave rise to the rent income was 100% outside Florida, or that the Respondent's initial audit "verified" the figures needed to compute the sales factor, the figures for the property factor, and the figures for the payroll factor of the "apportionment" method for the following reasons: In addition to the first auditor's report being free-form agency action which was ultimately rejected by the agency, and in addition to the failure of either the first auditor or his supervisor to testify in the instant Section 120.57(1) de novo proceeding as to the accuracy of the underlying primary documentation which Petitioner Murray Kramer claimed the first auditor had apparently reviewed, Petitioner did not offer in evidence at formal hearing any such direct evidence documentation which it claimed had been reviewed by the auditors. Further, Respondent's successive auditor, Mr. Siska, testified that it is auditor practice to only examine those books and records individual auditors believe to be necessary to complete the audit. This discretionary element eliminates any guarantee of what the initial auditor relied upon. For the same reasons, Petitioner's assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit of its books and records for the year 1979 "verifies" that the Petitioner's books and records accurately reflect the transactions that took place, is rejected. Petitioner Murray Kramer had admitted a letter (P-10) notifying the corporation that the IRS' "examination of ... tax returns for the above periods shows no change as required in the tax reported. The returns are accepted as filed." The tax period indicated on this exhibit is "7912", which is not helpful, and even if it means, as Mr. Weiss testified, that the 1979 federal tax return which is part of the Florida Corporate Tax Return is accurate under federal law, this IRS letter alone does not verify all the underlying documentation for all three years in question. Also, specifically with regard to investments made through other entities, Mr. Weiss' testimony suggests that the wages paid and partnership returns of these other entities never were in the possession of, nor accessible by, this Petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on its federal returns is apparently based, in part, at least, upon its assertion that it is a "financial institution" as defined in Sections 214.71(3)(b) and 220.15(2), F.S., but the presentation quality of evidence in this case does not permit of such a finding, either. Petitioner has paid no portion of the assessed taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order which dismisses the Petition and affirms the assessment. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4100 The following constitute rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 6. Accepted. 2, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19. Rejected for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue for the reasons set forth in the Recommended Order. With regard to item 8, specifically, this determination is non-binding in the de novo proceeding. 4. Rejected upon the citation given as not proved or applicable as stated. 13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as not proved or applicable as stated. See Conclusions of Law 11-12. 15, 18. Rejected as out of context and misleading upon the record as a whole, and as not dispositive of any material issue, and as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Respondent's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18. Accepted. 4, 5. Accepted in part; what is not adopted is subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found. 17. Accepted, but by itself is not dispositive of any material issue at bar, for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 686 Hampstead Avenue West Hampstead, New York 11552 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Sharon A. Zahner, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 William D. Townsend, Esquire General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 3091 North Course Drive Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 =================================================================
